American Airlines System Operations Control

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Timeline
(8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 11 Attendant Ong’s Hijacking Account Forwarded to American Airlines Operations Center

Nydia Gonzalez. [Source: 9/11 Commission] Nydia Gonzalez, an American Airlines supervisor with expertise on security matters, is patched in to a call with flight attendant Betty Ong on Flight 11. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] At 8:21 a.m., according to the 9/11 Commission (or 8:27 a.m., according to the Wall Street Journal), Gonzalez calls Craig Marquis, a manager at the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) in Fort Worth, Texas. Gonzalez holds the phone to Ong to one ear, and the phone to Marquis to the other. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; NEW YORK OBSERVER, 2/15/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 5; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 9 ] Marquis quickly says, “I’m assuming they’ve declared an emergency. Let me get ATC [air traffic control] on here. Stand by.… Okay, we’re contacting the flight crew now and we’re… we’re also contacting ATC.” Gonzalez relays that Ong is saying the hijackers from seats 2A and 2B are in the cockpit with the pilots, and that there are no doctors on board. Gonzalez talks to Marquis continuously until Flight 11 crashes. While only the first four minutes of Ong’s call from Flight 11 are recorded by American Airlines (see 8:19 a.m. September 11, 2001), all of Gonzalez’s call to Marquis will be recorded. Four minutes, of what is apparently a compilation from it, are later played before the 9/11 Commission. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] Entity Tags: American Airlines, Betty Ong, Craig Marquis, Nydia Gonzalez Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(8:26 a.m.-8:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 11 Turns, Many Watch It on Primary Radar At 8:26, Flight 11, which is already way off course, makes an unplanned 100-degree turn to the south over Albany, New York. A minute later, it turns right, to the south-southwest. Then, two minutes on, at 8:29, it turns left to the south-southeast. Boston air traffic controllers never lose sight of the flight, though they can no longer determine altitude as the transponder is turned off. Its last known altitude was 29,000 feet. [CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 9/13/2001; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 ; MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Before this turn, the FAA had tagged Flight 11’s radar dot for easy visibility and, at American Airlines’ System Operations Control (SOC) in Fort Worth, Texas, “All eyes watched as the plane headed south. On the screen, the plane showed a squiggly line after its turn near Albany, then it straightened.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001] Boston air traffic controller Mark Hodgkins later says, “I watched the target of American 11 the whole way down.” [ABC NEWS, 9/6/2002] However, apparently, NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) has different radar. When they are finally told about the flight, they cannot find it (see Shortly After 8:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). NEADS has to repeatedly phone the FAA, airlines, and others, for clues as to the plane’s location. NEADS will eventually focus on a radar blip they believe might be Flight 11, and watch it close in on New York. [NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, 1/25/2002; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Mark Hodgkins, American Airlines, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(Between 8:27 a.m. and 8:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Ong Gives Flight 11 Details; Seating Accounts Differ Nydia Gonzalez, an American Airlines supervisor at its Southeastern Reservations Office, is relaying information to Craig Marquis, a manager at the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) in Fort Worth (see (8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to Marquis, “She said two flight attendants had been stabbed, one was on oxygen. A passenger had his throat slashed and looked dead and they had gotten into the cockpit.” Marquis later recollects that Ong said the four hijackers had come from first-class seats: 2A, 2B, 9A, and 9B. She’d said the wounded passenger was in seat 10B. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; BOSTON GLOBE, 11/23/2001] Note that this conflicts with the seats flight attendant Amy Sweeney gave for the hijackers at about the same time: 9D, 9G, and 10B (see (Before 8:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001). At around 8:30 a.m., this information is passed to Gerard Arpey, the effective head of American Airlines this morning (see (8:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 12 ] By 9:59 a.m., counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke and other top officials receive the information. [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 13-14] Entity Tags: Gerard Arpey, Richard A. Clarke, Nydia Gonzalez, Craig Marquis, American Airlines, Betty Ong Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(8:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines Vice President Informed of Hijacking, But Unable to Contact Company President

Gerard Arpey. [Source: American Airlines] Gerard Arpey, American Airlines’ executive vice president for operations, is in his office at the company’s headquarters in Fort Worth, Texas. During a routine call to the airline’s nearby System Operations Control (SOC), he learns from manager Joe Burdepelly that Flight 11 may have been hijacked. Burdepelly tells Arpey that another manager, Craig Marquis, is in contact with flight attendant Betty Ong on the hijacked flight. Arpey learns that Ong said two other attendants have been stabbed, that two or three passengers are in the cockpit, and more. Arpey then tries, unsuccessfully, to contact American Airlines’ president Don Carty to inform him of the situation. He leaves a message for him to call back as soon as possible. Carty has not arrived at his office yet, meaning Arpey is the effective head of American Airlines during the early phase of the crisis. Arpey then sets out to the SOC, which is located about a mile from headquarters, and will arrive there some time between 8:35 and 8:40 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 12 ] At some point before Flight 11 crashes, he is told about the strange hijacker transmissions coming from this plane (see 8:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Entity Tags: Joe Burdepelly, Don Carty, Gerard Arpey, Craig Marquis, Betty Ong, American Airlines Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

8:36 a.m.-8:38 a.m. September 11, 2001: American Airlines Conducts ‘Lockout’ of Flight 11 Craig Marquis, a manager at the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) in Fort Worth, Texas, initiates actions to “lockout” Flight 11. This procedure, as the 9/11 Commission later describes, “acknowledges an emergency on the flight and isolates information so that the case can be managed by top leadership at the airlines in a way that protects information from being altered or released, and also protects the identities of the passengers and crew.” Within two minutes, American Airlines has completed the lockout. Marquis realized Flight 11 was an emergency situation almost immediately after 8:21 a.m., when he began receiving details of flight attendant Betty Ong’s phone call from it (see (8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Since “lockout” is a standard procedure for airlines in safety and security incidents, it is unclear why he did not initiate it sooner. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 5; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 12-13 ] Entity Tags: Craig Marquis, American Airlines Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

8:41 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA, Unusually, Does Not Contact United Airlines about Communications from Flight 175 Senior United Airlines personnel are, unusually, not informed about air traffic control communications with Flight 175. At 8:41, the pilots of United Airlines 175 report to air traffic controllers that they heard “a suspicious transmission” from another aircraft on their departure out of Boston (see 8:41 a.m.-8:42 a.m. September 11, 2001). Yet this information is not passed on to personnel at the United Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center, just outside Chicago. Rich Miles, the manager there, will later tell the 9/11 Commission that, “though he normally received relevant information about United flights from FAA air traffic control, on September 11, 2001, he did not recall receiving information about any air traffic control communications with or from Flight 175, including the 8:41 a.m. report.” None of the other senior United Airlines officials at the SOC on this morning are told of the 8:41 communication, although they will tell the 9/11 Commission that air traffic controllers will “first and foremost” communicate directly with pilots. Furthermore, these officials will recall, “they never received any communication… from the FAA or the air traffic control system advising United to contact its aircraft about the hijackings.” The 9/11 Commission will not offer any explanation for this lack of communication between the FAA and United Airlines. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 20 ] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Rich Miles, United Airlines Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(Before 8:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines Tells Crisis Center and Company Leaders of Hijacking, but Not Other Pilots At American Airlines’ System Operations Control (SOC) in Fort Worth, the Command Center is activated. This is a dedicated crisis response facility, located on the floor above the SOC floor, and used in the event of an emergency. In it, top operations officials focus on gathering together as much information about Flight 11 as possible. A page is sent to American’s top executives and operations personnel: “Confirmed hijacking Flight 11.” However, pilots on other American flights apparently are not notified. Top managers gathered at the Command Center watch the radar blip of Flight 11 until it disappears over New York City. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] Entity Tags: American Airlines Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(8:45 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines Security Director Informs FBI of Flight 11 Hijacking

Larry Wansley. [Source: Publicity photo] At 8:45 a.m., Larry Wansley learns of the hijacking of Flight 11. Wansley is the managing director of corporate security for American Airlines, and is at the company’s headquarters in Fort Worth, Texas. He is informed of the hijacking in an urgent phone call from the airline’s Command Center, located on the floor above its System Operations Control (SOC), about a mile away from headquarters (see (Before 8:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The SOC learned there was some kind of problem with Flight 11 at 8:20 a.m. (see 8:20 a.m. September 11, 2001). Since as early as 8:21, details of Flight 11 attendant Betty Ong’s emergency call have been constantly relayed to Craig Marquis, a manager at the SOC (see (8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Yet the 8:45 call is apparently Wansley’s first notification of the hijacking. He calls Danny Defenbaugh, the special agent in charge of the Dallas FBI office. Wansley is himself a former undercover FBI agent, and Defenbaugh is a longtime friend of his. This call is “the first step in the well-researched, secret hijack-response plan all commercial airlines have in place.” As Wansley is relaying information, he hears screaming from an adjacent conference room, as several employees watch the aftermath of the first WTC crash on television. The TV in Defenbaugh’s office has been turned on, but reportedly neither of the two men connects the images of the burning tower with the hijacking they are trying to deal with. As they continue discussing their response plans, television shows the second plane hitting the South Tower. No doubt realizing this is a terrorist attack, Defenbaugh says, “The ball game just changed.” Around this time, Wansley learns that the first plane to hit the WTC was the hijacked American Airlines flight. He will subsequently make a hurried drive to the nearby Command Center, where the FBI will already be setting up its own command post (see Shortly After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). [DALLAS OBSERVER, 11/21/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 14 ] Entity Tags: Larry Wansley, Federal Bureau of Investigation, American Airlines, Danny Defenbaugh Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Shortly After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: FBI Arrives at American Airlines’ Command Center and Takes Charge of Crisis Response Shortly before 9/11, American Airlines revised its crisis plan for dealing with situations including “plane crashes and 1978-style hijackings” (see Late Summer 2001). However, on this day, “American abandoned its freshly minted crisis communications plan almost immediately, not because putting the CEO out front isn’t the best plan of action in a crisis, but because the FBI rushed to American’s Command Center and made it clear who was in charge.” [PR WEEK, 11/5/2001] Larry Wansley, the American Airlines director of security, is at the company’s headquarters in Fort Worth, Texas. He had contacted the Dallas FBI about the hijacking of Flight 11 at around 8:45 a.m. (see (8:45 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). After learning of the two planes hitting the World Trade Center, he makes a hurried drive to the airline’s Command Center, about a mile from the headquarters, on the floor above its System Operations Control (SOC). Already, by the time he arrives, the FBI is setting up its own command post there, reviewing the Flight 11 passenger manifest, and replaying the recording of flight attendant Betty Ong’s emergency phone call. [DALLAS OBSERVER, 11/21/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] Tim Doke, the American Airlines vice president for corporate communications, later recounts that the “FBI essentially gagged us from any meaningful media interaction immediately following the terrorist attacks.” [JACK O'DWYER'S NEWSLETTER, 12/4/2002] American Airlines’ first press release, issued within a few hours of the attacks, will refer all questions to the FBI. [PR WEEK, 11/5/2001] Entity Tags: Larry Wansley, Federal Bureau of Investigation, American Airlines Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(Shortly After 8:48 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Learns Crashed Plane Belonged to American Airlines, but Director Unable to Contact Corporate Officials about This Apparently, managers at United Airlines’ System Operations Control (SOC) center, just outside Chicago, are unaware of any unfolding emergency until they see CNN reporting the burning World Trade Center (see 8:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). “Within minutes,” the air traffic control coordinator at United Airlines’ headquarters, located next to the SOC, calls an official at the FAA’s Herndon Command Center to confirm that the plane that just hit the WTC was not one of United’s aircraft. The FAA official tells him the plane had been a hijacked American Airlines 757. Soon afterwards, the air traffic control coordinator briefs Bill Roy and Mike Barber—the director and the dispatch manager at United’s SOC—on this information from the FAA. Barber then tries notifying United’s top corporate officials about it. However, he is unable to because the airline’s pager system is not working. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 21-22 ] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Bill Roy, Mike Barber, United Airlines Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines Learns of Plane Hitting WTC

Don Carty. [Source: Publicity photo] By 8:50 a.m., the American Airlines headquarters in Fort Worth, Texas has been called by an American employee at La Guardia Airport in New York City, and informed that an aircraft has hit the World Trade Center. However, it does not yet know that this was Flight 11. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 15 ] Around the same time, a ramp supervisor at JFK International Airport in New York phones the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC), located near to its headquarters, to also report the plane hitting the WTC, and workers at the SOC then switch on the television to see it on the news reports. Don Carty, the American Airlines president, who has not yet arrived at his office this morning, calls Gerard Arpey, American’s executive vice president for operations, who is at the SOC. Carty has seen the reports of the WTC and asks, “Is that our plane?” Arpey replies, “I don’t know, Don. We confirmed it was hijacked, and was headed south from Boston.” Carty later recalls that he had a bad feeling that it was indeed his plane that had hit the North Tower. According to Arpey, “We furiously attempted to learn if that aircraft was Flight 11.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] Yet, apparently, it is not until 9:30 a.m. that American Airlines confirms that Flight 11 hit the World Trade Center (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Gerard Arpey, Don Carty, American Airlines Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

8:52 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Attendant Reports Plane Has Been Hijacked; Accounts Conflict over Details

Robert Fangman. [Source: Family photo] A flight attendant on Flight 175 calls the United Airlines maintenance office in San Francisco and speaks with Marc Policastro, an employee there. The attendant reports that Flight 175 has been hijacked, both of its pilots have been killed, a flight attendant has been stabbed, and the hijackers are probably flying the plane. The line then goes dead. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 7-8; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 21 ] The call, which lasts 75 seconds, is made using an Airfone in row 31 at the back of the plane. Flight crews on United aircraft are able to contact the maintenance office simply by dialing *349 on an Airfone. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 90-91 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] The identity of the attendant making the call is unclear. According to the Wall Street Journal, the caller is “a female flight attendant.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001] The 9/11 Commission Report, however, refers to them as “a male flight attendant,” and one of the Commission’s earlier staff statements will specifically name Robert Fangman, who is one of the attendants on Flight 175. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 7; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 18 ] A summary of the phone calls made from the four hijacked planes presented at the 2006 Zacarias Moussaoui trial will refer to the caller simply as a “flight attendant,” with a question mark signifying their name. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] After the call ends, Policastro and also another employee at the maintenance office try contacting Flight 175 using ACARS (an e-mail system that enables personnel on the ground to rapidly communicate with those in the cockpit of an aircraft), but they receive no response to these and subsequent attempts at reaching the flight. According to GTE Airfone records, another successful call will be made from Flight 175 to the maintenance office four minutes after this first one (see 8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001). However, other evidence indicates only one call is made. Shortly before 9:00 a.m., a supervisor at the maintenance office will call the United Airlines System Operations Control center, just outside Chicago, and inform a manager there of the reported hijacking of Flight 175 (see Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). The supervisor also calls the airline’s security chief. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 21-22 AND 90 ] Entity Tags: Marc Policastro, Robert Fangman Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Learns about Flight 175 Hijacking

Jim Goodwin. [Source: Chicago Tribune] Rich Miles, the manager at the United Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center just outside Chicago, receives a call from a supervisor at United’s maintenance office in San Francisco, informing him that Flight 175 has been reported as hijacked. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 22 ] The maintenance office received a call minutes earlier from a flight attendant on United 175, who said their plane had been hijacked (see 8:52 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 7-8] When the supervisor tells Miles about this, he initially responds, “No, the information we’re getting is that it was an American 757.” (The FAA has just informed United Airlines that the plane that hit the World Trade Center was a hijacked American Airlines 757 (see (Shortly After 8:48 a.m.) September 11, 2001).) But the supervisor insists, “No, we got a call from a flight attendant on 175.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001] Miles notifies his boss Bill Roy, the SOC director, about this information. Roy then contacts United’s CEO Jim Goodwin and its chief operating officer Andy Studdert, who are in a meeting at the airline’s headquarters, located next to the SOC. Roy then begins the process of activating the crisis center at the United headquarters, which will take about 30 minutes to complete. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 22 ] Entity Tags: Andy Studdert, Jim Goodwin, Rich Miles, United Airlines, Bill Roy Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Chief Assures Employees that Crisis Is ‘Not a Drill’ When he arrives at the United Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center, United’s chief operating officer Andy Studdert has to reassure employees that the unfolding crisis is not a training exercise. [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 7/16/2003] Shortly before 9:00 a.m., Studdert had been in a meeting at the United Airlines headquarters, outside Chicago, with United’s CEO Jim Goodwin. His secretary had rushed in and told him about the first plane hitting the World Trade Center. Studdert immediately got up and ran across to the SOC, located next to the headquarters building. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] However, ten days previously, he had surprised the staff there with a crisis-training exercise, where he’d told them a flight over the Pacific had broken radio contact and suffered a potentially disastrous engine failure. For 30 minutes, the staff had believed the story, before he told them the truth. So when he arrives at the SOC at around 9:00 a.m., the Chicago Tribune will report, Studdert senses disbelief among his employees at the real-world crisis. He therefore shouts out to reassure them, “This is not a drill!” According to USA Today, the staff already realizes this. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 7/16/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] Entity Tags: United Airlines, Andy Studdert Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(9:01 a.m.-9:04 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Dispatcher and Air Traffic Control Coordinator Try Contacting Flight 175 At the United Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center outside Chicago, flight dispatcher Ed Ballinger learns that Flight 175 is suspected as being hijacked, and then sends text messages to try and make contact with it. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 23-24 ] The SOC center has just been contacted by the United Airlines maintenance office in San Francisco, about a call it received from an attendant on Flight 175, who had reported that their plane had been hijacked (see Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001] Subsequently, around 9:01 or 9:02, a dispatch manager at the SOC goes to Ballinger’s desk and informs him of the details of this call. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 23 ] Ballinger is the flight dispatcher responsible for United’s aircraft flying from the East Coast to the West Coast, which include Flight 175 (and also Flight 93). [CHICAGO DAILY HERALD, 4/14/2004] At 9:03, he sends an ACARS message to Flight 175: “How is the ride. Anything dispatch can do for you.” (ACARS is an e-mail system that enables personnel on the ground to rapidly communicate with those in the cockpit of an aircraft.) At the same time, the United Airlines air traffic control coordinator also sends an ACARS message to the flight: “NY approach lookin for ya on [frequency] 127.4.” Just after 9:03, unaware it has now crashed into the World Trade Center, Ballinger and the air traffic control coordinator re-send these ACARS messages to Flight 175. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 9 AND 23-24 ] Twenty minutes later, Ballinger will remain unaware that Flight 175 has crashed and still be trying to contact it by ACARS (see 9:23 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 ] All airlines have a staff of dispatchers like Ballinger who, under FAA rules, are responsible for monitoring aircraft in flight. They follow each flight’s progress, relay safety information, and handle any problems that arise. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 14 AND 35] United Airlines dispatchers typically monitor up to two dozen flights at once. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 68] Ballinger has 16 transcontinental flights taking off early this morning that he is responsible for. [NEW YORK OBSERVER, 6/20/2004] Entity Tags: Ed Ballinger Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

9:08 a.m. September 11, 2001: American Airlines Thinks Flight 77 Hit the WTC By this time, officials at American Airlines’ System Operations Control in Fort Worth, Texas have mistakenly concluded that the second aircraft to hit the World Trade Center might have been Flight 77. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 30 ] American Airlines learned that communications had been lost with Flight 77 just before 9 a.m. (see 8:58 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: American Airlines Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Between 9:10 a.m. and 9:20 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Dispatch Manager Speaks with Counterpart at American Airlines; Suspects Second Crash Was Flight 175 The United Airlines dispatch operations manager speaks with the American Airlines dispatch operations manager, and they discuss the two plane crashes in New York. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25 ] Mike Barber, the United dispatch manager, is at the airline’s System Operations Control (SOC) center, just outside Chicago, while Craig Parfitt, the American dispatch manager, is at that airline’s SOC center in Fort Worth, Texas. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001] At 9:10, United Airlines is aware a second aircraft has hit the World Trade Center, but it does not realize this is one of its own flights. During their call, Parfitt says to Barber he believes both the aircraft that hit the WTC belonged to American Airlines. (At 9:08 a.m., officials at American Airlines’ SOC mistakenly concluded the second aircraft to hit the WTC might have been Flight 77 (see 9:08 a.m. September 11, 2001).) But Barber says he is increasingly “confident” that the second plane was United Airlines Flight 175. “In slow motion and enlarged images of the second impact on CNN, he could see that the airplane did not have the shiny metallic color of American jets.” By 9:20, according to the 9/11 Commission, although Barber believes the second crashed plane was Flight 175, the identity of this aircraft is “still unconfirmed.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25-26 ] Entity Tags: Craig Parfitt, Mike Barber Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines Orders Its Flights to Land Immediately American Airlines orders all of its airborne flights to land at the nearest airport. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31 ] Managers at the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center in Fort Worth, Texas have learned of the second plane hitting the World Trade Center. Initially, they mistakenly believed this second plane was American Airlines Flight 77 (see 9:08 a.m. September 11, 2001). Gerard Arpey, the airline’s executive vice president for operations, conferred with other operational managers, and they all agreed that the airline needed to land its aircraft immediately. American Airlines’ president Don Carty then arrives at the SOC and also agrees, telling Arpey, “Do it.” So, at about 9:15, the airline orders all its planes to land at the nearest suitable airport. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] This is the first time an airline has ever ordered all its planes to land. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] The FAA will give out a similar order to all its facilities about 30 minutes later (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 29] Around that time, United Airlines will also order its aircraft to land (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] American Airlines ordered a ground stop earlier on that prevented any new takeoffs of its aircraft (see Between 9:00 a.m. and 9:10 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 30-31 ] Most of its domestic flights will have landed by about 11:50 a.m., though it will take longer to ground its international and trans-Pacific flights. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] Entity Tags: Gerard Arpey, American Airlines, Don Carty Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

9:16 a.m.-9:18 a.m. September 11, 2001: American Airlines Contacts FAA; Thinks Flight 77 May Have Hit the WTC Bill Halleck, an American Airlines air traffic control specialist at the airline’s System Operations Control (SOC) in Fort Worth, Texas, phones an official at the FAA’s Herndon Command Center, to ask about the status of New York City air traffic. During their two-and-a-half minute conversation, Halleck says American thinks Flight 11 crashed into the WTC, and says that Flight 77 is “missing.” Presently, he receives an update from someone else at SOC, indicating that Flight 77 may also have crashed into the WTC (see 9:08 a.m. September 11, 2001). He wonders how it could have gotten to New York, but updates the FAA official on this news. The FAA official replies that the second WTC crash may not have been Flight 77 because “we have another call sign” for that incident. The FAA Command Center is currently uncertain of the identity of either of the planes that hit the Twin Towers, and provides no further information. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31 AND 94 ] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Bill Halleck, American Airlines Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

9:22 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Manager Issues Advisory Stating Flight 175 Was in Accident Rich Miles, the manager of United Airlines’ System Operations Control center, located outside Chicago, issues an advisory to all United Airlines facilities, including the flight dispatchers. This advisory, which is issued under the name of UAL Chief Operating Officer Andy Studdert, states that Flight 175 has been involved in an accident in New York City, and that the airline’s crisis center has been activated. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 ] This appears to be United Airlines’ first proper confirmation that Flight 175 has crashed. However, it will not issue a press release confirming the crash until 11:53 a.m. (see 11:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). [UNITED AIRLINES, 9/11/2001] Entity Tags: Rich Miles, United Airlines, Andy Studdert Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines Confirms that Flight 11 Hit the North Tower According to the 9/11 Commission, by 9:30 a.m. American Airlines confirms that Flight 11 crashed into the World Trade Center. This is almost 45 minutes after the attack occurred. Earlier, at around 9:16, an American air traffic control specialist had only told the FAA that the airline “thought” the first plane to hit the WTC had been Flight 11 (see 9:16 a.m.-9:18 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 15-16 ] However, Colin Scoggins, a civilian manager at the FAA’s Boston Center, will later claim that American Airlines refused to confirm that its plane had hit the WTC for several hours afterwards. He will claim this lack of confirmation was a factor in his mistakenly reporting that Flight 11 was still airborne at 9:21 (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). He says, “When we phoned United [after the second tower was hit], they confirmed that United 175 was down, and I think they confirmed that within two or three minutes. With American Airlines, we could never confirm if it was down or not, so that left doubt in our minds.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Yet American Airlines had the advantage over United that two of its flight attendants on Flight 11 had been in extensive contact by phone, up until a couple of minutes before their plane crashed. Amy Sweeney had been talking to Michael Woodward, a manager at the American Airlines flight services office at Boston’s Logan Airport (see 8:22 a.m. September 11, 2001). And Betty Ong had been in contact with the airline’s Southeastern Reservations Office in North Carolina, with details of this call being continuously relayed to its System Operations Control (SOC) in Fort Worth, Texas (see (8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 8-14 ] Entity Tags: American Airlines Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001: Airline Dispatchers Learn Flight 93 Is Heading for Washington, Offer It Assistance United Airlines flight dispatcher Ed Ballinger is informed that Flight 93, which he is responsible for monitoring, is heading for Washington, DC. At the United Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center, near Chicago, dispatch manager Mike Barber tells Ballinger that Flight 93 is “off track, heading for DC.” The aircraft has just reversed course (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and, having learned that it is not responding to FAA communications (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), officials at United Airlines headquarters now believe it has been hijacked. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 456; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 41 ] Also at this time, a United dispatcher who is assisting Ballinger sends a text message to Flight 93, asking, “How’s the wx[?]” (what this means is unclear), and, “Can dispatch be of any assistance?” No response is received. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 41 ] Entity Tags: Ed Ballinger, Mike Barber Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

9:45 a.m.-9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001: American Airlines Briefly Loses Contact with Third Plane, Thinks It Is Hijacked American Airlines employees are panicked when they lose contact with a third of their aircraft, and mistakenly think this flight has been hijacked. At 9:45 a.m., the airline loses radio contact with the plane, which is flying from Boston to Seattle. Personnel at the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center in Fort Worth, Texas, are convinced it is a third hijacking, following American Airlines Flights 11 and 77. But, according to the Wall Street Journal, the loss of communication is due to a “radio glitch,” and everyone calms down when contact with the aircraft is restored after 10 minutes. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001] Entity Tags: American Airlines Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Manager Tries Unsuccessfully to Initiate Lockout of Flight 93 Rich Miles, the manager of United Airlines’ System Operations Control center outside Chicago, tries to initiate the “lockout” procedure for Flight 93, which would acknowledge an emergency on the flight and safeguard information about it, but he is unable to do so. At some time between 9:45 a.m. and 9:50 a.m., the United Airlines maintenance facility in San Francisco contacted Miles about a call it had just received from an attendant on Flight 93, reporting that her plane had been hijacked (see 9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001). In response, Miles attempts to initiate a lockout of Flight 93. Lockout is a standard procedure for airlines in safety and security incidents, which isolates information about a flight so the case can be managed by the airline’s top leadership, and protects the identities of the passengers and crew. But Miles is unable activate this procedure. According to the 9/11 Commission, this is because United Airlines has already conducted a lockout of Flight 175 (see (9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and its computer system is not presently set up to deal simultaneously with two such procedures. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 12-13 AND 43 ] Entity Tags: United Airlines, Rich Miles Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

11:53 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Publicly Confirms that Flight 175 Has Crashed United Airlines finally issues a press release confirming that Flight 175 has crashed, nearly three hours after this aircraft hit the World Trade Center (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). The release states, “United Airlines has now confirmed that two of its aircraft have crashed.” These include “United Flight 175, a Boeing 767 aircraft, [that] departed from Boston at 7:58 a.m. local time, bound for Los Angeles, with 56 passengers onboard, two pilots and seven flight attendants.” [UNITED AIRLINES, 9/11/2001] United Airlines previously issued a press release, at 11:17, confirming the crash of Flight 93 (see 11:17 a.m. September 11, 2001), but this had stated that the airline was, at that time, only “deeply concerned” about Flight 175. [UNITED AIRLINES, 9/11/2001] However, at 9:22, the United Airlines System Operations Control manager had issued an advisory to all the airline’s facilities, stating that Flight 175 had been in an accident in New York (see 9:22 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 ] And Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, will later claim that United confirmed to the center that Flight 175 was down, “within two or three minutes” (see (9:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Entity Tags: United Airlines Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline