George W. Bush:2002

2002-2006: US Does Not Strongly Press Pakistan about Taliban Leaders Hiding There
Robert Grenier, head of the CIA station in Islamabad, Pakistan, later says that the issue of fugitive Taliban leaders living in Pakistan was repeatedly raised with senior Pakistani intelligence officials in 2002. “The results were just not there. And it was quite clear to me that it wasn’t just bad luck.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/12/2007] For instance, in December 2001 the Guardian reported that many Taliban leaders are living openly in large villas in Pakistan (see December 24, 2001). But Grenier decides that Pakistan will not act on the Taliban and urges them to focus on arresting al-Qaeda operatives instead. “From our perspective at the time, the Taliban was a spent force. We were very much focused on al-Qaeda and didn’t want to distract the Pakistanis from that.” Zalmay Khalilzad, US ambassador to Afghanistan, US military officials, and some Bush administration officials periodically argue that the Taliban are crossing from Pakistan into Afghanistan and killing US soldiers and aid workers (see August 18, 2005 and June 18, 2005). But it is not until some time in 2006 that President Bush strenuously presses Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf about acting on the Taliban leaders living in Pakistan. Even then, Bush reportedly tells his aides that he worries the ties between the Pakistani ISI and the Taliban continue and no serious action will be taken despite Musharraf’s assurances. [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/12/2007] Entity Tags: Zalmay M. Khalilzad, George W. Bush, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Pervez Musharraf, Robert Grenier, Taliban Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, War in Afghanistan

Early 2002: Troops and Equipment Redirected from Afghanistan to Iraq

Members of the US Fifth Special Forces Group pose with future Afghan president Hamid Karzai, whom they are protecting. [Source: US Military] The Atlantic Monthly will later report, “By the beginning of 2002, US and Northern Alliance forces had beaten the Taliban but lost bin Laden. At that point the United States faced a consequential choice: to bear down even harder in Afghanistan, or to shift the emphasis in the global war on terror somewhere else.… Implicitly at the beginning of 2002, and as a matter of formal policy by the end, it placed all other considerations second to regime change in Iraq.” [ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 10/2004] In February, 2002, Gen. Tommy Franks allegedly tells Sen. Bob Graham (D), “Senator, we have stopped fighting the war on terror in Afghanistan. We are moving military and intelligence personnel and resources out of Afghanistan to get ready for a future war in Iraq” (see February 19, 2002). [COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 3/26/2004] This shift from Afghanistan to Iraq involves a change of focus and attention (see Early 2002). Additionally, while the total number of US troops (less than 10,000) in Afghanistan does not go down, there is a considerable shift of specialized personnel and equipment many months before the war in Iraq will begin: On February 15, 2002, President Bush directs the CIA to conduct operations in Iraq (see Early 2002). In mid-March, the CIA tells the White House that it is cutting back operations in Afghanistan (see Spring 2002). Most of Task Force 5, a top-secret elite CIA and military special forces group, is called home from Afghanistan to prepare for operations in Iraq (see Early 2002). In March 2002, Fifth Group Special Forces, an elite group whose members speak Arabic, Pashtun, and Dari, that is apparently different from Task Force 5, is sent from Afghanistan to Iraq (see March 2002). The US Air Force’s only two specially-equipped spy planes that had successfully intercepted the radio transmissions and cell phone calls of al-Qaeda’s leaders are pulled from Afghanistan to conduct surveillance over Iraq. NSA satellites are “boreholed,” (or redirected) from Afghanistan to Iraq as well (see May 2002). Almost all Predator drones are withdrawn from Afghanistan and apparently moved to the Persian Gulf region for missions over Iraq (see April 2002). More personnel will shift to Iraq in late 2002 and early 2003 (see Late 2002-Early 2003). In 2007, retired US Gen. James L. Jones, a former NATO supreme commander, will say that Iraq caused the US to “take its eye off the ball” in Afghanistan. [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/12/2007] Entity Tags: Taliban, Osama bin Laden, Thomas Franks, George W. Bush, Flynt Leverett, Al-Qaeda, National Security Agency, Bob Graham, Central Intelligence Agency, Bush administration, James L. Jones Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, War in Afghanistan

Early 2002: Bin Laden’s Wife and Sons Get Sudanese Passports When al-Qaeda operative Ramzi bin al-Shbih is captured in Karachi, Pakistan, in September 2002 (see September 11, 2002), a sign-in book is found with names and passport numbers. US investigators discover that one of Osama bin Laden’s wives and two of his sons had signed in, and their passports had been issued in their real bin Laden names by Sudan in early 2002, through the Sudanese Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. President Bush is briefed on this, and US intelligence figures suspect that high-ranking Sudanese leaders must have approved the passports and are playing a double game of supporting bin Laden and the US at the same time. The Sudanese government suggests that the officials involved may have been paid off. In a show of good faith, they provide vigorous assistance on several other CIA initiatives. [SUSKIND, 2006, PP. 165-166] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Sudan, US intelligence, Ramzi bin al-Shibh Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Early 2002: Bush Signs Executive Order Allowing NSA to Spy on US Citizens; Spying Began Before 9/11 Sometime in early 2002, President Bush signs a secret executive order authorizing the National Security Agency (NSA) to wiretap phone conversations and read e-mails to and from US citizens. The order extends an operation set into motion at least as early as October 2001 to begin wiretapping US citizens’ phones in a response to the 9/11 attacks. When the program is revealed by the US media in late 2005 (see December 15, 2005), Bush and his officials will say the program is completely legal, though it ignores the requirements of the Foreign Surveillance Intelligence Act (FISA) that requires the government to obtain court-issued warrants to mount surveillance against US citizens. They will insist that only those suspected of having ties to al-Qaeda, and then only when those individuals make or receive international communications, are monitored. As more information continues to come out about the program, these assertions will be increasingly called into question. [NEW YORK TIMES, 12/15/2005; WASHINGTON POST, 12/22/2005] In January 2006, the press will learn that the NSA wiretapping program began well before 9/11, obviating the justification that the Bush administration had to authorize the surveillance in response to the terrorist attacks (see Late 1999, February 27, 2000, December 2000, February 2001, February 2001, Spring 2001, and July 2001). Bush’s order details the NSA to monitor international telephone conversations and international e-mails of hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of US citizens without court warrants, in an effort to track what officials call “dirty numbers” linked to al-Qaeda. When the program is finally revealed by the New York Times over three years later (see December 15, 2005, officials will say that the NSA still seeks warrants to monitor domestic communications. But there is little evidence of this (see, e.g., Spring 2001). The presidential order is a radical shift in US surveillance and intelligence-gathering policies, and a major realignment for the NSA, which is mandated to only conduct surveillance abroad. Some officials believe that the NSA’s domestic eavesdropping crosses constitutional limits on legal searches. “This is really a sea change,” a former senior official who specializes in national security law will say in December 2005. “It’s almost a mainstay of this country that the NSA only does foreign searches.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 12/15/2005] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Al-Qaeda, National Security Agency Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

Early 2002: Top US Officials Want to Invade Iraq to Set Example for Countries Defying US Domination According to a 2006 book by journalist Ron Suskind, around early 2002, in National Security Council briefings, the main stated reason for a war in Iraq is “to make an example of [Saddam] Hussein, to create a demonstration model to guide the behavior of anyone with the temerity to acquire destructive weapons or, in any way, flout the authority of the United States.… More specifically, the theory [is] that the United States… would change the rules of geopolitical analysis and action for countless other countries.” In meetings, President Bush often calls war with Iraq a “game changer.” [SUSKIND, 2006, PP. 123] Entity Tags: National Security Council, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Early 2002: Bush Takes Part in Travel Industry Marketing Campaign The Travel Industry Association of America (TIA) coordinates its effort with the Bush administration to sell America’s airlines and hotel chains to consumers after the 9/11 attacks (see September 27, 2001). According to the TIA, “Travel was also linked to patriotic duty with expressions, such as ‘A return to travel is normal. Restoring travel is restoring our country’s economy.’” President Bush, apparently unaware that sitting presidents do not normally appear in industry ad campaigns, appears in “public service” ads created by TIA. The ads are part of a $20 million advertising campaign steered by, among others, J. W. “Bill” Marriott of Marriott International, one of the world’s largest hotel chains. Marriott personally solicited Bush’s participation in the television advertisements, which run throughout the US and in a number of foreign countries for four weeks. According to TIA polls, the Bush ad campaign reaches 70 percent of Americans, and most understand it as an appeal to travel and spend money. In 2008, author and public policy professor Alasdair Reynolds will write, “Many Americans appreciated that there was something strangely out of kilter about the president’s prominent role in boosting consumption in a moment of crisis.” [ASSOCIATION OF TRAVEL MARKETING EXECUTIVES, 2002; ROBERTS, 2008, PP. 90] Entity Tags: Marriott International, Alasdair Roberts, Bush administration, Travel Industry Association of America, George W. Bush, J. W. (“Bill”) Marriott Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Global Economic Collapse

January 2002: Senator Secretly Warns Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria that Bush Is Planning to Attack Iraq In 2005, Sen. John D. Rockefeller (D-WV) will claim in an interview, “I took a trip by myself in January of 2002 to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria, and I told each of the heads of state that it was my view that [President] George Bush had already made up his mind to go to war against Iraq, that that was a predetermined set course which had taken shape shortly after 9/11.” Rockefeller is Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee at the time of his trip. [FOX NEWS, 11/14/2005] Interestingly, CIA Director George Tenet gives the same warning to the president of Egypt in the same month (see January 16, 2002). Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, George W. Bush, John D. Rockefeller, Senate Intelligence Committee Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

January 2002: Rove: Republicans Can Win Elections on Issue of Winning War against Terror White House political guru Karl Rove tells the Republican National Committee: “We can go to the American people on this issue of winning the war [against terrorism]. We can go to the country on this issue because they trust the Republican Party to do a better job of protecting and strengthening America’s military might and thereby protecting America.” In 2008, current deputy White House press secretary Scott McClellan will write: “Rove was the first administration official to publicly make the case for winning the war as a partisan issue, a marked shift in tone from [President] Bush’s repeated emphasis on unity and bipartisanship in confronting and defeating radical Islam.… Rove’s candor about this strategy infuriated suspicious Democrats, who condemned Rove for trying to politicize the war.” Bush will soon begin campaigning for Republicans in the midterm elections using Rove’s strategy. McClellan will note: “As governor [of Texas], he’d maintained good relations with friendly legislators by refusing to campaign against them, even if they were members of the opposing party. Bush’s actions prompted concern and anxiety among Democrats.” [MCCLELLAN, 2008, PP. 112-113] Entity Tags: Scott McClellan, Bush administration, George W. Bush, Karl Rove, Republican National Committee Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda

January-April 2002: FBI Gives Control of Al-Qaeda Prisoners to CIA; Bush Rejects Law Enforcement Approach In the first months after 9/11, the FBI is generally in charge of captured al-Qaeda detainees and the assumption is that these detainees will be sent to the US for criminal prosecutions. However, beginning in January 2002, this policy begins to change. The highest ranking al-Qaeda detainee in US custody at the time, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, is transfered from FBI to CIA custody and then flown to Egypt to be tortured by the Egyptian government (see January 2002 and After). ]]). Also in January, the CIA, not the FBI, begins secretly flying detainees to the US-controlled prison in Guantanamo, Cuba (see January 14, 2002-2005). Journalist James Risen will later comment, “By choosing the CIA over the FBI, [President] Bush was rejecting the law enforcement approach to fighting terrorism that had been favored during the Clinton era. Bush had decided that al-Qaeda was a national security threat, not a law enforcement problem, and he did not want al-Qaeda operatives brought back to face trial in the United States, where they would come under the strict rules of the American legal system.” [RISEN, 2006, PP. 28] This change of policy culminates in the arrest of Abu Zubaida (see March 28, 2002). The Washington Post will later report, “In March 2002, Abu Zubaida was captured, and the interrogation debate between the CIA and FBI began anew. This time, when FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III decided to withhold FBI involvement, it was a signal that the tug of war was over. ‘Once the CIA was given the green light… they had the lead role,’ said a senior FBI counterterrorism official.” [WASHINGTON POST, 6/27/2004] The CIA decides that Guantanamo is too public and involves too many US agencies to hold important al-Qaeda detainees. By the time Zubaida is captured the CIA has already set up a secret prison in Thailand, and Zubaida is flown there just days after his capture (see March 2002). Risen will comment, “The CIA wanted secret locations where it could have complete control over the interrogations and debriefings, free from the prying eyes of the international media, free from monitoring by human rights groups, and most important, far from the jurisdiction of the American legal system.” [RISEN, 2006, PP. 29-30] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Abu Zubaida, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert S. Mueller III, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline

Early 2002: Administration Neoconservatives ‘Will Not Win the Policy’ toward Iraq, Former National Security Adviser Privately Says Former ambassador Joseph Wilson has numerous conversations with Brent Scowcroft, the former national security adviser to the first President Bush (see September 1998), and the head of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, about what Wilson sees as the worrisome drive to war with Iraq in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Wilson is particularly worried about the neoconservatives in the current Bush administration and their call for the implementation of the Iraq Liberation Act (see October 31, 1998) by declaring war against Iraq. Scowcroft is dismissive of the administration neoconservatives, calling them “right-wing nuts” and assuring Wilson, “They will not win the policy.” Wilson is not so sure, telling Scowcroft that, as he will write in 2004, “[w]e were committing our future… to a band of fanatics whose approach was the opposite of that pursued by the first President Bush, or articulated by candidate George W. Bush (see October 3, 2000 and October 11, 2000)…” Wilson believes, wrongly that Scowcroft’s “sage counsel [is] being listened to in the White House” (see October 16, 2001). [WILSON, 2004, PP. 290-291] Entity Tags: Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Brent Scowcroft, Joseph C. Wilson, George Herbert Walker Bush, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Neoconservative Influence, Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

January 2002: Cheney Convinces Bush to ‘Correct Error’ of 1991 Gulf War, Overthrow Hussein Vice President Dick Cheney makes an unusually personal plea to President Bush to redirect the US war on terror to focus on Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Several of Bush’s senior aides have argued the point before, but until now the US strategy has been to root out al-Qaeda from Afghanistan. Cheney argues that in 1991 he was part of the team that created what he now believes to be a flawed policy—leaving Hussein in power after the Gulf War—and now Bush can correct that error (see February 1991-1992). Cheney’s argument is very successful. “The reason that Cheney was able to sell Bush the policy is that he was able to say, ‘I’ve changed,’” a senior administration official will say. “‘I used to have the same position as [James] Baker, [Brent] Scowcroft, and your father—and here’s why it’s wrong.’” By late February or early March of 2002, Bush has swung to the position Cheney advocates, so much so that he interrupts a meeting between National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and three senators to boast: “F_ck Saddam. We’re taking him out” (see (March 2002)). [NEW REPUBLIC, 11/20/2003] According to his 2008 book What Happened, deputy press secretary Scott McClellan isn’t sure why Cheney is so determined to invade Iraq. McClellan will state flatly that “some, like Cheney, [Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld, and [Deputy Defense Secretary Paul] Wolfowitz were evidently pursuing their own agendas,” and will note that “[t]he most significant of their personal agendas was probably Cheney’s, given his closeness to the president and his influence over him.” Because of “Cheney’s personality and his penchant for secrecy,” McClellan believes his agenda “is the most likely to remain unknown.” Whether Cheney was driven to “finish the job he started as defense secretary in 1991,” when the US invaded Iraq but did not topple the Hussein regime (see January 16, 1991 and After), or whether he sought to “give America more influence over Iraq’s oil reserves,” McClellan is unsure. McClellan will write that Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s top foreign policy adviser, should have stood up to the “forceful personalities” of Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz, “rather than deferring to them.” But, he will write, “my later experiences with Condi led me to believe that she was more interested in figuring out where the president stood and just carrying out his wishes while expending only cursory effort on helping him understand all the considerations and potential consequences” of an invasion. Bush, McClellan will observe, is “intellectually incurious” and prone to make decisions based on instinct rather than “deep intellectual debate.” McClellan believes that Bush’s mistakes “could have been prevented had his beliefs been properly vetted and challenged by his top advisers. Bush’s top advisers, especially those on his national security team, allowed the president to be put in the position he is in today. His credibility has been shattered and his public standing seemingly irreparably damaged.” [MCCLELLAN, 2008, PP. 145-146] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Scott McClellan, Saddam Hussein, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleezza Rice, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

January 9, 2002: Yoo Memo Says US Not Bound by International Laws in War on Terror John Yoo, a neoconservative lawyer in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel serving as deputy assistant attorney general, writes a classified memo to senior Pentagon counsel William J. Haynes, titled “Application of Treaties and Law to al-Qaeda and Taliban Detainees.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/21/2004] Yoo: Geneva Conventions Do Not Apply in War on Terror - Yoo’s memo, written in conjunction with fellow Justice Department lawyer Robert Delahunty, echoes arguments by another Justice Department lawyer, Patrick Philbin, two months earlier (see November 6, 2001). Yoo states that, in his view, the laws of war, including the Geneva Conventions, do not apply to captured Taliban or al-Qaeda prisoners, nor do they apply to the military commissions set up to try such prisoners. Geneva Superseded by Presidential Authority - Yoo’s memo goes even farther, arguing that no international laws apply to the US whatsoever, because they do not have any status under US federal law. “As a result,” Yoo and Delahunty write, “any customary international law of armed conflict in no way binds, as a legal matter, the president or the US armed forces concerning the detention or trial of members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban.” In essence, Yoo and Delahunty argue that President Bush and the US military have carte blanche to conduct the global war on terrorism in any manner they see fit, without the restrictions of law or treaty. However, the memo says that while the US need not follow the rules of war, it can and should prosecute al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees for violating those same laws—a legal double standard that provokes sharp criticism when the memo comes to light in May 2004 (see May 21, 2004). Yoo and Delahunty write that while this double standard may seem “at first glance, counter-intuitive,” such expansive legal powers are a product of the president’s constitutional authority “to prosecute the war effectively.” The memo continues, “Restricting the president’s plenary power over military operations (including the treatment of prisoners)” would be “constitutionally dubious.” [MOTHER JONES, 1/9/2002; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 6/9/2002 ; NEWSWEEK, 5/21/2004; NEW YORK TIMES, 5/21/2004] Overriding International Legal Concerns - Yoo warns in the memo that international law experts may not accept his reasoning, as there is no legal precedent giving any country the right to unilaterally ignore its commitment to Geneva or any other such treaty, but Yoo writes that Bush, by invoking “the president’s commander in chief and chief executive powers to prosecute the war effectively,” can simply override any objections. “Importing customary international law notions concerning armed conflict would represent a direct infringement on the president’s discretion as commander in chief and chief executive to determine how best to conduct the nation’s military affairs.” [SAVAGE, 2007, PP. 146] The essence of Yoo’s argument, a Bush official later says, is that the law “applies to them, but it doesn’t apply to us.” [NEWSWEEK, 5/21/2004] Navy general counsel Alberto Mora later says of the memo that it “espoused an extreme and virtually unlimited theory of the extent of the president’s commander-in-chief authority.” [SAVAGE, 2007, PP. 181] White House Approval - White House counsel and future Attorney General Alberto Gonzales agrees (see January 25, 2002), saying, “In my judgment, this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions.” [MOTHER JONES, 1/9/2002] Spark for Prisoner Abuses - Many observers believe that Yoo’s memo is the spark for the torture and prisoner abuses later reported from Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison (see Evening November 7, 2003), Guantanamo Bay (see December 28, 2001), and other clandestine prisoner detention centers (see March 2, 2007). The rationale is that since Afghanistan is what Yoo considers a “failed state,” with no recognizable sovereignity, its militias do not have any status under any international treaties. [NEWSWEEK, 5/21/2004; NEWSWEEK, 5/24/2004] Resistance from Inside, Outside Government - Within days, the State Department will vehemently protest the memo, but to no practical effect (see January 25, 2002). Entity Tags: Patrick F. Philbin, Robert J. Delahunty, US Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Taliban, John C. Yoo, Colin Powell, Geneva Conventions, Al-Qaeda, George W. Bush, Alberto Mora, US Department of State, Alberto R. Gonzales, William J. Haynes Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline, Civil Liberties

January 12, 2002: Pakistani President Musharraf Denounces Terrorism, but Quickly Returns to Supporting Violent Militants Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf makes “a forceful speech… condemning Islamic extremism.” [WASHINGTON POST, 3/28/2002] He is essentially forced to make the speech in response to intense international pressure, as incursions by Islamist militants backed by Pakistan into the disputed region of Kashmir have brought Pakistan and India to the brink of nuclear war. For instance, on January 6, President Bush says publicly, “I think it’s very important for President Musharraf to make a clear statement to the world that he intends to crack down on terror. And I believe if he does that… it’ll provide relief… on a situation that’s still serious.” The US even gives Musharraf a list of points to cover in the speech, and he says everything the US wants him to say. In the speech, Musharraf says: “Pakistan has been made a soft state where the supremacy of law is questioned. This situation cannot be tolerated any longer.… Pakistan rejects and condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used for any terrorist activity anywhere in the world.… No organization will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir.” He specifically denounces violent jihad for the first time. However, he does not renounce Pakistan’s claims to Kashmir, saying, “Kashmir runs in our blood.” He announces a ban on five militant groups, and more than a thousand militants are arrested after the speech. The speech does cool tensions with India temporarily. But within several months it is clear that the attacks in Kashmir are continuing and most of the arrested militants have been released (see Shortly After January 12-March 2002). Pakistan and India come close to nuclear war again by May 2002. [RASHID, 2008, PP. 116-118, 146] Entity Tags: Pervez Musharraf, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

January 18-25, 2002: President Bush Ignores Advice from Senior Cabinet and Military Officials, Decides Geneva Conventions Do Not Apply to Taliban Siding with the Pentagon and Justice Department against the State Department, President Bush declares the Geneva Conventions invalid with regard to conflicts with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Secretary of State Colin Powell urges Bush to reconsider, saying that while Geneva does not apply to al-Qaeda terrorists, making such a decision for the Taliban—the putative government of Afghanistan—is a different matter. Such a decision could put US troops at risk. Both Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs chairman General Richard B. Myers support Powell’s position. Yet another voice carries more weight with Bush: John Yoo, a deputy in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC—see October 23, 2001). Yoo says that Afghanistan is a “failed state” without a functional government, and Taliban fighters are not members of an army as such, but members of a “militant, terrorist-like group” (see January 9, 2002). White House counsel Alberto Gonzales agrees with Yoo in a January 25 memo, calling Yoo’s opinion “definitive.” The Gonzales memo concludes that the “new kind of war” Bush wants to fight should not be equated with Geneva’s “quaint” privileges granted to prisoners of war, or the “strict limitations” they impose on interrogations (see January 25, 2002). Military lawyers dispute the idea that Geneva limits interrogations to recitals of name, rank, and serial number, but their objections are ignored. For an OLC lawyer to override the judgment of senior Cabinet officials is unprecedented. OLC lawyers usually render opinions on questions that have already been deliberated by the legal staffs of the agencies involved. But, perhaps because OLC lawyers like Yoo give Bush the legal opinions he wants, Bush grants that agency the first and last say in matters such as these. “OLC was definitely running the show legally, and John Yoo in particular,” a former Pentagon lawyer will recall. “Even though he was quite young, he exercised disproportionate authority because of his personality and his strong opinions.” Yoo is also very close to senior officials in the office of the vice president and in the Pentagon’s legal office. [LEDGER (LAKELAND FL), 10/24/2004] Undermining, Cutting out Top Advisers - Cheney deliberately cuts out the president’s national security counsel, John Bellinger, because, as the Washington Post will later report, Cheney’s top adviser, David Addington, holds Bellinger in “open contempt” and does not trust him to adequately push for expanded presidential authority (see January 18-25, 2002). Cheney and his office will also move to exclude Secretary of State Colin Powell from the decision-making process, and, when the media learns of the decision, will manage to shift some of the blame onto Powell (see January 25, 2002). [WASHINGTON POST, 6/24/2007] Final Decision - Bush will make his formal final declaration three weeks later (see February 7, 2002). Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, US Department of Justice, Richard B. Myers, US Department of State, Taliban, Office of Legal Counsel, John C. Yoo, Alberto R. Gonzales, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Colin Powell, Al-Qaeda, Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, John Bellinger, George W. Bush, Geneva Conventions, David S. Addington Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

January 19, 2002: Rove: Republicans Should Use War on Terror as Campaign Theme White House political adviser Karl Rove says that the Republican Party should campaign primarily on the war on terror in the 2002 midterm elections. “Americans trust the Republicans to do a better job of keeping our communities and our families safe,” Rove tells the Republican National Committee. “We can also go to the country on this issue because they trust the Republican Party to do a better job of protecting and strengthening America’s military might and thereby protecting America.” President Bush has said repeatedly that the war on terror should not be considered fodder for partisan political gain. Just days before Rove’s speech, Bush told a gathering in California, “It’s time to take the spirit of unity that has been prevalent when it comes to fighting the war and bring it to Washington, DC.” And Rove recently told reporters that Bush had told his aides: “Politics has no role in this. Don’t talk to me about politics for a while.” Now Rove is publicly advising Republicans to politicize the war. Democratic Party chairman Terry McAuliffe says: “If the White House is politicizing the war, that’s nothing short of despicable. For Karl Rove to politicize the issue is an affront to the integrity of the entire United States military.” McAuliffe’s Republican counterpart, Marc Racicot, calls on McAuliffe “to help stop the politics of obstruction.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 1/19/2002] Entity Tags: Karl Rove, George W. Bush, Republican National Committee, Terry McAuliffe, Marc Racicot Timeline Tags: Domestic Propaganda, 2004 Presidential Election

January 24, 2002: President Bush and Vice President Cheney Pressure Senator Daschle to Avoid 9/11 Inquiry Vice President Dick Cheney calls Democratic Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle and urges him not to launch a 9/11 inquiry. When the call is made, Howard Fineman of Newsweek is in Daschle’s office and he hears that end of the conversation, providing important independent confirmation of Daschle’s account. Author Philip Shenon will later describe Cheney’s tone as “polite but threatening,” and Cheney reportedly tells Daschle that an investigation into 9/11 would be a “very dangerous and time-consuming diversion for those of us who are on the front lines of our response today.” Cheney also says that if the Democrats push for an investigation, the White House will portray them as undermining the war on terror. Shenon will later call this “a potent political threat” the Republicans are holding over the Democrats. President Bush repeats the request on January 28, and Daschle is repeatedly pressured thereafter. [NEWSWEEK, 2/4/2002; SHENON, 2008, PP. 29-30, 426] Cheney will later disagree with this account: “Tom’s wrong. He has, in this case, let’s say a misinterpretation.” [REUTERS, 5/27/2002] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Tom Daschle, Howard Fineman, George W. Bush, Philip Shenon Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

January 25, 2002: Powell, State Department Sidelined in Decision to Abandon Geneva Conventions in Interrogations Secretary of State Colin Powell asks for a meeting with President Bush, hoping to dissuade him from abandoning the Geneva Conventions in the interrogation procedures involving terror suspects (see January 18-25, 2002). Powell is unaware that he and the State Department have been deliberately cut out of the decision-making process by the Office of the Vice President. Memo Released to Undermine Powell - Before Powell can meet with the president, White House counsel Alberto Gonzales releases a memo that paints Geneva as “quaint” (see January 25, 2002) to the administration, in an attempt to anticipate and undermine Powell’s objections. Following up on the argument that the Geneva Conventions are “quaint,” Vice President Cheney’s chief counsel, David Addington, portrays Powell as a defender of “obsolete” rules devised for an earlier time. If Bush follows Powell’s lead, Addington warns, US forces would be obliged to provide athletic gear and commissary privileges to captured terrorists. State Department lawyer David Bowker later says that Powell never argued that al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees deserve the full privileges of prisoners of war; while each captive deserves a status review under Geneva, he believes few will qualify because the suspects do not wear uniforms on the battlefield or obey a lawful chain of command. Bowker recalls, “We said, ‘If you give legal process and you follow the rules, you’re going to reach substantially the same result and the courts will defer to you.’” The upshot of Bush’s decision to go with Gonzales’s opinion over Powell’s has the effect of relegating the State Department to the sidelines. A senior administration official will later recall: “State was cut out of a lot of this activity from February of 2002 on. These were treaties that we were dealing with; they are meant to know about that.” State’s senior legal adviser, William H. Taft IV, is shunned by the lawyers who dominated the detainee policy, officials say; some Bush conservatives privately call Taft too “squishy and suspect” to adequately fight terrorists, according to a former White House official. “People did not take him very seriously.” [LEDGER (LAKELAND FL), 10/24/2004; WASHINGTON POST, 6/24/2007] Memo Prompts Media Criticism of Powell - As Gonzales’s memo begins to circulate around the government, Addington says to White House lawyer Timothy Flanigan, “It’ll leak in 10 minutes.” He is correct: on January 26, the conservative Washington Times prints a front-page article that features administration sources accusing Powell of “bowing to pressure from the political left” and advocating that terrorists be given “all sorts of amenities, including exercise rooms and canteens.” The article implies that Powell is soft on the nation’s enemies. Addington blames the State Department for leaking the memo, and says that the leak proves Taft cannot be trusted. Taft later recalls, “I was off the team.” Addington had marked him as an enemy, Taft will recall, but Taft had no idea he was at war. “Which, of course, is why you’re ripe for the taking, isn’t it?” he adds. [ALBERTO R. GONZALES, 1/25/2002 ; WASHINGTON POST, 6/24/2007] Entity Tags: Timothy E. Flanigan, Geneva Conventions, David S. Addington, David Bowker, Colin Powell, Alberto R. Gonzales, Al-Qaeda, George W. Bush, Taliban, William Howard Taft IV, US Department of State, Office of the Vice President, Washington Times Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

January 25, 2002: Gonzales Recommends Retaining Decision to Declare War on Terror Exempt from Geneva Conventions White House lawyer Alberto Gonzales completes a draft memorandum to the president advising him not to reconsider his decision (see January 18-25, 2002) declaring Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters ineligible for prisoner of war status as Colin Powell has apparently recommended. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1/25/2004 ; NEWSWEEK, 5/24/2004] The memo recommends that President Bush accept a recent Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memo saying that the president has the authority to set aside the Geneva Conventions as the basis of his policy (see January 9, 2002). [SAVAGE, 2007, PP. 146] Geneva No Longer Applies, Says Gonzales - Gonzales writes to Bush that Powell “has asked that you conclude that GPW [Third Geneva Convention] does apply to both al-Qaeda and the Taliban. I understand, however, that he would agree that al-Qaeda and the Taliban fighters could be determined not to be prisoners of war (POWs) but only on a case-by-case basis following individual hearings before a military board.” Powell believes that US troops will be put at risk if the US renounces the Geneva Conventions in relation to the Taliban. Rumsfeld and his chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Richard B. Myers, allegedly agree with Powell’s argument. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/24/2004] But Gonzales says that he agrees with the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, which has determined that the president had the authority to make this declaration on the premise that “the war against terrorism is a new kind of war” and “not the traditional clash between nations adhering to the laws of war that formed the backdrop for GPW [Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war].” Gonzales thus states, “In my judgment, this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions.” [NEWSWEEK, 5/24/2004] Gonzales also says that by declaring the war in Afghanistan exempt from the Geneva Conventions, the president would “[s]ubstantially [reduce] the threat of domestic criminal prosecution under the War Crimes Act [of 1996]” (see August 21, 1996). The president and other officials in the administration would then be protected from any future “prosecutors and independent counsels who may in the future decide to pursue unwarranted charges.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/21/2004; NEWSWEEK, 5/24/2004] Memo Actually Written by Cheney's Lawyer - Though the memo is released under Gonzales’s signature, many inside the White House do not believe the memo was written by him; it has an unorthodox format and a subtly mocking tone that does not go with Gonzales’s usual style. A White House lawyer with direct knowledge of the memo later says it was written by Cheney’s chief lawyer, David Addington. Deputy White House counsel Timothy Flanigan passed it to Gonzales, who signed it as “my judgment” and sent it to Bush. Addington’s memo quotes Bush’s own words: “the war against terrorism is a new kind of war.” [WASHINGTON POST, 6/24/2007] Powell 'Hits the Roof' over Memo - When Powell reads the memo (see January 26, 2002), he reportedly “hit[s] the roof” and immediately arranges for a meeting with the president (see January 25, 2002). [NEWSWEEK, 5/24/2004] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Office of Legal Counsel, Geneva Conventions, Alberto R. Gonzales, Colin Powell, David S. Addington, Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Richard B. Myers Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

January 27, 2002: Cheney and Bush Working to Expand Power of Presidency Vice President Cheney gives one of the first public indications that he and his office have a keen and active interest in expanding the power of the presidency (see January 21, 2001). Interviewed by ABC’s Cokie Roberts, Cheney openly discusses his interest in reversing the restraints placed on the presidency after Watergate and the Vietnam War. He calls the restraints “unwise compromises” that serve to “weaken the presidency and the vice presidency.” His job, he explains, is to reverse the “erosion of [presidential] powers and the ability of the president of the United States to do his job.” Cheney says he has laid out his case to President Bush, who agrees with his rationale and his agenda. “One of the things that I feel an obligation on—and I know the president does, too, because we talked about it—is to pass on our offices in better shape than we found them to our successors.” [SAVAGE, 2007, PP. 75-76] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Cokie Roberts Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

January 28, 2002: Bush: Guantanamo Detainees Are ‘Killers’ Referring to the Guantanamo detainees, President Bush tells the press: “These killers—these are killers… These are killers. These are terrorists.” [US PRESIDENT, 2/4/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

January 29, 2002: Bush Says US Is Adhering to ‘Spirit of the Geneva Convention’ With Guantanamo Detainees President Bush says of the detainees held at Guantanamo prison in Cuba, “We are adhering to the spirit of the Geneva Convention. They’re being well treated.” He also says, “We are not going to call them prisoners of war. And the reason why is al-Qaeda is not a known military. These are killers, these are terrorists, they know no countries.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1/29/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

January 29, 2002: Bush’s Inclusion of Iran as ‘Axis of Evil’ Member Disrupts Backchannel Negotiations Three weeks after the “Karine A” is seized, allegedly filled with Iranian weapons destined to be used against Israel (see January 3, 2002 and After), President Bush names Iran as one of the world’s “axis of evil” nations (see January 29, 2002). State Department official Hillary Mann, who has been facilitating secret backchannel discussions with Iranian officials for over a year (see September 11, 2001 and Fall 2001), later confirms that the “Karine A” incident helped prompt Iran’s inclusion in Bush’s speech. The speech prompts the Iranians to skip the monthly meeting with Mann in Geneva. When they resume their meeting in March, the Iranians, according to Mann, are disturbed by Bush’s characterization. “They said they had put their necks out to talk to us and they were taking big risks with their careers and their families and their lives,” she will recall. [ESQUIRE, 10/18/2007] Entity Tags: Hillary Mann, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: US International Relations

January 29, 2002: Bush Labels Iraq, Iran, and North Korea an ‘Axis of Evil,’ Ending Cooperation with Iran President Bush’s State of the Union speech describes an “axis of evil” consisting of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Osama bin Laden is not mentioned in the speech. [US PRESIDENT, 2/4/2002] Bush says: “States like these and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.” Bush goes on to suggest for the first time that the US might be prepared to launch pre-emptive wars by saying, “The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.” [VANITY FAIR, 5/2004] When Bush advisor Richard Perle was asked one month before 9/11 about new challenges the US faced, he replied by naming these exact three countries (see August 6, 2001). Michael Gerson, head of the White House speechwriting team at the time, will later claim that, as Newsweek will later put it, “Bush was already making plans to topple Saddam Hussein, but he wasn’t ready to say so.” Iran and North Korea are inserted into the speech in order to avoid focusing solely on Iraq. The speech is followed by a new public focus on Iraq and a downplaying of bin Laden (see September 15, 2001-April 6, 2002). Prior to the speech, the Iranian government had been very helpful in the US fight against the Taliban, since the Taliban and Iran were enemies. [NEWSWEEK, 2/12/2007] At the time, al-Qaeda operatives had been streaming into Iran from Afghanistan following the defeat of the Taliban. Iran has been turning over hundreds of suspects to US allies and providing US intelligence with the names, photographs, and fingerprints of those it is holding. [WASHINGTON POST, 2/10/2007] Newsweek will later say that it is “beyond doubt” the Iranian government was “critical… to stabilizing [Afghanistan] after the fall of Kabul.” But all this cooperation comes to an end after the speech. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Hossein Adeli will later say that “Those [inside the Iranian government] who were in favor of a rapprochement with the United States were marginalized. The speech somehow exonerated those who had always doubted America’s intentions.” [NEWSWEEK, 2/12/2007] In August 2003, reporter Jeffrey St. Clair will write that “the Axis of Evil [is not] an ‘axis’ at all, since two of the states, Iran and Iraq, hate… each other, and neither [have] anything at all to do with the third, North Korea.” [COUNTERPUNCH, 8/13/2003] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Mohammad Hossein Adeli, Jeffrey St. Clair, Michael Gerson Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran, Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, US International Relations

After January 29, 2002: Bush: Iran Added to ‘Axis of Evil’ to Confront Evil, Promote Freedom When asked why he included Iran in the “axis of evil” (see January 29, 2002), President Bush answers: “It is very important for the American president at this point in history to speak very clearly about the evils the world faces.… I believe the United States is the beacon for freedom in the world. And I believe we have a responsibility to promote freedom that is as solemn as the responsibility is to protecting the American people, because the two go hand in hand.” [SCOBLIC, 2008, PP. 247] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran

Late January 2002: Bush Officials: ‘Let’s Do’ Iraq in Order to ‘Handle the Iranians From Closer Quarters’

Uzi Arad. [Source: Jerusalem Post] Israeli officials tell Bush officials shortly after the president’s “axis of evil” speech (see January 29, 2002) that of the three countries on the list—Iran, Iraq, and North Korea—Iraq is a distant third as far as posing any threat to its neighbors. But Bush officials have a plan. According to former Mossad director of intelligence Uzi Arad, who served as Benjamin Netanyahu’s foreign policy advisor, those officials respond, “Let’s do first things first. Once we do Iraq, we’ll have a military presence in Iraq, which would enable us to handle the Iranians from closer quarters, would give us more leverage.” (Netanyahu, in the years following his term as Israel’s prime minister, will become an outspoken advocate for military strikes against Iran—see November 17, 2006). [VANITY FAIR, 3/2007] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Benjamin Netanyahu, Bush administration, Israel Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks (Mossad), Uzi Arad Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

February 2002: Bush Orders CIA to Find Evidence of Iraqi WMDs President Bush orders the CIA to start focusing on Iraq, and find evidence that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction. CIA analysts will not find any hard evidence of Iraqi WMDs. [SUSKIND, 2006, PP. 169] Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, Central Intelligence Agency, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

February 2002: DIA Suggests Prisoner Probably Lying about Al-Qaeda Ties to Iraq; but His Allegations Will Be Used in Bush Speech Later The Defense Intelligence Agency issues a four-page Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary (DITSUM No. 044-02) stating that it is probable that prisoner Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi intentionally misled debriefers when he claimed Iraq was supporting al-Qaeda in working with illicit weapons. During interviews with al-Libi, the DIA noted the Libyan al-Qaeda operative could not name any Iraqis involved, any chemical or biological material used, or where the alleged training took place. “It is possible he does not know any further details; it is more likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers,” the report says. “Ibn al-Shaykh has been undergoing debriefs for several weeks and may be describing scenarios to the debriefers that he knows will retain their interest.” The DIA report is presumably circulated widely within the government, and is available to the CIA, the White House, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, and other agencies. No Evidence of Connections between Iraq, al-Qaeda - On the general subject of Iraq’s alleged ties to al-Qaeda, the DIA report notes: “Saddam [Hussein]‘s regime is intensely secular and is wary of Islamic revolutionary movements. Moreover, Baghdad is unlikely to provide assistance to a group it cannot control.” The report also questions the reliability of information provided by high-value al-Qaeda detainees being held in secret CIA facilities or who have been “rendered” to foreign countries where they are believed to undergo harsh interrogation tactics. Using al-Libi's Information to Bolster Case for War - Information supplied by al-Libi will be the basis for a claim included in an October 2002 speech (see October 7, 2002) by President Bush, in which he states, “[W]e’ve learned that Iraq has trained al-Qaeda members in bomb making and poisons and gases.” Intelligence provided by al-Libi will also be included in Colin Powell’s February speech (see February 5, 2003) to the UN. In that speech, Powell will cite “the story of a senior terrorist operative telling how Iraq provided training in these weapons to al-Qaeda.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/6/2005; WASHINGTON POST, 11/6/2005; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 11/7/2005; NEWSWEEK, 11/10/2005] Report Released as Proof of Administration's Reliance on Poor Intelligence Sources - Declassified portions of the DIA report will be issued on November 6, 2005 by two senators, Carl Levin (D-MI) and John D. Rockefeller (D-WV). Rockefeller will tell CNN that al-Libi is “an entirely unreliable individual upon whom the White House was placing a substantial intelligence trust.” The situation was, Rockefeller will say, “a classic example of a lack of accountability to the American people.” [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 11/7/2005] Entity Tags: Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, US Department of Defense, National Security Council, George W. Bush, Saddam Hussein, Colin Powell, Al-Qaeda, Defense Intelligence Agency, Bush administration, John D. Rockefeller, Carl Levin, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

February 2002: Neoconservative: Bush Must Attack Numerous Arab Nations to Fight, Win ‘World War IV’ against Terrorism Norman Podhoretz, the editor of the neoconservative magazine Commentary, writes a call to arms called “How to Win World War IV.” For Podhoretz, the US has already won World War III—the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Now, he asserts, it is time to win the war against Islamist terrorism. The US must embrace this war against civilizations, and President Bush must accept that it is his mission “to fight World War IV—the war against militant Islam.” To win this war, Podhoretz writes, the nations of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea must be overthrown, but also Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority. Bush must reject the “timorous counsels” of the “incorrigibly cautious Colin Powell [and] find the stomach to impose a new political culture on the defeated” Islamic world. The 9/11 attacks caused the US to destroy the Afghan Taliban in the process of battling al-Qaeda, Podhoretz writes: “We may willy-nilly find ourselves forced… to topple five or six or seven more tyrannies in the Islamic world (including that other sponsor of terrorism, Yasir Arafat’s Palestinian Authority). I can even [imagine] the turmoil of this war leading to some new species of an imperial mission for America, whose purpose would be to oversee the emergence of successor governments in the region more amenable to reform and modernization than the despotisms now in place.… I can also envisage the establishment of some kind of American protectorate over the oil fields of Saudi Arabia, as we more and more come to wonder why 7,000 princes should go on being permitted to exert so much leverage over us and everyone else.” A year later, conservative pundit Pat Buchanan will explain why Podhoretz wants to so drastically remake the map of the Middle East: “[O]ne nation, one leader, one party. Israel, [Ariel] Sharon, Likud.” [COMMENTARY, 2/2002; AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, 3/24/2003] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Colin Powell, Ariel Sharon, Likud, Patrick Buchanan, Taliban, Norman Podhoretz, Al-Qaeda Timeline Tags: Neoconservative Influence

February 2002: Bush Makes Offer of Talks with North Korea In a press conference, President Bush issues an invitation for “talks” with North Korea, an odd offering considering that just days before, he had lumped North Korea in with Iran and Iraq as the so-called “axis of evil” in the world (see January 29, 2002). Bush also promises that the US will not attack North Korea, again an odd promise considering that weeks before, the US’s Nuclear Posture Review (see December 31, 2001) had been reported to include plans for a nuclear assault against that nation. During the same press conference, Bush undermines his own peace offering by calling North Korea a “despotic regime” and railing against it for mistreating its citizens. When the North Koreans do offer to reopen negotiations, Bush will refuse (see April 2002). [SCOBLIC, 2008, PP. 237-238] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: US International Relations

Early February 2002: US Negotiator Visits South Korea to Discuss North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program

Jim Kelly. [Source: ViewImages.com] Undersecretary of State Jim Kelly, slated to try to revive the US’s attempts to negotiate with North Korea over that nation’s nuclear weapons program, goes to South Korea in preparation for President Bush to visit Seoul. Kelly is fully aware that the Bush administration has gone out of its way to undermine and disrupt the Clinton-era negotiations with North Korea, and a year before had insulted then-President Kim Dae Jung over the issue (see March 7, 2001). Now South Korea has a new president, Roh Moo Hyun, a populist with the same intentions of reopening a dialogue with North Korea as his predecessor. Charles Pritchard, the Bush administration’s special North Korean envoy, accompanies Kelly on the visit, and later recalls: “The conversation in the streets of Seoul was, ‘Is there going to be a war? What will these crazy Americans do?’” When Kelly and Pritchard meet with Roh, the president tells them, “I wake up in a sweat every morning, wondering if Bush has done something unilaterally to affect the [Korean] peninsula.” Bush’s visit to South Korea does little to ease tensions or convince North Korea to consider abandoning its uranium enrichment program (see October 4, 2002). [WASHINGTON MONTHLY, 5/2004] Entity Tags: Roh Moo Hyun, Bush administration, Charles Pritchard, Kim Dae Jung, Jim Kelly, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: US International Relations

February 1, 2002: Attorney General Ashcroft Tells President Bush Third Geneva Convention Should Not Apply to Taliban In a letter to President George Bush, Attorney General John Ashcroft argues that the Third Geneva Convention should not be applicable to the Taliban, based on two grounds. First, Afghanistan is a failed state and cannot therefore be considered a party to the treaty. Second, Taliban fighters acted as unlawful combatants. Explaining the advantages of this proposal, Ashcroft notes, “[A] Presidential determination against treaty applicability would provide the highest assurance that no court would subsequently entertain charges that American military officers, intelligence officials and law enforcement officials violated Geneva Convention rules relating to field conduct, detention conduct or interrogation of detainees.” [US ATTORNEY GENERAL, 2/1/2002] As Judge Evan J. Wallach will later observe, “Attorney General Ashcroft’s letter seems to make it clear that by the end of January, at least, consideration was being given to conduct which might violate [the Third Geneva Convention’s] strictures regarding the detention and interrogation of prisoners of war.” [WALLACH, 9/29/2004] Entity Tags: John Ashcroft, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties, War in Afghanistan

February 7, 2002: OLC Memo Supports White House Conclusion that Taliban Do Not Warrant Geneva POW Status In a memo concurrent with the presidential declaration that the Geneva Convention does not apply to Taliban or al-Qaeda fighters (see February 7, 2002), Jay Bybee, the head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, sends a memo to White House counsel Alberto Gonzales. Bybee concludes that President Bush has the legal authority to conclude that Taliban fighters have no rights to prisoner of war status as defined under the Geneva Conventions, because the Taliban lack an organized command structure, do not wear uniforms, and do not consider themselves bound by Geneva. It also concludes that there is no need for the US to convene Article 5 tribunals under Geneva to determine the status of the Taliban, as Bush’s presidential determination of their status eliminates any doubt under domestic law. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 2/7/2002 ; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 1/28/2009 ] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Alberto R. Gonzales, Geneva Conventions, US Department of Justice, Taliban, Office of Legal Counsel, Jay S. Bybee Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

February 7, 2002: White House Declares Geneva Convention Does Not Apply to Taliban or Al-Qaeda The White House declares that the United States will apply the Geneva Conventions to the conflict in Afghanistan, but will not grant prisoner-of-war status to captured Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters. Though Afghanistan was party to the 1949 treaty, Taliban fighters are not protected by the Conventions, the directive states, because the Taliban is not recognized by the US as Afghanistan’s legitimate government. Likewise, al-Qaeda fighters are not eligible to be protected under the treaty’s provisions because they do not represent a state that is party to the Conventions either. Administration Will Treat Detainees Humanely 'Consistent' with Geneva - In the memo, President Bush writes that even though al-Qaeda detainees do not qualify as prisoners of war under Geneva, “as a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.” The presidential directive is apparently based on Alberto Gonzales’s January 25 memo (see January 25, 2002) and a memo from Vice President Cheney’s chief of staff, David Addington (see January 25, 2002). Bush Chooses Not to Suspend Geneva between US and Afghanistan - The directive also concludes that Bush, as commander in chief of the United States, has the authority to suspend the Geneva Conventions regarding the conflict in Afghanistan, should he feel necessary: Bush writes, “I have the authority under the Constitution to suspend Geneva as between the United States and Afghanistan, but I decline to exercise that authority at this time.” Though not scheduled for declassification until 2012, the directive will be released by the White House in June 2004 to demonstrate that the president never authorized torture against detainees from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. [GEORGE W. BUSH, 2/7/2002 ; CNN, 2/7/2002; NEWSWEEK, 5/24/2004; TRUTHOUT (.ORG), 1/19/2005; DUBOSE AND BERNSTEIN, 2006, PP. 191] Overriding State Department Objections - Bush apparently ignores or overrides objections from the State Department, including Secretary of State Colin Powell (see January 25, 2002) and the department’s chief legal counsel, William Howard Taft IV (see January 25, 2002). Both Powell and Taft strenuously objected to the new policy. [SAVAGE, 2007, PP. 147] Ignoring Promises of Humane Treatment - The reality will be somewhat different. Gonzales laid out the arguments for and against complying with Geneva in an earlier memo (see January 18-25, 2002), and argued that if the administration dispensed with Geneva, no one could later be charged with war crimes. Yet, according to Colin Powell’s chief of staff, Lawrence Wilkerson, sometime after the Bush memo is issued, Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld decide to ignore the portions promising humane treatment for prisoners. “In going back and looking at the deliberations,” Wilkerson later recalls, “it was clear to me that what the president had decided was one thing and what was implemented was quite another thing.” [DUBOSE AND BERNSTEIN, 2006, PP. 190-191] Entity Tags: Geneva Conventions, George W. Bush, Colin Powell, Lawrence Wilkerson, William Howard Taft IV, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Bush administration Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

After February 7, 2002: Bush Authorizes Secret CIA Prison System

The Salt Pit, a secret CIA prison near Kabul, Afghanistan. [Source: Space Imaging Middle East] President George Bush signs a secret order authorizing the CIA to set up a network of secret detention and interrogation centers outside the United States where high value prisoners can be interrogated “with unprecedented harshness.” [NEWSWEEK, 5/24/2004] This takes place shortly after February 7, 2002, when Bush declared that al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners were not subject to the Geneva Convention (see February 7, 2002). The first secret CIA prison will begin operating in Thailand in March 2002 (see March 2002). Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline

February 9, 2002: Sharon Argues that Iran ‘A Strategic Threat to Israel’

Ariel Sharon. [Source: US Department of Defense] Prime Minister Ariel Sharon meets with President George W. Bush. According to the Ha’aretz Daily, the goal of the meeting is to “convince the United States that Iran constitutes a strategic threat to Israel.” [HA'ARETZ, 2/9/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Ariel Sharon Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran

February 12, 2002: Bush Official: Decision Made to Overthrow Hussein Senior Bush administration officials say President Bush has decided to oust Iraqi despot Saddam Hussein from power. “This is not an argument about whether to get rid of Saddam Hussein,” one official says. “That debate is over. This is… how you do it.” CIA, Pentagon Making Plans for Regime Change - Bush has ordered the CIA, the Pentagon, and other agencies to come up with a plan combining military, diplomatic, and covert actions to force Hussein from power. A military strike is not yet imminent, but Bush has decided that Hussein and his putative weapons of mass destruction are such a threat to US security that he must be removed from power, even if US allies do not help. The CIA has already presented Bush with a plan to destabilize Hussein’s regime, incorporating covert action campaigns, sabotage, information warfare, and stepped-up bombing runs throughout the northern and southern “no-fly” zones. Bush is reportedly enthusiastic about the plan, and the CIA has begun assigning officers to the task. Reporters Warren P. Strobel and John Walcott write: “The president’s decision has launched the United States on a course that will have major ramifications for the US military, the Middle East’s future political alignment, international oil flows, and Bush’s own war on terrorism.” Some Allies Dubious - Allies such as Russia have already expressed grave doubts about the wisdom of such a series of actions, and military experts warn that any campaign in Iraq would be long, bloody, and difficult to bring to a satisfactory conclusion. Nevertheless, one foreign leader who recently met with Bush came away “with the feeling that a decision has been made to strike Iraq, and the ‘how’ and ‘when’ are still fluid,” according to a diplomat. Cheney to Inform Middle Eastern Leaders of US Intentions - Vice President Cheney will soon depart for a visit to 11 Middle East nations; while the public explanation is that he wants to listen to those nations’ views on the US’s Iraq policy, in reality, Cheney will inform them that the US will overthrow the Hussein regime. One senior official says: “He’s not going to beg for support. He’s going to inform them that the president’s decision has been made and will be carried out, and if they want some input into how and when it’s carried out, now’s the time for them to speak up.” At least one Middle Eastern ally, Egypt, has reservations about such a plan. Egyptian Ambassador Nabil Fahmy said last week that Bush should keep the US focus on fighting international terrorism, where he has broad international backing. “If you mix two issues together, you will lose this focus,” he said. Debate over Role of Chalabi, INC - There is still sharp debate within the administration over the role that Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress will play in the overthrow and subsequent realignment. Many neoconservatives, particularly in the offices of Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, tout Chalabi as the next leader of Iraq, but others are not sanguine about Chalabi and his organization, with CIA officials warning that the INC is riven by internal debate and undoubtedly riddled with spies from Iraq and Iran. [KNIGHT RIDDER, 2/13/2002] Entity Tags: Warren Strobel, Saddam Hussein, Central Intelligence Agency, Bush administration, Ahmed Chalabi, Donald Rumsfeld, George W. Bush, Iraqi National Congress, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Nabil Fahmy, John Walcott, US Department of Defense Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

February 13, 2002: Former Reagan Arms Control Director: Defeating Iraq Will be a ‘Cakewalk’

Kenneth Adelman. [Source: PBS] Neoconservative Kenneth Adelman, who served as an assistant to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld from 1975-1977 and was arms control director in the Reagan administration, writes an op-ed for the Washington Post titled “Cakewalk in Iraq.” Adelman is straightforward in his insistence that defeating the Iraqi military and beginning a transition to a democratic government in Iraq will be a “cakewalk.” He derides predictions that the US could lose “thousands of troops in the process,” writing, “I believe demolishing Hussein’s military power and liberating Iraq would be a cakewalk.” He gives what he calls “simple, responsible reasons:” it was a cakewalk in 1991, Iraq is significantly weaker than during the Gulf War, and “now we’re playing for keeps.” Adelman details just how weak and insignificant the much-vaunted Iraqi ground forces are, and says that US forces are “much fiercer.” Between that quality and the sophisticated “gizmos”—unmanned Predator drones, “smart” bombs, and other technological wonders—Adelman says the Iraqi military should be routed with ease. He gives similar short shrift to the idea that the US needs to build a multinational coalition. In 1991, he writes, the US “engaged a grand international coalition because we lacked a domestic coalition. Virtually the entire Democratic leadership stood against that President Bush. The public, too, was divided.” The situation is different today. “This President Bush does not need to amass rinky-dink nations as ‘coalition partners’ to convince the Washington establishment that we’re right. Americans of all parties now know we must wage a total war on terrorism.” Saddam Hussein, and not Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, is “the number one threat against American security and civilization. Unlike Osama bin Laden, he has billions of dollars in government funds, scores of government research labs working feverishly on weapons of mass destruction—and just as deep a hatred of America and civilized free societies.… Measured by any cost-benefit analysis, such an operation would constitute the greatest victory in America’s war on terrorism.” [WASHINGTON POST, 2/13/2002] Entity Tags: Kenneth Adelman, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

February 14, 2002: Bush Announces Administration’s Alternative to Kyoto and ‘Clear Skies’ Initiative President Bush unveils a plan to reduce the “intensity” of greenhouse gases by 18 percent. Greenhouse gas intensity is the ratio of emissions to economic output, meaning that global warming pollution would continue to grow, but at a slower pace. This target would be achieved through $4.6 billion in tax credits and incentives, spent over a five-year period, to encourage businesses and farmers to cut their emissions. For example, the plan would provide tax credits to businesses that use renewable energy sources. [CNN, 2/14/2006; NEW YORK TIMES, 2/14/2006] Critics of the plan say a voluntary program based on tax credits and incentives represents a weak alternative to the Kyoto Protocol’s mandatory reductions which would cut emissions well below their 1990 levels by 2010. “We’ve found that these voluntary programs just don’t work,” says Joseph Lieberman. [CNN, 2/14/2006] The New York Times notes, “The one thing the climate policy would not do is require anything of anybody.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 2/14/2006] The president also introduces a second plan aimed at curbing air pollution. The “Clear Skies Initiative” would require reductions of sulfur dioxide emissions by 73 percent, nitrogen oxides by 67 percent, and mercury by 69 percent, by 2018. But the plan includes no reductions for carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas. Companies would be able to purchase credits from other businesses that have reduced their emissions below required levels. Unlike the plan supported by environmentalists and many Democrats, Bush’s program would delay these reductions until 2010 or later. [CNN, 2/14/2006; NEW YORK TIMES, 2/14/2006] Entity Tags: Joseph Lieberman, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Bush's Environmental Record, Global Warming

February 14, 2002: US Gives More Aid to Pakistan Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf meets with President Bush in Washington, DC. Bush lavishly praises Musharraf, saying: “President Musharraf is a leader with great courage and vision.… I am proud to call him my friend.” Since 9/11, Pakistan has received $600 million in emergency aid, $500 million for supporting US forces, a moratorium on paying back its debt to the US, and the US has canceled economic sanctions against it. Bush announces the US will now cancel $1 billion of Pakistan’s US debt, reschedule the remaining $1.8 billion, and give $100 million for education reform. [RASHID, 2008, PP. 148-149] The month before, Musharraf denounced terrorism in a public speech (see January 12, 2002). But by the start of February, it is already clear that the militant groups Musharraf banned just after the speech have resumed operations under new names with the encouragement of the Pakistani ISI. [RASHID, 2008, PP. 147] Furthermore, CIA communications intercepts indicate the Pakistani army deliberately left portions of the border with Afghanistan unguarded, allowing Osama bin Laden and thousands of other al-Qaeda operatives to flee into Pakistan (see December 10, 2001). The Pakistani army still has not moved into the regions where al-Qaeda is regrouping (see Late May 2002), and will not allow US troops to enter these regions either (see Early 2002 and After). Entity Tags: Pervez Musharraf, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

February 16, 2002: Bush Directs CIA to Conduct Operations in Iraq Bush signs an intelligence finding directing the CIA to conduct some of the operations that have been proposed in the Anabasis plan devised by veteran CIA agents Luis (full-name not disclosed) and John Maguire (see Late November 2001 or December 2001). The plan called for conducting covert operations within Iraq as part of a larger effort to overthrow Hussein’s government. [WASHINGTON POST, 4/17/2004; ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 9 SOURCES: TOP OFFICIALS INTERVIEWED BY WASHINGTON POST EDITOR BOB WOODWARD] Entity Tags: Anabasis, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks, Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

February 22, 2002: GAO Sues White House for Task Force Energy Information David Walker, comptroller of the General Accounting Office (GAO) and a Ronald Reagan appointee, files a lawsuit to compel Vice President Dick Cheney and his office to reveal the names of the private businessmen and organizational officials that his energy task force (see January 29, 2001) met with to craft the Bush administration’s energy policies (see May 8, 2001). This is the first time since its creation in 1920 that the GAO has been forced to file suit to compel another government agency to follow the law and cooperate with its requests. [DEAN, 2004, PP. 78-79] In a statement, Walker writes: “This is the first time that GAO has filed suit against a federal official in connection with a records access issue. We take this step reluctantly. Nevertheless, given GAO’s responsibility to Congress and the American people, we have no other choice. Our repeated attempts to reach a reasonable accommodation on this matter have not been successful. Now that the matter has been submitted to the judicial branch, we are hopeful that the litigation will be resolved expeditiously. [GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 2/22/2002 ] 'Fundamental Questions' about Governmental 'Checks and Balances' - Former Nixon White House counsel John Dean will write in 2004: “This was, to say the least, a high-stakes lawsuit. It raised fundamental questions about the very nature of our system of checks and balances. If the GAO could not get the information it requested, then there was a black hole in the federal firmament—a no-man’s land where a president and vice president could go free from Congressional oversight.” By random selection, the case lands in the court of Judge John Bates, a career Justice Department lawyer who once worked for the Whitewater investigative team led by Kenneth Starr, and had just recently been appointed to the bench by President Bush. The choice of Bates will prove critical to the verdict of the case. [DEAN, 2004, PP. 78-79] Schlafly: Secrecy a 'Mistake' - Conservative commentator and activist Phyllis Schlafly will write in 2002: “[T]he public wants to know how our energy policy was developed. When information is kept secret, the natural inference is that there must be something the administration is very eager to hide. While private businesses and households can be selective about what they tell the world, the American people are not willing to accord the same privacy to public officials paid by the taxpayers. Regardless of the legal veil woven over the energy policy meetings, Cheney’s secrecy is a political mistake.” [EAGLE FORUM, 3/6/2002] Entity Tags: Kenneth Starr, Phyllis Schlafly, US Department of Justice, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, John Dean, Government Accountability Office, Bush administration, David Walker, George W. Bush, Energy Task Force, John Bates Timeline Tags: Bush's Environmental Record, Civil Liberties

Between February 27, 2002 and March 6, 2002: Bush’s Budget Director Complains to Bush about Army Corps Official Mitch Daniels, director of the Office of Management and Budget, writes in a memo to President Bush, complaining about Assistant Secretary of the Army Mike Parker’s testimony opposing the administration’s proposed budget cuts (see February 27, 2002). Daniels complains that Parker’s testimony “reads badly… on the printed page,” and that “Parker. . . is distancing [himself] actively from the administration.” [GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE, 9/1/2005] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Mitch Daniels Timeline Tags: Hurricane Katrina

Spring 2002 and Beyond: Cabinet-Level Bush Officials Frequently Discuss and Approve Specific ‘Harsh’ Interrogation Techniques In dozens of top-secret talks and meetings in the White House Situation Room, the National Security Council “Principals Committee” discusses and approves specific methods of extreme interrogation techniques to be used by CIA agents against high-value terrorism suspects. The US media does not learn of this until six years later (see April 9, 2008). The Principals meetings are chaired by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and attendees include Vice President Cheney, CIA Director George Tenet, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Attorney General John Ashcroft. Rice’s group not only discusses and approves specific “harsh” methods of interrogation, but approves the use of “combined” interrogation techniques on suspects that prove recalcitrant. The approved techniques include slapping and shoving prisoners, sleep deprivation, and waterboarding, or simulated drowning, a technique banned for decades by the US military. Some of the discussions of the interrogation sessions were so detailed that the Principals virtually choreograph the sessions down to the number of times CIA agents could use specific tactics. [ABC NEWS, 4/9/2008] The Principals also ensure that President Bush is not involved in the meetings, therefore granting him “deniability” over the decisions, though Bush will eventually admit to being very aware of the decisions (see April 11, 2008). The Principals, particularly Cheney, are described by a senior intelligence official as “deeply immersed” in the specifics of the decisions, often viewing demonstrations of how specific tactics work. They eventually approve, among other methods, waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and physical abuse such as slaps and pushes. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 4/10/2008] Imminent Threat Calls for Extreme Measures - The move towards using harsh and likely illegal interrogation tactics begins shortly after the capture of al-Qaeda operative Abu Zubaida in late March 2002 (see March 28, 2002). Zubaida is seen as a potentially critical source of information about potential attacks similar to 9/11. Zubaida is kept in a secret CIA prison where he recovers from the wounds suffered during his capture, and where he is repeatedly questioned. However, he is uncooperative with his inquisitors, and CIA officials want to use more physical and aggressive techniques to force him to talk (see March 28, 2002-Mid-2004). The CIA briefs the NSC Principals Committee, chaired by Rice, and the committee signs off on the agency’s plan to use more extreme interrogation methods on Zubaida. He is one of at least three al-Qaeda members to be waterboarded by CIA interrogators (see May 2002-2003). The 'Golden Shield' - The Principals Committee asks the Justice Department to determine whether using such methods would violate domestic or international laws. “No one at the agency wanted to operate under a notion of winks and nods and assumptions that everyone understood what was being talked about,” a second senior intelligence official will recall in 2008. “People wanted to be assured that everything that was conducted was understood and approved by the folks in the chain of command.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 4/10/2008] In August 2002, Justice Department lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel write a memo that gives formal legal authority to government interrogators to use harsh, abusive methods on detainees (see August 1, 2002). The memo is called the “Golden Shield” for CIA agents who worry that they could be held criminally liable if the harsh, perhaps tortuous interrogations ever become public. CIA veterans remember how everything from the Vietnam-era “Phoenix Program” of assassinations to the Iran-Contra arms sales of the 1980s were portrayed as actions of a “rogue,” “out-of-control” CIA; this time, they intend to ensure that the White House and not the agency is given ultimate responsibility for authorizing extreme techniques against terror suspects. [ABC NEWS, 4/9/2008] In April 2008, law professor Jonathan Turley will say, “[H]ere you have the CIA, which is basically saying, we’re not going to have a repeat of the 1970s, where you guys have us go exploding cigars and trying to take out leaders and then you say you didn’t know about it. So the CIA has learned a lot. So these meetings certainly cover them in that respect.” [MSNBC, 4/10/2008] Even after the memo is issued, Tenet continues to hold meetings with his fellow Principals to seek confirmation that specific interrogation plans and scenarios are legal, often sparked by cables from agents in the field asking for authorization of particular methodologies, and for guidance in how to handle particular cases (see Summer 2003). Both Tenet and his successor, Porter Goss, will, along with CIA lawyers, regularly brief Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld, Powell, and other senior White House officials about detainees in CIA custody overseas. One high-ranking official will later recall, “It kept coming up. CIA wanted us to sign off on each one every time. They’d say, ‘We’ve got so and so. This is the plan.’” In every instance, the Principals will approve the requests to use harsher methods. Ashcroft Uneasy at White House Involvement - One of the principals, Attorney General Ashcroft, is troubled by the discussions of harsh interrogation methods that sometimes cross the line into torture. Ashcroft seems perfectly happy with the methods being used, he just isn’t comfortable with senior White House officials being involved in the details of interrogating prisoners. After one meeting, Ashcroft asks, “Why are we talking about this in the White House? History will not judge this kindly.” [ABC NEWS, 4/9/2008] Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Colin Powell, Central Intelligence Agency, Bush administration, Al-Qaeda, Abu Zubaida, Donald Rumsfeld, US Department of Justice, Porter J. Goss, John Ashcroft, Jonathan Turley, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, National Security Council, Condoleezza Rice, Office of Legal Counsel, George W. Bush, Ramzi bin al-Shibh Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

Spring 2002: Bush Promises Saudi Leader to Work for Peace between Israel and Palestine Crown Prince Abdullah, the de facto leader of Saudi Arabia, flies to Texas to meet with President Bush at his ranch in Crawford. Abdullah has been working to convince Arab leaders to accept a proposed peace treaty between Israel and Palestine (see April 2002), but has had no support from the White House. The course of the meeting is later paraphrased by National Security Council staffer Flynt Leverett, the head of the NSC’s Mideast affairs division. As Leverett will recall, the usually deferential Abdullah tells Bush that he has a direct question and wants a direct answer. Abdullah asks Bush: “Are you going to do anything about the Palestinian issue? If you tell me no, if it’s too difficult, if you’re not going to give it that kind of priority, just tell me. I will understand and I will never say anything critical of you or your leadership in public, but I’m going to need to make my own judgments and my own decisions about Saudi interests.” Bush attempts to stall, telling Abdullah he understands his concerns and that he will see what he can do. Abdullah refuses to be mollified. Standing up, he says: “That’s it. This meeting is over.” Bush retreats to another room with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell to discuss Abdullah’s position. Bush returns shortly thereafter and gives Abdullah his word that he will deal seriously with the Palestinian issue. “Okay,” Abdullah says. “The president of the United States has given me his word.” After the meeting, Powell calls Abdullah’s threat “the near-death experience”; Bush, rolling his eyes, says, “We sure don’t want to go through anything like that again.” As Powell later recalls, “It was a very serious moment and no one wanted to see if the Saudis were bluffing.” It is unclear whether Bush is expressing relief or making a sarcastic comment. [ESQUIRE, 10/18/2007] Entity Tags: Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, Flynt Leverett, Bush administration, Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: US International Relations

(March 2002): Bush: ‘F__k Saddam. We’re Taking Him Out’ During a meeting at the White House attended by Condoleezza Rice and a group of Republican and Democratic senators, President Bush, who is not scheduled to be at the meeting, shows up. At some point, the discussion drifts to Iraq and the president says, “F__k Saddam. We’re taking him out.” The same Time magazine article that reports this also comments, “From the moment he took office, Bush has made noises about finishing the job his father started. Sept. 11 may have diverted his attention, but Iraq has never been far from his mind.” [TIME, 5/5/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Early March 2002: Bush Diverts Resources from War on Terror According to a former White House official interviewed by Seymour Hersh during the fall of 2003, Bush makes the decision to invade Iraq at this time and begins diverting resources away from the “war on terrorism” to the planned invasion of Iraq. “The Bush administration took many intelligence operations that had been aimed at al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups around the world and redirected them to the Persian Gulf. Linguists and special operatives were abruptly reassigned, and several ongoing anti-terrorism intelligence programs were curtailed.” [NEW YORKER, 10/27/2003 SOURCES: UNNAMED FORMER WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

(Show related quotes) March 2002: Presidential Panel Recommends Intelligence Agencies Be Transferred from Pentagon to CIA Retired Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft leads a presidential panel which proposes that control of the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency be transferred from the Department of Defense to the head of the CIA, the director of central intelligence (DCI). The plan is favored by the Congressional 9/11 joint inquiry but opposed by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney. For years experts have argued that the US intelligence community’s 13 disparate agencies—“85 percent of whose assets reside in the Defense Department”—should be consolidated under the head of the CIA. [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 8/12/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 8/19/2004] Intelligence Community Still Focused on Cold War Needs, Scowcroft Finds - Scowcroft, the head of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and a close friend and confidant of former President George H. W. Bush, actually revises a report he began before the 9/11 attacks. The report concludes that the US intelligence apparatus had been designed to meet the needs of the Cold War era and should now be overhauled. The 9/11 attacks are evidence of this, Scowcroft believes. The attacks came from rogue Islamist terrorists, not a superpower like China or the old USSR. Opposition from Rumsfeld, Cheney - But, as Ron Suskind will write in his 2006 book The One Percent Doctrine, Rumsfeld is “strongly opposed” to Scowcroft’s idea, presumably because, by transferring control of the NSA from the Pentagon to the CIA, it would take power away from him. Scowcroft approaches Cheney with the dilemma. Scowcroft is well aware of Cheney and Rumsfeld’s long political partnership, and gives Cheney an easy out. If his proposals are overly “disruptive,” Scowcroft says, “I’ll just fold my tent and go away. I don’t want to… but I’ll be guided by you.” Cheney now has a choice. Knowing this is a battle Scowcroft will not win, he can either call Scowcroft off now and defuse a potential political conflict within the administration, or, in author Craig Unger’s words, he can “send Scowcroft off on a fool’s errand, pitting Bush 41’s close friend, as Suskind noted, against Bush 43’s cabinet secretary [Rumsfeld], who just happened to be Bush 41’s lifelong nemesis (see September 21, 1974 and After). Cheney chose the latter.” Cheney tells Scowcroft to “go ahead, submit the report to the president.” He knows President Bush will listen to Cheney and Rumsfeld’s advice and ignore the report. Unger later notes, “Scowcroft had once been Cheney’s mentor, his patron. Now the vice president was just humoring him.” [UNGER, 2007, PP. 225-226] Entity Tags: National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, Ron Suskind, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Central Intelligence Agency, Brent Scowcroft, Craig Unger, Donald Rumsfeld, George Herbert Walker Bush Timeline Tags: US Military

March 13, 2002: Bush Refuses to Let DHS Chief Ridge Testify before Congress, Invokes Executive Privilege President Bush refuses to allow DHS chief Tom Ridge to testify before Congress regarding the agency’s efforts to protect the nation. Bush’s rationale is that Ridge was on the White House staff before the department was created. Bush tells reporters, “Well, he’s not—he doesn’t have to testify; he’s a part of my staff, and that’s part of the prerogative of the Executive Branch of government. And we hold that very dear.… I’m not going to let Congress erode the power of the Executive Branch. I have a duty to protect the Executive Branch from legislative encroachment. I mean, for example, when the GAO [Government Accountability Office] demands documents from us, we’re not going to give them to them. These were privileged conversations. These were conversations when people come into our offices and brief us. Can you imagine having to give up every single transcript of what is—advised me or the Vice President? Our advice wouldn’t be good and honest and open. And so I viewed that as an encroachment on the power of the Executive Branch. I have an obligation to make sure that the presidency remains robust and the Legislative Branch doesn’t end up running the Executive Branch.” [WHITE HOUSE, 3/13/2002; DEAN, 2004, PP. 180] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Bush administration, Tom Ridge, Government Accountability Office Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

March 20, 2002: Bush Says Guantanamo Detainees Are ‘Killers’ Without American ‘Values’ President Bush tells reporters during a visit to Samuel W. Tucker Elementary School in Alexandria: “Remember these are—the ones in Guantanamo Bay are killers. They don’t share the same values we share.” [US PRESIDENT, 3/25/2002; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 1/9/2004] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Shortly After March 28, 2002: US Intelligence Suspects Captured Al-Qaeda Leader Zubaida May Be Mentally Unstable and Overestimated In the wake of al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida’s arrest (see March 28, 2002), the FBI discovers much useful information (see Shortly After March 28, 2002). FBI agent Dan Coleman leads a team to sort through Zubaida’s computer files and documents. However, at the same time, it is discovered that Zubaida’s prominence in al-Qaeda’s hierarchy was overestimated. Many FBI officials conclude that he was used as little more than a travel agent for training camp attendees because he was mentally ill. Coleman will later comment: “This guy is insane, certifiable, split personality. That’s why they let him fly all over the world doing meet and greet. That’s why people used his name on all sorts of calls and e-mails. He was like a travel agent, the guy who booked your flights.… He knew very little about real operations, or strategy. He was expendable.” Zubaida’s diary evidences his apparent schizophrenia; he wrote it in three different personas, or voices, each with a different and distinctive personality. [SUSKIND, 2006, PP. 94-96, 100; SAVAGE, 2007, PP. 219] Other accounts back up this assessment. For instance, Omar Nasiri, a former informant for European intelligence agencies who met Zubaida in the nineties, will later describe Zubaida’s odd behavior. He “shuffled around his home in near-total darkness, carrying a gas lantern from room to room. He barely spoke and would often communicate by pointing.” [NEW YORKER, 1/22/2007] Involvement in Pre-9/11 Plots - On the other hand, Zubaida does appear to have been involved in numerous plots before 9/11 (see for instance November 30, 1999 and Early September 2001). Al-Qaeda operative Ahmed Ressam cooperated with US investigators after being arrested. He worked with Zubaida and suggested Zubaida was of some importance, but not one of al-Qaeda’s highest leaders: “He is the person in charge of the [training] camps. He receives young men from all countries. He accepts you or rejects you. He takes care of the expenses of the camps. He makes arrangements for you when you travel coming in or leaving.” [GUNARATNA, 2003, PP. 133] Former CIA Chief Rejects Diagnosis of Schizophrenia - In a 2007, former CIA Director George Tenet will claim that the reports Zubaida was mentally unstable are “[b]aloney.… Apparently, the source of the rumor that Abu Zubaida was unbalanced was his personal diary, in which he adopted various personas. From that shaky perch, some junior Freudians leapt to the conclusion that Zubaida had multiple personalities. In fact, Agency psychiatrists eventually determined that in his diary he was using a sophisticated literary device to express himself.” [TENET, 2007, PP. 243] Zubaida Touted as High-Level Terror Chief - Regardless, despite being briefed otherwise, President Bush and others in his administration will repeatedly tout the importance of capturing Zubaida and no hint of any doubts about his importance or sanity will be publicly expressed (see April 9, 2002 and After). Entity Tags: George W. Bush, George J. Tenet, Dan Coleman, Abu Zubaida, Ahmed Ressam, Omar Nasiri, Bush administration, Ron Suskind Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Late March 2002: President Bush Allegedly Takes Personal Interest in Interrogation of Zubaida In a 2006 book, New York Times reporter James Risen will claim that shortly after al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida is captured in March 2002, “According to a well-placed source with a proven track record of providing extremely reliable information to the author, [CIA Director] George Tenet soon learned that [President] George Bush was taking a very personal interest in the Zubaida case.” Just days after Zubaida’s arrest, Tenet goes to the White House to give his usual daily Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB). Bush asks Tenet about what the CIA is learning from Zubaida’s interrogation. Tenet replies that nothing has been learned yet because Zubaida is heavily wounded and is too groggy from painkillers to talk coherently. Bush then allegedly asks Tenet, “Who authorized putting him on pain medication?” Risen will comment, “It is possible that this was just one more piece of jocular banter between the two plain-speaking men, according to the source who recounted this incident. Bush’s phrasing was ambiguous. But it is also possible that the comment meant something more. Was [Bush] implicitly encouraging [Tenet] to order the harsh treatment of a prisoner?” Risen notes that some of Tenet’s associates claim they have never heard of the incident and doubt that it is true. [RISEN, 2006, PP. 22-23] Later, it appears Bush will be deliberately kept out of the loop regarding the treatment of Zubaida and other detainees in order to avoid culpability for the harsh interrogation methods used (see April 2002 and After). Entity Tags: James Risen, Abu Zubaida, George W. Bush, George J. Tenet Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline

April 2002: Bush Abandons Negotiations with Korea After exhaustive discussions, White House negotiator Charles Pritchard is able to convince the North Koreans that the US is serious about wanting to reopen negotiations (see Late March, 2001 and February 2002). Once the North Koreans make their overtures for reopening talks, President Bush once again reverses course, abandoning the 2001 policy changes in favor of what officials call a “bold approach” that will deal with all outstanding issues, including nuclear proliferation and human rights abuses, without protracted negotiations. The opportunity to test Bush’s rhetoric never comes; North Korea will soon admit to having the capability to enrich uranium in violation of the Agreed Framework (see October 4, 2002), a development that radically alters US-North Korean relations for the worse. [SCOBLIC, 2008, PP. 238] Entity Tags: Charles Pritchard, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: US International Relations

April 2002 and After: President Bush Deliberately Shielded from Knowledge of Harsh Interrogation Techniques After the capture of al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida (see March 28, 2002), the US government is forced to review procedures on how Zubaida and future detainees should be treated. One CIA source will later say, “Abu Zubaida’s capture triggered everything.” The legal basis for harsh interrogations is murky at best, and the Justice Department will not give any legal guidelines to the CIA until August 2002, after Zubaida has already been tortured (see March 28-August 1, 2002 and August 1, 2002). Bush Kept out of Discussions - New York Times reporter James Risen will later claim in a 2006 book that after showing some initial interest in Zubaida’s treatment (see Late March 2002), President Bush is mysteriously absent from any internal debates about the treatment of detainees. The CIA’s Office of Inspector General later investigates evidence of the CIA’s involvement in detainee abuse, and concludes in a secret report that Bush is never officially briefed on the interrogation tactics used. Earlier meetings are chaired by White House counsel Alberto Gonzales and attended by, among others, Vice President Cheney’s chief lawyer David Addington, Justice Department lawyer John Yoo, White House lawyer Timothy Flanigan, and Pentagon chief counsel William J. Haynes. Later, CIA Director George Tenet gives briefings on the tactics to a small group of top officials, including Vice President Cheney, National Security Adviser Rice, Attorney General John Ashcroft, and future Attorney General Gonzales, but not Bush. CIA: 'No Presidential Approval' Needed for Torture - Risen will note that “Normally, such high-stakes—and very secret—CIA activities would be carefully vetted by the White House and legally authorized in writing by the president under what are known as presidential findings. Such directives are required by Congress when the CIA engages in covert action.” But through a legal sleight-of-hand, the CIA determines the interrogations should be considered a normal part of “intelligence collection” and not a covert action, so no specific presidential approval is needed. Risen concludes: “Certainly, Cheney and senior White House officials knew that Bush was purposely not being briefed and that the CIA was not being given written presidential authorization for its tactics. It appears that there was a secret agreement among very senior administration officials to insulate Bush and to give him deniability, even as his vice president and senior lieutenants were meeting to discuss the harsh new interrogation methods. President Bush was following a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy on the treatment of prisoners.” Later, Flanigan will say of the meetings, “My overwheming impression is that everyone was focused on trying to avoid torture, staying within the line, while doing everything possible to save American lives.” [RISEN, 2006, PP. 23-27; SAVAGE, 2007, PP. 154] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, John C. Yoo, William J. Haynes, Timothy E. Flanigan, John Ashcroft, David S. Addington, George W. Bush, Abu Zubaida, James Risen, Central Intelligence Agency, George J. Tenet, Alberto R. Gonzales, Condoleezza Rice Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline

April 4, 2002: Bush: ‘I Made Up My Mind that Saddam Needs to Go’ President George Bush says in an interview on Britain’s ITV television network, “I made up my mind that Saddam [Hussein] needs to go. That’s about all I’m willing to share with you.” [US PRESIDENT, 4/15/2002, PP. 573] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

April 6-7, 2002: During Visit to Crawford, Blair Tells Bush Britain Will Support US Military Action against Iraq British Prime Minister Tony Blair, on a visit to Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas [INDEPENDENT, 2/27/2005], tells the president that Britain intends to “support military action to bring about regime change.” [GUARDIAN, 5/2/2005; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 5/4/2005] But Blair also says that certain conditions will have to be met. He says that efforts will have to be made to “construct a coalition,” “shape public opinion,” and demonstrate that all options to “eliminate Iraq’s WMD through the UN weapons inspectors” have been exhausted. Additionally, the Israeli-Palestinian crisis should be quiescent, he says. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 5/12/2005] At a joint press conference with Bush on the first day of their summit at Crawford, Blair is asked by a reporter if Bush has convinced him “on the need for military action against Iraq” and whether or not regime change “is now the policy of the British government.” Blair does not respond with a direct answer to either of the questions. [UNITED KINGDOM, 4/6/2002; US PRESIDENT, 4/15/2002] Also during the summit, the two leaders establish the US-UK Energy Dialogue to “enhance coordination and cooperation on energy issues” (see July 30, 2003) They agree to create a joint working group that will devise a plan to overcome obstacles to “free access” to Gulf oil. The first item on the task list is “a targeted study to examine the capital and investment needs of key Gulf countries….” [MUTTITT, 2005] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Tony Blair Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

April 9, 2002: Bush Boasts of Zubaida’s Imprisonment At a luncheon for Republicans in Connecticut, President Bush boasts of the recent capture of alleged al-Qaeda operative Abu Zubaida (see March 28, 2002). Bush says: “The other day we hauled in a guy named Abu Zubaida. He’s one of the top operatives plotting and planning death and destruction on the United States. He’s not plotting and planning anymore. He’s where he belongs.” [WHITE HOUSE, 4/9/2002] Bush is presumably aware that Zubaida is being tortured in Thailand (see Late March 2002 and April - June 2002). Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Abu Zubaida Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

April 9, 2002 and After: Bush Administration Exaggerates the Value of Al-Qaeda Prisoner Zubaida for Political Gain The capture of al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida (see March 28, 2002) is leaked to the press shortly after it occurs and on April 9, 2002, President Bush says in a speech: “The other day we hauled in a guy named Abu Zubaida. He’s one of the top operatives planning death and destruction on the United States. He’s not plotting and planning anymore.” In the weeks and months that follow, Bush and others in his administration will repeatedly tout the importance of capturing Zubaida. He is frequently described as “chief of operations” for all of al-Qaeda and the group’s number three leader. Zubaida is the only significant al-Qaeda capture in the first year after 9/11, so there is pressure to hype his importance. However, at the time there is a raging debate among US intelligence analysts as to Zubaida’s actual importance and even his mental sanity (see Shortly After March 28, 2002). According to journalist Ron Suskind, one day, when CIA Director George Tenet reminds Bush that Zubaida was not such a top leader after all, Bush reportedly says to him: “I said he was important. You’re not going to let me lose face on this, are you?” Tenet replies, “No sir, Mr. President.” Suskind will later comment: “In the wide, diffuse ‘war on terror,’ so much of it occurring in the shadows—with no transparency and only perfunctory oversight—the administration could say anything it wanted to say.… The administration could create whatever reality was convenient.” [SUSKIND, 2006, PP. 99-100] But in 2006, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) will issue a report containing the biographies of al-Qaeda detainees held at Guantanamo. In marked contrast to previous announcements, this biography downgrades the importance of Zubaida. It merely calls him a “leading extremist facilitator” and “one of al-Qaeda’s senior travel facilitators,” and says he is “not believed to be directly linked to the attacks on 11 September 2001.” [OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, 9/6/2006 ; TIME, 9/6/2006; DICKEY, 2009, PP. 77] In 2006, Bush will make new claims about Zubaida’s capture that are at odds with the known facts (see September 6, 2006). Entity Tags: Ron Suskind, George W. Bush, Bush administration, Abu Zubaida, George J. Tenet Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

April 11, 2002: Congresswoman Suspects Bush Knew of 9/11 in Advance

Cynthia McKinney. [Source: House of Representatives] Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney (D) calls for a thorough investigation into whether President Bush and other government officials may have been warned of the 9/11 attacks but did nothing to prevent them. She is the first national-level politician to do so. She states: “News reports from Der Spiegel to the London Observer, from the Los Angeles Times to MSNBC to CNN, indicate that many different warnings were received by the administration.… I am not aware of any evidence showing that President Bush or members of his administration have personally profited from the attacks of 9/11.… On the other hand, what is undeniable is that corporations close to the administration have directly benefited from the increased defense spending arising from the aftermath of September 11. The Carlyle Group, Dyn-Corp, and Halliburton certainly stand out as companies close to this administration.” [ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, 4/12/2002] McKinney’s comments are criticized and ridiculed by other politicians and the media. For instance, Congressman Mark Foley (R) states, “She has said some outrageous things but this has gone too far.… Maybe there should be an investigation as she suggests—but one focused on her.” Senator Zell Miller (D) says her comments were dangerous and irresponsible. [WASHINGTON POST, 4/12/2002] An editorial in her home state calls her the “most prominent nut” promoting 9/11 “conspiracy theories.” [ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, 4/15/2002] One columnist says she is possibly “a delusional paranoiac” or “a socialist rabble-rouser who despises her own country.” [ORLANDO SENTINEL, 4/21/2002] White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer said McKinney “must be running for the hall of fame of the Grassy Knoll Society.” [WASHINGTON POST, 4/12/2002] One month after McKinney’s comments, the Bush administration comes under fire after reports reveal it had been warned five weeks before 9/11 about possible al-Qaeda plane hijackings, and McKinney claims vindication. She will lose reelection later in the year, but win her seat back in 2004. [OFFICE OF CONGRESSWOMAN CYNTHIA MCKINNEY, 5/16/2002] Entity Tags: Cynthia McKinney, Carlyle Group, Halliburton, Inc., Bush administration, George W. Bush, Ari Fleischer, Mark Foley, Zell Miller Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

April 17, 2002: Bush Falsely Promises ‘Marshall Plan’ for Afghanistan President Bush explicitly likens US reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan to the successful Marshall Plan that helped rebuild Europe after World War II. At the Virginia Military Institute, where Gen. George Marshall trained a century ago, Bush calls the Marshall Plan “a beacon to light the path that we, too, must follow.” He says that Afghans have felt abandoned before, including by the US at the end of the Afghan war against the Soviets in the 1980s, and says, “We’re not going to repeat that mistake. We’re tough, we’re determined, we’re relentless. We will stay until the mission is done.” He vows to avoid the syndrome of “initial success, followed by long years of floundering and ultimate failure.” The New York Times will later note that that speech is little-noticed in the US but fuels expectations in Afghanistan and bolsters the stature of Hamid Karzai shortly before he is formally chosen to lead the Afghan government. But Bush’s promise will fail to materialize. In the months following the speech, the Bush administration fails to make any detailed reconstruction plan. For the next few years, Afghanistan will end up getting less assistance per capita than post-conflict Bosnia and Kosovo, or even poverty-stricken Haiti. [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/12/2007] Entity Tags: Hamid Karzai, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, War in Afghanistan

April 18, 2002: Bush Says Chavez Must Learn Lesson from Unrest US President Bush warns Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to draw a lesson from the unrest that his country has just experienced and insists that he commit himself to democracy. “If there’s lessons to be learned, it’s important that he learn them,” Bush says in a meeting with Colombian President Andres Pastrana. [BBC, 4/18/2002] Entity Tags: Hugo Chavez Frias, Andres Pastrana, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: US-Venezuela (1948-2005)

April 24-25, 2002: Saudi Prince Said to Meet Suspected Hijacker Associate while Visiting Bush; Three Figures in Saudi Crown Prince’s Entourage Are Wanted by FBI

Prince Bandar and President Bush meet at Bush’s ranch in August, 2002. [Source: Associated Press] Crown Prince Abdullah, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, is due to arrive in Houston, Texas, to meet with President Bush at his ranch in nearby Crawford, Texas. Abdullah’s entourage is so large that it fills eight airplanes. As these planes land, US intelligence learns that one person on the flight manifests is wanted by US law enforcement, and two more are on a terrorist watch list. An informed source will later claim that the FBI is ready to “storm the plane and pull those guys off.” However, the State Department fears an international incident. An interagency conflict erupts over what to do. The Wall Street Journal will report in 2003, “Details about what happened to the three men in the end are not entirely clear, and no one at [the State Department] was willing to provide any facts about the incident. What is clear, though, is that the three didn’t get anywhere near Crawford, but were also spared the ‘embarrassment’ of arrest. And the House of Saud was spared an ‘international incident.’” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/13/2003] The next day, Osama Basnan, an alleged associate of 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, reports his passport stolen to Houston police. [NEWSWEEK, 11/24/2002] This confirms that Basnan is in Houston on the same day that Crown Prince Abdullah, Prince Saud al-Faisal, and Saudi US Ambassador Prince Bandar meet with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Powell, and National Security Adviser Rice at Bush’s Crawford ranch. [US-SAUDI ARABIAN BUSINESS COUNCIL, 4/25/2002] While in Texas, it is believed that Basnan “met with a high Saudi prince who has responsibilities for intelligence matters and is known to bring suitcases full of cash into the United States.” [NEWSWEEK, 11/24/2002; GUARDIAN, 11/25/2002] The still-classified section of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry is said to discuss the possibility of Basnan meeting this figure at this time. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/2/2003] It is unknown if Basnan and/or the Saudi prince he allegedly meets have any connection to the three figures wanted by the FBI, or even if one or both of them could have been among the wanted figures. Basnan will be arrested in the US for visa fraud in August 2002, and then deported two months later (see August 22-November 2002). Entity Tags: Osama Basnan, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Nawaf Alhazmi, Saud al-Faisal, US Department of State, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Condoleezza Rice, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, Bandar bin Sultan, Colin Powell, George W. Bush, Khalid Almihdhar Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

May 2002: Gen. Franks Says There Is No War Plan for Invading Iraq When asked at a news conference in Tampa about what kind of military force would be needed to invade Iraq, Gen. Tommy Franks answers, “That’s a great question and one for which I don’t have an answer, because my boss has not yet asked me to put together a plan to do that.” Two years later, Franks will be on the record saying Rumsfeld instructed him to draw war plans up in November 2001 (see November 27, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 5/24/2002; CBS NEWS, 4/18/2004] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Thomas Franks Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

May 1, 2002: Bush: ‘I’m Going to Kick [Saddam’s] Sorry Motherf_cking ass all over the Middle East’ During the White House daily press briefing, Ari Fleischer is peppered with questions about Bush’s Iraq policy by Helen Thomas, a reporter for Hearst News Service. [WHITE HOUSE, 5/1/2002; ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 2-3] After the briefing, Fleischer meets with the president and recounts his exchange with Thomas. According to Adam Levine, a White House communications assistant who is present, the president’s mood immediately changes. “Did you tell her I don’t like motherf_ckers who gas their own people?,” Bush asks. “Did you tell her I don’t like assholes who lie to the world? Did you tell her I’m going to kick his sorry motherf_cking ass all over the Middle East?” Fleischer responds, “I told her half of that.” [ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 2-3 SOURCES: ADAM LEVINE] Entity Tags: Ari Fleischer, George W. Bush, Adam Levine Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

May 15, 2002: Bush’s ‘Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US’ Warning Is Leaked to Public

The New York Post has a banner headline on May 16, 2002. [Source: New York Post] The Bush administration is embarrassed when the CBS Evening News reveals that President Bush had been warned about al-Qaeda domestic attacks in August 2001 (see August 6, 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/15/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 5/16/2002] CBS’s David Martin reports: “The president’s daily intelligence brief is delivered to the president each morning, often by the director of central intelligence himself. In the weeks before 9/11 it warned that an attack by Osama bin Laden could involve the hijacking of a US aircraft.” [MCCLELLAN, 2008, PP. 113] Bush had repeatedly said that he had “no warning” of any kind. Press secretary Ari Fleischer states unequivocally that while Bush had been warned of possible hijackings, “[t]he president did not—not—receive information about the use of airplanes as missiles by suicide bombers.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/15/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 5/16/2002] “Until the attack took place, I think it’s fair to say that no one envisioned that as a possibility.” [MSNBC, 9/18/2002] Fleischer claims the August memo was titled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike the US,” but the real title is soon found to end with “Strike in US” [WASHINGTON POST, 5/18/2002] The Guardian will state a few days later, “[T]he memo left little doubt that the hijacked airliners were intended for use as missiles and that intended targets were to be inside the US.” It further states that, “now, as the columnist Joe Conason points out in the current edition of the New York Observer, ‘conspiracy’ begins to take over from ‘incompetence’ as a likely explanation for the failure to heed—and then inform the public about—warnings that might have averted the worst disaster in the nation’s history.” [GUARDIAN, 5/19/2002] Current deputy press secretary Scott McClellan will point out in 2008: “The [CBS] report left much open to question. Was it suggesting that the president had received info that should have led him to act? Was it just a possible warning sign, like many others that may have gone unheeded? Or was it something else, possibly a nonspecific bit of intelligence from years earlier?” McClellan will write that the uncertainty “mattered little to Democratic leaders in Congress. They saw an opportunity to attack the president’s strong suit—his leadership in the war on terrorism—and cut into his enormous popularity ahead of the midterm elections that coming November.” [MCCLELLAN, 2008, PP. 113] Entity Tags: Bush administration, David Martin, Osama bin Laden, George W. Bush, Scott McClellan, Ari Fleischer, Joe Conason Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

May 16, 2002: Vice President Cheney Publicly Warns Democrats Against Criticizing Handling of Pre-9/11 Warnings In the wake of new information on what President Bush knew, Vice President Cheney states, “[M]y Democratic friends in Congress… need to be very cautious not to seek political advantage by making incendiary suggestions, as were made by some today, that the White House had advance information that would have prevented the tragic attacks of 9/11.” He calls such criticism “thoroughly irresponsible… in time of war” and states that any serious probe of 9/11 foreknowledge would be tantamount to giving “aid and comfort” to the enemy. [WASHINGTON POST, 5/17/2002] The days later, Cheney adds that he doesn’t “have any problem with a legitimate debate over the performance of our intelligence agencies,” but he has “a real problem with the suggestion that somehow my president had information and failed to act upon it to prevent the attack of Sept. 11.” He calls this “beyond the pale.” On May 21, the on-line newspaper Salon suggests that such pressure “appears to have worked. Democrats are largely chastened in their criticism of the [Bush] administration, and few have criticized attempts to silence them.” [SALON, 5/21/2002] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

May 16, 2002 and After: Democrats Raise Questions about Bush’s Warning of 9/11 Attacks Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) says he is “gravely concerned” to learn that President Bush “received a warning in August about the threat of hijackers,” referring to a CBS News report revealing that Bush had been warned about a possible hijacking over a month before the 9/11 attacks (see August 6, 2001). Daschle calls on the White House to provide the classified briefing to Congressional investigators. House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO) says, using the language of Watergate investigators, “I think what we have to do now is find out what the president, what the White House knew about the events leading up to 9/11, when they knew it, and, most importantly, what was done about it at the time.” White House deputy press secretary Scott McClellan will later write that, as objectionable as the White House finds these statements, “the Democrat who most aroused the ire of the White House and Republicans was New York’s Democratic senator, Hillary Clinton.” Clinton takes the floor of the Senate and says, “We learn today something we might have learned at least eight months ago: that President Bush had been informed last year, before September 11, of a possible al-Qaeda plot to hijack a US airliner.” She displays a New York Post headline that reads, “BUSH KNEW” (see May 15, 2002) and “9/11 BOMBSHELL.” “The president knew what?” Clinton asks. McClellan will write that he and his White House colleagues are “incensed” at Clinton’s rhetoric: “To us, such grandstanding appeared to be a return to the ugly partisan warfare that had come to define Washington and its culture during the 1990s. Politics as war, the innuendo of scandal, and the egregious implication that the president had deliberately neglected the country’s safety—it was all in service of the November election results. All the familiar elements were there. The story and the partisan accusations that followed provided great controversy for the media to cover.” (In this passage, McClellan fails to note that White House political guru Karl Rove had, months before, advised Bush and Republican candidates to use the war to attack Democrats in the November 2002 elections—see January 2002). McClellan will complain that Clinton “had not even bothered to call [the White House] to find out more about the facts behind the headlines before delivering her speech,” and will note: “To us, the disingenuous way the leaders rushed to create a damning story line about the president and his administration crossed a line. Republicans objected vehemently and aggressively in a counteroffensive led by the White House,” with Vice President Dick Cheney calling the Democrats’ questions “incendiary” (see May 16, 2002) and Bush declaring, “Had we any inkling, whatsoever, that terrorists were about to attack our country, we would have moved heaven and earth to protect America.” Bush adds: “And I’m confident that President Clinton would have done the same thing (see September 7, 2003). Any president would have.” McClellan will call Bush’s statement “a gesture toward the rapidly vanishing spirit of bipartisanship.” He will write that Democrats did not, by themselves, break the bipartisanship that had supposedly reigned before CBS broke the news of the August 6 briefing: “Democrats were responding in part to perceived efforts by Republicans seeking political advantage from the president’s aggressive efforts to wage war against Islamist terrorists,” and will note that in 1998, Republicans accused President Clinton of “wagging the dog”—launching military strikes against Iraq to distract the nation from the Monica Lewinsky scandal (see December 16-19, 1998). [MCCLELLAN, 2008, PP. 117-118] Entity Tags: Hillary Rodham Clinton, Bush administration, George W. Bush, Tom Daschle, Scott McClellan, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Richard Gephardt, Karl Rove Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

May 17, 2002: President Bush Claims He Did Not Know ‘Enemy Was Going to Use Airplanes to Kill’ on 9/11 President Bush says of 9/11 in a speech, “Had I known that the enemy was going to use airplanes to kill on that fateful morning, I would have done everything in my power to protect the American people.” [US PRESIDENT, 5/20/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

May 22, 2002: Gonzales Says Framers of Constitution Intended ‘Strong Presidency,’ but Is Accused of Misrepresentation White House counsel Alberto Gonzales tells reporters that “the framers of the Constitution, I think, intended there to be a strong presidency in order to carry out certain functions, and [President Bush] feels an obligation to leave the office in better shape than when he came in.” Former Nixon White House counsel John Dean will sharply disagree with Gonzales in 2004. Dean will write, “In fact, the framers intended the exact opposite, and the president did not even have a staff until 1857, and what has become the modern presidency (beyond anything contemplated by the founders) occurred during the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, with the creation of the Executive Office of the President.” [DEAN, 2004, PP. 179] Entity Tags: John Dean, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Executive Office of the President, Alberto R. Gonzales, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

May 23, 2002: President Bush Opposes Independent 9/11 Commission President Bush says he is opposed to establishing a special, independent commission to probe how the government dealt with terrorism warnings before 9/11. [CBS NEWS, 5/23/2002] He will later change his stance in the face of overwhelming support for the idea (see September 20, 2002), and will then sabotage an agreement reached with Congress to establish a commission. Several years after leaving the White House, current Bush press secretary Scott McClellan will write that the president’s reluctance to open an independent investigation into the 9/11 attacks (see November 15, 2002) was part of a larger penchant for secrecy in the administration. McClellan will write: “Unfortunately, the initial response of the Bush White House to demands by partisan critics in Congress and elsewhere for an independent investigation fueled the firestorm of anger. It was an early indication that the Bush administration did not sufficiently accept the necessity for transparency in its management of the public business. The president and his senior advisers had little appetite for outside investigations. They resisted openness, and believed that investigations simply meant close scrutiny of things they would prefer to keep confidential. Not that anything they’d done had necessarily crossed a legal line; rather, some things done privately might not look so good if disclosed publicly, and might cause political embarrassment for the president.… The Bush administration lacked real accountability in large part because Bush himself did not embrace openness or government in the sunshine. His belief in secrecy and compartmentalization was activated when controversy began to stir.” [MCCLELLAN, 2008, PP. 117-118] Entity Tags: Scott McClellan, Bush administration, 9/11 Commission, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

May 24, 2002: US, Russia Sign SORT Nuclear Reduction Agreement

Bush and Putin at a Kremlin news conference announcing the SORT signing. [Source: September 11 News (.com)] Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin sign a joint US-Russian treaty, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), agreeing to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals from some 6,000 warheads, respectively, to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads apiece. Bush allies hail the agreement as evidence of Bush’s willingness to negotiate with other nations and his desire to reduce and perhaps end the threat of mutual nuclear annihilation. However, the treaty is very similar in content to an informal agreement between Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin in 1997. And SORT has far more flexibility built into its framework than either Clinton or Yeltsin had discussed: it does not call for the destruction of delivery vehicles, as the START I and II agreements had (see May 1982 and After), nor does it call for the destruction of warheads themselves, as START III had. In reality, either side can merely remove weapons from missiles and bombers, store them, and redeploy them in the future. Secretary of State Colin Powell will reassure conservative senators in June that “the treaty will allow you to have as many warheads as you want.” Arms reduction opponent John Bolton (see June 2001) approves the treaty, later noting that it “provided ‘exit ramps’ to allow for rapid change.” The treaty—only 500 words long—provides for no verification protocols whatsoever. And, as author J. Peter Scoblic will later write, “in a bit of diplomatic quantum mechanics, the treaty’s warhead limit was slated to take effect on the very day that it expired—December 31, 2012—meaning it would be valid for no more than twenty-four hours.” Scoblic will conclude that the treaty, in line with Bush’s “new strategic framework” (see May 1, 2001), is “still designed to fight nothing less than an all-out nuclear war with Russia.” [FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, 5/24/2002; SCOBLIC, 2008, PP. 177-178] Bush sees little need for the treaty, or any treaty, saying that “mutual trust” between the US and Russia should suffice (see July 2001). He agrees to this treaty in what Scoblic later calls a “condescending” manner, saying, “If we need to write it down on a piece of paper, I’ll do that.” Bolton will later call the treaty “the end of arms control.” [SCOBLIC, 2008, PP. 184] Entity Tags: J. Peter Scoblic, George W. Bush, John R. Bolton, Vladimir Putin, William Jefferson (“Bill”) Clinton, Colin Powell, Boris Yeltsin Timeline Tags: US International Relations

May 30, 2002: Afghan, Turkmen, and Pakistani Leaders Sign Pipeline Deal

Leaders sign the pipeline agreement. [Source: Associated Press] Afghanistan’s interim leader, Hamid Karzai, Turkmenistan’s President Niyazov, and Pakistani President Musharraf meet in Islamabad and sign a memorandum of understanding on the trans-Afghanistan gas pipeline project. [DAWN (KARACHI), 5/31/2002; ALEXANDER'S GAS & OIL CONNECTIONS, 6/8/2002] Afghan leader Hamid Karzai (who formerly worked for Unocal) calls Unocal the “lead company” in building the pipeline. [BBC, 5/13/2002] The Los Angeles Times comments, “To some here, it looked like the fix was in for Unocal when President Bush named a former Unocal consultant, Zalmay Khalilzad, as his special envoy to Afghanistan late last year .” [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 5/30/2002] Unocal claims that it has no interest in any Afghanistan pipeline after 9/11. However, Afghan officials say that Unocal will be the lead company in funding the pipeline. The Afghan deputy minister of mines comments on Unocal’s claim of disinterest: “Business has its secrets and mysteries. Maybe… they don’t want it to be disclosed in the media.” [TORONTO STAR, 3/2/2003] Entity Tags: Hamid Karzai, Saparmurat Niyazov, Unocal, Pervez Musharraf, George W. Bush, Zalmay M. Khalilzad Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Summer 2002: Bush Promises ‘Road Map’ to Peace between Israel and Palestine; No Proposal Ever Delivered The King of Jordan, Abdullah II, visits Washington to discuss the Israel-Palestinian peace process. Abdullah’s visit comes on the heels of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah’s earlier visit, where he threatened to break off discussions with the US if President Bush refused to deal seriously with the matter (see Spring 2002). Though the Saudi leader seemingly shook up Bush with his unusually direct insistence on American action, Bush appears surprised that the Jordanian king is also concerned with the issue. Bush listens politely to Abdullah’s appeal, and says that the king’s idea of a “road map to peace” sounds reasonable. National Security Council official Flynt Leverett, the head of the NSC’s Mideast affairs division, promises Abdullah that such a “road map” will be drawn up by the end of 2002. No such proposal is ever completed; neoconservatives in the Defense Department (Donald Rumsfeld and Douglas Feith), the Vice President’s Office (John Hannah and Lewis “Scooter” Libby), and the NSC (Elliott Abrams) continue to oppose the idea, calling it nothing but a reward to the Palestinians for “bad behavior” (see December 2001-January 2002). Only if Palestine rejects terrorism and implements democracy will the US enter into negotiations, they insist, regardless of what promises Bush has made. [ESQUIRE, 10/18/2007] Entity Tags: Office of the Vice President, Donald Rumsfeld, Bush administration, Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, Douglas Feith, Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby, Elliott Abrams, George W. Bush, US Department of Defense, Flynt Leverett, National Security Council, John Hannah Timeline Tags: US International Relations

June 1, 2002: Bush Launches Doctrine of Preemptive Attack In a speech, President Bush announces a “new” US policy of preemptive attacks: “If we wait for threats to fully materialize we will have waited too long. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 6/2/2002] This preemptive strategy is included in a defensive strategic paper the next month (see July 13, 2002), and formally announced in September 2002 (see September 20, 2002). Despite the obvious parallels, the mainstream media generally fails to report that this “new” antiterrorism strategy was first proposed by Bush’s key administration officials in 1992 (see March 8, 1992) and has been continually advocated by the same people ever since. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/20/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 9/21/2002; GUARDIAN, 9/21/2002] Furthermore, State Department Director of Policy Planning Richard Haass originally drafted this new national security strategy. However, Condoleezza Rice had ordered that it be completely rewritten, reportedly wanting “something bolder.” The man responsible for this task was Philip Zelikow, who in 2003 will be appointed executive director of the 9/11 Commission (see Mid-December 2002-March 2003). [MANN, 2004, PP. 316-317] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Summer and Fall 2002: White House Engaged in ‘Orchestrated Campaign’ to ‘Manipulate’ Public Opinion on Iraq Invasion, Media Complicit in Effort, according to Deputy Press Secretary According to deputy press secretary Scott McClellan, the White House is in the midst of a large and widespread effort to manipulate public opinion in favor of the impending invasion of Iraq. Writing in 2008, McClellan will note: “[President] Bush and the White House were engaging in a carefully orchestrated campaign to shape and manipulate sources of public approval to our advantage. We’d done much the same on other issues—tax cuts and education—to great success. But war with Iraq was different. Beyond the irreversible human costs and the substantial financial price, the decision to go to war and the way we went about selling it would ultimately lead to increased polarization and intensified partisan warfare. Our lack of candor and honesty in making the case for war would later provoke a partisan response from our opponents that, in its own way, further distorted and obscured a more nuanced reality.… And through it all, the media would serve as complicit enablers. Their primary focus would be in covering the campaign to sell the war, rather than aggressively questioning the rationale behind the war in pursuing the truth behind it. The White House knew the national media would cover its arguments for war even if the underlying evidence was a little shaky. Questions ought to be raised, but the administration had the biggest platform, especially when something as dramatic and controversial as war was at stake. And the public is generally inclined to believe what the White House says, or at least give it the benefit of the doubt until the watchdog media proves it is unreliable. But in this case, the media would neglect their watchdog role, focusing less on truth and accuracy and more on whether the campaign was succeeding.” [MCCLELLAN, 2008, PP. 125-126] Writing in hindsight, McClellan will continue: “In the permanent campaign era, it was all about manipulating sources of public opinion to the president’s advantage. Of course, I didn’t see it that way at the time. Like most if not all of those involved, I viewed it as the way things were done to advance the broader agenda—simply part of the way Washington governed. I didn’t pause to think about the potential consequences of our campaign to manipulate the public debate. When you are caught up in the intense day-to-day experience of the White House and Washington, your focus is on winning the daily battles, which makes it extremely difficult to step back and have a clear-eyed perspective on the broader meaning of it all.… Today, the fatal flaws of the administration’s strategy are apparent. Bush’s team confused the political propaganda campaign with the realities of the war-making campaign. We were more focused on creating a sense of gravity and urgency about the threat from Saddam Hussein than governing on the basis of the truths of the situation.” [MCCLELLAN, 2008, PP. 134-135] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Scott McClellan, Bush administration Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

June 4, 2002: Officer with Possible Unique 9/11 Knowledge Is Reprimanded for Criticizing Bush Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Steve Butler is suspended from his post at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California, and is told he could face a court martial for writing a letter to a local newspaper calling President Bush a “joke” and accusing him of allowing the 9/11 attacks to happen. The military prohibits public criticism of superiors. [BBC, 6/5/2002; MONTEREY COUNTY HERALD, 6/5/2002] What is not reported is that he may have had unique knowledge about 9/11: A hijacker named Saeed Alghamdi trained at the Defense Language Institute and Butler was Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs there (note that this is not the same person as the Steven Butler who later testifies before the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry). [GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, 9/17/2001] Later in the month the Air Force announces “the matter is resolved” and Butler will not face a court-martial, but it is unknown if he faced a lesser punishment. [KNIGHT RIDDER, 6/14/2002] Entity Tags: Steve Butler, Saeed Alghamdi, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

June 4, 2002: Bush Plays Down EPA Report on Global Warming; Reaffirms Rejection of Kyoto Protocol Responding to a reporter’s question about global warming, President Bush, referring to a recent EPA report (see May 2002) acknowledging that human activity is contributing to the Earth’s warming, says, “I read the report put out by a—put out by the bureaucracy.” He adds: “I do not support the Kyoto treaty. The Kyoto treaty would severely damage the United States economy, and I don’t accept that. I accept the alternative we put out, that we can grow our economy and, at the same time, through technologies, improve our environment.” [US PRESIDENT, 6/10/2002, PP. 957 ] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Bush's Environmental Record, Global Warming

June 4, 2002: President Bush Acknowledges Agencies Made Mistakes, Continues to Insist that 9/11 Could Not Have Been Prevented For the first time, Bush concedes that his intelligence agencies had problems: “In terms of whether or not the FBI and the CIA were communicating properly, I think it is clear that they weren’t.” [LONDON TIMES, 6/5/2002] However, in an address to the nation three days later, President Bush still maintains, “Based on everything I’ve seen, I do not believe anyone could have prevented the horror of September the 11th.” [SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 6/8/2002] Days earlier, Newsweek reported that the FBI had prepared a detailed chart showing how agents could have uncovered the 9/11 plot if the CIA had told them what it knew about the hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar sooner. (FBI Director Mueller denies the existence of such a chart. [WASHINGTON POST, 6/3/2002] ) One FBI official says, “There’s no question we could have tied all 19 hijackers together.” [NEWSWEEK, 6/2/2002] Attorney General Ashcroft also says it is unlikely better intelligence could have stopped the attacks. [WASHINGTON POST, 6/3/2002] Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, John Ashcroft, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Nawaf Alhazmi, Central Intelligence Agency, George W. Bush, Robert S. Mueller III Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

June 6, 2002: White House Uses Homeland Security Announcement to Divert Media Attention from FBI Testimony In a successful attempt to “steal” some media coverage from FBI agent Coleen Rowley’s testimony and concurrent media blitz (see June 6, 2002), the Bush administration counters with a public relations event of its own. The same day that Rowley testifies, President Bush announces the proposed creation of the new, Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—an agency proposed by Democrats and, up till now, one that Bush has vehemently opposed, preferring instead to make any such agency a subsidiary office within the White House. It will be the largest reorganization of the government since the implementation of the 1947 National Security Act, when the Defense Department, National Security Council (NSC), and CIA were created. To ensure that Rowley’s testimony does not dominate the headlines, Bush also gives an evening speech on prime-time television, again announcing the new department. In that speech, Bush calls the DHS the latest effort in the US’s “titanic struggle against terror.” In 2006, author and media critic Frank Rich will write that the announcement and speech “assur[e] that Rowley’s whistle-blowing would be knocked out of the lead position on the next day’s morning shows and newspapers.” DHS will not be officially activated for almost six months (see November 25, 2002), but the announcement and subsequent speech succeeds in driving Rowley’s testimony off the front pages and the television broadcasts. Rich will write that the announcement of the capture of alleged “dirty bomber” Jose Padilla (see June 10, 2002) four days later, even though Padilla had been in custody since May 8 (see May 8, 2002), further drives any mention or analysis of Rowley’s testimony out of the news. [WHITE HOUSE, 6/6/2002; CNN, 6/7/2002; RICH, 2006, PP. 49-50] Entity Tags: Frank Rich, Bush administration, Coleen Rowley, US Department of Homeland Security, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

June 6, 2002: Bush Tells Nation Zubaida Is ‘Al-Qaeda’s Chief of Operations’ In an address to the nation, President Bush labels captured Islamist militant Abu Zubaida (see March 28, 2002) as “al-Qaeda’s chief of operations.” He says: “Among those we have captured is a man named Abu Zubaida, al-Qaeda’s chief of operations. From him, and from hundreds of others, we are learning more about how the terrorists plan and operate; information crucial in anticipating and preventing future attacks.” He warns, “[W]e now know that thousands of trained killers are plotting to attack us, and this terrible knowledge requires us to act differently.” [WHITE HOUSE, 6/6/2002] This is, presumably, an oblique reference to the torture being inflicted on Zubaida and other detainees by CIA personnel (see April - June 2002). And by this time, senior government officials are aware that many intelligence officials believe that Zubaida’s importance and links to al-Qaeda have been overstated (see Shortly After March 28, 2002 and April 9, 2002 and After). Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Abu Zubaida Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

June 10, 2002: Attorney General Ashcroft Announces Padilla Arrest, Mentions Alleged ‘Dirty Bomb’ Plot Attorney General John Ashcroft announces Padilla’s arrest (see June 9, 2002), claiming that “in apprehending [Padilla] as he sought entry into the United States,” the US government has “disrupted an unfolding terrorist plot to attack the United States by exploding a radioactive ‘dirty bomb.’” [CBS NEWS, 6/10/2002] Similarly, President George Bush says: “This guy, Padilla, is a bad guy. And he is where he needs to be—detained,” along with many other “would-be killers” as part of the war on terrorism. And Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld too, states that Padilla “was unquestionably involved in terrorist activities.” [CNN, 6/11/2002] Entity Tags: John Ashcroft, Jose Padilla, Donald Rumsfeld, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

June 10-11, 2002: Evangelist Says Islam Founded by ‘Demon-Possessed Pedophile,’ Turns Believers into ‘Terrorists’

The Reverend Jerry Vines. [Source: Thomas White] Reverend Jerry Vines, pastor of a large Baptist church in Florida, denounces Islam as being responsible for the 9/11 attacks, and criticizes America’s propensity for “religious pluralism” as making the nation vulnerable to further attacks as well as causing other social ills. In his statement, made to an audience at the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), Vines insults Islam and its founder, the Prophet Muhammed: “They would have us believe that Islam is just as good as Christianity,” Vines says. “Christianity was founded by the virgin-born son of God, Jesus Christ. Islam was founded by Muhammad, a demon-possessed pedophile who had 12 wives, the last one of which was a 9-year-old girl.” Muslims do not worship the same god as Christians do, he adds: “And I will tell you Allah is not Jehovah, either. Jehovah’s not going to turn you into a terrorist.” White House press secretary Scott McClellan says after Vines’s remarks that President Bush “believes Islam is a religion that teaches peace. The president believes in religious tolerance and respects people of all faiths.” The day after Vines’s incendiary remarks, Bush addresses the SBC meeting via satellite to extol Baptists’ tolerance, praising their “extraordinary influence” on American history and saying, “Baptists were among the earliest champions of religious tolerance and freedom.” Vines’s remarks echo earlier attacks on Islam by other prominent evangelicals, including Franklin Graham (see October 2001). Other evangelical Christians, including the Reverend Jerry Falwell, rush to support Vines’s remarks, but Jewish leaders and mainstream Protestant groups join American Muslims in denouncing the remarks. Abraham Foxman, the director of the Jewish Anti-Defamation League, calls Vines’s remarks “deplorable,” and says such inflammatory language is “not surprising coming from the leadership of the Southern Baptist Convention, which has a track record of denigrating and delegitimizing other religions.” [WASHINGTON POST, 6/20/2002] Entity Tags: Jerry Vines, Abraham Foxman, Anti-Defamation League, Jerry Falwell, Franklin Graham, George W. Bush, Scott McClellan, Southern Baptist Convention Timeline Tags: US International Relations

June 12, 2002: GAO Finds Minor Damage in White House during Clinton-Bush Transition The General Accounting Office (GAO) concludes its own investigation of the so-called Clinton “vandal scandal” (see January 26, 2001), and finds that some minor destruction of property did take place within the White House during the final days of the Clinton administration. [NEW YORK TIMES, 6/12/2002] Keyboards Damaged, Glue on Desks, Graffiti in Restroom, Stolen Plaque - The GAO finds that about $13,000 to $14,000 of damage actually took place; initial reports from Bush administration sources placed the damages at closer to $250,000. Much of that money was spent on replacing computer keyboards, some of which had the “W” key either pried off or defaced. Other damage included glue smeared on desk drawers, derogatory graffiti written on a stall in a White House men’s bathroom, disparaging messages left on telephone answering machines, and signs with satirical or disparaging messages affixed to White House office doors. A file cabinet had a sticker reading “Jail to the Thief” stuck inside one drawer, obviously referring to allegations that President Bush had stolen the 2000 presidential election. And a foot-wide presidential seal went missing from the Eisenhower Executive Office Building. The GAO report notes that similar pranks and property damage were reported during earlier transitions, including the 1993 transition between the first Bush administration and the incoming Clinton administration. “We were unable to conclude whether the 2001 transition was worse than previous ones,” the report says. “Any intentional damage at the White House complex, which is a national treasure, is both inappropriate and a serious matter. The theft of or willful damage to government property would constitute a criminal act.” Representative Bob Barr (R-GA), a Clinton critic who requested the GAO investigation as well as an earlier investigation conducted by the General Services Administration (see May 18, 2001), says of the GAO report, “The Clinton administration treated the White House worse than college freshmen checking out of their dorm rooms.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 6/12/2002; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 6/12/2002] Most Allegations Never Confirmed - Salon correspondent Kerry Lauerman notes that the GAO report is “a far cry from what was promised by Republicans like… Barr.” He asks: “Whatever happened to the looting and trashing Barr said would be documented? The expensive paintings that were supposedly stolen from the White House? The ‘cut wires’ that White House press secretary Ari Fleischer had publicly referred to (see January 25, 2001)? The never-explained ‘porn bombs’ that anonymous GOP sources had complained about? The presidential seals that were stolen, or the historical doorknobs that had been yanked off for souvenirs?” Some of the allegations of missing items, such as the missing seal and antique doorknobs, cannot be demonstrated as the result of theft, but are merely listed as “missing.” And many of the items, such as the antique doorknobs, were not on original inventory lists, but, as Lauerman writes, “suddenly showed up on a White House list compiled in June 2001—based on the months-old ‘recollections’ of staffers—which does not exactly scream reliability” (see June 2-3, 2001). [SALON, 6/13/2002] Bush White House Demands Further Investigations - Bush officials are reported to be “deeply disappointed” with the report, with White House counsel Alberto Gonzales demanding more details, including the full text of the graffiti and other messages that Gonzales describes as “especially offensive or vulgar.” Gonzales is disappointed that the report did not include, for example, “portions of a sign of a mock Time magazine cover” that was among the prank signs left in the White House, and that apparently contained a profanity. “It is vital to include the substance of specific graffiti, messages and signs observed” in order to fully document the acts of vandalism, Gonzales argues. “The content of a message can—and often does—indicate who wrote the message, and when” and “often provides an insight into the mindset or intention of the person who wrote it.” The GAO responds that such details are “unnecessary and inappropriate.” A Bush administration official accuses the GAO of “undertak[ing] a concerted effort to downplay the damage found in the White House complex.” Lauerman writes: “[I]t’s safe to say that a close reading of the GAO report doesn’t validate the charges of wanton, widespread destruction by the Clinton team. What it does show is the lengths to which the Bush administration went to try to make the scandal charges stick.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 6/12/2002; SALON, 6/13/2002] Degrees of Cooperation - Democratic National Committee spokeswoman Jennifer Palmieri says: “The real scandal here is how much time and money the Republicans have wasted in a vendetta against the Clinton administration. It’s troubling that the White House cooperated so enthusiastically with this investigation, but refused to provide the GAO with records of the energy task force headed by Vice President Cheney” (see May 16, 2001). Bush spokeswoman Anne Womack responds: “The GAO confirmed that damage was done at the White House. We have considered this matter closed for more than a year. Our focus is on moving forward.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 6/12/2002] Tremendous Cost of Investigation - Lauerman concludes: “The White House made 78 staffers available for interviews with the GAO, and clearly spent an enormous amount of energy just to try to stick another scandal to the Clintons. (Gonzales’ time alone, billed by the hour, might cost more than the $9,000-plus the GAO blamed on the Clintons.) After 11 months, and an investigation that Democrats told the Washington Post cost $200,000, one somehow expected more. Now that all the facts are in, it seems pretty clear which administration should get the blame for the White House vandal scandal.” [SALON, 6/13/2002] Entity Tags: Alberto R. Gonzales, Anne Womack, Bush administration, Ari Fleischer, Robert “Bob” Barr, Clinton administration, General Services Administration, Kerry Lauerman, George W. Bush, Jennifer Palmieri, General Accounting Office Timeline Tags: Domestic Propaganda

June 20, 2002: Cheney Threatens to Terminate 9/11 Inquiry over NSA Leak Vice President Dick Cheney phones Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Bob Graham (D-FL). Cheney’s call comes early in the morning, and Graham takes it while still shaving. Cheney is agitated; he has just read in the newspaper that telephone calls intercepted by the NSA on September 10, 2001 warned of an imminent al-Qaeda attack. But, the story continues, the intercepts were not translated until September 12, the day after the 9/11 attacks (see September 10, 2001). Cheney is enraged that someone leaked the classified information from the NSA intercepts to the press. As a result, Cheney says, the Bush administration is considering terminating all cooperation with the joint inquiry by the Senate and House Intelligence Committees on the government’s failure to predict and prevent the attacks (see September 18, 2002). (Graham co-chairs the inquiry.) Classified records would no longer be made available to the committees, and administration witnesses would not be available for interviews or testimony. Furthermore, Cheney says, unless the committee leaders take action to find out who leaked the information, and more importantly, take steps to ensure that such leaks never happen again, President Bush will tell the citizenry that Congress cannot be trusted with vital national security secrets. “Take control of the situation,” Cheney tells Graham. The senator responds that he, too, is frustrated with the leaks, but Cheney is unwilling to be mollified. Quick Capitulation - At 7:30 a.m., Graham meets with the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Porter Goss (R-FL), and the ranking members of the committees, Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL, who will later be accused of leaking the information) and Nancy Pelosi (D-CA). They decide to request that the Justice Department conduct a criminal inquiry into whether anyone on either committee, member or staffer, leaked the information to the press. One participant in the meeting later says, “It was a hastily made decision, made out of a sense of panic… and by people with bleary eyes.” Another person involved in the decision later recalls: “There was a real concern that any meaningful oversight by Congress was very much at stake. The political dynamic back then—not that long after September 11—was completely different. They took Cheney’s threats very seriously.” In 2007, reporter Murray Waas will observe that Cheney and other administration officials saw the leak “as an opportunity to undercut Congressional oversight and possibly restrict the flow of classified information to Capitol Hill.” Graham: Congress Victimized by White House 'Set Up' - In 2007, after his retirement from politics, Graham will say: “Looking back at it, I think we were clearly set up by Dick Cheney and the White House. They wanted to shut us down. And they wanted to shut down a legitimate Congressional inquiry that might raise questions in part about whether their own people had aggressively pursued al-Qaeda in the days prior to the September 11 attacks. The vice president attempted to manipulate the situation, and he attempted to manipulate us.… But if his goal was to get us to back off, he was unsuccessful.” Graham will add that Goss shared his concerns, and say that in 2003, he speculates to Goss that the White House had set them up in order to sabotage the joint inquiry; according to Graham, Goss will respond, “I often wondered that myself.” Graham will go on to say that he believes the NSA leak was not only promulgated by a member of Congress, but by White House officials as well; he will base his belief on the fact that Washington Post and USA Today reports contain information not disclosed during the joint committee hearing. “That would lead a reasonable person to infer the administration leaked as well,” he will say, “or what they were doing was trying to set us up… to make this an issue which they could come after us with.” White House Goes Public - The same day, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer tells reporters, “The president [has] very deep concerns about anything that would be inappropriately leaked that could… harm our ability to maintain sources and methods and anything else that could interfere with America’s ability to fight the war on terrorism.” Investigation Will Point to Senate Republican - An investigation by the Justice Department will determine that the leak most likely came from Shelby, but Shelby will deny leaking the intercepts, and the Senate Ethics Committee will decline to pursue the matter (see August 5, 2004). [NATIONAL JOURNAL, 2/15/2007] Entity Tags: National Security Agency, George W. Bush, Bush administration, Bob Graham, Ari Fleischer, House Intelligence Committee, Nancy Pelosi, Senate Ethics Committee, Senate Intelligence Committee, Richard Shelby, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Porter J. Goss, US Department of Justice, Murray Waas Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Civil Liberties

July 2002: Rumsfeld Gains Control of Secret Covert Operations Unit President George Bush issues an executive order transferring control of the covert operations unit “Gray Fox” from the US Army to Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in Tampa at the insistence of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s office. [NEW YORKER, 1/24/2005 SOURCES: UNNAMED FORMER HIGH-LEVEL INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED BY SEYMOUR HERSH] Gray Fox becomes part of the Strategic Support Branch (SSB), a unit jointly run by the Defense Department and the DIA (see October 2001-April 2002). Entity Tags: Strategic Support Branch, or Project Icon, Donald Rumsfeld, Gray Fox, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: US Military

July 2002: New, Poorly Trained Interrogators Arrive at Bagram A new interrogation unit arrives at the Bagram Collection Point (BCP), the improvised interrogation and holding facility at Bagram Air Force Base (see October 2001). The unit is headed by Lieutenant Carolyn Wood (see January 22, 2003-May 8, 2003), who leads a 13-man unit from the 525th Military Intelligence Brigade at Fort Bragg, NC. Wood’s unit is augmented by six Arabic-speaking reservists from the Utah National Guard. Many in the group, consolidated under Company A of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, are counterintelligence specialists with no background in interrogation. Only two of the soldiers have ever questioned actual prisoners. The training they receive is ad hoc and minimal. The noncommissioned officer in charge of the interrogators, Staff Sergeant Steven Loring, will later tell investigators, “There was nothing that prepared us for running an interrogation operation” like the one at Bagram. Nor are the rules of engagement clear. The platoon uses the standard interrogations guide, Section 34-52 of the Army Fleld Manual, and an order from Defense Secretary Rumsfeld to treat prisoners “humanely” and, when possible, within the strictures of the Geneva Conventions. But when President Bush determines in February 2002 that the Conventions do not apply to Taliban and al-Qaeda captives (see February 7, 2002), the interrogators decide they “could deviate slightly from the rules,” in the words of Utah reservist Sergeant James Leahy. “There was the Geneva Conventions for enemy prisoners of war, but nothing for terrorists,” Leahy will tell Army investigators. And the detainees, senior intelligence officers say, are to be considered terrorists until proved otherwise. One group of soldiers is later dubbed “the Testosterone Gang”; they decorate their tent with a Confederate flag, spend large amounts of time bodybuilding, and quickly earn a reputation as some of the most brutal of the soldiers at Bagram. [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/20/2005] Entity Tags: US Department of the Army, Carolyn A. Wood, Donald Rumsfeld, Steven Loring, George W. Bush, James Leahy Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

July 2002: Complaints over Torture Results in Memo Granting Retroactive Legal ‘Immunity’ Military lawyers for a detainee believed to be Abu Zubaida (see March 28, 2002) lodge numerous complaints with unidentified White House officials over the torture of their client. Zubaida has been subjected to waterboarding and other abuses by CIA interrogators (see March 28, 2002-Mid-2004, March 28-August 1, 2002, Mid-April-May 2002, Mid-April 2002, and Mid-May 2002 and After). The complaints trigger a hastily arranged meeting between Vice President Cheney, White House counsel Alberto Gonzales, Cheney’s chief counsel David Addington, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and a number of officials from the Defense and State Departments. The discussion centers on the production of a legal memo specifically for the CIA that would provide retroactive legal immunity for the use of waterboarding and other illegal interrogation methods. According to a subsequent investigation by the Justice Department (see February 22, 2009), the participants in the discussion believe that the methods used against Zubaida are legal because on February 7, 2002, President Bush signed an executive order stating that terrorists were not entitled to protections under the Geneva Conventions (see February 7, 2002). Nevertheless, the participants agree that methods such as waterboarding probably violate international and domestic laws against torture, and therefore the CIA and the Bush administration would both benefit from a legal opinion stating what techniques are legal, and why they do not fit the legal definition of torture. The meeting results in the production of the so-called “Golden Shield” memo (see August 1, 2002). [PUBLIC RECORD, 2/22/2009] Entity Tags: US Department of State, Bush administration, Alberto R. Gonzales, Abu Zubaida, Central Intelligence Agency, US Department of Justice, Condoleezza Rice, Geneva Conventions, David S. Addington, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush, US Department of Defense Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

July 2002: Bush Publicly Supports Anti-Government Rebels in Iran President Bush issues a statement strongly supporting “prodemocracy” forces in Iran, whose stated goal is to overthrow the current Iranian regime. In response, Iranian president Mohammad Khatami, considered a moderate by most Westerners, calls Bush a “warmongerer.” [SCOBLIC, 2008, PP. 247] Entity Tags: Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran

July 2002-March 19, 2003: Intelligence Groups Refute Bush Claim of Iraqi Ties to al-Qaeda Numerous US and British, current and former, intelligence, military, and other government officials who have inside knowledge refute claims made by the Bush administration that Saddam Hussein’s regime has or is seeking ties with international militant Islamic groups. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 8/15/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 9/10/2002; BALTIMORE SUN, 9/26/2002; KNIGHT RIDDER, 10/7/2002; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 10/13/2002; RADIO FREE EUROPE, 10/29/2002; INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 11/1/2002; CBC NEWS, 11/1/2002; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 11/4/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 2/3/2003; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 2/4/2003; INDEPENDENT, 2/9/2003] Entity Tags: Michael Chandler, Richard Durbin, Jean-Louis Bruguiere, Rohan Gunaratna, Vincent Cannistraro, Tony Blair, Saddam Hussein, Youssef M. Ibrahim, Jean Chretien, Jack Straw, Michael O’Hanlon, George W. Bush, Anna Eshoo, Baltasar Garzon, Igor Ivanov, Brent Scowcroft, Daniel Benjamin Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

July 21, 2002: British Document: Britain to Back Military Action against Iraq; Legal Pretext Needed for Invasion; US Post-War Plan Insufficient The British Cabinet Office issues an eight-page briefing note to prepare officials for an upcoming meeting (see July 23, 2002) on Britain’s role in the United States’ confrontation with Iraq. The paper, titled “Conditions for Military Action,” addresses a number of issues including US invasion and post-war planning, legal justification for the use of military force, and what the US and British hope to achieve through “regime change.” [UNITED KINGDOM, 7/21/2002; LONDON TIMES, 5/2/2005; NEWSWEEK, 6/15/2005] British support for use of military force against Iraq - The briefing summarizes the main points of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s April meeting (see April 6-7, 2002) with President Bush, recalling that Blair pledged British support for “military action to bring about regime change” as long as “certain conditions” were met. Blair told Bush that the US and Britain would have to first develop a strategy to build a coalition and “shape public opinion.” Additionally, Britain would prefer that all “options for action to eliminate Iraq’s WMD through the UN weapons inspectors [are] exhausted” and that the Israel-Palestine crisis be quiescent before going to war against Iraq. [UNITED KINGDOM, 7/21/2002] US objectives in Iraq - The briefing paper reports that US military planners see the removal of Saddam Hussein as the primary objective, to be “followed by [the] elimination of Iraqi WMD [weapons of mass destruction].” The briefing notes that within the British government there are doubts that “regime change,” by itself, would be sufficient to gain control over any WMD present in Iraq. [UNITED KINGDOM, 7/21/2002] Creating conditions necessary for legal justification - Noting that “US views of international law vary from that of the UK and the international community,” the briefing paper makes it clear that the British government believes “[r]egime change per se is not a proper basis for military action under international law.” Because Blair told Bush in April that the British would support military action against Iraq, it will be necessary develop a realistic political strategy that would involve, among other things, working with the US to create “the conditions necessary to justify government military action.” It is suggested in the briefing note that an Iraqi refusal to cooperate with weapons inspections could help create such conditions. Saddam Hussein would “likely” agree to admit inspectors and allow them to operate freely during the first six months of inspections when UNMOVIC is in the process of establishing a monitoring and verification system. After this point, the briefing notes, Hussein would probably begin limiting cooperating with inspectors. This would likely not occur until January 2003. Another alternative—one that would provide a legal basis for “regime change” much sooner—is that “an ultimatum could be cast in terms which Saddam would reject… and which would not be regarded as unreasonable by the international community.” [UNITED KINGDOM, 7/21/2002; LONDON TIMES, 5/2/2005; GUARDIAN, 5/2/2005; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 5/4/2005; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 5/12/2005] US invasion plan - According to the briefing paper, US military planners seem to favor an invasion plan that would provide a “running start” to the ground invasion. It would consist of “[a]ir strikes and support for opposition groups in Iraq [that] would lead initially to small-scale land operations.” It would likely begin around November 2002 “with no overt military build-up,” followed by the ground invasion that could commence as early as January 2003. The other option under consideration is the “generated start” plan, which would involve a longer build-up. [UNITED KINGDOM, 7/21/2002; LONDON TIMES, 5/2/2005] US post-war plan - The briefing paper notes that US “military planning for action against Iraq is proceeding apace” —but with “little thought” to issues such as “the aftermath and how to shape it.” It predicts that a “post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise.” The Pentagon’s plans “are virtually silent on this point,” the document notes, warning of the possibility that “Washington could look to [the British] to share a disproportionate share of the burden.” [UNITED KINGDOM, 7/21/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 6/12/2005] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Tony Blair Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

July 30, 2002: White House Creates ‘Office of Global Communications’ to Buff US Image Abroad The White House formally announces plans to create a public diplomacy agency, to be called the Office of Global Communications, that will be charged with projecting a more positive image of the US abroad. [WASHINGTON POST, 7/30/2002; CBS NEWS, 7/30/2002; GUARDIAN, 7/31/2002; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 1/5/2003] It will help the world understand “what America is all about and why America does what it does,” says White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer. The task formerly belonged to the State Department, but Bush’s advisers didn’t think it was “doing a good enough job, so they’re going to take it on,” a former Coalition Information Center (CIC) official tells the Guardian. “Nobody [was] that impressed with [State Department public diplomacy head] Charlotte Beers (see October 2, 2001) and what she’s done. She listens to people. She’s done a lot of listening, but you need to go further than that.” [GUARDIAN, 7/31/2002] This new public diplomacy office, said to be the brainchild of President Bush’s senior adviser, Karen Hughes, has actually “existed for months, quietly working with foreign news media outlets to get the American message out about the war on terrorism,” according to CBS News. [CBS NEWS, 7/30/2002] Entity Tags: Karen Hughes, Hill and Knowlton, Charlotte Beers, Ari Fleischer, George W. Bush, US Department of State Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda

Late July -September 2002: As Much as $700 Million Diverted from Afghanistan to Prepare for Invasion of Iraq President Bush allegedly approves a request from the Pentagon for $700 million to help fund military preparations underway in the Gulf for war against Iraq. The charge is made by Bob Woodward in his book, Plan of Attack, released in the spring of 2004. [WOODWARD, 2004; CBS NEWS, 4/18/2004] The White House and Pentagon will deny the charge claiming that Bush only approved the spending of $178.4 million out of a requested total of $750 million. According to the Pentagon, $178.4 million is spent on 21 projects in Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman. At least 11 of them are in Kuwait, which becomes the major staging ground for operations in Iraq. In that country alone, $24 million is spent constructing an ammunition storage and supply system for an Army brigade, and $15 million worth of communications equipment is installed at the Arifjan Base Camp. The military also builds a $3 million detention facility and a $6.5 million inland petroleum-distribution system. In Qatar, $36.4 million goes toward the construction of a forward headquarters facility for Central Command. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 4/22/2004] The money for these projects is taken from a supplemental appropriation for the Afghan War without congressional approval. [CBS NEWS, 4/18/2004] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, War in Afghanistan

July 31, 2002: AEI Scholar Says Bush Has Already Decided to Attack Iraq, Partly Because of ‘Strong Suspicions’ about Iraq’s Possible Connection to 9/11 American Enterprise Institute Scholar Laurie Mylroie tells CNN’s Aaron Brown that President Bush has already decided to remove Saddam Hussein. She explains that Bush has ordered the CIA to do it covertly, but that “no one, including the CIA director” believes it can be done by covert means alone. Therefore, the US will have to invade. When asked why Bush wants to overthrow Hussein, she responds that it is partly because of Iraq’s illicit weapons and “partly its prior support for terrorism, including strong suspicions about Iraq’s involvement in 9/11 in the part of the vice president’s office and the office of the secretary of defense.” [CNN, 7/31/2002; ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 83] Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, Laurie Mylroie, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Neoconservative Influence

August 2002: Bush: ‘I Loathe’ North Korean Dictator President Bush makes it very clear how he feels about North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. According to Bob Woodward’s book Bush at War, Bush shouts at Woodward: “I loathe Kim Jong Il!… I’ve got a visceral reaction to this guy, because he is starving his people. And I have seen intelligence of these [North Korean] prison camps—they’re huge—that he uses to break up families, and to torture people.” Bush says he will not change his opinion of Kim “until he proves to the world that he has a good heart.” [SCOBLIC, 2008, PP. 232-233] Entity Tags: Kim Jong Il, Bob Woodward, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: US International Relations

Early August 2002: Bush and Blair Discuss Plans to Depose Hussein British Prime Minister Tony Blair and US President George Bush discuss over the phone their intention to topple Saddam Hussein’s government. An unnamed White House official who later reads the transcripts of the 15-minute phone call will explain to Vanity Fair that it was clear from their conversation that the decision to invade Iraq had already been made. The magazine reports in April 2004: “Before the call, the official says, he had the impression that the probability of invasion was high, but still below 100 percent, Afterward, he says, ‘it was a done deal.’” [VANITY FAIR, 5/2004, PP. 284] Entity Tags: Tony Blair, George W. Bush, Saddam Hussein Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

August 2, 2002: Bush Signs Bill Prohibiting Military Assistance for Some Countries Party to International Criminal Court US President George Bush signs the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (HR 4775), making it Public Law 107-206. Section 2007, written by Representative Tom DeLay of Texas, prohibits the United States from providing military assistance to any nation that is party to the International Criminal Court (see July 17, 1998). Only countries that receive a special waiver from the president or that sign so-called “Article 98” agreements (see August 2002-July 1, 2003) will be exempt from the prohibition. The exemption is also extended to a select few other counties (Taiwan, NATO members, and “major non-NATO allies” like Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Argentina, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand). Section 2007 will go into effect on July 1, 2003, one year after the Rome Statute entered into force. Section 2008 of HR 4775 gives the president authority to use “all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release of any person… being detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of the International Criminal Court.” [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 8/10/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Tom DeLay Timeline Tags: US International Relations

August 5, 2002: Powell Tells Bush That US Needs International Backing for Iraq Invasion, Occupation After dinner at the White House, Secretary of State Colin Powell speaks privately with George W. Bush and convinces him that international backing would be crucial for an invasion of Iraq and the inevitable occupation that would follow. Powell cites polls which indicate that a majority of Americans favor seeking a UN resolution. Bush reluctantly agrees. [VANITY FAIR, 5/2004, PP. 284] Entity Tags: Colin Powell, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

August 15, 2002: US Intelligence Refuses to Confirm Iraqi WMD USA Today reports: “US intelligence cannot say conclusively that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction, an information gap that is complicating White House efforts to build support for an attack on Saddam’s Iraqi regime. The CIA has advised top administration officials to assume that Iraq has some weapons of mass destruction. But the agency has not given President Bush a ‘smoking gun,’ according to US intelligence and administration officials. The most recent unclassified CIA report on the subject goes no further than saying it is ‘likely’ that Iraq has used the four years since United Nations inspectors left the country to rebuild chemical and biological weapons programs.” [USA TODAY, 8/15/2002] Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Saddam Hussein, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

August 15, 2002: Scowcroft: ‘Don’t Attack Saddam’

Brent Scowcroft. [Source: University of Texas] Brent Scowcroft is the source of major embarrassment for the administration when he authors an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal arguing against the need to remove Saddam Hussein from power. He says that the toppling of Saddam’s regime would destabilize the Middle East and thus “turn the whole region into a cauldron and destroy the War on Terror.” Noting that “there is scant evidence to tie Saddam to terrorist organizations, and even less to the Sept. 11 attacks,” he calls on President Bush to abandon his designs on Saddam Hussein and instead refocus his foreign policy on the war on terrorism. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 8/15/2002] It is suggested that Scowcroft’s criticisms probably reflect the feelings of the president’s father. The Los Angeles Times reports: “Several former officials close to Scowcroft said they doubted he would have gone public with that posture without clearing the move first with the senior Bush, heightening questions about the latter’s view on confronting Iraq. The former president has not commented publicly, which has only fed speculation.” [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 8/17/2002] (Privately, Bush responds tartly to the Scowcroft article: “Scowcroft has become a pain in the a_s in his old age.”) [UNGER, 2007, PP. 244] In his 2006 book The One Percent Doctrine, Ron Suskind muses on Scowcroft’s article and its apparent effect on President Bush: “Under the headline ‘Don’t Attack Saddam,’ his August 15 column stated such an invasion would require the United States to pursue a ‘go it alone’ strategy, and would ‘result in a serious degradation in international cooperation with us against terrorism. And make no mistake, we simply cannot win the war without enthusiastic international cooperation, especially on intelligence.’ The day the column ran, the president was off on his annual summer vacation to Crawford. The next day, at an NSC meeting on a secure video line, he agreed to give a speech the following month at the UN.” [SUSKIND, 2006, PP. 167] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, George Herbert Walker Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

August 16, 2002: Bush Says He Listens to Opposing Views on Iraq After a spate of criticism of his administration’s Iraq policy from several prominent Republican former US government officials, President George Bush says from his ranch in Crawford, Texas: “I am aware that some very intelligent people are expressing their opinions about Saddam Hussein and Iraq. I listen very carefully to what they have to say. I’ll continue to consult…. I will use all the latest intelligence to make informed decisions about how best to keep the world at peace, how best to defend freedom for the long run…. Listen, it’s a healthy debate for people to express their opinion. People should be allowed to express their opinion. But America needs to know, I’ll be making up my mind based upon the latest intelligence and how best to protect our own country plus our friends and allies.” But he also adds, “There should be no doubt in anybody’s mind that this man is thumbing his nose at the world, that he has gassed his own people, that he is trouble in his neighborhood, that he desires weapons of mass destruction.” [CNN, 8/16/2002; FOX NEWS, 8/16/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 8/17/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Saddam Hussein Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

August 16, 2002: Perle: Bush’s War Rhetoric Makes Invasion Necessary Neoconservative Richard Perle, the head of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board, says that the Bush administration has expended so much time and effort in making its case for war against Iraq that it has no other choice except to invade. He says, “The failure to take on Saddam [Hussein]… would produce such a collapse of confidence in the president that it would set back the war on terrorism.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/16/2002] In 2006, author Frank Rich interprets Perle’s words, writing: “If Bush didn’t get rid of Saddam after all this saber rattling, he will look like the biggest wimp since—well, his father. If he didn’t do it soon, after all these months of swagger, he would destroy his credibility and hurt the country’s.” [RICH, 2006, PP. 62] Entity Tags: Richard Perle, Bush administration, Defense Policy Board, Frank Rich, George Herbert Walker Bush, George W. Bush, US Department of Defense Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

August 26, 2002: White House Asserts It Can Launch War against Iraq without Congressional Approval

Ari Fleischer. [Source: Washington Post] White House press secretary Ari Fleischer says that White House lawyers believe President Bush does not need the approval of Congress before launching an attack against Iraq. Fleischer goes on to say that such a consultation with Congress is important, if not constitutionally necessary, because “Congress has an important role to play.… The president knows that any decision he makes on a hypothetical congressional vote will be guided by more than one factor, more than legal factors alone.” Bush “would consider a variety of legal, policy, historical factors in making up his mind about this, if it again becomes a relevant matter. The president knows that in a democracy, it’s vital to have the support of the public if he reaches any point where he makes decisions about military action.” [CNN, 8/26/2002] Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution specifically states that Congress, not the executive branch, has the responsibility of declaring war with another nation. In modern US history, the judiciary has concurred with a number of presidents that the executive branch has limited powers to authorize military strikes, though not the power to commit US forces to a region for an extended period of time without Congressional approval. [UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-KANSAS CITY, 8/16/2007] And the 1973 War Powers act requires the president to consult with Congress before deploying the military in “hostilities,” to notify Congress of troop commitments within 48 hours of deployment, and to end hostilities within 60 days unless Congress declares war or grants an extension to the deployment. In previous deployments since the law’s passage, presidents have often ignored the law, and Congress has usually not pressed the issue. White House lawyers say Bush has such authority based on his constitutional power to make military decisions as commander in chief, as well as under the terms of the 1991 Gulf War resolution and the September 14, 2001 Congressional resolution approving military action against terrorism. But House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt (D-MO) says that it is “imperative” that Congress debate and vote on any plan to attack Iraq. “This issue is much more than just a legal debate. The president will need the decisive support of the public and their elected representatives in order to initiate and sustain the effort that will be required to eliminate the threat posed by this regime.” [CNN, 8/26/2002] Entity Tags: Ari Fleischer, Richard Gephardt, George W. Bush, Bush administration Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

August 26, 2002: Cheney Says Hussein Has WMDs, Must Be Countered

Cheney speaking before the Veterans of Foreign Wars. [Source: White House] In a speech to the Nashville convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Vice President Dick Cheney says Saddam Hussein will “seek domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the world’s energy supplies, directly threaten America’s friends throughout the region, and subject the United States or any other nation to nuclear blackmail.” He also states unequivocally that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. “Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us.… What he wants is time, and more time to husband his resources to invest in his ongoing chemical and biological weapons program, and to gain possession of nuclear weapons.… Deliverable weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terror network, or a murderous dictator, or the two working together constitutes as grave a threat as can be imagined,” he says. “The risks of inaction are far greater than the risk of action.… The Iraqi regime has in fact been very busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents, and they continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years ago.” Therefore he argues, the answer is not weapons inspections. “Against that background, a person would be right to question any suggestion that we should just get inspectors back into Iraq, and then our worries will be over. Saddam has perfected the game of shoot and retreat, and is very skilled in the art of denial and deception. A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his compliance with UN resolutions.” He also says: “Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to the region. When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace.” [WHITE HOUSE, 8/26/2002] First White House Assertion of Iraq's Nuclear Program - Cheney’s speech marks the first major statement from the White House regarding the Bush administration’s Iraq policy following a flood of criticisms from former officials. Significantly, the speech was not cleared by the CIA or the State Department. [NEWSWEEK, 9/9/2002] Furthermore, Cheney’s comments dismissing the need for the return of inspectors, were not cleared by President Bush, according to White House chief of staff Andrew Card. [NEWSWEEK, 9/9/2002] The speech creates a media stir because it is the first time a senior US official has asserted Iraq has nuclear capabilities with such certainty. The CIA is astonished by the claim. CIA official Jami Miscik will later recall: “He said that Saddam was building his nuclear program. Our reaction was, ‘Where is he getting that stuff from? Does he have a source of information that we don’t know about?’” CIA analysts redouble their efforts to collect and review evidence on Iraq and nuclear weapons, but analysts know very little. [SUSKIND, 2006, PP. 167-169] Cheney’s assertions are contradicted by a broad base of military experts. [DEAN, 2004, PP. 138] Powell 'Blindsided' by Cheney - Three days after the speech, a State Department source tells CNN that Secretary of State Colin Powell’s view clashes with that which was presented in Cheney’s speech, explaining that the secretary of state is opposed to any military action in which the US would “go it alone… as if it doesn’t give a damn” what other nations think. The source also says that Powell and “others in the State Department were ‘blindsided’ by Cheney’s ‘time is running out’ speech… and were just as surprised as everyone else.” [CNN, 8/30/2002] Author and Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward will later describe Powell as “dumbfounded.” [ROBERTS, 2008, PP. 145] Cheney did, however, inform President Bush he would be speaking to the VFW. He did not provide Bush a copy of his speech. Bush merely told Cheney, “Don’t get me into trouble.” [DUBOSE AND BERNSTEIN, 2006, PP. 175] 'Off Script' - Current deputy press secretary Scott McClellan will later observe that it was always a tactic of the Iraq campaign strategy for Cheney to “lean a little more forward in his rhetoric than the president.” However, McClellan will go on to say that Cheney did not always “stay on message,” and will blame Cheney’s “deep-seated certitude, even arrogance” that sometimes operates “to the detriment of the president.” Cheney’s assertion to the VFW that it would be pointless to send UN inspectors back to Iraq is, McClellan will reflect, “off script.” Bush wants to continue to “show that he [is] exhausting all diplomatic options” before invading Iraq. [MCCLELLAN, 2008, PP. 138] Entity Tags: Colin Powell, US Department of State, George W. Bush, Central Intelligence Agency, Scott McClellan, Jami Miscik, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Bob Woodward Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

August 27, 2002: Ari Fleischer Says Bush Has Made No Decision on Iraq After a meeting between President Bush and Saudi ambassador Bandar bin Sultan, Ari Fleischer tells the press, “The president stressed that he has made no decisions, that he will continue to engage in consultations with Saudi Arabia and other nations about steps in the Middle East, steps in Iraq.” [CNN, 8/27/2002] Entity Tags: Bandar bin Sultan, Ari Fleischer, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

August 27, 2002: Close Relationship Between Saudi Ambassador and Bush Raises Questions Prince Bandar, Saudi ambassador to the US, meets privately for more than an hour with President Bush and National Security Adviser Rice in Crawford, Texas. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 8/28/2002] Press Secretary Ari Fleischer characterizes it as a warm meeting of old friends. Bandar, his wife Princess Haifa, and seven of their eight children stay for lunch. [FOX NEWS, 8/27/2002] Bandar, a long-time friend of the Bush family, donated $1 million to the George W. Bush Presidential Library in College Station, Texas. [BOSTON HERALD, 12/11/2001] This relationship later becomes news when it is learned that Princess Haifa gave between $51,000 and $73,000 to two Saudi families in California who may have financed two of the 9/11 hijackers (see December 4, 1999). [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/23/2002; MSNBC, 11/27/2002] Entity Tags: Bandar bin Sultan, George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, Ari Fleischer Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Fall 2002: White House Considers Invading Iraq without Congressional Approval After Senator Chuck Hagel learns that the White House counsel has told President Bush that he has the constitutional authority to use preemptive force without congressional approval (see September 25, 2001), he calls White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card and asks, “Andy, I don’t think you have a shred of ground to stand on, but more to the point, why would a president seriously consider taking a nation to war without Congress being with him?” Some time later, Hagel, along with senators Joseph Biden and Richard Lugar, are invited to the White House to discuss the matter. [GENTLEMEN'S QUARTERLY, 1/2007] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Alberto R. Gonzales, Chuck Hagel, Joseph Biden, Richard Lugar, Andrew Card Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Fall 2002: White House Creates New Interagency Task Force to Coordinate Iraq War Planning The Bush White House establishes a “high-level, interagency task force” charged with the task of “coordinating all Iraq war planning efforts and postwar initiatives.” The task force is headed by the Deputies Committee, which is made up of the “No. 2 officials at the Pentagon, Joint Chiefs of Staff, State Department, CIA, National Security Council, and vice president’s office.” The committee’s job is to review the work of other groups who have been involved in the planning of post-war Iraq, and provide recommendations to President Bush’s top advisers. The committee draws on the work of the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans (OSP) (see 2002-2003 and September 2002), Elliott Abrams’s group (see November 2002-December 2002 and December 2002) and the State Department’s “Future of Iraq” project (see April 2002-March 2003). Later accounts make clear that Abrams’s and the OSP’s recommendations have much more influence. The Deputies Committee usually meets in the White House situation room. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice keeps Bush updated on the progress of the task force’s work. In November, US News and World Report reports that a consensus is forming “at the highest levels of the Bush administration over how to run the country after Saddam and his regime are history.” [FINANCIAL TIMES, 11/4/2002; US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 11/25/2003; REUTERS, 11/25/2003] Some Conclusions of the Deputies Committee - No US-Created Government - The US should not create a provisional government or a government in exile. “We are not going to be in the business of choosing” who should lead Iraq, a senior official tells US News and World Report. [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 11/25/2003] Lengthy Occupation - The invasion of Iraq will likely be followed by a lengthy occupation. This conclusion is passed on to Bush. “I have been with the president when he has been briefed about the need to have US forces there for an extended period of time,” a senior administration official will later tell US News and World Report. [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 11/25/2003] Military Occupation Rule before Turning over Rule to Iraqis - During the first phase of the occupation, Iraq will be ruled by the military, probably a US general. The primary objective during this phase will be maintaining security and preventing the emergence of hostilities between the Shi’ites and Sunnis. Pentagon officials involved in planning this stage are reported to have reviewed the archived plans for the occupation of Germany and Japan. The second phase of the occupation will involve some sort of international civilian administration, with a diminished US military presence, and Iraqis will be given a larger role in the government. In the last phase, a constitution will be drafted, transferring power to a representative, multiethnic Iraqi government that commits to being free of weapons of mass destruction. [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 11/25/2003] War Paid for by Iraqi Oil - Revenue generated from the sale of Iraq’s oil will be used for the cost of reconstruction and for conducting humanitarian operations. Hardliners however want the funds to pay for the military costs of the invasion as well. [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 11/25/2003] Dissension over Roles of Iraqi Exiles - No firm decisions are made about the what role, if any, Iraqi exiles affiliated with the Iraqi National Congress (INC) will play in post-Saddam Iraq. Pentagon hardliners and some top officials in the White House favor giving them a prominent role, while the CIA and State Department adamantly oppose their inclusion, arguing that the exiles cannot be trusted. [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 11/25/2003] US Will Not Be Seen as 'Liberators' - Iraqis will not necessarily treat the invading American soldiers as “liberators.” Many Iraqis harbor a deep resentment against the US for the decades-long sanction policy. [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 11/25/2003] Entity Tags: Office of Special Plans, National Security Council, Office of the Vice President, US Department of State, Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Department of Defense, George W. Bush, Iraqi National Congress, Bush administration, Central Intelligence Agency, Ahmed Chalabi, Condoleezza Rice, Elliott Abrams Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Fall 2002: Bush Lowering Standards for Pre-Emptive War in Order to Overthrow Hussein, According to Press Official In 2008, Scott McClellan, the current White House deputy press secretary, will write of President Bush’s lowering of accepted standards to allow for a pre-emptive war. McClellan will write: “Bush was now lowering the bar for engaging in pre-emptive war, a step that might have been more widely viewed as radical had it occurred prior to 9/11. The [Bush] doctrine (see 8:30 p.m. September 11, 2001) unambiguously stated that while the United States would always proceed deliberately and carefully weigh the consequences of actions, it would not hesitate to use force if necessary to preempt not just an ‘imminent’ threat but a ‘grave and gathering’ one if need be (see September 16, 2002). It was based on the assumption that waiting for a threat to become imminent before acting would likely mean that we would respond too late. And this new principle encoded in our new national security strategy was clearly aimed in part in paving the way to removing Saddam Hussein from power by force.” [MCCLELLAN, 2008, PP. 134] Entity Tags: Bush administration, George W. Bush, Scott McClellan Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 2002: NSA’s ‘Other’ Data Mining Program Strongly Resembles ‘Total Information Awareness’ The NSA’s enormous data mining program, Novel Intelligence from Massive Data (NIMD—see After September 11, 2001), closely resembles another data mining program, the Defense Department’s Total Information Awareness program (see March 2002). TIA, which will be suspended in 2003 after outcries from citizens and legal experts concerned over that program’s refusal to comply with fundamental Constitutional guarantees of privacy, was also designed as an early-warning system that not only compiled intelligence data, but mined through private financial databases for credit-card and other financial transactions. Six of the corporations and research institutions who win NIMD contracts also held contracts for the earlier TIA project. Much of their work with TIA duplicated the same aspects and protocols to be used by NIMD, including challenging analytic assumptions and building prototype data-mining devices. Both TIA and NIMD attempt to second-guess human analysts’ conclusions over a particular data schema by creating a database of what TIA creator John Poindexter once called “plausible futures,” or likely terrorism scenarios. NIMD is a creation of the Advanced Research and Development Activity agency (ARDA); another ARDA project, the Advanced Capabilities for Intelligence Analysis (ACIA) also envisions a similar database (see 2005). Though TIA focused more on counterterrorism than the more sweeping NIMD, the two projects coordinated closely with one another, according to former program manager Tom Armour, who worked in Poindexter’s office. NIMD Survives In Other Agencies - Congress will eliminate funding for TIA and other Poindexter projects, but many of those projects, and related projects such as NIMD, do not disappear. Many are instead transferred to intelligence agencies such as the NSA. Although information about these projects is strictly classified, a former Army intelligence analyst familiar with the programs will confirm in 2006 that large elements of TIA were transferred to other agencies, where they will continue to be researched and implemented. It is highly likely that NIMD is an offshoot and outgrowth of TIA. Armour will say the two programs are specifically designed to analyze large amounts of phone and e-mail traffic: “That’s, in fact, what the interest is.” [NATIONAL JOURNAL, 1/20/2006] Government 'Shell Game' - Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists says in 2004, “The whole congressional action looks like a shell game. There may be enough of a difference for them to claim TIA was terminated while for all practical purposes the identical work is continuing.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2/23/2004] Aftergood will note that NIMD has thrived in the shadows where TIA died of exposure: “Pursued with a minimal public profile and lacking a polarizing figure like Admiral Poindexter to galvanize opposition, NIMD has proceeded quietly even as TIA imploded.” [DEFENSE TECH, 9/26/2003] Entity Tags: Tom Armour, Total Information Awareness, Steven Aftergood, Novel Intelligence from Massive Data, John Poindexter, National Security Agency, Advanced Research and Development Activity, Federation of American Scientists (FAS), George W. Bush, Advanced Capabilities for Intelligence Analysis Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

September 2002: Congressional ‘Top Secret’ Briefings Disclose Little New Information Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld holds a “top secret” briefing on Iraq for selected Congressional members, including, among others, Senator John McCain (R-AZ). The briefing takes place in the most secure room in the Capitol, a small, windowless chamber that is ostentatiously swept for bugs before the briefing. At the outset, the lawmakers are sworn to deepest secrecy. But during the briefing, Rumsfeld tells the assembled members nothing they couldn’t learn by watching the nightly news. McCain abruptly leaves the meeting, and later says, “It was a joke.” Vice President Cheney has said that the administration doesn’t trust the 535 members of Congress not to leak classified information, and therefore they must make their decisions concerning war with Iraq without the benefit of complete intelligence briefings (see Before September 9, 2002 and After). McCain reflects the feelings of many members in expressing his aggravation with the administration. “It becomes almost insulting after a while,” he says. “Everyone that goes to them is frustrated.” Rather than give “pretend” briefings that convey little information, McCain says, President Bush should just suspend the briefings entirely. House member Robert Menendez (D-NJ) says many members are skipping the briefings entirely to avoid signing a secrecy pledge that restricts what they can and cannot talk about. Menendez, briefed earlier by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and CIA Director George Tenet, says, “I heard nothing that was new, compelling, or that I have not heard before.” White House spokesman Ari Fleischer says, “The White House will continue to as fully inform as possible members of Congress, while also preserving sensitive intelligence information so no inadvertent disclosure jeopardizes sources or methods or missions.” The White House has had some success with Democrats who might be resistant to its arguments for war by choosing to give more complete briefings to a few selected Democratic leaders, including House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO). As a result, Democratic leaders in Congress are more supportive of the push towards war than many of their rank-and-file colleagues. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/15/2002] Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Condoleezza Rice, Ari Fleischer, Donald Rumsfeld, Robert Menendez, US Department of Defense, John McCain, George W. Bush, Richard Gephardt, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

Fall 2002 and After: Vice President Cheney’s Power Peaks as He Uses Bureaucratic Strategies to Manage Foreign Policy Himself Vice President Cheney, widely acknowledged as a master bureaucrat, uses a variety of bureaucratic strategies to craft his own foreign policy strategies, including the promotion the Office of Special Plans (OSP—see September 2002), simultaneously undercutting and marginalizing the CIA. Many senior intelligence officials have no idea that the OSP even exists. “I didn’t know about its existence,” Greg Thielmann, the director of the State Department’s in-house intelligence agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), will say. Strategic Placement of Personal, Ideological Allies - Another Cheney strategy is personal placement. He moves his special adviser, neoconservative William Luti, into the OSP. Another influential neoconservative, Abram Shulsky, soon joins Luti there. A longtime associate of both Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Stephen Cambone, becomes a special assistant to Rumsfeld (see Early 2001). Cheney now has his allies at the highest levels of the Pentagon. In Cheney’s office, chief of staff Lewis “Scooter” Libby serves as his liaison with the Pentagon. His chief counsel, David Addington, oversees Cheney’s aggressive and obsessively secretive legal staff. In the National Security Council (NSC), Stephen Hadley, Condoleezza Rice’s deputy, keeps a close eye on Rice in case she shows signs of falling back in with her old mentor, Brent Scowcroft (see August 1998). John Bolton and David Wurmser keep tabs on Colin Powell at the State Department. Cheney has John Yoo (see (After 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001) at the Justice Department. Not only does Cheney have highly placed loyalists in the State, Defense, and Justice Department, and in the NSC, he has vital allies in the Republican leadership in Congress. Managing the Oval Office - Cheney handles the Oval Office himself. A Pentagon official who works closely with Cheney will later observe that President Bush handles the executive branch much as he handled the Texas Rangers baseball team: ignoring much of the daily functions, leaving most policy decisions to others and serving as a “corporate master of ceremonies, attending to the morale of the management team and focusing on narrow issues… that interested him.” Cheney becomes, in author Craig Unger’s words, “the sole framer of key issues for Bush,” the single conduit through which information reaches the president. Cheney, the Pentagon official will later say, “rendered the policy planning, development and implementation functions of the interagency system essentially irrelevant. He has, in matters he has deemed important, governed. As a matter of protocol, good manners, and constitutional deference, he has obtained the requisite ‘check-mark’ of the president, often during one-on-one meetings after a Potemkin ‘interagency process’ had run its often inconclusive course.” [UNGER, 2007, PP. 249-250] Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, Stephen A. Cambone, Stephen J. Hadley, Texas Rangers, William Luti, Brent Scowcroft, Abram Shulsky, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Special Plans, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby, David Wurmser, David S. Addington, Craig Unger, National Security Council, John R. Bolton, Greg Thielmann, John C. Yoo, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: US International Relations

September 3, 2002: Bush Attempts to Solicit Support from Skeptical Congressional Leaders for Confronting Iraq President Bush invites a group of congressional leaders to have breakfast with him and Cheney in the White House’s private dining room to discuss Iraq. Present at the meeting are Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott, Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, and House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt. Bush tells the lawmakers that he needs a Congressional resolution authorizing military force against Iraq, and he needs it soon. During the meeting, Daschle suggests that it would be better to postpone the debate on such a resolution until after the November elections, so as to take politics out of the equation (see September 19, 2002). According to Daschle, Bush looks at Cheney, who replies with a “half smile.” Then Bush answers, “We just have to do it now.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/7/2002; DEAN, 2004, PP. 140; ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 23] After the meeting, the lawmakers pass the word that Bush implied new intelligence about Iraq’s nuclear weapons program would be forthcoming. That new information never materializes. [DEAN, 2004, PP. 140] In the upcoming days, many Democrats will accuse the Bush administration of attempting to “politicize” the debate on the resolution in order to impact the upcoming midterm elections (see September 25, 2002 and September 26, 2002). Entity Tags: Tom Daschle, Trent Lott, Dennis Hastert, George W. Bush, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Richard Gephardt Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 4, 2002: In Meeting with Bush and Cheney, Top Republican Congressman Warns about Invading Iraq President Bush invites eighteen senior members of the House and Senate to discuss Iraq with him in the White House Cabinet Room. During the discussion, House Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-TX), who is opposed to military action against Iraq, tells the president, “Mr. President, if you go in there, you’re likely to be stuck in a quagmire that will endanger your domestic agenda for the rest of your presidency.” He finishes his comments with a line from Shakespeare that he had gleaned from a country music song: “Our fears make cowards of us all.” Cheney and Bush reply that he should refrain from making public remarks dissenting from the White House’s policy on Iraq, at least until after he has been fully briefed on Iraq. Army agrees. [ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 2] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Dick Armey, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 4, 2002: Top Administration Officials Discuss Iraqi Policy with Senators The Bush administration invites two dozen senators from both parties to the Pentagon to discuss Iraqi policy with Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and CIA Director George Tenet. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/7/2002] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George J. Tenet, George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 7, 2002: President Bush and British Prime Minister Blair Make Inaccurate Statements During Press Conference During a joint press conference with US President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the two leaders make two factually incorrect statements, which are quickly contested by experts. Tony Blair states, “We only need to look at the report from the International Atomic Agency [IAEA] this morning showing what has been going on at the former nuclear weapons sites to realize that” Saddam is a real threat. [US PRESIDENT, 9/16/2002] But no such report exists. [WASHINGTON TIMES, 9/27/2002] What Blair is actually referring to is a set of commercial satellite photographs showing signs of new construction at a site the US had bombed in 1998. [MSNBC, 9/7/2002; GUARDIAN, 9/9/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/10/2002] That same day, Mark Gwozdecky, a spokesman for the UN agency, says the agency had drawn no conclusion from those photographs. [MSNBC, 9/7/2002] On September 9, the Guardian of London will report that according to “a well-placed source” the photographs do not support Blair’s statement. “You cannot draw any conclusions,” the source explains. “The satellites were only looking at the top of a roof. You cannot tell without inspectors on the ground.” [GUARDIAN, 9/9/2002] The following day, Hans Blix, head of UNMOVIC, will similarly tell reporters: “… [S]atellites don’t see through roofs. So we are not drawing conclusions from them. But it would be an important element in where, maybe, we want to go to inspect and monitor.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/10/2002; GLOBE AND MAIL, 9/11/2002] Bush asserts, “I would remind you that when the inspectors first went into Iraq and were denied—finally denied access [in 1998], a report came out of the Atomic—the IAEA that they were six months away from developing a weapon,” adding, “I don’t know what more evidence we need.” [US PRESIDENT, 9/16/2002; WASHINGTON TIMES, 9/27/2002] But Bush’s statement is quickly refuted by an MSNBC news report published later that day, which includes an excerpt from the summary of the 1998 IAEA report Bush cited. The summary reads, “[B]ased on all credible information available to date… the IAEA has found no indication of Iraq having achieved its program goal of producing nuclear weapons or of Iraq having retained a physical capability for the production of weapon-useable nuclear material or having clandestinely obtained such material.” [MSNBC, 9/7/2002; DEAN, 2004, PP. 138] The text of the actual report, authored by IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei, reads: “There are no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.” [WASHINGTON TIMES, 9/27/2002] When confronted by MSNBC reporters on this point, an unnamed senior White House official states, “What happened was, we formed our own conclusions based on the report.” [MSNBC, 9/7/2002] Later, when The Washington Times presses Deputy Press Secretary Scott McClellan for an explanation, he says, “[Bush is] referring to 1991 there. In ‘91, there was a report saying that after the war they found out they were about six months away.” But this too is challenged by Gwozdecky, spokesman for the UN agency, who says that no such report was ever published by the IAEA in 1991. Apparently the President’s accusations are based on two news articles that were published more than a decade ago—“a July 16 [2001] story in the London Times by Michael Evans and a July 18 [2001] story in the New York Times by Paul Lewis.” But as The Washington Times notes, “Neither article cites an IAEA report on Iraq’s nuclear-weapons program or states that Saddam was only six months away from ‘developing a weapon’—as claimed by Mr. Bush.” Instead the two news articles reported that at that time, UN inspectors had concluded that Iraq was only six months away from the large-scale production of enriched uranium. But as the 1998 report shows, both 1991 news stories are outdated. [WASHINGTON TIMES, 9/27/2002] Entity Tags: Tony Blair, International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, George W. Bush, Mark Gwozdecky, Scott McClellan Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 8, 2002: White House Marketing Group Launches Iraq PR Blitz The White House Iraq Group (WHIG—see August 2002) launches its Iraq marketing campaign with a blitz of the Sunday morning talk shows. Vice President Dick Cheney appears on NBC (see September 8, 2002 and September 8, 2002), Secretary of State Colin Powell on Fox (see September 8, 2002), Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on CBS (see September 8, 2002), and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice on CNN (see September 8, 2002). Rice is the first to use the characterization, “We don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud” (see September 4, 2002), but President Bush and his senior officials repeat the phrase over and over in the following days. Author Craig Unger will note “Cheney’s most Machiavellian flourish” in having all four officials cite “evidence” of Iraq’s nuclear program, suspicious aluminum tubes, and attribute the information to the New York Times. Cheney and the others are referring to a story by the Times’ Judith Miller and Michael Gordon (see September 8, 2002) that Iraq had tried “to buy thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes” that American experts believe could be used in centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. The story is attributed to “unnamed administration sources;” Miller and Gordon do not inform their readers that the story comes from Cheney’s office. In essence, Cheney planted disinformation in the New York Times, then cited the Times article to prove his contention. Gordon will later insist that he and Miller had to pry that story out of the administration, but Unger will note that it is hard to equate Gordon’s contention with four of the administration’s highest officials going on television simultaneously to spread the story and cite the Times article. Furthermore, because of the scheduling practices on the four networks, it appears that the four officials’ simultaneous appearances were arranged in advance. As the Times is the flagship newspaper of the US press, over 500 other newspapers and broadcast outlets pick up on the Times story and the officials’ appearances, giving the story tremendous visibility throughout the world. [UNGER, 2007, PP. 252-254] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, CNN, CBS News, Craig Unger, Judith Miller, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, NBC News, New York Times, Michael Gordon, White House Iraq Group, Fox News Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 9, 2002: Chretien: US Working WMD Angle on Iraq Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien and US President George Bush meet in Detroit to discuss policy towards Iraq as well as security measures along the US-Canadian border initiated after September 11. Chretien later tells reporters that Bush said that Saddam Hussein’s alleged ties to militant Islamic groups was “not the angle they’re exploring now. The angle they’re exploring is the production of weapons of mass destruction.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/10/2002; CNN, 9/10/2002] Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, George W. Bush, Jean Chretien Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 10, 2002: Threat Level Raised to Orange for First 9/11 Anniversary The government raises the National Alert Level to orange, the second highest level possible. This is the first time such an alert has been raised since 9/11. The government temporarily closes for public business about two dozen US diplomatic posts worldwide. Officials say there is no specific known threat against targets in the US. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/10/2002] President Bush personally makes the announcement while Vice President Cheney flees to a “secure location.” Attorney General John Ashcroft warns that the threat targets “transportation and energy sectors.” No specific details on the nature or targets of the threat are supplied. The heightened terror alert coincides with the president’s address to the nation from Ellis Island on the first anniversary of 9/11 (see September 11, 2002 and Before). [ROLLING STONE, 9/21/2006 ] Entity Tags: John Ashcroft, George W. Bush, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

September 11, 2002: Story of President Bush’s 9/11 Conduct Changes for 9/11 Anniversary On the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the story of what President Bush did on that day is significantly rewritten. In actual fact, when Chief of Staff Andrew Card told Bush about the second plane crash into the WTC, Bush continued to sit in a Florida elementary school classroom and hear a story about a pet goat for at least seven more minutes (see (9:06 a.m.-9:16 a.m.) September 11, 2001; (9:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001), as video footage later broadcast in the 2004 movie Fahrenheit 9/11 shows. But one year later, Card claims that after he told Bush about the second WTC crash, “it was only a matter of seconds” before Bush “excused himself very politely to the teacher and to the students, and he left the Florida classroom.” [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 9/11/2002] In a different account, Card says, “Not that many seconds later the president excused himself from the classroom.” [NEWSWEEK, 9/9/2002] An interview with the classroom teacher claims that Bush left the class even before the second WTC crash: “The president bolted right out of here and told me: ‘Take over.’” When the second WTC crash occurred, she claims her students are watching television in a nearby media room. [NEW YORK POST, 9/12/2002] Entity Tags: Andrew Card, World Trade Center, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline, Domestic Propaganda

September 11, 2002: Reagan Speechwriter Implores Bush to Make Factual Case for War

Peggy Noonan. [Source: MSNBC] Peggy Noonan, the former Reagan speechwriter and a staunch loyalist of the first President Bush, implores the current President Bush to make a solid case for war with Iraq based on facts and not emotional pronouncements. “[I]f Mr. Bush is to make the case it will not be with emotional rhetoric, with singing phrases, with high oratory,” she writes. “It will not, in this coming cooler time, be made with references to evil ones. All of that was good, excellent and Bushian the past passionate year. But now Mr. Bush should think in terms of Sgt. Joe Friday. ‘Just the facts, ma’am.’ ‘Saddam is evil’ is not enough. A number of people are evil, and some are even our friends. ‘Saddam has weapons of mass destruction’ is not enough. A number of countries do. What the people need now is hard data that demonstrate conclusively that Saddam has weapons of mass destruction which he is readying to use on the people of the US or the people of the West. If Mr. Bush has a good case, he will make it and the people will back him. If he does not, he will not convince the American people that blood and treasure must go to this endeavor.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: Peggy Noonan, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 11, 2002 and Before: Bush Speech Kicks Off Drive to War, Midterm Elections

Bush giving his speech in front of the Statue of Liberty. [Source: September 11 News (.com)] The Bush administration’s public relations team decides to kick off its push for a war with Iraq, and its drive to the midterm elections, with President Bush’s speech commemorating the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. After much deliberation, Ellis Island in New York Harbor is chosen as the setting for Bush’s speech; the Ellis site won out over nearby Governors Island because the senior public relations officials want the Statue of Liberty as a backdrop. “We had made a decision that this would be a compelling story either place,” White House communications director Dan Bartlett will later recall. “We sent a team out to go and look and they said, ‘This is a better shot,’ and we said okay.” Leading that team is Scott Sforza, the former ABC producer who will later oversee the May 2003 “Mission Accomplished” event (see May 1, 2003 and April 30, 2008). [RICH, 2006, PP. 57-58] (Deputy press secretary Scott McClellan will later write of Sforza, “Reagan’s team had perfected this art of stagecraft, and the man in charge for Bush, deputy communications director Scott Sforza, took it to new heights.” [MCCLELLAN, 2008, PP. 82] Sforza is joined by former Fox News producer Gary Jenkins and former NBC cameraman Bob De Servi. They use three barges laden with stadium lights to illuminate the Statue of Liberty for the shoot. Former Reagan administration public relations chief Michael Deaver will later observe that the Bush team is far better at this kind of marketing presentation than the Reagan, Bush I, or Clinton public relations teams ever were. “[T]hey’ve taken it to an art form,” Deaver will say. The speech is designed to push Congress towards authorizing the war before the midterm elections (see January 19, 2002 and October 10, 2002), when, as author Frank Rich will later write, “the pressure on congressmen facing re-election to prove their war-waging machismo would be at its nastiest. Any weak sisters could expect a thrashing much like that Republicans inflicted on Democrats who had failed to vote for the ‘use of force’ resolution sought by the first President Bush after the Persian Gulf War in 1991” (see January 9-13, 1991). A senior administration official says, “In the end it will be difficult for someone to vote against it.” [RICH, 2006, PP. 57-58] In other preparatory moves for the speech, the government raises the National Threat Level from yellow to orange (see September 10, 2002), and announces the death or capture of some 2,700 al-Qaeda operatives since 9/11 (see September 10, 2002). The administration will also attempt to significantly revise its account of events on 9/11 itself (see September 11, 2002). Entity Tags: Frank Rich, Dan Bartlett, Bob De Servi, Michael Deaver, Scott Sforza, Gary Jenkins, Bush administration, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda, 2004 Presidential Election

September 11, 2002: Bush Speechwriters Almost Insert Uranium Allegation in UN Speech White House speechwriter Michael Gerson contacts John Gibson, another speechwriter, at his Waldorf-Astoria hotel room where he is putting the final touches on Bush’s upcoming speech to the UN. Gerson asks him to contact National Security Council aide Robert Joseph about some new intelligence that Gibson might be able to insert into the speech. If it’s not used in the speech, “it’s something we might leak to the New York Times,” Gerson says. Gibson calls Joseph, who tells him to write in the speech that Iraq was caught trying to purchase 500 tons of uranium from Niger. Simultaneously, the office of Stephen Hadley, deputy national security adviser, asks the CIA to clear language so that President Bush can state: “Within the past few years, Iraq has resumed efforts to purchase large quantities of a type of uranium oxide known as yellowcake (see 1979-1982 and Between Late 2000 and September 11, 2001).… The regime was caught trying to purchase 500 metric tons of this material. It takes about 10 tons to produce enough enriched uranium for a single nuclear weapon.” But later in the day, the CIA rescinds its approval for this passage, saying that the information for this allegation had come from a single source and was not solid enough for a presidential speech. The reference to the alleged attempt to obtain uranium is dropped. [ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 85-86; UNGER, 2007, PP. 259] Entity Tags: Robert G. Joseph, Stephen J. Hadley, George W. Bush, Central Intelligence Agency, John Gibson, Michael Gerson Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

September 12, 2002: Bush Says Iraq Sought Aluminum Tubes for Nuclear Weapons Program In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Bush says: “Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons.… Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.” [PBS, 9/12/2002; US PRESIDENT, 9/16/2002; AGE (MELBOURNE), 6/7/2003] Bush also says that the US “will work with the UN Security Council.” [US PRESIDENT, 9/16/2002; VANITY FAIR, 5/2004, PP. 285] Deputy press secretary Scott McClellan will later describe the speech somewhat differently: “The UN speech… had been an ultimatum—either the UN acts to disarm Saddam Hussein or the United States will. The zero tolerance message was a further sign of how determined the president was to topple the regime by force. Saddam was never going to come completely clean. His power was grounded in brutality and in his ability to portray the regime as stronger than it was to intimidate the populace and potential enemies like Iran. The zero tolerance policy and the new ‘last chance’ resolution gave Bush plenty of room to maneuver and plausible justifications for his policy of regime change.” [MCCLELLAN, 2008, PP. 142] Entity Tags: UN General Assembly, Scott McClellan, George W. Bush, United Nations Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 13, 2002: Bush Implies Democrats Cowardly by Waiting for UN Resolution on Iraq War Concerning the proposed Congressional resolution to authorize force against Iraq (see September 19, 2002), President Bush is asked, “Are you concerned that Democrats in Congress don’t want a vote there until after UN action?” Bush replies, “[Are] Democrats waiting for the UN to act? I can’t imagine an elected United States—elected member of the United States Senate or House of Representatives saying, I think I’m going to wait for the United Nations to make a decision. It seems like to me that if you’re representing the United States, you ought to be making a decision on what’s best for the United States. If I were running for office, I’m not sure how I’d explain to the American people—say, vote for me, and, oh, by the way, on a matter of national security, I think I’m going to wait for somebody else to act.… My answer to the Congress is, they need to debate this issue and consult with us, and get the issue done as quickly as possible. It’s in our national interests that we do so. I don’t imagine Saddam Hussein sitting around, saying, gosh, I think I’m going to wait for some resolution. He’s a threat that we must deal with as quickly as possible.” [WHITE HOUSE, 9/13/2002] Entity Tags: United Nations, George W. Bush, Saddam Hussein Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 15, 2002: Rice Says Hussein Has Clear Links to Al-Qaeda In response to Tony Snow’s probing on Fox News Sunday as to whether or not President Bush was convinced there were links between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice is circumspect until she’s pressed. “He clearly has links to terrorism…—Links to terrorism [that] would include al-Qaeda….” [FOX NEWS, 9/15/2002; ISLAM ONLINE, 9/15/2002; CNN, 9/26/2002; US HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, 3/16/2004] Entity Tags: Tony Snow, George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 15, 2002: White House Economic Adviser Says Iraq Invasion Will Cost up to $200 Billion; OMB Head Says Cost Much Lower In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Lawrence Lindsey, head of the White House’s National Economic Council, says he believes the Bush administration’s planned invasion of Iraq could cost between $100 and $200 billion. The cost, he says, will have only a modest impact on the US economy, since it will only amount to between one and two percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). “One year [of additional spending]? That’s nothing.” Mitch Daniels, director of the Office of Management and Budget, subsequently disputes the figure, saying it is “very, very high.” He suggests the total costs would run between $50 and $60 billion. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 9/16/2002; REUTERS, 9/18/2002; WASHINGTON TIMES, 5/13/2005] The White House press office also denies Lindsey’s prediction. As the current deputy press secretary Scott McClellan will later recall: “Lindsey’s biggest mistake wasn’t the size of the figures he chose to cite. It was citing any figures at all. Talking about the projected cost of a potential war wasn’t part of the script, especially not when the White House was in the crucial early stages of building broad public support. In fact, none of the possible, unpleasant consequences of war—casualties, economic effects, geopolitical risks, diplomatic repercussions—were part of the message. We were in campaign mode now, just as we had been when [President] Bush traveled the country leading the effort to pass tax cuts and education reforms. This first stage was all about convincing the public that the threat was serious and needed addressing without delay. Citing or discussing potential costs, financial or human, only played into the arguments our critics and opponents of war were raising. Lindsey had violated the first rule of the disciplined, on-message Bush White House: don’t make news unless you’re authorized to do so. Lindsey’s transgression could only make the war harder to sell.” As McClellan recalls, Bush is “steamed” at Lindsey’s comments. Lindsey will resign four months later. McClellan will write: “Larry, a highly regarded economist, had violated a basic principle of the Bush White House: the president doesn’t like anyone getting out in front of him. It’s his job to make the news, not anyone else’s—unless authorized as part of the script.” [MCCLELLAN, 2008, PP. 121-124] Entity Tags: Mitch Daniels, Bush administration, George W. Bush, Lawrence Lindsey, Scott McClellan Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 16, 2002: Rumsfeld: Bush Hasn’t Decided to Go to War US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says that President Bush has not decided to go to war. [WHITE HOUSE, 9/16/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/16/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 16, 2002: Bush: Iraq a ‘Grave and Gathering Danger’ to World In a speech in Davenport, Iowa, President Bush reiterates his talking points against Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s harsh treatment of his citizens, its disregard and duplicity regarding United Nations resolutions, and its support for Islamist terrorism. Together, these make Iraq into “a grave and gathering danger” that must be dealt with. Bush says: “My nation will work with the UN Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq’s regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced—the just demands of peace and security will be met—or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose his power.” Scott McClellan, currently the deputy White House press secretary, will later write, “In a White House that prided itself on message discipline, Bush’s speech provided the new talking points for ‘educating the public about the threat’ (as we described our campaign to sell the war).” [MCCLELLAN, 2008, PP. 119-120] In the morning press gaggle, McClellan softpedals the president’s message somewhat: “The president will continue to consult with the international community and Congress as we move forward, and he will continue to talk to the American people as we move forward on any particular course of action. That is something he is doing now, and that is something he will continue to do. But what needs to happen right now is that the UN needs to act, and they need to back up their actions with enforcement. And that’s where our focus is, and we’re pleased with the emerging consensus from the international community around the president’s call for the UN to act.” [WHITE HOUSE, 9/16/2002] Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, George W. Bush, United Nations, Scott McClellan, United Nations Security Council Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Late September 2002: Iraqi Foreign Minister Tells CIA Status of Iraq’s WMD Program; Bush Uninterested in Reports The French arrange a backchannel meeting between a friend of Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri Hadithi and the CIA’s station chief in Paris, Bill Murray. Sabri’s friend, a Lebanese journalist, tells Murray that Sabri would be willing to provide the CIA with accurate information on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program in exchange for $1 million. The CIA agrees to advance the journalist $200,000. [ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 45; MSNBC, 3/21/2006] When CIA Director George Tenet announces the deal during a high-level meeting at the White House—attended by President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice—the news is greeted with enthusiasm. “They were enthusiastic because they said, they were excited that we had a high-level penetration of Iraqis,” Tyler Drumheller, the agency’s head of spying in Europe, later tells 60 Minutes. [CBS NEWS, 4/23/2006] But Sabri does not tell the CIA what the White House is expecting to hear. In a New York hotel room, the Lebanese journalist says that according to Sabri Iraq does not have a significant, active biological weapons program. He does however acknowledge that Iraq has some “poison gas” left over from the first Gulf War. Regarding the country’s alleged nuclear weapons program, Sabri’s friend says the Iraqis do not have an active program because they lack the fissile material needed to develop a nuclear bomb. But he does concede that Hussein desperately wants one. [ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 62-63; MSNBC, 3/21/2006] “He told us that they had no active weapons of mass destruction programs,” Drumheller, will recall. [UNGER, 2007, PP. 246-247] The White House immediately loses interest in Sabri as a source after the New York meeting. Sabri, Bush says, is merely telling the US “the same old thing.” The CIA continues to corroborate material provided to the agency by Sabri. Wiretaps on Sabri’s phone conversations by French intelligence back up Sabri’s claims, but Bush could not care less. “Bush didn’t give a f_ck about the intelligence,” a CIA officer will later say. “He had his mind made up.” CIA agent Luis (whose full name has never been disclosed) and John Maguire, the chief and deputy chief of the Iraq Operations Group, also lose interest in the lead. In one confrontation between Maguire and Murray, Maguire allegedly says: “One of these days you’re going to get it. This is not about intelligence. This is about regime change.” Drumheller will agree, saying the White House is “no longer interested.… They said, ‘Well, this isn’t about intel anymore. This is about regime change.’” [MSNBC, 3/21/2006; CBS NEWS, 4/23/2006; UNGER, 2007, PP. 246-247] Entity Tags: Naji Sabri Hadithi, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Luis, Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush, Bill Murray, Central Intelligence Agency, John Maguire Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 20, 2002: White House Discloses Plans for Iraq Invasion White House and Pentagon officials publicly disclose that the Department of Defense has finished a highly detailed plan for attacking Iraq that was delivered to President Bush’s desk in early September by Gen. Tommy R. Franks. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer says, “The president has options now, and he has not made any decisions.” The New York Times interviews senior officials who explain that the plan includes specific details, including the “number of ground troops, combat aircraft and aircraft carrier battle groups that would be needed,” and the “detailed sequencing for the use of air, land, naval and Special Operations forces to attack thousands of Iraqi targets, from air-defense sites to command-and-control headquarters to fielded forces.” Officials also tell the Times that any attack would begin “with a lengthy air campaign led by B-2 bombers armed with 2,000-pound satellite-guided bombs to knock out Iraqi command and control headquarters and air defenses.” The principal goal of the air attacks, they say, “would be to sever most communications from Baghdad and isolate Saddam Hussein from his commanders in the rest of the country.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/21/2002] The disclosure of this information notably comes only a few days after Iraq has offered to unconditionally admit weapons inspectors (see September 16, 2002). Entity Tags: Ari Fleischer, George W. Bush, Thomas Franks Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 20, 2002: President Bush Changes Course, Backs Creation of 9/11 Commission In the wake of damaging Congressional 9/11 inquiry revelations, President Bush reverses course and backs efforts by many lawmakers to form an independent commission to conduct a broader investigation than the current Congressional inquiry. Newsweek reports that Bush had virtually no choice. “There was a freight train coming down the tracks,” says one White House official. [NEWSWEEK, 9/22/2002] But as one of the 9/11 victim’s relatives says, “It’s carefully crafted to make it look like a general endorsement but it actually says that the commission would look at everything except the intelligence failures.” [CBS NEWS, 9/20/2002] Rather than look into such failures, Bush wants the commission to focus on areas like border security, visa issues, and the “role of Congress” in overseeing intelligence agencies. The White House also refuses to turn over documents showing what Bush knew before 9/11. [NEWSWEEK, 9/22/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

September 20, 2002: Bush Administration Releases ‘National Security Strategy’ Document Advocating Preemptive War The Bush administration submits to Congress a 31-page document entitled “The National Security Strategy of the United States.” Preemptive War - The National Security Strategy (NSS) openly advocates the necessity for the US to engage in “preemptive war” against nations it believes are likely to become a threat to the US’s security. It declares: “In an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle. The United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.” The declaration that the US will engage in preemptive war with other nations reverses decades of American military and foreign policy stances; until now, the US has held that it would only launch an attack against another nation if it had been attacked first, or if American lives were in imminent danger. President Bush had first mentioned the new policy in a speech in June 2002 (see June 1, 2002), and it echoes policies proposed by Paul Wolfowitz during the George H. W. Bush administration (see March 8, 1992). [SHENON, 2008, PP. 128] US Must Maintain Military 'Beyond Challenge' - The National Security Strategy states that the ultimate objective of US national security policy is to “dissuade future military competition.” The US must therefore “build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge. Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.” [LONDON TIMES, 9/21/2002] Ignoring the International Criminal Court - The NSS also states, “We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept.” [US PRESIDENT, 9/2002] Declaring War on Terrorism Itself - It states: “The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.” Journalism professor Mark Danner will later comment in the New York Times: “Not Islamic terrorism or Middle Eastern terrorism or even terrorism directed against the United States: terrorism itself. ‘Declaring war on “terror,”’ as one military strategist later remarked to me, ‘is like declaring war on air power.’” [NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 9/11/2005] Fundamental Reversal of Containment, Deterrence Principles - Washington Post reporter Tim Reich later describes the NSS as “revers[ing] the fundamental principles that have guided successive presidents for more than 50 years: containment and deterrence.” Foreign policy professor Andrew Bacevich will write that the NSS is a “fusion of breathtaking utopianism [and] barely disguised machtpolitik.” Bacevich continues, “It reads as if it were the product not of sober, ostensibly conservative Republicans but of an unlikely collaboration between Woodrow Wilson and the elder Field Marshal von Moltke.” [AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, 3/24/2003] Written by Future Executive Director of 9/11 Commission - The document is released under George W. Bush’s signature, but was written by Philip D. Zelikow, formerly a member of the previous Bush administration’s National Security Council, and currently a history professor at the University of Virginia and a member of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Zelikow produced the document at the behest of his longtime colleague National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (see June 1, 2002). His authorship of the document will not be revealed until well after he is appointed executive director of the 9/11 commission (see Mid-December 2002-March 2003). Many on the Commission will consider Zelikow’s authorship of the document a prima facie conflict of interest, and fear that Zelikow’s position on the Commission will be used to further the Bush administration’s doctrine of preemptive war (see March 21, 2004). [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 8/5/2005; SHENON, 2008, PP. 128] Entity Tags: Tim Reich, University of Virginia, National Security Council, Bush administration, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 9/11 Commission, Andrew Bacevich, Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush, Philip Zelikow Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, US International Relations, 9/11 Timeline

September 20, 2002: Bush: Iraq ‘An Extension of the War on Terror,’ Military Action Will be Managed with Midterm Elections in Mind President Bush hosts a dinner meeting with a group of Republican governors at the White House. As deputy press secretary Scott McClellan will later recall, because the meeting is private—no press is allowed—Bush is “conspicuously candid with his former colleagues, now trusted friends and political allies.… Bush’s forthrightness about his thinking and approach on Iraq [is] revealing.” Bush boasts of the recent capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh (see September 11, 2002) and says of Osama bin Laden, “[W]e don’t know where he is, but he has been diminished.” He then turns to Iraq: “It is important to know that Iraq is an extension of the war on terror,” he says. “In the international debate, we are starting to shift the burden of guilt to the guilty. The international community is risk averse. But I assure you I am going to stay plenty tough.” He repeats his belief that if the international community brings enough pressure to bear, the Iraqi people will take matters into their own hands: “I believe regime change can occur if we have strong, robust inspections. Saddam Hussein is a guy who is likely to have his head show up on a platter” if enough outside pressure is brought to bear. Of Hussein, Bush says: “He is a hateful, ugly, repugnant man who needs to go. He is also paranoid. This is a guy who killed his own security guards recently. I would like to see him gone peacefully. But if I unleash the military, I promise you it will be swift and decisive.” He then tells the governors how to handle questions from possible critics: “Don’t fall into the argument that there is no one to replace Saddam Hussein.… And our planning will make sure there is no oil disruption; we are looking at options to enhance oil flow.” To sum up, Bush says: “Military force is my last option, but it may be the only choice.… I’m gonna make a prediction. Write this down. Afghanistan and Iraq will lead that part of the world to democracy. They are going to be the catalyst to change the Middle East and the world.” In the questioning period, Bush tells the governors that while he intends to invade Iraq sooner rather than later, he is aware that the political timing of the decision is important, with the midterm elections approaching. He reiterates: “[I]f we have to go [into Iraq], we will be tough and swift and it will be violent so troops can move very quickly.… If we go, we will use the full force and the might of the US military (see February 25, 2003).… I believe in the power of freedom.” After the meeting, Governor John Rowland (R-CT), the chairman of the Republican Governors Association, calls the meeting a “heart to heart” on Iraq. But, McClellan will later reflect, “it was also a frank strategy powwow between the leader of a campaign and some important members of his team—a collection of local politicians who could play a crucial role in helping to generate popular support for the decision to invade.” [MCCLELLAN, 2008, PP. 139-141] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Bush administration, Scott McClellan, Saddam Hussein, Republican Governors Association, John Rowland Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 21, 2002: Bush’s Military Options on Attacking Iraq Leaked to New York Times The New York Times publishes a highly detailed set of military options the Pentagon has recently given President Bush for attacking Iraq (see September 20, 2002). General Tommy Franks gave Bush the document just before a US speech at the UN calling for military action against Saddam Hussein. The attack would begin with a lengthy air campaign by B-2 bombers using satellite-guided bombs to knock out Iraqi command centers and air defenses, to isolate Hussein from field commanders. Ground forces would stage out of Kuwait. “The President has options now, and he has not made any decisions,” states White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/21/2002] These plans assume that only 5,000 troops would remain in Iraq by December 2006, a date only 45 months from the proposed invasion date - D-Day. The plans discussed goals and strategies for the invasion: “POTUS/SECDEF [President of US/Secretary of Defense] directed effort; limited to a very small group… Integrate / consider all elements of national power… [State Department] will promote creation of a broad-based, credible provisional government - prior to D-day… Iraqi regime has WMD capability.” [NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, 2/14/2007] The release of the military plans causes no widespread outrage or official US investigation, suggesting the White House approved the leak. Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, US Department of Defense, George W. Bush, Ari Fleischer, Thomas Franks Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 23, 2002: Al Gore Speaks Out against War in Iraq and Preemptive War in General In a speech to the Commonwealth Club, former Vice President Al Gore discusses his views on the struggle against terrorism and the proposed war in Iraq. He says that the major focus of the US should be the apprehension and punishment of “those who sponsored, planned and implemented the cold-blooded murder of more than 3,000 Americans.” He states his belief that the US is capable of succeeding in this task, despite the fact that it is taking much longer than anticipated. “President Bush is telling us that America’s most urgent requirement of the moment—right now—is not to redouble our efforts against al-Qaeda, not to stabilize the nation of Afghanistan after driving its host government from power, even as al-Qaeda members slip back across the border to set up in Afghanistan again; rather, he is telling us that our most urgent task right now is to shift our focus and concentrate on immediately launching a new war against Saddam Hussein. And the president is proclaiming a new, uniquely American right to preemptively attack whomsoever he may deem represents a potential future threat.” Gore warns that “if other nations assert that same right, then the rule of law will quickly be replaced by the reign of fear.” He states that this policy of preemptive action will damage American international alliances and inhibit the effective execution of the war on terror, which requires a multilateral approach to succeed. Gore advises Congress to fully examine the evidence prior to any commitment in Iraq and to always bear in mind what he says are the core principles of the US. He says “the administration has not said much of anything to clarify its idea of what would follow regime change or the degree of engagement that it is prepared to accept for the United States in Iraq in the months and years after a regime change has taken place.” Ominously, he warns “the resulting chaos in the aftermath of a military victory in Iraq could easily pose a far greater danger to the United States than we presently face from Saddam.” Gore asks, “What if in the aftermath of a war against Iraq, we face a situation like that because we washed our hands of it?…what if the al-Qaeda members infiltrated across the borders of Iraq the way they are in Afghanistan?” [COMMONWEALTH CLUB.ORG, 9/23/2002] Entity Tags: Al Gore, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 24, 2002: Bush Urges Congress to Pass Iraq Resolution Now In a press conference, President Bush urges Congress to pass its resolution authorizing military force against Iraq (see September 19, 2002) before the midterm elections. “Congress must act now to pass a resolution which will hold Saddam Hussein to account for a decade of defiance,” he says. “I’m confident a lot of Democrats here in Washington, DC, will understand that Saddam [Hussein] is a true threat to America. And I look forward to working with them to get a strong resolution passed.” [WHITE HOUSE, 9/24/2002] White House political adviser Karl Rove will later claim that the White House did not want the resolution to go up for debate until after the elections, a claim that is demonstrably untrue (see November 20, 2007). Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Karl Rove, Saddam Hussein Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 25, 2002: Daschle Accuses Cheney of Politicizing Debate on Iraq War Resolution Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) accuses Vice President Dick Cheney of politicizing the Iraq debate by urging an audience in Kansas to vote for a GOP congressional candidate because he supports President Bush on the issue (see September 10, 2002 and September 24, 2002). Dashcle says, “I must say that I was very chagrined that the vice president would go to a congressional district yesterday and make the assertion that somebody ought to vote for this particular Republican candidate because he was a war supporter and that he was bringing more support to the president than his opponent. If that doesn’t politicize this war, I don’t know what does.” Cheney was campaigning on behalf of Republican House candidate Adam Taff, running against incumbent Democrat Dennis Moore. Cheney told the audience of Taff supporters that the US “must not look the other way as threats gather against the American people” and that the “entire world knows beyond dispute that Saddam Hussein holds weapons of mass destruction in large quantities.… President Bush and I are grateful for the opportunity to serve our country. We thank you for your support—not just for our efforts, but for good candidates like Adam Taff who will be a fine partner for us in the important work ahead.” Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL) says, “It goes to the question of what the goal is here. Is it regime change in Iraq or regime change in the Senate?… If this is really designed to be dragged out to get it closer to the election and to obscure every other issue including the limited success of our war against terrorism and the economy, then I don’t give it much hope.” [CNN, 9/25/2002] Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, Adam Taff, Dennis Moore, George W. Bush, Tom Daschle, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Richard Durbin Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 25, 2002: Bush Says Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein Are Indistinguishable During a White House meeting with Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, George Bush makes the claim that Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden work together. “They’re both risks, they’re both dangerous,” Bush tells reporters. “The danger is, is that they work in concert,” he says in response to a question from a Reuters reporter. “The difference, of course, is that al-Qaeda likes to hijack governments. Saddam Hussein is a dictator of a government. Al-Qaeda hides, Saddam doesn’t, but the danger is, is that they work in concert. The danger is, is that al-Qaeda becomes an extension of Saddam’s madness and his hatred and his capacity to extend weapons of mass destruction around the world. Both of them need to be dealt with. The war on terror, you can’t distinguish between al-Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror. And so it’s a comparison that is - I can’t make because I can’t distinguish between the two, because they’re both equally as bad, and equally as evil, and equally as destructive.” [KNIGHT RIDDER, 9/25/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 9/26/2002; US PRESIDENT, 9/30/2002; CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, 1/23/2008] Later in the day, Bush’s comments are downplayed by White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, who says that Bush did not mean bin Laden and Hussein are working together, but rather that there is the danger that they could work together. He explains: “Clearly, al-Qaeda is operating inside Iraq. In the shadowy world of terrorism, sometimes there is no precise way to have definitive information until it is too late.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/26/2002; WHITE HOUSE, 9/25/2003] Bush fails to mention that the Defense Intelligence Agency has found no evidence of any such connections (see July 2002), or that eight days before his statement, the director of the CIA, George Tenet, told a Senate committee that no such connections can be shown to exist (see September 17, 2002). [CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, 1/23/2008] Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, Alvaro Uribe, Ari Fleischer, George J. Tenet, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

September 25, 2002: Administration Lawyers Give ‘Green Light’ for Harsh Interrogations at Guantanamo Several high-level Bush administration lawyers arrive in Guantanamo. The group includes White House counsel Alberto Gonzales; Vice President Cheney’s chief of staff David Addington, who had helped the Justice Department craft its “torture memo” (see August 1, 2002); CIA legal counsel John Rizzo, who had asked the Justice Department for details about how interrogation methods could be implemented (see June 22, 2004); and the Pentagon’s general counsel, William J. Haynes. They are at Guantanamo to discuss the case of suspected “20th hijacker” Mohamed al-Khatani (see August 8, 2002-January 15, 2003). Pressure from Washington - The commander of the Guantanamo facility, Major General Michael Dunlavey, will recall: “They wanted to know what we were doing to get to this guy, and Addington was interested in how we were managing it… They brought ideas with them which had been given from sources in DC. They came down to observe and talk.” Dunlavey will say that he was pressured by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld himself to expedite the interrogation and use extraordinary means to squeeze information from the suspect. “I’ve got a short fuse on this to get it up the chain,” Dunlavey recalls. “I was on a timeline. This guy may have been the key to the survival of the US.” Asked how high up the pressure was from, Dunlavey will say, “It must have been all the way to the White House.” Rumsfeld is “directly and regularly involved” in all the discussions of interrogations. 'Do Whatever Needed to Be Done' - Staff judge advocate Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver will recall that Addington is “definitely the guy in charge,” taking control of the discussions. Gonzales is quiet. Haynes, a close friend and colleague of Addington’s, seems most interested in how the military commissions would function to try and convict detainees. The lawyers meet with intelligence officials and themselves witness several interrogations. Beaver will recall that the message from Addington and his group is “Do whatever needed to be done.” In essence, the Guantanamo interrogators and commanders are given a green light from the administration’s top lawyers, representing President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Rumsfeld, and the CIA. [VANITY FAIR, 5/2008] Entity Tags: William J. Haynes, US Department of Justice, Mohamed al-Khatani, Michael E. Dunlavey, David S. Addington, Diane E. Beaver, Central Intelligence Agency, Alberto R. Gonzales, Bush administration, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, John Rizzo, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

September 28, 2002: Bush Tells US Litany of Falsehoods about Iraq’s WMDs, Terror Ties In his weekly radio address, President Bush tells the nation: “The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons, is rebuilding the facilities to make more, and, according to the British government, could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as 45 minutes after the order is given. The regime has long-standing and continuing ties to terrorist groups, and there are al-Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq. This regime is seeking a nuclear bomb, and with fissile material could build one within a year.” Many Americans are shocked and frightened by Bush’s flat litany of assertions. What they do not know is that none of them are true. The CIA had reluctantly agreed to produce a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq less than three weeks before (see September 5, 2002); the result is an NIE packed with half-truths, exaggerations, and outright lies (see October 1, 2002). None of Bush’s statements are supported by hard intelligence, and all will later be disproven. [WHITE HOUSE, 9/28/2002; CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, 1/23/2008] In 2007, author Craig Unger will write that the conflict seems to have gotten personal with Bush. “There’s no doubt [Saddam Hussein’s] hatred is mainly directed against us,” Bush says during the address. “There’s no doubt he can’t stand us. After all, this is a guy that tried to kill my dad at one time.” [UNGER, 2007, PP. 264] Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, Saddam Hussein, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Late September 2002: Bush: Hussein’s Policy toward US is ‘F_ck the United States’ During a breakfast meeting with congressional leaders, President Bush says there is no point trying to talk to Saddam Hussein. “Do you want to know what the foreign policy of Iraq is to the United States?” he asks Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD), according to someone who was present at the meeting. Then, thrusting his middle finger in the senator’s face, he says, “F_ck the United States! That’s what it is—that’s why we’re going to get him!” [ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 116-117] Entity Tags: Tom Daschle, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

(October 2002): CIA Station Chief in Jordan Refuses Order to Engage in Sabotage against Iraqi Vehicles The Iraqi Operations Group, headed by Luis (his full name has not been disclosed) and John Maguire, orders the CIA station chief in Annan Jordan to conduct a sabotage operation against a fleet of cars used by Iraqi officials in Jordan. They want the CIA in Annan to pour contaminants into the fuel tanks of the vehicles so as to destroy their the engines. But the station chief refuses, telling agency headquarters in a cable that he won’t participate in “juvenile college pranks.” Maguire is livid with anger. “We have a directive from the president of the United States to do this,” Maquire says. “So shut the f_ck up and do this! We’re not interested in your grousing as to whether or not this is a wise move or not. The president has made a decision!” The operation never takes place. [ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 160-161] Entity Tags: Anabasis, John Maguire, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Early October 2002: Bush Receives Intelligence Memo Noting Dissents About Iraqi Aluminum Tubes President Bush receives a one-page, highly classified “President’s Summary” of the US intelligence community’s new National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq (see October 1, 2002). The summary discusses the high-strength aluminum tubes that many administration and Pentagon officials believe are being used to help Iraq construct a nuclear weapon. Both the Energy Department (DOE) and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) believe the tubes are “intended for conventional weapons,” contradicting the view of other intelligence agencies, including the CIA and DIA. The public will not be told of Bush’s personal knowledge of the DOE and INR dissents until March 2006. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and other senior officials will try to explain the administration’s stance on Iraq’s nuclear program by asserting that neither Bush, Vice President Cheney, nor Rice ever saw the dissents. For months, Bush, Cheney, Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell (see February 5, 2003), and others will cite the tubes as indisputable proof of an Iraqi nuclear program. US inspectors will discover, after the fall of the Iraqi regime, that the nuclear program had been dormant for over ten years, and the aluminum tubes used only for artillery shells. Inquiry - The Bush administration will refuse to release the summary to Congressional investigators who wish to know the basis for the Bush administration’s assertions about Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. A senior official calls it the “one document which illustrates what the president knew and when he knew it.” It is likely that Bush never read the dissents in the report itself, as administration officials will confirm they do not believe Bush would have read the entire NIE, and it is likely that he never made it to the dissents, in a special text box positioned well away from the main text of the report. However, the one-page summary was written specifically for Bush, was handed to Bush by then-CIA director George Tenet, Bush read the summary in Tenet’s presence, and the two discussed the subject at length. Cheney was given virtually the same information as Bush concerning every aspect of the intelligence community’s findings on Iraq. Nevertheless, Bush and other officials (see July 11, 2003) will claim for months that they were unaware of the dissents. [NATIONAL JOURNAL, 3/2/2006] Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Colin Powell, Defense Intelligence Agency, George W. Bush, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, US Department of Energy, US Department of Defense, Condoleezza Rice Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

October 1, 2002: Bush Denies Having Made Decision To Go to War with Iraq; Says US Economy Strong Enough to Deal with Iraq President Bush is asked whether he thinks the US economy is strong enough to withstand a war with Iraq. He responds, “Of course, I haven’t made up my mind we’re going to war with Iraq,” and then adds, “I think the US economy is strong…. we’re strong enough to handle the challenges ahead.” [US PRESIDENT, 10/7/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

October 1, 2002: Bush Rejects Bipartisan Alternative to Resolution For War Senators Richard Lugar and Joseph Biden circulate an alternative to Bush’s draft congressional resolution, which the two senators explain, “helps the president attract strong bipartisan support in Congress.” Their proposed resolution focuses on the use of force against Iraq as opposed to the entire region and specifies that the disarmament of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction would be the reason for using military force. Bush rejects the suggested alternative outright, complaining, “I don’t want to get a resolution which ties my hands,” instead insisting that Congress pass a resolution that “sends a clear signal that this country is determined to disarm Iraq and thereby bring peace to the world.” Bush says, “My question is, what’s changed [since the Congressional resolution passed in 1998]? Why would Congress want to weaken a resolution?” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/1/2002; GUARDIAN, 10/2/2002; US PRESIDENT, 10/7/2002] Saddam Hussein, he continues, is “more of a threat four years later” and “[a]ll of us recognize that the military option is not the first choice, but disarming this man is, because he represents a true threat to the United States.” [GUARDIAN, 10/2/2002; US PRESIDENT, 10/7/2002] Entity Tags: Joseph Biden, Richard Lugar, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

October 1, 2002: US Intelligence Completes National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq

UNSCOM photo of an Iraqi unmanned aerial vehicle. [Source: CIA] The National Intelligence Council, a board of senior analysts that prepares reports on crucial national security issues, completes a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq. The purpose of an NIE is to provide policy-makers with an intelligence assessment that includes all available information on a specific issue so they can make sound policy decisions. The formal document is supposed to be the result of a collaborative effort of the entire intelligence community and is supposed to be untainted by political interests. The decision to produce the assessment on Iraq followed criticisms that the administration had already made a decision to invade Iraq without having thoroughly reviewed all available intelligence on Iraq. Congress wanted the NIE completed prior to voting on a bill authorizing the president to use force against Iraq (see September 5, 2002). NIEs such as this usually take months to prepare, however this document took a mere three weeks. The person in charge of preparing the document was weapons expert Robert Walpole. According to the Independent of London, Walpole has a track record of tailoring his work to support the biases of his superiors. “In 1998, he had come up with an estimate of the missile capabilities of various rogue states that managed to sound considerably more alarming than a previous CIA estimate issued three years earlier,” the newspaper later reports. “On that occasion, he was acting at the behest of a congressional commission anxious to make the case for a missile defense system; the commission chairman was none other than Donald Rumsfeld….” [INDEPENDENT, 11/3/2003; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/3/2004] Summary of NIE Conclusions - The NIE says there are potentially links between Iraq and al-Qaeda, but uses cautionary language and acknowledges that its sources—Iraqi defectors and captured al-Qaeda members—have provided conflicting reports. The sections dealing with weapons of mass destruction are also filled with caveats and nuanced statements. In the second paragraph of its “key judgment” section, the NIE states that US intelligence lacks “specific information” on Iraq’s alleged arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. And while the NIE says that Iraq probably has chemical and biological weapons, it also says that US intelligence analysts believe that Saddam Hussein would only launch an attack against the US if he felt a US invasion were inevitable. It also concludes that Saddam would only provide terrorists with chemical or biological agents for use against the United States as a last resort in order to “exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him.” [CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 10/1/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 6/22/2003; AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 11/30/2003] Reconstituted nuclear weapons programs - According to the NIE, “most” of the US’ six intelligence agencies believe there is “compelling evidence that Saddam [Hussein] is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad’s nuclear weapons program.” The one agency that disagrees with this conclusion is the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), which says in its dissenting opinion: “The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment. Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons programs, INR is unwilling to… project a timeline for the completion of activities it does not now see happening.” It is later learned that nuclear scientists in the Department of Energy’s in-house intelligence office were also opposed to the NIE’s conclusion and wanted to endorse the State’s alternative view. However, the person representing the DOE, Thomas Ryder, silenced them and inexplicably voted to support the position that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program (see Late September 2002). The DOE’s vote was seen as critical, since the department’s assessment was supposed to represent the views of the government’s nuclear experts. [CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 10/1/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 7/19/2003; KNIGHT RIDDER, 2/10/2004; KNIGHT RIDDER, 2/10/2004] Iraqi attempts to obtain uranium from Africa - According to the NIE, Iraq is “vigorously trying” to obtain uranium and “reportedly” is working on a deal to purchase “up to 500 tons” of uranium from Niger. It reads: “A foreign government service reported that as of early 2001, Niger planned to send several tons of ‘pure uranium’ (probably yellowcake) to Iraq. As of early 2001, Niger and Iraq reportedly were still working out arrangements for this deal, which could be for up to 500 tons of yellowcake. We do not know the status of this arrangement. Reports indicate Iraq also has sought uranium ore from Somalia and possibly the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” But the alternative view—endorsed by the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)—says that it is doubtful Iraq is trying to procure uranium from Africa. ”(T)he claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR’s assessment, highly dubious,” it reads. [CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 10/1/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 7/19/2003] Iraqi attempts to obtain aluminum tubes - The NIE says that most “agencies believe that Saddam’s personal interest in and Iraq’s aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors—as well as Iraq’s attempts to acquire magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools—provide compelling evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad’s nuclear weapons program.” To support its analysis of the tubes, it includes a chart which compares the dimensions of the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq with those that would be needed for a “Zippe-type” centrifuge. The chart’s comparison of the tubes makes it appear that the tubes are similar. But the NIE neglects to say that the aluminum tubes are an exact match with those used in Iraq’s 81-millimeter rocket. The estimate also claims that the tubes are not suitable for rockets. The assertion ignores the fact that similar tubes are used in rockets from several countries, including the United States. [US CONGRESS, 7/7/2004, PP. 84; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/3/2004] It does note however that the 900 mm tubes ordered by Iraq would have to have been cut in half to make two 400 mm rotors, and that the tubes would have needed other modifications as well in order to be used in centrifuge rotors. [THE COMMISSION ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (AKA 'ROBB-SILBERMAN COMMISSION'), 3/31/2005] The NIE’s conclusion about the tubes is challenged by two US intelligence agencies, the DOE’s in house intelligence agency, and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. In its dissenting opinion, the DOE says, “It is well established in open sources that bare aluminum is resistant to UF6 and anodization is unnecessary for corrosion resistance, either for the aluminum rotors or for the thousands of feet of aluminum piping in a centrifuge facility. Instead, anodization would likely introduce uncertainties into the design that would need to be resolved before a centrifuge could be operated.” The DOE’s dissenting opinion—written mainly by nuclear physicist William Domke at the Energy Department’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and nuclear physicist Jeffrey Bedell at the Los Alamos National Laboratory—also notes that anodization is a standard practice in missile construction for environmental protection. The Energy Department’s centrifuge physicists suggested more than a year before that the tubes were meant to serve as casings for conventional rockets (see May 9, 2001), but CIA analysts held fast to their theory. [WASHINGTON POST, 7/19/2003; USA TODAY, 7/31/2003; WASHINGTON POST, 10/26/2003; US CONGRESS, 7/7/2004, PP. 59] Years later a DOE intelligence analyst will tell two journalists, “[The DOE’s nuclear scientists] are the most boring people. Their whole lives revolve around nuclear technology. They can talk about gas centrifuges until you want to jump out of a window. And maybe once every ten years or longer there comes along an important question about gas centrifuges. That’s when you should really listen to these guys. If they say an aluminum tube is not for a gas centrifuge, it’s like a fish talking about water.” [ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 40] The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, similarly writes in its dissenting footnote: “In INR’s view Iraq’s efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, but INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors. INR accepts the judgment of technical experts at the US Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges to be used for uranium enrichment and finds unpersuasive the arguments advanced by others to make the case that they are intended for that purpose. INR considers it far more likely that the tubes are intended for another purpose, most likely the production of artillery rockets. The very large quantities being sought, the way the tubes were tested by the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of attention to operational security in the procurement efforts are among the factors, in addition to the DOE assessment, that lead INR to conclude that the tubes are not intended for use in Iraq’s nuclear weapon program.” [WASHINGTON POST, 7/19/2003; USA TODAY, 7/31/2003] Chemical and Biological Weapons - On the question of chemical and biological weapons, the NIE says: “We judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives.” But the document also highlights the belief that it is unlikely that Iraq has any intention to use these against the US. “… Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW [Chemical/Biological Weapons] against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington with a stronger case for making war.” Iraq would probably only use such weapons against the United States if it “feared an attack that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable, or possibly for revenge.” [CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 10/1/2002] Unmanned Aerial Vehicles - Citing defectors and exiles, the NIE states that Iraq possesses unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) which can be used to deploy biological and chemical weapons. But the document includes a dissenting opinion by the Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center. The center, which controls most of the US military’s UAV fleet, says there is little evidence that Iraq’s drones are related to the country’s suspected biological weapons program. Current intelligence suggests that the drones are not capable of carrying much more than a camera and a video recorder. The Air Force believes that Iraq’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are for reconnaissance, like its counterparts in the US. The dissenting opinion reads: “… The Director, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, US Air Force, does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents. The small size of Iraq’s new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance, although CBW delivery is an inherent capability.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/24/2003; WASHINGTON POST, 9/26/2003; KNIGHT RIDDER, 2/10/2004] Bob Boyd, director of the Air Force Intelligence Analysis Agency, will tell reporters in August 2003 that his department thought the allegation in the NIE “was a little odd,” noting that Air Force assessments “all along” had said that reconnaissance, not weapons delivery, was the purpose of Iraq’s drones. “Everything we discovered strengthened our conviction that the UAVs were to be used for reconnaissance,” he will explain. “What we were thinking was: Why would you purposefully design a vehicle to be an inefficient delivery means? Wouldn’t it make more sense that they were purposefully designing it to be a decent reconnaissance UAV?” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/24/2003; WASHINGTON POST, 9/26/2003] The NIE also says that Iraq is attempting to obtain commercially available route-planning software that contains topographic data of the United States. According to the NIE, this data could facilitate targeting of US sites. But Air Force analysts were not convinced by the argument, noting that this sort of information could easily be retrieved from the Internet and other highly accessible sources. “We saw nothing sinister about the inclusion of the US maps in route-planning software,” Boyd will tell reporters. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/26/2003] Analysts at the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency are said to back the Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center’s position. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/24/2003] Appendices - Most of the caveats and dissents in the NIE are relegated to a variety of appendices at the end of the document. [UNGER, 2007, PP. 266] Aftermath - After the completion of the National Intelligence Estimate, the Bush administration will continue to make allegations concerning Iraq’s weapons capabilities and ties to militant Islamic groups, but will include none of the qualifications and nuances that are present in the classified NIE. After excerpts from the classified version of the NIE are published in the press in July of 2003 (see 3:09 p.m. July 11, 2003), administration officials will claim that neither Bush, Rice, nor other top officials were informed about the alternative views expressed by the DOE, INR, and the Air Force intelligence agency. They will also assert that the dissenting views did not significantly undermine the overall conclusion of the NIE that Iraq was continuing its banned weapons program despite UN resolutions. [WASHINGTON POST, 7/19/2003; NEW YORK TIMES, 7/19/2003; WASHINGTON POST, 7/27/2003] But this claim is later disputed in an article by the Washington Post, which reports: “One person who has worked with Rice describes as ‘inconceivable’ the claims that she was not more actively involved. Indeed, subsequent to the July 18 briefing, another senior administration official said Rice had been briefed immediately on the NIE—including the doubts about Iraq’s nuclear program—and had ‘skimmed’ the document. The official said that within a couple of weeks, Rice ‘read it all.’” [WASHINGTON POST, 7/27/2003] The official’s account, will in fact be confirmed by Rice herself, who reportedly tells Gwen Ifill at the National Association of Black Journalists Convention in Dallas on August 7, 2003: “I did read everything that the CIA produced for the president on weapons of mass destruction. I read the National Intelligence Estimate cover to cover a couple of times. I read the reports; I was briefed on the reports. This is—after 20 years, as somebody who has read a lot of intelligence reports—this is one of the strongest cases about weapons of mass destruction that I had ever read.” [DAILY HOWLER, 8/11/2003] Conclusions 'Overstated' - George Bush is also provided with a summary of the NIE’s dissenting views. According to the Robb-Silberman report, released in early 2005, the president’s summary of the NIE notes that “INR and DOE believe that the tubes more likely are intended for conventional weapon uses.” [THE COMMISSION ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (AKA 'ROBB-SILBERMAN COMMISSION'), 3/31/2005] Additionally, senior CIA analyst Stuart Cohen, the acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council at this time, who helped write the document, will tell the Agence France-Presse, “Any reader would have had to read only as far as the second paragraph of the Key Judgments to know that as we said, ‘we lacked specific information on many key aspects of Iraq’s WMD program.’” The Key Judgments section is also where INR’s detailed dissent on the aluminum tubes allegation was located. [AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 11/30/2003] A Senate Intelligence Committee investigation will determine in July 2004 that “most of the major key judgments in the Intelligence Community’s October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting.” [US CONGRESS, 7/7/2004, PP. 59] And in 2006, one of the report’s authors, CIA senior analyst Paul Pillar, will admit the NIE had been written with the intent of “strengthen[ing] the case of going to war with the American public.” [PBS FRONTLINE, 6/20/2006] NIE 'Distorted' Due to Political Pressures, Author Claims - In 2007, author Craig Unger will write, “At the time, to virtually everyone in Congress, the NIE was still sacrosanct. It was still the last word in American intelligence. Yet it had been distorted thanks to political pressures from the neocons and the White House. If one took it seriously, the Niger documents were real. Curveball had credibility. And the aluminum tubes were part of Saddam’s nuclear program. Only one conclusion could be drawn: Saddam Hussein post an extraordinarily grave threat.” [UNGER, 2007, PP. 266] Entity Tags: Bob Boyd, Condoleezza Rice, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Paul R. Pillar, US Congress, Jeffrey Bedell, Stuart Cohen, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

October 2, 2002: US Officials Leak Dubious Claim that Al-Zarqawi Stayed in Baghdad with Approval of Hussein Government The Associated Press reports that Islamist militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi “was in Baghdad about two months ago, and US officials suspect his presence was known to the government of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, a defense official said…” This anonymous US official also calls al-Zarqawi among al-Qaeda’s top two dozen leaders. The article notes that “some US officials… contend the United States has no solid evidence of Iraq and al-Qaeda working together to conduct terrorist operations.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/2/2002] But despite this caveat, just five days later, in a public speech President Bush mentions “one very senior al-Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for chemical and biological attacks” (see October 7, 2002). This is a reference to al-Zarqawi, and is said to be based on communications intercepts. But the same day as the speech, Knight Ridder Newspapers reports that according to US intelligence officials, “The intercepts provide no evidence that [al-Zarqawi] was working with the Iraqi regime or that he was working on a terrorist operation while he was in Iraq.” [KNIGHT RIDDER, 10/7/2002; US PRESIDENT, 10/14/2002] After the US invades Iraq in March 2003, evidence of this Baghdad connection will start to be questioned. Reports that al-Zarqawi was there to have a leg amputated will later be debunked (see January 26, 2003). In June 2003, Newsweek will report, “Bush Administration officials also have acknowledged that their information about al-Zarqawi’s stay in Baghdad is sketchy at best.” [NEWSWEEK, 6/25/2003] Whether al-Zarqawi stayed in Baghdad and if the Hussein government was aware of his movements remains unclear. Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

October 2, 2002: Representative Gephardt Introduces Bush-Approved Resolution on Iraq The House and Senate draft a joint resolution authorizing the president to use military force against Iraq. The House bill is sponsored by Democrat Richard Gephardt (D-MI), who meets with the president in the morning to discuss the compromise bill. Bush concedes on a few of Gephardt’s requests. The resulting joint resolutions—HJ Res. 114 in the House and SJ Res. 46, in the Senate—is considered a win for President Bush, effectively derailing the bipartisan Biden-Lugar initiative (see October 1, 2002) which would have explicitly restricted the authorization of military force to Iraq only. Gephardt’s resolution angers many fellow Democrats. The general feeling is that Gephardt conceded so much to Bush because he didn’t want it to become an issue in the November elections (see also September 3, 2002). [US CONGRESS, 10/2/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/3/2002; ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 127] The document alleges, among other things, that Iraq is harboring al-Qaeda operatives, is actively seeking and preparing to use weapons of mass destruction, had gassed its own people, had attempted to assassinate the president’s father, and was in violation of past UN resolutions. [US CONGRESS, 10/2/2002] The document authorizes the president to use military force to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and… enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.” [US CONGRESS, 10/2/2002] The document requires that the president, within 48 hours of exercising the use of military force, provide Congress with an explanation as to why diplomacy was insufficient to protect the United States or enforce United Nations resolutions. The resolution also requires the president to report to Congress every 60 days during the entire duration of the conflict. [US CONGRESS, 10/2/2002] Entity Tags: US Congress, Richard Gephardt, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

October 3, 2002: Byrd Speaks Out Against Drive Towards War Senator Robert Byrd speaks strongly against the Bush administration’s drive towards war with Iraq during a debate over Senate Joint Resolution 46. [US CONGRESS, 10/3/2002, PP. S9873-S9877] Byrd calls the rush to war “blind and improvident,” deplores the “bellicose mood that permeates this White House” and accuses the Bush administration of being “clearly motivated by campaign politics. Republicans are already running attack ads against Democrats on Iraq. Democrats favor fast approval of a resolution so they can change the subject to domestic economic problems. Before risking the lives of American troops, all members of Congress—Democrats and Republicans alike—must overcome the siren song of political polls and focus strictly on the merits, not the politics, of this most serious issue.” Byrd calls the resolution a “product of haste [and of] presidential hubris [that] redefines the nature of defense, and reinterprets the Constitution to suit the will of the Executive Branch. It would give the President blanket authority to launch a unilateral preemptive attack on a sovereign nation that is perceived to be a threat to the United States. This is an unprecedented and unfounded interpretation of the President’s authority under the Constitution, not to mention the fact that it stands the charter of the United Nations on its head.” Byrd tells the Senate, “Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution grants Congress the power to declare war and to call forth the militia ‘to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.’ Nowhere in the Constitution is it written that the President has the authority to call forth the militia to preempt a perceived threat. And yet, the resolution before the Senate avers that the President ‘has authority under the Constitution to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States, as Congress recognized in the joint resolution on Authorization for Use of Miliary Force’ following the September 11 terrorist attack. What a cynical twisting of words! The reality is that Congress, exercising the authority granted to it under the Constitution, granted the President specific and limited authority to use force against the perpetrators of the September 11 attack. Nowhere was there an implied recognition of inherent authority under the Constitution to ‘deter and prevent’ future acts of terrorism. Think for a moment of the precedent that this resolution will set, not just for this president but for future presidents. From this day forward, American Presidents will be able to invoke Senate Joint Resolution 46 as justification for launching preemptive military strikes against any sovereign nations that they perceive to be a threat. Other nations will be able to hold up the United States as the model to justify their military adventures. Do you not think that India and Pakistan, China and Taiwan, Russia and Georgia are closely watching the outcome of this debate? Do you not think that future adversaries will look to this moment to rationalize the use of military force to achieve who knows what ends?” Byrd asks, “Why is war being dealt with not as a last resort but as a first resort? Why is Congress being pressured to act now, as of today, 33 days before a general election when a third of the Senate and the entire House of Representatives are in the final, highly politicized, weeks of election campaigns? As recently as Tuesday, the President said he had not yet made up his mind about whether to go to war with Iraq. And yet Congress is being exhorted to give the president open-ended authority now, to exercise whenever he pleases, in the event that he decides to invade Iraq. Why is Congress elbowing past the president to authorize a military campaign that the President may or may not even decide to pursue? Aren’t we getting ahead of ourselves?” Byrd worries about the destabilization of Iraq and of the Middle East such an invasion might precipitate, the “climate of suspicion and mistrust” other nations will adopt towards the US, the likelihood that the Iraqi people will not welcome American “liberators,” the debilitating effect a long-term occupation would have on the US military, and the tremendous cost to the US taxpayer of such an occupation. “The questions surrounding the wisdom of declaring war on Iraq are many and serious,” Byrd says. “The answers are too few and too glib. This is no way to embark on war. The Senate must address these questions before acting on this kind of sweeping use of force resolution. We don’t need more rhetoric. We don’t need more campaign slogans or fund raising letters. We need—the American people need—information and informed debate.” [AUSTRALIAN POLITICS (.COM), 10/3/2002] Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, Bush administration, Robert C. Byrd, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

October 3, 2002: US, Britain Demand UN Weapons Inspectors Not Return to Iraq; Bush Threatens to Invade Without UN Approval The US and Britain continue to demand that weapons inspectors not return to Iraq until after a stronger resolution—one that authorizes the use of force—is agreed upon by the National Security Council. Bush threatens to lead a coalition against Iraq if the UN Security Council fails to back him. During an address in Washington to Hispanic leaders, Bush says: “My intent, of course, is for the United Nations to do its job. I think it’ll make it easier for us to keep the peace…. My intent is to put together a vast coalition of countries who understand the threat of Saddam Hussein. The military option is my last choice, not my first. It’s my last choice…. The choice is up to the United Nations to show its resolve. The choice is up to Saddam Hussein to fulfill its word—his word. And if neither of them acts, the United States, in deliberate fashion, will lead a coalition to take away the world’s worst weapons from one of the world’s worst leaders.” [REUTERS, 10/3/2002; US PRESIDENT, 10/7/2002] But Russia, France, and China maintain their opposition to the US-British draft resolution which would pave the way for using military force against Iraq. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Saltanov strongly disagrees that a tougher resolution is needed. And France remains insistent that any further resolutions against Iraq should be broken into two parts—one defining the terms of inspections, and a second outlining the consequences if Iraq does not comply. [REUTERS, 10/3/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Alexander Saltanov, Robert C. Byrd, Richard Gephardt Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

October 6, 2002: Christian Fundamentalists Believed to Influence Bush Foreign Policy 60 Minutes airs a program on the religious support for President Bush’s expansionist Middle Eastern policies. [CBS NEWS, 10/6/2002] A Guardian editorial from around the same time suggests that “Christian millenarians” who are “driven by visions of messiahs and Armageddon” have formed an alliance with “secular, neoconservative Jewish intellectuals, such as Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz” and are strongly influencing Bush’s foreign policy. [GUARDIAN, 9/17/2002] A later Washington Post article also sees the support of evangelical Christians and right-wing Jewish groups as instrumental in defining US Middle East policy. [WASHINGTON POST, 2/9/2003] Entity Tags: Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Christian fundamentalists, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

October 7, 2002: President Bush Argues War in Iraq is ‘Crucial to Winning the War on Terror’ In a televised speech in Cincinnati (see October 7, 2002), President Bush says: “Some have argued that confronting the threat from Iraq could detract from the war against terror. To the contrary, confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning the war on terror.” [US PRESIDENT, 10/14/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

October 7, 2002: Bush Uses Groundless Evidence to Tout Hussein as a Direct Threat to US

Fallujah II chemical plant. [Source: CIA] In a televised speech, President Bush presents the administration’s case that Saddam Hussein’s regime is a threat to the security of the nation and insists that regime change would improve lifes for Iraqis. “Some worry that a change of leadership in Iraq could create instability and make the situation worse. The situation could hardly get worse, for world security and for the people of Iraq. The lives of Iraqi citizens would improve dramatically if Saddam Hussein were no longer in power, just as the lives of Afghanistan’s citizens improved after the Taliban.” The speech is widely criticized for including false and exaggerated statements. Iraq has attempted to purchase equipment used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons - Bush claims that a shipment of 3,000 aluminum tubes to Iraq, which were intercepted in Jordan by US authorities in July of 2001 (see July 2001), had been destined for use in a uranium enrichment program. But by this time numerous experts and government scientists have already warned the administration against making this allegation. [US PRESIDENT, 10/14/2002] Three weeks before Bush’s speech, The Washington Post ran a story on the aluminum tubes. The article summarized a study by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), disputing the administration’s claim that the tubes were to be used for gas centrifuges. The report was authored by the institute’s president and founder, David Albright, a respected nuclear physicist, who had investigated Iraq’s nuclear weapons program after the First Gulf War as a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspection team and who has spoken before Congress on numerous occasions. In his study, he concluded that Iraq’s attempts to import the tubes “are not evidence that Iraq is in possession of, or close to possessing, nuclear weapons” and “do not provide evidence that Iraq has an operating centrifuge plant or when such a plant could be operational.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/19/2002; GUARDIAN, 10/9/2002; SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 10/12/2002; ALBRIGHT, 10/9/2003] Soon after the speech, Albright tells The Guardian newspaper that there is still no evidence to substantiate that interpretation. As one unnamed specialist at the US Department of Energy explains to the newspaper, “I would just say there is not much support for that [nuclear] theory around here.” [GUARDIAN, 10/9/2002] The Washington Post article also reported that government experts on nuclear technology who disagreed with the White House view had told Albright that the administration expected them to remain silent. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/19/2002; INDEPENDENT, 9/22/2002] Houston G. Wood III, a retired Oak Ridge physicist considered to be “among the most eminent living experts” on gas centrifuges reviewed the tube question in August 2001 (see 1950s) and concluded at that time that it was very unlikely that the tubes had been imported to be used for centrifuges in a uranium enrichment program. He later tells The Washington Post in mid-2003 that “it would have been extremely difficult to make these tubes into centrifuges,” adding that it stretched “the imagination to come up with a way.” He also says that other centrifuge experts whom he knew shared his assessment of the tubes. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/10/2003] In addition to the several outside experts who criticized the tubes allegation, analysts within the US intelligence community also doubted the claim. Less than a week before Bush’s speech, the Energy Department and the State Department’s intelligence branch, the INR, had appended a statement to a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq disputing the theory (see October 1, 2002). [CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 10/1/2002 SOURCES: DAVID ALBRIGHT] Saddam Hussein ordered his nuclear program to continue in 1998 - Bush says that US intelligence has information that Saddam Hussein ordered his nuclear program to continue after inspectors left in 1998. “Before being barred from Iraq in 1998, the International Atomic Energy Agency dismantled extensive nuclear weapons-related facilities, including three uranium enrichment sites,” Bush charges. “That same year, information from a high-ranking Iraqi nuclear engineer who had defected revealed that despite his public promises, Saddam Hussein had ordered his nuclear program to continue.” [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 10/12/2002; US PRESIDENT, 10/14/2002] But Bush’s “high-ranking” source turns out to be Khidir Hamza, who is considered by many to be an unreliable source. Albright, who was president of the Institute for Science and International Security where Hamza worked as an analyst from 1997 to 1999, says that after Hamza defected, “he went off the edge [and] started saying irresponsible things.” [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 10/12/2002] And General Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law who was in charge of the dictator’s former weapons program but who defected in 1995, told UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors, as well as US and British intelligence, that Khidir Hamza was “a professional liar.” Kamel explained, “He worked with us, but he was useless and always looking for promotions. He consulted with me but could not deliver anything…. He was even interrogated by a team before he left and was allowed to go.” [UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION, 4/16/1998; NEW YORKER, 5/12/2003] Iraq is developing drones that could deploy chemical and biological weapons - The President claims that Iraq is developing drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which “could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas.” He goes so far as to say, “We’re concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States.” [GUARDIAN, 10/9/2002; US PRESIDENT, 10/14/2002] But this claim comes shortly after US intelligence agencies completed a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, in which Air Force intelligence had disputed the drone allegation (see October 1, 2002). Bush’s drone allegation is quickly derided by experts and other sources. The Guardian of London reports two days later that according to US military experts, “Iraq had been converting eastern European trainer jets, known as L-29s, into drones, but… that with a maximum range of a few hundred miles they were no threat to targets in the US.” [GUARDIAN, 10/9/2002] And the San Francisco Chronicle will cite experts who say that “slow-moving unmanned aerial vehicles would likely be shot down as soon as they crossed Iraq’s borders” because “Iraqi airspace is closely monitored by US and British planes and radar systems.” The report will also note, “It’s also unclear how the vehicles would reach the US mainland—the nearest point is Maine, almost 5, 500 miles away—without being intercepted.” [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 10/12/2002] Anthony Cordesman, a security analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, will say he believes the drone allegation is unrealistic. In an interview with the San Francisco Chronicle, he says, “As a guesstimate, Iraq’s present holdings of delivery systems and chemical and biological weapons seem most likely to be so limited in technology and operational lethality that they do not constrain US freedom of action or do much to intimidate Iraq’s neighbors.” [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 10/12/2002] These criticisms of Bush’s claim are validated after the US invasion of Iraq. Two US government scientists involved in the post-invasion hunt for weapons of mass destruction will tell the Associated Press in August 2003 that they inspected the drones and concluded that they were never a threat to the US. “We just looked at the UAVs and said, ‘There’s nothing here. There’s no room to put anything in here,’” one of the scientists will say. “The US scientists, weapons experts who spoke on condition of anonymity, reached their conclusions after studying the small aircraft and interviewing Iraqi missile experts, system designers and Gen. Ibrahim Hussein Ismail, the Iraqi head of the military facility where the UAVs were designed,” the Associated Press will explain in its report. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/24/2003] Saddam Hussein could give terrorists weapons of mass destruction - Bush asserts, “Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists.” [US PRESIDENT, 10/14/2002] But not only have numerous experts and inside sources disputed this theory (see July 2002-March 19, 2003), US intelligence’s National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq—completed just one week before—concluded that this is an unlikely scenario (see October 1, 2002). “Baghdad, for now, appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States,” the document clearly stated. “Should Saddam conclude that a US-led attack could no longer be deterred he probably would become much less constrained in adopting terrorist actions.” [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 10/12/2002] Iraq rebuilding facilities associated with production of biological and chemical weapons - Bush claims that surveillance photos indicate that Iraq “is rebuilding facilities that it had used to produce chemical and biological weapons.” [US PRESIDENT, 10/14/2002] On the following day, photos are published on the White House website showing that Iraq had repaired three sites damaged by US bombs—the Al Furat Manufacturing Facility, the Nassr Engineering Establishment Manufacturing Facility, and Fallujah II. [US PRESIDENT, 10/14/2002] But no evidence is provided by the White House demonstrating that these sites have resumed activities related to the production of weapons of mass destruction. Iraqi authorities will give reporters a tour of the facilities on October 10 (see October 10, 2002). Iraq has trained al-Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases - Bush alleges that Iraq has trained al-Qaeda operatives “in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases.” [US PRESIDENT, 10/14/2002] The claim is based on a September 2002 CIA document which had warned that its sources were of “varying reliability” and that the claim had not yet been substantiated (see September 2002). The report’s main source, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, an al-Qaeda operative who offered the information to CIA interrogators while in custody, later recants the claim (see February 14, 2004). A Defense Intelligence Agency report in February 2002 (see February 2002) had also expressed doubt in the claim, going so far as to suggest that al-Libi was “intentionally misleading [his] debriefers.” [CNN, 9/26/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 7/31/2004; NEWSWEEK, 7/5/2005; NEW YORK TIMES, 11/6/2005] And earlier in the month, US intelligence services had concluded in their National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq that this allegation could not be confirmed. [CNN, 9/26/2002; NEWSDAY, 10/10/2002; SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 10/12/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 6/22/2003] A very senior al-Qaeda leader received medical treatment in Baghdad - Bush claims: “Some al-Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq. These include one very senior al-Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for chemical and biological attacks.” The allegation refers to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born Palestinian who is the founder of al-Tawhid, an organization whose aim is to kill Jews and install an Islamic regime in Jordan. It was first leaked to the press by an anonymous US official several days before Bush’s speech (see October 2, 2002). The allegation is partly based on intercepted telephone calls in which al-Zarqawi was overheard calling friends or relatives (see December 2001-Mid-2002). But on the same day as Bush’s speech, Knight Ridder Newspapers reports that according to US intelligence officials, “The intercepts provide no evidence that the suspected terrorist was working with the Iraqi regime or that he was working on a terrorist operation while he was in Iraq.” [KNIGHT RIDDER, 10/7/2002; US PRESIDENT, 10/14/2002] Al-Zarqawi will link with al-Qaeda, but only in 2004, after the start of the war in Iraq (see October 17, 2004). Entity Tags: Al-Tawhid, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Anthony Cordesman, David Albright, Institute for Science and International Security, Heritage Foundation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, George W. Bush, Hussein Kamel, Houston G. Wood III, Al-Qaeda, Saddam Hussein, International Atomic Energy Agency, US Department of State, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, US Department of Energy, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, Taliban, Ibrahim Hussein Ismail, Khidir Hamza Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

October 8 and 11, 2002: Iraq, UN Dispute Conditions of Inspectors’ Return Chief UN inspector Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the UN International Atomic Energy Agency, send a letter to the Iraqi government, which lists conclusions they had drawn from the October 1 meeting with Iraqi arms officials (see October 1, 2002). The letter asks that Iraqi officials respond with a letter confirming these conclusions. But the inspectors’ letter actually includes additional conditions not discussed during the October 1 meeting, such as the right of inspectors to conduct interviews and choose “the mode and location” for them as well as the right for UN member states to fly U-2 spy planes over Iraq. [REUTERS, 10/12/2002] Iraqi Response 'Another Example of Evasion' - Iraqi officials respond to the request on October 11 with a letter signed by Amir Hammudi al-Saadi, an adviser to Saddam Hussein. The letter agrees only to the conditions that were agreed upon during the October 1 meeting. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/12/2002; REUTERS, 10/12/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/12/2002] The Bush administration seizes on the Iraqi response, calling it another example of evasion. “We are not surprised that once again the Iraqis want to delay and deceive.… We’ve had 16 resolutions and 11 years of playing this game, and it’s time the Security Council takes action,” says Richard Grenell, spokesman for US Ambassador John Negroponte. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/12/2002] Threat from White House - When Blix and ElBaradei discuss the issue with Vice President Cheney, he will threaten to ‘discredit’ them if they do not support the US position (see October 11, 2002). Entity Tags: Mohamed ElBaradei, George W. Bush, Amir Hammudi al-Saadi, Hans Blix, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

After October 7, 2002: Administration Neoconservatives Purge Intelligence Community of Undesirables Senior Bush neoconservatives, angry at the US intelligence community’s refusal to allow the Iraq-Niger uranium deal allegations into President Bush’s Cincinnati speech (see October 5, 2002 and October 6, 2002), begin purging “troublesome” intelligence analysts. One such victim is Bruce Hardcastle (see Early 2002), the DIA’s intelligence officer for the Middle East, South Asia, and Counterterrorism. Hardcastle has challenged Bush officials, telling them “that the way they were handling evidence was wrong.” In retaliation, not only does Hardcastle lose his job, but his position is eliminated entirely. DIA analyst Patrick Lang will later recall: “They wanted just liaison officers who were junior. They didn’t want a senior intelligence officer who argued with them.” Lang will recall Hardcastle saying, “I couldn’t deal with these people.” Lang continues: “They are such ideologues that they know what the outcome should be.… They start with an almost psuedo-religious faith. They wanted the intelligence agencies to produce material to show a threat, particularly an imminent threat. Then they worked back to prove their case. It was the opposite of what the process should have been like, that the evidence should prove the case.” [UNGER, 2007, PP. 262-263] Entity Tags: Bush administration, Bruce Hardcastle, Patrick Lang, Defense Intelligence Agency, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Neoconservative Influence, Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

Before October 10, 2002: Bush Refuses to Discuss Iraq with Senators As a group of Democratic and Republican members of Congress are discussing the proposed bill to authorize the use of force against Iraq (see October 2, 2002), President Bush walks in and says: “Look, I want your vote. I’m not going to debate it with you.” When a senator attempts to ask him a question, Bush snaps back, “Look, I’m not going to debate it with you.” [TIME, 9/6/2004; NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 10/17/2004] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

October 9, 2002: Limbaugh: Lack of Coverage of Presidential Speech ‘Final Confirmation’ of Media’s Liberal Bias Fox News is the only national television news broadcaster to cover a speech by President Bush on Iraq. Conservative radio host Rush Limbaugh calls the lack of coverage by other broadcasters the “final confirmation” of liberal bias among the news media. “If there was any remaining doubt about the networks’ editorial bias and ideological preferences,” he tells his listeners, “there shouldn’t be any longer.” [JAMIESON AND CAPPELLA, 2008, PP. 149-150] Entity Tags: Rush Limbaugh, Fox News, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Domestic Propaganda

October 10, 2002: House of Representatives Approves Authorization for Military Force (AUMF) against Iraq; Senate Follows Suit The House votes to give President Bush sweeping authorization to use military force against Iraq, on an overwhelming 296-133 vote. One hundred and twenty-six Democrats vote against the bill even though House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO) co-authored it. House Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-TX) issues a veiled warning to the president to use his newly granted powers judiciously: “Mr. President, we are about to give you a great trust.” After the bill passes the House, Bush says, “The days of Iraq acting as an outlaw state are coming to an end… [t]he gathering threat of Iraq must be confronted fully and finally.” One of the opponents of the House bill, John Spratt (D-SC), says that without an international diplomatic approach, “this will be the United States versus Iraq and in some quarters the US versus the Arab and the Muslim world.” Commenting on the passing of the resolution, the Washington Post reports: “Yesterday’s debate often lacked the passion and unpredictability of the 1991 affair, when members sat late into the night listening attentively to a war of words. By contrast, the House chamber was largely empty most of yesterday: the arguments familiar, the outcome certain, the conclusion anticlimactic.” [WHITE HOUSE, 10/2/2002; PBS, 10/10/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 10/11/2002] Bush calls on the Senate to pass the bill (see October 11, 2002) so it can be signed into law as soon as possible (see October 16, 2002). The Senate overwhelmingly approves the resolution the next day. [PBS, 10/10/2002; US SENATE, 10/11/2002] The AUMF contains a caveat in the authorization that conditions Congress’s authorization of military force on a formal determination by Bush that Iraq poses a threat to the US that cannot be contained diplomatically, and that any military action against Iraq must be consistent with the war against those who attacked the US on 9/11 (see March 18, 2003). The US media virtually ignores this condition, and therefore the Bush administration does not feel particularly bound by it. Congress asks for the formal declaration either before launching an attack or within 48 hours of the attack, and insists that the declaration contain solid evidence of the impossibility of further diplomacy, and of Iraq’s connection to the 9/11 terrorists. [DEAN, 2004, PP. 143-148] Entity Tags: Richard Gephardt, John Spratt, Bush administration, Dick Armey, George W. Bush, Washington Post Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

October 11, 2002: Army Officials Request Permission to Use More Aggressive Techniques in Interrogation of Guantanamo Terror Suspects Two days after General Rick Baccus has been relieved from duty as the guard commander at Guantanamo (see October 9, 2002), and almost one and a half months since the writing of the Office of Legal Counsel’s (OLC) August memo on torture (see August 1, 2002), military intelligence at Guantanamo begin suggesting new rules of interrogation. Lieutenant Colonel Jerald Phifer, Director J2, sends a memo, to Major General Michael E. Dunlavey, Commander of Joint Task Force (JTF) 170, requesting approval for more severe interrogation techniques. [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 10/11/2002 ; NEW YORKER, 2/27/2008] In 2009, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) will write (see April 21, 2009) that Dunlavey’s request is sparked by recent reports on the use of SERE training techniques for interrogation purposes (see January 2002 and After and April 16, 2002). [HUFFINGTON POST, 4/21/2009] Three Categories of Techniques - The memo states, “The current guidelines for interrogation procedures at GTMO [Guantanamo] limit the ability of interrogators to counter advanced resistance.” Phifer proposes three categories of techniques. The mildest, which includes yelling and weak forms of deception, are included in category one. Category two techniques are more severe and require approval by an “interrogator group director.” They include the use of stress positions for up to four hours; use of falsified documents; isolation for up to 30 days; sensory deprivation and hooding; 20-hour interrogations; removal of comfort and religious items; replacing hot food with cold military rations; removal of clothing; forced grooming, including the shaving of beards; and playing on detainees’ phobias to induce stress, such as a fear of dogs. The harshest techniques, listed in category three, are to be reserved for a “very small percentage of the most uncooperative detainees” and only used with permission from the commander of the prison. These methods include using non-injurious physical contact like poking or grabbing; threatening a detainee with death or severe pain or threatening that a family member would be subjected to such harm; exposing him to cold weather or water; using a wet towel to “induce the misperception of suffocation.” [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 10/11/2002 ; NEW YORKER, 2/27/2008] Desire to Extract More Information from Detainee - The request is prompted in part by military intelligence’s belief that Guantanamo detainee Mohamed al-Khatani has more information than the FBI has managed to extract from him. “Al-Khatani is a person in… whom we have considerable interest,” Dell’Orto will explain during a 2004 press briefing at the White House. “He has resisted our techniques. And so it is concluded at Guantanamo that it may be time to inquire as to whether there may be more flexibility in the type of techniques we use on him.” [WASHINGTON FILE, 6/23/2004] JAG Officer Concludes Tactics are Legal - The same day, a staff judge advocate, Lieutenant Colonel Diane E. Beaver, reviews Phifer’s proposed techniques for legality and, while making qualifications and recommending further review, concludes in a memo to Dunlavey that they are legal. Also the same day, Dunlavey sends the list of techniques to his superior, General James T. Hill, commander of the Southern Command, requesting approval for their use. Dunlavey writes: “Although [the techniques currently employed] have resulted in significant exploitable intelligence the same methods have become less effective over time. I believe the methods and techniques delineated in the accompanying J-2 memorandum will enhance our efforts to extract additional information.” [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 10/11/2002 ] Beaver concludes that since President Bush had decided that all the detainees “are not protected by the Geneva Conventions” (see January 18-25, 2002, February 7, 2002), all of the desired techniques are allowable because “no international body of law directly applies.” [SAVAGE, 2007, PP. 178] Entity Tags: Rick Baccus, George W. Bush, James T. Hill, Carl Levin, Daniel J. Dell’Orto, Diane E. Beaver, Michael E. Dunlavey, Mohamed al-Khatani Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

October 13, 2002: Wilson Recommends Aggressive Disarmament, Inspections for Iraq to Avoid War Former ambassador Joseph Wilson, having broken his decade-long silence on Middle Eastern affairs just months before (see May 2002), pens an op-ed for the San Jose Mercury News titled “How Saddam Thinks.” Wilson warns of a “bloody American invasion and long occupation of Iraq” if President Bush follows up on his threats of “regime change,” with the United Nations failing to derail the US push for war with forceful weapons inspections. Crucial Lessons of Desert Shield/Desert Storm - “Both the US and UN approaches are dangerously flawed,” he warns. “They ignore crucial lessons we learned in the Persian Gulf War about how Saddam thinks.” If Bush does go to war, Wilson writes, “Saddam [Hussein] will use every weapon in his arsenal to defend himself,” which may well include chemical and biological weapons. “But,” he continues, “history also shows that the less-confrontational approach favored by some on the Security Council—France and Russia—isn’t likely to work, either. Saddam has, after all, repeatedly flouted UN resolutions and ignored its demands to let weapons inspectors back into the country for almost four years.” Wilson recalls listening to Hussein gloat over the prospect of slaughtering American soldiers during Desert Shield (see August 6, 1990), and the difficulties Wilson and his fellow diplomats encountered in persuading Hussein to release hundreds of foreign hostages intended for use as “human shields” (see August 8, 1990). Hussein a 'Malignant Narcissist' - Wilson writes that “[w]e learned firsthand… what the CIA psychiatrists have said for years: Saddam is an egomaniacal sociopath whose penchant for high-risk gambles is exceeded only by a propensity for miscalculation. Those psychiatrists, who study the characters of world leaders, believe that he suffers from what is popularly called ‘malignant narcissism,’ a sense of self-worth that drives him to act in ways that others would deem irrational, such as invading neighboring countries. But the trait also makes him highly sensitive to direct confrontation and embarrassment, even as he is contemptuous of compromise.” Confrontation without War - Wilson found that a confrontational, “in your face” approach worked the best in getting the desired results from Hussein (see August 8-9, 1990). Wilson recommends revisiting the techniques that worked during the 1991 Gulf War, incorporating “[a]n aggressive UN-sanctioned campaign to disarm Iraq—bolstered by a militarily supported inspection process—would combine the best of the US and UN approaches, a robust disarmament policy with the international legitimacy the United States seeks.” Wilson continues: “Our message to Saddam can be simple: ‘You are going to lose your weapons of mass destruction capability either through the inspections or through a sustained cruise-missile assault on the 700 suspicious sites the United Nations has already identified. If you rebuild them, we will attack again. And if you use weapons of mass destruction or attack another country in the region, we will destroy you and your regime.’ The decision to live or die then becomes his to make. The ultimate lesson of the Gulf War may be that when offered the choice, Saddam will sacrifice almost everything before sacrificing his own life or grip on power.” [MERCURY NEWS (SAN JOSE), 10/13/2002] Response - Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board chief Brent Scowcroft (see October 16, 2001 and March 2002) asks Wilson if he can “take [the editorial] over to the White House.” Scowcroft says that White House officials need to hear the views of someone who actually has experience with Iraq and with Hussein. Days later, Wilson receives a note from former President George H. W. Bush indicating that he agrees wholeheartedly with Wilson’s position. The op-ed will also garner invitations from a variety of television news shows for Wilson to appear as a commentator. [WILSON, 2004, PP. 295-297] Entity Tags: Joseph C. Wilson, George Herbert Walker Bush, Bush administration, Brent Scowcroft, Saddam Hussein, George W. Bush, United Nations Security Council Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

October 14, 2002: Bush Mislabels Zubaida as One of Al-Qaeda’s ‘Top Three Leaders’ At a Republican fundraiser, President Bush erroneously labels captured Islamic militant Abu Zubaida (see March 28, 2002) as “one of the top three leaders” of al-Qaeda. Senior government officials have long been aware that many intelligence officials believe Zubaida to be little more than a low-level “gofer” for al-Qaeda (see Shortly After March 28, 2002 and April 9, 2002 and After). Bush says, apparently boasting of the deaths of some captured suspects: “I would say we’ve hauled in—arrested, or however you want to put it—a couple of thousand of al-Qaeda. Some of them are former leaders. Abu Zubaida was one of the top three leaders in the organization. Like number weren’t as lucky, they met a different kind of fate. But they’re no longer a problem. We’re slowly but surely rounding them up. The other day we got this guy, [Ramzi b]in al-Shibh. He popped his head up. He’s not a problem (see September 11, 2002). Slowly but surely. And I’m not giving up. There’s not a calendar on my desk that says, okay, on this day, you quit. That’s just not the way I think.” [WHITE HOUSE, 10/14/2002] Entity Tags: Abu Zubaida, Al-Qaeda, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

October 16, 2002: President Bush Signs Congressional Resolution Authorizing Use of Force Against Iraq; Says War is a ‘Last Resort’ President Bush signs the congressional resolution (see October 2, 2002 and October 11, 2002) authorizing him to use military force against Iraq. He continues to maintain that he wants to avoid war if at all possible (see (March 2002)). “I have not ordered the use of force,” he says. “I hope the use of force will not become necessary,” he says shortly before signing the document. “Hopefully this can be done peacefully. Hopefully we can do this without any military action.” He says he has “carefully weighed the human cost of every option before us” and that he will only send troops “as a last resort.” [US PRESIDENT, 10/21/2002; UNGER, 2007, PP. 267] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

October 20, 2002: US Withdraws from Agreement with North Korea, Says Further Aid in Doubt Responding to North Korea’s admission that it has the centrifuges necessary to produce weapons-grade uranium (see October 4, 2002 and October 17, 2002), President Bush announces that the US is unilaterally withdrawing from the 1994 “Agreed Framework” treaty between the US and North Korea that keeps North Korea from producing nuclear weapons (see October 21, 1994). It halts oil supplies to North Korea and urges other countries to cut off all economic relations with that country. In return, the North goes back and forth, at one turn defending its right to develop nuclear weapons, and in another offering to halt its nuclear program in return for US aid and the signing of a US non-aggression pact. North Korea asserts that the US has not met its obligations under the Agreed Framework (see October 21, 1994), as the construction of light-water nuclear reactors, scheduled to be completed in 2003, is years behind schedule. [WASHINGTON MONTHLY, 5/2004; BBC, 12/2007] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: US International Relations

October 21, 2002: US Presses UN to Accept Revised Resolution US Ambassador to the UN John Negroponte provides the five permanent members of the UN Security Council with a revision of the UN draft resolution on disarming Iraq. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/21/2002; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 10/22/2002] The Bush administration makes it clear that it expects the UN Security Council to vote on this draft of the resolution soon and signals that US officials are losing their patience with other member states. State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, states, “We’re also making clear it is time to wrap this up.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/21/2002] Similarly, Ari Fleischer tells reporters the following day, “It’s coming down to the end. The United Nations does not have forever.” [WHITE HOUSE, 10/22/2002] The same day, Bush will say in a Pennsylvania speech: “The United Nations can’t make its mind up. If Saddam won’t disarm, we will lead a coalition to disarm him for the sake of peace…. [The United Nations] must resolve itself to be something more than the League of Nations, must resolve itself to be more than a debating society, must resolve itself to keep international peace.” [CNN, 10/22/2002; US PRESIDENT, 10/28/2002] Summing up US feelings, an unnamed official tells the New York Times that the administration’s message to the other permanent members is, “You’re either with us or against us.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/23/2002] The revision drops the words “all necessary means,” stipulating in its place that Iraq’s failure to abide by the new resolution would result in “serious consequences.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/21/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/21/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 10/23/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/23/2002] The revision does not require that UN inspectors be accompanied by armed guards, a requirement in the earlier draft which many current and former UN inspectors opposed. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/21/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/23/2002] A provision in the previous draft requiring that member states help the UN enforce “no-fly” and “no-drive” zones around the inspection sites remains in the draft resolution, but in brackets, suggesting that the US and Britain are willing to negotiate on this point. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/21/2002; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 10/22/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/23/2002] The revision does not require that the five permanent members of the Security Council be permitted to appoint their own officials to the inspection teams. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/21/2002; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 10/22/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/23/2002] The revision stipulates that Iraq must declare its weapons of mass destruction within 30 days of the resolution’s passing, after which the weapons inspectors would have another 45 days to commence its work on disarmament. [ABC NEWS, 10/23/2002 SOURCES: JOHN NEGROPONTE] If Iraq does not meet the deadline, its failure to do so will be considered a “material breach” of the resolution. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/21/2002 SOURCES: JOHN NEGROPONTE] The revised draft still contains phrases that set a hair trigger for the implementation of “serious consequences.” The revision stipulates that further “false statements and omissions” by Iraq would amount to “a further material breach.” [ECONOMIST, 10/23/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/23/2002] Reactions - In spite of the revision, the oppositional stances of France, Russia, Mexico, and China remain unchanged. Bulgaria, Colombia, Norway, Singapore show some support for the revision. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/21/2002; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 10/22/2002; LONDON TIMES, 10/28/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, John Negroponte, Ari Fleischer, Richard A. Boucher Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

October 27, 2002: Author Gore Vidal Says Bush Used 9/11 as Pretext

Gore Vidal. [Source: David Rentas] The Observer reports: “America’s most controversial writer Gore Vidal has launched the most scathing attack to date on George W. Bush’s Presidency, calling for an investigation into the events of 9/11 to discover whether the Bush administration deliberately chose not to act on warnings of al-Qaeda’s plans. Vidal’s highly controversial 7,000 word polemic titled ‘The Enemy Within’… argues that what he calls a ‘Bush junta’ used the terrorist attacks as a pretext to enact a preexisting agenda to invade Afghanistan and crack down on civil liberties at home.” Vidal also said, “Apparently, ‘conspiracy stuff’ is now shorthand for unspeakable truth.” [OBSERVER, 10/27/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Bush administration, Al-Qaeda, Gore Vidal Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

October 27, 2002: Bush Fails to Secure Mexican Support for UN Resolution; Mexico Aligning with France President Bush attends a summit conference in Mexico and fails to secure a pledge of support from Mexican President Vicente Fox for the US-British draft resolution. President Vicente Fox says, “What we need to accomplish is a resolution that is satisfactory to all the parties there in the United Nations. We are listening and talking and we want to search for and do everything possible for a strong resolution.” [LONDON TIMES, 10/28/2002] Mexican officials reportedly make “it clear that Mexico is siding with France in the debate at the United Nations.” Mexico’s foreign minister, Jorge G. Casteneda, says, “What we want is a resolution that is approved by all 15 or 14 members of the Security Council. We think that’s more important for the United States’ cause.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/28/2002] Entity Tags: Vicente Fox, Jorge G. Casteneda, George W. Bush, United Nations Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

October 30, 2002: Bush Refuses to Open Negotiations with Iran Over Nukes Mohamed ElBaradei, the president of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), meets with President Bush in the Oval Office to discuss the news of Iran’s restarted nuclear program (see August 2002 and December 12, 2002). ElBaradei tells Bush that the Iranians want to meet with an American delegation to discuss the program, obviously with the intent of negotiating a cessation in return for American concessions. ElBaradei offers to help set up the talks, and even keep them low-profile. But Bush is uninterested. His goal, as he later tells British Prime Minister Tony Blair, is to “free Iran.” Author J. Peter Scoblic will later write that any negotiations that might succeed in shutting down Iran’s nuclear program would also serve to strengthen and legitimize Iran’s government; it is, therefore, worth the risk of a nuclear Iran to continue working towards “regime change” in that nation. This also helps explain why, several months later, Bush officials refused to consider Iran’s offer of the so-called “grand bargain” (see May 4, 2003). [SCOBLIC, 2008, PP. 247] Entity Tags: Tony Blair, George W. Bush, International Atomic Energy Agency, J. Peter Scoblic, Mohamed ElBaradei Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran

Late 2002-Early 2003: CIA Staffers Reportedly Warn Bush That Intel on Iraq Is Weaker Than He Thinks

James Risen’s State of War. [Source: Simon and Schuster] According to a senior former CIA official interviewed by journalist James Risen, frustrated CIA staffers go to President Bush and inform him that the President’s Daily Briefs delivered by George Tenet had left out reports raising questions about the agency’s intelligence on Iraq’s alleged arsenal of WMD. Risen says in his book State of War that this suggests “that the President’s Daily Brief [never] reflected the level of skepticism about the quality of the intelligence that was widespread within the CIA.” [RISEN, 2006, PP. 183-184] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

November 2002: North Korea Offers Nuclear Resolution, Rebuffed by US North Korean leader Kim Jong Il sends a letter to President Bush saying, “If the United States recognizes our sovreignty and assures non-aggression, it is our view that we should be able to find a way to resolve the nuclear issue in compliance with the demands of a new century.” The Bush administration has already ignored one recent proffer from North Korea (see October 27, 2002); it responds to this one by cutting off the monthly shipments of heavy fuel oil as mandated by the Agreed Framework (see October 21, 1994). In turn, North Korea declares the Agreed Framework dead. [SCOBLIC, 2008, PP. 239] Entity Tags: Kim Jong Il, Bush administration, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: US International Relations

November 2002-March 2003: US Insists Any Violations of Resolution 1441 Should be Considered Cause for War The Bush administration disagrees with the United Nations and other member states over what precisely should qualify as a “material breach” of UN Resolution 1441 (see November 8, 2002). The UN and other nations believe that only serious violations should count. The US, however, takes the position that any violation, no matter how small, should be considered a material breach and thus sufficient cause for using military force against Iraq. The difference in opinion is acknowledged by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who says, “The US does seem… to have a lower threshold than others may have” to justify the use of military force. He also says, “I think the discussion in the council made it clear we should be looking for something serious and meaningful, and not for excuses to do something.” President Bush, reflecting the stance of his hawkish advisors, says the Security Council should have “zero tolerance,” implying that even minor infractions could be considered a “material breach.” [WASHINGTON POST, 11/17/2002 SOURCES: US AND UN OFFICIALS] Colin Powell and Vice President Cheney contend that the delay of, or omissions and inaccuracies in, Iraq’s early December declaration would constitute a breach. Iraq is warned to this effect. [EVENING NEWS WITH DAN RATHER, 11/21/2002; OBSERVER, 12/8/2002] During a dinner meeting on November 18, Hans Blix reminds a close aide to Saddam Hussein that a failure to meet the deadline would be considered by the United States to be a “material breach.” [INDEPENDENT, 11/20/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Kofi Annan, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, United Nations Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

November 5, 2002: Bush: Congress Has No Authority to Control Education Department Institute Congress passes a law creating the Institute of Education Sciences, a subsidiary of the Department of Education. The new institute is designed to generate independent statistics about student performance. The law stipulates that the institute’s director may conduct and publish research “without the approval of the secretary [of education] or any other office of the department.” President Bush issues a signing statement indicating that contrary to the law, the director will be responsible to the secretary of education. Since the president has the power to control the actions of all executive branch officials, the statement asserts, “the director of the Institute of Education Sciences shall [be] subject to the supervision and direction of the secretary of education.” Bush’s signing statement directly contradicts the letter and the intent of Congress’s law. [BOSTON GLOBE, 4/30/2006; SAVAGE, 2007, PP. 240] Entity Tags: US Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

November 7, 2002: Bush Says War Is His Last Choice; Press Secretary Will Dispute Claim A reporter asks President Bush if he thinks a war against Iraq might be a bad idea given widespread concerns that it could “generate a tremendous amount of anger and hatred at the United States… [thus] creating many new terrorists who would want to kill Americans.” Bush responds that the US should not avoid taking action out of fear that it might “irritate somebody [who] would create a danger to Americans.” He adds that no decision has been made with regard to using force against Iraq. “Hopefully, we can do this peacefully,” he says. “And if the world were to collectively come together to do so, and to put pressure on Saddam Hussein and convince him to disarm, there’s a chance he may decide to do that. And war is not my first choice… it’s my last choice. But nevertheless, it is… an option in order to make the world a more peaceful place.” [US PRESIDENT, 11/11/2002] McClellan: War 'Inevitable' - However, current deputy press secretary Scott McClellan will dispute Bush’s claim. In 2008, he will write: “Bush made sure this initiative was closely held, known only by a few people who could be trusted not to leak it. But it meant that, in effect, Bush had already made the decision to go to war—even if he convinced himself it might still be avoided. In the back of his mind, he would be convinced in Iraq, as on other issues, that until he gave the final order to commence war the decision was never final. But as I would learn upon reflection, war was inevitable given the course of action the president set from the beginning.” [MCCLELLAN, 2008, PP. 127-128] Enabled by Foreign Advisers - McClellan will continue: “Did Bush’s National Security Adviser, Condi Rice, fully calibrate for Bush’s headstrong style of leadership or appreciate the need to keep his beliefs in proper check? That will be for historians to judge. But overall, Bush’s foreign policy advisers played right into his thinking, doing little to question it or to cause him to pause long enough to fully consider the consequences before moving forward. And once Bush set a course of action, it was rarely questioned. That is what Bush expected and made known to his top advisers. The strategy for carrying out a policy was open for debate, but there would be no hand-wringing, no second-guessing of the policy once it was decided and set in motion.” [MCCLELLAN, 2008, PP. 127-128] Entity Tags: Scott McClellan, George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

November 8, 2002: UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 1441; Does Not Authorize Force Against Iraq The UN Security Council unanimously votes 15-0 in favor of UN Resolution 1441, which stipulates that Iraq is required to readmit UN weapons inspectors under tougher terms than required by previous UN resolutions. The resolution does not give the US authority to use force against Iraq. [UNITED NATIONS, 11/8/2002] The resolution makes it very clear that only the UN Security Council has the right to take punitive action against Iraq in the event of noncompliance. [COMMON DREAMS, 11/14/2002] After the resolution is passed, top Bush administration officials make public statements threatening to use military force against Iraq if Saddam’s regime does not comply with the resolution. George Bush, Colin Powell, John Negroponte, Andrew Card, and Ari Fleischer make statements asserting that the resolution does not prevent the US from using force. A provision that would have authorized UN member states to use “all necessary means” to disarm Iraq is relocated to the preamble of the resolution where it has no practical significance. [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/6/2002; UNITED NATIONS, 11/9/2002] A provision requiring that security guards accompany the inspectors is removed. [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/6/2002] The resolution requires Iraq to provide the UN with the names of all its weapons experts. [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/6/2002; LONDON TIMES, 11/9/2002; UNITED NATIONS, 11/9/2002] The resolution states that weapons inspectors will be authorized to remove Iraqi scientists, as well as their families, from Iraq in order to interview them. An official later tells the Washington Post that the power to interview Iraqi scientists was “the most significant authority contained in the resolution” and “the one thing that is most likely to produce overt Iraqi opposition.” [UNITED NATIONS, 11/9/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 12/12/2002] The resolution overturns provisions of the previous Resolution 1154 that required UN inspectors to notify Baghdad before inspecting Saddam Hussein’s presidential sites. Resolution 1154 had also required that inspections of those sensitive sites occur in the presence of diplomats. The new resolution demands that Iraq allow the inspectors “immediate, unimpeded, unconditional and unrestricted access” to any sites chosen by the inspectors. [UNITED NATIONS, 11/9/2002] Unnamed diplomats and US officials tell USA Today that the US may attempt to claim that Iraq is engaged in a pattern of defiance and deceit if it hinders the inspectors in any way. [USA TODAY, 12/19/2002 SOURCES: UNNAMED DIPLOMATS AND US OFFICIALS] The resolution includes a provision calling for “no-fly” and “no-drive” zones in the areas surrounding suspected weapons sites to prevent the Iraqis from removing evidence prior to or during inspections. [UNITED NATIONS, 11/9/2002] The final resolution includes statements stipulating that an Iraqi failure to comply with the terms of the resolution, including “false statements or omissions” in the weapons declaration it is required to submit, will “constitute a further material breach” of its obligations. Additional wording included in the same provision explains that any breach of the resolution will “be reported to the Council for assessment.” Also, towards the end of the resolution, it states that the chief weapons inspector should “report immediately to the Council any interference” by Iraq so that the Council can “convene immediately to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all the relevant council resolutions in order to restore international peace and security.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/6/2002; CNN, 11/8/2002; LONDON TIMES, 11/9/2002; UNITED NATIONS, 11/9/2002] Paragraph 8 of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 states that Iraq “shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or the IAEA or of any Member State taking action to uphold any Council resolution.” The US contends that this applies to the US- and British- patrolling of the “no-fly” zones that the two countries imposed shortly after the Gulf War. The “patrolling,” which has never been officially sanctioned by the UN and which is not recognized by Iraq, often includes aerial attacks on Iraqi sovereign territory. Iraq consistently fires on the attacking jets in self-defense. Other UN Security Council members explicitly oppose this interpretation of the resolution before its passage. [UNITED NATIONS, 11/9/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 11/12/2002] The resolution gives Iraq seven days to announce whether or not it will comply with the resolution, and 30 days (December 8) to declare its chemical, biological, and nuclear-related capabilities—even those that are unrelated to weapons programs. 10 days after Iraq’s acceptance of the terms, inspectors will send an advanced team to Baghdad, but will have a total of 45 days to begin the actual work. The inspection team will be required to provide the UN Security Council with a report 60 days (January 27) after the commencement of its work. [GUARDIAN, 11/7/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 11/8/2002; UNITED NATIONS, 11/9/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 11/13/2002] Diplomats and US officials speaking off the record tell USA Today that the declaration due on December 8 represents a hidden trigger, explaining that any omissions will be considered a material breach and sufficient justification for war. [USA TODAY, 12/19/2002 SOURCES: UNNAMED DIPLOMATS AND US OFFICIALS] Syria requested that the resolution include a provision stating that Iraq’s compliance with the terms would result in the lifting of sanctions. This provision was not included. [CNN, 11/8/2002] Syria requested that the resolution declare the entire Middle East a “nuclear-free and weapons of mass destruction-free zone.” This provision was not included. [CNN, 11/8/2002] France did not want the resolution to include any wording that might authorize the use of force. Instead it argued that the resolution should include only terms for tougher inspections. In the event of Iraqi noncompliance with the terms, France argued, a separate resolution should be agreed upon to decide what further action would be necessary. France lost its argument, and the new resolution includes a warning to Iraq “that it will face serious consequences” in the event of its failure to comply with the terms of the resolution. [GUARDIAN, 11/7/2002] Entity Tags: John Negroponte, Ari Fleischer, George W. Bush, Colin Powell, Andrew Card Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

November 13, 2002: Bush: UN Resolution Won’t Prevent US from Invading Iraq without UN Support President Bush reiterates the White House’s interpretation of UN Resolution 1441, saying: “I have told the United Nations we’ll be glad to consult with them, but the resolution does not prevent us from doing what needs to be done, which is to hold Saddam Hussein into account. We hope that he disarms, we hope that he will listen to the world.” [US PRESIDENT, 11/18/2002] Deputy press secretary Scott McClellan will later observe: “Pursuing a new UN resolution that included an immediate call for Saddam to come clean and let inspectors back in was vital to building public support. Even more important for the American public was to have strong, bipartisan Congressional support. Americans would be much more likely to support war if they felt Bush had pursued and exhausted diplomatic options and if Congress provided strong bipartisan approval.” [MCCLELLAN, 2008, PP. 138] Entity Tags: Scott McClellan, Saddam Hussein, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

November 15, 2002: Congress and President Bush Approve New 9/11 Commission Congress approves legislation creating an independent commission—the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States—which will later be popularly known as the 9/11 Commission. The Commission’s mandate is to “examine and report on the facts and causes relating to the September 11th terrorist attacks” and “make a full and complete accounting of the circumstances surrounding the attacks.” President Bush signs it into law November 27, 2002. [US CONGRESS, 11/27/2002] Bush originally opposed an independent commission (see May 23, 2002), but changed his mind over the summer (see September 20, 2002) after political pressure. The Democrats conceded several important aspects of the Commission (such as subpoena approval) after the White House threatened to create a Commission by executive order, over which it would have more control. Bush will appoint the Commission chairman and he sets a strict time frame (18 months) for its investigation. [CNN, 11/15/2002] The Commission will only have a $3 million budget. Senator Jon Corzine (D) and others wonder how the Commission can accomplish much with such a small budget. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1/20/2003] (In contrast, a 1996 federal commission investigating casino gambling received $5 million; the federal government spent $50 million investigating Bill Clinton and Whitewater; and the investigation into the February 2003 Columbia shuttle explosion will receive $50 million.) [CARTER, 2004, PP. 280] Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D) will call the budget “a joke.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 31] The budget will later be increased (see March 26, 2003). Entity Tags: US Congress, Jon Corzine, Tom Daschle, 9/11 Commission, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

November 20, 2002: Perle: UN Won’t Find Iraqi Weapons Because They Are So Well Hidden; US Will Attack Even If No Weapons Found Richard Perle, a member of the Defense Policy Board, attends a meeting on global security with members of the British Parliament. At one point he argues that the weapons inspection team might be unable to find Saddam’s arsenal of banned weapons because they are so well hidden. According to the London Mirror, he then states that the US would “attack Iraq even if UN inspectors fail to find weapons.” [MIRROR, 11/21/2002] Peter Kilfoyle, a former defense minister and Labour backbencher, tells the Mirror: “America is duping the world into believing it supports these inspections. President Bush intends to go to war even if inspectors find nothing. This make a mockery of the whole process and exposes America’s real determination to bomb Iraq.” [MIRROR, 11/21/2002] Entity Tags: Peter Kilfoyle, Richard Perle, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

November 20, 2002: Bush Warns that ‘Deception’ from Iraq ‘Will Not Be Tolerated’ On the eve of a two-day NATO summit in Prague, Czech Republic, President Bush addresses the UN mandate for Iraq to declare its arsenal of unconventional weapons (see November 8, 2002): “Saddam Hussein has been given a very short time to declare completely and truthfully his arsenal of terror. Should he again deny that this arsenal exists, he will have entered his final stage with a lie. And deception this time will not be tolerated. Delay and defiance will invite the severest of consequences. America’s goal, the world’s goal, is more than the return of inspectors to Iraq. Our goal is to secure the peace through the comprehensive and verified disarmament of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Voluntary or by force, that goal will be achieved.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/21/2002; US PRESIDENT, 11/25/2002] Bush is echoing and reiterating calls from conservatives and neoconservatives both inside and outside the White House to label Hussein a liar no matter what he declares (see November 20, 2002 and December 2, 2002). They go farther than Bush in demanding that the US invade Iraq as soon as the December 8 deadline for declaring his weapons expires (see December 7, 2002). Former ambassador Joseph Wilson will write: “If the neoconservatives had been angry before the UN deal—and they were—they were truly furious afterward. The ink on the resolution was barely dry before they launched attacks on [Secretary of State] Colin Powell for having led the president down the wrong path, one in which he was placing his faith in what they said was a feckless international community.” [WILSON, 2004, PP. 301] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Colin Powell, Joseph C. Wilson, Saddam Hussein Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

November 25, 2002: Woodward Publishes ‘Hagiographic’ Book Chronicling Bush’s Response to 9/11, Preparations for War with Iraq

The cover of ‘Bush at War.’ [Source: Amazon (.co.uk)] Author and famed reporter Bob Woodward’s book Bush at War is published. Unprecedented Access - Woodward, who made his reputation uncovering the Watergate conspiracy from 30 years before (see June 15, 1974), is no longer an unknown young reporter working to find sources that will confide in him. Now he is an established Washington insider. For this book, Woodward was granted “unprecedented access” to Bush administration officials, including notes from National Security Council meetings and two long interviews with President Bush himself, far more access than even that granted to the 9/11 Commission and Congressional inquiries into other events of interest. Former Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich will find this level of access inexplicable, saying that “it makes no sense for an administration that has jealously guarded its executive privilege to allow a reporter the access it denies to members of Congress.” Hagiographic Account - The Observer’s Peter Preston calls Woodward’s book a “more-or-less instant study of the White House after 9/11,” and writes that while Woodward could have created “a classic of investigative journalism,” instead he gave us a compendium of “painful, obsessively useless detail” that generally paints the picture the White House wants painted. If Woodward’s book is to be believed, Preston writes, the Colin Powell moderates and the Dick Cheney hawks “had their snappy moments, but they’re OK-ish now.” CIA Director George Tenet “is a far-sighted man” who not only immediately divined that Osama bin Laden was behind the attacks, but while the towers were still burning, wondered if the attacks had anything to do with “that guy taking pilot training,” Zacarias Moussaoui. Iraq war planner General Tommy Franks usually feels “finer than the hair on a frog’s back.” Former President Clinton’s “weak-willed men used to ‘pound the desert’ ineffectually, while his brilliant successors like to hit something, if at all possible.” And President Bush “is bright and talented and eloquent and decisive,” who runs National Security Council meetings himself and knows all he needs to know about the state of the world (Woodward quotes Bush as saying, “I’m not a textbook player—I’m a gut player”). Both Preston and author Frank Rich accuse Woodward of “burnishing” Bush’s image at the expense of the truth. A few potentially embarrassing tidbits manage to poke their way through what both Preston and Rich call the “hagiography,” mostly relating to senior administration officials’ lack of knowledge about Afghan tribal politics and the lack of evidence tying Saddam Hussein to the 9/11 attacks. But all told, the book seems to tell a clear story: where Clinton was indecisive, Bush is forthright; where Clinton muddled around with bin Laden and Middle East terrorism, Bush is taking the war straight into the heart of the Islamist redoubt. [OBSERVER, 12/1/2002; RICH, 2006, PP. 66-67] The book gives such a favorable impression of Bush and his administration that the Republican National Committee will recommend it on its Web site. [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/12/2006] Selective Reporting - The administration officials who talked to Woodward are painted in largely glowing terms, while those who did not (including Attorney General John Ashcroft and Homeland Security head Tom Ridge) are, in Preston’s words, “written out of the script.” Potentially embarrassing incidents such as the administration’s complete failure to find the source of the anthrax mailings of 2001 (see September 17-18, 2001 and October 5-November 21, 2001) and the ineffective roundup of thousands of Middle Eastern “terror suspects” after 9/11 (see Late November, 2001) are ignored entirely. The pivotal Afghan battle of Tora Bora, where bin Laden was allowed to escape US clutches (see Mid-November 2001-Mid-December 2001), gets two paragraphs. [OBSERVER, 12/1/2002; RICH, 2006, PP. 66-67] Guardian reviewer Peter Symon notes that Woodward even fails to ask the most “obvious questions” about the 9/11 attacks, instead accepting the administration’s accounts of events and its responses as absolute and unquestionable. [GUARDIAN, 1/29/2003] Rich notes that Woodward grants Bush and his officials tremendous individual credence, taking their word on one issue after another without question: for example, when Bush calls investigative journalist Seymour Hersh “a liar,” Woodward takes Bush’s word without giving Hersh a chance to respond. More generally, Woodward never asks the obvious follow-up questions. Bush explains why the US didn’t attack Afghanistan and Iraq simultaneously after the 9/11 attacks: “If we tried to do too many things… militarily, then… the lack of focus would have been a huge risk.” Rich notes, “The follow-up question that was not to be found in Bush at War was simple enough: If it was a huge risk to split our focus between Saddam and al-Qaeda then, why wasn’t it now?” Preston concludes: “Maybe the Woodward of three decades ago would have given [the Bush administration more intense scrutiny]. No longer. Today’s Woodward, eight bestsellers later, skates breathlessly from interview to interview and notepad to notepad without ever, seemingly, stopping to think, ‘Why am I being told all this? What does it mean?’ It isn’t investigation, just cross-referenced compilation.” [OBSERVER, 12/1/2002; RICH, 2006, PP. 66-67] Entity Tags: Peter Preston, National Security Council, John Ashcroft, Frank Rich, Bob Woodward, Bush administration, Newt Gingrich, Thomas Franks, Peter Symon, George W. Bush, Republican National Committee, Seymour Hersh, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda

November 25, 2002: Bush Creates Department of Homeland Security

This Homeland Security department logo of an eye peeking through a keyhole was copyrighted but apparently not used. [Source: Public domain] President Bush signs legislation creating the Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge is promoted to secretary of homeland security. The department will consolidate nearly 170,000 workers from 22 agencies, including the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, the federal security guards in airports, and the Customs Service. [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/26/2002; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 11/26/2002] However, the FBI and CIA, the two most prominent anti-terrorism agencies, will not be part of it. [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/20/2002] The department wants to be active by March 1, 2003, but “it’s going to take years to integrate all these different entities into an efficient and effective organization.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/20/2002; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 11/26/2002] Some 9/11 victims’ relatives are angry over sections inserted into the legislation at the last minute. Airport screening companies will be protected from lawsuits filed by family members of 9/11 victims. Kristen Breitweiser, whose husband died in the World Trade Center, says: “We were down there lobbying last week and trying to make the case that this will hurt us, but they did it anyway. It’s just a slap in the face to the victims.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/26/2002] The legislation creating the new department contains sweeping new powers for the executive branch that go largely unremarked on by the media. The White House and the departments under its control can now withhold from the public vast amounts of information about “critical infrastructure,” such as emergency plans for major industrial sites, and makes the release of such information a criminal offense. The explanation is that keeping this information out of terrorist hands will prevent them from creating a “road map” for planning attacks; what is much less discussed is how little the public can now know about risky practices at industrial sites in their communities. [SAVAGE, 2007, PP. 110] Entity Tags: US Coast Guard, US Department of Homeland Security, US Customs Service, Secret Service, George W. Bush, Kristen Breitweiser, Bush administration, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Relatives of September 11 Victims, Tom Ridge Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Civil Liberties

November 27, 2002: Kissinger Named Chairman of New 9/11 Commission

Henry Kissinger. [Source: Public domain] President Bush names Henry Kissinger as Chairman of the 9/11 Commission. Congressional Democrats appoint George Mitchell, former Senate majority leader and peace envoy to Northern Ireland and the Middle East, as vice chairman. Their replacements and the other eight members of the commission are chosen by mid-December. Kissinger served as Secretary of State and National Security Adviser for Presidents Nixon and Ford. [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/29/2002] Kissinger’s ability to remain independent is met with skepticism. [SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 11/29/2002; CNN, 11/30/2002; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 12/3/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 12/17/2002] He has a very controversial past. For instance, “Documents recently released by the CIA, strengthen previously-held suspicions that Kissinger was actively involved in the establishment of Operation Condor, a covert plan involving six Latin American countries including Chile, to assassinate thousands of political opponents.” He is also famous for an “obsession with secrecy.” [BBC, 4/26/2002] It is even difficult for Kissinger to travel outside the US. Investigative judges in Spain, France, Chile, and Argentina seek to question him in several legal actions related to his possible involvement in war crimes, particularly in Latin America, Vietnam, Cambodia (see March 1969), Laos (see 1969-1973), Bangladesh, Chile, and East Timor (see December 7, 1976). [VILLAGE VOICE, 8/15/2001; BBC, 4/18/2002; CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 12/1/2002] The New York Times suggests, “Indeed, it is tempting to wonder if the choice of Mr. Kissinger is not a clever maneuver by the White House to contain an investigation it long opposed.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/29/2002] The Chicago Tribune notes that “the president who appointed him originally opposed this whole undertaking.” Kissinger is “known more for keeping secrets from the American people than for telling the truth” and asking him “to deliver a critique that may ruin friends and associates is asking a great deal.” [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 12/5/2002] Entity Tags: George Mitchell, 9/11 Commission, Henry A. Kissinger, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

December 2002: President Bush Expresses Confidence Victory in Iraq Will Solve Counterterrorism Problems President Bush meets with his cabinet-level advisers to review progress with counterterrorism efforts. According to author James Risen, one participant in the meeting will later recall that “several senior officials, including [CIA Director] Tenet, [National Security Adviser] Rice, and [Deputy Defense Secretary] Wolfowitz, voiced concerns about the ability of al-Qaeda-style terrorists to recruit and gain support on a widespread basis in the Islamic world. Did the United States have a strategy to counter the growth potential of Islamic extremism? ‘The president dismissed them, saying that victory in Iraq would take care of that. After he said that, people just kind of sat down,’ the participant recalled.” [RISEN, 2006, PP. 169-170] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleezza Rice, George J. Tenet Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

December 1, 2002: White House Stops Israeli-Palestinian ‘Road Map’ Negotiations at Israel’s Request, Angering Arab Partners National Security Council official Flynt Leverett, the head of Mideast affairs and the prime proponent of a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians in that organization (see December 2001-January 2002 and April 2002), confronts his boss, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, over the Bush administration’s continued lack of progress on such negotiations, and over its repeated broken promises to Arab heads of state (see Spring 2002 and Summer 2002). Leverett has fielded a furious phone call from Jordan’s Foreign Minister, Marwan Muasher, who has just been told by Rice that all negotiations over the so-called “road map to peace” are at an end. “Do you have any idea how this has pulled the rug out from under us, from under me?” Muasher demanded. “I’m the one that has to go into Arab League meetings and get beat up and say, ‘No, there’s going to be a plan out by the end of the year.’ How can we ever trust you again?” Leverett demands an explanation from Rice. She tells him that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has called for early elections, and he asked President Bush to put all negotiations on hold until after the elections. Leverett, unable to swallow his indignation any longer, retorts: “You told the whole world you were going to put this out before Christmas. Because one Israeli politician told you it’s going to make things politically difficult for him, you don’t put it out? Do you realize how hard that makes things for all our Arab partners?” Rice remains impassive. “If we put the road map out,” she says, “it will interfere with Israeli elections.” Leverett replies, “You are interfering with Israeli elections, just in another way.” Rice concludes the discussion, “Flynt, the decision has already been made.” Leverett, disgusted with the lack of sincerity towards the negotiations and with the impending Iraq invasion, will quit the NSC in March 2003. [ESQUIRE, 10/18/2007] Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, Ariel Sharon, Bush administration, National Security Council, Flynt Leverett, Marwan Muasher, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: US International Relations

December 2, 2002: Ari Fleischer Insists Iraq Intended to Use Imported Aluminum Tubes for Nuclear Program, and Iraq has WMD White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer says during a press briefing: “I will say this is something that the president has said publicly, that Iraq did, in fact, seek to buy these tubes for the purpose of producing, not as Iraq now claims conventional forces, but for the purpose of trying to produce nuclear weapons. And so it’s, on the one hand, mildly encouraging that Iraq would now admit to what it’s been doing. But on the other hand, a lie is still a lie, because these—they sought to produce these for the purpose of production of nuclear weapons, not conventional.” He also states that the evidence of WMD is that Saddam Hussein will claim there are no WMD and that proves there are WMD because Hussein is a liar. “Saddam Hussein does not exactly have a track record of telling the world the truth. So he, on December 8th, has to indicate whether or not he has weapons. Let’s see what he says. If he declares he has none, then we will know that Saddam Hussein is once again misleading the world.” When asked how he knows Iraq has WMD, Fleischer says, “We have intelligence information about what Saddam Hussein possesses… It’s no secret. We’ve said many times—you’ve heard the President say repeatedly that he has chemical and biological weapons, and he has missiles that can reach an access of 150 kilometers, all three of which are violations of his sworn commitments to the United Nations.” [WHITE HOUSE, 12/2/2002] Entity Tags: Ari Fleischer, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

December 2, 2002: Bush Officials Launch Discreditation Campaign Against UN Inspections Bush administration officials launch what appears to be a concerted effort to discredit the inspections after press reports indicate that inspections are going well and that Iraq is cooperating. The Washington Post reports, “In speeches in London, Washington and Denver, Bush, Vice President Cheney and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz sought to increase pressure on Hussein in advance of a Sunday deadline for the Iraqi leader to declare his inventory of weapons and missiles.” The paper adds, “The coordinated speeches… seemed designed to preempt any positive sign from the UN inspection teams about Iraqi compliance and to set the stage for an early confrontation with Hussein.” [WASHINGTON POST, 12/3/2002] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush, Paul Wolfowitz Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

December 2, 2002: President Bush Creates Position of Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence US President George Bush signs the 2003 Defense Authorization Act. [US PRESIDENT, 12/9/2002] One of the act’s provisions creates the new Pentagon post of undersecretary of defense for intelligence (see June 21, 2002). [US CONGRESS, 11/12/2002 ] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: US Military

December 3, 2002: Rumsfeld: ‘Any Country… With an Active Intelligence Program Knows’ Iraq Has WMD Iraq reiterates its claim that it has no weapons of mass destruction in the country, foreshadowing the content of its formal declaration, which is due in five days. Responding to the statement, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says, “Any country on the face of the earth with an active intelligence program knows that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction.” And President Bush says, “He [Saddam Hussein] says he won’t have weapons of mass destruction; he’s got them.” [BBC, 12/4/2002] Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

December 3, 2002: CIA Investigating Iraq Smallpox Claim, New York Times Reports

An enhanced photo of the variola virus, which causes smallpox. [Source: University College London] New York Times reporter Judith Miller reports that the CIA is investigating an anonymous report that Iraq has obtained a virulent strain of smallpox from a Russian scientist. According to the anonymous informant, the smallpox may have come from Nelja N. Maltseva, a virologist who worked for over 30 years at the Research Institute for Viral Preparations in Moscow before her death in 2001. The CIA has briefed President Bush about the investigation, though, as Miller notes, “The attempt to verify the information is continuing.” Maltseva visited Iraq in 1972 and 1973, according to intelligence officials, and may have visited as recently as 1990. The facility where she worked housed what Russia has claimed was its entire national collection of some 120 strains of smallpox. Miller writes, “[S]ome experts fear that she may have provided the Iraqis with a version that could be resistant to vaccines and could be more easily transmitted as a biological weapon.” In response, the White House may decide that 500,000 military personnel and another 500,000 civilian medical workers should be vaccinated against smallpox, a disease officially eradicated in 1980. The White House says that despite promises made by Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russia has not cooperated with US requests for information about its smallpox strains. “There is information we would like the Russians to share as a partner of ours,” says William Winkenwerder Jr., assistant secretary of defense for health affairs. “Because if there are strains that present a unique problem with respect to vaccines and treatment, it is in the interests of all freedom-loving people to have as much information as possible.” Recently declassified Soviet-era records show that in 1971, Maltseva was sent to Aralsk, a port city in what was then the Soviet republic of Kazakhstan, to help stop an epidemic of smallpox. That outbreak was possibly the result of open-air tests of a Soviet smallpox strain. Some scientists worry that Maltseva may have shared the Aralsk strain with Iraqi scientists in 1990, according to administration sources. David Kelly, a former United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq, says there was a “resurgence of interest” in smallpox vaccine in Iraq in 1990, “but we have never known why.” Both Maltseva’s daughter and her deputy in the Moscow laboratory deny that Maltseva ever went to Iraq. [NEW YORK TIMES, 12/3/2002] Entity Tags: William Winkenwerder Jr., Bush administration, Central Intelligence Agency, David Kelly, George W. Bush, Judith Miller, Vladimir Putin, Research Institute for Viral Preparations, Nelja N. Maltseva Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

December 4, 2002: Bush Insists It Is Up to Saddam Whether or Not US Invades Iraq During a question and answer period following President Bush’s signing of the Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002, the president is asked about the weapon inspectors’ progress in Iraq and if he believes “the signs are not encouraging that they’re doing their job.” Bush responds: “This isn’t about inspectors. The issue is whether Saddam Hussein will disarm. Will he disarm in the name of peace.” He also condemns Iraq’s shooting of US and British planes that have been patrolling the so-called “no-fly” zones over northern and southern Iraq (see June 2002-March 2003) and contends that these actions demonstrate that Saddam does not intend to comply with UN Resolution 1441 (see November 8, 2002). Bush also implies that no decision has been made to use military force against Iraq. “The best way for peace is for Mr. Saddam Hussein to disarm,” he insists. “It’s up to him to make his decision.” [US PRESIDENT, 12/9/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

December 4, 2002: Bush: Hussein Not Interested in Disarmament During the bill signing of the Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002, Bush says of Saddam Hussein: “One of my concerns is that in the past he has shot at our airplanes. Anybody who shoots at US airplanes or British airplanes is not somebody who looks like he’s interested in complying with disarmament.” He also chastises Saddam’s questioning US motives (see November 23, 2002). “He wrote letters, stinging rebukes, to what the UN did. He was very critical of the US and Britain. It didn’t appear to be somebody that was that anxious to comply, but we’ve just started the process.” [CNN, 12/4/2002; US PRESIDENT, 12/9/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

December 5, 2002: Fleischer: Everyone Says Iraq Has WMD White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer says: “The president of the United States and the Secretary of Defense would not assert as plainly and bluntly as they have that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction if it was not true, and if they did not have a solid basis for saying it.” When pressed for details, he adds: “President Bush has said Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. Tony Blair has said Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. Donald Rumsfeld has said Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. Richard Butler has said they do. The United Nations has said they do. The experts have said they do. Iraq says they don’t. You can choose who you want to believe.” [CBC NEWS, 12/5/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/5/2003] Entity Tags: Richard Butler, Donald Rumsfeld, Ari Fleischer, Tony Blair, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

December 11, 2002: Rumsfeld Asks Bush to Give Planners Access to Nuclear Weapons Options US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sends President Bush a memo requesting authority to appoint US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) commander Adm. James O. Ellis Jr. in charge of all of the United States’ “strategic” warfare options to combat terrorist states and organizations. By giving STRATCOM warplanners jurisdiction over the full range of the country’s warfare options, the president would effectively remove a decades-old firewall between conventional and nuclear weapons which had served to prevent nuclear arms from being anything but a weapon of last resort. According to William Arkin, a columnist for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the request, if approved, would remove “nuclear weapons out of their long-established special category and [lump] them in with all the other military options.” Bush approves the request early the following month (see Early January 2003). [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 1/26/2003 SOURCES: UNNAMED SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIALS AT US CENTRAL COMMAND, MEMO OBTAINED BY THE LA TIMES] Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, George W. Bush, James O. Ellis Jr Timeline Tags: US Military

December 11, 2002: Changes Boosting ‘Fuels Treatment’ Projects in Forests Put Forward Interior Secretary Gale A. Norton, Agriculture Secretary Ann M. Veneman, and Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) Chairman James L. Connaughton meet with President Bush to discuss the implementation of the administration’s “Healthy Forest Initiative.” After the meeting, they announce proposed changes that would expedite the approval of “fuels treatment” projects (forest thinning) by weakening the review process and restricting public input. [US DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, 12/11/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/11/2002] Critics say the changes would make it easier for the timber industry to cut the larger, more fire resistant trees, making the forests more vulnerable to wildfires. They also charge that the proposed rules would allow logging interests to override local concerns. [NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, 12/11/2002] Mike Francis, a forest specialist with the Wilderness Society, commenting on the proposed rule changes, tells the Associated Press, “Those are nothing more than administration’s typical desires to cut the public out of forest decisions. This administration doesn’t like what the public wants to do with their forests.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/11/2002] Entity Tags: James L. Connaughton, George W. Bush, Gale A. Norton, Ann M. Veneman, Bush administration Timeline Tags: Bush's Environmental Record

December 13, 2002: Bush Appears Unaware about Saudi Funding for Al-Qaeda, Takes No Action about It The top two dozen US government officials meet for a year-end review of counterterrorism efforts. Counterterrorism “tsar” Gen. John Gordon chairs the meeting. At one point, President Bush turns to Deputy Treasury Secretary Kenneth Dam and asks him, “Ken, where are we on terror finances?” Dam replies, “Mr. President, the majority of the funders for al-Qaeda are Saudis.” Dan gave all the meeting participants a one-page memo listing the fifteen or so top al-Qaeda funders, and almost all of them are Saudis. According to journalist Ron Suskind’s account, “Bush looked at Dam, perplexed, as though he either hadn’t read the handout in front of him, or was somehow surprised—though this was all but common knowledge.” Bush then asks how this is known and is told it is based on CIA intelligence. Bush then ends the meeting a few minutes later without any further comments or plan for action about terrorism financing. Apparently, he takes no significant action on the issue in the following months, either. [SUSKIND, 2006, PP. 184-186] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Kenneth Dam, John A. Gordon Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

December 16, 2002: Ex-Governor Thomas Kean Replaces Kissinger as Chairman of 9/11 Commission

Thomas Kean. [Source: Public domain] President Bush names former New Jersey governor Thomas Kean as the chairman of the 9/11 Commission after his original choice, Henry Kissinger, resigned (see December 13, 2002). [WASHINGTON POST, 12/17/2002] In an appearance on NBC, Kean promises an aggressive investigation. “It’s really a remarkably broad mandate, so I don’t think we’ll have any problem looking under every rock. I’ve got no problems in going as far as we have to in finding out the facts.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/17/2002] However, Kean plans to remain president of Drew University and devote only one day a week to the commission. He also claims he would have no conflicts of interest, stating: “I have no clients except the university.” [WASHINGTON POST, 12/17/2002] However, he has a history of such conflicts of interest. Multinational Monitor has previously stated: “Perhaps no individual more clearly illustrates the dangers of university presidents maintaining corporate ties than Thomas Kean,” citing the fact that he is on the Board of Directors of Aramark (which received a large contract with his university after he became president), Bell Atlantic, United Health Care, Beneficial Corporation, Fiduciary Trust Company International, and others. [MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, 11/1997] Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, George W. Bush, Thomas Kean Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

December 17, 2002: Bush Alarms Lawmakers with Tale of Unmanned Drones Attacking East Coast President Bush, in a classified briefing with approximately 75 senators, says that Iraq not only has biological and chemical weapons, but is able to strike at the US East Coast via unmanned drone aircraft. For senators still nervous from the recent anthrax attacks, the specter of such an attack is terrifying. Bush provides no evidence of the claim, which is later proven entirely false. [DEAN, 2004, PP. 141] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

December 18-20, 2002: Tenet Fails to Get ‘Curveball’ on Television after Germans Doubt His Reliability

Dr. August Hanning. [Source: Der Spiegel] CIA Director George Tenet makes an urgent request to the chief of German intelligence, Dr. August Hanning. Tenet is scheduled to meet with President Bush in three days to discuss the case for invading Iraq. Tenet wants to cement his case by allowing the Iraqi defector known as “Curveball” to appear on television and tell his story; failing that, Tenet wants the Germans to allow an American expert to debrief Curveball (later revealed as a fabricator named Rafid Ahmed Alwan—see November 4, 2007) and then himself appear on television with his findings. Two days later, Hanning rejects Tenet’s requests. Hanning calls Curveball’s information “plausible and believable,” but adds that “attempts to verify the information have been unsuccessful.” Therefore, all of Curveball’s reports “must be considered unconfirmed.” However, Hanning would allow Curveball’s information to be used, if Tenet still desired to use that unconfirmed information, if the source is protected. In November 2007, Tenet denies ever seeing Hanning’s letter. The CIA’s former European division chief, Tyler Drumheller, believes Tenet is lying. “He needs to talk to his special assistants if he didn’t see it. And the fact is, he had very good special assistants. I’m sure they showed it to him. And I’m sure it was just, it wasn’t what they wanted to see,” Drumheller says. [CBS NEWS, 11/4/2007] Entity Tags: ’Curveball’, George W. Bush, August Hanning, Bundesnachrichtendienst, Tyler Drumheller, Central Intelligence Agency, George J. Tenet Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

December 19, 2002: US Says UN Ignoring Iraq-Niger Uranium Deal The State Department publishes a fact sheet titled “Illustrative Examples of Omissions From the Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations Security Council,” which states that in its December 2002 declaration (see December 7, 2002) to the UN, Iraq “ignores [its] efforts to procure uranium from Niger.” [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 12/19/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6/12/2003; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 7/13/2003] Secretary of State Colin Powell rejects the UN dossier, in part because it does not account for the Nigerien uranium (see Between Late 2000 and September 11, 2001) and aluminum tubes (see Between April 2001 and September 2002) Iraq is supposedly using to make nuclear weapons. [UNGER, 2007, PP. 268] But at this time, there is no evidence that Iraq had in fact sought to obtain uranium from Niger. Prior to the fact sheet’s publication, the CIA had warned the State Department about this and recommended that the phrase be removed—advice the State Department chose to ignore. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6/12/2003] Throughout the rest of December, almost every statement the US goverment makes on Iraq will include references to the Nigerien uranium deal. President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and Powell will all state publicly that Iraq had been caught trying to buy uranium from Niger. [UNGER, 2007, PP. 268] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush, Central Intelligence Agency, Colin Powell, United Nations Security Council, Condoleezza Rice, US Department of State Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

December 20, 2002: Navy’s General Counsel Tries to Convince Pentagon Chief Counsel to Withdraw Torture Authorization Alberto Mora, the Navy’s general counsel, has learned that possibly illegal interrogation techniques are being used against Guantanamo Bay detainees (see December 17-18, 2002). After getting the authorization of Gordon England, the secretary of the Navy, Mora meets with the Pentagon’s general counsel, William J. Haynes, in Haynes’s Pentagon office. Meeting with Pentagon Counsel - In 2006, Mora will recall telling Haynes in the meeting that whatever its intent, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s decision to allow extreme interrogation techniques (see December 2, 2002) is “torture.” Haynes replies, “No, it isn’t.” Mora asks Haynes to reconsider his opinions. For example, what does “deprivation of light and auditory stimuli” mean? Detention in a completely dark cell? For how long? Until he goes blind? And what does the phrase “exploitation of phobias” entail? Could it mean holding a detainee in a coffin? Threatening him with dogs, or rats? Can an interrogator drive a detainee insane? Mora notes that at the bottom of Rumsfeld’s memo, he asks why a detainee can be forced to stand for no longer than four hours a day when he himself often stands “for 8-10 hours a day.” While Rumsfeld may have intended to be humorous, Mora notes that Rumsfeld’s comment could be used as a defense argument in future terrorist trials. (In 2006, Lawrence Wilkerson will say of Rumsfeld’s comment: “It said, ‘Carte blanche, guys.’ That’s what started them down the slope. You’ll have My Lais then. Once you pull this thread, the whole fabric unravels.”) Mora leaves the office hoping that Haynes will come around to his point of view and convince Rumsfeld to withdraw the memo. He will be sharply disappointed (see July 7, 2004). [NEW YORKER, 2/27/2006] He later calls the interrogation practices “unlawful and unworthy of the military services.” [SAVAGE, 2007, PP. 179] Haynes Close to Cheney's Office - Mora may not be aware that in meeting with Haynes, he is also in effect engaging the office of Vice President Dick Cheney. Haynes is a protege of Cheney’s neoconservative chief of staff, David Addington. Haynes worked as Addington’s special assistant when Addington served under then-Defense Secretary Cheney in 1989, and Addington promoted Haynes to the office of general counsel of the Army. When George W. Bush took office in 2001, Haynes was awarded the position of the Pentagon’s general counsel. Addington has played key roles in almost all of the administration’s legal arguments in favor of extreme interrogation techniques and detainee policies. One former government lawyer will describe Addington as “the Octopus” because his hands seem to reach into every legal issue. Many of Haynes’s colleagues know that information moves rapidly between Haynes’s and Cheney’s offices. While not a hardline neoconservative like Addington and many other Cheney staffers, Haynes is, as one former Pentagon colleague will call him, “pliant” to serving the agenda of the vice president. [NEW YORKER, 2/27/2006] Entity Tags: Alberto Mora, Gordon England, David S. Addington, William J. Haynes, Lawrence Wilkerson, Donald Rumsfeld, US Department of Defense, George W. Bush, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

December 21, 2002: Top CIA Officials Present Evidence of Iraqi WMD to President, George Tenet Makes Infamous ‘Slam Dunk’ Statement

A White House meeting in March 2003. From left to right: Cheney, Tenet, and Bush. [Source: Eric Draper / White House] CIA Director George Tenet and his deputy John McLaughlin meet in the White House with President George Bush and Bush’s top advisers for a “dress rehearsal” ahead of a public presentation that will accuse Iraq of having weapons of mass destruction. Bush is disappointed with Tenet and McLauglin’s presentation, which is based on communications intercepts, satellite photos, diagrams, and other intelligence. “Nice try,” one official will later recall Bush saying. “I don’t think this quite—it’s not something that Joe Public would understand or would gain a lot of confidence from.” Bush reportedly says to Tenet. “I’ve been told all this intelligence about having WMD, and this is the best we’ve got?” According to a White House leak to Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward, Tenet responds, “It’s a slam dunk case,” Bush then reportedly asks, “George, how confident are you?” To which the intelligence head responds, “Don’t worry, it’s a slam dunk.” [WASHINGTON POST, 4/17/2004; PBS FRONTLINE, 6/20/2006 SOURCES: CARL W. FORD, JR.] But this account is later disputed by Tenet. According to Tenet, he told the president that he could provide more intelligence to strengthen the public case. It would be easy—“a slam dunk.” [TENET, 2007, PP. 359-367; CBS NEWS, 4/29/2007] Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, George W. Bush, John E. McLaughlin Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

December 27, 2002: Human Rights Watch Asks President Bush to Investigate Allegations of Detainee Abuse; Bush Administration Not Interested Human Rights Watch writes to President Bush about the allegations of torture reported in the Washington Post (see December 26, 2002), asking that the allegations be investigated immediately. [HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 12/26/2002; BBC, 12/26/2002; CBC NEWS, 12/27/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 12/28/2002; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 5/7/2004] White House spokesman Scott McClellan denies that US interrogation practices violate international law and indicates no interest on the part of the administration to investigate the allegations. “We are not aware we have received the letter.… [W]e believe we are in full compliance with domestic and international law, including domestic and international law dealing with torture.” He adds that combatants detained by the US are always treated “humanely, in a manner consistent with the third Geneva Convention.” [WASHINGTON POST, 12/28/2002] Entity Tags: Human Rights Watch, Scott McClellan, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

December 27, 2002-January 1, 2003: Infiltration Story Based on Fabricated Information

Mohammed Asghar [Source: CBC] A member of a document-forging and smuggling ring is arrested in Canada in late October 2002. The suspect, Michael Hamdani, tells authorities about a cell of 19 terrorists seeking false passports from a Pakistani smuggling ring in order to gain entry to the US, with five successfully infiltrating the country via Canada on Christmas Eve. [ABC NEWS, 1/6/2003] He tells the FBI that he had been offered a large sum of money to assist with the smuggling of the five men into the US. He admits that he was part of the smuggling and counterfeit document ring; officials also believe that Hamdani has links to terrorist groups. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/3/2003] As a result, on December 27, 2002, the FBI issues an all-points bulletin that launches a massive effort by law enforcement officials who fear terrorist attacks over the holiday period. The bulletin is approved by President Bush, who says publicly, “We need to know why they have been smuggled into the country and what they’re doing in the country.” The FBI posts pictures of five of the men on its website, warning that the provided names and ages could be fictitious. They also raid six locations in Brooklyn and Queens. These pictures lead to numerous calls and sightings of the men from around the country. [ABC NEWS, 1/6/2003] During the course of the investigation, an unsubstantiated report surfaces; the FBI learns from a Middle East source that terrorists are planning eight diversionary explosions in New York harbor on New Year’s Eve, to be followed by one large-scale genuine attack. The target is identified as the US Secret Service office in Manhattan. The New York Police Department alerts the US Coast Guard, which closes the harbor to pleasure craft and scrambles a 100-person Maritime Safety and Security Team. This team patrols the harbor with boats mounted with heavy machine guns and carrying tactical officers armed with automatic weapons. No other evidence ever emerges to support the FBI’s source. [TIME, 1/5/2003] The man pictured as Mustafa Khan Owasi in one of the FBI photos is found a few days later in Pakistan. [ABC NEWS, 1/6/2003] He says he had once tried to get a false visa in order to travel to Britain, but had been caught in the United Arab Emirates and returned to his home in Lahore, Pakistan. His real name is Mohammed Asghar and he works as a jeweler. He says he suspects the forgers that he provided his information to in order to receive the false visa may have used his identity to create papers for someone else. Investigators begin to doubt the veracity of Hamdani’s claims. [CBC NEWS, 1/2/2003] US experts also find that the polygraph exam of Hamdani administered by Canadian authorities was seriously flawed. The assumption that this polygraph exam was accurate was one of the main motives in issuing the alert. Officials also fail to find any link between Hamdani and al-Qaeda, or any other radical militant organization. No links are discovered between the identities in the passports and extremist groups. [ABC NEWS, 1/6/2003] The FBI realizes that the infiltration story had been fabricated by Hamdani and retracts the terror alert on New Year’s Day. [TIME, 1/5/2003] The retraction of the terror alert leads to criticism of the FBI. Michael Greenberger, a former Justice Department official who heads the University of Maryland’s Center for Health and Homeland Security, says, “There is going to be a sort of ‘crying wolf’ scenario… When they put these out, there should be a more thorough explanation to the American public about what they’re doing.” The FBI defends its handling of the situation, saying that it reacted appropriately to the possibility of a real threat and noting that some of Hamdani’s information on the smuggling ring was accurate and led to ten (non-terrorism related) arrests. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/8/2003] Hamdani was already facing fraud charges in Canada after the raid that led to his arrest discovered fake passports, Pakistani driving licenses, immigration documents, and counterfeit traveler’s checks. He also had outstanding fraud warrants from the FBI in New York and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The FBI believes that Hamdani fabricated the story to avoid extradition to Canada. [ABC NEWS, 1/6/2003] One investigator says, “You wouldn’t trust him as far as you could throw him.” [TIME, 1/5/2003] Entity Tags: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Mustafa Khan Owasi, Michael Hamdani, Mohammed Asghar, George W. Bush, Abid Noraiz Ali, Iftikhar Khozmai Ali, Adil Pervez, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Akbar Jamal Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

December 31, 2002: Bush to Reporter: ‘I’m the Person Who Gets to Decide’ about War with Iraq, ‘Not You’ At his ranch in Texas, President Bush tells a reporter who questions whether the world is safer heading into 2003: “I hope this Iraq situation will be resolved peacefully. One of my New Year’s resolutions is to work to deal with these situations in a way so that they’re resolved peacefully.” However, Bush takes a harder line when pressed. When a reporter asks about “a possible war with Iraq looming,” Bush retorts: “You said we’re headed to war in Iraq—I don’t know why you say that. I hope we’re not headed to war in Iraq. I’m the person who gets to decide, not you. I hope this can be done peacefully. We’ve got a military presence there to remind Saddam Hussein, however, that when I say we will lead a coalition of the willing to disarm him if he chooses to disarm, I mean it.” [US PRESIDENT, 1/6/2003; ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 10/2004; UNGER, 2007, PP. 268] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion