Q3 2002

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July 2002: Future Alleged Ricin Plotter Arrested in Britain, Police Fail to Notice Illegal Overstay
Kamal Bourgass, a radical who will go on to be involved in an alleged ricin plot and kill a policeman (see January 5, 2003), is arrested for stealing two pairs of jeans in East London. He is taken to a police station, interviewed, charged, and fined £70 (about $110) by a magistrate. However, according to authors Sean O’Neill and Daniel McGrory, “His immigration status as an illegal overstayer [is] not discovered, because on the night he [is] detained there [are] no immigration officers on duty in London with whom his name could [be] cross-referenced.” The jeans were apparently stolen as a part of a terrorism fundraising racket run out of London’s Finsbury Park mosque; members of the racket steal clothes and then sell them on a market stall. British authorities are aware of various illegal financial activities at the mosque (see 1995-April 21, 2000), but what they know of Bourgass at this point is unclear. [O'NEILL AND MCGRORY, 2006, PP. 243] Entity Tags: Kamal Bourgass Category Tags: Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism

July 2002: Militants Tied to Al-Qaeda and ISI Indicted by US, but Little Effort Is Made to Find Them The US secretly indicts Rajaa Gulum Abbas and Abdul Malik for attempting to buy $32 million in Stinger missiles and other military weaponry in an undercover arms-dealing investigation. However, a US official states that Abbas is an alleged member of the ISI, and is thought to have ties to Middle Eastern militant groups and arms-trafficking operations. He also appears to have foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks. Abdul Malik is said to be Abbas’s money man. Abdul Malik is not related to Mohammed Malik, another Pakistani targeted by the undercover operation. The chief US informant in the case, Randy Glass, says that both men also have clear ties to al-Qaeda, and the arms were going to be funneled to al-Qaeda and used against American targets. [PALM BEACH POST, 3/20/2003; SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, 3/20/2003] The indictment is not revealed until March 2003; both men still remain missing and are presumed to be in Pakistan. The US says it is still working on capturing and extraditing Abbas and Malik. [NBC, 3/18/2003] NBC seems to have no trouble reaching Abbas in Pakistan by telephone. [MSNBC, 8/2/2002; NBC, 3/18/2003] The indictment “makes no mention of Pakistan, any ties to Afghanistan’s former Taliban regime or the ultimate destination of the weapons.” [PALM BEACH POST, 3/20/2003] Entity Tags: Taliban, Randy Glass, US Department of Justice, Mohammed Malik, Al-Qaeda, Abdul Malik, Rajaa Gulum Abbas Timeline Tags: A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network Category Tags: Randy Glass/ Diamondback, Pakistan and the ISI

July 2002: US Special Forces Not Given Permission to Target Mullah Omar A CIA case officer tells Adam Rice, a US Special Forces operations sergeant working out of a safe house near Kandahar, Afghanistan, that a figure believed to be top Taliban leader Mullah Omar has been tracked by a Predator drone to a location in Shah-i-Kot Valley, a short flight away. Omar and the group with him would be vulnerable to a helicopter assault. However, whenever Rice’s team wants to move more than five kilometers from their safe house, they are required to file a request in advance. If fighting is involved, the request has to pass through several layers of bureaucracy, and a three-star general has to give the final okay. The process can take days, and in this case it does. The target eventually moves on before permission is given. [NEWSWEEK, 8/28/2007] Entity Tags: Adam Rice, Mullah Omar Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Afghanistan, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

July 2002: Alleged ‘20th Hijacker’ Confesses in Guantanamo The FBI takes over interrogations of Saudi Guantanamo detainee Mohamed al-Khatani. He had been captured and taken into US custody months before (see December 2001) but his real identity was only recently discovered. In the months before, military intelligence, using harsh tactics, was unsuccessful in gaining information from him, but the FBI allegedly uses subtle persuasion with an experienced interrogator and succeeds. Khatani discloses: He is an al-Qaeda member and received terrorist training at two al-Qaeda camps. He attended an al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia attended by two 9/11 hijackers (see January 5-8, 2000). He attempted unsuccessfully to be one of the hijackers himself, failing to enter the US in August 2001 (see August 4, 2001). He had been sent to the US by 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. He had met bin Laden on several occasions and had been in contact with many other senior al-Qaeda leaders. He is related to Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, an apparent al-Qaeda sleeper agent already arrested in the US (see September 10, 2001). He informs on about thirty other prisoners being held at Guantanamo. But he is also believed to have little knowledge of other al-Qaeda plots. [NEW YORK TIMES, 6/21/2004; TIME, 3/3/2006] He will later recant his confession (see October 26, 2006). Entity Tags: Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, Mohamed al-Khatani, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

Early July 2002: Moussaoui Expresses Willingness to Talk, Offer Is Rejected by Justice Department Zacarias Moussaoui indicates that he is willing to disclose information to the US authorities, but his overtures are rejected by the FBI and the Justice Department. After learning of Moussaoui’s offer, Minneapolis FBI counsel Coleen Rowley contacts assistants to FBI director Robert Mueller and to Justice Department manager Michael Chertoff. She says she is worried about Moussaoui’s research into cropdusting and wind patterns, and that the information he could provide may prove useful averting a second strike by al-Qaeda. Rowley will later comment: “But by that time Moussaoui had been charged with the death penalty and I deduced that [attorney general John] Ashcroft would not allow any potential for bargaining leverage to be injected into the case.” [HUFFINGTON POST, 5/2/2007] Entity Tags: Michael Chertoff, Coleen Rowley, FBI Minnesota field office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, John Ashcroft, Zacarias Moussaoui, Robert S. Mueller III, US Department of Justice Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, FBI 9/11 Investigation

Mid-2002-June 1, 2006: Lack of US Cooperation Hinders Al-Qaeda Prosecutions in Spain Spanish investigators and prosecutors attempting to jail people they believe are important al-Qaeda operatives seek US assistance, but the US fails to provide them with full co-operation. Spanish authorities started to build a case against a Spain-based al-Qaeda cell headed by Barakat Yarkas in the 1990s and some of the suspects were under surveillance as they allegedly assisted the 9/11 plot (see August 1998-September 11, 2001). The US has some information about them, but does not release what the Spanish need because the US apparently does not want to fight terrorism through law enforcement, but through more direct methods. A Spanish official says, “From the US point of view, everything is an intelligence affair, not a judicial matter… That is what is undermining the whole process.” In 2004, the Spanish official complains: “We could clearly prove the Spanish role in 9/11 if we had real cooperation. There are literally two or three elements missing to close the case, but as it is now, all of the suspects will go free.” One key dispute centers on US unwillingness to share evidence linking Spain-based al-Qaeda operative Amer el-Azizi to the 9/11 plot and Spanish officials spend six months persuading the US before getting a copy of a “specific element that provides a concrete link” between el-Azizi and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (see (November 2001)). In addition, the US fails to provide information identifying Saudi Arabian investors in Spanish construction companies owned by a Syrian businessman, Mohammed Galeb Kalaje Zouaydi, another suspected militant who is thought to have channeled money to extremists through his group of companies, as well as suspicious Islamic charities. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 5/4/2004] This lack of co-operation hinders the prosecutions of the operatives and means they receive only relatively light sentences. For example, Yarkas is initially found guilty of both terrorism in Spain and assisting the 9/11 plot, but his 9/11 conviction is overturned on appeal (see September 26, 2005). Entity Tags: Barakat Yarkas, Amer el-Azizi, Mohammed Galeb Kalaje Zouaydi, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Al-Qaeda in Spain

July 2, 2002: Al-Qaeda Is Regrouping in Pakistani Kashmir with Support of ISI
The Christian Science Monitor reports that some al-Qaeda forces have relocated to the Pakistani-controlled portion of Kashmir since being driven out of Afghanistan, and they are there with the tacit support of the Pakistani ISI. This is very problematic for the US, due to diplomatic sensitivities regarding the Kashmir region, which is split by a UN monitored Line of Control between Pakistan and India, and is claimed by both countries. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recently commented that he had “seen indications that there are al-Qaeda operating near the [Kashmir] Line of Control.” Pakistani militant groups linked to al-Qaeda such as Harkat ul-Mujahedeen operate openly in Pakistani Kashmir, even though they have been officially banned by the US and Pakistan. For many years, the ISI has used such group to harass the Indian army on India’s portion of Kashmir, and they continue to do so. [CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 7/2/2002] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Harkat ul-Mujahedeen, Donald Rumsfeld Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region

July 3, 2002: Few Detained on Immigration Charges Still in Custody The Justice Department announces that only 74 of the 752 people detained on immigration charges after 9/11 are still in US custody. By December, only six of them will remain in custody (see December 11, 2002). Hundreds more were detained on other charges or as material witnesses, but no numbers pertaining to them have been released. 611 were subject to secret hearings. Senator Carl Levin (D), who had requested the figures, says, “It took the Justice Department more than three months to produce a partial response to my letter.” But the answers raise “a number of additional questions, including why closed hearings were necessary for so many people.” Though many were held for months, “the vast majority were never charged with anything other than overstaying a visa.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 7/11/2002] All the deportation hearings for these people have been held in secret as well. Some say the government is cloaking its activities out of embarrassment, because none of these people have turned out to have any ties to terrorism. [NEW YORK TIMES, 7/11/2002; DETROIT FREE PRESS, 7/18/2002] Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, Carl Levin Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Internal US Security After 9/11

July 6, 2002: Afghan Vice President Assassinated Afghan Vice President Hajji Abdul Qadir is assassinated by Afghan warlords. Some believe that Qadir was assassinated by opium warlords upset by Qadir’s efforts to reduce the rampant opium farming and processing that has taken place since the US occupation. Qadir had been overseeing a Western-backed eradication program, and had recently complained that the money meant to be given to reward farmers for not planting opium was in fact not reaching the farmers. Additionally, Qadir “had long been suspected of enriching himself through involvement in the opium trade.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 7/8/2002; CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 7/8/2002] Entity Tags: Hajji Abdul Qadir Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Afghanistan, Drugs

July 10, 2002: Defense Policy Board: ‘Saudis Are Active at Every Level of the Terror Chain’

Laurent Murawiec. [Source: Hudson Institute] A briefing given to a top Pentagon advisory group by RAND Corp. analyst Laurent Murawiec states: “The Saudis are active at every level of the terror chain, from planners to financiers, from cadre to foot-soldier, from ideologist to cheerleader.… Saudi Arabia supports our enemies and attacks our allies.” Saudi Arabia is called “the kernel of evil, the prime mover, the most dangerous opponent.” This position still runs counter to official US policy, but the Washington Post says it “represents a point of view that has growing currency within the Bush administration.” The briefing suggests that the Saudis be given an ultimatum to stop backing terrorism or face seizure of their oil fields and financial assets invested in the United States. The advisory group, the Defense Policy Board, is headed by Richard Perle. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/6/2002] An international controversy follows the public reports of the briefing in August 2002 (for instance, [SCOTSMAN, 8/12/2002] ). In an abrupt change, the media starts calling the Saudis enemies, not allies, of the US. Slate reports details of the briefing the Post failed to mention. The briefing states, “There is an ‘Arabia,’ but it needs not be ‘Saudi.’” The conclusion of the briefing: “Grand strategy for the Middle East: Iraq is the tactical pivot. Saudi Arabia the strategic pivot. Egypt the prize.” [SLATE, 8/7/2002] Note that a similar meeting of the Defense Policy Board appears to have preceded and affected the United States’ decision to take a warlike stance against Iraq (see September 19-20, 2001). Murawiec is later identified as a former editor of the Executive Intelligence Review, a magazine controlled by Lyndon LaRouche, an infamous far-right conspiracy theorist and convicted felon. Perle invited Murawiec to make his presentation. [NEW YORKER, 3/17/2003] Entity Tags: Saudi Arabia, Richard Perle, Lyndon LaRouche, Laurent Murawiec, RAND Corporation, Defense Policy Board, Bush administration, Executive Intelligence Review Category Tags: Saudi Arabia

July 11, 2002: Al-Qaeda Leader Allegedly Arrested in Pakistan, Disappears into US Custody

Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan. [Source: FBI] Al-Qaeda leader Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan is allegedly arrested in Methadar, a slum region of Karachi, Pakistan. Swedan, a Kenyan, had been wanted for a key role in the 1998 embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). He is said to have bought the trucks used in the bombings and then left Kenya five days before the bombs went off. The US bounty on him rose to $25 million after 9/11. The slum area where he was arrested was said to have been used by al-Qaeda to ship gold and al-Qaeda operatives out of Pakistan after 9/11, and thousands of dollars, fake passports, and visa stamps are found in his house. Pakistani agents are said to have been led to Swedan by satellite telephone intercepts provided by the FBI. Neighbors claim to have seen Sweden taken away, but both the US and Pakistani governments deny that he has been arrested. [DAILY TIMES (LAHORE), 9/9/2002; ASIA TIMES, 9/11/2002] His name has yet to be taken off an FBI wanted list years after his alleged arrest. In 2007, Amnesty International and other human rights groups will claim that he has been secretly held by the US or renditioned to another country (see June 7, 2007). In 2008, counterterrorism expert Peter Bergen will conclude based on various reports that Swedan was renditioned by the US from Pakistan in 2002, but his current fate is unknown. [MOTHER JONES, 3/3/2008] Entity Tags: Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Remote Surveillance, Key Captures and Deaths, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

July 13, 2002: US Military Plans for Global Dominance The US military releases a new Defense Planning Guidance strategic vision. It “contains all the key elements” of a similar document written ten years earlier (see March 8, 1992) by largely the same people now in power. Like the original, the centerpiece of this vision is preventing any other powers from challenging US world dominance. Some new tactics are proposed, such as using nuclear weapons for a preemptive strike, but the basic plan remains the same. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 7/13/2002; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 7/16/2002; HARPER'S, 10/2002] David Armstrong notes in Harper’s magazine: “[In 1992] the goal was global dominance, and it met with bad reviews. Now it is the answer to terrorism. The emphasis is on preemption, and the reviews are generally enthusiastic. Through all of this, the dominance motif remains, though largely undetected.” [HARPER'S, 10/2002] Entity Tags: US Department of Defense Category Tags: US Dominance

July 15, 2002: US Media Ignore ISI Link in Reports on Saeed Sheikh’s Conviction Saeed Sheikh and three co-defendants are judged guilty for the murder of reporter Daniel Pearl. Saeed, the supposed mastermind of the murder, is sentenced to death by hanging, and the others are given 25-year terms. Saeed threatens the judge with retribution. As if to confirm that his death covers up unpleasant truths, in the stories of his sentencing every major US media story fails to report Saeed’s connections to 9/11 and even to the ISI. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 7/15/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 7/15/2002; CBS NEWS, 7/15/2002; CNN, 7/15/2002; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 7/15/2002; MSNBC, 7/15/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 7/15/2002; REUTERS, 7/15/2002; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 7/15/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 7/15/2002; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 7/16/2002] In contrast, the British media connects Saeed to the ISI [GUARDIAN, 7/16/2002; GUARDIAN, 7/16/2002; DAILY MAIL, 7/16/2002], al-Qaeda [INDEPENDENT, 7/16/2002] , the 9/11 attacks [SCOTSMAN, 7/16/2002] , or some combination of the three [LONDON TIMES, 7/16/2002; DAILY MAIL, 7/16/2002; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 7/16/2002] (with one exception [BBC, 7/16/2002; BBC, 7/16/2002] ). The US and British governments both approve of the verdict. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 7/15/2002; BBC, 7/15/2002] In the US, only the Washington Post questions the justice of the verdict. [WASHINGTON POST, 7/15/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 7/16/2002] By contrast, all British newspapers question the verdict, and subsequently raise additional questions about it (see July 16-21, 2002). Saeed has appealed the decision, but a second trial has yet to begin. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/18/2002] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Saeed Sheikh, Daniel Pearl Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh, Media

July 16, 2002: Blair Claims Attack on Afghanistan Only Possible After 9/11 British Prime Minister Tony Blair states, “We knew about al-Qaeda for a long time. They were committing terrorist acts, they were planning, they were organizing. Everybody knew, we all knew, that Afghanistan was a failed state living on drugs and terror. We did not act.… To be truthful about it, there was no way we could have got the public consent to have suddenly launched a campaign on Afghanistan but for what happened on September 11.” [LONDON TIMES, 7/17/2002] In a book released one month later, Clinton’s former National Security Adviser Sandy Berger will similarly state, “You show me one reporter, one commentator, one member of Congress who thought we should invade Afghanistan before September 11 and I’ll buy you dinner in the best restaurant in New York City.” [MILLER, STONE, AND MITCHELL, 2002, PP. 219] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Sandy Berger, Tony Blair Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Pipeline Politics

July 16-21, 2002: More Controversy Surrounds Trial of Saeed Sheikh More questions emerge in British newspapers about the conviction of Saeed Sheikh for reporter Daniel Pearl’s murder in the days immediately after the verdict. Pakistani police have secretly arrested two men who many believe are the real masterminds of Pearl’s murder, and official confirmation of these crucial arrests could have ended Saeed’s trial. [GUARDIAN, 7/18/2002] On May 16, Pearl’s body was found and identified, but the FBI does not officially release the DNA results because official confirmation of the body would also have meant a new trial. [INDEPENDENT, 7/16/2002] Pakistani officials admit they waited to release the results until after the verdict. [GUARDIAN, 7/18/2002] After the trial ends, Pakistani officials admit that the key testimony of a taxi driver is doubtful. The “taxi driver” turns out to be a head constable policeman. [GUARDIAN, 7/18/2002] One of the co-defendants turns out to be working for the Special Branch. [INDEPENDENT, 7/21/2002] According to Pakistani law, the trial needed to be completed in a week, but in fact it took three months. The trial judge and the venue were changed three times. [BBC, 7/16/2002] The trial was held in a bunker underneath a prison, and no reporters were allowed to attend. When all the appeals are done, it is doubtful that Saeed will be extradited to the US, “because Mr. Sheikh might tell the Americans about the links between al-Qaeda and Pakistan’s own intelligence organization.” [INDEPENDENT, 7/16/2002] Meanwhile, at least seven more suspects remain at large. All have ties to the ISI, and as one investigator remarks, “It seems inconceivable that there isn’t someone in the ISI who knows where they’re hiding.” [TIME, 5/6/2002] Entity Tags: Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Daniel Pearl, Al-Qaeda, Saeed Sheikh, Federal Bureau of Investigation Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh

July 18, 2002: FBI Official Says Bin Laden ‘Probably’ Dead FBI Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism Dale Watson says he thinks Osama bin Laden is “probably” dead. According to the BBC, this is “thought to be the first time a senior US law enforcement official has publicly offered an opinion on whether bin Laden… is dead or alive.” “Is [bin Laden] alive or is he dead?” Watson says at a law enforcement conference in Washington, DC. “I am not really sure of the answer.… I personally think he is probably not with us anymore but I have no evidence to support that.” The BBC will add that “Watson’s comments suggest that the FBI, at least, has no firsthand information that confirms bin Laden is still alive.” However, other US officials tell the Associated Press they are surprised by Watson’s remarks, as the US administration’s official position remains that it does not know where bin Laden is, or whether he is still alive. [BBC, 7/18/2002] Entity Tags: Dale Watson, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden

July 19, 2002: US Finally Ends Controversial Visa Program in Saudi Arabia Faced with growing criticism of its Visa Express program, the State Department decides to change the program’s name in early July 2002. When that fails to satisfy critics, the program is abandoned altogether on July 19. The Visa Express program allowed anyone in Saudi Arabia to apply for US visas through their travel agents instead of having to show up at a consulate in person. [WASHINGTON POST, 7/11/2002] Mary Ryan, the head of the State Department’s consular service that was responsible for letting most of the hijackers into the US, is also forced to retire. It has been pointed out that Ryan deceived Congress by testifying that “there was nothing State could have done to prevent the terrorists from obtaining visas.” However, after all this, Ryan and the other authors of the Visa Express program are given “outstanding performance” awards of $15,000 each. The reporter who wrote most of the stories critical of Visa Express is briefly detained and pressured by the State Department. [WASHINGTON TIMES, 10/23/2002; PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, 12/30/2002] Entity Tags: US Department of State, Mary Ryan, US Congress Category Tags: Saudi Arabia

July 19, 2002: Why Is US Not Interrogating Saeed Sheikh, Indian Newspaper Wonders An editorial in an Indian newspaper wonders why the US is still not interrogating Saeed Sheikh, recently convicted of murdering Daniel Pearl. Saeed was briefly interrogated by the FBI in February, but they were unable to ask about his links to al-Qaeda, and no known US contact has taken place since. [INDEPENDENT, 7/16/2002; INDIAN EXPRESS, 7/19/2002] The editorial suggests that if the US pressures its close ally Pakistan to allow Saeed to be interrogated in his Pakistani prison, they could learn more about his financing of the 9/11 attacks and the criminal underworld that Saeed was connected to. Also, US attempts to find al-Qaeda cells in Pakistan could be strongly boosted with new information. [INDIAN EXPRESS, 7/19/2002] Entity Tags: Pakistan, Daniel Pearl, Al-Qaeda, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Saeed Sheikh Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh

(Late July-Early August, 2002): Moussaoui E-mails May Have Vanished Although US authorities are aware that Zacarias Moussaoui has one e-mail account and recover e-mails from it, he now says that he has another two, but the FBI is unable to find any trace of them (see August 17-November 11, 2001 and After). E-mails sent from the first address, pilotz123@hotmail.com, have been recovered and will be produced at his trial. However, the other two addresses, xdesertman@hotmail.com and olimahammed@hotmail.com, were not uncovered by the FBI’s post-9/11 investigation and US authorities only learn of them from a statement made at this time by Moussaoui, who says the e-mails could provide him with an alibi and that he accessed the accounts from various computers, including his laptop, one at a Kinko’s outlet, and one at the University of Oklahoma. However, Microsoft, which operates Hotmail, says it is unable to locate any records of the accounts and that they do not exist. As the accounts have been inactive for over a year and all data for a hotmail account is deleted after 90 days of inactivity, no e-mails can be retrieved. Had the FBI asked Microsoft about the addresses within the 90-day period, they may have found information about the e-mails, but they did not do so because they did not know about them—the FBI decided not to interview Moussaoui after 9/11 (see September 11-12, 2001 and Early July 2002). The hard drives at the Kinko’s outlet had been wiped by the time the FBI arrived in September 2001 and no record of Moussaoui’s computer use there is found. Moussaoui had a receipt for the Kinko’s outlet with him when he was arrested, so the FBI might have been able to examine the Kinko’s computers before the hard drives were wiped if they had acted more promptly (see August 17-November 11, 2001 and After). [WIRED NEWS, 8/30/2002; INTERNETNEWS (.COM), 8/30/2002; CNN, 9/4/2002; CNN, 12/31/2002; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, FBI 9/11 Investigation

July 22, 2002: Rumsfeld Authorizes Killing Terrorists Defense Secretary Rumsfeld issues a secret directive to Special Operations forces allowing them to “capture terrorists for interrogation or, if necessary, to kill them” anywhere in the world. [NEW YORKER, 12/16/2002] Bush already issued a presidential finding authorizing the killing of terrorist leaders, but this increases such efforts. [NEW YORK TIMES, 12/15/2002] However, Bush has not rescinded a presidential executive order dating from the 1970s that bans all assassinations, claiming that terrorists are military combatants. “Many past and present military and intelligence officials have expressed alarm” at the legality, wisdom, ethics, and effectiveness of the assassination program. Apparently much of the leadership of Special Operations is against it, worrying about the blowback effect. In February 2002, a Predator missile targeting someone intelligecet agents thought was bin Laden hit its target, but killed three innocent Afghan farmers instead. [NEW YORKER, 12/16/2002] The first successful assassination takes place in November (see November 3, 2002). Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Special Operations Command Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

July 22, 2002: New Rumsfeld Policy Prefers Interrogation or Killing of Terrorists Over Legally Arresting Them

Wreckage left behind where a missile struck Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi’s truck in Yemen. [Source: Associated Press] Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld issue a secret directive ordering commander of Special Operations Air Force General Charles Holland “to develop a plan to find and deal with members of terrorist organizations.” The directive says, “The objective is to capture terrorists for interrogation or, if necessary, to kill them, not simply to arrest them in a law-enforcement exercise.” The manhunt would be global in its reach. Holland is to cut through the Pentagon bureaucracy and process deployment orders “in minutes and hours, not days and weeks.” In internal Defense Department memos, Rumsfeld and the civilian officials close to him lay out the case for a new approach to the war on terrorism, one that would partly rely on the killing of individuals outside war zones. [NEW YORKER, 12/16/2002] The first public manifestation of this new policy will be the November 2002 assassination of al-Qaeda leader Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi in Yemen with a Predator missile strike (see November 3, 2002). Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Charles Holland Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

July 22, 2002-February 20, 2003: Saudi Princes and Pakistani General Later Implicated in 9/11 Plot Die Mysteriously

Mushaf Ali Mir. [Source: Publicity photo] Three prominent members of the Saudi royal family die in mysterious circumstances. Prince Ahmed bin Salman, a nephew of the Saudi king, prominent businessman, and owner of the winning 2002 Kentucky Derby horse, is said to die of a heart attack at the age of 43. The next day, Prince Sultan bin Faisal, another nephew of the king, dies driving to Prince Ahmed’s funeral. A week later, Prince Fahd bin Turki supposedly “dies of thirst” in the Arabian desert. Seven months later, on February 20, 2003, Pakistan’s air force chief, Mushaf Ali Mir, dies in a plane crash in clear weather, along with his wife and closest confidants. Controversial author Gerald Posner implies that all of these events are linked together and the deaths are not accidental, but have occurred because of the testimony of captured al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida in March 2002 (see Early April 2002). The deaths all occurred not long after the respective governments were told of Zubaida’s confessions. Only one other key figure named by Zubaida remains alive: Saudi Intelligence Minister Prince Turki al-Faisal. Posner says, “He’s the J. Edgar Hoover of Saudi Arabia,” too powerful and aware of too many secrets to be killed off. Prince Turki lost his intelligence minister job ten days before 9/11, and is later made Saudi ambassador to Britain, giving him diplomatic immunity from any criminal prosecution. [POSNER, 2003, PP. 190-94; TIME, 8/31/2003] Entity Tags: Ahmed bin Salman, Sultan bin Faisal, Turki al-Faisal, Mushaf Ali Mir, Fahd bin Turki bin Saud al-Kabir, Abu Zubaida Category Tags: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the ISI, Abu Zubaida

July 23, 2002: British Intelligence Chief Says Bush Has Decided on War; ‘Facts… Being Fixed around the Policy’ Top British officials attend a meeting to discuss Britain’s potential role in the Bush administration’s confrontation with Iraq. According to the minutes of the meeting, transcribed by Matthew Rycroft, Sir Richard Dearlove, head of the British intelligence service, MI6, says that during his last visit (see July 20, 2002) to Washington he noticed a “perceptible shift in attitude. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and [weapons of mass destruction]. But the intelligence and the facts were being fixed around the policy.” Furthermore, he states, Bush’s National Security Council indicated it “had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record.” He also noted that there “was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.” [UNITED KINGDOM, 7/23/2002; SALON, 5/6/2005; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 5/12/2005] Foreign Minister Jack Straw appears to agree with Dearlove’s assessment, saying that it seems clear that President Bush has already decided on using military force to depose Saddam Hussein. But Straw notes that the Bush administration’s case against Saddam was “thin.” The Iraqi leader “was not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea, or Iran,” the minutes say, summarizing his remarks. [GUARDIAN, 5/2/2005; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 5/12/2005] There is no indication in the minutes that anyone present at the meeting disputed Dearlove’s or Straw’s observations. [UNITED KINGDOM, 7/23/2002] Furthermore, the account provided by the intelligence official and Straw are corroborated by a former senior US official who is later interviewed by Knight Ridder. It is “an absolutely accurate description of what transpired,” the official will say. [KNIGHT RIDDER, 5/2/2005] Straw proposes that the next step would be to “work up an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors,” which “would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.” [GUARDIAN, 5/2/2005; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 5/12/2005] Britain’s attorney general, Lord Peter Goldsmith, warns that “the desire for regime change [is] not a legal base for military action,” the minutes say. But Blair says that “it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors.” [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 5/12/2005] Finally, the officials agree that the British government “should continue to work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action” but “not ignore the legal issues.” [GUARDIAN, 5/2/2005] The minutes do not provide any indication that officials discussed how war might be avoided. [SALON, 6/10/2005] The minutes of this meetings will be revealed by the British Sunday Times three years later (see May 1, 2005). Commonly referred to as the “Downing Street Memo,” the minutes will re-spark the controversy over politicized intelligence. Entity Tags: Richard Wilson, Michael Boyce, Peter Goldsmith, Richard Dearlove, Jonathan Powell, Geoff Hoon, Jack Straw, Alastair Campbell, Francis Richards, Sally Morgan, John Scarlett, Tony Blair Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism

July 23, 2002: New York City Declares Records of Firefighters’ Actions on 9/11 Will Be Kept Secret The New York City government decides that the audio and written records of the Fire Department’s actions on 9/11 should never be released to the general public. The New York Times has been trying to get copies of the materials, which include firsthand accounts given to Fire Department officials by scores of firefighters and chiefs. The city claims the firefighters were told their accounts would be kept confidential, but senior fire officials say they were never told that their remarks would be kept confidential. [NEW YORK TIMES, 7/23/2002] The records will be released in 2005 after a legal battle (see August 12, 2005). Entity Tags: New York Times, New York City Fire Department, City of New York Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: WTC Investigation

July 25, 2002: Moussaoui Claims Accomplice Was British Agent Zacarias Moussaoui claims that one of his associates, Atif Ahmed, was an informer for British intelligence and had foreknowledge of 9/11. In court Moussaoui says Ahmed “is a British agent who has taken a very important part of this,” adding, “My aim in pleading guilty was to expose the information I have.” Ahmed, the only associate named by Moussaoui during his initial questioning (see August 17, 2001), was arrested and released in November 2001 (see Mid-November 2001). Although Moussaoui was monitored by British authorities (see 1999, Mid-2000-December 9, 2000, and August 21, 2001-September 13, 2001), the security services say that Ahmed was not one of their agents. Moussaoui attempts to get British lawyer Sadiq Khan to investigate Ahmed, but the results of his inquiries, if any, are not known. [COUNTERPUNCH, 7/16/2002; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 7/26/2002; FINANCIAL TIMES, 9/19/2002; COUNTERPUNCH, 9/25/2002] Ahmed’s name will be mentioned at Moussaoui’s trial in 2006, but both the prosecutor and FBI agent Harry Samit will indicate he was not deeply involved in 9/11. [UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, A/K/A SHAQIL, A/K/A ABU KHALID AL SAHRAWI, DEFENDANT, 3/6/2006; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 3/9/2006] It is unclear why Moussaoui thinks Ahmed is an informer. Moussaoui does not say whether he suspected Ahmed was an informer before he gave his name to the FBI, or whether he surmised this because the British did little with the information, and then let him go soon after arresting him. Entity Tags: Harry Samit, Atif Ahmed, Zacarias Moussaoui Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other Possible Moles or Informants, Zacarias Moussaoui, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism

July 25, 2002: Pentagon Memo Disputes View that Hussein Will Not Work with Al-Qaeda A memo written by an intelligence analyst working under Pentagon policy chief Douglas Feith asserts that while “some analysts have argued” that Osama bin Laden will not cooperate with secular Arab groups like Iraq, “reporting indicates otherwise.” A subsequent investigation by the Pentagon’s Office of Inspector General (see February 9, 2007) will criticize the memo, titled “Iraq and al-Qaeda: Making the Case,” saying that it constituted an “alternative intelligence assessment” and therefore should have been developed in accordance with intelligence agency guidelines for publishing alternative views. [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 2/9/2007 ; NEW YORK TIMES, 2/9/2007] Nevertheless, Bush administration officials such as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, CIA Director George Tenet, DIA Director Thomas Wilson, Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, and the chief of staff for Vice President Cheney, Lewis “Scooter” Libby, embrace the memo. Cheney’s office is particularly enamoured of the report; journalists Franklin Foer and Spencer Ackerman later report a White House official as saying of Cheney and his staffers, “They so believed that the CIA were wrong, they were like, ‘We want to show these f_ckers that they are wrong.” The memo is based on an earlier briefing by Feith entitled “Assessing the Relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda,” which accused the CIA of using overly rigorous standards to analyze information that might show links between Iraq and the terrorist organization. Feith’s briefing uses almost no evidence to claim a “mature, symbiotic” relationship between the two, alleging “more than a decade of numerous contacts” between al-Qaeda and the Hussein government, and asserting “possible Iraqi coordination with al-Qaeda specifically related to 9/11.” [SCOBLIC, 2008, PP. 220-222] An updated version of the “Making the Case” briefing will be presented to the White House in September 2002 (see September 16, 2002). Entity Tags: Office of the Vice President, Thomas Wilson, Office of Special Plans, Stephen J. Hadley, Spencer Ackerman, Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby, Franklin Foer, Donald Rumsfeld, Bush administration, George J. Tenet, Douglas Feith Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

Late July 2002: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry Concludes Atta Did Not Have Prague Meeting The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry investigating the 9/11 attacks concludes that there is no evidence that Mohammad Atta—under any of his known aliases—visited Prague in April 2001 (see April 8, 2001). [BOSTON GLOBE, 8/3/2003] However, the Bush administration will delay the publication of the Inquiry’s final report for many months, so this conclusion will not be made public until after the US invasion of Iraq is done (see January-July 2003). Entity Tags: Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, Mohamed Atta, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

Late July 2002: Taliban General Reportedly Captured, but Released After Questioning US Special Forces apprehend Mullah Akhter Mohammed Osmani, a top general and one of the six most-wanted Taliban, in Kandahar. He is flown to a detention center north of Kabul for interrogation, but is released a few weeks later and escapes to Pakistan. Contradicting the statements of many soldiers in Kandahar, the Defense Intelligence Agency says it “has no knowledge that Mullah Akhter Mohammed Osmani was ever in US custody in Afghanistan.” [WASHINGTON TIMES, 12/18/2002] Curiously, the CIA took part in secret talks with Osmani over the fate of bin Laden (see Mid-September-October 2, 2001). Osmani will be killed in an air strike at the end of 2006 (see December 19, 2006). Entity Tags: Mullah Akhter Mohammed Osmani, Defense Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Afghanistan, Escape From Afghanistan, Key Captures and Deaths

Late July -September 2002: As Much as $700 Million Diverted from Afghanistan to Prepare for Invasion of Iraq President Bush allegedly approves a request from the Pentagon for $700 million to help fund military preparations underway in the Gulf for war against Iraq. The charge is made by Bob Woodward in his book, Plan of Attack, released in the spring of 2004. [WOODWARD, 2004; CBS NEWS, 4/18/2004] The White House and Pentagon will deny the charge claiming that Bush only approved the spending of $178.4 million out of a requested total of $750 million. According to the Pentagon, $178.4 million is spent on 21 projects in Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman. At least 11 of them are in Kuwait, which becomes the major staging ground for operations in Iraq. In that country alone, $24 million is spent constructing an ammunition storage and supply system for an Army brigade, and $15 million worth of communications equipment is installed at the Arifjan Base Camp. The military also builds a $3 million detention facility and a $6.5 million inland petroleum-distribution system. In Qatar, $36.4 million goes toward the construction of a forward headquarters facility for Central Command. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 4/22/2004] The money for these projects is taken from a supplemental appropriation for the Afghan War without congressional approval. [CBS NEWS, 4/18/2004] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Afghanistan

July 31, 2002: Sheriff Raids Business that Supplied 9/11 Hijackers with Fake ID

Passaic County Sheriff Jerry Speziale. [Source: Triborochamber] A business owned by Mohamed el-Atriss, who supplied the 9/11 hijackers with fake IDs (see (July-August 2001)), is raided by the Passaic County Sheriff’s Department. The raids are carried out in a blaze of publicity and are strongly opposed by the US attorney’s office for New Jersey and the FBI, which has a relationship with el-Atriss (see July 31, 2002 and After, September 13, 2001-Mid 2002). [BERGEN RECORD, 8/7/2002] The sheriff is suspicious of el-Atriss and raids his business because, in addition to providing hijackers Abdulaziz Alomari and Khalid Almihdhar with at least two pieces of fake ID, el-Atriss: Talked repeatedly on the phone to another hijacker (see (July-August 2001)); Is an associate of an unindicted co-conspirator in the 1993 ‘Landmarks’ bomb plot (see Before September 11, 2001); Wired $29,000 to the Arab National Bank in Mecca in 2002; [WASHINGTON POST, 1/3/2003] Made inquiries to a parts manufacturer about navigational systems for commercial jetliners to be shipped to Egypt in 1999; [NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, 10/20/2003] Downloaded a list of the 9/11 hijackers from the Internet after 9/11, underlined some names, and circled Khalid Almihdhar’s. [NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, 10/20/2003] El-Atriss is not present during the raid, having traveled to Egypt a short time before, but later returns to the US and is arrested at JFK airport in New York. [CBS NEWS, 7/31/2002; BBC, 8/21/2002] He will later say that he came back to the US to clear his name after learning of the raid while in Egypt. He will be charged with over two dozen counts of selling false documents. [NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, 10/20/2003] Secret evidence will be used against him at the trial. He will plead guilty to one of charges, while the rest will be dropped. (see November 2002-June 2003). Entity Tags: Mohamed el-Atriss, Khalid Almihdhar, Passaic County Sheriff’s Department Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: FBI 9/11 Investigation, Internal US Security After 9/11, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

July 31, 2002 and After: US Attorney Threatens to Arrest Local Sheriff in Row over Raid on Hijackers’ Associate, FBI Also Highly Critical
US attorney for New Jersey Christopher Christie opposed a raid on an associate of the 9/11 hijackers. [Source: Public domain] Both the FBI and the US attorney’s office for New Jersey are highly critical of a raid by the Passaic County sheriff’s office on the business of Mohamed el-Atriss, who supplied the 9/11 hijackers with false IDs (see (July-August 2001) and July 31, 2002). El-Atriss is later arrested and will plead guilty to selling fake IDs (see November 2002-June 2003). According to the sheriff, when US attorney for New Jersey Christopher Christie learns the sheriff intends to hold a news conference about the raid, he tells the sheriff that “he [will] be arrested and the US attorney [will] come down and shut down the Sheriff’s Department.” However, a spokesman for Christie will deny this. [NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, 10/20/2003] The FBI also hammers the sheriff in the media after the arrest, calling the raid, in which officers were accompanied by several press representatives, a “shameful media grab” and saying that the sheriff killed an FBI investigation. The Bergen County Record will point out that this is unusual, as “the feds don’t make a habit of lambasting other law enforcement officials publicly or of confirming the existence of secret investigations.” [BERGEN RECORD, 8/7/2002] Federal officials then tell the sheriff’s department not to proceed with any investigations related to el-Atriss until they get clearance from the FBI. [NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, 10/20/2003] El-Atriss cooperated with the FBI after 9/11 and promised to “keep his eyes and ears open” for other terrorists (see September 13, 2001-Mid 2002). Entity Tags: US Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey, Mohamed el-Atriss, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Christopher J. Christie, Passaic County Sheriff’s Department Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: FBI 9/11 Investigation, Internal US Security After 9/11, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

August 2002: Former UN Inspector Says Allegations Iraqi Government Using Salman Pak to Train Terrorists Are False Former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter casts doubt on Salman Pak’s characterization as a terrorist training facility (see April 6, 2003), in an August 2002 interview later included in his book War on Iraq. Ritter says in part, “Iraqi defectors have been talking lately about the training camp at Salman Pak, south of Baghdad. They say there’s a Boeing aircraft there. That’s not true. There’s an Antonov aircraft of Russian manufacture. They say there are railroad mock-ups, bus mock-ups, buildings, and so on. These are all things you’d find in a hostage rescue training camp, which is what this camp was when it was built in the mid-1980s with British intelligence supervision. In fact, British SAS special operations forces were sent to help train the Iraqis in hostage rescue techniques. Any nation with a national airline and that is under attack from terrorists—and Iraq was, from Iran and Syria at the time would need this capability. Iraq operated Salman Pak as a hostage rescue training facility up until 1992. In 1992, because Iraq no longer had a functioning airline, and because their railroad system was inoperative, Iraq turned the facility over to the Iraqi Intelligence service, particularly the Department of External Threats. These are documented facts coming out of multiple sources from a variety of different countries. The Department of External Threats was created to deal with Kurdistan, in particular, the infusion of Islamic fundamentalist elements from Iran into Kurdistan. So, rather than being a camp dedicated to train Islamic fundamentalist terrorists, it was a camp dedicated to train Iraq to deal with Islamic fundamentalist terrorists. And they did so. Their number one target was the Islamic Kurdish party, which later grew into [Ansar al-Islam]. Now, Jeff Goldberg claimed in the New Yorker that [Ansar al-Islam] is funded by the Iraqi Intelligence service. But that’s exactly the opposite of reality: the Iraqis have been fighting Ansar for years now. Ansar comes out of Iran and is supported by Iranians. Iraq, as part of their ongoing war against Islamic fundamentalism, created a unit specifically designed to destroy these people. It would be ludicrous for Iraq to support al-Qaeda, either conventionally, as many have claimed, or even worse, to give it weapons of mass destruction…” [RITTER AND PITT, 9/25/2002] Entity Tags: Department of External Threats (Iraq), Al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Islam, Scott Ritter, Special Air Service, Jeff Goldberg Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

August 2002: Former FBI Translator Sues Bureau for Documents Relating to Allegations against Co-Worker Accused of Breaching Security Former FBI translator Sibel Edmonds hires attorney David Colapinto of the Washington firm Kohn, Kohn and Calapinto, who sues the FBI under the Freedom of Information Act for full disclosure of all documents related to her allegations against Melek Can Dickerson (see December 4, 2001 and Afternoon February 12, 2002) and her dismissal from the FBI (see March 22, 2002). [VANITY FAIR, 9/2005] Entity Tags: David Colapinto, Sibel Edmonds, Federal Bureau of Investigation Category Tags: Sibel Edmonds

August 2002: US Justice Department Prevents Prosecutors from Indicting Possible Future 7/7 London Bombings Mastermind In 2002, federal prosecutors are building a case against a group of Islamist militants for attempting to start a militant training camp in Oregon in 1999 (see November 1999-Early 2000). They prepare charges against radical London imam Abu Hamza al-Masri, his “highly public aide” Haroon Rashid Aswat, Oussama Kassir (who visited the prospective camp with Aswat), and James Ujaama. Ujaama is living in Seattle, but the others are believed to be overseas. Seattle prosecutors want to seek a grand jury indictment against all of them, which would result in arrest warrants and possible detention for extradition. However, this plan is blocked by higher-level officials at Justice Department headquarters, who want most of the case to be handled by the US Attorney’s Office in New York City. Seattle prosecutors are only allowed to bring charges against Ujaama. [SEATTLE TIMES, 7/24/2005] They go ahead and arrest Ujaama in August 2002, finding weapons and training materials, and charge him with conspiring with Abu Hamza “to provide material support and resources” to the Taliban. One of his associates, Feroz Abbasi, is already in Guantanamo Bay, and is talking to interrogators about trips Ujaama has made to Afghanistan (see December 2000-December 2001). Ujaama quickly agrees to co-operate with the authorities, giving them details about Abu Hamza’s activities, and is given a two-year sentence for a lesser offence. [O'NEILL AND MCGRORY, 2006, PP. 189-190, 198-200] The others are merely listed in Ujaama’s indictment as unindicted co-conspirators. Abu Hamza has actually been working as an informant for British intelligence (see Early 1997), but by early 2004 his relationship with the British has soured (see April 2003 and April 26, 2004), and the US Justice Department will finally indict him for charges relating to the training camp in May 2004. However, Aswat still will not be indicted. When asked why Aswat is not indicted as well, a federal official in Seattle will reply with frustration, “That’s a great question.” [SEATTLE TIMES, 7/24/2005] Shortly after the 7/7 London bombings (see July 7, 2005), it will be widely reported that Aswat was the attack’s mastermind (see Late June-July 7, 2005). Then a counterterrorism expert will claim that Aswat was also an informant for British intelligence, and this explains why the US never indicted him and other mysteries surrounding him (see July 29, 2005). Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, James Ujaama, Abu Hamza al-Masri, Haroon Rashid Aswat, Oussama Kassir Category Tags: Abu Hamza Al-Masri, Haroon Rashid Aswat, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism, 2005 7/7 London Bombings, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

August 2002: Neocons Give Unconvincing Presentation on Iraq Ties to Al-Qaeda; Information Used by Bush, Tenet, Right-Wing Supporters Two influential neoconservatives, Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] reservist and Penn State political science professor Chris Carney and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, give two presentations on Iraq’s alleged ties to al-Qaeda to the CIA at the agency’s Langley headquarters. CIA analysts are not impressed, having seen much of the information before and having already determined that it was not credible. Some of the information will nevertheless be included in speeches by Bush and in testimony by Tenet to Congress. The information is also put into a classified memo to the Senate Intelligence Committee by Feith, which is later leaked to the Weekly Standard, a neoconservative magazine (see November 14, 2003). [VANITY FAIR, 5/2004, PP. 238] Entity Tags: Senate Intelligence Committee, Chris Carney, Weekly Standard, Central Intelligence Agency, Douglas Feith, US Congress, Al-Qaeda Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Neoconservative Influence Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

August or September 2002: Air Forces Investigation Concludes that Major, Accused of Espionage and Obstruction, Has Not Done Anything Wrong The Air Force Office of Special Investigations completes its investigation into Major Douglas Dickerson’s relationship with the American-Turkish Council. The inquiry had been launched in response to allegations by FBI translator Sibel Edmonds that Dickerson’s wife was using her position as an FBI translator to shield certain targets working for the ATC from surveillance (see December 2, 2001 and Afternoon February 12, 2002). On September 10, 2002, Colonel James N. Worth, the Air Force’s director of inquiries, writes in a letter to Edmonds’ attorneys: “We have determined the allegations contained in your letter of August 7, 2002, involving Major Douglas Dickerson do not show improprieties and therefore do not warrant a formal inquiry” by the Air Force’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG). After conducting “a complete and thorough review,” he continued, the Office of Special Investigations could find “no evidence of any deviation from the scope of his duties. Absent new and relevant information we have closed this matter.” [VILLAGE VOICE, 7/13/2004; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 1/24/2005] Edmonds, who was never interviewed as part of the investigation, will continue to press for an investigation. In a September 19 letter to Joseph E. Schmitz, the Air Force’s Inspector General, Edmonds’ attorney will request that the OIG reopen the case and thoroughly investigate her charges. [COLAPINTO, 9/19/2004] Entity Tags: American-Turkish Council, Sibel Edmonds, Douglas Dickerson, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, James N. Worth Category Tags: Sibel Edmonds

August 2002: Al-Qaeda Restarts Training Camps in Pakistan’s Border Region Since its defeat in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, in late 2001, thousands of al-Qaeda-linked militants have been regrouping in the Pakistani tribal region of Waziristan (see December 2001-Spring 2002). The Pakistani army finally entered Waziristan in May 2002 (see Late May 2002), but the army remains in the administrative capital of Wana, leaving al-Qaeda free to operate in the countryside. Emboldened, al-Qaeda begins setting up small mobile training camps in South Waziristan by August 2002. [RASHID, 2008, PP. 148] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Pakistani Army Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region

August 2002: Radical Imam Abu Qatada Has Alleged Madrid Bomber Live with Him in London It will later be alleged that in August 2002, radical imam Abu Qatada calls Spanish militant Moutaz Almallah and asks him to live with him in London. Almallah does move to London one month later. For most of 2002, Qatada is supposedly hiding in London, but in fact British intelligence knows where he is (see Late September 2001-Summer 2002 and Summer-Early November 2002), and he has a history of being an British informant (see June 1996-February 1997). The account of Moutaz moving to London comes from the estranged wife of his brother Mouhannad Almallah. Shortly after the Madrid bombings, she will tell a Spanish judge about the call and much more. She will say both brothers had frequent contact with Abu Qatada before moving. Spanish authorities also are aware that the brothers are linked to Barakat Yarkas, who frequently traveled to London to meet with Abu Qatada for many years (see 1995-February 2001). Abu Qatada will be arrested in October 2002, not long after Moutaz moves there (see October 23, 2002), but Moutaz will continue to live in London while making occasional trips back to Spain. Moutaz will be arrested in Britain in 2005. He will be extradited to Spain for a role in the 2004 Madrid train bombings, but will not have been put on trial by July 2007. In 2007, Mouhannad will be sentenced to 12 years for his role in the bombings (see October 31, 2007). [EL MUNDO (MADRID), 7/28/2005] Entity Tags: Mouhannad Almallah’s wife, Abu Qatada, Barakat Yarkas, Mouhannad Almallah, Moutaz Almallah Category Tags: Abu Qatada, Al-Qaeda in Spain, 2004 Madrid Train Bombings, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism

August 2002: Al-Qaeda Videos Uncovered in Afghanistan; Tapes Show Capabilities, Global Reach

Al-Qaeda videos. [Source: CNN] CNN reporter Nic Robertson obtains a large number of al-Qaeda videos in Afghanistan. The tapes show the organization’s capabilities in bomb-making and assassination techniques, and its efforts to develop chemical weapons (see Before December 2001). Among the 250 tapes obtained, many provide instructions in terror techniques. Others show al-Qaeda meetings with Osama bin Laden, or bin Laden interviews with journalists. Al-Qaeda’s global reach is also evident from the tapes provided by affiliated groups in Bosnia, Chechnya, Eritrea, Uzbekistan, Burma, Algeria, and Sudan. According to counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna, the tapes show that al-Qaeda has become “an organization of organizations… waging a universal jihad campaign.” The earliest are from the 1980s; the latest include news reporting of the 9/11 attacks. “This is their history, the record room of Osama bin Laden,” says Gunaratna. “No terrorist organization is ever known to have put this much knowledge on videotape before,” reports CNN. [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/19/2002; CNN, 8/19/2002; CNN, 8/23/2002] CNN does not disclose how it obtained the material, except to say that a trusted source drove Robertson to a remote part of Afghanistan and that the tapes had been moved from their original location. [CNN, 8/19/2002] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Afghanistan, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

August 2002: Pentagon Officials Pressure CIA to Delay CIA Assessment on Iraq; They Disagree with CIA’s View about Alleged Prague-Atta Link At the request of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, Pentagon officials visit CIA Director George Tenet at Langley headquarters to voice their objections to the final draft of a CIA assessment on Iraq’s supposed links to militant Islamic groups. The officials dispute the report’s conclusion that intelligence suggesting an alleged April 2001 Prague meeting between Mohamed Atta and Iraqi diplomat Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani (see 1999) is not credible. As a result of Pentagon officials’ objections, the CIA’s assessment is postponed until September 18. Tenet will later say he “didn’t think much of” the briefing. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 7/11/2004; NEWSWEEK, 7/19/2004] Entity Tags: Douglas Feith, US Department of Defense, Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, George J. Tenet, Mohamed Atta Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

August 2002: Al-Qaeda Operative Captured, Warns of Attack on Oil Tanker near Yemen; Disappears into CIA Custody In August 2002, alleged al-Qaeda operative Ahmed Muhammad al-Darbi, a Saudi, reportedly comes into US custody. On October 6, 2002, a French oil tanker is attacked by a suicide bomber off the coast of Yemen (see October 6, 2002). Later that month, the Washington Post will report that al-Darbi warned in interrogation interviews that a Yemen cell was planning an attack on a Western oil tanker. It will later be claimed that he was arrested based on information gained by the interrogation of prisoner Abu Zubaida (see June 2002). [WASHINGTON POST, 10/18/2002; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 11/30/2005] In December 2002, another Post article will mention that al-Darbi remains “under CIA control.” [WASHINGTON POST, 12/26/2002] However, his whereabouts will then be unknown for some time. In late 2005, Human Rights Watch will list him as a likely “ghost prisoner” probably still being held by the CIA. [HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 11/30/2005] Entity Tags: Ahmed Muhammad al-Darbi, Central Intelligence Agency Category Tags: Key Captures and Deaths, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

Early August 2002: Wolfowitz Pressures FBI to Confirm That Prague Meeting Took Place Several Pentagon officials, including Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, meet with the FBI’s assistant director for counterterrorism, Pat D’Amuro, to discuss the latest intelligence concerning the alleged April 2001 (see April 8, 2001) meeting between 9/11 plotter Mohamed Atta and Iraqi diplomat Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani. Wolfowitz pressures the FBI briefers to confirm that the Prague meeting had in fact happened. The FBI concedes that the occurrence of the meeting, though not proven, was at least possible. [TIME, 9/2/2002] Entity Tags: Pasquale D’Amuro, Paul Wolfowitz, Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, Mohamed Atta Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

August 1, 2002: Consular Officer Who Issued 9/11 Hijackers with 12 Visas Gives Incorrect Testimony to House Committee Shayna Steinger, a consular officer who issued 12 visas to the 9/11 hijackers (see July 1, 2000), gives incorrect testimony about one of the visa issuances to the House Committee on Government Reform. The incorrect testimony concerns the issue of a visa to Hani Hanjour, the alleged pilot of Flight 77, which hit the Pentagon. Steinger initially refused to grant Hanjour a visa (see September 10, 2000), but then reversed her decision two weeks later (see September 25, 2000). Steinger claims that she initially denied Hanjour a visa because he applied under the Visa Express program. However, the visa was denied in September 2000 and the Visa Express program did not begin until May 2001 (see May 2001). Steinger claims to have a memory of the event which cannot be correct. “I remember that I had refused him for interview, because he had applied for a tourist visa and he said that his reason for going to the United States was to study,” she tells the committee. The denial was “for administrative reasons,” she adds. It meant: “No. Come in. I want to talk to you.” The 9/11 Commission will point out that this cannot have been the case, stating, “In fact, the date Hanjour applied (as shown on his written application) and the date he was denied (as shown both on the application and on [the State Department’s] electronic records) are the same: September 10, 2000.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 37-38 ] This is apparently the first time Steinger has been interviewed by anyone about the 12 visa issuances. [OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (US DEPARTMENT OF STATE), 1/30/2003] Steinger will be interviewed twice more about the visas, changing her story about Hanjour. One interview is by the State Department’s inspector general (see January 20, 2003), the other by the 9/11 Commission (see December 30, 2003). Entity Tags: Shayna Steinger, 9/11 Commission, House Committee on Government Reform Category Tags: Other 9/11 Investigations

August 1, 2002: Justice Department’s ‘Golden Shield’ Memo Approves Torture of Terrorism Suspects

Jay Bybee. [Source: Public domain] The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) sends a non-classified memo to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, offering the opinion that a policy allowing suspected al-Qaeda members to be tortured abroad “may be justified.” [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 8/1/2002 ] This memo will later be nicknamed the “Golden Shield” by insiders in the hopes that it will protect government officials from later being charged with war crimes (see Spring 2002 and Beyond). [ABC NEWS, 4/9/2008] Multiple Authors - The 50-page “torture memo” is signed and authored by Jay S. Bybee, head of OLC, and co-authored by John Yoo, a deputy assistant attorney general. It is later revealed that Yoo authored the memo himself, in close consultation with Vice President Cheney’s chief adviser David Addington, and Bybee just signed off on it (see December 2003-June 2004). [WASHINGTON POST, 6/9/2004] Deputy White House counsel Timothy Flanigan also contributed to the memo. Addington contributed the claim that the president may authorize any interrogation method, even if it is plainly torture. Addington’s reasoning: US and treaty law “do not apply” to the commander in chief, because Congress “may no more regulate the president’s ability to detain and interrogate enemy combatants than it may regulate his ability to direct troop movements on the battlefield.” [WASHINGTON POST, 6/25/2007] Statute Only Prohibits 'Extreme Acts' - Gonzales had formally asked for the OLC’s legal opinion in response to a request by the CIA for legal guidance. A former administration official, quoted by the Washington Post, says the CIA “was prepared to get more aggressive and re-learn old skills, but only with explicit assurances from the top that they were doing so with the full legal authority the president could confer on them.” [WASHINGTON POST, 6/9/2004] “We conclude that the statute, taken as a whole,” Bybee and Yoo write, “makes plain that it prohibits only extreme acts.” Addressing the question of what exactly constitute such acts of an extreme nature, the authors proceed to define torture as the infliction of “physical pain” that is “equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.” Purely mental pain or suffering can also amount to “torture under Section 2340,” but only if it results “in significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g. lasting for months or even years.” [WASHINGTON POST, 6/9/2004] Torture Legal and Defensible - Bybee and Yoo appear to conclude that any act short of torture, even though it may be cruel, inhuman or degrading, would be permissible. They examine, for example, “international decisions regarding the use of sensory deprivation techniques.” These cases, they notice, “make clear that while many of these techniques may amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, they do not produce pain or suffering of the necessary intensity to meet the definition of torture. From these decisions, we conclude that there is a wide range of such techniques that will not rise to the level of torture.” More astounding is Bybee and Yoo’s view that even torture can be defensible. “We conclude,” they write, “that, under the current circumstances, necessity or self-defense may justify interrogation methods that might violate Section 2340A.” Inflicting physical or mental pain might be justified, Bybee and Yoo argue, “in order to prevent further attacks on the United States by the al-Qaeda terrorist network.” In other words, necessity or self-defense may justify torture. Moreover, “necessity and self-defense could provide justifications that would eliminate any criminal liability.” [WASHINGTON POST, 6/8/2004] International anti-torture rules, furthermore, “may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogations” of suspected terrorists. [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 6/21/2004] Laws prohibiting torture would “not apply to the president’s detention and interrogation of enemy combatants” in the “war on terror,” because the president has constitutional authority to conduct a military campaign. [WASHINGTON POST, 6/27/2004] Protecting US Officials from Prosecution - In 2007, author and reporter Charlie Savage will write: “In case an interrogator was ever prosecuted for violating the antitorture law (see October 21, 1994 and January 26, 1998, Yoo laid out page after page of legal defenses he could mount to get the charges dismissed. And should someone balk at this strained interpretation of the law, Yoo offered his usual trump card: Applying the antitorture law to interrogations authorized by the president would be unconstitutional, since only the commander in chief could set standards for questioning prisoners.” [SAVAGE, 2007, PP. 155-156] Virtually Unrestricted Authority of President - “As commander in chief,” the memo argues, “the president has the constitutional authority to order interrogations of enemy combatants to gain intelligence information concerning the military plans of the enemy.” [WASHINGTON POST, 6/9/2004] According to some critics, this judgment—which will be echoed in a March 2003 draft Pentagon report (see March 6, 2003)—ignores important past rulings such as the 1952 Supreme Court decision in Youngstown Steel and Tube Co v. Sawyer, which determined that the president, even in wartime, is subject to US laws. [WASHINGTON POST, 6/9/2004] The memo also says that US Congress “may no more regulate the president’s ability to detain and interrogate enemy combatants than it may regulate his ability to direct troop movements on the battlefield.” [WASHINGTON POST, 6/27/2004] Ashcroft Refuses to Release Memo - After the memo’s existence is revealed, Attorney General John Ashcroft denies senators’ requests to release it, and refuses to say if or how the president was involved in the discussion. “The president has a right to hear advice from his attorney general, in confidence,” he says. [NEW YORK TIMES, 6/8/2004; BLOOMBERG, 6/8/2004; WASHINGTON POST, 6/9/2004] Privately, Ashcroft is so irritated by Yoo’s hand-in-glove work with the White House that he begins disparagingly referring to him as “Dr. Yes.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/4/2007] Only 'Analytical' - Responding to questions about the memo, White House press secretary Scott McClellan will claim that the memo “was not prepared to provide advice on specific methods or techniques,” but was “analytical.” But the 50-page memo seems to have been considered immensely important, given its length and the fact that it was signed by Bybee. “Given the topic and length of opinion, it had to get pretty high-level attention,” Beth Nolan, a former White House counsel from 1999-2001, will tell reporters. This view is confirmed by another former Office of Legal Counsel lawyer who says that unlike documents signed by deputies in the Office of Legal Counsel, memorandums signed by the Office’s head are considered legally binding. [WASHINGTON POST, 6/9/2004] Memo Will be Withdrawn - Almost two years later, the OLC’s new head, Jack Goldsmith, will withdraw the torture memos, fearing that they go far beyond anything countenanced by US law (see December 2003-June 2004). Memo Addresses CIA Concerns - The administration, particularly the axis of neoconservatives centered around Cheney’s office, has enthusiastically advocated the use of violent, abusive, and sometimes tortuous interrogation techniques, though the US has never endorsed such tactics before, and many experts say such techniques are counterproductive. The CIA, responding to the desires from the White House, hastily put together a rough program after consulting with intelligence officials from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, where detainees are routinely tortured and killed in captivity, and after studying methods used by former Soviet Union interrogators. The legal questions were continuous. The former deputy legal counsel for the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, Paul Kelbaugh, recalls in 2007: “We were getting asked about combinations—‘Can we do this and this at the same time?… These approved techniques, say, withholding food, and 50-degree temperature—can they be combined?’ Or ‘Do I have to do the less extreme before the more extreme?’” The “torture memo” is designed to address these concerns. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/4/2007] Entity Tags: John C. Yoo, Paul Kelbaugh, Timothy E. Flanigan, Scott McClellan, John Ashcroft, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Jay S. Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel, David S. Addington, Alberto R. Gonzales, Beth Nolan, Al-Qaeda, Charlie Savage, Central Intelligence Agency, Jack Goldsmith Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

August 2, 2002: CIA Memo Says Evidence of Saudi Government Support for Hijackers Is ‘Incontrovertible’ According to Sen. Bob Graham (D), the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry he co-chairs later will uncover a CIA memo written on this date. The author of the memo writes about hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi and concludes that there is “incontrovertible evidence that there is support for these terrorists within the Saudi government.” [GRAHAM AND NUSSBAUM, 2004, PP. 169] Apparently, this memo will be discussed in the completely censored section of the Inquiry’s final report that deals with foreign government involvement in the 9/11 plot (see August 1-3, 2003). Osama Basnan, one of the key players in a suspected transfer of funds from the Saudi government to these two hijackers, is arrested in the US a few weeks after this memo is written, but he will be deported two months after that (see August 22-November 2002). Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Central Intelligence Agency, Nawaf Alhazmi, Bob Graham Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Saudi Arabia, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Key Hijacker Events, Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi Connection

August 2, 2002: Judge Rules Identities of Hundreds Secretly Arrested in US after 9/11 Must Be Disclosed A federal judge rules that the Bush administration must reveal the identities of the hundreds of people secretly arrested after the 9/11 attacks within 15 days. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/3/2002] The judge calls the secret arrests “odious to a democratic society.” The New York Times applauds the decision and notes that the government’s argument that terrorist groups could exploit the release of the names makes no sense, because the detainees were allowed a phone call to notify anyone that they were being held. [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/6/2002] Two weeks later, the same judge agrees to postpone the release of the names until an appeals court can rule on the matter. [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/16/2002] Entity Tags: Bush administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, Civil Liberties Category Tags: Other 9/11 Investigations

August 2, 2002: ISI Tried to Buy Nuclear Material for Bin Laden

This unnamed Pakistani intelligence agent was captured on undercover video in January 2001 as part of Operation Diamondback. [Source: Dateline NBC] MSNBC airs recordings informant Randy Glass made of arms dealers and Pakistani ISI agents attempting to buy nuclear material and other illegal weapons for bin Laden. [MSNBC, 8/2/2002] Meanwhile, it is reported that federal investigators are re-examining the arms smuggling case involving Glass “to determine whether agents of the Pakistani government tried to buy missiles and nuclear weapons components in the United States last year for use by terrorists or Pakistan’s military.” [WASHINGTON POST, 8/2/2002] Two such ISI agents, Rajaa Gulum Abbas and Abdul Malik, are already secretly indicted by this time. But Glass still says, “The government knows about those involved in my case who were never charged, never deported, who actively took part in bringing terrorists into our country to meet with me and undercover agents.” [COX NEWS SERVICE, 8/2/2002] One such person may be a former Egyptian judge named Shireen Shawky, who was interested in buying weapons for the Taliban and attended a meeting in July 1999 in which ISI agent Rajaa Gulum Abbas said the WTC would be destroyed. [MSNBC, 8/2/2002; WPBF 25 (WEST PALM BEACH), 8/5/2002] Others not charged may include Mohamed el Amir and Dr. Magdy el Amir. Entity Tags: Randy Glass, Taliban, World Trade Center, Rajaa Gulum Abbas, Shireen Shawky, Pakistan, Mohamed el Amir, Osama bin Laden, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Magdy el Amir, Abdul Malik Timeline Tags: A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network Category Tags: Randy Glass/ Diamondback, Pakistan and the ISI, Pakistani Nukes & Islamic Militancy

August 2, 2002: FBI Questions Members of 9/11 Congressional Inquiry about 9/11 Leaks

Senator Richard Shelby. [Source: US Senate] The Washington Post reveals that FBI agents have questioned nearly all 37 senators and congresspeople making up the 9/1 Congressional Inquiry about 9/11-related information leaks. In particular, in June 2002 the media reported that the day before 9/11 the NSA intercepted the messages “The match is about to begin” and “Tomorrow is zero hour”(see September 10, 2001). The FBI has asked the members to submit to lie detector tests but most have refused. Congresspeople express “grave concern” for this historically unprecedented move. A law professor states: “Now the FBI can open dossiers on every member and staffer and develop full information on them. It creates a great chilling effect on those who would be critical of the FBI.” [WASHINGTON POST, 8/2/2002] Senator John McCain (R-AZ) suggests that “the constitutional separation of powers is being violated in spirit if not in the letter. ‘What you have here is an organization compiling dossiers on people who are investigating the same organization. The administration bitterly complains about some leaks out of a committee, but meanwhile leaks abound about secret war plans for fighting a war against Saddam Hussein. What’s that about? There’s a bit of a contradiction here, if not a double standard.’” [WASHINGTON POST, 8/3/2002] Later the search for the source of the leak intensifies to unprecedented levels as the FBI asks 17 senators to turn over phone records, appointment calendars, and schedules that would reveal their possible contact with reporters. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/24/2002] Most, if not all, turn over the records, even as some complain that the request breaches the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches. One senator says the FBI is “trying to put a damper on our activities and I think they will be successful.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/29/2002] In January 2004, it will be reported that the probe is focusing on Sen. Richard Shelby (R-AL). He will not be charged with any crime relating to the leak. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/22/2004] In November 2005, the Senate Ethics Committee will announce it has dropped a probe of Shelby, citing insufficient evidence. [REUTERS, 11/13/2005] Inquiry co-chair Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL) will write in a book in late 2004 that, at the time, he guessed “the leak was intended to sabotage [the inquiry’s] efforts. I am not by nature a conspiracy theorist, but the fact that we were hit with this disclosure at the moment we began to make things uncomfortable for the Bush administration has stuck with me. Over a year later, I asked [inquiry co-chair] Congressman [Porter] Goss (R-FL) whether he thought we had been set up. Nodding, he replied, ‘I often wonder that myself.’” [GRAHAM AND NUSSBAUM, 2004, PP. 140] Author Philip Shenon will observe that this tactic of intimidation worked, as “Members of the joint committee and their staffs were frightened into silence about the investigation.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 55] Entity Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bob Graham, Philip Shenon, Porter J. Goss, Richard Shelby, John McCain, House Intelligence Committee Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, FBI 9/11 Investigation

August 3, 2002: US Pilots Believe 9/11 Conspirators Used Utmost Professional Skill A Portuguese newspaper reports on an independent inquiry into 9/11 by a group of military and civilian US pilots that challenges the official version of events. The group’s press statement says, “The so-called terrorist attack was in fact a superbly executed military operation carried out against the [US], requiring the utmost professional military skill in command, communications, and control. It was flawless in timing, in the choice of selected aircraft to be used as guided missiles and in the coordinated delivery of those missiles to their preselected targets.” A member of the inquiry team, a US Air Force officer who flew over 100 sorties during the Vietnam War, says: “Those birds (airliners) either had a crack fighter pilot in the left seat, or they were being maneuvered by remote control.” [NEWS (PORTUGAL), 8/3/2002; NEWS (PORTUGAL), 8/8/2002] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Investigations

August 4, 2002: Time Magazine Briefly Mentions Key Pre-Attack Meeting Left out of 9/11 Commission Report An article in Time magazine briefly mentions a key meeting between the CIA and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, where top CIA officials warned Rice of an impending attack (see July 10, 2001). The meeting will be left out of the 9/11 Commission report, although CIA Director George Tenet will tell the Commission about it (see January 28, 2004). Time writes: “In mid-July, Tenet sat down for a special meeting with Rice and aides. ‘George briefed Condi that there was going to be a major attack,’ says an official; another, who was present at the meeting, says Tenet broke out a huge wall chart… with dozens of threats. Tenet couldn’t rule out a domestic attack but thought it more likely that al-Qaeda would strike overseas.” [TIME, 8/4/2002] According to a transcript of Tenet’s testimony to the 9/11 Commission, he told Rice there could be an al-Qaeda attack in weeks or perhaps months, that there would be multiple, simultaneous attacks causing major human casualties, and that the focus would be US targets, facilities, or interests. As Time reports, Tenet says the intelligence focuses on an overseas attack, but a domestic attack could not be ruled out. [WASHINGTON POST, 10/3/2006] News of the meeting will emerge in 2006 (see September 29, 2006), but the 9/11 Commission members will deny they were told about it. After the transcript is shared with reporters, they will reverse their denials (see September 30-October 3, 2006). Rice will also deny the meeting took place, only to reverse her position as well (see October 1-2, 2006). Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, 9/11 Commission, Condoleezza Rice Category Tags: Other 9/11 Investigations

August 4, 2002: Firefighters Saw Only Limited Fire in South Tower

This picture of the hole created in the WTC by Flight 11 supports recordings indicating that fires weren’t burning out of control. In the close-up insert at the top left, note the person standing at the edge of the hole. [Source: unknown] A “lost tape” of radio messages from firefighters inside the WTC on 9/11 is made public. Supposedly, “city fire officials simply delayed listening” to this tape until after the official report on the fire department’s response to the attacks was published, and they still refuse to allow any officials to discuss the contents. The tape reveals that two firefighters were able to reach the crash site on the 78th floor of the South Tower. While there, “Chief Palmer could see only two pockets of fire, and called for a pair of engine companies to fight them.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/4/2002; GUARDIAN, 8/5/2002] Entity Tags: New York City Fire Department, World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: WTC Investigation

August 11, 2002: Bush’s Advisers Advocate Attacking Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, and Other Countries A Newsweek article suggests that some of President Bush’s advisers advocate not only attacking Iraq, but also Saudi Arabia, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Egypt, and Burma, shocking many. One senior British official tells the magazine: “Everyone wants to go to Baghdad. Real men want to go to Tehran.” [NEWSWEEK, 8/11/2002; NEWSWEEK, 8/11/2002] In February 2003, US Undersecretary of State John Bolton will say in meetings with Israeli officials that he has no doubt America will attack Iraq, and that it will be necessary to deal with threats from Syria, Iran, and North Korea afterward. This is largely unreported in the US media. [HA'ARETZ, 2/17/2003; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 2/19/2003; WORLDNETDAILY, 2/25/2003] In April 2003, former CIA Director James Woolsey will say that the US is engaged in a “world war,” where the enemies include not only Islamic extremists like al-Qaeda, but also the religious rulers of Iran, and the “fascists” of Iraq and Syria (see April 3, 2003). [OBSERVER, 4/6/2003] Wesley Clark, the former NATO supreme allied commander, later recalls having been told of a Defense Department plan to take out “seven countries in five years,” beginning with Iraq and Syria, and ending with Iran (see Early November 2001). [SALON, 10/12/2007] Entity Tags: Wesley Clark, James Woolsey, John R. Bolton, Bush administration Category Tags: US Dominance

August 11, 2002: Afghans Directly Producing and Exporting Heroin in Broad Daylight

An Afghan refines opium into heroin. [Source: BBC] In the past, Afghanistan had mostly exported raw opium, but now many new refineries are converting the opium into heroin. The British government has spent £20 million to eradicate opium, but the program is marred by corruption and largely seen as a failure. The new heroin factories are said to be “working in broad daylight.” There has been a rash of bombings and assassinations in Afghanistan as various factions fight over drug profits. Reporters for a British newspaper are able to determine the precise location of some of these factories, but the US-led forces in Afghanistan are doing nothing to stop them. [OBSERVER, 8/11/2002] Entity Tags: United Kingdom Category Tags: Afghanistan, Drugs

August 12, 2002: FAA Releases No New Information About 9/11 A group of FAA flight controllers hold a press conference to talk about the 9/11 events for the first time. However, virtually no new information is disclosed. As the Boston Globe put it, “questions about detailed communications from the hijacked planes was avoided, with FAA officials saying that information remains under investigation.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 8/13/2002] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Investigations

August 13, 2002: Electronic Warfare Methods May Have Brought Flight 93 Down The Independent carries a story entitled, “Unanswered Questions: The Mystery of Flight 93,” a rare critique of the official version of events around that plane’s crash. Most of the information is a summation of what was reported before. However, there is one interesting new theory. Theorizing why witnesses did not see smoke from the faltering plane, the article points to the 1996 research of Harvard academic Elaine Scarry, “showing that the Air Force and the Pentagon have conducted extensive research on ‘electronic warfare applications’ with the possible capacity to intentionally disrupt the mechanisms of an aeroplane in such a way as to provoke, for example, an uncontrollable dive. Scarry also reports that US Customs aircraft are already equipped with such weaponry; as are some C-130 Air Force transport planes. The FBI has stated that, apart from the enigmatic Falcon business jet, there was a C-130 military cargo plane within 25 miles of the passenger jet when it crashed (see September 14, 2001). According to the Scarry findings, in 1995 the Air Force installed ‘electronic suites’ in at least 28 of its C-130s—capable, among other things, of emitting lethal jamming signals.” [NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 11/19/2000; INDEPENDENT, 8/13/2002] Entity Tags: Pentagon, Central Intelligence Agency, Elaine Scarry Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Investigations

August 15, 2002: 9/11 Victims’ Relatives File Lawsuit Against Alleged Saudi Al-Qaeda Financiers

Deena Burnett, wife of Flight 93 passenger Tom Burnett, speaks on behalf of the victims’ relatives suing the Saudis. [Source: Associated Press] More than 600 relatives of victims of the 9/11 attacks file a 15-count, $1 trillion lawsuit against various parties they accuse of financing al-Qaeda and Afghanistan’s former Taliban regime. The number of plaintiffs will quickly increase to 2,500 after the suit is widely publicized. Up to 10,000 were eligible to join this suit. The lawsuit does not allege that Saudi defendants directly participated in the 9/11 attacks, or approved them. Instead, it is alleged they helped fund and sustain al-Qaeda, which enabled the attacks to occur. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/16/2002; NEWSWEEK, 9/13/2002] Defendants named include: The Saudi Binladin Group, the conglomerate owned by the bin Laden family. [CNN, 8/15/2002] The National Commercial Bank, one of the largest banks in Saudi Arabia. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/15/2002] The government of Sudan, for letting bin Laden live in that country until 1996. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/16/2002] The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). [WASHINGTON POST, 8/16/2002] The SAAR Foundation. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/16/2002] Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp., which the plaintiffs contend is the primary bank for a number of charities that funnel money to terrorists. (This bank will later be dismissed from the suit (see November 14, 2003-September 28, 2005).) [WASHINGTON POST, 8/16/2002] The Benevolence International Foundation. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/16/2002] The International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and its parent organization, the Muslim World League (MWL). The suit claims that the IIRO gave more than $60 million to the Taliban. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/16/2002] Khalid bin Mahfouz, one-time prominent investor in the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) who had to pay a $225 million fine following the collapse of that bank. It is claimed he later operated a bank that funneled millions of dollars to charities controlled by al-Qaeda. (Mahfouz denies supporting terrorism and has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.) [WASHINGTON POST, 8/16/2002] Mohammed al Faisal al Saud, a Saudi prince. (His name will later be dismissed from the suit because of diplomatic immunity (see November 14, 2003-September 28, 2005).) [WASHINGTON POST, 8/16/2002] Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan. (His name will later be dismissed from the suit because of diplomatic immunity (see November 14, 2003-September 28, 2005).) [WASHINGTON POST, 8/16/2002] Prince Turki al-Faisal, former chief of Saudi intelligence. (His name will later be dismissed from the suit because of diplomatic immunity (see November 14, 2003-September 28, 2005).) [WASHINGTON POST, 8/16/2002] “The attorneys and investigators were able to obtain, through French intelligence, the translation of a secretly recorded meeting between representatives of bin Laden and three Saudi princes in which they sought to pay him hush money to keep him from attacking their enterprises in Saudi Arabia.” [CNN, 8/15/2002] The plaintiffs also accuse the US government of failing to pursue such institutions thoroughly enough because of lucrative oil interests. [BBC, 8/15/2002] Ron Motley, the lead lawyer in the suit, says the case is being aided by intelligence services from France and four other foreign governments, but no help has come from the Justice Department. [STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 8/16/2002] The plaintiffs acknowledge the chance of ever winning any money is slim, but hope the lawsuit will help bring to light the role of Saudi Arabia in the 9/11 attacks. [BBC, 8/15/2002] A number of rich Saudis respond by threatening to withdraw hundreds of billions of dollars in US investments if the lawsuit goes forward (see August 20, 2002). More defendants will be added to the suit later in the year (see November 22, 2002). [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 8/20/2002] Entity Tags: Saudi Binladin Group, Sudan, Taliban, SAAR Foundation, Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Ron Motley, International Islamic Relief Organization, Khalid bin Mahfouz, Al-Qaeda, National Commercial Bank, Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp., Turki al-Faisal, World Assembly of Muslim Youth, Benevolence International Foundation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Saudi Arabia, Terrorism Financing, BIF, Bin Laden Family, Other 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Related Lawsuits

August 15, 2002: Son of Saudi Official Associated with 9/ 11 Hijackers

Saud al-Rashid. [Source: FBI] A picture of a young Saudi man named Saud al-Rashid is discovered on a CD-ROM that also contains the pictures of three 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, and Abdulaziz Alomari, in an al-Qaeda safe house in Pakistan. A senior US official says that investigators “were able to take this piece of information and it showed clear signals or lines that he was connected to 9/11.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 526] Al-Rashid was in Afghanistan in 2000 and 2001, where he met 9/11 hijacker Ahmed Alhaznawi “once or twice” in a guest house. [NEW YORK TIMES, 7/29/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 526] Six days after the raid, the US issues a worldwide dragnet to find him. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002] But they are unable to catch him because a few days later, he flees from Egypt to Saudi Arabia and turns himself in to the Saudi authorities. The Saudis apparently will not try him for any crime or allow the FBI to interview him. [CNN, 8/26/2002; CNN, 8/31/2002] Although detainees identify him as a candidate 9/11 hijacker, he claims not to have met Osama bin Laden or Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), or even have heard of al-Qaeda. Under interrogation, KSM says he was headstrong and immature and dropped out of the plot after returning to Saudi Arabia for a visa, either due to second thoughts or the influence of his family. However, doubts will be raised about the reliability of KSM’s statements under interrogation (see August 6, 2007). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 526] Intriguingly, Al-Rashid’s father is Hamid al-Rashid, a Saudi government official who paid a salary to Omar al-Bayoumi, an associate of both Almihdhar and Alhazmi who is later suspected of being a Saudi agent. [NEW YORK TIMES, 7/29/2003] Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Khalid Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Abdulaziz Alomari, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Saud al-Rashid, Hamid al-Rashid, Omar al-Bayoumi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Other 9/11 Hijackers, Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi Connection, Saudi Arabia

August 15, 2002: US General Believes Troops Will Remain in Afghanistan for Long Time General Tommy Franks, commander of US troops in Central Asia, says, “It does not surprise me that someone would say, ‘Oh gosh, the military is going to be in Afghanistan for a long, long time.’ Sure we will be.” He likens the situation to South Korea, where the US has stationed troops for over 50 years. A few days earlier, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers said the war on terrorism “could last years and years.” [CBS NEWS, 8/16/2002] Entity Tags: Richard B. Myers, Thomas Franks Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Afghanistan, US Dominance

August 15, 2002: CNN General Manager Concedes Media Censored Itself Rena Golden, the executive vice-president and general manager of CNN International, claims that the press has censored itself over 9/11 and the Afghanistan war. “Anyone who claims the US media didn’t censor itself is kidding you. It was not a matter of government pressure but a reluctance to criticize anything in a war that was obviously supported by the vast majority of the people. And this isn’t just a CNN issue—every journalist who was in any way involved in 9/11 is partly responsible.” [PRESS GAZETTE (LONDON), 8/15/2002] These comments echo criticisms by Dan Rather in May 2002 (see May 17, 2002). Entity Tags: Rena Golden Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, 9/11 Timeline, Domestic Propaganda Category Tags: Media

August 16, 2002: US Military Plans New Strategies, Including Conducting Secret Operations Aimed at ‘Stimulating Reactions’ Among Terrorists and States The Defense Science Board authors a report titled “Special Operations and Joint Forces in Countering Terrorism” recommending an increase of more than $7 billion in the Pentagon’s budget. It says the war on terrorism is a “real war” and describes the enemy as “committed, resourceful and globally dispersed… with strategic reach.” The US will have to wage “a long, at times violent, and borderless war” that “requires new strategies, postures and organization,” it adds. The report includes suggestions to develop the capability to tag key terrorist figures with special chemicals so they can be tracked by laser; a proposal to create a special SWAT team charged with secretly seeking and destroying chemical, biological and nuclear weapons anywhere in the world; and a plan to establish a “red team” known as the Proactive, Preemptive Operations Group, (P2OG), which would conduct secret operations aimed at “stimulating reactions” among terrorists and states suspected of possessing weapons of mass destruction. [BOARD, 8/16/2002; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 9/26/2002; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 10/27/2002; ASIA TIMES, 11/5/2002] Proactive, Preemptive Operations Group, (P2OG) - The unit would provoke terrorist cells into action, perhaps by stealing their money or tricking them with fake communications, in order to expose them. The exposed cells would then be taken care of by “quick-response” teams. The US would use the revelation of such cells as an opportunity to hold “states/sub-state actors accountable” and “signal to harboring states that their sovereignty will be at risk.” The P2OG would require at least $100 million and about 100 people, including specialists in information operations, psychological operations, computer network attack, covert activities, signal intelligence, human intelligence, special operations forces and deception operations. According to the DSB, it should be headed by the Special Operations Executive in the White House’s National Security Council. But according to sources interviewed by United Press International (UPI), people in the Defense Department want to see the group under the Pentagon’s authority. [BOARD, 8/16/2002; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 9/26/2002; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 10/27/2002; ASIA TIMES, 11/5/2002] Tagging terrorists - Intelligence operatives would penetrate terrorist cells and tag leaders’ clothes with chemicals that would make them trackable by a laser. The agents would also collect DNA samples from objects and papers that are handled by the targets. Information about the terrorist’s DNA would be kept in a database. The program would cost $1.7 billion over a 5-year period beginning in 2004. [BOARD, 8/16/2002; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 9/26/2002] Special SWAT team - The SWAT Team would consist of special forces soldiers whose specialty would be searching and destroying nuclear, chemical or biological weapons sites anywhere in the world. They would also be trained to offer protection to US soldiers operating nearby and be responsible for “consequence management,” like enacting quarantines. The program would cost about $500 million a year and would be headed by US Special Operations Command. To effectively detect the presence of such weapons, the DSB advocates allocating about $1 billion a year on the research and development of new sensor and “agent defeat” technologies. [BOARD, 8/16/2002; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 9/26/2002] Expanding US Special Forces - The panel recommends increasing the size of US Special Forces by about 2 percent a year. It also proposes that more special forces operations be conducted jointly with conventional forces. Its budget should be increased by “billions,” the report also says. [BOARD, 8/16/2002; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 9/26/2002] Panel to speculate on possible terrorist attack scenarios - A panel of roughly 24 creative, highly respected analysts would be convened to speculate on the nature of future terrorists attacks against the US. The report recommends allocating $20 million a year for the program. [BOARD, 8/16/2002; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 9/26/2002] Intelligence Reserve - A $100 million-a-year reserve program would be established that would put former intelligence retirees on call to assist with intelligence tasks and to participate in counterterrorism exercises when needed. [BOARD, 8/16/2002; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 9/26/2002; ASIA TIMES, 11/5/2002] Addition of 500 people who would focus on identifying characteristics of potential adversaries - $800 million would be spent on the addition of over 500 people to existing military and intelligence agencies who would “focus on understanding effects of globalization, radicalism, cultures, religions, economics, etc., to better characterize potential adversaries.” [BOARD, 8/16/2002; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 9/26/2002] Increase budget of Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) and Joint Forces Command's net assessment center - $200 million more would be allocated to the Joint Warfare Analysis Center and Joint Forces Command’s net assessment center. JWAC is a cell of about 500 planners and target analysts who work in Dahlgren, Va. [BOARD, 8/16/2002; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 9/26/2002] Increase surveillance and reconnaissance budgets - The panel envisions infusing $1.6 billion per year into intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance budgets over the next six years. Spending would be focused on tying together unmanned aerial vehicles, manned platforms, space-based sensors and databases. A portion of the funds would also be used to develop “a rich set of new ground sensor capabilities” aimed at the surveillance of small terrorist cells. [BOARD, 8/16/2002; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 9/26/2002] Urban Training Center - A dedicated urban training range would be constructed on the West Coast emphasizing “small unit action, leadership initiative and flexibility.” Relatively low-level soldiers would also be trained on how to determine the logistics of the back-up fire they need while they are in battle. The program would need $300 million a year for the next six years. [BOARD, 8/16/2002; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 9/26/2002] Database providing 3-d view of most of the cities of the world - The report recommends developing a detailed database of most of the cities in the world which would allow soldiers to view a three-dimensional display of the cities including “buildings [doors and windows included],… streets and alleys and underground passages, obstacles like power lines and key infrastructure like water and communications lines,” the UPI reports. [BOARD, 8/16/2002; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 9/26/2002] Critics warn that the changes proposed by the report would allow the military to engage in covert activities currently handled by the CIA. However unlike the CIA, the military would not be subject to Congressional oversight. But William Schneider Jr, the DSB chairman, downplays those concerns. “The CIA executes the plans but they use Department of Defense assets,” Schneider says, adding that his board’s recommendations do not advocate any changes to US policies banning assassinations, or requiring presidents to approve US covert operations in advance. He also insists that such changes would not preclude congressional oversight. [ASIA TIMES, 11/5/2002] Entity Tags: Defense Science Board, Donald Rumsfeld, William Schneider Jr. Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks, US Military Category Tags: US Dominance

August 18, 2002: Los Angeles Times: No Al-Qaeda Leaders Held at Guantanamo The Los Angeles Times reports that “despite intense interrogations and investigations,” no senior al-Qaeda leaders appear to be amongst the nearly 600 detainees at the Guantanamo prison. One US official says that some usual intelligence has been gained from the detainees, but “it’s not roll-up-plots, knock-your-socks-off-kind of stuff.” This official says the detainees are mostly “low-and middle-level” fighters and supporters, not “the big-time guys” high enough to help unravel plots and understand al-Qaeda’s structure. Another official similarly says there are “no big fish” there. “Some of these guys literally don’t know the world is round.” The Times also notes that several European countries “have quietly offered to take prisoners home and put them on trial if US officials can provide evidence that they have committed a crime.” But none has been released for trial so far. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 8/18/2002] The New York Times will confirm in June 2004 that no al-Qaeda or Taliban leaders are being held at the prison and that in fact the vast majority are innocent of any militant connections (see June 21, 2004). Some al-Qaeda leaders will be sent into the prison from secret CIA prisons in September 2006 (see September 2-3, 2006). Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

August 20, 2002: Saudis Retract Billions from US in Response to 9/11 Lawsuit The Financial Times reports that “disgruntled Saudis have pulled tens of billions of dollars out of the US, signaling a deep alienation from America.” Estimates range from $100 billion to over $200 billion. Part of the anger is in response to reports that the US might attack Saudi Arabia and freeze Saudi assets unless Saudi Arabia makes a serious effort al-Qaeda and other Islamic militant groups. It is also in response to a lawsuit against many Saudi Arabians that also may lead to a freeze of Saudi assets (see August 15, 2002). Estimates of total Saudi investments in the US range from $400 billion to $600 billion. [FINANCIAL TIMES, 8/20/2002] Entity Tags: United States Category Tags: Saudi Arabia, 9/11 Related Lawsuits

August 20, 2002: Rumsfeld Compares Resistance to Iraq Invasion to Nazi Appeasement; Alleges Al-Qaeda-Iraq Links Again During an interview with Fox News, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld mocks calls from Washington, Europe and the Arab world demanding that the Bush administration show them evidence to substantiate the hawk’s claim that Saddam Hussein is a threat to the US and its allies. “Think of the prelude to World War Two,” the Defense Secretary says. “Think of all the countries that said, well, we don’t have enough evidence. I mean, Mein Kampf had been written. Hitler had indicated what he intended to do. Maybe he won’t attack us. Maybe he won’t do this or that. Well, there were millions of people dead because of the miscalculations. The people who argued for waiting for more evidence have to ask themselves how they are going to feel at that point where another event occurs.” [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 8/21/2002; GUARDIAN, 8/22/2002; FOX NEWS, 8/20/2003] Rumsfeld also says during a news conference that according to “intelligence reports,” Saddam’s government is “hosting, supporting or sponsoring” an al-Qaeda presence in Iraq. Responding to a question about whether he has any evidence to support the claim that al-Qaeda is operating in Iraq, Rumsfeld states, “There are Al-Qaeda in a number of locations in Iraq…. The suggestion that… [Iraqi government officials] who are so attentive in denying human rights to their population aren’t aware of where these folks [al-Qaeda] are or what they’re doing is ludicrous in a vicious, repressive dictatorship…. [I]t’s very hard to imagine that the government is not aware of what’s taking place in the country.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/20/2002] Shortly after Rumsfeld’s remarks, a senior US intelligence official tells The Guardian that there is no evidence to back the defense secretary’s claims. “They are not the official guests of the government,” a second official says, adding that any al-Qaeda in the region are still “on the run.” [GUARDIAN, 8/22/2002] Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

August 20, 2002: Rumsfeld Claims Iraqi Government Is Supporting Al-Qaeda in Iraq Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, citing various “intelligence reports,” claims that the Iraqi government is “hosting, supporting or sponsoring” an al-Qaeda presence in Iraq. This is a likely reference to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his followers, whom the US alleges is an al-Qaeda operative with links to the Iraqi government. When asked if he has evidence to support this claim Rumsfeld responds: “There are al-Qaeda in a number of locations in Iraq…. The suggestion that… [Iraqi government officials] who are so attentive in denying human rights to their population aren’t aware of where these folks [al-Qaeda] are or what they’re doing is ludicrous in a vicious, repressive dictatorship.” He also says, “It’s very hard to imagine that the government is not aware of what’s taking place in the country.” [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 8/20/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 8/20/2002] Shortly after the defense secretary’s allegations, an unnamed intelligence official tells the Guardian, “They are not the official guests of the government,” adding that any al-Qaeda in the region are still “on the run.” A month later, Knight Ridder reports that according to an anonymous US official, Rumsfeld’s charge is based on information from Kurdish opposition groups which are feeding information to the Pentagon. [GUARDIAN, 8/22/2002; KNIGHT RIDDER, 9/25/2002 SOURCES: UNNAMED US INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL, UNNAMED US OFFICIAL] Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

August 21, 2002: Commencement of NIST Investigation Announced The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)—an agency of the US Commerce Department’s Technology Administration—announces details of its forthcoming investigation into the collapses of the World Trade Center Twin Towers and Building 7 on 9/11. The NIST investigation aims “to investigate the building construction, the materials used, and the technical conditions that contributed to the outcome of the World Trade Center (WTC) disaster.” It also aims to examine the activities of building occupants and emergency responders on 9/11, studying such issues as emergency communications within the WTC, the movement of people during the evacuations, and issues around persons with disabilities. Leading technical experts from industry, academia, and other laboratories, alongside NIST’s own expert staff, will participate in the investigation. Expert professionals from the private sector will also be involved. Glenn Corbett, a fire science professor at John Jay College, says, “This is going to be the most extensive building disaster investigation ever performed.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 8/21/2002; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 8/3/2005] The investigation is formally authorized in October 2002, when the National Construction Safety Team Act is signed into law. The act, which gives NIST authorization to investigate major building failures in the US, is written largely as a result of the World Trade Center collapses. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 10/2/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 5/8/2003] NIST’s investigation is originally proposed to last two years, with a budget of $16 million. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 8/21/2002] However, it eventually will last three years, with its final report into the collapses of the Twin Towers being released in October 2005 (see October 26, 2005). A previous analysis of the WTC collapses conducted by FEMA and the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) was completed earlier in 2002 (see May 1, 2002), but this had a budget of just $1.1 million. By the time NIST starts its investigation, much of the crucial steel debris from the WTC collapses has already been destroyed (see September 12-October 2001). They later refer to there being a “scarcity of physical evidence that is typically available in place for reconstruction of a disaster.” [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. XXXVI ] Entity Tags: World Trade Center, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Glenn Corbett Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: WTC Investigation

August 21, 2002: US Warns Governments that Al-Qaeda Wants to Attack Nightclubs and Restaurants in Southeast Asia, Possibly in Bali

Mohammed Mansour Jabarah. [Source: CBC] A number of governments are given warnings suggesting an upcoming attack on nightclubs on the island of Bali, Indonesia, but this does not prevent the bombing of two nightclubs in Bali in October 2002 (see October 12, 2002). Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, an al-Qaeda operative with Canadian citizenship, attended a meeting held in January 2002 in southern Thailand led by Hambali, an al-Qaeda leader who also heads the al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Hambali announces a new plan to target nightclubs and restaurants in Southeast Asia. A second meeting held shortly thereafter also attended by Jabarah (but not Hambali) narrowed the target to nightclubs in Bali. Jabarah was arrested in Oman in April 2002 and deported to Canada. By August, he is in the US and is interrogated by US agents, and he reveals this attack plan. He also reveals code phrases, such as the use of “white meat” to refer to US targets. As a result, the FBI completes an intelligence report on his interrogation on August 21, and passes a warning to all Southeast Asian governments immediately thereafter. A leading counterterrorism expert will later say, “There is absolutely no question [Australia] would have received [the report] under our intelligence-sharing agreement with the US, [Britain], and Canada.” [AGE (MELBOURNE), 1/23/2003; SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 10/10/2003] A US intelligence report in early September will list six likely targets, including two nightclubs in Bali (see Early September 2002). Entity Tags: Jemaah Islamiyah, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hambali, Mohammed Mansour Jabarah Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, 2002 Bali Bombings, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

August 22, 2002: Counterterrorism ‘Tsar’ Richard Clarke Appears to Praise Bush Administration’s Record on Fighting Terrorism Although he will later come to prominence for accusing it of failing to adequately address the al-Qaeda threat before 9/11 (see March 21, 2004), in a background briefing to reporters, former counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke appears to praise the Bush administration for aggressively pursuing al-Qaeda from the outset. [CNN, 3/24/2004] 'Rapid Elimination' - During the briefing, Clarke says that when the Bush administration came into office in January 2001, it had “decided then” to “vigorously pursue the existing policy” on al-Qaeda, “including all of the lethal covert action findings.” He says that in the first week of February 2001, the administration decided in principle “to add to the existing Clinton strategy and to increase CIA resources, for example, for covert action, five-fold, to go after al-Qaeda.” He says the strategy was changed “from one of rollback with al-Qaeda over the course of five years, which it had been, to a new strategy that called for the rapid elimination of al-Qaeda.” Response to Time Magazine - Clarke responds to a recent Time magazine article that suggested the Bush administration was unwilling to adopt suggestions made in the Clinton administration because of a general animus against its foreign policy. He says: “This is the one issue where the National Security Council leadership decided continuity was important and kept the same guy around, the same team in place. That doesn’t sound like animus against, uh, the previous team to me.” He is asked, “You’re saying that the Bush administration did not stop anything that the Clinton administration was doing while it was making these decisions, and by the end of the summer had increased money for covert action five-fold?” Clarke replies, “All of that’s correct.” No Plan, No Delay - One reporter asks about an alleged Clinton administration plan against al-Qaeda, to which Clarke responds, “There was never a plan.” Regarding problems the Clinton administration faced in dealing with the al-Qaeda threat, a reporter asks, “And none of that really changed until we were attacked [on 9/11]?” Clarke says: “No, that’s not true. In the spring, the Bush administration changed—began to change Pakistani policy, um, by a dialogue that said we would be willing to lift sanctions.… So that’s really how it started.” He is asked, “[W]hat you’re saying is that… one, there was no plan; two, there was no delay; and that actually the first changes since October of ‘98 were made in the spring months just after the [Bush] administration came into office?” Clarke replies: “You got it. That’s right.” [FOX NEWS, 3/24/2004] Comments Published - In March 2004, the White House will violate a long-standing confidentiality policy by authorizing Fox News to publish these comments that Clarke has made off the record (see March 24, 2004). [COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW, 3/25/2004; FINDLAW, 4/9/2004] Clarke's Explanation - Around that time, when Clarke appears before the 9/11 Commission (see March 24, 2004), Commissioner James Thompson will ask him about the apparent discrepancies between his comments during this briefing and the criticisms he makes of the Bush administration in his book Against All Enemies. Clarke will explain that his briefing was in the context of Time magazine’s critical story. He will say, “So I was asked by several people in senior levels of the Bush White House to do a press backgrounder to try to explain that set of facts in a way that minimized criticism of the administration.” He will add, “I was asked to highlight the positive aspects of what the administration had done, and to minimize the negative aspects of what the administration had done.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/24/2004] Former Nixon White House counsel John Dean will defend Clarke, writing, “The truth is that the background briefing simply does not conflict with anything Clarke says openly, if more bluntly, in his book.” [FINDLAW, 4/9/2004] Previous Briefing for 9/11 Congressional Inquiry - Two months before this, Clarke had briefed the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry on the Bush administration’s counterterrorism record and had been largely uncritical of its policies (see June 11, 2002). Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Clinton administration, Bush administration, John Dean, Al-Qaeda Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

August 22-November 2002: Possible Hijacker Associate Is Arrested, Then Deported Osama Basnan, an alleged associate of 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, and his wife are arrested for visa fraud. [NEWSWEEK, 11/22/2002; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 11/24/2002] One report says he is arrested for allegedly having links to Omar al-Bayoumi. [ARAB NEWS, 11/26/2002] On October 22, Basnan and his wife, Majeda Dweikat, admit they used false immigration documents to stay in the US. [KGTV 10 (SAN DIEGO), 10/22/2002] Possible financial connections between Basnan and al-Bayoumi, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, and the Saudi royal family are known to the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry (as well as the FBI and CIA) at this time. Remarkably, Basnan is deported to Saudi Arabia on November 17, 2002. His wife is deported to Jordan the same day. [WASHINGTON POST, 11/24/2002] Less than a week after the deportations, new media reports make Basnan a widely known suspect. [NEWSWEEK, 11/22/2002] Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Osama Basnan, Central Intelligence Agency, Omar al-Bayoumi, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Majeda Dweikat Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi Connection, Internal US Security After 9/11

August 23, 2002: Zinni: Bigger Issues Than Iraq Confront US In a speech to the Economic Club of Florida in Tallahassee, retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, who recently served as the president’s special envoy to the Middle East, argues that there are more pressing issues than Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. Specifically, he points to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, instability in Afghanistan, the continuing existence of the al-Qaeda network, and the theocracy in Iran. He adds that the proposed war with Iraq would be expensive and would put considerable strain on the military’s resources, which already are “stretched too tight all over the world.” Furthermore, notes the general, invading Iraq would further antagonize America’s allies in the Middle East. “We need to quit making enemies that we don’t need to make enemies out of,” he says. He also notes, “It’s pretty interesting that all the generals see it the same way and all the others who have never fired a shot and are hot to go to war see it another way.” [TAMPA TRIBUNE, 8/24/2002] Entity Tags: Anthony Zinni Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism

August 25, 2002: CIA Collects No Intelligence About Saudi Arabia Appearing on NBC’s Dateline, former CIA agent Robert Baer says the US collects virtually no intelligence about Saudi Arabia nor are they given any intelligence collected by the Saudis. He says this is because there are implicit orders from the White House that say: “Do not collect information on Saudi Arabia because we’re going to risk annoying the royal family.” On the same television program, despite being on a US list of suspected terrorist financiers since October 2001, Saudi millionaire Yassin al-Qadi says, “I’m living my life here in Saudi Arabia without any problem” because he is being protected by the Saudi government. Al-Qadi admits to giving bin Laden money for his “humanitarian” work, but says this is different from bin Laden’s militant activities. Presented with this information, the US Treasury Department only says that the US “is pleased with and appreciates the actions taken by the Saudis” in the war on terror. The Saudi government still has not given US intelligence permission to talk to any family members of the hijackers, even though some US journalists have had limited contact with a few. [MSNBC, 8/25/2002] Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, United States, Saudi Arabia, Robert Baer, Yassin al-Qadi, US Department of the Treasury Category Tags: Saudi Arabia, Robert Wright and Vulgar Betrayal

August 27, 2002: US Stengthens Military Presence in Uzbekistan

The K2 (Karshi-Khanabad) US airbase in southeastern Uzbekistan. It was established in late 2001. [Source: Confidential source via Robin Moore] The Central Asian nation of Uzbekistan has recently signed a treaty committing the US to respond to “any external threat” to the country. Uzbekistan’s foreign minister explains: “The logic of the situation suggests that the United States has come here with a serious purpose, and for a long time.” According to a Washington Post report, the other Central Asian nations—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—have similar agreements with the US. The US claims it is supporting democracy in these nations, but experts say authoritarianism has been on the rise since 9/11. The US military has been in Uzbekistan since 2001. A new US military base in Uzbekistan currently holds about 1,000 US soldiers, but is being greatly enlarged. The article makes the general point that the US is replacing Russia as the dominant power in Central Asia. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/27/2002] Entity Tags: United States, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Category Tags: US Dominance

August 27, 2002: Close Relationship Between Saudi Ambassador and Bush Raises Questions Prince Bandar, Saudi ambassador to the US, meets privately for more than an hour with President Bush and National Security Adviser Rice in Crawford, Texas. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 8/28/2002] Press Secretary Ari Fleischer characterizes it as a warm meeting of old friends. Bandar, his wife Princess Haifa, and seven of their eight children stay for lunch. [FOX NEWS, 8/27/2002] Bandar, a long-time friend of the Bush family, donated $1 million to the George W. Bush Presidential Library in College Station, Texas. [BOSTON HERALD, 12/11/2001] This relationship later becomes news when it is learned that Princess Haifa gave between $51,000 and $73,000 to two Saudi families in California who may have financed two of the 9/11 hijackers (see December 4, 1999). [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/23/2002; MSNBC, 11/27/2002] Entity Tags: Bandar bin Sultan, George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, Ari Fleischer Category Tags: Saudi Arabia

August 28, 2002: UN Calls Attempt to Thwart Al-Qaeda Money Flow a Failure The Washington Post reports, “A global campaign to block al-Qaeda’s access to money has stalled, enabling the terrorist network to obtain a fresh infusion of tens of millions of dollars and putting it in a position to finance future attacks, according to a draft UN report.” In the months immediately following 9/11, more than $112 million in assets was frozen. Since then, only $10 million more has been frozen, and most of the original money has been unfrozen due to lack of evidence. Private donations to the group, estimated at $16 million a year, are believed to “continue, largely unabated.” The US and other governments are not sharing information about suspected militants, and known militants are not being put on official lists of suspected terrorists. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/29/2002] One month later, a report by the Council on Foreign Relations, an influential US think tank, largely blames the US relationship with Saudi Arabia for the failure. The report says, “It is worth stating clearly and unambiguously what official US government spokespersons have not. For years, individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia have been the most important source of funds for al-Qaeda, and for years the Saudi officials have turned a blind eye to this problem.” The report will also note that the Bush administration “appears to have made a policy decision not to use the full power of US influence and legal authorities to pressure or compel other governments to combat terrorist financing more effectively.” [WASHINGTON POST, 10/16/2002] News reports from early 2006 will show little change to the situation (see November 29, 2005; January 15, 2006). Entity Tags: Bush administration, Al-Qaeda, Saudi Arabia Category Tags: Terrorism Financing, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

August 29, 2002: Germany Charges Moroccan with Complicity in 9/11 German authorities charge Mounir El Motassadeq with complicity in the 9/11 attacks. He was arrested in Germany two months after 9/11. He is only the second person in the world to be charged with any crime related to the 9/11 attacks (after Zacarias Moussaoui). He is charged with helping finance Mohamed Atta and others in the Hamburg terrorist cell. [AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 8/29/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 8/29/2002] Entity Tags: Germany, Mohamed Atta, Mounir El Motassadeq Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Germany

August 31, 2002: Indonesian Military Shoots US Teachers, Blames Attack on Rebel Group

Patsy Spier, an American teacher wounded in the attack. Her husband Rick Spier was killed. [Source: US Department of Justice] A group of US teachers traveling in the Indonesian province of Papua (also known as Irian Jaya) are ambushed on a jungle road. Two American teachers and one Indonesian teacher are killed, and eight American teachers are injured. The ambush takes place on a road owned by the company Freeport-McMoRan, which owns an extremely lucrative gold and copper mine nearby. The road is tightly controlled by the Indonesian military, the TNI, and a military check point is only 500 yards away. The TNI quickly blames the killings on the Free Papua Movement (OPM), a separatist group in the province. But a preliminary Indonesian police investigation finds that “there is a strong possibility” the ambush was carried out by members of the Indonesian military. Other classified reports presented to Congress by the CIA and FBI suggest the TNI was behind the ambush. [WASHINGTON POST, 6/22/2003] The weeks later, a US intelligence report suggests that senior Indonesian military officials discussed an operation against Freeport shortly before the ambush (see Mid-September 2002). [WASHINGTON POST, 11/3/2002] Matthew P. Daley, deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, later says: “The preponderance of evidence indicates to us that members of the Indonesian army were responsible for the murders in Papua. The question of what level and for what motive did these murders take place is of deep interest to the United States.” At the time, over 2,000 security personnel were guarding the Freeport mine, and this has been a lucrative business for the TNI. However, Freeport had made recent comments in the local media that they were planning on cutting the security forces. The Washington Post will report in 2003 that the FBI is investigating the possibility that the ambush was designed to make Freeport increase its payments to the TNI. The Post will additionally report US officials also believe that “elements of the military may have wanted to frame the [OPM] in the hope of prompting the State Department to add the group to the department’s terrorist list. If the separatists were listed as a terrorist group, it would almost guarantee an increase in US counterterrorism aid to the Indonesian military.” [WASHINGTON POST, 6/22/2003] In 2006, the New York Times will report that, despite all the evidence, “Bush administration officials [have] consistently sought to absolve the Indonesian military of any link to the killings.” In November 2005, the US officially restores ties to the TNI despite the unresolved nature of the killings. The ties had been cut for 12 years due to widespread human rights abuses by the TNI. Also in 2006, Anthonius Wamang, the main suspect in the killings who was recently arrested, will confess that he did shoot at the teachers, but so did three men in Indonesian military uniforms. Furthermore, he says he was given his bullets by a senior Indonesian soldier. Wamang is said to belong to the OPM, but a human rights group connects him to the TNI. [NEW YORK TIMES, 1/14/2006] After the Bali bombings less than two months later (see October 12, 2002), the Asia Times will point to the Papua ambush to suggest that elements in the TNI could have had a role in the Bali bombings as well. [ASIA TIMES, 11/7/2002] Entity Tags: Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Free Papua Movement, Freeport-McMoRan, Bush administration, Anthonius Wamang, Matthew P. Daley Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, Indonesian Militant Collusion

Autumn 2002: Taliban and Al-Qaeda Regrouping in Afghanistan With the US having diverted much of their best troops and equipment to Iraq, the Taliban and al-Qaeda begin regrouping inside Afghanistan. In August 2002, it is reported that former Taliban head Mullah Omar has secretly returned to Afghanistan and is living in remote hideouts near Kandahar. [GUARDIAN, 8/30/2002] In September, US intelligence officials say “al-Qaeda operatives who found refuge in Pakistan are starting to regroup and move back into Afghanistan… The movement back into Afghanistan is still relatively small and involves al-Qaeda members traveling in small groups, the officials say.… American officials say the world’s largest concentrations of al-Qaeda operatives are now in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the recent influx into Afghanistan is creating new dangers.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/10/2002] In December, a United Nations report claims that al-Qaeda training camps have recently been reactivated in Afghanistan, and new volunteers are making their way to the camps. While the new camps are basic, they are said to be “increasing the long-term capabilities of the al-Qaeda network.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/17/2002] Entity Tags: Taliban, Al-Qaeda, United Nations, Mullah Omar Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Afghanistan, Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region

September 2002: Congressional Leaders Allegedly Briefed on CIA Interrogation Techniques, but Do Not Complain Some congressional leaders are reportedly briefed on the CIA’s detainee interrogation program, but what is actually said will later be disputed. The briefing is described as “a virtual tour of the CIA’s overseas detention sites and the harsh techniques interrogators had devised to try to make their prisoners talk,” and apparently mentions waterboarding and information gleaned from detainees, according to two unnamed officials who are present and will later talk to the Washington Post. Few, if Any, Objections Raised - Due to the feeling of “panic” following 9/11, the legislators’ attitude is described as, “We don’t care what you do to those guys as long as you get the information you need to protect the American people,” and two even ask if the methods are “tough enough.” The briefing, apparently one of the first of a series of around 30 private briefings on the CIA’s interrogation program, is for the “Gang of Eight,” the four top congressional leaders and the senior member from each party on the House and Senate intelligence committees. However, the methods used are only described in some of the briefings, and some of the meetings are just for the “gang of four”—intelligence committee members only. The groups are said to be so small because they concern highly secret covert activities, although it will later be suggested that the administration’s motivation is “partly to hide from view an embarrassing practice that the CIA considered vital but outsiders would almost certainly condemn as abhorrent.” One of the committee members present is Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), and other officials that receive such briefings are reported to include Jane Harman (D-CA), Bob Graham (D-FL), Jay Rockefeller (D-WV), Porter Goss (R-FL) and Pat Roberts (R-KS). Harman is said to be the only one to object at any point. The attendees’ recollections of the meeting will later vary greatly. Goss will say, “Among those being briefed, there was a pretty full understanding of what the CIA was doing… And the reaction in the room was not just approval, but encouragement,” although this may not be a reference to this specific meeting. Graham, who will leave the Senate Intelligence Committee in January 2003, will later say he has no memory of being told about waterboarding, “Personally, I was unaware of it, so I couldn’t object.” A “source familiar with Pelosi’s position” will say that she participates in a discussion of enhanced interrogation techniques, but understands they are at the planning stage at this time and are not in use. [WASHINGTON POST, 12/9/2007] Restrictions on Information - Graham will later describe the limitations placed on legislators who receive such briefings: “In addition to the fact that the full members of the committee can’t hear what’s happening, those who are in the room are very restricted. You can’t take any notes. You can’t bring anyone with you and after the meeting, you cannot discuss what you’ve heard. So that if, for instance, there’s an issue about, is this legal under the Geneva Convention, you can’t go to someone who’s an expert on that subject and get their opinion. It’s a very limiting situation.” [CNN, 12/13/2007] Secret Interrogations Already Underway - The CIA has been conducting aggressive interrogations since at least May 2002 (see Mid-May 2002 and After), but is has no firm legal basis to perform them until the Justice Department gives approval in August 2002 (see August 1, 2002). CIA Director George Tenet will later comment in a 2007 book, “After we received the written Department of Justice guidance on the interrogation issue, we briefed the chairmen and ranking members of our oversight committees. While they were not asked to formally approve the program as it was done under the President’s unilateral authorities, I can recall no objections being raised.” [MSNBC, 9/13/2007] Entity Tags: Porter J. Goss, Senate Intelligence Committee, Pat Roberts, Nancy Pelosi, John D. Rockefeller, Jane Harman, Central Intelligence Agency, George J. Tenet, House Intelligence Committee, Bob Graham Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

September 2002: Australian Intelligence Reportedly Overhears Al-Qaeda-Linked Group Plotting to Attack Australians in Southeast Asia US News and World Report will claim shortly after the 2002 Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002) that unnamed US officials say that not long before the bombing, “conversations [were] intercepted by Australian intelligence of [Jemaah Islamiyah] operatives plotting to attack Australians in the region.” Jemaah Islamiyah is considered the al-Qaeda affiliate in Southeast Asia. [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 10/20/2002] This warning is based on “two intelligence sources.” The conversations were intercepted “in the weeks before” the Bali bombings. It is unclear whether the conversations were translated or analyzed before the bombings. [SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 10/23/2002] Entity Tags: Jemaah Islamiyah, Australian Security Intelligence Organization Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, 2002 Bali Bombings, Remote Surveillance

September 2002: Yemeni Government Official with 9/11 Foreknowledge Kidnapped in Egypt, Handed to CIA Abdulsalam Ali Abdulrahman, a section chief in Yemen’s Political Security Organization, the Yemeni equivalent of the FBI, disappears in Cairo, Egypt, after going there on business. Abdulrahman, who appears to have had foreknowledge of 9/11 (see August 12, 2000), calls his family after arriving in Cairo, but is apparently kidnapped by Egyptian intelligence and handed over to the CIA. However, it is unclear whether the CIA takes him to Azerbaijan or Afghanistan. [VIDINO, 2006, PP. 230; GREY, 2007, PP. 252] He will later be taken to Guantanamo (see September 20, 2004). Entity Tags: Abdulsalam Ali Abdulrahman, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Yemeni Militant Collusion, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

September 2002: US Assertions of Ties Between Iraq and Al-Qaeda Based on Single Guantanamo Prisoner A US official with inside knowledge of the interrogations of detainees at the US prison at Guantanamo tells USA Today that the administration’s recent assertions that Iraq has trained al-Qaeda members are based on uncorroborated information from a single Guantanamo detainee. The source also notes that the detainees may be lying to US authorities to encourage a US invasion of Iraq in order to add support to the al-Qaeda argument “that the United States is the mortal enemy of Muslim countries.” [USA TODAY, 9/26/2002] Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Bush administration, US Department of Defense Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

September 2002: FBI Agent Sees ‘Grave Violations’ in FBI Handling of Terrorism Case in Florida

Mike German. [Source: Publicity photo] FBI agent Mike German is assigned to a counterterrorism case involving international militant groups. Apparently a domestic militia group in Tampa, Florida is considering allying with a major, unnamed militant Islamic organization. He becomes concerned that the investigation will fail due to “grave violations of FBI policy and possibly even grave violations of the law.” He complains to the Justice Department’s inspector general, claiming that FBI managers have falsified records, failed to properly handle evidence, falsely discredited witnesses, and failed to adhere to laws and regulations about electronic surveillance. German also sends his complaints directly to FBI Director Robert Mueller. But Mueller does not respond. Some time after German submits his complaints, he is removed from the case. “The phone just stopped ringing, and I became a persona non grata. Because I wouldn’t let this go away, I became the problem.… My entire career has been ruined, all because I thought I was doing the right thing here.” Frustrated with the bureau’s continuing mismanagement, he will retire from the FBI in 2004. [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/2/2004; GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE, 1/26/2005] German will later be exonerated in a 2005 Justice Department report investigating his charges (see December 3, 2005). Entity Tags: Office of the Inspector General (DOJ), Mike German, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Internal US Security After 9/11

September 2002: CIA Completes ‘Iraqi Ties to Terrorism’ Report Based on Al-Libi Interrogation The CIA completes a highly classified report on “Iraqi Ties to Terrorism,” summarizing claims that Iraq has provided “training in poisons and gases” to members of al-Qaeda. The report warns that evidence for the claim comes from “sources of varying reliability” and has not yet been substanitated. The main source behind this allegation, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, who once operated bin Laden’s Khaldan training camp in Afghanistan and who is being held in custody by the CIA, will later recant the claim (see February 14, 2004). [NEW YORK TIMES, 7/31/2004; NEWSWEEK, 7/5/2005] Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

September 2002: Most Members of House and Senate Intelligence Committees Not Briefed on CIA Interrogations, Reportedly Because They Are Covert Activities Although some members of both the House and Senate intelligence committees are briefed about a CIA detainee interrogation program around this time (see September 2002), the briefing is not received by all committee members. Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Bob Graham (D-FL) will later say that the information is not shared with all committee members because the activities are regarded as covert. Within the intelligence committees, the information is restricted to the “gang of four”—the two top members from each committee. Graham will later complain about this: “Not only should I have been briefed [about the CIA interrogation program] but the entire committee [should have] been briefed. The only basis for what they called these covert gang of four briefings is where the president has indicated there’s an action that’s being undertaken for which the United States wants to have deniability. It’s not a blanket for every subject that the intelligence community might be involved with. In my judgment, this was not a covert operation and should have been briefed to the entire intelligence committee.” [CNN, 12/13/2007] However, President Bush, who would usually be briefed on activities like the interrogation program, is not briefed on it, precisely because it is not regarded as a covert activity, but is classified as a normal part of “intelligence collection” (see April 2002 and After). Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Senate Intelligence Committee, Bob Graham, House Intelligence Committee Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

September 2002: Customs Intercepts Associated Press Package The Customs Service intercepts a package sent via Federal Express from the Associated Press bureau in Manila to the AP office in Washington, and turns the contents over to the FBI. The FBI keeps the material, all unclassified and previously publicly disclosed, and fails to inform AP about this. It is claimed they do so to prevent the reporters from reporting their story, which is about government foreknowledge of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and ties with Ramzi Yousef and other Islamic militants in the Philippines. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 3/12/2003] Entity Tags: US Customs Service, Federal Express, Associated Press, Federal Bureau of Investigation Category Tags: 1995 Bojinka Plot

September-October 2002: Saudi Government Charity Stays Open Despite Link to Bali Bombings

Al Haramain logo. [Source: Reuters / Corbis] In June 2002, al-Qaeda operative Omar al-Faruq was captured by the US and interrogated with techniques described as close to torture (see June 5, 2002). On September 9, 2002, he reportedly breaks down and immediately begins spilling secrets in great detail. He confesses that he is al-Qaeda’s senior representative in Southeast Asia. He says that al-Qaeda leaders Abu Zubaida and Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi had ordered him to “plan large-scale attacks against US interests in Indonesia, Malaysia, [the] Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Cambodia.” In particular, he had a plan to launch truck bomb attacks on US embassies in Southeast Asia around the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The US issues a code orange alert, and the attacks never happen. He also says that much of the money for al-Qaeda’s operations in the region comes from the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, a charity closely linked to the Saudi government. Al-Faruq’s confessions are immediately leaked to Time magazine, which publishes a story about them on September 15. US investigators tell Time that Al Haramain is a “significant” source of funding for al-Qaeda linked groups in the region and they also say they are investigating possible links between al-Qaeda and top al-Haramain officials in Saudi Arabia. [TIME, 9/15/2002] However, Al Haramain offices are not shut down in Southeast Asia or elsewhere. Early the next month, a car bomb and a backpack bomb hit two discotheques in Bali, Indonesia, killing over 200 people (see October 12, 2002). The London Times reports later in the month that $74,000 was sent to Abu Bakar Bashir, the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, al-Qaeda’s main affiliate in the region. The money was spent to buy the explosives for the bombing from the Indonesian military. Furthermore, Jemaah Islamiyah was mainly funded by money from Al Haramain. [LONDON TIMES, 10/20/2002] However, Al Haramain still is not shut down. In late 2003, it is announced that the charity’s Indonesian branch is shutting down, but in fact it secretly changes locations and stays open. All Al Haramain branches worldwide will finally be shut down in 2004 (see March 2002-September 2004). [BURR AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 38-41] Entity Tags: Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Omar al-Faruq, Abu Bakar Bashir, Abu Zubaida, Jemaah Islamiyah Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, 2002 Bali Bombings, Saudi Arabia, Terrorism Financing

September-October 2002: DOE Nuclear Safety Specialist Demoted, Fired for Criticizing ‘Inept’ Terrorism Preparations Department of Energy (DOE) safety specialist Chris Steele, who shut down a hazardous, unsecured nuclear waste dump at the Los Alamos nuclear facility a year earlier (see July 18, 2001), is demoted from his position as the DOE’s chief safety official at Los Alamos after he overrules what he calls inept preparations against terrorist attacks. In October 2002, Steele receives a safety analysis report for a radioactive waste treatment facility at Los Alamos. The report estimates the chances of a “rogue” airliner crashing into the facility as being a million to one, even considering the events of September 11, 2001. It predicts that such a crash, deliberate or not, would cause hundreds of thousands of gallons of nuclear waste to catch fire. However, the report said, the roof sprinkler system would put out the flames. Steele points out that the sprinkler system would be destroyed in the crash: “That must be a magical sprinkler system, since it’s apparently able to rise up from the rubble, turn itself on and put out the flames. We should buy one of those for every nuclear plant in the country.” After Steele rejects the report, he is stripped of his security clearance and fired. He is accused of committing “serious security violations” by the National Nuclear Security Administration. [CARTER, 2004, PP. 17-18; VANITY FAIR, 2/15/2004] Entity Tags: National Nuclear Security Administration, US Department of Energy, Chris Steele Category Tags: Internal US Security After 9/11

September 2002-October 2003: Informer Closely Watches Madrid Bombers Abdelkader Farssaoui, a.k.a. Cartagena, is the imam of a mosque in the town of Villaverde, near Madrid, Spain. In 2007, he will testify under oath as a protected witness that he was recruited to be a police informer beginning in late 2001, if not earlier. He says that he is also working as an informant for the government of Morocco, but he nonetheless becomes highly trusted for the Spanish. Apparently, he is little used by the Spanish until about September 2002. But starting that month, he informs on a group of men attending his mosque, led by Serhane Abdelmajid Fakhet. Other members in the group he watches include Said Berraj, Mustafa Maymouni (Fakhet’s brother-in-law), Mohammed Larbi ben Sellam, and Rabei Osman Sayed Ahmed. He is also encouraged to bring Jamal Zougam closer to the group, although he does not see Zougam doing anything criminal. All of these men will later have alleged roles in the 2004 Madrid train bombings (see 7:37-7:42 a.m., March 11, 2004), except for Maymouni, who will be arrested in Morocco in 2003 for a key role in the Casablanca bombings there that year (see May 16, 2003). Even before Maymouni was arrested, Farssaoui has been giving warnings to his handlers that the group is talking about conducting attacks in Spain and Morocco (see April-June 2003). He is able to get the mobile phone numbers of all of the men so police can monitor those phones. Police do monitor the group members in other ways to confirm what Farssaoui is learning (see January 17, 2003-Late March 2004). In October 2003, Farssaoui reports that Fakhet is “looking for martyrs.” But Farssaoui is told by his handlers to immediately leave Madrid for another assignment (see October 2003). He does, so he stops monitoring the bombers just as they began planning their bombing in detail. He later says that his handlers forbid him to share what he learns with judge Baltasar Garzon, who is leading investigations into al-Qaeda related cases in Spain. They also encourage him to exaggerate what the suspects are doing so they can be indicted, and he does. This testimony Farssaoui will give in 2007 will contradict some details of earlier testimony he gave in the same trial, but he will claim that it took him time to find courage to tell the whole truth. [EL MUNDO (MADRID), 10/18/2004; EL MUNDO (MADRID), 10/21/2004; EL MUNDO (MADRID), 3/7/2007; ABC (SPAIN), 3/7/2007] He will also claim that he later accidentally discovers Farket, the leader of the group he was watching, is also a government informant (see Shortly After October 2003). Entity Tags: Mariano Rayon, Abdelkader Farssaoui, Jamal Zougam, Unidad Central de Informacion Exterior, Said Berraj, Baltasar Garzon, Mustapha Maymouni, Rabei Osman Sayed Ahmed, Mohammed Larbi ben Sellam, Serhane Abdelmajid Fakhet Category Tags: Other Possible Moles or Informants, Al-Qaeda in Spain, 2004 Madrid Train Bombings

Early September 2002: ’Stunningly Explicit and Specific’ CIA Warning Lists Bali Nighclubs as Targets In the first half of September 2002, a secret report compiled by the CIA, State Department, FBI, NSA, and other US agencies lists six likely bomb targets in Indonesia, including two Bali nightclubs (the Sahid Bali Seaside Resort and the Hard Rock Hotel) that are just a short distance away from the two nightclubs that will ultimately be attacked one month later (see October 12, 2002). The CIA passes the report to its stations in Southeast Asia, alerting them to an imminent attack. The information is at least partially based on the interrogation of al-Qaeda operative Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, who revealed that al-Qaeda is planning an attack on nightclubs and restaurants in Southeast Asia, particularly in Bali (see August 21, 2002). [GUARDIAN, 10/17/2002; AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 6/26/2003] On September 26, 2002, the US embassy in Indonesia issues a public warning that states, “Americans and Westerners should avoid large gatherings, and locations known to cater primarily to a Western clientele such as certain bars, restaurants and tourist areas.” However, the US State Department does not issue any travel warning for Indonesia, and other governments such as Australia do not issue any warnings. There also is no evidence that the owners of Bali nightclubs are given any warnings. [SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 10/10/2003] A US intelligence source will later tell the Guardian, “The State Department didn’t act on [the early September warning] and it’s become a bubbling scandal.” The Guardian will say shortly after the October 2002 Bali bombings that the warning has “fueled a growing row” in the US, Britain, and Australia “over whether Indonesia could have acted sooner against Islamist militants or whether tourists could have been given more warning of the dangers of traveling to resorts like Bali.” [GUARDIAN, 10/17/2002] The Sydney Morning Herald will conclude in 2003 that it is now “impossible for anyone to believe that Mohammed Mansour Jabarah’s interrogation did not result in the US learning of JI’s plan for a terrorist attack in Bali.” Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage will later call Jabarah’s warning “stunningly explicit and specific.” [SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 10/10/2003] Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of State, Jemaah Islamiyah, National Security Agency, Richard Armitage Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, 2002 Bali Bombings, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

Early September 2002: Bush Administration Considers Designating ‘Lackawanna Six’ Enemy Combatants In early September 2002, a group of senior Bush administration officials gathers for a secret videoconference to decide what to do with the “Lackawanna Six,” the six Yemeni-Americans living in Lackawanna, New York, who had attended an al-Qaeda training camp before 9/11. Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld argue that the men should be locked up indefinitely as “enemy combatants,” and thrown into a military brig with no right to trial or even to see a lawyer. The US has already done this with two other US citizens, Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla. According to a participant in the meeting, Cheney argues, “They are the enemy, and they’re right here in the country.” However, all six men left their basic training course early and there is no evidence any of them had carried out or even planned any terrorist acts (see April-August 2001). Attorney General John Ashcroft insists he can bring a tough criminal case against them for providing “material support” to al-Qaeda. Ashcroft wins the argument and the six men are formally charged several days later (see September 13, 2002). [NEWSWEEK, 10/10/2007] The six men will all eventually strike plea bargains and plead guilty, saying they were essentially forced to because the government made clear that if they fought the charges they would be declared enemy combatants (see May 19, 2003). Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Faysal Galab, Mukhtar al-Bakri, Shafel Mosed, Yaseinn Taher, Sahim Alwan, John Ashcroft, Yahya Goba Category Tags: "Lackawanna Six", Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

September 3, 2002: Al-Marabh Given Light Prison Sentence on Non-Terrorism Charges The FBI decides not to charge Nabil al-Marabh on any terrorism related charge. Instead, on September 3, 2002, al-Marabh pleads guilty to illegally entering the US in June 2001 (see June 27, 2001-July 11, 2001), and is sentenced to only eight months in prison. [CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, 9/5/2002] Federal prosecutors claim that “at this time” there is no evidence “of any involvement by [al-Marabh] in any terrorist organization,” even though he has admitted to getting weapons training in Afghan training camps. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/4/2002] Numerous reported ties between al-Marabh and the 9/11 hijackers are apparently not mentioned in the trial (see September 2000; January 2001-Summer 2001; January 2001-Summer 2001; Spring 2001; Early September 2001). The judge states he cannot say “in good conscience” that he approves of the plea bargain worked out between the prosecution and defense, but he seems unable to stop it. He says, “Something about this case makes me feel uncomfortable. I just don’t have a lot of information.” He has a number of unanswered questions, such as how al-Marabh had $22,000 in cash and $25,000 worth of amber jewels on his possession when he was arrested, despite holding only a sporadic series of low-paying jobs. “These are the things that kind of bother me. It’s kind of unusual, isn’t it?” says the judge. [NATIONAL POST, 9/4/2002] In 2003, the judge at al-Marabh’s deportation hearing will rule that al-Marabh presents “a danger to national security” and is “credibly linked to elements of terrorism” but this will not stop him from being deported.(see January 2004). Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Nabil al-Marabh Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Nabil Al-Marabh, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

September 4, 2002: Iraq Sued for Conspiring with Al-Qaeda in 9/11 Attacks Over 1,400 relatives of 9/11 attack victims sue Iraq for more than $1 trillion, claiming there is evidence Iraq conspired with al-Qaeda on the 9/11 attacks. [CBS NEWS, 9/5/2002] One of the key pieces of evidence cited is an article in a small town Iraqi newspaper written by Naeem Abd Muhalhal on July 21, 2001. He describes bin Laden thinking “seriously, with the seriousness of the Bedouin of the desert, about the way he will try to bomb the Pentagon after he destroys the White House.” He adds that bin Laden is “insisting very convincingly that he will strike America on the arm that is already hurting,” which has been interpreted as a possible reference to the 1993 bombing of the WTC. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein apparently praised this writer on September 1, 2001. The lawsuit is based largely on the idea that “Iraqi officials were aware of plans to attack American landmarks,” yet did not warn their archenemy, the US. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/4/2002] Former CIA agent and terrorism consultant Robert Baer is hired by the prosecuting legal team to find evidence of a meeting between Mohamed Atta and Iraqi agents on April 8, 2001, but despite the help of the CIA, he is unable find any evidence of such a meeting. [CBS NEWS, 9/5/2002] Entity Tags: Robert Baer Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links, 9/11 Related Lawsuits

September 5, 2002: Senator Decries Lack of Government Cooperation in 9/11 Congressional Inquiry Richard Shelby of Alabama, the ranking Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee, expresses doubts that the committee’s 9/11 Congressional Inquiry will be able to accomplish anything, and he supports an independent investigation. “Time is not on our side,” he says, since the investigation has a built-in deadline at the end of 2002. “You know, we were told that there would be cooperation in this investigation, and I question that. I think that most of the information that our staff has been able to get that is real meaningful has had to be extracted piece by piece.” He adds that there is explosive information that has not been publicly released. “I think there are some more bombs out there… I know that.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/10/2002] Entity Tags: Richard Shelby, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry

September 5, 2002: French Believe Moussaoui Was Prepared for Second Wave of Attacks Based on the recent interrogations of al-Qaeda operative Zacarias Moussaoui’s al-Qaeda associates, including his alleged handler, French intelligence believes Moussaoui was not part of the 9/11 attacks, but was being readied for a second wave of attacks. Says one French official: “Moussaoui was going to be a foot soldier in a second wave of attacks that was supposed to culminate in early 2002 with simultaneous bombings against US embassies in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, as well as several hijackings in the United States.” However, the US has charged him with being the “20th hijacker” who planned to be on Flight 77 in the 9/11 attack. [ABC NEWS, 9/5/2002] Entity Tags: France, Zacarias Moussaoui Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

September 6, 2002: Cheney ‘Hell-bent for Action’ against Iraq During a meeting at Camp David held with most principal cabinet members but without President Bush, Vice President Cheney argues against asking for a new UN resolution authorizing force against Iraq. Secretary of State Colin Powell argues in favor of getting a new UN resolution. Journalist Bob Woodward, who later has access to some of the participants in the meeting, will comment, “Cheney was beyond hell-bent for action against Saddam. It was as if nothing else existed.” [WOODWARD, 2002, PP. 245-346] Entity Tags: Bob Woodward, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Colin Powell Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links, Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism

September 6, 2002: Al-Qaeda Figure with Ties to Rich Saudis Is Declared Terrorist Financier, but to Little Effect

Wael Hamza Julaidan. [Source: Public domain, via Evan Kohlmmann] The US and United Nations designate Wael Hamza Julaidan a terrorist financier and freezes the funds of the Rabita Trust. Julaidan worked with bin Laden’s mentor Abdullah Azzam in the Muslim World League in Pakistan in the 1980s and was one of the founders of al-Qaeda in 1988 (see August 11-20, 1988). [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 12/15/2003] Julaidan’s name was on the “Golden Chain” list of early al-Qaeda funders (see 1988-1989), serving as an intermediary between bin Laden and Saudi multimillionaires. Beginning in 2000, he became director general of the Rabita Trust, a Pakistani charity which the UN determined has been funding al-Qaeda. The US froze the bank accounts of the Rabita Trust shortly after 9/11 due to suspected terrorist links, but the organization changed its name and continued to operate (see Mid-September-October 12, 2001). Julaidan is considered highly connected in Saudi Arabia and even though the Saudi government officially goes along with the terrorist designations of Julaidan and the Rabita Trust, some top Saudi officials publicly defend him. For instance, Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nawaf bin Abdul Aziz publicly suggests that Julaidan is innocent. Julaidan is not arrested and the Saudi government offers no proof that they seized any of his or Rabita’s bank accounts. In December 2003, the Washington Post will report that US and UN officials believe Julaidan continues to work with charity fronts and handles large sums of money. [WASHINGTON POST, 12/14/2003; BURR AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 100-101] Entity Tags: Wael Hamza Julaidan, Osama bin Laden, Muslim World League, Nawaf bin Abdul Aziz, Abdullah Azzam, Al-Qaeda, Rabita Trust Category Tags: Saudi Arabia, Terrorism Financing

September 8-11, 2002: Interview with Al-Qaeda Leaders Is Broadcast

Abdulaziz Alomari filmed speaking in Afghanistan in early 2001. He stands in front of a large map of the world. [Source: Spiegel TV] Details of an Al Jazeera interview with al-Qaeda leaders Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) and Ramzi bin al-Shibh (see April, June, or August 2002) are widely publicized. [LONDON TIMES, 9/8/2002; AUSTRALIAN, 9/9/2002; GUARDIAN, 9/9/2002] But there are numerous doubts about this interview, since there is no video footage and only audio footage from bin al-Shibh. It has further been suggested that the broadcast of bin al-Shibh’s voice in the interview helps in his capture a few days later (see September 11, 2002). [OBSERVER, 9/15/2002; CBS NEWS, 10/9/2002] Al Jazeera also broadcasts footage of hijacker Abdulaziz Alomari speaking against the US filmed in Afghanistan in early 2001 and other footage of some other hijackers (see September 9, 2002). [FINANCIAL TIMES, 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: Al Jazeera, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Abdulaziz Alomari, Ramzi bin al-Shibh Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

September 9, 2002: New Video Footage of 911 Hijackers Shown; New Audio of Bin Laden Praising Them

The top picture is of Waleed Alshehri. The bottom two pictures are said to be of hijackers planning the 9/11 attacks, but no faces are shown to help confirm this. [Source: Spiegel TV] Al Jazeera television broadcasts video footage in which bin Laden appears to take credit for the 9/11 attacks. Some of the video footage shows some 9/11 hijackers, including Ahmed Alnami, Hamza Alghamdi, Saeed Alghamdi, Waleed Alshehri, and Wail Alshehri, talking with each other and studying maps and flight manuals. At one point, hands are shown over maps of the US and the Pentagon, but no faces are shown. Al Jazeera says the video was filmed in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in early 2001. Additional footage has bin Laden hailing the hijackers as heroes, but there is no video footage of him saying this, only his voice over still photographs of the hijackers. The Financial Times will report, “But analysts cited the crude editing of the tapes and the timing of the broadcasts as reasons to be suspicious about their authenticity. The skepticism was deepened by Al Jazeera’s silence yesterday about how it had obtained the videos.” [FINANCIAL TIMES, 9/11/2002] Al Jazeera shows an interview of al-Qaeda leaders Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed around the same time (see September 8-11, 2002). Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Hamza Alghamdi, Saeed Alghamdi, Wail Alshehri, Ahmed Alnami, Waleed M. Alshehri Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, Osama Bin Laden, FBI 9/11 Investigation, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

September 9, 2002: FBI Translator and Air Force Major, Both the Targets of Federal Investigations, Leave Country with Government Approval FBI translator Melek Can Dickerson and her husband Douglas Dickerson leave the country. Douglas, a US Air Force major who procures weapons from the US for various Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries, has been reassigned to Belgium to work on a NATO-related assignment. [ANTI-WAR (.COM), 7/1/2004; VANITY FAIR, 9/2005] The Dickersons had been recently subpoenaed in Sibel Edmonds’ lawsuit against the FBI (see June 2002) and are the subject of three separate investigations: one by the Air Force Office of Special Investigation, one by the Justice Department, and the third by the Senate Judiciary Committee. [ANTI-WAR (.COM), 8/22/2005] The FBI, under court order not to allow the couple to leave the country, requires that Douglas Dickerson swear under oath that he will return if requested by the court. [ANTI-WAR (.COM), 7/1/2004; VANITY FAIR, 9/2005] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Melek Can Dickerson, Douglas Dickerson Category Tags: Sibel Edmonds

September 10, 2002: Port Authority Sued by Victims’ Relatives and Insurance Companies for 9/11-Related Failures Right before the expiration of a one-year legal deadline, the Port Authority, the government body that owns the WTC complex, is sued by five insurance companies, one utility and 700 relatives of the WTC victims. The insurance companies and utility are suing because of safety violations connected to the installation of diesel fuel tanks in 1999 that many blame for the collapse of WTC Building 7. [DOW JONES BUSINESS NEWS, 9/10/2002] The relatives’ lawsuit is much more encompassing, and even blames the Port Authority for the Flight 93 hijacking (the Port Authority owns Newark airport, where the flight originated). The relatives’ lawsuit is likely to lie dormant for at least six months as evidence is collected. Relatives are also considering suing the airlines, security companies, and other entities. [NEWSWEEK, 9/13/2002] Entity Tags: New York Port Authority, World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Related Lawsuits

September 10, 2002: 10 of Al-Qaeda’s 24 Pre-9/11 Leaders Said to Be Killed or Captured

Fahid Muhammad Ally Msalam. [Source: FBI] The New York Times reports that 10 out of the 24 al-Qaeda leaders considered most important by the CIA before 9/11 have been killed or captured. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/10/2002] The four most important figures considered still at large are: Osama bin Laden (Saudi). Ayman al-Zawahiri (Egyptian). Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (Kuwaiti/Pakistani). He will be captured in 2003 (see March 1, 2003). Saif al-Adel (Egyptian). Other figures considered still at large are: Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah (Egyptian). Mustafa Muhammad Fadhil (Egyptian). Mushin Musa Matwalli Atwah (Egyptian). He will be killed in 2006 (see April 12, 2006). Fahid Muhammad Ally Msalam (Kenyan). Fazul Abdullah Mohammed (a.k.a. Haroun Fazul) (Comoros Islander). Mahfouz Walad Al-Walid (a.k.a. Abu Hafs the Mauritanian) (Mauritanian). Amin ul-Haq (Afghan). Midhat Mursi (Egyptian). Anas al-Liby (Libyan). He may have been secretly captured already (see January 20, 2002- March 20, 2002). Suliman abu Ghaith (Kuwaiti). Saad bin Laden (Saudi). Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi (Saudi). He will be captured in 2003 (see March 1, 2003). [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/10/2002] The four leaders captured are: Abu Zubaida (Palestinian) (see March 28, 2002). Abdul Rahim al-Sharqawi (Yemeni) (see January 2002). Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi (Libyan) (see December 19, 2001). Abu Zubair al-Haili (Saudi) (see June 8, 2002 and After). [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/10/2002] Five of the six leaders believed killed are: Mohammed Atef (Egyptian) (see November 15, 2001). Abu Jaffa (a.k.a. Abu Jafar al-Jaziri) (Algerian). Abu Salah al-Yemeni (Yemeni). Tariq Anwar al-Sayyid Ahmad (Egyptian). Muhammad Salah (a.k.a. Nasr Fahmi Nasr Hasanayn) (Egyptian). [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/10/2002] The sixth leader believed killed is not named. One year after 9/11, US intelligence identifies 20 current high-ranking al-Qaeda leaders, though it is not mentioned who the six new leaders are who replaced some of the killed or captured leaders. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/10/2002] This list of leaders, while instructive, is curiously incomplete because it fails to mention al-Qaeda leaders known as important to US intelligence before 9/11, such as Hambali, Khallad bin Attash, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Thirwat Salah Shehata, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, and Mohammed Jamal Khalifa. Entity Tags: Muhammad Salah, Mohammed Atef, Midhat Mursi, Mushin Musa Matwalli Atwah, Saif al-Adel, Saad bin Laden, Osama bin Laden, Suliman abu Ghaith, Mahfouz Walad Al-Walid, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Abu Jaffa, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, Abdul Rahim al-Sharqawi, Abu Salah al-Yemeni, Abu Zubaida, Abu Zubair al-Haili, Anas al-Liby, Fahid Muhammad Ally Msalam, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, Amin ul-Haq, Al-Qaeda Category Tags: Key Captures and Deaths, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

September 10, 2002: Future 9/11 Commission Executive Director Says ‘Real Threat’ of Iraqi WMDs Is to Israel In remarks made at a foreign policy conference at the University of Virginia, Philip Zelikow says that Iraq is more of a threat to Israel than to the US and that protecting Israel would be a major motive for a US-Iraq war. Zelikow’s speech goes unreported at the time but will come to light in a 2004 article. Zelikow says: “Why would Iraq attack America or use nuclear weapons against us? I’ll tell you what I think the real threat (is) and actually has been since 1990—it’s the threat against Israel.… And this is the threat that dare not speak its name, because the Europeans don’t care deeply about that threat, I will tell you frankly. And the American government doesn’t want to lean too hard on it rhetorically, because it is not a popular sell.” Zelikow is at the time a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), and will later serve as the executive director to the 9/11 Commission. [ASIA TIMES ONLINE, 3/31/2004] John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt will later use Zelikow’s statement in their controversial paper “The Israel Lobby” as evidence that the Iraq War was launched in part to advance Israel’s security. [LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS, 3/23/2006; LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS, 4/25/2006; LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS, 4/25/2006] Entity Tags: John Mearsheimer, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), Stephen Walt, Philip Zelikow Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow

September 10, 2002: Threat Level Raised to Orange for First 9/11 Anniversary The government raises the National Alert Level to orange, the second highest level possible. This is the first time such an alert has been raised since 9/11. The government temporarily closes for public business about two dozen US diplomatic posts worldwide. Officials say there is no specific known threat against targets in the US. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/10/2002] President Bush personally makes the announcement while Vice President Cheney flees to a “secure location.” Attorney General John Ashcroft warns that the threat targets “transportation and energy sectors.” No specific details on the nature or targets of the threat are supplied. The heightened terror alert coincides with the president’s address to the nation from Ellis Island on the first anniversary of 9/11 (see September 11, 2002 and Before). [ROLLING STONE, 9/21/2006 ] Entity Tags: John Ashcroft, George W. Bush, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney Category Tags: Terror Alerts, Internal US Security After 9/11

September 10, 2002: US Says 2,700 Al-Qaeda Operatives Captured since 9/11 US officials claim that approximately 2,700 known or suspected al-Qaeda operatives have been captured around the world in the year since 9/11. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/10/2002] However, what this means exactly is unclear. It is estimated that there were only about 1,000 al-Qaeda operatives at the time of 9/11, although many more people passed through al-Qaeda training camps (see Just Before September 11, 2001). Furthermore, a later investigation will suggest that only one or two dozen of the many hundreds of prisoners sent to Guantanamo prison have any significant al-Qaeda links (see June 21, 2004). Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, US intelligence Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

September 10, 2002-June 2003: Germans Begin, Then Cancel, Investigation into Company with Ties to Hamburg Cell and Syrian Intelligence

Tatex logo. [Source: Tatex] On September 10, 2002, German police raid the Tatex Trading company, a small textile business located just outside of Hamburg. According to Newsweek, German authorities has been “keeping a close watch on the company… for years.” Germans begin preparing a case against the company and the US prepares to freeze the company’s assets. But by June 2003, the investigation is closed and no action is taken by the US or Germany. Newsweek will claim that “Some US and German officials suggest that both countries decided not to proceed with legal action against Tatex to avoid antagonizing the government of Syria.” [DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR (HAMBURG), 9/7/2003; NEWSWEEK, 1/18/2004] The New Yorker will claim “Tatex was infiltrated by Syrian intelligence in the eighties; one of its shareholders was Mohammed Majed Said, who ran the Syrian intelligence directorate from 1987 to 1994.” [NEW YORKER, 7/18/2003] Some believe the Syrians infiltrated the company to spy on extremist Syrian exiles in Hamburg, while others believe Syrians were using the company as a front to illegally acquire high-tech equipment from the West. It is claimed that the investigation into Tatex is dropped because Syria has been cooperative with Germany and the US in other areas. [NEWSWEEK, 1/18/2004] Abdul-Matin Tatari, the Syrian in charge of Tatex, admits that his company had employed Mohammed Haydar Zammar and Mamoun Darkazanli, both of whom have been tied to the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell. Further, the Chicago Tribune claims, “Investigators also say Mohamed Atta himself worked for a time at Tatex, something Tatari vehemently denies. But Tatari admits that one of his sons signed Atta’s petition to establish an Islamic ‘study group’ at Hamburg’s Technical University that served as a rendezvous for the hijackers and their supporters.” Tatari’s son took trips with Mounir El Motassadeq, who also has been tied to the Hamburg cell. Tatari, Zammar, Darkazanli, and Atta all are believed to be members of the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, a secret society banned in Egypt. [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 11/1/2002] Entity Tags: Tatex Trading company, Mohammed Majed Said, Mounir El Motassadeq, Mamoun Darkazanli, Germany, Abdul-Matin Tatari, Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammed Haydar Zammar Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Al-Qaeda in Germany, Mamoun Darkazanli

September 11, 2002: Story of President Bush’s 9/11 Conduct Changes for 9/11 Anniversary On the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the story of what President Bush did on that day is significantly rewritten. In actual fact, when Chief of Staff Andrew Card told Bush about the second plane crash into the WTC, Bush continued to sit in a Florida elementary school classroom and hear a story about a pet goat for at least seven more minutes (see (9:06 a.m.-9:16 a.m.) September 11, 2001; (9:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001), as video footage later broadcast in the 2004 movie Fahrenheit 9/11 shows. But one year later, Card claims that after he told Bush about the second WTC crash, “it was only a matter of seconds” before Bush “excused himself very politely to the teacher and to the students, and he left the Florida classroom.” [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 9/11/2002] In a different account, Card says, “Not that many seconds later the president excused himself from the classroom.” [NEWSWEEK, 9/9/2002] An interview with the classroom teacher claims that Bush left the class even before the second WTC crash: “The president bolted right out of here and told me: ‘Take over.’” When the second WTC crash occurred, she claims her students are watching television in a nearby media room. [NEW YORK POST, 9/12/2002] Entity Tags: Andrew Card, World Trade Center, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, Domestic Propaganda Category Tags: Media

September 11, 2002: One Year After 9/11, Details of Plot Are Still Very Mysterious On the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the New York Times writes, “One year later, the public knows less about the circumstances of 2,801 deaths at the foot of Manhattan in broad daylight than people in 1912 knew within weeks about the Titanic, which sank in the middle of an ocean in the dead of night.” John F. Timoney, the former police commissioner of Philadelphia, says: “You can hardly point to a cataclysmic event in our history, whether it was the sinking of the Titanic, the Pearl Harbor attack, [or] the Kennedy assassination, when a blue-ribbon panel did not set out to establish the facts and, where appropriate, suggest reforms. That has not happened here.” The Times specifically points to a failure by New York City Mayor Bloomberg to conduct a real investigation into the WTC attack response. Bloomberg stated in August 2002, “Every single major event is different from all others. The training of how you would respond to the last incident is not really important.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/11/2002] The Chicago Tribune made similar comments a week earlier, pointing out that despite the “largest investigation in history,” “Americans know little more today about the September 11 conspiracy, or the conspirators, than they did within a few weeks of the attacks.” [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 9/5/2002] Entity Tags: John F. Timoney Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Investigations

September 11, 2002: Saudi Government Falsely Announces It Will Start Overseeing Saudi Charities

Stuart Levey. [Source: US Treasury Department] On the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the Saudi government announces that it is setting up a supervisory body to control Islamic charities accused of financing terrorism. The US government had been strongly pressuring them to do so. Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdul-Aziz states, “We have established the Saudi Higher Authority for Relief and Charity Work… so all relief and charity work comes under its umbrella.” He says this will help “ensure the aid goes to the right people and for the right purposes,” adding, “We are also creating accurate systems and means… to guarantee a continuous followup of charities.” [AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 9/11/2002] However, no such body is actually created, then or later. In July 2007, Stuart Levey, the top counterterrorism official at the Treasury Department, will say the Saudi government has failed to keep its promise to create such a body. “They are also not holding people responsible for sending money abroad for jihad. It just doesn’t happen.” The White House will respond with a generic statement saying that “the Saudis continue to be a strong partner in the War on Terror.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 7/26/2007] Entity Tags: Stuart Levey, Nayef bin Abdul-Aziz, Saudi Arabia, US Department of the Treasury Category Tags: Saudi Arabia, Terrorism Financing

September 11, 2002: 9/11 Planner Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Captured in Pakistan; KSM Possibly Captured or Killed as Well

Ramzi bin al-Shibh arrested in Pakistan. [Source: Associated Press] Would-be hijacker Ramzi bin al-Shibh is arrested after a huge gunfight in Karachi, Pakistan, involving thousands of police. [OBSERVER, 9/15/2002] He is considered “a high-ranking operative for al-Qaeda and one of the few people still alive who know the inside details of the 9/11 plot.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2002] Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) called bin al-Shibh “the coordinator of the Holy Tuesday [9/11] operation” in an interview aired days before. Captured with him are approximately nine associates, as well as numerous computers, phones, and other evidence. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2002; TIME, 9/15/2002] There are conflicting claims that either Mohammed is killed in the raid [ASIA TIMES, 10/30/2002; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 3/4/2003; ASIA TIMES, 3/6/2003] ; shot while escaping [AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 3/2/2003] ; someone who looks like him is killed, leading to initial misidentification [TIME, 1/20/2003] ; someone matching his general appearance is captured [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/16/2002] ; or that he narrowly escapes capture but his young children are captured. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 12/22/2002] Entity Tags: Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Key Captures and Deaths, High Value Detainees

September 12, 2002: Major Paper First to Give Room for 9/11 Skeptics For the first time, a mainstream US newspaper looks at the people who believe there was government complicity or criminal incompetence in 9/11 and does not immediately dismiss them. The San Francisco Examiner quotes a number of 9/11 skeptics and lets them speak for themselves. “While different theorists focus on different aspects of the attacks, what they seem to have in common is they would like an independent investigation into 9/11.” [SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, 9/12/2002] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Media, US Government and 9/11 Criticism

Shortly After September 11, 2002: Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Allegedly Not Waterboarded In 2002 and 2003, many of the highest-ranking al-Qaeda detainees are subjected to waterboarding and other forms of interrogation generally considered to be torture (see May 2002-2003). However, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, captured in Pakistan in September 2002 and sent to a secret CIA prison (see September 11, 2002), is not waterboarded. NBC News will later claim that he agreed to talk with just the threat of waterboarding. “Bin al-Shibh was viewed as a weakling and a narcissist and the agency played heavily on that. He quickly became the most cooperative of those detained…” However, by the time bin al-Shbih is charged before a military tribunal in 2007, he once again is refusing to talk (see March 9-April 28, 2007). [MSNBC, 9/13/2007] It is unknown what other interrogation techniques may have been used on him. In contradiction to the allegation that bin al-Shibh broke easily by the mere threat of torture, it will later be reported that in late 2002, he was secretly transfered to Jordanian custody for a time so he could be tortured by the Jordanian government (see Late 2002). Entity Tags: Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

After September 11, 2002: KSM’s Children Said to Be Tortured Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s (KSM’s) children, who were captured in a September 2002 raid on a house KSM used (see September 11, 2002), are allegedly tortured following their capture. A statement that they are tortured is made in a submission to a Guantanamo Bay hearing to determine the status of a detainee called Majid Khan. The submission is made by Khan’s father, based on information from another of his sons. It reads: “The Pakistani guards told my son that the boys were kept in a separate area upstairs and were denied food and water by other guards. They were also mentally tortured by having ants or other creatures put on their legs to scare them and get them to say where their father was hiding.” [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 4/15/2007 ] Human Rights Watch, based on eyewitness accounts, says that KSM’s children are held in an adult detention center (see June 7, 2007), and KSM also says that his children are abused in US custody (see March 10-April 15, 2007). [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 3/10/2007 ; REUTERS, 6/7/2007] Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Majid Khan, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

September 12-16, 2002: Majority of Americans Believe Hussein Involved in 9/11, Has Connections to al-Qaeda A CBS news poll concludes that 51 percent of Americans think that Saddam Hussein “was personally involved in the Sept. 11 attacks” and “70 percent believe that members of al-Qaeda are currently in Iraq.” [CBS NEWS, 9/24/2002] Entity Tags: CBS News, Saddam Hussein Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

September 13, 2002: FBI Arrests and Charges Alleged Al-Qaeda Sleeper Cell, the ‘Lackawanna Six’ The FBI arrests six US citizens with a Yemeni background, on information provided by the CIA: Sahim Alwan, Mukhtar al-Bakri, Faysal Galab, Yahya Goba, Shafel Mosed and Yaseinn Taher. Five are arrested in their hometown Lackawanna, a suburb of Buffalo, New York. The sixth, who is connected to the other five, is arrested in Bahrain and then transferred to the US. [CBS NEWS, 11/9/2002] They are hereafter nicknamed “the Lackawanna Six.” They reportedly traveled to Afghanistan in April and May 2001 to join in Islamic jihad and receive military training at the Al Farooq training camp run by al-Qaeda (see April-August 2001). They also allegedly met with Osama bin Laden (see (June 2001)). They are believed to have been encouraged to go to Afghanistan by two American veteran mujaheddin, Juma al-Dosari and Kamal Derwish, who fought in the war in Bosnia and who visited Lackawanna in early 2001. [WASHINGTON POST, 7/29/2003] One month later, a federal jury indicts the Lackawanna Six on two counts of providing material support to terrorism. They are charged with supporting terrorism. If found guilty, they could face up to 15 years in prison. All of them plead not guilty. [CBS NEWS, 10/22/2002] Entity Tags: Yahya Goba, Yaseinn Taher, Shafel Mosed, Sahim Alwan, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Kamal Derwish, Faysal Galab, Mukhtar al-Bakri, Juma al-Dosari Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: "Lackawanna Six", Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Internal US Security After 9/11

September 15, 2002: Rice Says Hussein Has Clear Links to Al-Qaeda In response to Tony Snow’s probing on Fox News Sunday as to whether or not President Bush was convinced there were links between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice is circumspect until she’s pressed. “He clearly has links to terrorism…—Links to terrorism [that] would include al-Qaeda….” [FOX NEWS, 9/15/2002; ISLAM ONLINE, 9/15/2002; CNN, 9/26/2002; US HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, 3/16/2004] Entity Tags: Tony Snow, George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

Mid-September 2002: US and Australian Intelligence Learn Indonesian Military Likely behind False Flag Attack on US Teachers; No Action or Warnings Result On August 31, 2002, a group mostly made up of American teachers near a mine owned by the US company Freeport-McMoRan are ambushed in the jungles of the Indonesian province of Papua; 3 teachers are killed and 12 injured (see August 31, 2002). According to a Washington Post article published on November 2, 2002, a US intelligence report two weeks later strongly suggests the Indonesian military is behind the killings. According to a US official and another US source, shortly before the ambush, a discussion involving the top ranks of Indonesia’s military (the TNI) take place. Influential commander-in-chief Endriartono Sutarto is involved. Sutarto and the other military leaders discuss discrediting a Papuan separatist group, the Free Papua Movement (OPM). This information is based on a “highly reliable” source said to be knowledgeable about the high-level military conversations, as well as communications intercepts by the Australian government. The discussions do not detail a specific attack nor do they call explicitly for the killing of foreigners, but they clearly target the Freeport company. Subordinates could understand the discussions as an implicit command to take violent action against Freeport. The report suggest the Indonesian military may have wanted to blame an attack on the OPM in order to prod the US to declare the OPM a terrorist group. FBI Reaches Similar Conclusions - In early October, the FBI briefs State Department and US embassy officials in Indonesia and reveal that their investigation indicates the Indonesian military was behind the ambush, although the determination is not conclusive. Later Reactions in US - Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt) will later say, “It should surprise no one that the Indonesian army may have been involved in this atrocity. It has a long history of human rights violations and obstruction of justice. The fact that the perpetrators apparently believed they could murder Americans without fear of being punished illustrates the extent of the impunity.” Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz will say he is concerned about the allegations, but suggests the US should nonetheless reestablish ties with the Indonesian military, which had been suspended due to human rights violations. The Indonesian military will later deny any involvement in the killings. [WASHINGTON POST, 11/3/2002] Indonesian Police also Blame Military - However, the Washington Post also reports around the same time that the Indonesian police have concluded in a secret report that the Indonesian military is responsible. They blame Kopassus, the military’s special forces unit, for carrying out the ambush. [WASHINGTON POST, 10/27/2002] No Warnings before Bali Bombings - But neither the US nor Australian governments give any kind of public warning that the Indonesian military could be targeting and killing Westerners, and no known action is taken against the Indonesian government. On October 12, 2002, over 200 people, mostly Westerners, will be killed in bombings on the island of Bali (see October 12, 2002). While the al-Qaeda affiliate group Jemaah Islamiyah will be blamed for the bombings, a retired Indonesian military officer will allegedly confess to having a role but not be charged (see October 16, 2002), and several top Indonesian military generals will also be suspected in media reports (see October 28, 2002). Entity Tags: Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Freeport-McMoRan, Free Papua Movement, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Endriartono Sutarto, Kopassus, Paul Wolfowitz, US intelligence, US Department of State, Patrick J. Leahy Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, 2002 Bali Bombings, Indonesian Militant Collusion

September 16, 2002: Defense Department Briefing to White House Officials Incorrectly Alleges Deep Ties between Iraq and Al-Qaeda Two days before the CIA is to issue an assessment (see August 2002) on Iraq’s supposed links to militant Islamic groups, Defense Department officials working in the Office of Special Plans (OSP) deliver a briefing in the White House to several top officials, including I. Lewis Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief of staff, and Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley. The briefing is entitled “Assessing the Relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda,” and is an updated version of a briefing presented in July 2002 (see July 25, 2002). The OSP, working under Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith, is aggressively promoting any evidence it can find to support a decision to invade Iraq (see September 2002). The briefing claims that the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda is “mature” and “symbiotic,” and marked by shared interests. It lists cooperation in 10 categories, or “multiple areas of cooperation,” including training, financing, and logistics. [SAVAGE, 2007, PP. 292; NEW YORK TIMES, 4/6/2007; WASHINGTON POST, 4/6/2007] An alleged 2001 meeting in Prague between an Iraqi spy and 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta is listed as one of eight “Known Iraq-Al-Qaeda Contacts.” It claims that there is a “known contact” between Atta and the Iraqi intelligence agency, a claim already rejected by the CIA. [SAVAGE, 2007, PP. 293; WASHINGTON POST, 4/6/2007] The briefing claims that “Fragmentary reporting points to possible Iraqi involvement not only in 9/11 but also in previous al-Qaeda attacks.” [WASHINGTON POST, 4/6/2007] It includes a slide criticizing the rest of the US intelligence community, which says there are “fundamental problems” with CIA intelligence gathering methods. It claims other intelligence agencies assume “that secularists and Islamists will not cooperate, even when they have common interests,” and there is a “consistent underestimation of importance that would be attached by Iraq and al-Qaeda to hiding a relationship.” [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 7/11/2004; NEWSWEEK, 7/19/2004; SAVAGE, 2007, PP. 293; WASHINGTON POST, 4/6/2007] Around the same time, the briefing is also presented with slight variations to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and CIA Director George Tenet. The slide criticizing other intelligence agencies is excluded when a version of the briefing is given to Tenet. A later report by the Defense Department’s Office of Inspector General will conclude the briefing was entirely incorrect and deliberately ignored intelligence by the CIA, DIA, and other intelligence agencies that contradicted its conclusions (see February 9, 2007). [WASHINGTON POST, 4/6/2007] The CIA has already found the majority of the information in the presentation either completely false or largely unsupported by reliable evidence. [SAVAGE, 2007, PP. 293] Unusual Briefing - This briefing, delivered at the same time the White House is pressing Congress to authorize the upcoming war with Iraq (see October 11, 2002), is, in the words of author and reporter Charlie Savage, “highly unusual.” Usually, high-level administration officials making national security decisions rely on information vetted by top-flight analysts at the CIA, in order to ensure the information is as accurate and politically neutral as possible. No CIA analyst has ever found a meaningful link between Hussein and al-Qaeda; the few reports of such claims were seen as highly dubious. But Cheney and his supporters consider the CIA slow, pedantic, and incompetent, and believe Feith’s OSP can provide better—or at least more amenable—intelligence. Savage will write: “In Feith’s shop and elsewhere in the executive branch, neoconservative political appointees stitched together raw intelligence reports, often of dubious credibility, without any vetting or analysis by professional intelligence specialists. The officials cherry-picked the files for reports that supported the notion that Iraq had an active [WMD] program and that it was working hand-in-hand with al-Qaeda, ‘stovepiping’ such reports to top decision makers (and leaking them to the press) while discounting any skepticism mounted by the professionals.” [SAVAGE, 2007, PP. 292] Dismantling Intelligence Filtering System in Favor of Politically Controlled Intelligence Provisions - What the presentation accomplishes, according to former CIA intelligence analyst Kenneth Pollock, is to support a conclusion already drawn—the need to get rid of Saddam Hussein—by using slanted, altered, and sometimes entirely fabricated “intelligence.” The White House proceeded to “dismantle the existing filtering process that for 50 years had been preventing the policymakers from getting bad information.” Savage goes one step farther. He will write that the presentation is part of a larger White House strategy to alter the balance of power between the presidency and a key element of the bureaucracy. By setting up a politically controlled alternative intelligence filtering system, he will write, “the administration succeeded in diminishing the power of the CIA’s information bureaucracy to check the White House’s desired course of action.” [SAVAGE, 2007, PP. 294] Entity Tags: Office of Special Plans, Stephen J. Hadley, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Kenneth Pollock, Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby, Douglas Feith, Charlie Savage, George J. Tenet, Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

September 16, 2002: US Allegedly Pressures Indonesia to Rendition Accused Spiritual Leader of Al-Qaeda-Linked Group US officials hold a secret meeting with Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri and strongly urge her to allow the US to rendition Abu Bakar Bashir out of the country. Bashir is a radical Islamist imam alleged to be the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), al-Qaeda’s main Southeast Asian affiliate. US ambassador to Indonesia Ralph Boyce, National Security Council official Karen Brooks, and a CIA official meet with Megawati at her home in Jakarta. The interpreter is an American named Fred Burks, who will later reveal details of the meeting during an Indonesian trial. Burks claims the CIA official tells Megawati that Bashir was responsible for a series of Christmas Eve bombings in Indonesia in 2000 and asks to rendition him. Megawati had allowed the US to rendition two suspects earlier in the year, Omar al-Faruq and Muhammad Saad Iqbal Madni (see June 5, 2002 and Early January-January 9, 2002). But neither of them are Indonesian citizens, whereas Bashir is. Megawati rejects the request, saying Bashir is too popular to simply disappear without repercussions. (Megawati’s Vice President Hamzah Haz describes himself as “very close” to Bashir, and shortly after this meeting he says publicly, “If you want to arrest Abu Bakar Bashir, you will have to deal with me first” (see July 23, 2001-October 20, 2004).) Burks claims that Megawati says: “I can’t render somebody like him. People will find out.” Boyce will later claim that the US did press forcefully for Indonesia to arrest Bashir because the CIA had just learned from interrogating al-Faruq that Bashir was the head of a terrorist network that was about to attack Indonesia. However, he will deny the US wanted to rendition him. Boyce will later call the meeting the centerpiece of a month-long series of meetings with Indonesian officials in an attempt to prevent a terrorist attack in Indonesia. [BBC, 1/3/2005; BOSTON GLOBE, 3/2/2005] However, the Bali bombings take place one month later, killing over 200 (see October 12, 2002). In 2005, Bashir will be acquitted of charges that he was involved in any terrorist acts and set free after serving a year in prison on minor charges (see March 3, 2005). Entity Tags: Megawati Sukarnoputri, Fred Burks, Central Intelligence Agency, Abu Bakar Bashir, Hamzah Haz, Karen Brooks, Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni, Omar al-Faruq, Jemaah Islamiyah, Ralph Boyce Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, 2002 Bali Bombings, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

September 17, 2002: Tie Between 9/11 Arrest and Bin Laden Family Members CBS reports that in the days after the arrest of Ramzi bin al-Shibh (see September 11, 2002) and four other al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan on September 11, 2002, “a search of the home of the five al-Qaeda suspects turned up passports belonging to members of the family of Osama bin Laden.” No more details, such as which family members, or why bin al-Shibh’s group had these passports, is given. [CBS NEWS, 9/17/2002] Entity Tags: Bin Laden Family, Al-Qaeda Category Tags: Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden Family

September 18, 2002: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry Holds Public Hearing Amidst Protests about Lack of Government Cooperation

Eleanor Hill. [Source: Reuters] The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry holds its first public hearing. The inquiry was formed in February 2002, but suffered months of delays. The day’s testimony focuses on intelligence warnings that should have led the government to believe airplanes could be used as bombs. [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] However, the Washington Post reports, “lawmakers from both parties… [protest] the Bush administration’s lack of cooperation in the congressional inquiry into September 11 intelligence failures and [threaten] to renew efforts to establish an independent commission.” Eleanor Hill, the joint committee’s staff director, testifies that, “According to [CIA Director Tenet], the president’s knowledge of intelligence information relevant to this inquiry remains classified even when the substance of that intelligence information has been declassified.” She adds that “the American public has a compelling interest in this information and that public disclosure would not harm national security.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/19/2002] Furthermore, the committee believes that “a particular al-Qaeda leader may have been instrumental in the attacks” and US intelligence has known about this person since 1995. Tenet “has declined to declassify the information we developed [about this person] on the grounds that it could compromise intelligence sources and methods and that this consideration supersedes the American public’s interest in this particular area.” [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] A few days later, the New York Times reveals this leader to be Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/22/2002] An FBI spokesman says the FBI had offered “full cooperation” to the committee. A CIA official denies that the report is damning: “The committee acknowledges the hard work done by intelligence community, the successes it achieved…” [MSNBC, 9/18/2002] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Eleanor Hill, Bush administration, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Central Intelligence Agency, George J. Tenet Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry

September 18, 2002: 9/11 Victims’ Relatives Raise Questions about US Agencies’ Conduct

Kristen Breitweiser. [Source: Hyungwon Kang/ Reuters] Two 9/11 victims’ relatives testify before the Congressional 9/11 inquiry. Kristen Breitweiser, whose husband Ronald died at the WTC, asks how the FBI was so quickly able to assemble information on the hijackers. She cites a New York Times article stating that agents descended on flight schools within hours of the attacks. “How did the FBI know where to go a few hours after the attacks?” she asks. “Were any of the hijackers already under surveillance?” [MSNBC, 9/18/2002] She adds, “Our intelligence agencies suffered an utter collapse in their duties and responsibilities leading up to and on September 11th. But their negligence does not stand alone. Agencies like the Port Authority, the City of NY, the FAA, the INS, the Secret Service, NORAD, the Air Force, and the airlines also failed our nation that morning.” [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] Stephen Push states, “If the intelligence community had been doing its job, my wife, Lisa Raines, would be alive today.” He cites the government’s failure to place Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi on a terrorist watch list until long after they were photographed meeting with alleged al-Qaeda operatives in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000 and Shortly After). [MSNBC, 9/18/2002] Entity Tags: Stephen Push, Secret Service, New York Port Authority, US Department of the Air Force, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Kristen Breitweiser, Al-Qaeda, Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, City of New York, Lisa Raines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, FBI 9/11 Investigation

September 18, 2002-January 3, 2003: British Learn of Ricin Plot from Suspected Al-Qaeda Operative Tortured in Algeria

Mohammed Meguerba [Source: BBC] The first traces of the alleged ricin plot later uncovered in London in January 2003 (see January 7, 2003) are discovered in the wake of the arrest of an illegal Algerian immigrant. Mohammed Meguerba, later alleged to be the mastermind of the plot, is arrested in north London with various false IDs. An epileptic, Meguerba had entered Britain as an illegal immigrant. He had left his homeland in 1995 and traveled through Europe. He became a waiter in Ireland and married, divorced, remarried and, “by pure chance or cultural void,” said Algerian secret service, “allowed himself to be recruited by fundamentalists” at a Belfast mosque in 2000. Activists in London sent him to training camps in Afghanistan, where Osama bin Laden himself allegedly gave him a mission in Britain and supplied him with documentation and money. [OBSERVER, 4/17/2005] After this training, Meguerba returned to London in March 2002. He went to the Finsbury Park mosque, where he began to work on crude poisons with fellow Algerian Kamal Bourgass. On September 18, 2002, Meguerba is arrested in London during an operation into suspected terrorist fundraising. But he is released on bail after suffering an epileptic fit, and then flees to Algeria. [LONDON TIMES, 5/9/2005] On December 16, 2002, Meguerba is arrested in Algeria by security forces after allegedly being smuggled in by Islamist radicals. On December 28, police begin his interrogation. Within two days, he tells them that he had been working with an al-Qaeda cell in north London and had been helping them produce poisons at a flat. Authorities in Britain receive this information from the Algerian security forces on January 2 or 3. The Algerian intelligence report spurs British authorities into action. As well as information on the poison plot, it contains information on many individuals in Britain who are allegedly engaged in hard-line, violent Islamic radicalism. The report also suggests the existence of a number of terrorist cells in Britain. [OBSERVER, 4/17/2005] Meguerba names Bourgass as ringleader and other Algerians as co-conspirators. [INDEPENDENT, 4/17/2005] Meguerba had been held in a secret detention center for 17 months by the Algerian security service. His relatives are unaware he had been held from December 2002 until he was moved to a prison in Algiers. When they are finally permitted to visit him, Meguerba weighs 77 lbs and claims he has been badly tortured. These claims are backed up another Algerian man, residing in Britain, who was detained in Algiers in January 2003 and placed by his interrogators in a room with Meguerba, whom the man describes as “bruised, cut, and swollen.” Upon his appearance in an Algiers court, Meguerba appears frail and is missing teeth. The confession extracted from Meguerba during this time was the evidence that led to the Wood Green raid. However, during the later trial, the confession is not relied on by the prosecution as the allegations of torture could be raised by the defense. One source says “the Government has introduced the Human Rights Act but finds itself relying on regimes with appalling human rights records for information.” Algerian secret services deny the claims of torture. [LONDON TIMES, 5/9/2005] Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Mohammed Meguerba, Al-Qaeda, Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité, Kamal Bourgass Category Tags: Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism, Algerian Militant Collusion, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

September 20, 2002: Saudi Charity in Bosnia Linked to Al-Qaeda A Bosnian government probe connects the Saudi charity Talibah International Aid Association to the funding of Islamic militant groups and an al-Qaeda front group. Talibah has been under investigation since shortly after 9/11 due to a foiled attack in Bosnia that has been connected to Talibah and al-Qaeda. Abdullah Awad bin Laden, one of bin Laden’s nephews, is a Talibah officer in its Virginia office. An investigation into him was cancelled in September 1996 (see February-September 11, 1996). The US has been criticized for failing to list Talibah as a sponsor of terrorism and for not freezing its assets. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 9/20/2002] Entity Tags: Talibah International Aid Association, Al-Qaeda, Abdullah Awad bin Laden Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Balkans, Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden Family, Terrorism Financing

September 20, 2002: President Bush Changes Course, Backs Creation of 9/11 Commission In the wake of damaging Congressional 9/11 inquiry revelations, President Bush reverses course and backs efforts by many lawmakers to form an independent commission to conduct a broader investigation than the current Congressional inquiry. Newsweek reports that Bush had virtually no choice. “There was a freight train coming down the tracks,” says one White House official. [NEWSWEEK, 9/22/2002] But as one of the 9/11 victim’s relatives says, “It’s carefully crafted to make it look like a general endorsement but it actually says that the commission would look at everything except the intelligence failures.” [CBS NEWS, 9/20/2002] Rather than look into such failures, Bush wants the commission to focus on areas like border security, visa issues, and the “role of Congress” in overseeing intelligence agencies. The White House also refuses to turn over documents showing what Bush knew before 9/11. [NEWSWEEK, 9/22/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry

September 20, 2002: Cheney Alleges ‘Well-Established Pattern of Cooperation between Iraq and Terrorists’ At a political fund-raising event, Vice President Dick Cheney alleges that there is a “well-established pattern of cooperation between Iraq and terrorists.” This comes just four days after a briefing to Cheney’s staff by the Defense Department’s Office of Special Plans, which is aggressively pushing allegations of al-Qaeda-Iraq links (see September 16, 2002). [WASHINGTON POST, 4/6/2007] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Office of Special Plans Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

September 20, 2002: Bush Administration Releases ‘National Security Strategy’ Document Advocating Preemptive War The Bush administration submits to Congress a 31-page document entitled “The National Security Strategy of the United States.” Preemptive War - The National Security Strategy (NSS) openly advocates the necessity for the US to engage in “preemptive war” against nations it believes are likely to become a threat to the US’s security. It declares: “In an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle. The United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.” The declaration that the US will engage in preemptive war with other nations reverses decades of American military and foreign policy stances; until now, the US has held that it would only launch an attack against another nation if it had been attacked first, or if American lives were in imminent danger. President Bush had first mentioned the new policy in a speech in June 2002 (see June 1, 2002), and it echoes policies proposed by Paul Wolfowitz during the George H. W. Bush administration (see March 8, 1992). [SHENON, 2008, PP. 128] US Must Maintain Military 'Beyond Challenge' - The National Security Strategy states that the ultimate objective of US national security policy is to “dissuade future military competition.” The US must therefore “build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge. Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.” [LONDON TIMES, 9/21/2002] Ignoring the International Criminal Court - The NSS also states, “We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept.” [US PRESIDENT, 9/2002] Declaring War on Terrorism Itself - It states: “The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.” Journalism professor Mark Danner will later comment in the New York Times: “Not Islamic terrorism or Middle Eastern terrorism or even terrorism directed against the United States: terrorism itself. ‘Declaring war on “terror,”’ as one military strategist later remarked to me, ‘is like declaring war on air power.’” [NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 9/11/2005] Fundamental Reversal of Containment, Deterrence Principles - Washington Post reporter Tim Reich later describes the NSS as “revers[ing] the fundamental principles that have guided successive presidents for more than 50 years: containment and deterrence.” Foreign policy professor Andrew Bacevich will write that the NSS is a “fusion of breathtaking utopianism [and] barely disguised machtpolitik.” Bacevich continues, “It reads as if it were the product not of sober, ostensibly conservative Republicans but of an unlikely collaboration between Woodrow Wilson and the elder Field Marshal von Moltke.” [AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, 3/24/2003] Written by Future Executive Director of 9/11 Commission - The document is released under George W. Bush’s signature, but was written by Philip D. Zelikow, formerly a member of the previous Bush administration’s National Security Council, and currently a history professor at the University of Virginia and a member of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Zelikow produced the document at the behest of his longtime colleague National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (see June 1, 2002). His authorship of the document will not be revealed until well after he is appointed executive director of the 9/11 commission (see Mid-December 2002-March 2003). Many on the Commission will consider Zelikow’s authorship of the document a prima facie conflict of interest, and fear that Zelikow’s position on the Commission will be used to further the Bush administration’s doctrine of preemptive war (see March 21, 2004). [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 8/5/2005; SHENON, 2008, PP. 128] Entity Tags: Tim Reich, University of Virginia, National Security Council, Bush administration, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 9/11 Commission, Andrew Bacevich, Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush, Philip Zelikow Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, US International Relations, 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: US Dominance, 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

September 21, 2002: Feith Pushes Iraq-Al-Qaeda Collaboration Theory at White House Meeting Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen J. Hadley convenes a meeting in the White House Situation Room to discuss Iraq with Colin Powell, George Tenet, and Donald Rumsfeld. The White House wants to be sure they are all on the same page when they testify before Congress next week. When a CIA officer notes that the alleged ties between Iraq and al-Qaeda are not supported by current intelligence, Douglas Feith cuts in insisting that Mohamed Atta had met an Iraqi agent in Prague, and that the director of Iraqi intelligence had met with Osama bin Laden in 1996. Both theories have been dismissed by the intelligence community. After a few minutes, Hadley cuts him off and tells him to sit down. [ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 113-114] Entity Tags: Stephen J. Hadley, Iraq, Al-Qaeda, Colin Powell, Mohamed Atta, Donald Rumsfeld, George J. Tenet Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

September 22, 2002: US Intelligence Has Increasing Number of Al-Qaeda Informants US News and World Report reveals that US intelligence has a growing number of al-Qaeda informants. The magazine comments, “Once thought nearly impossible to penetrate, al-Qaeda is proving no tougher a target than the KGB or the Mafia—closed societies that took the US government years to get inside.” An unnamed US intelligence official says: “We’re getting names, the different camps they trained at, the hierarchy, the infighting. It’s very promising.” Many prisoners have begun to reveal what they know as knowledge of al-Qaeda increases and their interrogations are based on more information about them. One official says, “Now when you go to interrogate people, you know when they’re lying.” [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 9/22/2002] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, US intelligence Category Tags: Other Possible Moles or Informants, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

September 23, 2002: Al Gore Speaks Out against War in Iraq and Preemptive War in General In a speech to the Commonwealth Club, former Vice President Al Gore discusses his views on the struggle against terrorism and the proposed war in Iraq. He says that the major focus of the US should be the apprehension and punishment of “those who sponsored, planned and implemented the cold-blooded murder of more than 3,000 Americans.” He states his belief that the US is capable of succeeding in this task, despite the fact that it is taking much longer than anticipated. “President Bush is telling us that America’s most urgent requirement of the moment—right now—is not to redouble our efforts against al-Qaeda, not to stabilize the nation of Afghanistan after driving its host government from power, even as al-Qaeda members slip back across the border to set up in Afghanistan again; rather, he is telling us that our most urgent task right now is to shift our focus and concentrate on immediately launching a new war against Saddam Hussein. And the president is proclaiming a new, uniquely American right to preemptively attack whomsoever he may deem represents a potential future threat.” Gore warns that “if other nations assert that same right, then the rule of law will quickly be replaced by the reign of fear.” He states that this policy of preemptive action will damage American international alliances and inhibit the effective execution of the war on terror, which requires a multilateral approach to succeed. Gore advises Congress to fully examine the evidence prior to any commitment in Iraq and to always bear in mind what he says are the core principles of the US. He says “the administration has not said much of anything to clarify its idea of what would follow regime change or the degree of engagement that it is prepared to accept for the United States in Iraq in the months and years after a regime change has taken place.” Ominously, he warns “the resulting chaos in the aftermath of a military victory in Iraq could easily pose a far greater danger to the United States than we presently face from Saddam.” Gore asks, “What if in the aftermath of a war against Iraq, we face a situation like that because we washed our hands of it?…what if the al-Qaeda members infiltrated across the borders of Iraq the way they are in Afghanistan?” [COMMONWEALTH CLUB.ORG, 9/23/2002] Entity Tags: Al Gore, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism, US Dominance

September 24, 2002: Discovered Business Card Helps Case Against Moussaoui Federal prosecutors say a business card found in the wreckage of Flight 93 provides a link between alleged conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui and hijacker Ziad Jarrah. [MSNBC, 9/24/2002] The business card is in the name of one of Jarrah’s relatives, Assem Jarrah, and there are some handwritten notes on the reverse side. The notes include an address in Germany linked with Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a member of the hijacker cell in Hamburg. This is relevant to the Moussaoui case because, before Moussaoui was arrested, he associated with bin al-Shibh and received money from him (see October 2000-February 2001, Between February 23, 2001 and June 2001, and July 29, 2001-August 3, 2001). In addition, the phone number associated with bin al-Shibh’s address received a fax from Norman, Oklahoma, on July 29, 2001, when Moussaoui was living there. The circumstances of the card’s discovery are not known. [UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, A/K/A SHAQIL, A/K/A ABU KHALID AL SAHRAWI, DEFENDANT, 3/7/2006; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] Interestingly, this find comes just as the case against Moussaoui is facing trouble. For instance, one month earlier, USA Today reported that investigators had found no link between Moussaoui and the other hijackers. [USA TODAY, 8/29/2002] Prosecutors have been trying to get permission to play the Flight 93 cockpit voice recordings to the jury, but on September 13, the judge said, “the recordings appear to have marginal evidentiary value while posing unfair prejudice to the defendant.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/25/2002] Entity Tags: Assem Jarrah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Zacarias Moussaoui, Ziad Jarrah Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

September 25, 2002: FBI Director Mueller Denies Moussaoui Leads Could Have Prevented 9/11 In an interview with CBS, FBI Director Robert Mueller states, “I can tell you there are things I wish we had done differently. That there are things we should have followed up on. But the bottom line is I do not believe that we would have been able to prevent 9/11.” Speaking about the Zacarias Moussaoui case, he says, “That took us several months, to follow that lead, and it also required the full support of the German authorities, and it would have been very, I think impossible to have followed that particular lead in the days between the time in which Moussaoui was detained and September 11th.” [CBS NEWS, 9/25/2002] This negativism is in sharp contrast to a previous statement he made on May 21, 2002 (see May 21, 2002), as well as the opinion of many rank and file FBI officers, some of whom have made a chart showing how all the hijackers could have been caught if certain leads had been followed. [NEWSWEEK, 6/2/2002] Mueller’s opinion on the Moussaoui case is contradicted by many, including FBI agents working on that case. [TIME, 5/21/2002] The media also does not agree. For instance the Independent suggested information on Moussaoui’s computer “might have been enough to expose the Hamburg cell, which investigators believe was the key planning unit for 11 September.” [INDEPENDENT, 12/11/2001] Entity Tags: Robert S. Mueller III, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Zacarias Moussaoui Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, 9/11 Denials

September 25, 2002: Bush Says Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein Are Indistinguishable
During a White House meeting with Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, George Bush makes the claim that Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden work together. “They’re both risks, they’re both dangerous,” Bush tells reporters. “The danger is, is that they work in concert,” he says in response to a question from a Reuters reporter. “The difference, of course, is that al-Qaeda likes to hijack governments. Saddam Hussein is a dictator of a government. Al-Qaeda hides, Saddam doesn’t, but the danger is, is that they work in concert. The danger is, is that al-Qaeda becomes an extension of Saddam’s madness and his hatred and his capacity to extend weapons of mass destruction around the world. Both of them need to be dealt with. The war on terror, you can’t distinguish between al-Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror. And so it’s a comparison that is - I can’t make because I can’t distinguish between the two, because they’re both equally as bad, and equally as evil, and equally as destructive.” [KNIGHT RIDDER, 9/25/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 9/26/2002; US PRESIDENT, 9/30/2002; CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, 1/23/2008] Later in the day, Bush’s comments are downplayed by White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, who says that Bush did not mean bin Laden and Hussein are working together, but rather that there is the danger that they could work together. He explains: “Clearly, al-Qaeda is operating inside Iraq. In the shadowy world of terrorism, sometimes there is no precise way to have definitive information until it is too late.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/26/2002; WHITE HOUSE, 9/25/2003] Bush fails to mention that the Defense Intelligence Agency has found no evidence of any such connections (see July 2002), or that eight days before his statement, the director of the CIA, George Tenet, told a Senate committee that no such connections can be shown to exist (see September 17, 2002). [CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, 1/23/2008] Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, Alvaro Uribe, Ari Fleischer, George J. Tenet, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

September 26, 2002: Assertions of Ties Between Iraq and Al-Qaeda Called ‘Exaggerations’ An unnamed Pentagon official tells USA Today that the hawks’ recent assertions regarding Iraq-al-Qaeda ties are “exaggeration[s]. The USA Today article, titled Experts Skeptical of Reports on Al-Qaeda-Baghdad Link, also says that “Other intelligence experts said some of the charges appeared to be based on old information and that there was still no ‘smoking gun’ connecting Iraq with the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States.” [USA TODAY, 9/26/2002] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, US Department of Defense Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

September 26, 2002: Powell Implies Connection Between Iraq, Islamist Terrorists, Says Terrorists Must Not Get WMD Secretary of State Colin Powell tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “The world had to recognize that the potential connection between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction moved terrorism to a new level of threat. In fact, that nexus became the overriding security concern of our nation. It still is and it will continue to be our overriding concern for some years to come.” [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 9/26/2002] But Paul Anderson, spokesman for Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL), chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, tells reporters that Graham, who has access to highly classified reports, has seen no evidence that Iraq has ties to al-Qaeda. [USA TODAY, 9/26/2002] Entity Tags: Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Bob Graham, Colin Powell, Paul Anderson Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

September 26, 2002: Rumsfeld Incorrectly Connects Al-Zarqawi to Iraqi Government

A wanted poster for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi posted by the US military in Iraq. [Source: US Department of Defense] Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld claims the US government has “bulletproof” confirmation of ties between the Iraqi government and al-Qaeda members, including “solid evidence” that al-Qaeda maintains a presence in Iraq. The allegation refers to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born Palestinian who is the founder of al-Tawhid, an organization whose aim is to kill Jews and install an Islamic regime in Jordan (see December 2001-Mid-2002). Rumsfeld’s statement is based on intercepted telephone calls in which al-Zarqawi was overheard calling friends or relatives. But Knight Ridder Newspapers reports that, according to US intelligence officials, “The intercepts provide no evidence that the suspected terrorist was working with the Iraqi regime or that he was working on a terrorist operation while he was in Iraq.” [KNIGHT RIDDER, 10/7/2002] Two years later, Rumsfeld will back away from his allegation after it is disproven (see October 4, 2004). Entity Tags: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

September 26, 2002: British Police Find Evidence of Al-Qaeda Poison Plot British police raid a flat in the small town of Thetford, a hundred miles northeast of London, where they arrest a man named David Khalef. The raid, part of a crackdown on radical Islamist fundraisers in Britain, turns up a black holdall, inside which there are several photocopied sheets of paper with Arabic writing. After translation, the papers are found to contain recipes for making ricin, cyanide, nicotine poison, and rotten meat poison, as well as a list of chemicals and other ingredients needed to make them. These chemicals and ingredients can be freely purchased in shops. British government scientists find that the recipes are “viable” and could be used to make a small quantity of poison. According to authors Sean O’Neill and Daniel McGrory: “The discovery [sends] shock waves through the senior ranks of Britain’s security and intelligence community. For the first time they had uncovered an Islamist plot to carry out a terrorist attack in Britain.” An anonymous senior anti-terrorist officer will say: “It was the first tangible evidence that we had come across something more than fundraising. Imagine the impact of the discovery that we had found people who were apparently interested in mounting attacks in the UK using unconventional weapons.” [O'NEILL AND MCGRORY, 2006, PP. 238-239] Khalef will later be tried for involvement in a ricin plot, but acquitted (see April 8-12, 2004). Entity Tags: David Khalef Category Tags: Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism

September 26, 2002: CIA Manager Says, ‘After 9/11 the Gloves Came Off’ Cofer Black, then director of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, speaks about US interrogation policy during a 9/11 Congressional Inquiry hearing. “This is a very highly classified area, but I have to say that all you need to know: there was a before-9/11 and an after-9/11. After 9/11 the gloves came off.” [NEWSWEEK, 5/24/2004] He apparently made similar comments on September 19, 2001, to the first CIA operatives heading to Afghanistan after 9/11 (see September 19, 2001). Entity Tags: Cofer Black, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry

September 27, 2002: French Court Ruling Backs Allegations of Widespread False Flag Attacks in Algeria

Habib Souaidia. [Source: Public domain] Algerian general Khaled Nezzar loses a libel suit in France against Habib Souaidia, a former lieutenant in the Algerian army. Souaidia claimed in a 2001 book that in the 1990s the Algerian army frequently massacred Algerian civilians and then blamed Islamic militants for the killings. The French court rules that the contents of Souaidia’s book are “legitimate.” The court declares that it could not judge Algeria’s history but Souaidia had acted in good faith in making his allegations. [AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 9/27/2002; INTER PRESS SERVICE, 9/30/2002] Souaidia served in the Algerian army until 1996 and took part in operations against Islamic militants. Nezzar is considered the real power in Algeria, still ruling behind a facade of civilian rule ever since the early 1990s. Several former Algerian officers living in exile testified in court and corroborated Souaidia’s statements. For instance: Souaidia told the French court, “In the beginning we spoke about restoring order in the country. But very soon the generals made of us an army of wild murderers.… We had permission to kill whoever we wanted to for nothing at all.” He pointed to Nezzar in the courtroom and said that “at the same time they were counting the millions of dollars they had stolen from the people.” Former colonel Mohammed Samraoui testified that “the Algerian army used all means to attack the Islamic rebellion: blackmail, corruption, threats, killings…we used terrorist methods to attack terrorism even before it had appeared.” Former officer Ahmed Chouchene said that soldiers were told they could kill civilians as much as they liked as long as they could “produce a false explanation for the killings.” They were taught that “their role was not to apply law, but to circumvent it.” [INTER PRESS SERVICE, 9/30/2002] Entity Tags: Algerian army, Ahmed Chouchene, Habib Souaidia, Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité, Mohammed Samraoui, Groupe Islamique Armé, Islamic Salvation Front, Khaled Nezzar Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks Category Tags: Algerian Militant Collusion

September 27, 2002: Rumsfeld Claims Link between Al-Qaeda and Iraq Is ‘Accurate and Not Debatable’ Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says the link between al-Qaeda and Iraq is “accurate and not debatable.” He also claims that President Bush has not yet made any decision on possible military action against Iraq. [AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 9/27/2002] Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

Late September 2002: US Intelligence Intercepts Uncover Planned Attack on Tourist Sites in Bali; No Public Warning Results Shortly after the Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002), the Washington Post will report: “US intelligence officials said they intercepted communications in late September [2002] signaling a strike on a Western tourist site. Bali was mentioned in the US intelligence report…” [WASHINGTON POST, 10/15/2002] In response to the Post story, the State Department will issue a statement saying they did share this information with the Australian government. The statement admits their warning discussed tourists as potential targets, but says the warning did no specify an attack on Bali on the weekend that it took place. No government urgently warns tourists to stay away from likely targets in Bali before the bombings. Australian Prime Minister John Howard will later admit that Australia received this warning, but he will claim his intelligence agency analyzed it and decided no upgrade in alert status or any special warning was warranted. [AGE (MELBOURNE), 10/17/2002] Entity Tags: John Howard, US Department of State, US intelligence Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, 2002 Bali Bombings, Remote Surveillance, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

Late September 2002: US Intelligence Plants Moles Inside ‘Al-Qaeda’s Bank’

Dennis Lormel. [Source: Chris Nicodemo] According to author Ron Suskind, after 9/11, US officials from various agencies decide that a man named Pacha Wazir from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is the main money-handler for al-Qaeda. Wazir runs a chain of hawalas from South Asia to Europe. An FBI team led by Dennis Lormel determines that Wazir handled $67 million in assets for al-Qaeda over a two-year period. But since hawalas leave little to no financial trial, prosecution would be very difficult. [SUSKIND, 2006, PP. 142-146] In late September 2002, the UAE government freezes millions of dollars of Wazir’s assets and tells him that he is under investigation by the FBI. Wazir asks to meet with the FBI to convince them he is innocent. The FBI had already been preparing to apprehend him and now they put their plan in motion. Wazir is arrested by the CIA while on his way to meet with the FBI. His accounts are frozen and he is taken to a facility somewhere in the UAE for interrogation. But Wazir does not reveal anything useful. His brother is then apprehended in a similar manner, but he does not talk either. Several days later, two of Wazir’s employees operating a store in Karachi, Pakistan, are also apprehended on their way home from work. That night, they are interrogated but refuse to talk. The next morning, the store opens as usual, but the two men are replaced by CIA agents of Pakistani descent who have been specially trained for such an occasion. Pretending to be distant cousins of Wazir temporarily filling in for the other two, they continue to run the store. According to Suskind, “Over the coming months, dozens of key captures in Pakistan and elsewhere would be made because the CIA had taken up residence inside al-Qaeda’s bank.” Wazir and the other three men are rendered to a CIA black site and their fate since is unknown. [SUSKIND, 2006, PP. 159-161] Entity Tags: Dennis Lormel, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Pacha Wazir Category Tags: Terrorism Financing, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Key Captures and Deaths, Other Possible Moles or Informants

September 30, 2002: No Plea Bargain Sought in Case Against Moussaoui

Zacarias Moussaoui. [Source: Sherburne County Sheriffs Office] Seymour Hersh of New Yorker magazine reveals that, despite a weak case against Zacarias Moussaoui, no federal prosecutor has discussed a plea bargain with him since he was indicted in November 2001. Hersh reports that “Moussaoui’s lawyers, and some FBI officials, remain bewildered at the government’s failure to pursue a plea bargain.” Says a federal public defender, “I’ve never been in a conspiracy case where the government wasn’t interested in knowing if the defendant had any information—to see if there wasn’t more to the conspiracy.” Apparently a plea bargain isn’t being considered because Attorney General Ashcroft wants nothing less than the death penalty for Moussaoui. One former CIA official claims, “They cast a wide net and [Moussaoui] happened to be a little fish who got caught up in it. They know it now. And nobody will back off.” A legal expert says, “It appears that Moussaoui is not competent to represent himself, because he doesn’t seem to understand the fundamentals of the charges against him, but I am starting to feel that the rest of us are crazier… we may let this man talk himself to death to soothe our sense of vulnerability.” [NEW YORKER, 9/30/2002] Entity Tags: John Ashcroft, Seymour Hersh, Zacarias Moussaoui Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui