September 11 9:30-9:35

❌

(9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Office of Emergency Management Command Center Is Evacuated; Exact Time Is Unclear
Thomas Von Essen. [Source: Publicity photo] The headquarters of New York’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM), which is on the 23rd floor of WTC Building 7, is evacuated at approximately 9:30 a.m., according to the 9/11 Commission. The headquarters was opened in 1999 and was specifically intended to coordinate the city’s response to disasters such as terrorist attacks (see June 8, 1999). A senior OEM official orders the evacuation after being told by a Secret Service agent that additional commercial planes are unaccounted for (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 283-284 AND 305] OEM personnel do not initially respond to the evacuation order with a sense of urgency. According to a 2003 report by the Mineta Transportation Institute, “They calmly collected personal belongings and began removing OEM records, but they were urged to abandon everything and leave the building quickly.” [JENKINS AND EDWARDS-WINSLOW, 9/2003, PP. 16] However, there are contradictory accounts of when the OEM command center is evacuated. The National Institute of Standards of Technology (NIST) claims the evacuation happens slightly later than stated by the 9/11 Commission, at “approximately 9:44 a.m.” [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 109 ] Other accounts suggest it may have happened before 9:03, when the second attack occurred (see (Soon After 8:46 a.m.-9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (Shortly Before 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Fire Commissioner Thomas Von Essen will arrive at WTC 7 shortly before the collapse of the South Tower, looking for Mayor Giuliani. Learning that the OEM headquarters has been evacuated, he later claims that he thinks, “How ridiculous. We’ve got a thirteen-million-dollar command center and we can’t even use it.” [ESSEN, 2002, PP. 26] He says in frustration, “How can we be evacuating OEM? We really need it now.” He will later tell an interviewer that he’d headed for the OEM headquarters because, “I thought that was where we should all be because that’s what [it] was built for.” [FINK AND MATHIAS, 2002, PP. 230] All civilians were evacuated from WTC 7 earlier on, around the time the second WTC tower was hit (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Secret Service, Thomas Von Essen, Office of Emergency Management Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

9:30 a.m.-9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Langley Fighters Fly East over Ocean instead of North toward Washington

Route of the Langley Air Base fighters to Washington. [Source: Yvonne Vermillion/ MagicGraphix.com] The three F-16s that took off from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) head east, out over the Atlantic Ocean, instead of north toward the Baltimore area, as NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) instructed when it issued the scramble order (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27] Three Reasons Jets Head East - The 9/11 Commission will give three reasons why the Langley jets go east instead of north: “First, unlike a normal scramble order, this order did not include a distance to the target or the target’s location. Second, a ‘generic’ flight plan—prepared to get the aircraft airborne and out of local airspace quickly—incorrectly led the Langley fighters to believe they were ordered to fly due east (090) for 60 miles. Third, the lead pilot and local FAA controller incorrectly assumed the flight plan instruction to go ‘090 for 60’ superseded the original scramble order.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27] NORAD Commander Blames 'Peacetime Rules' - In his testimony before the 9/11 Commission in May 2003, Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region, will address the question of why the Langley jets head out over the sea. He says, “When we scramble an aircraft… the aircraft take off and they have a predetermined departure route.” According to Arnold, NORAD is “looking outward,” and so “our mission, unlike law enforcement’s mission, is to protect things coming towards the United States.” He concludes, “So our peacetime procedures, to de-conflict with civil aviation’s, so as to not have endanger[ed] civil aviation in any particular way.” Arnold will also suggest that “peacetime rules” might be partly to blame for the Langley jets heading in the wrong direction. He says, “[I]f we were operating under something other than peacetime rules… they could have turned immediately toward Washington, DC.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] According to the Wall Street Journal, the “peacetime rules” Arnold refers to are “noise restrictions requiring that [the Langley jets] fly more slowly than supersonic speed and take off over water, pointed away from Washington.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 3/22/2004 ] One of the Langley pilots, Captain Craig Borgstrom, will later recall that, shortly after the jets take off, NEADS “gave us max-subsonic,” which is “as fast as you can go without breaking the sound barrier.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 65] Risk of Midair Collision - NORAD official Major General Craig McKinley will tell the 9/11 Commission that “another reason why” the Langley jets are “vectored east originally” is that “the air traffic over the Northeast corridor is so complex that to just launch fighters… into that air traffic system can cause potential damage or midair collision. So we rely on the FAA to de-conflict those corridors.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Jets Far Away from Pentagon - When the Pentagon is hit at 9:37 a.m., the Langley jets have flown nearly 60 miles out over the ocean and are 150 miles from Washington (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 151] Entity Tags: Craig McKinley, Larry Arnold, Craig Borgstrom Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

(9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Langley Tower Gives Jets Incorrect Heading, Sends Them East instead of North

The air traffic control tower at Langley Air Force Base. [Source: Langley Air Force Base] The air traffic control tower at Langley Air Force Base (AFB) instructs the three F-16s taking off from the base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) to fly east for 60 miles, even though the scramble order issued by NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001) specified that they be directed north toward Washington, DC. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 96 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 142-143] Controller Directs Jets Eastward - The air traffic controllers at the Langley tower responsible for getting the three fighter jets launched are Master Sergeant Kevin Griffith and Senior Airman Raymond Halford. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/6/2003 ] One of them tells the jets they are “cleared for takeoff, 090 for 60,” meaning they are to fly east for 60 miles. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 143] According to a 9/11 Commission memorandum, “A takeoff to the east on the Langley radial for 60 miles was the standard takeoff from Langley in order to clear local traffic and get the fighters to altitude as quickly as possible.” But this document will add that the jets are “not bound to the 60 mile distance and could have turned to the north at any time they were directed to or had orders to do so.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/6/2003 ] Pilot Assumes Controllers Have More Information - The command post at Langley AFB has already forwarded the NEADS scramble instructions directing the jets to the north—“010, flight level 290”—to the pilots. According to author Lynn Spencer, lead pilot Major Dean Eckmann “knows that the scramble calls for a northerly heading, but he assumes they are being vectored eastward in order to fly around the traffic in their way. He doesn’t second-guess the instructions; he assumes that the controllers have more information than he does.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/9/2004; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 142-143] Scramble Order Did Not Include Distance and Location - The 9/11 Commission will later try to explain why the Langley tower directs the fighters east. According to the Commission, the scramble order from NEADS lacked complete instructions. Though it included a direction of “010” and an altitude of 29,000 feet (“290”), it “did not include a distance to the target, nor the target’s location, two key components that are normally included in a scramble order.” Generic Flight Plan Used - Additionally: “In order to launch aircraft, the Langley AFB tower was required to file an automated flight plan specifically designating the direction and distance of intended flight. Prior to 9/11, the standard—or generic—flight plan for aircraft departing Langley AFB to the east was ‘090 for 60.‘… Langley tower personnel assumed that once fighters got airborne they would be vectored to the target of interest by either NEADS or the FAA.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 96 ] Operator Could Have Entered a Unique Flight Plan - According to a 9/11 Commission memorandum, Langley tower personnel follow established procedures and accomplish their duties “efficiently and effectively.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/6/2003 ] However, John Harter, an operations supervisor at the FAA’s Norfolk Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON), will tell the Commission that he disagrees with a claim made by Langley tower personnel, “that it was more efficient to enter a flight plan known to be acceptable to the system than to enter something different. That is an operator issue. An operator knowing what he/she was doing would have been able to correctly enter a unique flight plan.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 12/1/2003 ] Tower Responsible for Establishing Flight Plan - The Langley control tower is one of four facilities that are notified when NEADS issues a scramble order. (The other three are the Langley AFB command post, the 119th Fighter Wing, and the Norfolk TRACON.) The duty of Langley tower controllers is to get a flight plan established in the system so the system will accept an aircraft’s departure. The Langley tower’s control over aircraft launching from the base extends only five miles off the runway, so scrambled aircraft are passed on to the Norfolk TRACON upon takeoff (see 9:31 a.m.-9:33 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/6/2003 ] Entity Tags: Dean Eckmann, Kevin Griffith, John Harter, Langley Air Force Base, Raymond Halford Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

(Between 9:30 a.m. and 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Richard Clarke Asks White House Bunker for Air Force One Fighter Escort and Shootdown Authorization Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, who is in the White House Situation Room, requests a fighter escort for Air Force One and authorization for the Air Force to shoot down threatening aircraft. According to Clarke’s own account, when they see President Bush starting his short speech from the Booker Elementary School library on television (at about 9:30), he and others in the Situation Room briefly discuss getting the president away from the school to somewhere safer. Clarke then telephones the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House, which contains Vice President Dick Cheney and others. He speaks with Army Major Mike Fenzel and instructs him: “Mike, somebody has to tell the president he can’t come right back here [to Washington]. Cheney, Condi, somebody. Secret Service concurs. We do not want them saying where they are going when they take off. Second, when they take off, they should have fighter escort. Three, we need to authorize the Air Force to shoot down any aircraft—including a hijacked passenger flight—that looks like it is threatening to attack and cause large-scale death on the ground. Got it?” Fenzel replies, “Roger that, Dick, get right back to you.” This conversation appears to take place shortly before the Pentagon attack occurs, so roughly around 9:35 or 9:36, as soon afterwards Secret Service Director Brian Stafford slips Clarke a note stating that radar shows an aircraft heading their way (see (9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and then Ralph Seigler, the Situation Room deputy director, reports an explosion having occurred at the Pentagon. [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 6-7] However, it is unclear how long it takes for Clarke’s requests to be implemented. According to some accounts, fighters do not arrive to accompany Air Force One until an hour or more after it takes off (see (11:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Reports are also contradictory as to when shootdown authorization is given for the Air Force. According to Clarke’s own recollections, it is given between around 9:38 and 9:56 (see (9:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Other accounts, including that of the 9/11 Commission, state that it is not given until after 9:56, possibly as late as 10:20 (see (Shortly After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 10:18 a.m.-10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Mike Fenzel Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93, Richard Clarke

(9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: DC Air National Guard Fighters Returning from Training Mission Learn of Events in New York During Refueling Three F-16 fighter jets from a base just outside Washington, DC, that have been away on a training mission, first learn of events in New York when they meet up with a refueling plane. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004] The jets belong to the 121st Fighter Squadron, part of the 113th Wing of the District of Columbia Air National Guard, which is based at Andrews Air Force Base, 10 miles from Washington. [DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AIR NATIONAL GUARD, 7/24/2001; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 10/21/2001; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002] They have been on a routine training mission on a range about 200 miles from Andrews, in Dare County, North Carolina (see 8:36 a.m. September 11, 2001). Supervisor Concerned, Contacted Refueling Plane Pilot - Major Daniel Caine, the supervisor of flying (SOF) with their unit, has wanted to call the three jets back to base since learning of the second plane hitting the World Trade Center (see (9:04 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/8/2004 ] However, the jets were outside his radio range, so he’d called the tanker refueling plane they were scheduled to meet up with shortly, and asked its pilot to pass on an urgent return to base (“RTB”) message to the F-16s. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 124] Tanker Pilot Notifies Jets about First WTC Crash - The three fighter jets now meet the tanker to get refueled. The refueling plane, which has come from Tennessee, has arrived late, and flight lead Major Billy Hutchison’s F-16 is low on fuel. The tanker pilot radios Hutchison and tells him that a plane has hit the WTC, but nothing more. Hutchison will later recall that, while one of the other two F-16s is being refueled, the “tanker was told that everyone must land. Hutchison knew he had to get back to Andrews.” Radio Frequency Is Silent - After Hutchison disconnects his aircraft from the refueling plane, he plugs back into the air traffic control radio frequency, as is standard procedure. However, as he will recall, there is “nothing” on the frequency. “Normally, there is constant chatter as controllers work all the air traffic. This was highly unusual.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004] When he is about half way back to Andrews AFB, Hutchison will radio his SOF and be instructed to fly back to base at maximum speed (see (9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 79] According to author Lynn Spencer, the three F-16s do not fill their tanks right up when they meet with the tanker, and so they will be virtually out of fuel by the time they are approaching Andrews. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 217] Entity Tags: Daniel Caine, 121st Fighter Squadron, Billy Hutchison Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Air Traffic Control Notifies United Airlines about Flight 93 The FAA’s Cleveland Center notifies United Airlines’ headquarters, near Chicago, that Flight 93 is not responding to attempted radio contacts. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 39 ] Cleveland Center made its last normal communication with Flight 93 at 9:27 (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28] After the hijacking began at around 9:28, the controller handling Flight 93, John Werth, tried unsuccessfully to re-establish contact with it. [GREGOR, 12/21/2001 ; CBS NEWS, 9/10/2006] The lack of response from Flight 93, combined with the plane’s turning to the east (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001), will lead United to believe, by 9:36 a.m., that it has been hijacked. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 456] Entity Tags: United Airlines, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:30 a.m.-9:38 a.m. September 11, 2001: Delta 1989 and Other Aircraft Have to Turn to Avoid Hijacked Flight 93 John Werth, the air traffic controller at the FAA’s Cleveland Center who is monitoring the now-hijacked Flight 93, has to move Delta Air Lines Flight 1989 and several other aircraft, in order to get them out of Flight 93’s path and avoid a midair collision. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 39 ; USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] Controller Begins Moving Aircraft - At 9:30 a.m., Werth begins moving other aircraft away from Flight 93 due to the hijacked flight’s failure to acknowledge his radio transmissions. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ] Furthermore, as USA Today will describe, Flight 93 “became erratic. It sped up and started gaining on another United [Airlines] flight. Werth commanded the second jet to turn right. Seconds later, Flight 93 turned to the right, too.” [USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] Controller Worried about Possible Collision - Then, between 9:34 a.m. and 9:38 a.m., Flight 93 climbs from 35,000 feet up to 41,000 feet (see (9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and during this period it reverses course and heads back east (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 39, 41 ] Werth becomes concerned about the possibility of a midair collision. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/1/2003 ] Delta 1989 Turns Several Times - As Flight 93 climbs, Werth instructs Delta 1989, which is also in the airspace he is monitoring, to turn right, so as to get away from the hijacked jet. As Flight 93 continues its turn back toward the east, Werth has to move Delta 1989 out of its path. In all, he has to turn the Delta flight several times. [USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] Minutes earlier, Cleveland Center concluded incorrectly that Delta 1989, not Flight 93, was the aircraft being hijacked (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] The Delta pilots’ normal responses to his instructions reassure Werth that it is a “safe bet that the Delta flight hadn’t been hijacked.” [USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] Other Aircraft Moved out of Path - According to the 9/11 Commission, while Flight 93 is ascending to 41,000 feet, Werth has to move “several aircraft out of its way,” acting “decisively to clear the other flights in his sector from Flight 93’s path.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 39 ] Entity Tags: John Werth Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Requests a New Flight Plan Shortly before Flight 93 reverses direction and heads east, someone in its cockpit radios in and asks the FAA for a new flight plan, with a final destination of Washington, DC. [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2001; ABC NEWS, 9/14/2001] Jeff Krawczyk, the chief operating officer of a company that tracks aircraft movements, later comments, “We hardly ever get a flight plan change. Very unusual.” [WASHINGTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, 9/11/2001] Who it is that makes this request is unclear. The hijacker takeover of Flight 93 occurred around 9:28 a.m. (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001) [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 11], so it is presumably made by one of the hijackers. Twenty-five minutes later the pilot hijacker will also program a new destination into the plane’s navigational system (see 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001). Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:30 a.m.-9:45 a.m. September 11, 2001: Tom Burnett Makes Three Airfone Calls from Flight 93, according to Later Trial Evidence According to evidence presented at the 2006 Zacarias Moussaoui trial, passenger Tom Burnett makes just three phone calls from Flight 93 to his wife, Deena Burnett. According to the trial evidence, his first call, lasting 28 seconds, is at 9:30. At just before 9:38, he makes a second call, which lasts 62 seconds, and at 9:44 he makes his final call, lasting 54 seconds. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] Although he was assigned a seat in row 4 near the front of the plane, records show he makes these calls using Airfones further back, in rows 24 and 25. [UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, A/K/A SHAQIL, A/K/A ABU KHALID AL SAHRAWI, DEFENDANT., 4/11/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 9-10 ] This evidence, however, contradicts the account given by Burnett’s wife. According to an FBI record of the interview, in her initial meeting with investigators (see (12:30 p.m.) September 11, 2001), Deena Burnett will say she received “a series of three to five cellular phone calls from her husband.” [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001 ] But she will subsequently say consistently that she received four phone calls from him. And, rather than occurring between 9:30 and 9:44, she notes them as having occurred at 9:27, 9:34, 9:45, and 9:54. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/13/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2001; CNN, 9/11/2002; BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 61-67; HOUR OF POWER, 9/10/2006; MSNBC, 9/11/2006] While the trial evidence states that Tom Burnett makes his calls from the plane using Airfones, other accounts will report that he makes all—or all but one—of them using his cell phone. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/13/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 107-111 AND 118; WASHINGTON POST, 4/19/2002; SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 4/21/2002; CBS NEWS, 9/10/2003] Entity Tags: Tom Burnett, Deena Burnett Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

9:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Airport Director Receives Passenger Manifests for Flights 11 and 175; Singles Out Arab Names A director at Boston’s Logan Airport receives the passenger manifests for Flight 11 and Flight 175, and reportedly is able to quickly single out the names of the five hijackers on each of these flights. Ed Freni, the director of aviation operations at Logan, had phoned his contacts at American and United Airlines who are based at the airport roughly around 9:00-9:15. He had requested the manifests for the two hijacked planes that took off from there (see (9:00 a.m.-9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Several pages with names listed in long columns now roll out of the fax machine in the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport) aviation office at Logan, where Freni recently arrived. Freni looks over the manifest for Flight 11. Aware that Arab men attacked the World Trade Center in 1993, he searches for any Arabic names. According to author Tom Murphy, he circles the names of the five men later accused of being the plane’s hijackers: “In 2A and 2B, he circled two, both W. Alshehri. In 8D, M. Atta, and 8G, A. Alomari. In 10B, he circled S. Al Suqami.” None of the names of the other individuals on the plane appear suspicious to him. Freni then looks over the manifest for Flight 175. Again, according to Murphy, he singles out the names of the men later accused of being the plane’s hijackers: “He circled F. Alquadibanihammad [presumably Fayez Ahmed Banihammad], A. Alghamdi, H. Alghamdi, M. Alshehri, and M. Alshehhi.” Freni asks John Duval, Logan’s deputy director of operations who is with him in the aviation office, “FBI here yet?” Duval replies, “They’re on the way over from downtown.” Freni says, “Tell ‘em we got their guys.” [MURPHY, 2006, PP. 34-36] However, at 10:59 a.m., the FBI’s Chicago command post will receive a copy of the manifest for Flight 175, and, according to an FBI document, this will have six Muslim names on it—one more than Freni reportedly singles out. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/12/2001 ] Presumably the sixth Muslim name is that of Touri Bolourchi, a nurse originally from Iran. [NEW YORK TIMES, 6/30/2002] There were also at least another two passengers on Flight 11 with names that might appear to be Arabic, yet that Freni apparently does not single out: Waleed Iskandar was a Lebanese management consultant. [PALO ALTO WEEKLY, 12/12/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2002] And Rahma Salie was an IT consultant of Sri Lankan descent. [INDEPENDENT, 10/11/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 7/14/2002] Entity Tags: Ed Freni, John Duval Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, FBI 9/11 Investigation

(9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS Unable to Talk to Langley Supervisor because He Is Flying Spare Jet A technical sergeant at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) learns, to his astonishment, that the supervisor of flying (SOF) for the alert unit at Langley Air Force Base is unavailable, because he has taken off in a spare jet in response to the recent scramble order (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 148] SOF Was Instructed to Launch - Captain Craig Borgstrom is the operations manager of a detachment at Langley AFB from the North Dakota Air National Guard’s 119th Fighter Wing. In the event of a scramble order, he is supposed to serve as the SOF, being responsible for monitoring the scrambled jets, working with local air traffic controllers, and communicating with NEADS. However, someone at NEADS (who, exactly, is unstated) recently called and urged him to launch as many aircraft as possible (see (Between 9:10 a.m. and 9:23 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 65; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 114, 116, 118] He has therefore just taken off, along with the unit’s two alert pilots (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 4/16/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27] NEADS Wants to Notify Borgstrom of Jets' Mission - At NEADS, Tech Sgt. Jeremy Powell now tries calling Borgstrom to inform him that his jets’ mission is to set up a combat air patrol over Washington and intercept a hijacked civilian airliner that is approaching the city. However, as Borgstrom is absent, the phone just rings and rings. Finally, a sergeant picks it up. Powell asks to speak to the SOF and is informed, “Oh, he’s not here.” Incredulous, Powell says, “I need to speak to the SOF,” but the sergeant retorts, “He’s not here!” Powell knows that the alert detachment at Langley AFB should have an SOF on duty 24/7. He raises his voice, saying, “This is Huntress and I need to talk to your SOF now!” (“Huntress” is the call sign for NEADS.) The sergeant replies, “He’s one of the three that got airborne!” Confused, Powell says: “Three? I only scrambled two!” The sergeant explains, “No, he took off in a spare jet.” Powell is speechless, but finally says, “Wow… okay,” before hanging up the phone. The order to launch three jets, instead of just the two that are kept on alert at Langley AFB, had not gone through Powell. He assumes it was issued by the senior officers in the NEADS battle cab. According to author Lynn Spencer, Powell thinks to himself, “The battle cab has taken serious measures to increase our air power.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 148] Entity Tags: Langley Air Force Base, Craig Borgstrom, Jeremy Powell, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

9:30 a.m.-10:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: Agency near Pentagon Scheduled to Practice Response to Simulated Plane Crash

A Learjet 35A. [Source: enviscope GmbH] A training exercise planned by a US government agency is scheduled to include the scenario of a small corporate jet plane hitting a building just over 20 miles from the Pentagon around this time, though whether the scenario is actually played out before the exercise is called off is unclear. [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 8/22/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/14/2003] The exercise was set to begin at 9:00 a.m. at the headquarters of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in Chantilly, Virginia (see 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001), which is just four miles from Washington Dulles International Airport, from where Flight 77 took off. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 8/22/2002] Simulated Crash around Time of Pentagon Attack - In the exercise scenario, a Learjet 35A with two pilots and four passengers takes off from Dulles Airport at 9:30 a.m. About a minute later, an explosion is heard, and the pilot complains that one of the engines is on fire and he is losing altitude. Around 9:32 a.m., the plane crashes into tower 4 at the NRO headquarters. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/14/2003] This would be just five minutes before the real attack occurs at the Pentagon, which is 24 miles away from the NRO headquarters (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 8/22/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 10] Simulation Includes Numerous Deaths and Injuries - According to a description of the exercise scenario: “Various parts of the aircraft struck the outside portions of the building, spraying jet fuel. The final portions of the wreckage were scattered around the entryway between tower 1 and 2. Jet fuel was burning uncontrollably in the vicinity of the flagpoles. There are a number of injured and dead NRO employees.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/14/2003] No real plane is to be used in the simulation, and the crash is to be the result of mechanical failure, not terrorism. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002] Exercise 'Inputs' - The exercise is set to include numerous “inputs,” which are presumably communications and other actions that will make it appear more realistic to participants. Planned “inputs” include, at 9:30 a.m. a smoke generator is to be started. At 9:32, numerous phone calls are set to begin flooding in, from people reporting fires in various locations in the building. At 9:34, after someone reports that a small civilian jet has crashed, NRO personnel are to be instructed to evacuate their building. At 9:37, the first engine from Fairfax County Fire Department is scheduled to arrive. (The exercise description states that “inputs from simulated Fairfax responders” are to be used “if Fairfax does not play.”) At 10:03, four more fire department trucks and emergency medical technician vehicles respond to the crash. By 10:30 all the simulated fires will have been extinguished, but at least four NRO employees will be confirmed to have died in the crash. The exercise is set to end at 11:45 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/14/2003] Exercise Canceled, Timing Unclear - The exercise is reportedly called off in response to the morning’s real world crisis. However, the time when it is canceled is unstated. NRO spokesman Art Haubold will only say, “As soon as the real world events began, we canceled the exercise.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002] It is therefore unclear whether the simulated plane crash is actually played out, or whether the exercise is brought to an end beforehand. After the exercise is called off, all but the NRO’s most essential employees are sent home. [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 8/22/2002] Entity Tags: National Reconnaissance Office, Art Haubold, Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

(9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Nonessential Personnel Evacuated from NSA Headquarters At the National Security Agency (NSA) headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland, Michael Hayden, the agency’s director, orders the evacuation of all nonessential personnel from the NSA complex. His two reasons for this, he later says, are “just pure safety,” and to protect the people who work at the agency by sending “them home on the dispersal plan.” In a 2007 speech, he will state that he gave this order at 9:30 a.m. But in the account of author James Bamford, around the time Hayden gives the order he hears “some early reports about the explosion at the Pentagon.” Yet the attack on the Pentagon does not occur until 9:37 (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). The reason for this discrepancy is unclear. Hayden’s evacuation order is announced over loudspeakers throughout the NSA, and many of the 16,000 employees there leave. After hearing for sure that the Pentagon has been struck and that one or more hijacked aircraft is heading toward Washington, Hayden orders the three to four thousand remaining essential personnel to immediately evacuate the agency’s three tall towers and relocate to the low-rise Ops 1 Building. However, as Hayden later says, “[W]e really couldn’t afford to move the counterterrorism shop” where experts and linguists who track terrorists’ foreign communications work, even though it is located near the top of one of the NSA’s high-rise buildings. Maureen Baginski, the NSA’s director of signals intelligence, goes up there shortly after the time of the Pentagon attack to calm down the workers who, according to Hayden, are “emotionally shattered.” [US CONGRESS, 10/17/2002; BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 52-54; NATIONAL JOURNAL, 6/19/2006; CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 5/4/2007] At 9:53, analysts in the counterterrorism office will pick up and quickly translate a phone call from a bin Laden operative in Afghanistan, apparently referring to the attacks (see 9:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: National Security Agency, Michael Hayden, Maureen Baginski Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines Confirms that Flight 11 Hit the North Tower According to the 9/11 Commission, by 9:30 a.m. American Airlines confirms that Flight 11 crashed into the World Trade Center. This is almost 45 minutes after the attack occurred. Earlier, at around 9:16, an American air traffic control specialist had only told the FAA that the airline “thought” the first plane to hit the WTC had been Flight 11 (see 9:16 a.m.-9:18 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 15-16 ] However, Colin Scoggins, a civilian manager at the FAA’s Boston Center, will later claim that American Airlines refused to confirm that its plane had hit the WTC for several hours afterwards. He will claim this lack of confirmation was a factor in his mistakenly reporting that Flight 11 was still airborne at 9:21 (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). He says, “When we phoned United [after the second tower was hit], they confirmed that United 175 was down, and I think they confirmed that within two or three minutes. With American Airlines, we could never confirm if it was down or not, so that left doubt in our minds.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Yet American Airlines had the advantage over United that two of its flight attendants on Flight 11 had been in extensive contact by phone, up until a couple of minutes before their plane crashed. Amy Sweeney had been talking to Michael Woodward, a manager at the American Airlines flight services office at Boston’s Logan Airport (see 8:22 a.m. September 11, 2001). And Betty Ong had been in contact with the airline’s Southeastern Reservations Office in North Carolina, with details of this call being continuously relayed to its System Operations Control (SOC) in Fort Worth, Texas (see (8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 8-14 ] Entity Tags: American Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Emergency Responders Receive False Report of a Third Plane Approaching New York

Joseph Callan. [Source: FDNY] Emergency responders in the lobby of the north WTC tower hear an unconfirmed report of a third plane heading toward New York. Consequently, Assistant Fire Chief Joseph Callan orders all firefighters to evacuate the tower. The third plane report is soon found to be incorrect. One firefighter tells a colleague over radio, “That plane is ours, I repeat, it is ours.” Rescue operations therefore continue. [NEW YORK TIMES, 7/7/2002; NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT, 8/19/2002, PP. 32; FIRE ENGINEERING, 9/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 11/16/2002] The source of the incorrect report is apparently Richard Rotanz, the deputy director of the New York Office of Emergency Management (OEM), who is reportedly in the OEM command center on the 23rd floor of WTC Building 7. A Secret Service agent in WTC 7 reportedly told him there were unconfirmed reports of other planes in the air. When OEM Director Richard Sheirer called Rotanz some time after the second WTC tower was hit, Rotanz relayed this information, telling him there were “still planes unaccounted for that may [be] heading for New York.” Sheirer then told people in the North Tower lobby “that another plane was on the way.” Journalists Wayne Barrett and Dan Collins, in their book Grand Illusion, blame Sheirer for “instantly converting unspecific information into a very specific false alarm.” This false alarm quickly ends up on fire and police department dispatches. Sheirer is apparently so unnerved by it that he instructs the police department aviation unit to not let another plane hit the WTC. As he will later tell the 9/11 Commission, though, “We were grasping at straws,” since no police helicopter could “stop a commercial jet going over 400 miles per hour.” [FIREHOUSE MAGAZINE, 4/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/18/2004 ; BARRETT AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 32-33] Emergency medical technician Richard Zarrillo is currently in WTC 7, and is informed by an OEM rep there of the alleged third plane inbound for New York. While the rest of Building 7 was evacuated earlier on (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001), this false threat reportedly leads to the evacuation of the OEM command center as well (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/25/2001] (However, some accounts indicate the command center may have been evacuated earlier (see (Soon After 8:46 a.m.-9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (Shortly Before 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001).) Soon after hearing this false report of a third inbound plane, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik, and OEM Director Richard Sheirer will all leave the North Tower lobby and relocate to a temporary command post on Barclay Street (see (9:50 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [KERIK, 2001, PP. 334; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/18/2004 ; BARRETT AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 342] Entity Tags: Richard Zarrillo, Joseph Callan, Richard Rotanz, Richard Sheirer Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

(9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Emergency Operations Center Is Finally Operational The FAA’s Emergency Operations Center gets up and running, five minutes after the FAA issues an order grounding all civilian, military, and law enforcement aircraft. [TIME, 9/14/2001] This center’s role in the crisis response remains unclear. Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

(9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Who Warns Who of Flight 77’s Impending Approach to D.C.? Chris Stephenson, head flight controller at Washington’s Reagan National Airport tower, says that he is called by the Secret Service around this time. He is told an unidentified aircraft is speeding toward Washington. Stephenson looks at the radarscope and sees Flight 77 about five miles to the west. He looks out the tower window and sees the plane turning to the right and descending. He follows it until it disappears behind a building in nearby Crystal City, Virginia. [USA TODAY, 8/11/2002] However, according to another account, just before 9:30 a.m., a controller in the same tower has an unidentified plane on radar, “heading toward Washington and without a transponder signal to identify it. It’s flying fast, she says: almost 500 mph. And it’s heading straight for the heart of the city. Could it be American Flight 77? The FAA warns the Secret Service.” [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] In short, it is unclear whether the Secret Service warns the FAA, or vice versa. Entity Tags: Chris Stephenson, Federal Aviation Administration, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(Between 9:30-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Cockpit Voice Recording Begins

Key events of Flight 93 (times are based on a Pittsburgh Post-Gazette map and otherwise interopolated). [Source: Yvonne Vermillion/ MagicGraphix.com] (click image to enlarge) Apparently, the only cockpit voice recording recovered undamaged from any of the 9/11 crashes is from Flight 93. It recorded on a 30-minute reel, which means that the tape is continually overwritten and only the final 30 minutes of any flight is recorded, though in practice sometimes the tape is slightly longer. Flight 93’s recording lasts 31 minutes and begins at this time. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 206-207; CNN, 4/19/2002; HARTFORD COURANT, 4/19/2004] According to one account, it begins seconds before the plane is hijacked. [WASHINGTON POST, 11/17/2001] However, the version of the tape later played for the victims’ relatives begins “too late to pick up the sounds of the hijackers’ initial takeover.” [MSNBC, 4/18/2002] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:30 a.m.-2:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001: Langley Pilots Not Clearly Informed about Unfolding Events Even after they take off, the three fighter pilots who are scrambled from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia are unaware of what is happening regarding the ongoing attacks. The three F-16s were airborne at 9:30 (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). But according to the 9/11 Commission, the pilots are “never briefed about the reason” they are scrambled. “The pilots [know] their mission [is] to divert aircraft, but [do] not know that the threat [is coming] from hijacked airliners.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27 AND 45] One of the pilots, Captain Craig Borgstrom, will later recall that it is only when they see the burning Pentagon that they start piecing things together: “[A]s you get closer, you start thinking, ‘OK, maybe there’s some type of attack going on.’ You start correlating Washington, DC, with New York. We still have no ‘intel’ brief of what’s going on.… We knew something terribly wrong was going on.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 65-66] He says he “had no idea” that the Pentagon and World Trade Center had been hit by suicide terrorists in airplanes. [CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 4/16/2002] The Langley pilots will only learn about Flight 93 and a plane crashing in Pennsylvania when they return to their base at around 2:00 p.m. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 222] Entity Tags: Craig Borgstrom Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

(9:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m.) September 11, 2001: Learning of Attacks, Colin Powell Prepares to Head Back From Peru Secretary of State Colin Powell is in Lima, Peru for a meeting of the Organization of American States. He is having breakfast with the president of Peru and his cabinet. As Powell later recalls, “[S]uddenly a note was handed to me saying that something had happened in New York City, some planes had crashed into the World Trade Center.… And then a few moments later, more information came in, and it was… obviously a terrorist attack. So we concluded the breakfast.… I told my staff, ‘Get the plane ready. We got to get home.’ Because clearly this was—this was [a] catastrophe and I had to get back to the United States.” It will take an hour to get his plane ready, so Powell stops off at the Organization of American States conference where he gives a brief statement, and other foreign ministers give speeches of support. Powell then leaves immediately for Lima’s military airport to fly back to Washington. [GUARDIAN, 9/12/2001; WOODWARD, 2002, PP. 9-10; WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/23/2004 ] However, his plane reportedly does not take off until about 12:30 p.m. EDT. [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 9/11/2001] His flight will take seven hours, during which time he has significant problems communicating with colleagues in Washington (see (12:30 p.m.-7:30 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002; MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: Organization of American States (OAS), Colin Powell Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(After 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Van Stopped Near Temporary Command Post Shows Plane Crashing into WTC The command center of New York’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM), based in WTC Building 7, was evacuated around 9:30 a.m., according to the 9/11 Commission (though other accounts suggest it is evacuated earlier or later than this) (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 305] Subsequently, OEM staff members request the OEM command bus, which is equipped with radios and computers, to use as a mobile operations center. This is then used to set up a temporary command post, located at one point in front of 70 Barclay Street, with Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, OEM Commissioner John Odermatt, and the police and fire commissioners all present. Giuliani is apparently at this post when forewarned of the WTC collapse (see (Before 9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Alarm is raised when a panel truck is stopped near the temporary command post, with a painting of a plane flying into the World Trade Center on it. Fearing that it might be a truck bomb, the New York Police Department immediately evacuates the surrounding area and calls out the bomb squad. NYPD temporarily detains the truck’s occupants, who turn out to be a group of Middle Easterners who speak no English, and have rented the truck. According to a report by the Mineta Transportation Institute, the vehicle turns out to be an innocent delivery truck. The report does not state who rented the truck to the Middle Easterners, or why it shows a picture of a plane hitting the WTC. [JENKINS AND EDWARDS-WINSLOW, 9/2003, PP. 20; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/19/2004] Entity Tags: Office of Emergency Management, Rudolph (“Rudy”) Giuliani, New York City Police Department, John Odermatt Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:31 a.m.-9:33 a.m. September 11, 2001: Norfolk Approach Control Handles Langley Jets, but Does Not Redirect Them to Correct Heading

The Norfolk Tower TRACON. [Source: Federal Aviation Administration] The FAA’s Norfolk Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) is briefly in charge of the three F-16s launched from Langley Air Force Base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but it does not redirect them northward in line with the military’s orders, after the Langley air traffic control tower previously instructed them to fly east. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 96 ] Jets Sent East instead of North - When NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) issued the scramble order (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001), it specified that the Langley jets be directed north toward Washington, DC. But as the jets were taking off, the Langley tower instructed them to go “090 for 60,” meaning they were to fly east for 60 miles (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/9/2004; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 142-143] TRACON Does Not Redirect Jets - When aircraft take off from Langley Air Force Base, control of them is passed from the Langley tower to the Norfolk TRACON. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/6/2003 ] Controllers at the TRACON are permitted to change an aircraft’s flight plan, in the case of the Langley jets the “090 for 60” instruction. [9/11 COMMISSION, 12/1/2003 ] A 9/11 Commission memorandum will state that the Langley jets are “not bound to the 60 mile distance and could have turned to the north at any time they were directed to or had orders to do so.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/6/2003 ] However, although the TRACON is aware that NEADS ordered the jets to head north, it does not redirect them toward this heading instead of going east. [9/11 COMMISSION, 12/1/2003 ] According to the 9/11 Commission, the reason is that “both the lead Langley pilot,” Major Dean Eckmann, “and the FAA’s Norfolk TRACON facility… assumed the flight plan instruction to go ‘090 for 60’ was newer guidance that superseded the original scramble order instructions” issued by NEADS. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 96 ] Pilot Agrees to Follow Tower's Directions - At 9:33, Norfolk TRACON controller Michael Strother asks Eckmann what direction he wants to head in. Strother says, “Quit 2-5, are you going directly to the Langley 090 at 60?” If Eckmann wanted to go somewhere other than what is specified in the flight plan, Strother has the authority to grant the request. But Eckmann replies, “Affirmative.” He says, “That’s our second clearance,” and, referring to the NEADS scramble order, adds, “We had an earlier clearance of a vector and an altitude.” The 9/11 Commission will summarize, “Put simply, the Langley pilots received flight direction guidance from both the scramble order and the Langley AFB departure flight plan, and continued on the latter heading for several minutes until a direction and geographic destination was provided.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 12/1/2003 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/9/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 96 ] Navy Facility Takes over Control of Jets - Norfolk TRACON subsequently passes control of the three F-16s on to “Giant Killer,” the Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility in Virginia Beach, Virginia. This is the Navy air traffic control agency that handles all over-water military operations. [NEW YORK TIMES, 2/10/1997; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/9/2004; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 143] It will not be until around the time the Pentagon is hit that the Langley jets are redirected to their correct heading (see 9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001), after NEADS notices they are going in the wrong direction (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 149-151] Entity Tags: Norfolk Terminal Radar Approach Control, Dean Eckmann, Michael Strother Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

9:31 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001: Deena Burnett Reports Husband’s Call from Flight 93 to Police and FBI After receiving a call from her husband Tom Burnett, who is on the hijacked Flight 93 (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001), Deena Burnett calls 911 to report the hijacking. She used to be a flight attendant, so knows what to say in an emergency. Her 911 call is recorded and she will later be provided with a tape of it. According to journalist and author Jere Longman, who is played this tape, Deena reports: “My husband just called me from United Flight 93. The plane has been hijacked. They just knifed a passenger and there are guns on the airplane.” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 107-108 AND 278] However, in her 2006 book, Deena Burnett will give a slightly different account according to which she makes no mention of guns on the plane, instead telling the dispatcher: “My husband is on an airplane that has been hijacked. He just called me from the airplane on his cellular telephone. He told me they have a bomb on board.” [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 62-63] (Note that the 9/11 Commission later concludes that the Flight 93 hijackers do not possess guns (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 13] ) Deena then tells the dispatcher the flight number and route. Her call is transferred to a man at the police department, who then switches her to the FBI. She repeats her story to a special agent, who initially misunderstands her, thinking she is saying her husband was on one of the planes that hit the World Trade Center. Once she has clarified that he is on another plane, the agent gives her a list of questions to ask her husband if she speaks with him again, such as how many hijackers are there and what weapons do they have? At that moment, her call waiting beeps, as Tom Burnett is calling a second time (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [SACRAMENTO BEE, 9/11/2002; BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 63] Deena will be unable to ask Tom the questions the agent has asked her to during his subsequent calls from Flight 93, because, she later recalls, “I didn’t want to take up any precious time talking any more than was necessary,” and “I had wanted to hear Tom’s voice.” Instead, she writes down everything he says and everything that is going on. [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 68] According to Longman, Deena will call the FBI back minutes later, following her husband’s second call (see (Between 9:36 a.m. and 9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 110] But according to Deena Burnett’s 2006 book, she will not speak to the FBI agent again until around 10:00 a.m., after her husband’s final call to her from Flight 93 (see (Shortly After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 68-69] Entity Tags: Deena Burnett, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Tom Burnett Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

9:31 a.m.-9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines, Learning of Potential Problem, Tries to Contact Flight 93 After United Airlines learns that Flight 93 is not responding to air traffic controllers, it notifies its flight dispatchers of this, and two of its employees try to contact the flight. At about 9:30, the FAA’s Cleveland Center informed the United Airlines headquarters, near Chicago, that Flight 93 was not responding to attempted radio contacts (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). At 9:31, officials at the headquarters inform the airline’s dispatchers—who are responsible for monitoring aircraft in flight—that there is a potential problem with Flight 93. Over the next minute, United’s air traffic control coordinator and another of its employees each send a text message to Flight 93, stating, “ATC looking for you on 133.37.” Flight 93 does not respond to these or any subsequent text messages. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 39 ] Entity Tags: United Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:31 a.m.-9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Unidentified Military Planes Fly near Pentagon Two unidentified military aircraft fly in the vicinity of the Pentagon at an altitude of over 20,000 feet, and are in the area during the minutes before the Pentagon is hit. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/20/2001 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/28/2003 ] Between at least 9:31 a.m. and 9:40 a.m., the two aircraft communicate with the air traffic control tower at Washington’s Reagan National Airport, which is less than a mile from the Pentagon. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/20/2001 ; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 10/3/2001] Radar data will show that they fly “in trail” (in single file, with one aircraft directly behind the other) at 21,000 feet, and are overhead during the last few minutes that Flight 77 is airborne, before it hits the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/28/2003 ] Launched from Delaware Base - The identities of the two aircraft are unclear. They have the call signs “Bobcat 14” and “Bobcat 17.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/20/2001 ] A 9/11 Commission memorandum will state that “flight strips and other information indicate that Bobcat 14 and Bobcat 17 originated out of Dover Air Force Base in Delaware.… It is possible, but not confirmed, that they were Air Force corporate passenger jets.” Airport Managers Do Not Recall Planes - Two key officials will later be unable to specifically recall the aircraft when questioned by the 9/11 Commission. Bob Lazar, the acting operations manager at Reagan National Airport, will say he “did not remember any aircraft with the call sign ‘Bobcat’ that hung out over the National airspace” on this day. However, as well as two of the fighter jets that are inbound from Langley Air Force Base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), he will recall two aircraft “coming from the north, but he did not think that they entered National’s airspace.” Donny Simons, the airport manager at Baltimore-Washington International Airport in Linthicum, Maryland, will stress “that he did not remember the Bobcats specifically,” but he speculates that controllers at his airport “were working the two ‘Bobcats’ and needed vectors from National controllers.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/28/2003 ] Entity Tags: Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, Bob Lazar, Donny Simons Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(After 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Secret Service Finally Rushes President Bush Out of School Kevin Down, a Sarasota police officer, recalls that immediately after President Bush’s speech concludes, “The Secret Service agent [runs] out from the school and [says] We’re under terrorist attack, we have to go now.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] The motorcade departs a few minutes later. Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Secret Service, Kevin Down Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

(After 9:31 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Attendant Is Stabbed

Flight attendant Debbie Welsh is apparently stabbed. [Source: Family photo] A few minutes after 9:31 a.m., a hijacker on board Flight 93 can be heard on the cockpit voice recorder ordering a woman to sit down. A woman, presumably a flight attendant, implores, “don’t, don’t.” She pleads, “Please, I don’t want to die.” Patrick Welsh, the husband of flight attendant Debbie Welsh, is later told that a flight attendant was stabbed early in the takeover, and it is strongly implied it was his wife. She was a first-class attendant, and he says, “knowing Debbie,” she would have resisted. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 207] Entity Tags: Debbie Welsh, Patrick Welsh Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001: Stock Exchange Closes The New York Stock Exchange closes. It is a short distance from the WTC. [MSNBC, 9/22/2001] Entity Tags: New York Stock Exchange Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(9:32 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: In Middle of Crisis, FAA Group Wants Tour of Washington Airport’s Control Tower A group from FAA headquarters, who are apparently oblivious to the morning’s crisis, request and are given a tour of the air traffic control tower at Washington’s Reagan National Airport, until they are forced to leave there just before the time of the Pentagon attack. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 157-158] Reagan Airport is located less than a mile from the Pentagon. [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 10/3/2001] Tour Group Wants to See Tower - At 9:32, the tower supervisor, Chris Stephenson, receives a phone call from one of the airport’s maintenance workers. The maintenance worker says he has a group there from the FAA’s Washington headquarters that is visiting the airport to go over some maintenance issues, but they are also curious to see what goes on in the control tower. It appears the FAA personnel are unaware of the attacks in New York, and Stephenson is asked if it is okay to bring them up. Though he is busy dealing with the chaos resulting from the ground stop recently ordered by the FAA’s Command Center (see (9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001), Stephenson reluctantly agrees. The group arrives moments later, but Stephenson tries to ignore them. According to author Lynn Spencer, Stephenson is as yet unaware that an errant aircraft has been spotted heading toward Washington (see (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 157] But according to USA Today, the Secret Service warned him about this aircraft at around 9:30 a.m. (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 8/11/2002] Group Ordered to Leave - Shortly after the group arrives, Stephenson is called by a controller at the TRACON and notified of the unidentified aircraft (presumably Flight 77), which is five miles west of the tower (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). When he looks out the window, he sees it, now less than a mile away and approaching fast. Stephenson yells at the tour group: “Out! Get out!” The FAA group heads off down the stairs, but the last in the line looks out the window at the descending aircraft and asks, “What’s that guy doing?” ”Get out!” Stephenson repeats, and pushes the man into the stairwell. Soon afterwards, the Pentagon is hit (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 158] Entity Tags: Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, Chris Stephenson, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001: Dulles Airport Controllers Notice Flight 77 Approaching, According to 9/11 Commission

Danielle O’Brien. [Source: ABC News] At 9:32 a.m., according to the 9/11 Commission, several air traffic controllers at Washington Dulles International Airport notice a fast-moving target, which is later determined to be Flight 77, heading eastbound on their radar screens. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 25; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 33 ] At the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) at Dulles Airport, which is 22 miles west of the Pentagon, controllers have been searching for primary radar targets since 9:21, when the facility was notified of the loss of contact with Flight 77 (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 9/13/2001; NAVY TIMES, 9/22/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 25] Controllers See Fast-Moving Radar Track - They now notice an unidentified blip on their screens, heading toward the White House at unusually high speed. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/11/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 145] Controller Danielle O’Brien will later recall: “I noticed the aircraft. It was an unidentified plane to the southwest of Dulles, moving at a very high rate of speed.… I had literally a blip and nothing more. I slid over to the controller on my left, Tom Howell, and I asked him, ‘Do you see an unidentified plane there southwest of Dulles?’ And his response was, ‘Yes. Oh, my gosh, yes! Look how fast he is.’” According to O’Brien, the aircraft is between 12 and 14 miles away when she notices it. It is heading for what is known as Prohibited Area 56 (P-56), which is the airspace over and near the White House, at a speed of about 500 miles per hour. [ABC, 10/24/2001; ABC NEWS, 10/24/2001; DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 8/4/2005] Because the plane’s transponder has been turned off (see 8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001) its identity and type are presently unknown, and the Dulles controllers initially think it is a military aircraft (see (9:25 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; ABC NEWS, 10/24/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 25] TRACON Notifies Others - The Dulles TRACON alerts Washington’s Reagan National Airport (see (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and the Secret Service (see (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001) to the approaching aircraft. Its operations supervisor also provides continuous updates over a teleconference that has been established at the FAA’s headquarters. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 25] According to an FAA chronology that is published shortly after 9/11, the Dulles TRACON controllers notice the unidentified aircraft earlier than the 9/11 Commission says, at between 9:25 and 9:30 (see (Between 9:25 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ] Entity Tags: Danielle O’Brien, Washington Dulles International Airport, Tom Howell Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

9:32 a.m.-9:33 a.m. September 11, 2001: Airline Dispatcher Warns Flights, Including United 93, to Secure Cockpits United Airlines flight dispatcher Ed Ballinger sends a warning message to the flights he is monitoring, which include Flight 93. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 39 ] Ballinger is responsible for monitoring 16 transcontinental flights. [CHICAGO DAILY HERALD, 4/14/2004] Beginning at 9:32, he sends out a text message to these flights: “High security alert. Secure cockpit.” He presumably sends this in response to United Airlines’ notification a minute earlier that there is a potential problem with Flight 93 (see 9:31 a.m.-9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001). Ballinger’s message is transmitted to Flight 93 at 9:33, but the plane does not respond. Ballinger apparently informs his colleagues of this lack of response: United Airlines Chief Operating Officer Andy Studdert will later tell the 9/11 Commission that at “approximately 9:30, a United dispatcher reports that we cannot reach Flight 93.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 39 ] Ballinger previously sent out a message at 9:19, warning his flights to “Beware any cockpit intrusion” (see 9:19 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 11] Entity Tags: Ed Ballinger, Andy Studdert Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Hijacker Tells Passengers Bomb Is Onboard; Air Traffic Controller Overhears At the FAA’s Cleveland Center, an air traffic controller hears a transmission, presumably made by Flight 93 hijacker-pilot Ziad Jarrah, stating: “Ladies and gentlemen: Here the captain, please sit down, keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board. So, sit.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 12; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 39 ] As the 9/11 Commission later notes, “Like [Mohamed] Atta on Flight 11, Jarrah apparently did not know how to operate the communication radios; thus his attempts to communicate with the passengers were broadcast on the [air traffic control] channel.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 98 ] While this communication is assumed to have come from Flight 93, an early FAA report states that it came “from an unknown origin.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ] According to Newsweek, just prior to the communication, Cleveland Center controllers heard the sound of screaming from the flight. [NEWSWEEK, 9/22/2001] The 9/11 Commission states that, around the time of the transmission, the plane’s cockpit voice recording indicates “that a woman, most likely a flight attendant, was being held captive in the cockpit. She struggled with one of the hijackers who killed or otherwise silenced her.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 12; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 39 ] Though the Cleveland air traffic controller understands the hijacker’s communication, he responds to it: “Calling Cleveland Center, you’re unreadable. Say again, slowly.” He also notifies his supervisor who passes the information up the chain of command, and the FAA’s Command Center is subsequently informed, “United 93 may have a bomb on board.” At 9:34 the Command Center will relay this information to FAA headquarters (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28] Entity Tags: Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, 9/11 Commission, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Reagan Airport Informs Secret Service about Aircraft Approaching the White House, but Cheney Reportedly Not Evacuated A supervisor at Washington’s Reagan National Airport calls the Secret Service Joint Operations Center (JOC) and warns it about an unidentified aircraft that is heading toward the White House. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/14/2001; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] Controllers at Reagan Airport have just been contacted by controllers at Washington Dulles International Airport, and notified of the unidentified aircraft, later determined to be Flight 77, approaching Washington (see (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 33 ] Supervisor Calls Secret Service - Immediately after he learns of this aircraft, Victor Padgett, the operations supervisor at the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) at Reagan Airport, picks up a direct line to the White House and informs the Secret Service JOC there: “We have a target five [miles] west. He’s turning south but he’s still on our scope. We’re not talking to him. It’s definitely a suspicious aircraft.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/14/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 146] According to the 9/11 Commission, this is “the first specific report to the Secret Service of a direct threat to the White House.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 39] Padgett provides the Secret Service with continuous updates on the aircraft’s actions. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/14/2001; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ] After traveling almost 10 miles south of Reagan Airport, the aircraft turns back toward Washington and again appears to be heading for the White House. Padgett tells the Secret Service: “What I’m telling you, buddy, if you’ve got people, you’d better get them out of there! And I mean right g_ddamned now!” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 158] (People will begin rapidly evacuating from the White House at about 9:45 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001] Cheney Not Evacuated - According to the 9/11 Commission, when Padgett initially calls the JOC, “No move [is] made to evacuate the vice president” from his White House office. The officer who takes the call will explain, “[I was] about to push the alert button when the tower advised that the aircraft was turning south and approaching Reagan National Airport.” According to the Commission, Vice President Dick Cheney is not evacuated until “just before 9:36.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 39] (However, other accounts indicate he was evacuated earlier on, shortly after 9:00 a.m. (see (9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2001; ABC NEWS, 9/14/2002] ) A supervisor at Dulles Airport also contacts the Secret Service around this time to notify it of the approaching aircraft (see (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Secret Service, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, Victor Padgett Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Dick Cheney

(9:33 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Smooth Flight Path Indicates No Loss of Control on Flight 77 Based on an analysis of radar data for Flight 77 as it approaches the Pentagon and makes a 330 degree loop (see 9:34 a.m.- 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001), experts will later say that the plane is being flown so smoothly that “it’s clear there [is] no fight for control going on.” [CBS NEWS, 9/21/2001; BOSTON GLOBE, 11/23/2001] The plane gets near the White House during this turn. “Sources say the hijacked jet… [flies] several miles south of the restricted airspace around the White House.” [CBS NEWS, 9/21/2001] The Daily Telegraph will later write: “If the airliner had approached much nearer to the White House it might have been shot down by the Secret Service, who are believed to have a battery of ground-to-air Stinger missiles ready to defend the president’s home. The Pentagon is not similarly defended.” [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 9/16/2001] White House spokesman Ari Fleischer will suggest the plane goes even closer to the White House, saying, “That is not the radar data that we have seen. The plane was headed toward the White House.” [CBS NEWS, 9/21/2001 SOURCES: ARI FLEISCHER] Entity Tags: Pentagon, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Reagan Airport Controllers Notified of Unidentified Aircraft Approaching Washington

Reagan National Airport. [Source: Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority] Air traffic controllers at Washington’s Reagan National Airport are contacted by controllers at Washington Dulles International Airport, and informed of a fast-moving unidentified aircraft, later determined to be Flight 77, which is approaching the restricted airspace around the White House. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/11/2001; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/4/2003 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 33 ] Reagan Airport is less than a mile from the Pentagon and only a few miles from the White House. [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/19/2001] During a shift, it has 10 or 11 controllers working in its Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) and seven or eight controllers working in its air traffic control tower. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/28/2003 ] Controllers at the Dulles TRACON have recently noticed the unidentified aircraft on their radar screens (see (Between 9:25 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] TRACON Told of Aircraft - A Dulles Airport controller now calls the TRACON at Reagan Airport, and says: “Hey! Untracked target 15 [miles] west of you. Primary target eastbound! Heading toward P-56!” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 145-146] (P-56, or Prohibited Area 56, is the restricted airspace above and near the White House. [DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 8/4/2005] ) Reagan Airport controller Dan Creedon checks his radar screen and sees the aircraft’s target about 10 miles west of the White House. The radar track is untagged, so he attaches a data box to it with the word “LOOK” in it. This will allow other controllers to quickly spot the aircraft. It also causes its ground speed to appear on the screen. According to author Lynn Spencer, the aircraft is shown to be flying at 290 miles per hour. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 146] But other accounts will claim it is flying at between 400 and 500 mph as it approaches Washington. [CBS NEWS, 9/21/2001; ABC NEWS, 10/24/2001; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/28/2003 ] Creedon then calls out to Victor Padgett, the operations supervisor in the TRACON, and tells him about the aircraft heading their way. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/14/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 146] Controllers Notify Others - After the Reagan Airport controllers learn of the approaching aircraft, they promptly contact other agencies about it. Padgett calls the Secret Service (see (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/14/2001; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ] And another controller will issue traffic advisories on the aircraft to a C-130 military cargo plane that is flying in the area, and then instruct the C-130 to identify and follow the aircraft (see 9.36 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 33 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 146-147] A controller in the TRACON will also call the Reagan Airport control tower, and alert it to the approaching aircraft (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 158] Entity Tags: Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, Victor Padgett, Dan Creedon, Washington Dulles International Airport Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(9:33 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Reagan Airport Controllers Fail to Notify Pentagon and Nearby Helicopter Unit about Approaching Aircraft Air traffic controllers at Washington’s Reagan National Airport fail to notify the Pentagon and a nearby Army airfield about an unidentified aircraft, later determined to be Flight 77, which they are tracking as it approaches the capital. [US ARMY CENTER FOR MILITARY HISTORY, 11/14/2001 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 33 ] Controllers Call Secret Service but Not Military - Controllers in the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) at Reagan National Airport are aware of the unidentified, fast-moving aircraft that is approaching the White House from at least as early as 9:33 a.m. (see (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9, 39; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 145-146] (However, those in the airport’s control tower possibly only learn of it slightly later (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 158] ) Although a supervisor at the TRACON promptly alerts the Secret Service at the White House to the aircraft (see (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001), none of the Reagan Airport controllers contact the Pentagon or the nearby Davison Army Airfield about it. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; US ARMY CENTER FOR MILITARY HISTORY, 11/14/2001 ] Aviation Unit Located near Pentagon - Davison Army Airfield is located at Fort Belvoir, an Army base 12 miles south of the Pentagon. The airfield’s principal missions include maintaining “a readiness posture in support of contingency plans,” exercising “operational control” of the local airspace, and providing “aviation support for the White House, US government officials, Department of Defense, Department of the Army, and other government agencies.” The 12th Aviation Battalion, which is the aviation support unit for the Military District of Washington, is stationed at Davison Airfield. The battalion operates UH-1 “Huey” and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. [PENTAGRAM, 5/7/1999; MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, 8/2000] Its airfield operations unit—Davison Airfield Management—operates and maintains the heliport at the Pentagon. [SOLDIERS MAGAZINE, 7/2006] Tower Supervisor Unhappy - The supervisor of air traffic control currently working in the control tower at Davison Airfield will be unhappy about the failure of the Reagan Airport controllers to alert his unit or the Pentagon to the approaching aircraft. He will voice his complaints when he later talks to one of those controllers. The supervisor will later recall: “I was asking him, ‘Did you know that the aircraft was coming this way?’ And he said: ‘Yes. We were tracking him for so many miles.’” Controller: 'It Never Occurred to Me' to Call Military - The supervisor will ask the controller: “Why you didn’t say anything to Davison? Why you didn’t say anything to the Pentagon? Because if you would have said something, my controller at the Pentagon would have called the DPS unit,” meaning the Defense Protective Service, which guards the Pentagon, “and it would have alerted them that there was something coming to Washington, DC, an aircraft with hostile intentions or something.” The controller will reply, “Well, you know what, it never occurred to me,” and say, “we didn’t know that he was going to hit the Pentagon.” [US ARMY CENTER FOR MILITARY HISTORY, 11/14/2001 ] Entity Tags: Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, Pentagon, Davison Army Airfield Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Dulles Airport Supervisor Notifies Secret Service of Aircraft Approaching the White House A supervisor at Washington Dulles International Airport contacts the Secret Service at the White House and informs it that an unidentified aircraft is heading toward Washington at a high rate of speed. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/22/2003 ] Air traffic controllers at the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) at Dulles Airport have recently noticed this aircraft on their radar screens (see (Between 9:25 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001). Its identity and type are currently unknown, but it is later determined to be Flight 77. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9, 25] Supervisor Calls White House over Hotline - The Dulles TRACON has a direct phone line to the Secret Service at the White House. After a controller alerts him to the suspicious aircraft, John Hendershot, the operations supervisor, calls the Secret Service over this line. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/22/2003 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 12/22/2003 ] He says, “We have an unidentified, very fast-moving aircraft inbound toward your vicinity, eight miles west.” [ABC NEWS, 10/24/2001] Supervisor Uncertain about Response - Hendershot is unsure what response his call elicits. He will tell the 9/11 Commission, “I guess the operator picked it up,” and say that he assumed the information he provided was relayed to the relevant people at the White House. He will also tell the Commission that, following his call, “no one from Dulles tower was talking to the White House during the minute-minute countdown concerning the unknown primary approaching from the west.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 12/22/2003 ] A supervisor at Washington’s Reagan National Airport also contacts the Secret Service around this time, to notify it of the approaching aircraft (see (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] But, while the White House is alerted, personnel at Dulles Airport will tell the 9/11 Commission that there is no discussion about notifying the US Capitol of the unidentified aircraft. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/22/2003 ] Entity Tags: Washington Dulles International Airport, Secret Service, John Hendershot Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

9:33 a.m. September 11, 2001: Planes Warned Away from Washington The BBC reports that pilot Major Dean Eckmann gets a message as he’s flying from Langley, Virginia. “They said—all airplanes, if you come within (I believe it was) 30 miles of Washington, D.C., you will be shot down.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] It’s not clear who “they” are and what authority they have. However, fighters are not actually given shootdown orders until later, if at all. Entity Tags: Dean Eckmann Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

(9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Notifies Video Conference United 93 Is Suspected Hijack FAA Administrator Jane Garvey notifies the video conference chaired by counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke that all aircraft have been ordered to land at the nearest field and reads a list of potential hijacks including Delta 1989 and United 93. [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 5] Although, according to Clarke’s account, both General Richard Myers and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld are present at the conference at this point, the 9/11 Commission will later claim that the military was not notified about the hijacking of United 93 until over half an hour later (see 10:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Richard B. Myers, Jane Garvey, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard A. Clarke Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA’s Headquarters Notified There Might Be a Bomb Onboard Flight 93; NORAD Not Notified According to the 9/11 Commission, word of Flight 93’s hijacking reaches FAA headquarters. By this time, headquarters has established an open line of communication with the FAA Command Center at Herndon, Virginia. It had instructed the center to poll all flight control centers about suspect aircraft. So, at this time, the Command Center passes on Cleveland’s message: “United 93 may have a bomb on board.” The FAA headquarters apparently does not forward this information to the military, despite having the responsibility for doing so. Ben Sliney, the FAA’s national operations manager at its Herndon Command Center, will later recount, “I do know that all the information was being relayed to headquarters and, at least as far as we were concerned, it should have been. We thought it had been given to the military at each juncture.” The Command Center continually updates FAA headquarters on Flight 93 until it crashes. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; CBC, 9/12/2006] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Ben Sliney Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Mentions in Passing to NORAD that Flight 77 Is Missing According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS contacts Washington flight control to ask about Flight 11. A manager there happens to mention, “We’re looking—we also lost American 77.” The commission claims, “This was the first notice to the military that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance.… No one at FAA Command Center or headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Yet, 38 minutes earlier, flight controllers determined Flight 77 was off course, out of radio contact, and had no transponder signal (see 8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001). They’d warned American Airlines headquarters within minutes. By some accounts, this is the first time NORAD is told about Flight 77, but other accounts have them warned around 9:25 a.m. Entity Tags: American Airlines, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Key Day of 9/11 Events

9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Passenger Burnett Calls Again, Learns Hijackers Are on Suicide Mission

Mark Rothenberg. [Source: Family photo] Tom Burnett, a passenger on the hijacked Flight 93, calls his wife Deena Burnett a second time from the aircraft and is told about the planes hitting the World Trade Center. [SACRAMENTO BEE, 9/11/2002] Deena is on the phone with an FBI agent, reporting her husband’s previous call from the plane (see 9:31 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001), when she hears her call-waiting beep. She answers her husband’s call, making a note of the time. [NEWSWEEK, 12/3/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 109-110] Tom tells her the plane’s hijackers are “in the cockpit. The guy they knifed is dead.… I tried to help him, but I couldn’t get a pulse.” [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 64] (According to journalist and author Jere Longman, Burnett is likely referring here to fellow passenger Mark Rothenberg. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 107] ) Deena says: “Tom, they are hijacking planes all up and down the East coast. They are taking them and hitting designated targets. They’ve already hit both towers of the World Trade Center.” [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 64] (When the FBI later interviews her (see (12:30 p.m.) September 11, 2001), Deena will say it seemed her husband was already aware at this time that other flights had crashed into the WTC, although this possibility is not specifically brought up during their call. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001 ] ) Tom says the hijackers are “talking about crashing this plane.” He adds: “Oh my gosh! It’s a suicide mission.” Deena hears him repeating the information she has told him to other people. When she asks who this is, he tells her he is talking to his seatmate. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001 ; BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 64] Tom wants to know if commercial aircraft have been hijacked, how many planes and which airlines are involved, and who is involved? [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 110] He then says: “We’re turning back toward New York. We’re going back to the World Trade Center. No, wait, we’re turning back the other way. We’re going south.” He reports: “We’re over a rural area. It’s just fields. I’ve gotta go.” He then hangs up. The call has lasted about two minutes. [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 64] According to Longman, unlike his previous call, which he made using his cell phone, Tom Burnett makes this call using an Airfone. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 110] But other reports will state that he makes all four of his calls from Flight 93 using his cell phone. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/13/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 4/19/2002; SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 4/21/2002] According to notes of Deena Burnett’s later interview with the FBI, all Tom’s calls are made using his cell phone, but “one of the calls did not show on the caller identification as [Deena] was on the line with another call” when it was made. This could be referring to this second call, which occurred while Deena was on the phone with the FBI agent. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001 ] Entity Tags: Tom Burnett, Deena Burnett, Mark Rothenberg Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(9:34 a.m.) September 11, 2001: President Bush Leaves Booker Elementary School for Sarasota Airport, Initially Heading in Wrong Direction; Possible Threat En Route

Bushâs motorcade on its way to the Sarasota airport. [Source: CBC] President Bush’s motorcade leaves Booker Elementary School bound for Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport. It initially heads off in the wrong direction, though, and has to perform a U-turn in order to proceed toward the airport. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001; WASHINGTON TIMES, 10/8/2002; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 3/22/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/10/2006] A few days after 9/11, Sarasota’s main newspaper reports: “Sarasota barely skirted its own disaster. As it turns out, terrorists targeted the president and Air Force One on Tuesday, maybe even while they were on the ground in Sarasota and certainly not long after. The Secret Service learned of the threat just minutes after Bush left Booker Elementary.” [SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, 9/16/2001] Kevin Down, a Sarasota police officer at the scene, recalls, “I thought they were actually anticipating a terrorist attack on the president while we were en route.” [BBC, 8/30/2002] ABC News reporter Ann Compton, who is part of the motorcade, recalls, “It was a mad-dash motorcade out to the airport.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Kevin Down, Ann Compton, Andrew Card, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Notices Langley Jets Are off Course, but Navy Controller Seems Unconcerned At NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), Staff Sergeant William Huckabone is the first person to notice that the three fighter jets launched from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001) are drastically off course. Jets Heading to Training Airspace - Huckabone has spotted the radar returns for the Langley F-16s and notices that, instead of flying north toward the Baltimore area as instructed, the fighters are going east, out over the Atlantic Ocean, apparently toward a military training airspace called Whiskey 386 (see 9:30 a.m.-9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). Unfortunately, NEADS cannot contact the jets directly, as they are out of its radio range. Furthermore, the supervisor of flying (SOF) for the alert unit at Langley AFB is unavailable. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 149] As the SOF, Captain Craig Borgstrom would normally be responsible for communicating with NEADS and getting information to pass on to his jets, but he has taken off himself, along with his unit’s two alert pilots (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 4/16/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 118] NEADS Calls 'Giant Killer' - Huckabone alerts fellow weapons director Master Sergeant Steve Citino, who is sitting next to him, to the off-course fighters. He then gets on the phone to “Giant Killer”—the Fleet Area Control Surveillance Facility in Virginia Beach, Virginia. This is the Navy air traffic control agency that handles all over-water military operations. [NEW YORK TIMES, 2/10/1997; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 143, 149] Protocol requires that, because the Langley jets are in Giant Killer’s airspace, the Navy facility is responsible for directing them until they reach the airspace of the FAA’s Washington Center, where FAA controllers will take over. Navy Controller Unconcerned - Citino and Huckabone speak to the Navy air traffic controller who is handling the three Langley fighters, but the controller appears not to grasp the urgency of the situation. Huckabone says, “Those fighters need to go north toward Baltimore, and now!” The Navy controller asks: “You’ve got [the Langley F-16s] moving east in airspace. Now you want ‘em to go to Baltimore?” Huckabone says yes, and adds, “We’re not gonna take ‘em in Whiskey 386.” He tells the Navy controller that, once the jets are heading toward Baltimore: “Have [the pilots] contact us on auxiliary frequency 2-3-4 decimal 6. Instead of taking handoffs to us and us handing ‘em back, just tell [the FAA’s Washington] Center they’ve got to go to Baltimore.” The Navy controller responds: “All right, man. Stand by. We’ll get back to you.” He seems to lack any sense of urgency, and Citino snaps at him: “What do you mean, ‘We’ll get back to you’? Just do it!” After hanging up the phone, Huckabone jokes, “I’m gonna choke that guy!” Looking at his radar screen, he sees that the Langley F-16s are continuing to fly out over the ocean. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 149-150] Entity Tags: Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility, William Huckabone, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Craig Borgstrom, Steve Citino Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

(Shortly After 9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Secret Service Asks DC Air National Guard If It Can Launch Fighters

Daniel Caine. [Source: White House] The Secret Service calls the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) at Andrews Air Force Base, just outside Washington, and asks if it can get fighter jets launched. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 78] Secret Service Calls DCANG - Major Daniel Caine, the supervisor of flying with the 113th Wing of the DC Air National Guard, which is based at Andrews, called his contact at the Secret Service earlier on to see if they needed assistance from his unit, but was told they did not (see (Between 9:05 a.m. and 9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001). But the Secret Service has just learned of a suspicious aircraft five miles from the White House (see (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and so one of its agents now calls Caine back. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 124, 156] Caine’s previous call to the Secret Service had been with agent Kenneth Beauchamp, who told Caine he would call back. However, he did not do so. The name of the agent that makes the current call is unstated. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/8/2004 ] Agent Wants Planes Launched - The Secret Service agent asks, “Can you get airplanes up?” He then tells Caine to stand by, and says somebody else will call. Caine will later recall, “When I heard the tone in his voice, I called our bomb dump and told them to uncrate our missiles.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 78] But before Caine does this, Lieutenant Colonel Marc Sasseville, the acting operations group commander under the 113th Wing, calls Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the 113th Wing, to get permission to use their “war-reserve missiles.” Wherley gives the go-ahead, and then Caine calls the weapons loaders across the base and orders them, “Get some live AIM-9s [missiles] and bring them over!” At the same time, Sasseville calls the unit’s maintenance officer and orders that their jets be prepared for launch (see (9:35 a.m.-11:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/8/2004 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 156-157] Someone from the Secret Service’s White House Joint Operations Center will soon call Caine, and request that armed fighters be launched over Washington (see (Shortly After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 78; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/11/2004 ] Entity Tags: Daniel Caine, Secret Service, David Wherley, Marc Sasseville, District of Columbia Air National Guard Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

9:34 a.m.- 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Flies Complex Near-Circular Loop before Striking Pentagon Before crashing into the Pentagon, Flight 77 performs a rapid downward spiral, flying almost a complete circle and descending 7,000 feet in two and a half minutes. [CBS NEWS, 9/21/2001] 330-Degree Turn - At 9:34 a.m., Flight 77 is about 3.5 miles west-southwest of the Pentagon. But, at an altitude of around 7,000 feet, it is flying too high to hit its target. [CBS NEWS, 9/21/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 ] Based on an analysis of radar data and information from the plane’s flight data recorder, a 2002 National Transportation Safety Board report will describe the maneuver the aircraft then performs: “[Flight 77] started a right 330-degree descending turn to the right. At the end of the turn, the aircraft was at about 2,000 feet altitude and four miles southwest of the Pentagon. Over the next 30 seconds, power was increased to near maximum and the nose was pitched down in response to control column movements.” The aircraft accelerates to about 530 miles per hour as it closes in on the Pentagon. [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 ] Controllers Watch on Radar - Air Traffic Controllers at Washington Dulles International Airport follow Flight 77 on their radar screens as it performs this maneuver. Danielle O’Brien will later recall: “John, our supervisor, relayed verbatim, ‘OK, he’s 12 miles west, he’s moving very fast eastbound.… Eleven miles west.’ And it was just a countdown. Ten miles west, nine miles west.… And it went six, five, four, and I had it in my mouth to say three, and all of a sudden the plane turned away. In the room it was almost a sense of relief.” [ABC, 10/24/2001; ABC NEWS, 10/24/2001] Todd Lewis will recall that the aircraft “was heading right towards a prohibited area in downtown Washington.… Then it turned south and away from the prohibited area, which seemed like a momentary sigh of relief, and it disappeared. But it was going away from Washington, which seemed to be the right thing.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] However, O’Brien will continue: “[T]he plane turned back. He continued in the right-hand turn, made a 360-degree maneuver.… We lost radar contact with that aircraft. And we waited. And we waited.” [ABC, 10/24/2001; ABC NEWS, 10/24/2001] Maneuver Indicates Advanced Flying Skills - According to CBS News, “The steep turn” made by Flight 77 “was so smooth… sources say, it’s clear there was no fight for control going on.” The “complex maneuver suggests the hijackers had better flying skills than many investigators first believed.” [CBS NEWS, 9/21/2001] Aviation experts will conclude that this maneuver was the work of “a great talent… virtually a textbook turn and landing.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/10/2002] Due to the aircraft’s high speed and the way it is being flown, Dulles Airport controllers mistake it for a military fighter jet (see (9:25 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; ABC NEWS, 10/24/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Yet the hijacker allegedly at the controls, Hani Hanjour, was considered to be a very poor pilot at numerous flight schools he attended (see October 1996-December 1997, 1998, January-February 2001, February 8-March 12, 2001, (April-July 2001), and Mid-August 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 9/10/2002] Entity Tags: Todd Lewis, National Transportation Safety Board, Danielle O’Brien, John Hendershot, Washington Dulles International Airport Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(9:34 a.m.-11:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: President’s Attempts at Communicating with White House Severely Hindered

Bush trying to use a cell phone while sitting next to Andrew Card as his motorcade nears the Sarasota airport. [Source: Associated Press] After departing the Booker Elementary School, President Bush experiences problems trying to communicate with the White House. On his way to Air Force One, he is unable to get a secure phone line to Dick Cheney, and has to rely instead on using a borrowed cell phone. According to the CBC, even this cell phone doesn’t work. Lee Hamilton, vice chair of the 9/11 Commission, claims the difficulty is because the members of Bush’s entourage, all suddenly trying to call Washington, create a “communication jam.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; NEW YORK TIMES, 6/18/2004; OBSERVER, 6/20/2004; CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/10/2006] Yet after boarding Air Force One the problems continue, despite the plane’s elaborate communications equipment. Bush will later tell the 9/11 Commission “that he was deeply dissatisfied with the ability to communicate from Air Force One,” and that “this was a very major flaw.” Thomas Kean, chair of the Commission, says Bush’s inability to communicate with the White House is “scary on both sides because the president is the only one who can give certain orders that need to be given.” [NBC, 4/4/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/10/2006] Some time before 11:45 a.m., Bush’s senior adviser Karen Hughes tries calling him through the White House switchboard. In a shaky voice, the operator tells her, “Ma’am, we can’t reach Air Force One.” Hughes is very frightened as, she says, “I never had that happen before.” [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002; CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/10/2006] Entity Tags: Lee Hamilton, Thomas Kean, George W. Bush, Karen Hughes Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

(9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Pilot Says He Would Shoot Down a Hijacked Aircraft In answer to a question from a weapons controller at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), one of the pilots that took off in response to Flight 11 confirms that he would be willing to shoot down a hijacked aircraft. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 153] Major Kevin Nasypany, the NEADS mission crew commander, has already checked that his section heads and weapons technicians are prepared to order the shooting down of a civilian aircraft (see (9:19 a.m.) September 11, 2001). At 9:32, after NEADS received a report of a hijacked plane approaching Washington (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001), Major James Anderson asked Nasypany what would happen if they located that aircraft, saying, “Are we gonna shoot him down if they got passengers on board?” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Duffy Says He Would Shoot down a Plane - Nasypany wants to be sure that his pilots are willing to follow a shootdown order, should one be issued. He therefore directs his weapons controller who is dealing with the fighter jets launched from Otis Air National Guard Base (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) to check this. The weapons controller radios Otis pilot Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy and tells him, “If we get another hijack track, you’re going to be ordered to shoot it down.” He then asks, “Do you have a problem with that?” Somewhat startled by the question, Duffy replies, “No—no problem with that.” He reportedly thinks to himself, “If I have a problem with that order, I am in the wrong seat.” According to author Lynn Spencer, Duffy is “doing what he’s been trained to do.… [I]f he gets a legal, lawful order to take out an airliner, then that’s what he’s going to do. He knows every other fighter pilot would do the same.” Duffy and the other Otis pilot that launched with him, Major Daniel Nash, are “confident no plane will get past them: they’ll do what it takes, and follow any order, to protect New York.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 153] Duffy will later tell the Boston Globe: “[P]eople have said, ‘Would you have done it [i.e. shot down a hostile airliner]?’ Absolutely, that’s my job.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/11/2005] No Shootdown Order Issued - However, according to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS personnel will only learn that NORAD has been cleared to shoot down threatening aircraft at 10:31 a.m. (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42] And, according to most accounts, the two Otis pilots never receive an order from the military to shoot down an airliner (see (After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002; BOSTON GLOBE, 9/11/2005] Duffy and Nash will also be contacted by a civilian air traffic controller regarding the possibility of shooting down a hijacked aircraft (see (9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [BBC, 9/1/2002] Entity Tags: Daniel Nash, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Kevin Nasypany, Timothy Duffy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center and NEADS Decide to Send Home Fighter Jets on Training The traffic management unit (TMU) at the FAA’s Boston Center calls NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) to ask whether military planes out on training should be sent home. Boston Center asks, “The military aircraft that are in the air right now, we’re wondering if we should tell them to return to base if they’re just on training missions, or what you guys suggest?” NEADS replies, “No, they’re actually on the active air for the DO [director of operations] out there,” but adds, “We did send the ones home in 105 that were on the training mission.” This is presumably a reference to some fighters from Otis Air National Guard Base that were training in “Whiskey 105,” which is military training airspace southeast of Long Island (see (9:15 a.m.-9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Boston Center mentions that there are other military aircraft still airborne for training, and asks, “In general, anybody that’s training?” After consulting with colleagues, the member of staff at NEADS tells Boston, “Yes, go ahead and send them home.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001] NEADS was involved in a major training exercise this morning, though this was reportedly canceled shortly after the second WTC tower was hit (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, 1/25/2002; AIRMAN, 3/2002] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

(9:35 a.m.-11:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001: DC Air National Guard Unloads Missiles and Prepares Jets to Fly, but First Planes Launch with Guns Only

Weapons being driven across Andrews Air Force Base to the flight line on September 11. [Source: Corensa Brooks / District of Columbia Air National Guard] Munitions workers with the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) unload bullets and missiles from storage sheds, and work toward getting fighter jets armed to launch in response to the attacks, but even by 10:42 a.m., when two pilots take off, no jets have been armed with missiles. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 78, 82] Ordered to Prepare Jets - The munitions crew with the 113th Wing of the DC Air National Guard at Andrews Air Force Base, just outside Washington, has been ordered to uncrate missiles and bring them across the base, while the unit’s maintenance officer has been told to prepare fighters for take off (see (Shortly After 9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 78; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/8/2004 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 157] According to author Lynn Spencer, the unit’s “war-reserve missiles… are never touched, but are kept operational and in minimal numbers for non-alert wings like the DC Guard to allow for contingencies such as this.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 156] Commander Anticipated Order - Colonel Don Mozley, the commander of the 113th Logistics Group, had been anticipating the order to get jets armed and ready to fly, and so has already instructed his weapons officer to “break out the AIM-9s and start building them up.” The missiles need to be transported across the base from its far side, which will take time. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002] Missiles Unloaded onto Trailer - The munitions crew unloads bullets and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles from storage sheds onto a flatbed trailer. Senior Master Sergeant David Bowman, the 113th Wing munitions supervisor, will later recall: “There were six of us there and we had 28 missiles to unload, and they each have three components. And if you drop one, you can’t use it anymore. We were doing it as fast as we could, because for all we knew the terrorists were getting ready to hit us.” Another officer will say the crew prepares the missiles “really fast,” but “we didn’t do it unsafely.” 45 Minutes to Get Missiles across Base - However, the trailer that carries the missiles has a maximum speed of 25 miles per hour and needs a security escort. It takes 45 minutes before the weapons crew has brought missiles across the base to the flight line, where aircraft park. Usually it takes much longer—three hours—to bring weapons from the storage sheds and load them onto fighter jets, according to two senior officers with the unit. Once the missiles have been carried across the base, it takes “no more than 10 minutes” to load each one onto an aircraft, according to one of those officers. Jets Loaded with Ammo after Exercise - The arming of the fighter jets is apparently speeded up because one of the munitions staff had thought to load the jets with ammunition after members of the 113th Wing recently came back from a training exercise. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 78, 84; RASMUSSEN, 9/18/2003; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 157] Three days earlier, members of the wing returned to Andrews after spending two weeks in Nevada for the “Red Flag” exercise (see Late August-September 8, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 156] Master Sergeant Joseph Proctor, one of the unit’s “weapons guys,” had decided to take a load crew and put some ammunition in the jets brought back from Nevada, as these were empty following the exercise. According to Captain Brandon Rasmussen, a pilot with the unit, Proctor’s reason for doing this was so “they wouldn’t be in a rush on Tuesday morning [i.e. September 11],” and “he was thinking local flying and just to help us out a little bit.” Rasmussen will later thank Proctor because of the benefit his actions have on the unit’s response to the attacks, telling him, “If you hadn’t have done that we’d been dead in the water.” [RASMUSSEN, 9/18/2003] Jets Not Fully Armed at 10:42 - Yet in spite of actions like these, even by 10:42 a.m. on September 11, two F-16s that take off from Andrews have not yet been armed with missiles (see 10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 82] Chief Master Sergeant Roy Belknap, the 113th Wing production superintendent, will later recall: “We had two air-to-air birds on the ramp… that already had ammo in them. We launched those first two with only hot guns. By then, we had missiles rolling up, so we loaded those other two airplanes while the pilots were sitting in the cockpit.” [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002] Those aircraft, the first jets to take off with missiles as well as guns, will launch at 11:11 a.m. (see 11:11 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 84; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004] Entity Tags: District of Columbia Air National Guard, Don Mozley, David Bowman, Roy Belknap Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Attendant Warns United Airlines about Hijacking; Information Passed on to United’s Crisis Center An unknown flight attendant on Flight 93, later determined to be Sandy Bradshaw, calls the United Airlines maintenance facility in San Francisco, and reports that her plane has been hijacked. The San Francisco number is one that flight crews know to call if they need to report mechanical problems, obtain advice on troubleshooting, or request maintenance while in flight. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 40 ; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, A/K/A SHAQIL, A/K/A ABU KHALID AL SAHRAWI, DEFENDANT., 4/11/2006 ] Bradshaw makes her call from the rear of Flight 93, using an Airfone. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] A United Airlines maintenance employee initially answers the call. Shortly thereafter, it is taken over by a manager at the facility. Bradshaw reports that hijackers are in the cabin of her plane behind the first-class curtain, and also in the cockpit. They have pulled a knife, have killed a flight attendant, and have announced they have a bomb on board. The manager will later describe Bradshaw as being “shockingly calm” during the conversation. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 40 ; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, A/K/A SHAQIL, A/K/A ABU KHALID AL SAHRAWI, DEFENDANT., 4/11/2006 ] Bradshaw’s call lasts just under six minutes. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] The manager reports the emergency to his supervisor, who passes the information to the crisis center at United Airlines’ headquarters, outside Chicago. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 40 ] After about 9:45-9:50, “everyone” in the crisis center will know “that a flight attendant on board” Flight 93 has “called the mechanics desk to report that one hijacker had a bomb strapped on and another was holding a knife on the crew.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 43 ] The manager at the San Francisco maintenance facility instructs the Airfone operator to try and reestablish contact with the plane, but the effort is unsuccessful. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 40 ] At 9:50, Bradshaw will make another call from Flight 93, this time to her husband (see 9:50 a.m. September 11, 2001). [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 12 ] Entity Tags: United Airlines, Sandy Bradshaw Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Contractors Evacuate Pentagon Just before It Is Hit A contract crew has been installing furniture in the southwest perimeter of the Pentagon. Construction workers are currently doing the final touching up, after more than three years of renovation work on this area of the building, and some Defense Department employees are already moving into their new office spaces. But the wife of one crew member phones her husband after seeing footage of the attacks in New York on CNN and says she feels he is in danger at the Pentagon. Hearing of the attacks, the crew leader instructs his 23 workers to abandon what they are doing and evacuate. Moments later, as they are crossing the parking lot, they see the airliner crash into the exact area of the Pentagon they had just left. [GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE, 5/1/2002; FRENI, 2003, PP. 43-44] There is no evidence that anyone else in the Pentagon evacuates the building before it is struck (see Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001] Another report, which appears to be describing the same incident, says the construction crew evacuates for a different reason: to discuss security with a customer in the parking lot. [PENTAGRAM, 9/14/2001] Entity Tags: Pentagon Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Pentagon

After 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001: Military Liaisons at FAA Command Center Said to Be Informed of Flight 93 Hijacking Military officers at the FAA’s Command Center are informed of the hijacking of Flight 93, according to the FAA’s National Operations Manager Ben Sliney. If such notification is given, it is presumably shortly after the Command Center learns of the hijacking (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). Sliney will later tell the 9/11 Commission: “Available to us at the Command Center of course is the military cell, which was our liaison with the military services. They were present at all of the events that occurred on 9/11.” He will add, “The normal protocols for the events that were transpiring then—that is to say hijacked aircraft, which requires a notification to NORAD—those, at least I was given to understand, were made promptly—the notifications on each hijack.” The FAA’s acting Deputy Administrator Monte Belger will add: “[T]here were military people on duty at the FAA Command Center, as Mr. Sliney said. They were participating in what was going on. There were military people in the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization in a situation room. They were participating in what was going on.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] If the cell is notified, it is unclear what, if anything, the military liaison officers—Colonel John Czabaranek, Lieutenant Colonel Michael-Anne Cherry, and Major Kevin Bridges (see (Between 9:04 a.m. and 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001)—at the Command Center do with the information about Flight 93’s hijacking. The 9/11 Commission will say that the first notification to the military about Flight 93 comes at 10:07 a.m. (see 10:05 a.m.-10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Monte Belger, Kevin Bridges, John Czabaranek, Ben Sliney, Michael-Anne Cherry Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

Before 9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001: Officials Claim NORAD Is Monitoring Flight 93 According to one account given by NEADS Commander Robert Marr, some time before around 9:36 when it changes direction, while it is still flying west, Flight 93 is being monitored by NEADS. Marr describes how, “We don’t have fighters that way and we think [Flight 93 is] headed toward Detroit or Chicago.” He says he contacts a base in the area “so they [can] head off 93 at the pass.” Not only does NORAD know about the flight, but also, according to NORAD Commander Larry Arnold, “We watched the 93 track as it meandered around the Ohio-Pennsylvania area and started to turn south toward DC.” (This change of direction occurs around 9:36 a.m.) [FILSON, 2003] This account completely contradicts the 9/11 Commission’s later claim that NEADS is first notified about Flight 93 at 10:07 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: Robert Marr, Larry Arnold, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(Between 9:35 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NORAD Commander Spends 45 Minutes Driving to Operations Center In the middle of the 9/11 attacks, General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, drives from his NORAD headquarters office at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado to the NORAD operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, about a dozen miles away. The journey reportedly takes him 45 minutes and en route he loses a cell phone call with Vice President Cheney. The reason he makes this journey is unknown, though it is reported that there are superior communications capabilities available at Cheyenne Mountain. [GAZETTE (COLORADO SPRINGS), 6/16/2006; DENVER POST, 7/28/2006; WASHINGTON POST, 7/29/2006] The exact times when Eberhart departs Peterson AFB and arrives at Cheyenne Mountain are unclear. General Richard Myers says that Eberhart phones him from Peterson either just before or just after the Pentagon is hit, which suggests that Eberhart heads out some time between 9:35 a.m. and 9:40 a.m. [ARMED FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION SERVICE, 10/17/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Eberhart tells the 9/11 Commission that when he arrives at the NORAD operations center, the order to shoot down hijacked aircraft has already been passed down NORAD’s chain of command. According to the commission’s timeline, this would indicate he arrives after 10:31 a.m. (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42] Yet other reports state that the massive blast doors to Cheyenne Mountain are shut at around 10:15 a.m. (see 10:15 a.m. September 11, 2001), which suggests that Eberhart arrives earlier. Entity Tags: Ralph Eberhart Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Silent Flight 93 Climbs and Drops; NORAD Still Not Notified When Flight 93 is over Youngstown, Ohio, Stacey Taylor and other Cleveland flight controllers see it rapidly climb 6,000 feet above its assigned altitude of 35,000 feet and then rapidly descend. The plane drops so quickly toward Cleveland that the flight controllers worry they might be the target. Other accounts say the climb occurs around 9:35 a.m. Controllers continue to try to contact the plane but still get no response. [GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: Stacey Taylor, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Rumsfeld Said to Make Eerie Predictions, but Witness Who Gives Account Is Long Gone Representative Christopher Cox later claims he is still meeting with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. They are still discussing missile defense, apparently completely oblivious of the approaching Flight 77. Watching television coverage from New York City, Rumsfeld says to Cox, “Believe me, this isn’t over yet. There’s going to be another attack, and it could be us.” According to the Daily Telegraph, Flight 77 hits the building “moments later.” [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001] In another telling, Cox claims that Rumsfeld says, “If we remain vulnerable to missile attack, a terrorist group or rogue state that demonstrates the capacity to strike the US or its allies from long range could have the power to hold our entire country hostage to nuclear or other blackmail. And let me tell you, I’ve been around the block a few times. There will be another event.” Rumsfeld repeats that sentence for emphasis. According to Cox, “Within minutes of that utterance, Rumsfeld’s words proved tragically prophetic.” Cox also claims, “I escaped just minutes before the building was hit.” [OFFICE OF REPRESENTATIVE CHRISTOPHER COX, 9/11/2001] However, Rumsfeld claims that this meeting with Cox ended before the second WTC crash, which occurred at 9:03 a.m. Cox himself said that after being told of the WTC, “[Rumsfeld] sped off, as did I.” Cox says he immediately headed to his car, making it impossible for him to still be in the Pentagon “just minutes before” it is hit. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001] Another account puts Rumsfeld’s “I’ve been around the block a few times. There will be another event” comment two minutes before the first WTC crash at 8:46 a.m., when Rumsfeld reportedly makes other predictive comments. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/16/2001] Entity Tags: Christopher Cox, Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Donald Rumsfeld, Pentagon

(9:36 a.m.-10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Crisis Center Watches Flight 93 on Radar until It Crashes At the United Airlines crisis center, at its headquarters outside Chicago, staff members watch Flight 93’s radar track until the plane crashes. United Airlines’ senior management has started to gather in the theater-like crisis center, a room that resembles NASA’s Mission Control. Although the airline still has hundreds of flights in the air, officials have highlighted only Flight 93’s path on the large Aircraft Situation Display screen. Even after the plane’s transponder has been switched off (see (9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001), the flight can still be tracked, but officials can no longer determine its altitude. They watch as the plane’s speed fluctuates wildly while it heads toward Washington. Hank Krakowski, United Airlines’ director of flight operations, will later recall: “We knew what was going on. We could see the airplane headed toward the capital. We were wondering whether the military was going to intervene or not.” Those in the crisis center see Flight 93’s radar track stop moving at the time it crashes. A dispatcher determines the latitude and longitude of its last position and reports that it was south of Johnstown in Pennsylvania, about 120 miles from Washington. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 77-78 AND 214; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Entity Tags: Hank Krakowski, United Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(Shortly Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Fire Department Responds to Alarm from USA Today ‘Twin Towers’ Building, near Pentagon

The ‘Twin Towers’ USA Today building in Rosslyn, Virginia. [Source: Monday Properties] Arlington County firefighters are dispatched in response to a fire alarm at the USA Today building, located just a few miles down the road from the Pentagon, though whether there is actually a fire there is unclear. [USA TODAY, 9/13/2001; MCCLATCHY WASHINGTON BUREAU, 2008] The USA Today complex, in the Rosslyn area, includes the two tallest high-rise buildings in the county, which are in fact known as the “Twin Towers.” [WASHINGTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, 9/7/2001; CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 9] The building’s managers had been worried that the complex could be a terrorist target, and called the Arlington County Emergency Communications Center (ECC), asking if they should evacuate (see (9:04 a.m.-9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to Assistant Chief James Schwartz of the Arlington County Fire Department, “Shortly after that, we had a fire response for alarm bells at the USA Today building.” Schwartz is dispatched to the building, but before he leaves his office, word is received about the Pentagon attack, so he heads to the Pentagon instead. [MCCLATCHY WASHINGTON BUREAU, 2008; CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 48-49] Fire Chief Believes Alarm Activated to Facilitate Evacuation - Schwartz will later reflect, “I’ve always suspected that people who were evacuating [the USA Today building] decided that they would pull the fire alarm in order to get everybody out of the building, and that initiated a response on our part.” [MCCLATCHY WASHINGTON BUREAU, 2008] However, according to USA Today spokesman Steve Anderson, who is at the complex, employees of USA Today and its parent company Gannett only begin evacuating the building after the Pentagon attack occurs. Westfield Realty, the company that owns the building, asks all the tenants to evacuate at about 11:00 a.m., but most will already have left by then. [WASHINGTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, 9/11/2001; WASHINGTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, 9/14/2001] Report Apparently Describes Same Incident - The alarm at the USA Today building may be the same incident as is later described in the Arlington County After-Action Report on the emergency response to the Pentagon attack. The report states that, “just one minute before the Pentagon crash,” several fire and medical units are dispatched “to an apartment fire at 1003 Wilson Boulevard in Rosslyn” (see (Shortly Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. A9] The address of the USA Today complex is reported as being “1000 and 1110 Wilson Blvd.,” suggesting this is the same building as where the “apartment fire” is reported to be. [WASHINGTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, 9/7/2001] The first engine to arrive in response to the apartment fire reports that it is already out. [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. A9] News Reports of Fire - In the aftermath of the attack on the Pentagon, news reports will—apparently incorrectly—describe a fire at the USA Today building. At 9:46 a.m., local radio station WTOP will report, “We’re hearing from a caller who says she is eyewitness to another hit here in town; the USA Today building may also be on fire in addition to the Pentagon.” [BROADCASTING AND CABLE, 8/26/2002] The Washington Post will describe, “The USA Today building in Rosslyn was supposedly enveloped in smoke.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/11/2001] But the Associated Press states that “Radio reports about an explosion at the USA Today building in Rosslyn were false.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001] Entity Tags: USA Today building, Arlington County Fire Department, James Schwartz Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(Shortly Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: E-mail Informs Pentagon Staff that Alert Level Is Still ‘Normal’

Peter Murphy. [Source: Gerry J. Gilmore] Peter Murphy, the counsel to the commandant of the Marine Corps, is in his office on the fourth floor of the Pentagon’s outer E Ring, watching the CNN coverage of the attacks in New York. Having seen what happened, Murphy had asked Robert Hogue, his deputy counsel, to check with their administrative clerk, Corporal Timothy Garofola, on the current security status of the Pentagon. Yet despite what has happened in New York, Garofola has reportedly “just received an e-mail from the security manager to all Department of Defense employees that the threat condition remained ‘Normal.’” Garofola passes this information to Hogue. As Hogue is stepping into Murphy’s office to relay the message to him, there is a tremendous explosion as the Pentagon is hit. [LEATHERNECK, 11/2001; WASHINGTON TIMES, 9/11/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 8/3/2003] Reportedly, John Pugrud—the deputy chief of the Defense Protective Service, which guards the Pentagon—is finally about to pass on an instruction to raise the threat level at this time, when the Pentagon is hit (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 152] The aircraft crashes two floors below and just yards to the right of Murphy’s office. Fortunately, neither he nor any of the men with him are hurt, and they all manage to make it safely outside. [AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 8/16/2002] Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Timothy Garofola, Peter Murphy, Robert Hogue Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

Shortly Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: FBI Works from ‘Script’ at Dulles Airport; Not Asking about Hijackers Shortly before Flight 77 hits the Pentagon, Washington’s Dulles Airport, from where it had departed, is “locked down” by the FAA, and many FBI and INS agents arrive, but their behavior is considered odd. Ed Nelson, a security manager at the airport, thinks something is not “adding up,” due to the unusual questions his employees are being asked: “They were not asking about the hijackers—they were focusing on what my screeners might have done wrong. It was as if they were working off a script.” FBI agents will later confirm this, and an FBI supervisor will say: “The orders came from headquarters through the local Washington-area FBI field offices and the Joint Task Force on Terrorism. The teams of agents were told to ‘get the screeners to admit they had violated FAA recommended procedures.’” [TRENTO AND TRENTO, 2006, PP. 36] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Ed Nelson Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, FBI 9/11 Investigation

Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Pentagon Clinic Has Crisis Equipment Ready Due to Inventory

Major Lorie Brown. [Source: US Medicine] The DiLorenzo Tricare Health Clinic inside the Pentagon has its equipment for dealing with mass casualty (MASCAL) incidents out of storage this morning, because staff members are doing an inventory. Major Lorie Brown, the chief nurse, will need to initiate the clinic’s MASCAL disaster plan after the Pentagon is hit at 9:37 a.m. (see Soon after 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). She later says, “So there were many pieces that just fell into place and worked so well on that day. It was just fortuitous. It was just amazing that way that things kind of happened the way they did.” [NURSING SPECTRUM, 9/24/2001; OFFICE OF MEDICAL HISTORY, 9/2004, PP. 7] Entity Tags: DiLorenzo Tricare Health Clinic Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Cleveland Flight Control Wants NORAD Notified; FAA Command Center Says People Are Working on It

FAA’s Cleveland Center. [Source: ABC News] According to the 9/11 Commission, at about this time Cleveland flight control specifically asks the FAA Command Center whether someone has requested the military to launch fighters toward Flight 93. Cleveland offers to contact a nearby military base. The Command Center replies that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command have to make that decision and are working on the issue. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Cleveland overheard a hijacker say there was a “bomb on board” at 9:32 a.m. and passed the message to FAA higher ups (see (9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to John Werth, the Cleveland controller handling Flight 93, “Within three or four minutes, probably, of when [the hijacking] happened, I asked if the military was advised yet. Had anybody called the military? They said, ‘don’t worry. That’s been taken care of,’ which I think to them, meant they had called the command center in Washington.” [CBS NEWS, 9/10/2006] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, John Werth, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001: Airline Dispatchers Learn Flight 93 Is Heading for Washington, Offer It Assistance United Airlines flight dispatcher Ed Ballinger is informed that Flight 93, which he is responsible for monitoring, is heading for Washington, DC. At the United Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center, near Chicago, dispatch manager Mike Barber tells Ballinger that Flight 93 is “off track, heading for DC.” The aircraft has just reversed course (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and, having learned that it is not responding to FAA communications (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), officials at United Airlines headquarters now believe it has been hijacked. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 456; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 41 ] Also at this time, a United dispatcher who is assisting Ballinger sends a text message to Flight 93, asking, “How’s the wx[?]” (what this means is unclear), and, “Can dispatch be of any assistance?” No response is received. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 41 ] Entity Tags: Ed Ballinger, Mike Barber Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(Between 9:36 a.m. and 9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Passenger’s Wife Deena Burnett Calls FBI, according to One Account According to journalist and author Jere Longman, after her husband Tom Burnett has called her a second time from the hijacked Flight 93 (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001), Deena Burnett calls the FBI again. She had previously spoken with an FBI agent after she’d called 911 following her first call from her husband (see 9:31 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). Longman provides no details of what is said during this second call to the FBI. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 110-111] Deena Burnett’s account, presented in her own 2006 book, will make no mention of any call to the FBI at this time. She only says that at this time she speaks by phone with her husband’s two sisters and his parents. According to her 2006 account, Deena will not speak to the FBI a second time until around 10:00 a.m., after Tom has made his fourth and final call to her from Flight 93 (see (Shortly After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 64-65 AND 68-69] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Deena Burnett Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(Shortly Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Sheer Coincidence Brings Emergency Rescue near to Pentagon; Bomb Disposal Unit Also on Its Way before Attack In response to an emergency 911 telephone call, the Arlington County Emergency Communications Center dispatches several units to deal with an apartment fire at 1003 Wilson Boulevard in Rosslyn, Virginia—within the vicinity of the Pentagon. Because this fire is in a high-rise building, nine different fire and medical service units are dispatched. However, the first engine crew to arrive radios to the other units that the fire has gone out. Consequently, by “sheer coincidence,” at the time when the Pentagon is hit, there are a significant number of available fire and medical service units already on the road nearby. [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. A9; FIRE ENGINEERING, 11/2002] Assistant Chief James Schwartz of the Arlington County Fire Department will later recall that, around this time, firefighters are dispatched in response to an alarm at the high-rise USA Today complex in Rosslyn (see (Shortly Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The address of the complex is 1000 and 1110 Wilson Boulevard, suggesting this is in fact the same incident as the “apartment fire” at 1003 Wilson Boulevard. [WASHINGTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, 9/7/2001; MCCLATCHY WASHINGTON BUREAU, 2008] Furthermore, apparently around this same time, soldiers from a bomb ordnance disposal unit at Fort Belvoir, 12 miles south of the Pentagon, are on their way to do a sweep of the Pentagon heliport, ready for the expected arrival of the president there at around midday (see 8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 64-65] Entity Tags: Arlington County Emergency Communications Center, James Schwartz Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Disappears from Radar Washington flight controllers are watching Flight 77’s radar blip. Just before radar contact is lost, FAA headquarters is told: “The aircraft is circling. It’s turning away from the White House.” [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Then the blip disappears (see 9:34 a.m.- 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). Its last known position is six miles from the Pentagon and four miles from the White House. The plane is said to be traveling at around 500 mph, or a mile every seven seconds. [CBS NEWS, 9/21/2001; NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, 1/25/2002; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(9:36 a.m.-10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Military Claims It Is Tracking Flight 93 and Ready to Shoot It Down; 9/11 Commission Says Otherwise According to the later claims of several senior officials, the US military is tracking Flight 93 as it heads east and is ready to shoot it down if necessary. According to Brigadier General Montague Winfield, the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) has “received the report from the FAA that Flight 93 had turned off its transponder, had turned, and was now heading towards Washington, DC.” Winfield will add, “The decision was made to try to go intercept Flight 93.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] General Richard Myers, the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will write that in the NMCC, “We learned that there was apparently a fourth hijacked aircraft, United Airlines Flight 93 out of Newark, bound nonstop for San Francisco. Like the other planes, it had switched off its transponder, making it much harder if not impossible to track on ground radar.” [MYERS, 2009, PP. 152] Major General Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region, will say, “I was personally anxious to see what 93 was going to do, and our intent was to intercept it.” Three fighters have taken off from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to Arnold, “we launched the aircraft out of Langley to put them over top of Washington, DC, not in response to American Airline 77, but really to put them in position in case United 93 were to head that way.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] He says, “as we discussed it in the conference call, we decided not to move fighters toward 93 until it was closer because there could have been other aircraft coming in,” but adds, “I had every intention of shooting down United 93 if it continued to progress toward Washington, DC… whether we had authority or not.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 73] Colonel Robert Marr, the battle commander at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), is reportedly “focused on United Flight 93, headed straight toward Washington.” He will concur with Arnold, saying: “United Airlines Flight 93 would not have hit Washington, DC. He would have been engaged and shot down before he got there.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 73] Marr and Arnold will both say they were tracking Flight 93 even earlier on, while it was still heading west (see Before 9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001). Yet, contradicting these claims, the 9/11 Commission will conclude that the military only learns about Flight 93 around the time it crashes. It says the NMCC learns of the hijacking at 10:03 a.m. (see 10:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). Based upon official records, including recordings of the NEADS operations floor, it says NEADS never follows Flight 93 on radar and is first alerted to it at 10:07 a.m. (see 10:05 a.m.-10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 30-31, 34 AND 42; WASHINGTON POST, 4/30/2006; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Entity Tags: National Military Command Center, Montague Winfield, Richard B. Myers, Robert Marr, Larry Arnold Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93 (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Reagan Airport Control Tower Notified about Approaching Aircraft, Possibly for First Time

An air traffic controller in the tower at Reagan National Airport. [Source: Rob Ballenger / NPR] An air traffic controller in the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) at Washington’s Reagan National Airport calls the airport’s control tower and alerts it to an unidentified aircraft that is approaching and heading in the direction of the White House. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 145-146, 158] The TRACON was recently contacted by controllers at Washington Dulles International Airport and notified of this aircraft, which is later determined to be Flight 77 (see (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 33 ] TRACON controllers have watched it on radar as it traveled almost 10 miles south of the airport, and then turned back toward Washington. TRACON Calls Tower - A controller in the TRACON now phones Chris Stephenson, the supervisor in the Reagan Airport control tower, and says to him, “See in the sky, five miles west of you?” Stephenson thinks he has identified the target the controller is referring to on his radar screen, but it is the wrong one. The controller clarifies: “No! The ‘LOOK’ tag! See the ‘LOOK’ tag? It’s a 757! Do you see anything out there?” Stephenson then looks out of the window and can see the plane, now less than a mile away, coming in fast. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 158] He sees it turning to the right and descending. [USA TODAY, 8/11/2002] A tour group from FAA headquarters is currently looking around the tower, and Stephenson promptly orders its members to “get out” of there (see (9:32 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Time of First Notification Unclear - According to author Lynn Spencer, Stephenson was unaware of the approaching aircraft prior to this call from the TRACON. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 157-158] But USA Today will claim he received a call at “[a]bout 9:30” from the Secret Service, telling him an unidentified aircraft was speeding toward Washington (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 8/11/2002] Furthermore, after the Reagan TRACON was alerted to the aircraft, departure controller Dan Creedon quickly attached a data box to its radar track with the word “LOOK” in it, which would allow other controllers—including those in the control tower—to quickly spot it and track it on their screens. Why Stephenson had not noticed this is unclear. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/28/2003 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 145-146] Entity Tags: Chris Stephenson, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

Shortly Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Army Airfield near Pentagon Ordered to Recall Its Aircraft The air traffic control tower at an Army airfield near the Pentagon receives a call from someone at Washington’s Reagan National Airport—presumably an air traffic controller—who instructs it to recall all its aircraft. [US ARMY CENTER FOR MILITARY HISTORY, 11/14/2001 ] Davison Army Airfield is at Fort Belvoir, 12 miles south of the Pentagon. The 12th Aviation Battalion, which is the Military District of Washington’s aviation support unit, is stationed there. This includes three helicopter companies that fly UH-1 “Huey” and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. [MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, 8/2000] Airfield Told to Land All Aircraft 'Very Quickly' - According to a supervisor of air traffic control at Davison Airfield who is currently in the airfield’s control tower, shortly before the time when the Pentagon is hit a controller at his facility receives the call from Reagan Airport telling them to recall all their air traffic. The supervisor, who will say that the caller is “going crazy,” takes over the call. The caller then tells him to “recall all your traffic. Just make sure that everybody lands.… [H]e was like, telling us, everybody that you got outside, bring them in and land them quickly, very quickly.” The supervisor tells him, “Give me a reason and I’ll do it,” but the caller responds, “I can’t tell you the reason, but you need to do this.” [US ARMY CENTER FOR MILITARY HISTORY, 11/14/2001 ] (At around 9:32 a.m., according to the 9/11 Commission, Washington’s Dulles Airport notified Reagan Airport of a “radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed” toward Washington (see 9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001), so it is plausible that this is what has prompted Reagan Airport to call the Davison control tower. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 33 ] ) Davison Airfield Recalls Its Aircraft - After the caller hangs up, the supervisor at Davison Airfield instructs the air traffic controller at his facility to “tell everybody to come in.” The controller then starts “recalling everybody that just departed,” and the supervisor approves “for them to make it straight in, the helicopters to land straight in without using the regular traffic pattern.” The control tower recalls its aircraft individually, rather than putting out a single broadcast telling all aircraft to return to the airfield. The supervisor will recall: “[E]verybody was coming in. And at that time when everybody was coming in… I was like thinking, why? Why do they want to recall everybody? That means that something is going on.” While the control tower is still recalling its aircraft, the supervisor looks out of a window to the northeast, and notices a large black cloud of smoke in the area of the Pentagon, the result of the attack there. [US ARMY CENTER FOR MILITARY HISTORY, 11/14/2001 ] It is unclear what aircraft from Davison Airfield are airborne and recalled to base. But a 12th Aviation Battalion helicopter and its crew that are always on standby for “contingency” missions have been away this morning, conducting a traffic survey (see Early Morning September 11, 2001). They are presumably recalled at this time, if not beforehand. [ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, 11/14/2001 ] Entity Tags: Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, 12th Aviation Battalion, Davison Army Airfield Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Pentagon

(Shortly After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: DC Air National Guard Officer Receives Call from Secret Service at White House, Requesting Armed Fighters The District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) at Andrews Air Force Base, just outside Washington, receives a call from the Secret Service at its White House Joint Operations Center (JOC), requesting armed fighter jets over the capital. JOC Calls DC Air National Guard - Major Daniel Caine is the supervisor of flying with the 113th Wing of the DC Air National Guard at Andrews, and is currently at the operations desk, where a Secret Service agent recently called him and asked if the DCANG could launch fighters. The agent then told Caine to stand by and said someone else would call (see (Shortly After 9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Now the phone rings, and Caine answers it. The caller, from the JOC, asks for armed fighter jets over Washington. Caine is unsure how the JOC has got the operations desk phone number. He will later speculate that it got it from Secret Service agent Kenneth Beauchamp, who he’d contacted earlier on (see (Between 9:05 a.m. and 9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Caine Possibly Hears Cheney in Background - The name of the caller is unstated. However, Caine believes he can hear Vice President Dick Cheney’s voice in the background. He will tell author Lesley Filson: “I could hear plain as day the vice president talking in the background. That’s basically where we got the execute order. It was ‘VFR [visual flight rules] direct.’” He will later tell the 9/11 Commission that he “thought, but would not swear to it, that he heard the vice president’s voice in the background.” Caine Learns of Pentagon Attack - Around this time, Caine learns that the Pentagon has been hit. Even though the Pentagon is just 10 miles from Andrews Air Force Base, he will later recall that he only learns of the attack from news reports, and “no other source.” The result of learning this, according to Caine, is that “the intensity level increased even more.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 76, 78; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/8/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/11/2004 ] Commander Arrives, Takes over Call - At some point during Caine’s call with the JOC, apparently soon after the Pentagon attack, Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the DC Air National Guard, finally arrives at the headquarters of the 121st Fighter Squadron, where Caine and his colleagues are (see (Shortly After 9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (The 121st Fighter Squadron is part of the 113th Wing of the DCANG.) At this time, Caine has a phone to each ear. He passes the phone with the call from the JOC to Wherley, saying, “Boss… here, you take this one!” He passes the other to Lieutenant Colonel Phil Thompson, the chief of safety for the 113th Wing. Caine has decided he is going to fly, and so Thompson will be replacing him as the unit’s supervisor of flying. Caine then goes to join the other pilots that are suiting up, ready to take off in their jets. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 78-79; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/8/2004 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 184] Caine will take off from Andrews at 11:11 a.m. (see 11:11 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 84; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004] Entity Tags: District of Columbia Air National Guard, Daniel Caine, Phil Thompson, David Wherley, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

(After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Pilots Reportedly Never Receive Shootdown Order, though One Account Suggests Otherwise According to most accounts, the two fighter jets launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to the hijacked Flight 11 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) never receive an order from the military to shoot down hostile aircraft. However, one account will suggest otherwise. [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 70; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42-44; BOSTON GLOBE, 9/11/2005] According to the 9/11 Commission, personnel at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) learn that NORAD has been cleared to shoot down threatening aircraft at 10:31 a.m., but they do not pass this order on to the fighter pilots (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). The only order conveyed to the pilots is to “ID type and tail” of hostile aircraft. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42-43] In 2005, the Boston Globe will report that the two Otis pilots, Major Daniel Nash and Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Duffy, “stressed that they never had orders to shoot down any of the [hijacked] planes.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/11/2005] However, in October 2002, Duffy will tell author Leslie Filson that, while flying over Manhattan, he and Nash “were given clearance to kill over their radio frequencies, but to this day aren’t sure who gave that order. Was it NEADS or a civilian air traffic controller?” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 70, 89] At around 9:35 a.m., NEADS radioed Duffy to check he would be prepared to shoot down a hijacked aircraft (see (9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 153] And at some point, a civilian air traffic controller tells the two Otis pilots that if another plane is hijacked, it will have to be shot down (see (9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002] Entity Tags: Timothy Duffy, Daniel Nash, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

Shortly Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Navy Intelligence Unit at Pentagon Learns of Third Hijacked Plane Approaching Washington

Dan Shanower. [Source: Family photo / Associated Press] Petty Officer Jason Lhuillier is on duty at the Chief of Naval Operations Intelligence Plot (CNO-IP). This small intelligence unit is located within the Navy Command Center at the Pentagon, on the first floor of the building’s southwest face. Since learning of the second plane hitting the WTC, he and his colleagues have been trying to build the intelligence picture, liaising with such agencies as the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Shortly before the Pentagon is struck, Lhuillier receives a phone call from the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC). [WASHINGTON POST, 9/16/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 1/20/2002; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 9/11/2002] Like the National Military Command Center (NMCC), the NMJIC is located in the Joint Staff area of the Pentagon. It constantly monitors worldwide developments for any looming crises that might require US involvement. [JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, N.D.; WASHINGTON TIMES, 9/25/1997] The caller informs Lhuillier, “We’ve got indications of another aircraft that’s been hijacked. It’s heading out to DC.” [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 9/11/2002] The caller may possibly be referring to the same incorrect report that was received by the NMCC at around 9:30 a.m., that Flight 11 is still airborne and heading toward Washington (see (9:29 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 37] Lhuillier then interrupts a meeting between Commander Dan Shanower, who is in charge of the CNO-IP, and six others, to tell them about this third plane. Commander David Radi, an aide to Admiral William Fallon, the vice chief of naval operations, is in his Pentagon office about 100 yards from the CNO-IP. He has also heard fragmentary reports about another hijacked plane heading towards Washington, and that fighter jets are being scrambled. He calls the CNO-IP for more information, but is only told, “We’re working on it.” Radi later recalls that he’d wondered where the plane might be heading: “I’m thinking to myself, ‘Well, the Pentagon, the White House or the Capitol.’” Within minutes, the Pentagon is struck. The CNO-IP will be destroyed in the impact, and seven people working in it will be killed. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/20/2002; ARLINGTON COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 2/21/2002; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: National Military Joint Intelligence Center, David Radi, Jason Lhuillier, Dan Shanower Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Pentagon

(Shortly Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Chief of Pentagon Defense Protective Service Instructs Deputy to Raise Alert Level

John Jester. [Source: The Pentagon Channel] John Jester, the chief of the Defense Protective Service (DPS), which guards the Pentagon, finally gives the instruction to raise the Pentagon’s state of alert, though only by one level. Jester had been in his office on the fourth floor of the Pentagon when he learned of the attacks in New York (see Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). He had reviewed contingency plans and procedures for increasing security with DPS Major James Phillips, and then headed to the office of David O. “Doc” Cooke, the head of the Washington Headquarters Services. Jester next goes to the office of his immediate supervisor Paul Haselbush, the director of real estate and facilities. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 151-152] Jester will recall that Haselbush asks him: “What if a plane were to come here? It’s just a thought that people have had. What if it were to occur here?” Jester replies: “Hopefully it is not going to happen here. What can you do to defend a building against a plane?” [MURPHY, 2002, PP. 244] According to the Defense Department’s own book about the Pentagon attack, before returning to his office Jester meets with his deputy, John Pugrud, and directs him to notify the DPS Communications Center to raise the Terrorist Force Protection Condition. This ranges from Normal up through four higher levels, Alpha to Delta. But Jester only instructs that it be raised one level, from Normal to Alpha, which means a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists that requires enhanced security. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 152] It requires spot-inspections of vehicles and increased police patrols. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/16/2001] In one account, Jester will recall having instructed Pugrud to increase the threat level earlier, before he’d headed to Cooke’s office. [MURPHY, 2002, PP. 244] But other evidence is consistent with him giving this instruction at the later time, minutes before the Pentagon attack. For example, Marine Corporal Timothy Garofola reportedly receives an e-mail shortly before the Pentagon is struck, informing all Defense Department employees that the threat condition remains at Normal (see (Shortly Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [LEATHERNECK, 11/2001] And Pugrud is reportedly trying to phone the DPS Communications Center about raising the threat level at the very time the Pentagon is hit (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 152] Entity Tags: Paul Haselbush, John Jester, John Pugrud Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Government Departments in Washington Not Evacuated Prior to Pentagon Attack Government buildings in Washington, DC, are not evacuated prior to the attack on the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m. As CNN will describe, even after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the FAA’s warning to the military of a hijacked aircraft apparently heading toward Washington (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001), “the federal government failed to make any move to evacuate the White House, Capitol, State Department, or the Pentagon.” [CNN, 9/16/2001] Although a slow evacuation of the White House begins around 9:20 a.m. (see (9:22 a.m.) September 11, 2001), it is not until 9:45 that the Secret Service orders people to run from there (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001; ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] Other government buildings, including the Capitol (see 9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001), the Justice Department, the State Department, and the Supreme Court, will not be evacuated until between 9:45 and 10:45 a.m. [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 9/14/2001; US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 8/15/2002] Robert Bonner, who was recently nominated as Commissioner of Customs, will later estimate that he was evacuated from the Treasury Department at “about 9:35 a.m.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004; US DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 9/20/2004] But other accounts say the Treasury Department is not evacuated until after the Pentagon attack. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001; REUTERS, 9/11/2001; US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 9/11/2002] Furthermore, journalist and author Robert Draper will describe that, even after the State and Treasury departments have been evacuated: “no agents thought to take charge of the Commerce Department, which housed 5,000 employees. Eventually, Secretary [of Commerce] Don Evans got tired of waiting for orders and had someone drive him to his home in McLean, where he sat for hours until he finally made contact with the Secret Service.” [DRAPER, 2007, PP. 143] According to CNN, prior to the Pentagon attack, “neither the FAA, NORAD, nor any other federal government organ made any effort to evacuate the buildings in Washington. Officials at the Pentagon said that no mechanism existed within the US government to notify various departments and agencies under such circumstances [as occur on 9/11].” [CNN, 9/16/2001] Entity Tags: Pentagon, US Supreme Court, Robert Bonner, US Department of Commerce, US Department of Justice, Federal Aviation Administration, US Department of the Treasury, US Department of State, White House, US Capitol building, Donald L. Evans Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93, Pentagon

9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001: Report of Airliner Approaching White House Sets off ‘Frenzy’ at NEADS Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, calls NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) to report a low-flying airliner he has spotted six miles southeast of the White House. He can offer no details regarding its identity. The plane is reportedly Flight 77, but as it has its transponder turned off, no one realizes this at the time. The news of the plane “sets off a frenzy.” Major Kevin Nasypany orders Major James Fox, head of the NEADS weapons team, “Get your fighters there as soon as possible!” Staff Sergeant William Huckabone says, “Ma’am, we are going AFIO [emergency military control of the fighters] right now with Quit 2-5 [the Langley Air Force Base fighters]” (see 9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001), and adds, “They are going direct Washington.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] The Langley fighters will arrive over Washington some time around 10 a.m. (see (Between 9:49 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: William Huckabone, James Fox, Kevin Nasypany, Colin Scoggins, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Washington, DC, Area Hospital Alerted to Approaching Plane; Activates Disaster Plan

Dr. Thomas Mayer. [Source: Studer Group] The air traffic control tower at Washington Dulles International Airport notifies Inova Fairfax Hospital—the largest hospital in Northern Virginia—that a hijacked aircraft is missing. It passes this information to Dr. Thomas Mayer, the chair of the hospital’s emergency department. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 117] At around 9:32 a.m., air traffic controllers at the FAA’s terminal control facility at Dulles had “observed a primary radar target,” later determined to be Flight 77, “tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed” (see 9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 25; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 33 ] Mayer will later recall: “We knew that something was headed towards the national capital area. We didn’t know where. But we knew we needed to get ready. So we immediately went on disaster planning mode.” [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 117] The Arlington County After-Action Report indicates the hospital in fact initiates its disaster plan earlier than Mayer suggests, stating: “Inova Fairfax Hospital activated its disaster plan following reports of the World Trade Center attacks. Subsequently, the hospital received emergency notification of a missing airliner from the Washington Dulles International Airport tower.” The hospital cancels elective surgeries until 6:00 p.m. and makes eight trauma teams available within 20 minutes. The regular emergency room is relocated to an alternate site, and nearly 100 nurses and doctors prepare to respond in the event of an attack in the Washington Metropolitan Area. [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. B3] Due to the strategic importance of the region, Inova Fairfax and the other hospitals and clinics in the Washington area are particularly well prepared for mass casualty incidents. They regularly conduct drills to practice for chemical or biological attacks. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 115] Entity Tags: Thomas Mayer, Inova Fairfax Hospital Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Pentagon Not Evacuated Prior to Being Hit Before the Pentagon is hit, no steps are taken to alert or evacuate the building’s 20,000 employees. Even Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his top aides are reportedly unaware of a rogue plane heading toward Washington prior to the attack there. [ABC NEWS, 9/16/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 429] Pentagon spokesman Glenn Flood will later try to explain why the Pentagon is not evacuated at this time, saying: “To call for a general evacuation, at that point, it would have been just guessing. We evacuate when we know something is a real threat to us.” He says that an evacuation could have put employees at risk by moving them outside the protection provided by the building’s walls. Another Pentagon spokesman, Air Force Lt. Col. Vic Warzinski, will add, “The Pentagon was simply not aware that this aircraft was coming our way.” [NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001] Yet, as early as 9:21, the FAA warned the military of a hijacked aircraft heading toward Washington (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The National Military Command Center (NMCC), located inside the Pentagon, was aware of this hijacked aircraft by 9:30, according to the 9/11 Commission (see (9:29 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 26 AND 37; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 429] The New York Times will in fact report that, since shortly before 9:00 a.m., “military officials in [the NMCC] were urgently talking to law enforcement and air traffic control officials about what to do.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/15/2001] The order to evacuate will only go out over the Pentagon’s public address system shortly after the building is hit. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 137-138] The Defense Protective Service, which guards the Pentagon, does not order that the building’s threat level be raised until the time when it is hit (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 151-152] Entity Tags: Vic Warzinski, Glenn Flood, Pentagon, Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(9:36 a.m.-9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Emergency Workers See and Promptly Report Low-Flying Flight 77 Approaching the Pentagon and Crashing

Sergeant William Lagasse. [Source: Citizen Investigation Team] Several police officers and firefighters see the low-flying Flight 77 as it approaches the Pentagon and crashes. They quickly report this to their own agencies or to the Arlington County Emergency Communications Center (ECC), which is the focal point of all police and fire 911 calls for the county. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 66] Arlington County Police Department Corporal Barry Foust is stopped at traffic lights less than two miles from the Pentagon, and spots the aircraft flying low, then sees a plume of smoke. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 13] He immediately calls the ECC and calmly reports: “I think we just had an airplane crash east of here. Must be in the District area.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/17/2001 ; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/18/2001; US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. C6] Police Motorcycle Officer Richard Cox is standing near a diner less than a mile from the Pentagon. Hearing a sudden roar, he turns and reportedly sees the plane “directly overhead… no more than a hundred feet off the ground.” [VOGEL, 2007, PP. 427] He calls the ECC and reports, “It’s an American Airlines plane headed eastbound over the [Columbia] Pike, possibly headed for the Pentagon.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/17/2001 ; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/18/2001; US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. C6] Fire Captain Steve McCoy and his crew are traveling north on Interstate 395 in ACFD Engine 101, for a training session in Crystal City. McCoy reportedly sees “a commercial airliner in steep descent, banking sharply to its right before disappearing beyond the horizon,” followed by “a tremendous explosion” and “a massive plume of smoke and fire.” He immediately radioes ECC and reports, “We got a plane down, it looks like in the Crystal City area by the 14th Street Bridge.” Being aware of the attacks on the World Trade Center, he advises that the FBI should be notified, as this is a possible terrorist attack. [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. A4; GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 66] Officer Mark Bright of the Defense Protective Service (DPS)—the Pentagon’s police force—is manning the security booth at the Pentagon’s Mall entrance, when he hears a loud noise. He will recall: “I saw the plane at the Navy Annex area [a few hundred yards from the Pentagon]. I knew it was going to strike the building because it was very, very low—at the height of the street lights.” As soon as he sees it hit the Pentagon he radioes in his report of the attack, and then speeds in his police cruiser to the crash site, becoming the first officer there. [AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 9/24/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 10/25/2001; GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 152] Sergeant William Lagasse, also a member of the DPS, is filling up his patrol car at a gas station near the Pentagon. He recalls that he sees an “American Airlines 757… approximately 100 feet above the ground level, maybe 60 feet in front of me.” He watches the plane crash into the Pentagon. His first reaction is to call the DPS Communications Center and state, “An aircraft has just flown into the side of the building.” He then grabs his medical bag and dashes to the crash scene. [WASHINGTON POST, 10/25/2001; LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 12/4/2001] Alan Wallace and Mark Skipper of the Fort Myer Fire Department are manning the fire station by the Pentagon heliport, and are outside checking their truck. Wallace glances up and sees the plane coming at them, and the two men then dive for cover (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). Wallace promptly radioes the fire department headquarters at Fort Myer, and reports that an airliner has hit the west side of the Pentagon. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 65] Partly due to these calls, many emergency responders quickly learn of the crash and are able to arrive at the Pentagon within minutes of it (see 9:40 a.m.-9:43 a.m. September 11, 2001). [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 66] Some fire and rescue units from Arlington County and elsewhere also respond—self-dispatching from stations or diverting from other destinations—after hearing Captain McCoy’s radio message to the ECC. [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. A4] Entity Tags: Barry Foust, Arlington County Emergency Communications Center, William Lagasse, Alan Wallace, Richard Cox, Steve McCoy, Mark Bright, Mark Skipper Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Pentagon

9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Takes Control of Washington Airspace, Directs Langley Fighters toward White House NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) declares “AFIO” (Authorization for Interceptor Operations) for Washington airspace, giving the military authority over the FAA for that airspace, and directs the fighter jets launched from Langley Air Force Base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) toward the White House. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 33 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 113, 150] Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, has just called to report an unidentified aircraft closing in on Washington, DC, which is currently six miles southeast of the White House (see 9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001). Nasypany Declares AFIO - Major Kevin Nasypany, the NEADS mission crew commander, is unaware that the F-16s he scrambled from Langley Air Force Base are heading out to sea rather than going north toward the Baltimore area (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). He therefore orders Major James Fox, the leader of the NEADS weapons team, to direct the Langley jets toward the White House, telling him: “I got an aircraft six miles east of the White House! Get your fighters there as soon as possible!” Fox asks, “Do you want us to declare AFIO?” Nasypany replies, “Take [the Langley fighters] and run ‘em to the White House,” and adds, “I want AFIO right now!” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 150] Declaring AFIO gives the military emergency authority to enter FAA-controlled airspace without permission, and means that NORAD assumes responsibility for ensuring that its fighter jets see and avoid all aircraft in that airspace. NEADS has already declared AFIO for New York airspace (see (9:12 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 2/19/2004, PP. 4-12-1 - 4-12-2; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 113] Now it does the same for Washington airspace. Fox tells the members of his weapons team: “We’re going direct [to] DC with my guys. Tell Giant Killer that we’re going AFIO!” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 150] (“Giant Killer” is the call sign for the Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility in Virginia Beach, Virginia—the Navy air traffic control agency that handles all over-water military operations. [NEW YORK TIMES, 2/10/1997; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 143] ) NEADS Unable to Contact Langley Jets - Master Sergeant Steve Citino, the NEADS weapons director, tries calling Langley pilot Major Dean Eckmann to inform him of the AFIO declaration, but receives no response. According to author Lynn Spencer, the Langley jets are not yet in NEADS’s radio range. Meanwhile, NEADS Staff Sergeant William Huckabone calls Giant Killer and notifies it: “Ma’am, we are going AFIO right now with Quit 2-5 [the Langley fighters]. They are going direct [to] Washington.” But the controller only offers modest reassurance that the Langley jets will be given the appropriate clearance to enter Washington airspace, responding, “We’re handing ‘em off to [the FAA’s Washington] Center right now.” Huckabone retorts: “Ma’am, we need that expedited right now! We need to contact them on 234.6.… Do you understand?” NEADS Reaches Langley Jets - As soon as the Langley jets enter radio range, Citino makes contact with pilot Craig Borgstrom and instructs him, “Squawk quad-sevens and head 010!” This means the pilots should dial the code for AFIO—7777—into their planes’ transponders. Borgstrom radios fellow pilot Eckmann and passes on this instruction. According to Spencer: “The declaration of AFIO startles Eckmann. He has never, in all his years of flying, received such an order. He’s only heard about it and, to him, it means no less than the start of World War III.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 150-151] At 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon is hit, the Langley jets have flown nearly 60 miles out over the ocean and are 150 miles from Washington (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 151] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Kevin Nasypany, James Fox, Craig Borgstrom, Dean Eckmann, Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility, William Huckabone, Steve Citino Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

(9:36 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS Personnel See Aircraft Disappear over Washington on Radar At NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), members of staff spot the radar track for an aircraft—later reported to be Flight 77—flying over Washington, DC and approaching the White House. [NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, 1/25/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 65; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 151] Around this time, Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, has called NEADS to report an unidentified aircraft six miles southeast of the White House (see 9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001). [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Deskins Sees Aircraft Circling and Disappear - Lt. Col. Dawne Deskins has noticed a suspicious track on the radar scope. She will later recall: “I had the scope focused in on the DC area and got blips of this aircraft that appeared to be going in a turn around DC. It was going fast for where it was located and I remember looking at the guy next to me and saying, ’What is that?’” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 65] Tracker Spots Aircraft - One of the tracker technicians also thinks he has spotted the aircraft on radar, just a few miles south of the White House and heading north, but then loses it. He calls out: “Right here, right here, right here! I got him. I got him!” NEADS mission crew commander Major Kevin Nasypany says, “Get me coordinates!” and then picks up the phone to quickly brief Colonel Robert Marr in the NEADS battle cab. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 151] Entity Tags: Dawne Deskins, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Kevin Nasypany, Robert Marr Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(Shortly Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Airborne Command Post Launched from near Washington An E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) takes off from an unspecified airfield outside of Washington, DC. The aircraft, which is carrying civilian and military officials, is launched in order to participate in a pre-scheduled military exercise. This would be Global Guardian, which is being conducted on this day by the US Strategic Command (Stratcom) to test its ability to fight a nuclear war (see 8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). E-4Bs are a militarized version of a Boeing 747. They serve as an airborne command center that could be used by the president, vice president, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, in order to execute war plans and coordinate government operations during a national emergency. Two other such planes are also participating in Global Guardian on this day (see Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). For the exercise, the E-4B launched from outside Washington is supposed to be using and testing its sophisticated technology and communications equipment. According to journalist and author Dan Verton, the aircraft has “only just taken off” at the time the Pentagon is hit (at 9:37 a.m.). Verton will say it is then “immediately ordered to cease the military exercise it was conducting and prepare to become the actual National Airborne Operations Center.” [OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 2/27/2002; VERTON, 2003, PP. 143-144] (Global Guardian was reportedly put on pause at 9:11 a.m. (see 9:11 a.m. September 11, 2001), but it is not formally terminated until 10:44 a.m. (see (10:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [BOMBARDIER, 9/8/2006 ] ) Minutes after the Pentagon attack, an unidentified four-engine jet plane will be seen circling above the White House (see (9:41 a.m.-9:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001). CNN will later suggest this is an E-4B, so it is possible it is the plane launched from the airfield outside Washington that Verton describes. [CNN, 9/12/2007] Air traffic control tapes will reveal that an E-4B takes off from Andrews Air Force Base, 10 miles from Washington, at 9:43 a.m., several minutes after the Pentagon is hit (see 9:43 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004; FARMER, 2009, PP. 206] Whether that aircraft is the one participating in Global Guardian that is described by Verton, or another E-4B, is unclear. Entity Tags: Global Guardian, E-4B National Airborne Operations Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

(Shortly After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Jets Refueled by Tanker out for Training Mission

A KC-135 Stratotanker. [Source: Boeing] The two F-15 fighter jets launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to Flight 11 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) are finally able to refuel, after they request to rendezvous with a tanker plane that was scheduled to refuel Otis jets out on training missions this morning. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 153] By around 9:35 a.m., according to author Lynn Spencer, the two Otis jets are running increasingly low on fuel and need to find a fuel tanker right away. For about the last 25 minutes, technicians at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) have been searching for a tanker (see (9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but the two Otis pilots have apparently not heard back from them about this. Now one of these pilots, Major Daniel Nash, has come up with a solution. Prior to being put on alert duty, he had been acting as the scheduling officer at Otis, and therefore knows that a training mission that Otis jets were scheduled to fly today called for refueling. Consequently, there is a KC-135 tanker plane from Bangor, Maine, that should be available. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 112 AND 152-153] This is presumably one of the eight KC-135s that are attached to the 101st Air Refueling Wing, which is based at Bangor International Airport. [PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, 9/13/2001] It had been scheduled to rendezvous with the Otis fighters on their training mission about 20 minutes from now in “Whiskey 105,” the military training airspace just south of Long Island, where Nash and his fellow Otis pilot Timothy Duffy had earlier been flying in a “holding pattern” (see 9:09 a.m.-9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001). The KC-135 should be on its way there now. Nash calls Duffy and tells him, “[W]e have a tanker scheduled for the training missions this morning off the coast in 105.” Duffy then calls NEADS and requests that the KC-135 orbit at 20,000 feet above New York’s JFK International Airport. Minutes later, NEADS has coordinated with Bangor to borrow the tanker, and the two Otis jets are able to take turns refueling. [GRANT AND THOMPSON, 10/6/2006, PP. 4 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 153] According to the 9/11 Commission, the two Otis jets first arrived over Manhattan at 9:25 a.m. (see 9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001), but accounts of most witnesses on the ground indicate they do not arrive there until after 10:00 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.-10:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] Entity Tags: Daniel Nash, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Timothy Duffy, 101st Air Refueling Wing Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

9.36 a.m. September 11, 2001: Military Cargo Plane Asked to Identify Flight 77

A typical C-130. [Source: US Air Force Reserve Command] Washington’s Reagan National Airport air traffic control instructs a military C-130 cargo plane that has just departed Andrews Air Force Base to intercept Flight 77 and identify it. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001] Remarkably, this C-130 is the same C-130 that will be 17 miles from Flight 93 when it later crashes into the Pennsylvania countryside (see 10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001). [PITTSBURGH CHANNEL, 9/15/2001; STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 9/11/2002] The pilot, Lt. Col. Steve O’Brien, will claim that he took off around 9:30 a.m., planning to return to Minnesota after dropping supplies off in the Caribbean. He will describe his close encounter: “When air traffic control asked me if we had him [Flight 77] in sight, I told him that was an understatement—by then, he had pretty much filled our windscreen. Then he made a pretty aggressive turn so he was moving right in front of us, a mile and a half, two miles away. I said we had him in sight, then the controller asked me what kind of plane it was. That caught us up, because normally they have all that information. The controller didn’t seem to know anything.” O’Brien reports that the plane is either a 757 or 767 and its silver fuselage means it is probably an American Airlines plane. “They told us to turn and follow that aircraft—in 20 plus years of flying, I’ve never been asked to do something like that.” [STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 9/11/2002] O’Brien and his crew, Maj. Robert Schumacher and flight engineer Master Sgt. Jeffrey Rosenthal, are unaware of the attacks in New York. Schumacher will say that, after being directed to follow Flight 77, he first thought that the plane was having technical difficulties, “that the pilots were really just trying to fly the airplane, and get it on the ground safely.” After the impact, O’Brien tunes in to a news broadcast, but is surprised to hear about a second crash in New York, not at the Pentagon. He will recall: “The first thing we heard on there was ‘We’re now hearing about a second airplane hitting the World Trade Center.’ That was not what we were expecting to hear. We were expecting to hear about an airplane impacting the Pentagon… and the light goes on, and it’s like, ‘Oh my God, the nation’s under attack!’” [MINNESOTA PUBLIC RADIO, 5/31/2004] The 9/11 Commission will report that O’Brien specifically identifies the hijacked plane as a Boeing 757. Seconds after impact, he reports to the Washington tower, “Looks like that aircraft crashed into the Pentagon, sir.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, Robert Schumacher, Pentagon, Steve O’Brien, Jeffrey Rosenthal Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Reverses Course Having followed a seemingly normal course until now, after reaching the Cleveland area, Flight 93 suddenly makes a sharp turn to the south. It then makes another turn back eastward, cutting through West Virginia’s Northern Panhandle before re-entering Pennsylvania. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/13/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 41 ] Having thus turned 180 degrees, it now heads toward Washington, DC. [CNN, 9/13/2001] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Cleveland Center Receives Numerous Bomb Threats Concerning Planes According to a book about the FAA’s response to the 9/11 attacks, Cleveland Center air traffic controllers follow Flight 93 as it turns south and reverses course (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). But, “bomb threats called in concerning four other planes focused their attention onto what they believed to be more critical maneuvers.” [FRENI, 2003, PP. 40] One of these four planes is presumably Delta Flight 1989, which is mistakenly thought to be hijacked and to have a bomb aboard (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WKYC, 9/11/2006] The identities of the other three planes are unknown. By this time, Cleveland Center has already overheard a radio transmission from Flight 93 stating, “We have a bomb on board” (see (9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and has acknowledged this, reporting, “United 93 may have a bomb on board,” so it seems unlikely that other threatened aircraft would be regarded as “more critical maneuvers.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Several Witnesses See Helicopter near the Pentagon An unnamed senior Air Force officer will tell a CNN reporter minutes later that, just prior to the Pentagon being hit, he is outside the building and sees what appears to be a US military helicopter circling the Pentagon. He will say it disappears behind the building where the helicopter landing pad is, and then he sees an explosion. [CNN, 9/11/2001] Jennifer Reichert, who is stuck in traffic on Route 27 in front of the Pentagon, will also later recall seeing a helicopter just before the Pentagon is hit, describing: “A helicopter takes off from the heliport at the Pentagon. Minutes—maybe seconds—later, I hear it: American Airlines Flight 77 screams toward the Pentagon. The explosion [of the crash] shakes my car.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/5/2002] Captain William Durm, the commander of the Pentagon’s Triservice Dental Clinic, will head to the building’s center courtyard shortly after it is hit. Someone there tells him a helicopter has hit the other side of the building. [OFFICE OF MEDICAL HISTORY, 9/2004, PP. 11] The Guardian reports one witness claiming that the explosion that occurs when the Pentagon is hit blows up a helicopter circling overhead. [GUARDIAN, 9/12/2001] No other witnesses are known to report seeing this helicopter. However, some early news reports will suggest a helicopter crashed into the Pentagon. [POYNTER INSTITUTE, 9/11/2001; THOMAS CROSBIE MEDIA, 9/11/2001] One report claims that “one aircraft and a helicopter have crashed into the Pentagon.” [AIRLINE INDUSTRY INFORMATION, 9/11/2001] Vice President Dick Cheney will later tell NBC’s Meet the Press that “the first reports on the Pentagon attack suggested a helicopter” hit it. [MEET THE PRESS, 9/16/2001] Interestingly, New York Times columnist William Safire will report that, at approximately this time, Cheney is told that either another plane or “a helicopter loaded with explosives” is heading for the White House. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2001] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Pentagon, William Safire, Jennifer Reichert, William Durm Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Pentagon

Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Army Base near Pentagon Holding Air Field Fire Fighting Training At the Education Center at Fort Myer, an army base 1.5 miles northwest of the Pentagon, the base’s firefighters are undertaking training variously described as “an airport rescue firefighters class”; “an aircraft crash refresher class”; “a week-long class on Air Field Fire Fighting”; and a “training exercise in airport emergency operations.” Despite hearing of the first WTC crash during a break, with no access to a TV, the class simply continues with its training. According to Bruce Surette, who is attending the session: “We had heard some radio transmissions from some other units in Arlington about how they thought they had a plane down here or a plane down there. So you’re thinking, ‘Hey this could be real.’ But it really didn’t strike home as being real until our guy came on the radio and said where the plane crash was.” The Fort Myer firefighters then immediately head for the Pentagon, arriving there at 9:40 a.m., only three minutes after it is hit, and participate in the firefighting and rescue effort there. The fire station at the Pentagon heliport is actually operated by the Fort Myer Fire Department, and is manned on the morning of 9/11 by three Fort Myer firefighters who have already undertaken the airfield firefighting training. [MDW NEWS SERVICE, 10/4/2001; PENTAGRAM, 11/2/2001; JEMS, 4/2002 ; US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002; FIRST DUE NEWS, 4/17/2003] The Fort Myer military community, which includes Fort Myer and Fort Lesley J. McNair—another army base, just two miles east of the Pentagon—was scheduled to hold a “force protection exercise” the week after 9/11. However this has been cancelled, so just prior to the attacks the morning of September 11, “some of its participants [are] breathing a sigh of relief.” [PENTAGRAM, 9/14/2001] Entity Tags: Fort Myer, Pentagon Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon, Training Exercises

9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Flights Are Told to Bar Cockpit Entry Captain Jim Hosking, piloting United Flight 890 from Japan to Los Angeles, is sent a warning message to his cockpit printer. It reads, “There has been a terrorist attack against United Airlines and American Airlines aircraft. We are advised there may be additional hijackings in progress. Shut down all access to the flight deck. Unable to elaborate further.” He tells his first officer, “Get out the crash axe.” Other pilots are receiving similar messages around this time. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Entity Tags: Jim Hosking Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Pentagon Law Enforcement Deputy Finally Makes Call to Raise Alert Level At the time the Pentagon is struck, a member of the Defense Protective Service (DPS), which guards the Pentagon, is in the process of ordering the threat level be raised. John Pugrud, the deputy chief of the DPS, has met with DPS Chief John Jester, and Jester directed him to instruct the DPS Communications Center to raise the Force Protection Condition up one level, from Normal to Alpha (see (Shortly Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The moment the Pentagon is hit, Pugrud has the phone in his hand to dial the center. When his call is answered, he can hear the center’s alarms activating and radio calls taking place. The dispatcher yells: “We’ve been hit! We’ve been hit! Wedge one. Wedge one.” According to the Defense Department’s book about the Pentagon attack, no one in DPS has received any warning of a hijacked aircraft heading toward Washington. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 152] No steps have been taken to alert Pentagon employees or evacuate the building. [VOGEL, 2007, PP. 429] Around 30 minutes after the attack occurs, the US military will increase its threat level to Defcon Delta, the highest possible level (see (10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/4/2002] This will be reduced to “Charlie” before the end of the week. [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 9/16/2001; USA TODAY, 9/16/2001] Entity Tags: Defense Protective Service, John Pugrud Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Misses Key Pentagon Officials When Flight 77 hits the Pentagon, it misses the parts of the building known to house the military’s most senior leaders. Journalist and author Steve Vogel later says, “The hijackers had not hit the River or Mall sides” of the building, “where the senior military leadership had been concentrated since 1942.” At the time of the attack, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is “sitting in the same third-floor office above the River entrance as every secretary of defense since Louis Johnson in 1949, a location that had been a matter of public record all that time. The joint chiefs and all the service secretaries were arrayed in various prime E-Ring offices on the River and Mall sides.” Furthermore, “All the command centers save the Navy’s were on the River or Mall sides; the National Military Command Center could have been decimated as the Navy Command Center was, a disaster that could have effectively shut down the Pentagon as the first American war of the twenty-first century began.” Instead, the area hit comprises Army accounting offices, the Navy Command Center, and the Defense Intelligence Agency’s comptroller’s office. [VOGEL, 2007, PP. 431 AND 449-450] Due to recent renovation work, many offices in that section of the Pentagon are currently empty. [GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE, 9/11/2001] Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Pentagon

9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Fireman Dodges Flight 77; Immediately Notifies Superior about Crashed Jumbo Jet

Internet researchers have put together this image showing how an object the size of a jumbo jet clips a number of light poles and then destroys columns inside the Pentagon. [From website] [Source: Eric Bart] (click image to enlarge) Fireman Alan Wallace is busy with a safety crew at the Pentagon’s heliport pad. As Wallace is walking in front of the Pentagon, he looks up and sees Flight 77 coming straight at him. It is about 25 feet off the ground, with no landing wheels visible, a few hundred yards away, and closing fast. He runs about 30 feet and dives under a nearby van. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/21/2001] The plane is traveling at about 460 mph, and flying so low that it clips the tops of streetlights. [CBS NEWS, 9/21/2001] Using the radio in the van, he calls his fire chief at nearby Fort Myer and says, “We have had a commercial carrier crash into the west side of the Pentagon at the heliport, Washington Boulevard side. The crew is OK. The airplane was a 757 Boeing or a 320 Airbus.” [SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, 8/1/2002] Entity Tags: Pentagon, Fort Myer, Alan Wallace Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Pentagon

(9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Myers Speaks to NORAD Commander At some time after the second attack in New York, Richard Myers, the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, receives a call from NORAD Commander Ralph Eberhart. According to his own account, Myers is on Capitol Hill, where he has been meeting with Senator Max Cleland (D-GA). Apparently soon after he leaves this meeting, his military aide, Army Captain Chris Donahue, hands him a cell phone on which Eberhart is calling. Myers will later comment, “In this emergency, I had to forgo the luxury of a secure encrypted red switch phone and use Donahue’s cell.” Myers will recall that Eberhart “said, you know, we’ve got several hijack codes, meaning that the transponders in the aircraft are talking to the ground, and they’re saying we’re under, we’re being hijacked, several hijack codes in the system, and we’re responding with, with fighter aircraft.” [AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 10/23/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; MYERS, 2009, PP. 8-9] (However, none of the pilots of the four hijacked flights this morning keyed the emergency four-digit code that would indicate a hijacking into their plane’s transponder (see (8:13 a.m.-9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/11/2001] It is therefore unclear what “hijack codes” Eberhart is referring to.) Eberhart also tells Myers, “The decision I’m going to make is, we’re going to land everybody, and we’ll sort it out when we get them on the ground.” [COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 6/29/2006] He is presumably referring to a plan called SCATANA, which clears the skies and gives the military control over US airspace. However, Eberhart does not implement this until around 11:00 a.m. (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] It is unclear exactly when this call takes place, but it appears to be just before the time the Pentagon is hit, or just before Myers is informed of the Pentagon attack. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 6/29/2006; AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 9/8/2006] In his 2009 memoirs, Myers will place it after he is informed of the second attack on the World Trade Center (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but not give a specific time. [MYERS, 2009, PP. 8-9] Cleland will confirm that Myers meets with him on this morning, and is with him up to the time of the Pentagon attack, or shortly before. [US CONGRESS, 9/13/2001; CNN, 11/20/2001; ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, 6/16/2003] However, according to counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, Myers is back at the Pentagon speaking over a video conference around 10 minutes before the Pentagon is struck (see 9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 5] Entity Tags: Ralph Eberhart, Max Cleland, Richard B. Myers, Chris Donahue Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Crashes into Reinforced Section of the Pentagon

The Pentagon explodes. [Source: Donley/ Sipa] Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon. All 64 people on the plane are killed. A hundred-and-twenty-four people working in the building are killed, and a further victim will die in hospital several days later. [CNN, 9/17/2001; NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 11/21/2001; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; MSNBC, 9/3/2002; ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002; CBS NEWS, 9/11/2002] Flight 77 hits the first floor of the Pentagon’s west wall. The impact and the resulting explosion heavily damage the building’s three outer rings. The path of destruction cuts through Army accounting offices on the outer E Ring, the Navy Command Center on the D Ring, and the Defense Intelligence Agency’s comptroller’s office on the C Ring. [VOGEL, 2007, PP. 431 AND 449] Flight 77 strikes the only side of the Pentagon that had recently been renovated—it was “within days of being totally [renovated].” [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 9/15/2001] “It was the only area of the Pentagon with a sprinkler system, and it had been reconstructed with a web of steel columns and bars to withstand bomb blasts. The area struck by the plane also had blast-resistant windows—two inches thick and 2,500 pounds each—that stayed intact during the crash and fire. While perhaps, 4,500 people normally would have been working in the hardest-hit areas, because of the renovation work only about 800 were there.” More than 25,000 people work at the Pentagon. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/16/2001] Furthermore, the plane hits an area that has no basement. As journalist Steve Vogel later points out, “If there had been one under the first floor, its occupants could easily have been trapped by fire and killed when the upper floors collapsed.” [VOGEL, 2007, PP. 450] Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Pentagon Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93, George Bush, Pentagon

9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Unlike Other Three Crashes, Pentagon Attack Does Not Produce Clear Seismic Signal The strike on the Pentagon does not generate a clear seismic signal. A study by the Maryland Geological Survey will state, “We analyzed seismic records from five stations in the northeastern United States, ranging from 63 to 350 km from the Pentagon. Despite detailed analysis of the data, we could not find a clear seismic signal. Even the closest station… did not record the impact. We concluded that the plane impact to the Pentagon generated relatively weak seismic signals.” The study, which is conducted at the request of the Army, states that there are seismic signals for the two planes impacting the World Trade Center and for the Flight 93 crash in Pennsylvania, which allow times to be determined for these events. [KIM AND BAUM, 2002 ] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Pentagon

(9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Richard Clarke Learns of Aircraft Approaching White House

Barbara Riggs. [Source: Miles B. Norman / Elmira Star-Gazette] Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke learns of an aircraft heading toward the White House. Clarke, who is in the White House Situation Room, is passed a note by Secret Service Director Brian Stafford, which says, “Radar shows aircraft headed this way.” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 7] Around this time, the FAA’s Boston Center is reporting a low-flying aircraft six miles southeast of the White House (see 9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001), so this is presumably the same airliner to which Stafford’s note refers. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Clarke later comments that the Secret Service is aware of the approaching plane because it has “a system that allowed them to see what FAA’s radar was seeing.” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 7] Secret Service agent Barbara Riggs, who is in the agency’s Washington headquarters, will later corroborate this, recalling: “Through monitoring radar and activating an open line with the FAA, the Secret Service was able to receive real time information about… hijacked aircraft. We were tracking two hijacked aircraft as they approached Washington, DC, and our assumption was that the White House was a target.” [PCCW NEWSLETTER, 3/2006] Stafford informs Clarke that he is going to evacuate the White House complex. (This evacuation appears to take place at around 9:45 (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001).) Those in the Situation Room are then informed that there has been an explosion at the Pentagon, and soon after that a plane has hit it. [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 7] Entity Tags: Brian L. Stafford, Richard A. Clarke, Barbara Riggs, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Richard Clarke

(Between 9:37 a.m. and 9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Mayor Giuliani Told Seven Planes Unaccounted For New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani is told by his chief of staff that the White House knows of seven planes that are unaccounted for. He is told that the Pentagon has been hit, but also hears erroneous reports that the Sears Tower and other buildings have been hit. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/19/2004] Entity Tags: Rudolph (“Rudy”) Giuliani, Pentagon Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Navy Command Center Employees Killed While Trying to Get More Fighters Launched

Diagram showing the area of impact at the Pentagon. The Navy Command Center is highlighted in red. [Source: Washington Post] (click image to enlarge) Edward Earhart, Matthew Flocco, and their supervisor Lt. Nancy McKeown are inside the Pentagon, watching the televised footage of the burning World Trade Center. They belong to a small meteorological unit based in the Navy Command Center, located on the first floor of the building’s southwest face. McKeown asks her two young aides to bring up New York on the computer because the Command Center is going to send some fighter jets there, in case there is another attack on the city. She orders them to program weather updates for military aircraft converging on New York. However, very soon after this, the Command Center is directly impacted when the Pentagon is hit, and both Flocco and Earhart are killed. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/16/2001; READER'S DIGEST, 9/2002; CNN, 9/8/2002; NEWSDAY, 4/12/2006] Ronald Vauk, the watch commander in the Navy Command Center, is on the phone trying to get more fighters scrambled at the time the Pentagon is hit, though news reports say he wants them to protect Washington, not New York. [JOHN HOPKINS MAGAZINE, 11/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 11/17/2001; BALTIMORE SUN, 9/11/2002] At 9:24 a.m., NORAD had ordered fighters at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia to scramble (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001), though these will not arrive over the Pentagon until after it is hit (see (Between 9:49 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] According to Lt. Kevin Shaeffer, who works in the Command Center, just prior to the attack on the Pentagon, the watch section and watch leaders in the center are actively engaged in logging and recording the events going on in New York. He later says, “they all responded in exactly the way they were trained,” and, “Had the Command Center not been destroyed it surely would have been able to provide the highest levels of our Navy leadership with updates as to exactly what was occurring.” [CHIPS, 3/2003] Entity Tags: Ronald Vauk, Kevin Shaeffer, Nancy McKeown Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Pentagon

9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Witnesses See Military Cargo Plane near Flight 77; Pilot Later Implies He Is Far Away A C-130 transport plane that has been sent to follow Flight 77 (see 9.36 a.m. September 11, 2001) is trailing only a short distance behind the plane as it crashes. This curious C-130, originally bound for Minnesota, is the same C-130 that will be 17 miles from Flight 93 when it later crashes into the Pennsylvania countryside (see 10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001). [PITTSBURGH CHANNEL, 9/15/2001; STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 9/11/2002] A number of people see this plane fly remarkably close to Flight 77: Kelly Knowles says that seconds after seeing Flight 77 pass, she sees a “second plane that seemed to be chasing the first [pass] over at a slightly different angle.” [DAILY PRESS (NEWPORT NEWS), 9/15/2001] Keith Wheelhouse says the second plane is a C-130; two other witnesses are not certain. [DAILY PRESS (NEWPORT NEWS), 9/15/2001] Wheelhouse “believes it flew directly above the American Airlines jet, as if to prevent two planes from appearing on radar, while at the same time guiding the jet toward the Pentagon.” As Flight 77 descends toward the Pentagon, the second plane veers off west. [DAILY PRESS (NEWPORT NEWS), 9/14/2001] USA Today reporter Vin Narayanan, who sees the Pentagon explosion, later says, “I hopped out of my car after the jet exploded, nearly oblivious to a second jet hovering in the skies.” [USA TODAY, 9/17/2001] USA Today Editor Joel Sucherman sees a second plane but gives few details. [EWEEK, 9/13/2001] Brian Kennedy, press secretary for a Congressman, and others also see a second plane. [SACRAMENTO BEE, 9/15/2001] An unnamed worker at Arlington National Cemetery, which is about a mile from the Pentagon, will recall that “a mysterious second plane was circling the area when the first one attacked the Pentagon.” [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 12/20/2001] An interment foreman at Arlington Cemetery also sees a second plane. He will recall: “There was a second plane behind it.… It appeared to be a cargo plane… mostly white.… I think it was somebody who observed him [Flight 77] and was following him and saw where he was going or what was going on… he was probably behind that far and when he saw [the explosion], he banked it back hard and went back the other way.” [ARMY CENTER FOR MILITARY HISTORY, 12/13/2001 ] John O’Keefe is driving in his car when he sees the Pentagon crash. He will recall: “The first thing I did was pull over onto the shoulder, and when I got out of the car I saw another plane flying over my head.… Then the plane—it looked like a C-130 cargo plane—started turning away from the Pentagon, it did a complete turnaround.” [NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, 9/12/2001] Phillip Thompson, a former Marine, is sitting in traffic when he witnesses the crash of Flight 77 and then sees a cargo plane overhead. He will recall that, following the Flight 77 crash, “a gray C-130 flew overhead, setting off a new round of panic. I tried to reassure people that the plane was not a threat.” [MILITARYCITY (.COM), 9/22/2001] The pilot of the C-130, Lieutenant Colonel Steve O’Brien, will later be interviewed, but his account differs from the on-the-ground eyewitnesses. He will claim that just before the explosion, “With all of the East Coast haze, I had a hard time picking him out,” implying he is not nearby. He also says that just after the explosion, “I could see the outline of the Pentagon,” again implying he is not nearby. He then asks “the controller whether [I] should set up a low orbit around the building,” but he is told “to get out of the area as quickly as possible.” He will add, “I took the plane once through the plume of smoke and thought if this was a terrorist attack, it probably wasn’t a good idea to be flying through that plume.” [STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: John O’Keefe, Vin Narayanan, Keith Wheelhouse, Kelly Knowles, Phillip Thompson, Brian Kennedy, Pentagon, Joel Sucherman, Steve O’Brien Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Pentagon

9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Langley Fighters Still Short of Washington; Where and Why Is Not Clear

A typical F-16. [Source: NORAD] Accounts differ as to how far from Washington the F-16 fighters scrambled from Langley are when Flight 77 crashes. The Langley, Virginia, base is 129 miles from Washington. NORAD originally claimed that, at the time of the crash, the fighters are 105 miles away, despite having taken off seven minutes earlier. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001] The 9/11 Commission claims that at 9:36 a.m., NEADS discovers that Flight 77 is only a few miles from the White House and is dismayed to find the fighters have headed east over the ocean. They are ordered to Washington immediately, but are still about 150 miles away. This is farther away than the base from which they took off. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] The F-16 pilot codenamed Honey (who is apparently Captain Craig Borgstrom) offers a different explanation. As previously mentioned, he says they are flying toward New York, when they see a black column of smoke coming from Washington, about 30 or 40 miles to the west. He is then asked over the radio by NEADS if he can confirm the Pentagon is burning. He confirms it. He says that the mission of the Langley pilots at this time is clear: to keep all airplanes away from Washington. The F-16s are then ordered to set up a defensive perimeter above Washington. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 76; FILSON, 2003, PP. 66; NEW YORK OBSERVER, 2/15/2004] The maximum speed of an F-16 is 1,500 mph. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6/16/2000] Had the fighters traveled straight to Washington at 1,300 mph, they would have reached Washington at least one minute before Flight 77. Furthermore, at the time the Pentagon is hit, according to Craig Borgstrom, he and the other Langley pilots are hearing a lot of chatter over their radios, but nothing about airliners crashing into buildings. He says they are “all three on different frequencies… and [are] getting orders from a lot of different people.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 66] Entity Tags: Pentagon, Craig Borgstrom, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93, Key Day of 9/11 Events

(9:37 a.m.-10:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Some Flight 93 Passengers and Crew Able to Remain Calm Despite Hijacking

Lyz Glick. [Source: NBC] In phone calls made from Flight 93, some passengers and crew members sound as if they are able to keep surprisingly calm, despite the crisis: Passenger Jeremy Glick calls his wife, Lyz, at 9:37. She later recalls, “He was so calm, the plane sounded so calm, that if I hadn’t seen what was going on on the TV, I wouldn’t have believed it.” She says, “I was surprised by how calm it seemed in the background. I didn’t hear any screaming. I didn’t hear any noises. I didn’t hear any commotion.” [BERGEN RECORD, 10/5/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2006] Passenger Lauren Grandcolas calls her husband, Jack, at 9:39, and leaves a message on the answering machine. According to journalist and author Jere Longman, “It sounded to Jack as if she were driving home from the grocery store or ordering a pizza.” Jack Grandcolas later says, “She sounded calm.” He describes, “There is absolutely no background noise on her message. You can’t hear people screaming or yelling or crying. It’s very calm, the whole cabin, the background, there’s really very little sound.” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 128; KATE SOLOMON, 2006; WASHINGTON POST, 4/26/2006] Passenger Mark Bingham speaks on the phone with his mother and aunt, reportedly from around 9:42. His aunt finds him sounding “calm, matter-of-fact.” His mother later recalls, “His voice was calm. He seemed very much composed, even though I know he must have been under terrible duress.” She also says the background discussion between passengers, about taking back the plane, sounds like a “calm boardroom meeting.” [CNN, 9/12/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 129-130; CNN, 4/21/2006] Passenger Todd Beamer speaks with GTE supervisor Lisa Jefferson for 13 minutes, starting at 9:45. Jefferson later says that Beamer “stayed calm through the entire conversation. He made me doubt the severity of the call.” She tells Beamer’s wife, “If I hadn’t known it was a real hijacking, I’d have thought it was a crank call, because Todd was so rational and methodical about what he was doing.” [BEAMER AND ABRAHAM, 2002, PP. 211; BELIEFNET (.COM), 2006] Passenger Honor Elizabeth Wainio speaks with her stepmother, Esther Heymann, from around 9:54. Heymann later tells CNN that Wainio “really was remarkably calm throughout our whole conversation.” (However, according to Jere Longman, although she speaks calmly, Wainio’s breathing is “shallow, as if she were hyperventilating.”) When her stepdaughter is not talking, Heymann reportedly cannot “hear another person. She could not hear any conversation or crying or yelling or whimpering. Nothing.” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 168 AND 171-172; CNN, 2/18/2006] Flight attendant Sandy Bradshaw calls her husband at 9:50. He later says, “She sounded calm, but like her adrenaline was really going.” [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 10/21/2001] At 9:58, flight attendant CeeCee Lyles phones her husband. He later says, “She was surprisingly calm,” considering the screaming he heard in the background. Her relatives attribute her calmness to her police training (she is a former police officer). [LYLES, 9/11/2001; DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 9/17/2001; INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY, 4/18/2002] Longman later writes, “I heard tapes of a couple of the phone calls made from [Flight 93] and was struck by the absence of panic in the voices.” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. XI] Entity Tags: Lauren Grandcolas, Jeremy Glick, Jere Longman, Esther Heymann, Jack Grandcolas, Lisa Jefferson, Lyz Glick, CeeCee Lyles, Todd Beamer, Mark Bingham, Elizabeth Wainio, Sandy Bradshaw Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Rumsfeld Feels Pentagon Shake When It Is Hit, Allegedly Thinks Bomb Has Gone Off According to most accounts, at the time the Pentagon is hit, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is in his office on the third floor of the Pentagon’s outer E Ring, receiving his daily intelligence briefing. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/12/2001; WOODWARD, 2002, PP. 24; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/23/2004; CLARKE, 2006, PP. 221; COCKBURN, 2007, PP. 1; GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 130; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 438-439] As he later recalls, “the building shook and the tables jumped.” [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 130] Although he has been informed of the two aircraft hitting the World Trade Center (see Shortly After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001), he supposedly does not initially suspect a plane has hit the Pentagon, thinking instead that a bomb has gone off. [ABC NEWS, 9/16/2001; MSNBC, 9/30/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 1/9/2002] In his nearby office, Rumsfeld’s senior military assistant Vice Admiral Edmund Giambastiani Jr. also hears the explosion, and walks through his doorway toward Rumsfeld’s office. As the two meet, Rumsfeld asks Giambastiani, “What the hell’s happening?” [AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 9/8/2006; GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 130] Rumsfeld then looks out his window but, he later recalls, sees “nothing here.” [PARADE MAGAZINE, 10/12/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 1/9/2002] He goes into the hallway and, accompanied by his security guards, hurries toward the crash site (see 9:38 a.m. September 11, 2001). [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 130] However, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke will later contradict these accounts. Clarke indicates that Rumsfeld has been participating in the video teleconference conducted from the White House Situation Room since shortly after the second WTC crash (see (9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). He claims that Rumsfeld is still involved in this conference at the time the Pentagon is hit, and he tells his deputy, “I can still see Rumsfeld on the screen, so the whole building didn’t get hit.” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 2-3 AND 7-8] If Clarke’s account were correct, this would presumably mean Rumsfeld is in the Pentagon’s Executive Support Center (ESC), which has secure video facilities, rather than in his office. [WASHINGTON TIMES, 2/23/2004] But according to other accounts, Rumsfeld does not go to the ESC until around 10:15 a.m., after he returns from the crash site (see (10:00 a.m.-10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CLARKE, 2006, PP. 221; COCKBURN, 2007, PP. 1-5] Entity Tags: Edmund Giambastiani, Richard A. Clarke, Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke, Donald Rumsfeld, Pentagon

9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Pentagon’s ‘War Room’ Doesn’t Realize Building Has Been Hit, Despite Hearing Explosion Those inside the Pentagon’s Executive Support Center (ESC) feel and hear the impact when the building is hit, yet supposedly do not realize what has happened. Victoria Clarke, the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, who is in the ESC at this time, calls the center “the Pentagon’s war room, with instant access to satellite images and intelligence sources peering into every corner of the globe.” She describes it as “the place where the building’s top leadership goes to coordinate military operations during national emergencies.” In it with her are Stephen Cambone, Donald Rumsfeld’s closest aide, and Larry Di Rita, Rumsfeld’s personal chief of staff. They’d been discussing how to go about getting every plane currently in the air back on the ground when, according to Clarke, “we felt a jarring thump and heard a loud but still muffled explosion. The building seemed to have shifted.” Yet, despite all the ESC’s resources, they supposedly do not initially realize exactly what has happened. Clarke says to the others, “It must have been a car bomb.” Di Rita replies, “A bomb of some kind.” But one unnamed staffer who frequently uses the ESC for meetings points to the ceiling and says, “No, it’s just the heating and cooling system. It makes that noise all the time.” Clarke later claims, “The notion of a jetliner attacking the Pentagon was exactly that unfathomable back then. Our eyes were glued to television screens showing two hijacked planes destroying the World Trade Center and it still didn’t occur to any of us, certainly not me, that one might have just hit our own building.” Clarke guesses aloud that the noise was something other than the heating and cooling system. In the ensuing minutes, she and the others with her will scramble “for information about what exactly had happened, how many were hurt or killed, and [analyze] what we could do to prevent further attacks.” Yet, she will later claim, it is only when Donald Rumsfeld comes into the ESC at 10:15 a.m., after having gone to the crash scene, that they receive their first confirmation that a plane has hit the Pentagon (see (10:00 a.m.-10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CLARKE, 2006, PP. 219-221] Those inside the National Military Command Center (NMCC), located next door to the ESC, supposedly do not feel the impact when the Pentagon is hit, and one officer there claims he only learns of the attack from television reports (see Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/4/2002; AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 9/7/2006; COCKBURN, 2007, PP. 5] But Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, who is in his office about 200 feet away from the ESC, feels the building shake due to the explosion. After seeing nothing out of his window, he immediately dashes outside to determine what has happened (see 9:38 a.m. September 11, 2001). [WBZ RADIO 1030 (BOSTON), 9/15/2001; PARADE MAGAZINE, 10/12/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 1/9/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/23/2004] Entity Tags: Stephen A. Cambone, Larry DiRita, Victoria Clarke Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Passenger Jeremy Glick Describes Hijackers, Bomb

Jeremy Glick. [Source: Family photo] Jeremy Glick calls his wife, Lyz, from Flight 93. He describes the hijackers as Middle Eastern- and Iranian-looking. According to Glick, three of them put on red headbands, stood up, yelled, and ran into the cockpit. He had been sitting in the front of the coach section, but he was then sent to the back with most of the passengers. Glick says the hijackers claimed to have a bomb, which looked like a box with something red around it. Family members immediately call emergency 9-1-1 on another line. New York State Police are patched in midway through the call. Glick finds out about the WTC towers. Two others onboard also learn about the WTC at about this time. Glick’s phone remains connected until the very end of the flight. [TORONTO SUN, 9/16/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 143; MSNBC, 7/30/2002] Entity Tags: Jeremy Glick Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(After 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FBI Confiscates Film of Pentagon Crash An employee at a gas station located across the street from the Pentagon servicing military personnel later says the station’s security cameras should have recorded the moment of impact. However, he says, “I’ve never seen what the pictures looked like. The FBI was here within minutes and took the film.” [RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, 12/11/2001] A security camera atop a hotel close to the Pentagon also records the impact. Hotel employees watch the film several times before the FBI confiscates the video. [WASHINGTON TIMES, 9/21/2001] The Justice Department will refuse to release the footage, claiming that if they did it might provide intelligence to someone who would want to harm the US, but some Pentagon officials say they see no national security value to the video. [CNN, 3/7/2002] The gas station footage and video taken from one nearby hotel, the Doubletree, will eventually be released in 2006, but do not show much (see September 13, 2006-Early December 2006). Reporter Sandra Jontz, who is evacuated from the Pentagon some time after it is hit, notices a Department of Transportation camera that monitors traffic backups pointed towards the crash site. [BULL AND ERMAN, 2002, PP. 281] As of the end of 2006, the footage from this camera has not been released. Entity Tags: Sandra Jontz, Pentagon, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Emergency Responders Experience Communications Problems at Pentagon

Firefighters and other rescuers at the Pentagon crash site. [Source: US Department of Defense] Emergency responders and others at the Pentagon experience serious problems with communications following the attack there. These difficulties last for several hours. [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. 12-13; GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 114] According to a federally funded report on the emergency response to the Pentagon attack, communications systems had been busy “even before American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon.” But when the crash occurs, “all area communications [seem] simultaneously overwhelmed.” [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. A34] The Defense Department’s book about the Pentagon attack later describes, “Almost immediately radio traffic gridlocked, land lines were unavailable, and cellular telephone networks became so overloaded that for a time Pentagon officials and employees as well as some emergency responders could not call outside.” [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 114] This leads to significant problems: “Firefighters calling the [Arlington County Emergency Communications Center] couldn’t get through. Relatives of Pentagon workers found cellular and land lines jammed.” [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. A34] The DiLorenzo Tricare Health Clinic at the Pentagon and the Rader Clinic at nearby Fort Myer are unable to establish reliable communications. Reportedly, “Hospitals and clinics could not be informed about the flow of casualties, and perhaps more damaging, communication between the fire and rescue and the emergency medical elements on-site was severely impaired.” [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 114] Officer Aubrey Davis of the Pentagon police heads to the crash site with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld immediately after the Pentagon is hit. He receives frantic pleas over his radio, regarding Rumsfeld’s whereabouts. But, as Davis later recalls, “the system was overloaded, everyone on the frequency was talking, everything jumbled, so I couldn’t get through and they went on asking” (see (9:38 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [COCKBURN, 2007, PP. 1-2] Cellular and landline telephone communications remain “virtually unreliable or inaccessible during the first few hours of the response.” But later on, in the afternoon, Verizon technicians and Secret Service technical staff install portable cellular towers at the Pentagon, and this significantly increases cell phone access. [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. C36] Communications problems are experienced not just around the Pentagon but also in the broader Washington area, with some senior government officials being affected (see (After 8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [VERTON, 2003, PP. 149] Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, DiLorenzo Tricare Health Clinic, Arlington County Emergency Communications Center, Pentagon, US Department of Defense, Aubrey Davis, Rader Clinic Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(Shortly After 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Air Force Secretary and Chief of Staff Initially Unaware a Plane Has Hit Pentagon; Head to Operations Center

James Roche. [Source: United States Air Force] Secretary of the Air Force James Roche is in his office on the fourth floor of the Pentagon, along with Air Force Chief of Staff John Jumper. [CNN, 10/10/2001; AIRMAN, 10/2002] Both men had learned of the first attack on the WTC and seen the second attack live on television during a staff meeting in the Air Force Council conference room (see (9:00 a.m.-9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND NEWS SERVICE, 9/5/2002; GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 136] They do not feel the impact when the Pentagon is hit at 9:37, being on the opposite side of the building to the crash. [CNN, 10/10/2001; MIDLAND REPORTER-TELEGRAM, 4/2/2002] They are initially unaware that a plane has hit the place. Reportedly, “for those first minutes and hours of confusion, rumors circulated about a bomb hitting the Pentagon.” Tim Green, the assistant executive to the Air Force chief of staff who is responsible for securing Jumper, will later recall: “It was amazing, from inside the building, how little we knew about what actually went on. People outside of the building… probably knew more about what happened from the news than I did.” Roche and Jumper, accompanied by Green, head down to the Air Force Operations Center. [MIDLAND REPORTER-TELEGRAM, 4/2/2002; GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 136] The Operations Center is located in the basement of the Pentagon’s C Ring. In it, the Crisis Action Team (CAT) is carrying out emergency operations for the Air Force. [SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY MAGAZINE, 12/2001] Roche later recalls, “Once in our crisis action center, we found out that the building had been hit by an aircraft.” [CNN, 10/10/2001] Entity Tags: John P. Jumper, Tim Green, James G. Roche Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Some Pentagon Medical Workers Initially Think Evacuation Is Part of a Drill

Paul Carlton Jr. [Source: Publicity photo] A number of medical workers at the US Army’s DiLorenzo Tricare Health Clinic (DTHC) initially believe the evacuation in response to the Pentagon attack is part of a training exercise. The DTHC is located in the basement on the east side of the Pentagon, more than 1,000 feet from where the building was hit, and therefore many of the people there did not feel or hear the impact when the attack occurred. [NURSING SPECTRUM, 9/24/2001; GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 107-108; CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 57-58] After being told to get out of the clinic, Captain Jennifer Glidewell leaves along with Sergeant Matthew Rosenberg. According to Glidewell, they are “thinking fire drill.” They head for the Pentagon’s center courtyard where they see an injured man running and screaming, with his face burnt and the skin hanging off. According to authors Patrick Creed and Rick Newman, Glidewell initially thinks this is “the best moulage job she had ever seen. Moulage was the makeup medical practitioners put on mock patients during exercises, to simulate injuries.” When she realizes the injuries are genuine, she grabs her radio and yells into it: “This is not a drill! This is real!” [OFFICE OF MEDICAL HISTORY, 9/2004, PP. 19; CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 57-58] Sergeant Mark Maxey Davis will recall, “I just thought [the evacuation] was a routine fire drill or something like that.” [OFFICE OF MEDICAL HISTORY, 9/2004, PP. 69] Dr. Veena Railan describes: “I was not very sure what was happening, what was going on at that time. Maybe this is a drill because of what happened in New York.” [OFFICE OF MEDICAL HISTORY, 9/2004, PP. 125] Staff Sergeant Keith Pernell recalls, “We just thought it was a regular fire drill.” [OFFICE OF MEDICAL HISTORY, 9/2004, PP. 111] US Air Force Surgeon General Paul Carlton Jr. is accompanying a team of medics from the DTHC to the center courtyard. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 109] He will recall that a young sergeant with him is “under the impression that this crash was yet another exercise.” Carlton tells him, “I think this one’s for real, my friend.” [MURPHY, 2002, PP. 222] Captain Liza Lindenberg later describes, “Not until we went out the door did I see these plumes of smoke and thought, this is definitely not a drill.” [OFFICE OF MEDICAL HISTORY, 9/2004, PP. 85] Major Bridget Larew remains at the clinic to help an injured victim. Soon, she will recall, “our medical teams were starting to come back in the building, realizing that this was not a drill and that they needed to be here with us to get supplies and stuff.” [OFFICE OF MEDICAL HISTORY, 9/2004, PP. 83] A factor that may have contributed to this confusion is that personnel from the DTHC have participated in at least two training exercises during the previous 12 months based around the scenario of a plane crashing into the Pentagon (see October 24-26, 2000 and May 2001). [MDW NEWS SERVICE, 11/3/2000; US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. B17; GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 107] In response to the attack, the clinic’s workers will be involved with the emergency response, performing triage and treatment at the Pentagon. [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. B1] Entity Tags: Keith Pernell, DiLorenzo Tricare Health Clinic, Veena Railan, Bridget Larew, Matt Rosenberg, Paul Carlton, Jennifer Glidewell, Liza Lindenberg, Mark Maxey Davis Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon, Training Exercises

(Shortly After 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Air Force Liaison Joins FAA Teleconference, Later than FAA Claims

Sabra Kaulia. [Source: Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association] The US Air Force liaison to the FAA joins a teleconference that has been established by the FAA shortly after the time of the Pentagon attack, according to her own later recollections, although an FAA statement will claim she joined it significantly earlier. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/26/2004; US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 8/31/2006 ] Watches Television, Does Not Join Teleconference - The Air Force liaison, Colonel Sheryl Atkins, will recall that she arrived at FAA headquarters in Washington, DC, around five to 10 minutes after the first attack in New York (see (Between 8:51 a.m. and 8:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and went to her fourth-floor office there. She will describe: “Everybody was there around the TV. We watched the events unfold. At first, we were kind of hanging back and saying, you know, ‘there’s something awful going on with the air traffic system.‘… But at a certain point, not too long after that, it became obvious that, you know, something really strange is going on.” Heads to Situation Room - Shortly after 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon is hit, Atkins hears CNN reporting a bomb may have gone off at the Pentagon. She will recall that she then heads up to the 10th floor of the headquarters building along with Sabra Kaulia, the program director for air traffic airspace management, and goes to the air traffic situation room, where David Canoles, the FAA’s manager of air traffic evaluations and investigations, is participating in a teleconference. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/26/2004; US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 8/31/2006 ] According to a 2003 statement provided by the FAA, the FAA established this teleconference with several other agencies “[w]ithin minutes” of the first attack in New York (see (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Atkins will say she is then “in and out” of the air traffic situation room throughout the morning. She does not speak with any of the military representatives at the White House, but does work directly with Steve Nolte, the airspace manager at NORAD, and also communicates with Lieutenant Colonel Michael-Anne Cherry, who is at the FAA’s Herndon Command Center, to exchange information. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/26/2004] FAA Claims Atkins Joined Teleconference Earlier - In a 2003 statement it provides to the 9/11 Commission the FAA will say Atkins joined the teleconference significantly earlier than she claims. According to the statement, the “US Air Force liaison to the FAA [i.e. Atkins] immediately joined the FAA headquarters phone bridge” that was set up minutes after the first attack in New York, “and established contact with NORAD on a separate line.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Other Liaisons Arrive Later On - As well as Atkins, who represents the Air Force, liaisons representing the other three military services within the Department of Defense (the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps) work at FAA headquarters. However, Atkins is the only military liaison currently there. The Navy and Marine Corps liaisons will arrive at FAA headquarters at around 10:30 a.m. and join Atkins on the building’s 10th floor, from where they help establish and maintain critical communications channels between the Defense Department and the FAA. The Army liaison will not arrive at FAA headquarters until the following day. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/26/2004] Entity Tags: Sheryl Atkins, David Canoles, Sabra Kaulia Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:38 a.m. September 11, 2001: Pentagon Building Command Center Staff Confused as Attack Sets Off Over 300 Fire Alarms Employees in the Pentagon’s Building Operations Command Center (BOCC) do not realize a plane has hit their building, and are confused when over 300 of the Pentagon’s fire alarms go off at once. [CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 31; WHYY-FM, 5/27/2008] The BOCC, located on the first floor of the Pentagon’s innermost corridor, is usually staffed by two or three people who constantly monitor the building’s utility systems. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 137; CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 31] In it, Steve Carter and Kathy Greenwell felt the building tremble and heard a dull explosion when the Pentagon was hit. Their computers then show that, in an instant, 335 fire alarms have gone off, including the alarm for the BOCC itself. As authors Patrick Creed and Rick Newman will describe: “That didn’t make sense. Normally, fire spreads slowly. If the computer was correct, 400,000 square feet of the Pentagon had erupted into flame all at once.” Creed and Newman describe the plane impact that has caused this: “As the mass [of the aircraft] traveled through the building, it began to resemble a shaped charge, a form of explosive that funnels its force into a small, directed area—like a beam of energy—in order to punch holes through armor or other strong material.” The entire event, from the moment of impact until the aircraft’s movement is arrested, has “taken place in eight-tenths of a second.” [CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 29-31] Furthermore, an unusual pattern of explosions occurred when the aircraft struck the Pentagon. The Defense Department’s book about the attack will describe: “The Jet A fuel atomized and quickly combusted, causing explosive bursts as the plane hurtled into the building. A detonation 150 feet inside the building resulted from a ‘fuel-air’ explosion after the Jet A tanks disintegrated on impact. Here, as elsewhere, there was no uniform pattern of death and destruction. The vagaries of the fuel-air explosions and freakish blast effects meant deaths occurred randomly inside the Pentagon, with the occupants of seemingly more secure interior offices sometimes suffering worse fates than those nearer the outside wall.” [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 37] In the BOCC, not realizing what has happened, Carter says aloud: “I think we have a truck bomb! Or some kind of explosion!” [CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 31] It is not until later in the day that he learns a plane hit the Pentagon. [WHYY-FM, 5/27/2008] Entity Tags: Building Operations Command Center, Pentagon, Kathy Greenwell, Steve Carter Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Damaged Pentagon Security Cameras Allegedly Do Not Show Crash Site Pentagon security cameras facing the crash scene allegedly have been put out of order by the attack. [MURPHY, 2002, PP. 245] John Jester, the chief of the Defense Protective Service (DPS), runs from his office at the Pentagon down to the DPS Communications Center and orders, “Get a camera up there!” [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 152-153] As the Washington Times later notes, “The attack occurred close to the Pentagon’s heliport, an area that normally would be under 24-hour security surveillance, including video monitoring.” [WASHINGTON TIMES, 9/21/2001] However, some of the Communications Center’s eight wall-mounted monitor screens are blank, because the crash has destroyed the camera nearest the area of impact and cut connectivity to others. Furthermore, some of the security cameras at the Pentagon are currently inoperable because of construction work going on. Officer Jesse De Vaughn brings up an image from a camera at the Navy Annex, located a few hundred yards from the Pentagon, which is then focused onto the crash site. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 153 AND 244] Two recently installed security cameras located north of the crash site in fact captured the moment the aircraft impacted the Pentagon. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 161] The poor quality footage from these will be officially released in 2006 (see May 16, 2006). Whether the cameras that were destroyed or disconnected when the Pentagon was hit captured the approaching aircraft or the moment of impact is unstated. Entity Tags: Pentagon, John Jester Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Officer in Pentagon Command Center Only Learns from TV that Pentagon Has Been Hit The Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) is located on the other side of the building to where it is hit. Therefore, when the attack on the Pentagon occurs, those inside it supposedly do not feel the impact. [CNN, 9/4/2002] According to Newsweek, the NMCC has been called “the primary nerve system” of the Pentagon, from where “commanders can monitor and communicate with American forces around the world.” [NEWSWEEK, 9/28/2001] A military instruction for dealing with hijacked aircraft describes it as “the focal point within Department of Defense for providing assistance” in response to hijackings. [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 6/1/2001 ] But supposedly NMCC personnel do not initially realize the Pentagon has been attacked. Steve Hahn, an operations officer at the center, later says, “I didn’t know [the Pentagon had been hit] until I heard the news report on television.” [AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 9/7/2006] Yet an article in the New York Times later claims, “During the hour or so that American Airlines Flight 77 was under the control of hijackers, up to the moment it struck the west side of the Pentagon, military officials in [the NMCC] were urgently talking to law enforcement and air traffic control officials about what to do” (see (Shortly After 8:51 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/15/2001] Furthermore, at about 8:50 a.m. according to the FAA, or 9:20 a.m. according to the 9/11 Commission, the FAA had established several phone bridges linking key players, including the NMCC (see (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001) (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The FAA states that it shares “real-time information on the phone bridges,” which includes “actions being taken by all the flights of interest, including Flight 77.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 36] Why NMCC personnel do not therefore know immediately that the Pentagon has been hit is unclear. Also around this time, Officer Aubrey Davis of the Pentagon police is outside Donald Rumsfeld’s office. He hears what he later describes as “an incredibly loud ‘boom,’” when the Pentagon is struck (see 9:38 a.m. September 11, 2001). Yet no mention is made of anyone in the NMCC hearing this “boom,” even though the center is located only around 200 feet from where Davis is standing. [WBZ RADIO 1030 (BOSTON), 9/15/2001; COCKBURN, 2007, PP. 1] Dan Mangino, an operations officer in the NMCC, went out earlier to withdraw some money from a cash machine (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), and rushes back to the center after the Pentagon is hit. He finds the people in it are very calm. He says, “There was no panic, no raised voices. We train for emergencies all the time, and that training took over.” [AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 9/7/2006] Entity Tags: Steve Hahn, National Military Command Center, Dan Mangino Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(9:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001: ‘Experienced Combat Arms Officers’ at Pentagon Think a Bomb Has Exploded There A group of Army officers at the Pentagon initially thinks that a bomb has gone off in their building when it is attacked. Army Major Craig Collier and his colleagues are in their office on the second floor of the Pentagon’s C Ring, about 200 feet from where the building is hit. Collier will later recall: “[T]he building jolted and we heard a muffled boom, then a rumble.… All of my peers in the area are experienced combat arms officers, and we quickly agreed that it sounded and felt like a bomb.” [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 26] Numerous other Pentagon employees also initially think a bomb has gone off, and apparently only a few guess a plane has hit the place (see (9:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Craig Collier Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(9:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Reagan Airport Controllers Alert Others to Pentagon Crash After seeing the explosion from the attack on the Pentagon, air traffic controllers at Washington’s Reagan National Airport promptly alert others to the crash, with a supervisor reporting that the crashed aircraft was an American Airlines 757. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/18/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 158-159] Reagan Airport is less than a mile from the Pentagon. [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/19/2001] In its control tower, supervisor Chris Stephenson had looked out the window and seen Flight 77 approaching (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). He watched it flying a full circle and disappearing behind a building in nearby Crystal City, before crashing into the Pentagon. Stephenson sees the resulting fireball and a mass of paper debris that fills the air. He calls the airport’s Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) and reports: “It was an American 757! It hit the Pentagon. It was a 757 and it hit the Pentagon. American!” [USA TODAY, 8/11/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 158-159] Other controllers see the fireball from the crash. One of them, David Walsh, activates the crash phone, which instantly connects the control tower to airport operations, as well as fire and police departments. He yells down the line: “Aircraft down at the Pentagon! Aircraft down at the Pentagon!” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/18/2001; MCDONNELL, 2004, PP. 19-20 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 158-159] Reagan Airport controllers contact controllers at Washington Dulles International Airport, who hear over the speakers in their room: “Dulles, hold all of our inbound traffic. The Pentagon’s been hit.” [ABC NEWS, 10/24/2001] Entity Tags: David Walsh, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, Chris Stephenson, Washington Dulles International Airport Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(Between 9:38 a.m. and 9:43 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Bush Learns of Attack on Pentagon While his motorcade is traveling from the Booker Elementary School to the Sarasota airport, President Bush learns about the attack on the Pentagon. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 39; FLEISCHER, 2005, PP. 141] How exactly Bush learns of it is unclear, as he is reportedly experiencing serious communications problems during this journey, being unable to contact his staff at the White House (see (9:34 a.m.-11:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/10/2006] His chief of staff Andrew Card is also in the presidential limousine. [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/8/2002] Card will later recall, “As we were heading to Air Force One, we did hear about the Pentagon attack, and we also learned what turned out to be a mistake, but we learned that the Air Force One package could in fact be a target.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: Andrew Card, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Airborne Command Center Launched from Ohio Air Base Minutes after the attack on the Pentagon, an E-4B National Airborne Operations Center plane takes off from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, near Dayton, Ohio, bound for an undisclosed location. E-4Bs are highly modified Boeing 747s, fitted with sophisticated communications equipment, that act as flying military command posts. Nicknamed “Doomsday” planes during the Cold War, they serve the president and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They can also support the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) during major disasters, like hurricanes or earthquakes. Wright-Patterson is one of the few designated bases for these special planes. The US military possesses four of them in total, one of which is constantly kept on alert. [FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, 4/23/2000; DAYTON DAILY NEWS, 9/12/2001] Three of the E-4Bs are airborne this morning, due to their role in a pre-scheduled military exercise called Global Guardian (see Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (Shortly Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 2/27/2002] The E-4B from Wright-Patterson will return to the base later in the day. [DAYTON DAILY NEWS, 9/12/2001] Entity Tags: E-4B National Airborne Operations Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Shortly After 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Myers Learns of Pentagon Attack; Heads Back to Pentagon According to his own account, acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers was in a meeting on Capitol Hill with Senator Max Cleland (D) since just before 9:00 a.m. (see Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] It is unclear exactly when this meeting ended. But Myers says he first learns of the Pentagon attack (which occurs at 9:37) around the time he is leaving the building for the drive back to the Pentagon. In an early interview, he says he hears somebody say the Pentagon has been hit just after he comes out of his meeting with Cleland. [ARMED FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION SERVICE, 10/17/2001] In some accounts, he says he hears that the Pentagon has been hit just as he is leaving Capitol Hill. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 ] In a meeting in 2006, he says, “my security guy got the call the Pentagon had been hit,” as he is making his way out of the building. [COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 6/29/2006] Myers says that, as his car crosses the 14th Street Bridge across the Potomac River, he can see all the black smoke rising up out of the Pentagon. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 463; AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 9/8/2006] Max Cleland later confirms that Myers meets with him on this morning, and is with him until the time of the Pentagon attack, or slightly before. [US CONGRESS, 9/13/2001; CNN, 11/20/2001; ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, 6/16/2003] However, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke gives a contradictory account. He claims that Myers is back at the Pentagon, speaking to him over a video conference, around ten minutes before the Pentagon is struck (see 9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 5] Entity Tags: Richard B. Myers Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Between 9:38 a.m. and 9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Clarke Orders Combat Air Patrols over All Major Cities; Unclear Whether Order Is Passed On From the White House Situation Room, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke gives the instruction for fighter jets to establish patrols over all major US cities. Clarke has been talking with the FAA over the White House video conference, and his deputy, Roger Cressey, has just announced that a plane hit the Pentagon. According to his own recollection, Clarke responds: “I can still see [Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld on the screen [for the Pentagon], so the whole building didn’t get hit. No emotion in here. We are going to stay focused.” He orders Cressey: “Find out where the fighter planes are. I want combat air patrol over every major city in this country. Now.” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 7-8; AUSTRALIAN, 3/27/2004] A combat air patrol (CAP) is an aircraft patrol over a particular area, with the purpose of intercepting and destroying any hostile aircraft before they reach their targets. [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 4/12/2001] It is unclear how long it takes for CAPs to be formed over all major cities, as Clarke requests. At 9:49, NORAD Commander Ralph Eberhart will direct all the US’s air sovereignty aircraft to battle stations (see 9:49 a.m. September 11, 2001), but bases have reportedly been calling into NORAD and asking for permission to send up fighters since after the second WTC crash (see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] At around 11:00 a.m. Eberhart will implement a plan called SCATANA, which clears the skies and gives the military control over US airspace (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Roger Cressey, Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke

(After 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Aircraft Carriers Called to Defend US; Uncertainty Over When This Happens

The USS George Washington. [Source: Summer Anderson / Department of Defense] After the attack on the Pentagon, Navy ships and aircraft squadrons that are stationed, or at sea, along the coast of the United States are, reportedly, “rapidly pressed into action” to defend the country. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark is evacuated from his office in the Pentagon after the building is hit, and soon relocates to the Navy’s Antiterrorist Alert Center in southeast Washington, DC, where a backup Navy command center is being established (see After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). Clark later explains, “We had carriers at sea. I talked to Admiral Natter [Adm. Robert J. Natter, commander in chief, US Atlantic Fleet] and Admiral Fargo [Adm. Thomas B. Fargo, commander in chief, US Pacific Fleet] about immediate loadouts [of weapons and armed aircraft] and the positioning of our air defense cruisers. Fundamentally, those pieces were in place almost immediately and integrated into the interagency process and with the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration].” The aircraft carrier USS George Washington is currently at sea conducting training exercises. It is dispatched to New York, “following the recovery of armed F-14 Tomcats and F/A-18 Hornets from Naval Air Station Oceana,” in Virginia Beach, Virginia. According to Sea Power magazine, another aircraft carrier—the USS John F. Kennedy—that is departing Mayport, Florida, is ordered to patrol the waters off Hampton Roads, Virginia, “to protect the Navy’s vast shore complex in Norfolk.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/12/2001; SEA POWER, 1/2002; NOTRE DAME MAGAZINE, 4/2007] The John F. Kennedy has nearly a full air wing of 75 fighter, attack, and reconnaissance planes aboard it, while the George Washington has only a limited number of aircraft on board. [VIRGINIAN-PILOT, 9/12/2001] Admiral Natter orders two amphibious ships—the USS Bataan and the USS Shreveport—to proceed to North Carolina, to pick up Marines from Camp Lejeune, in case additional support is needed in New York. “Within three hours, an undisclosed number of Aegis guided-missile cruisers and destroyers also were underway, their magazines loaded with Standard 2 surface-to-air missiles. Positioned off New York and Norfolk, and along the Gulf Coast, they provided robust early-warning and air-defense capabilities to help ensure against follow-on terrorist attacks.” Vern Clark later recalls that, after the Pentagon attack, “We were thinking about the immediate protection of the United States of America.” [SEA POWER, 1/2002] Yet, according to CNN, it is not until 1:44 p.m. that the Pentagon announces that five warships and two aircraft carriers—the USS George Washington and the USS John F. Kennedy—are to depart the Naval Station in Norfolk, Virginia, so as to protect the East Coast (see 1:44 p.m. September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/12/2001] And, according to some reports, the Navy only dispatches missile destroyers toward New York and Washington at 2:51 p.m. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; FOX NEWS, 9/13/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2006] Entity Tags: Robert Natter, US Department of the Navy, Federal Aviation Administration, Thomas Fargo, Vern Clark Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Some Officers in Area Where Pentagon Is Hit Think Bombs Have Exploded

Lt. Col. Brian Birdwell. [Source: Molly A. Burgess / US Army] At least three Pentagon employees in the area of the building that is hit, and who narrowly survive the attack, initially believe that what they have experienced is a bomb, or bombs, going off: John Thurman, an Army lieutenant colonel, is in a second floor office just above where the Pentagon is hit. [WASHINGTON POST, 4/12/2006] He later describes the moment of impact: “To me it didn’t seem like a plane.… [T]o me it seemed like it was a bomb. Being in the military, I have been around grenade, artillery explosions. It was a two-part explosion to me.… [I]t seemed like that there was a percussion blast that blew me kind of backwards in my cubicle to the side. And then it seemed as if a massive explosion went off at the same time.” He will add: “I had thought that perhaps the terrorists had surreptitiously gotten construction workers to come in and place explosives.” [UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, A/K/A SHAQIL, A/K/A ABU KHALID AL SAHRAWI, DEFENDANT., 4/11/2006 ] Lt. Nancy McKeown is on the first floor of the Pentagon’s D Ring in the Navy Command Center, which is mostly destroyed when the building is hit. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/20/2002; GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 30-31] She will recall: “[I]t initially felt like an earthquake.… It sounded like a series of explosions going off.… It sounded like a series of bombs exploding, similar to like firecrackers when you light them and you just get a series going off.” [UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, A/K/A SHAQIL, A/K/A ABU KHALID AL SAHRAWI, DEFENDANT., 4/11/2006 ] She yells out to her colleagues, “Bomb!” [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 31] Army Lt. Col. Brian Birdwell is returning to his second floor office, and is just yards from where the building is impacted. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/31/2003; DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 9/7/2006] “Bomb! I thought,” he recalls of the moment the building is hit. [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 12/2/2001; TODAY'S CHRISTIAN WOMAN, 7/1/2004] Entity Tags: Brian Birdwell, John Thurman, Nancy McKeown Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

9:38 a.m. September 11, 2001: Rumsfeld Dashes toward Crash Site Seconds after Pentagon Is Hit Immediately after the Pentagon is hit, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld heads for the crash site. At the time of the attack, Rumsfeld is in his office proceeding with his regularly scheduled CIA briefing, despite being aware of the two attacks on the World Trade Center earlier on. Waiting outside his door is Officer Aubrey Davis of the Pentagon police, who is assigned to the defense secretary’s personal bodyguard, and has come of his own initiative to move Rumsfeld to a better-protected location. According to Davis, there is “an incredibly loud ‘boom,’” as the Pentagon is struck. Just 15 or 20 seconds later, Rumsfeld walks out of his door looking composed, having already put on the jacket he normally discards when in his office. Davis informs him there is a report of an airplane hitting a section of the Pentagon known as the Mall. Rumsfeld sets off without saying anything or informing any of his command staff where he is going, and heads swiftly toward the Mall. Davis accompanies him, as does Rumsfeld’s other security guard Gilbert Oldach, his communications officer, and the deputy director of security for the secretary’s office. Finding no sign of damage at the Mall, Davis tells Rumsfeld, “[N]ow we’re hearing it’s by the heliport,” which is along the next side of the building. Despite Davis’s protests that he should head back, Rumsfeld continues onward, and they go outside near where the crash occurred. [COCKBURN, 2007, PP. 1-2; GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 130; DEMOCRACY NOW!, 3/7/2007] The Pentagon was hit on the opposite site of the huge building to Rumsfeld’s office. [REUTERS, 9/11/2001] Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Torie Clarke says Rumsfeld is “one of the first people” to arrive at the crash scene. [KYW RADIO 1060 (PHILADELPHIA), 9/15/2001] He spends a brief time there (see Between 9:38 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001), before returning to the building by about 10 a.m., according to his own account (see (10:00 a.m.-10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/23/2004] Rumsfeld will later justify his actions following the attack, saying, “I was going, which seemed to me perfectly logically, towards the scene of the accident to see what could be done and what had happened.” [ABC NEWS, 8/12/2002] As journalist Andrew Cockburn points out, though, “the country was under attack, and yet the secretary of defense disappears for 20 minutes.” [C-SPAN, 2/25/2007] The numerous reports of Rumsfeld going outside to the crash scene are apparently contradicted by counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke. In his 2004 book Against All Enemies, Clarke gives the impression that Rumsfeld never leaves a video conference for very long after the Pentagon is hit, except to move from one secure teleconferencing studio to another elsewhere in the Pentagon. [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 7-9] However, video footage confirms that Rumsfeld does indeed go to the crash site. [CNN, 8/17/2002] Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Aubrey Davis, Gilbert Oldach Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Donald Rumsfeld, Pentagon

After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Air Force Crisis Action Team Responds to Attacks

Harry Brosofsky. [Source: Syracuse University] Inside the Air Force Operations Center at the Pentagon, personnel do not feel when the building is hit. The Operations Center is located in the basement of the building’s C Ring, on the opposite side to where the impact occurs. But alarms go off, and television news reports confirm that the Pentagon has been attacked. Secretary of the Air Force James Roche and Air Force Chief of Staff John Jumper arrive at the Operations Center shortly after the attack (see (Shortly After 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to Roche, the first thing they do there is “try and find out where our people were to make sure they were safe and safely out of the building.” Then, “The second thing we did was to try and hook up with the North American Air Defense Command, NORAD, and then to stand by and start to think of how we, the Air Force, could support any casualties or any other things that might develop during the day.” Air Force Major Harry Brosofsky also arrives at the Operations Center shortly after the Pentagon is hit, to help the Air Force’s Crisis Action Team (CAT) there. When he arrives, the CAT is taking calls coming in on numerous phone lines. As Brosofsky later describes, “We became the eyes and ears of the Air Force.” The CAT works with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to monitor flight activity over the US. It also coordinates with NORAD to put fighter jets on alert in Alaska and Hawaii. Brosofsky says that while “We’re trained to know what to do in a crisis,… at times we had information overload and had to decide quickly what to do with all the information that was pouring in.” Around midday, the decision is made to leave the building, and the CAT relocates to a secret location outside Washington. [DOVER POST, 9/19/2001; CNN, 10/10/2001; SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY MAGAZINE, 12/2001; AIRMAN, 10/2002; PROSPECTUS, 9/2006, PP. 3-6 ] Entity Tags: James G. Roche, Air Force Crisis Action Team, Harry Brosofsky, North American Aerospace Defense Command, US Department of the Air Force, Federal Aviation Administration, John P. Jumper Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Some Witnesses Surprised by Lack of Plane Debris at the Pentagon

This piece of metal, apparently showing the red, white, and blue stripes worn by American Airlines, is said to be a piece of wreckage from Flight 77. [Source: Associated Press] Some emergency responders and other witnesses are surprised at the lack of major plane debris at the Flight 77 crash site at the Pentagon: Brian Ladd of the Fort Myer Fire Department arrives at the scene a few minutes after the attack. Yet, “Expecting to see pieces of the wings or fuselage,” he instead sees “millions of tiny pieces” of debris spread “everywhere.” [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 68] Captain John Durrer of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority Fire Department also arrives within minutes of the crash. He later recalls thinking: “Well where’s the airplane, you know, where’s the parts to it? You would think there’d be something.” Reportedly, “The near total disintegration of the plane had left only a multitude of bits scattered outside the building.” [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 70] Steve DeChiaro, the president of a New Jersey technology firm, had just arrived at the Pentagon when it was hit and ran toward the crash site. He later recalls: “But when I looked at the site, my brain could not resolve the fact that it was a plane because it only seemed like a small hole in the building. No tail. No wings. No nothing.” [SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, 8/1/2002] Early in the afternoon, CNN Pentagon correspondent Jamie McIntyre reports: “[T]he only pieces left that you can see are small enough that you can pick up in your hand. There are no large tail sections, wing sections, fuselage, nothing like that anywhere around, which would indicate that the entire plane crashed into the side of the Pentagon and then caused the side to collapse.” [CNN, 9/11/2001] Sheryl Alleger, a Navy officer at the Pentagon, goes past the crash site in an ambulance in the afternoon. She will recall: “[Y]ou couldn’t see any bits of the airplane, that was the thing that got me.… I expected to see the tail sticking out.… But—nothing. It was like the building swallowed the plane.” [HILTON, 2002, PP. 143] Eileen Murphy, a nurse at the Pentagon’s DiLorenzo Tricare Health Clinic, will later recall: “I expected to see the airplane, so I guess my initial impression was, ‘Where’s the plane? How come there’s not a plane?’ I would have thought the building would have stopped it and somehow we would have seen something like part of, or half of the plane, or the lower part, or the back of the plane. So it was just a real surprise that the plane wasn’t there.” [OFFICE OF MEDICAL HISTORY, 9/2004, PP. 96] Sgt. Reginald Powell will say: “I was truly impressed with how the building stood up, after they told me the size of the plane. And then I was in awe that I saw no plane, nothing left from the plane. It was like it disintegrated as it went into the building.” [OFFICE OF MEDICAL HISTORY, 9/2004, PP. 119] Captain Dennis Gilroy, acting commander of the Fort Myer fire department, “wondered why he saw no aircraft parts” when he arrives at the scene. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 68] Other witnesses say they come across some pieces of plane debris: Rich Fitzharris, an electrical engineer working at the Pentagon, later remembers seeing “small pieces of debris, the largest of which might have been part of an engine shroud.” [MLAKAR ET AL., 1/2003, PP. 13 ] Allyn Kilsheimer, a structural engineer who arrives at the Pentagon at about 5:00 p.m., later recalls: “I picked up parts of the plane with the airline markings on them. I held in my hand the tail section of the plane.” [POPULAR MECHANICS, 3/2005; GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 100] Later on during the day, the FBI arranges a search of the lawn in front of the crash site. According to the Defense Department’s book about the Pentagon attack: “Although much of the plane disintegrated within the Pentagon, the searchers found many scraps and a few personal items widely scattered on the grass and heliport. Plane remnants varied from half-dollar size to a few feet long.” [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 159] Also, one photo shows what appears to be plane debris on the lawn in front of the Pentagon, with the red, white, and blue stripes of American Airlines. [KNIGHT RIDDER, 4/28/2002] Entity Tags: Eileen Murphy, Brian Ladd, Allyn Kilsheimer, Reginald Powell, Sheryl Alleger, Jamie McIntyre, Rich Fitzharris, John Durrer, Steve DeChiaro Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Supervisor at Army Airfield Sees Two Unidentified Aircraft on Radar, Circling above Pentagon

Davison Army Airfield. [Source: Airnav.com] Shortly after the Pentagon crash, an air traffic control supervisor at Davison Army Airfield sees two unidentified aircraft near the Pentagon on the radar of his facility, which is located at Fort Belvoir, about 12 miles south of the Pentagon. The supervisor, who is working in the airfield’s control tower, looks out the window toward where the Pentagon is and sees a large black cloud of smoke. He is told by a colleague that news reports are saying a small airplane has hit the Pentagon. He then looks at the facility’s radar scope, which shows two aircraft circling above the Pentagon. The transponder of one of these is transmitting the emergency code. The supervisor will recall: “I look at where the Pentagon area is [on the radar scope], and I look, and there was an aircraft squawking 7700, meaning emergency. And it was circling—it was coming down and fast.… [A]nd there was another target with no markings or anything—it was just a target,” with none of the accompanying information that would be emitted by a transponder. This second aircraft is “descending rapidly and very fast.” The supervisor will recall that the two aircraft “circled around and both tags they disappeared. But they stay in the air.” He will provide no further information on the identities of the aircraft or why one of them is transmitting the emergency code. [US ARMY CENTER FOR MILITARY HISTORY, 11/14/2001 ] There will be eyewitness accounts of aircraft near the Pentagon around this time (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001, 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001, and (9:41 a.m.-9:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Davison Army Airfield Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Pentagon

(9:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Some inside Pentagon Think a Bomb Has Exploded There Even though two planes have already crashed in New York, some people in the Pentagon initially think a bomb has gone off when their building is hit: Steve Carter, who is in the Building Operations Command Center on the first floor of the Pentagon, hears a “big boom,” and tells his assistant, “I think we just got hit by a bomb.” [VOGEL, 2007, PP. 434] John Bowman, a retired Marine lieutenant colonel, is in his office near the main entrance to the Pentagon’s south parking lot at the time of the attack. He later describes, “Most people knew it was a bomb.” [PENTAGRAM, 9/14/2001] Army Colonel Jonathan Fruendt is in his second floor office in the Pentagon’s inner A Ring, when he feels and hears “a very sharp jolt and the sound of an explosion.” He later recalls, “I thought it was a bomb that had gone off.” [OFFICE OF MEDICAL HISTORY, 9/2004, PP. 73] Apparently only a few people in the Pentagon initially guess a plane has hit the place. According to the Defense Department’s book about the Pentagon attack, among the few exceptions are Peter Murphy and his companions in the Marine Corps Office of the General Counsel, located on the fourth floor just above where the building is hit: “Unlike most other survivors, Murphy and his companions ‘were pretty certain it was a plane and it was a terrorist,’ even though they had not seen the plane coming in. They had been watching the attack on the Twin Towers and had speculated about such an attack on the Pentagon.” [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 45] Entity Tags: Steve Carter, Jonathan Fruendt, Peter Murphy, John Bowman Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Attorney General Ashcroft Insists on Leaving Milwaukee and Flying to Washington, despite FAA Ground Stop

General Mitchell International Airport in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. [Source: VisitingDC.com] Attorney General John Ashcroft insists that the plane he is traveling on take off from Milwaukee and head to Washington, DC, even though he has been discouraged from getting airborne due to the possibility of further attacks, and his pilot has been told by air traffic control that he will not be allowed to take off. [ASHCROFT, 2006, PP. 117; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 257-258] Ashcroft was flying from Washington to Milwaukee in a Cessna Citation V jet when he learned of the attacks in New York in a phone call with the Justice Department command center. He’d wanted to immediately head back to Washington, but his pilot, David Clemmer, said they would first need to land in Milwaukee to refuel (see Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). Their aircraft then landed, presumably at Milwaukee’s General Mitchell International Airport. SWAT Team Surrounds Plane - After the plane touched down, Ashcroft and the others on board were met by a SWAT team, brandishing weapons, which surrounded the plane. Then, while Clemmer took care of refueling, Ashcroft and his fellow passengers—some colleagues of his from the Justice Department—went into the airport’s evacuated terminal and found a television on which they could watch the news coverage from New York. Soon after, they learned that the Pentagon had been hit. Ashcroft Discouraged from Taking Off - While at the airport, Ashcroft spends much of his time speaking over the phone to the Justice Department command center in Washington. He will later recall, “Some people were discouraging us from getting back on the plane until we knew whether there was going to be another attack.” But Ashcroft “didn’t want to wait that long,” so as soon as Clemmer has finished refueling the plane, Ashcroft gives him the order to take off. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/28/2001; ASHCROFT, 2006, PP. 115-117] Ashcroft Overrules Order Not to Take Off - However, the FAA has ordered a nationwide ground stop to prevent aircraft from taking off (see (9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and air traffic control has informed Clemmer that his plane will not be allowed to leave Milwaukee for Washington. [US CONGRESS. HOUSE. COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 9/21/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 25; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 257-258] Clemmer therefore tells Ashcroft: “I’m sorry, sir. We can’t take off. I just received orders that we are not supposed to be flying.” But Ashcroft responds: “No, we’re going. Let’s get back in the air.” Ashcroft and his fellow passengers then board the plane. [ASHCROFT, 2006, PP. 117] They are joined by another Justice Department aide and another FBI agent in addition to the one who’d been on the plane when it landed in Milwaukee. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/28/2001] Pilot Convinces Controller to Let Him Take Off - Clemmer is eventually able to convince air traffic control to allow him to leave Milwaukee. He then takes off and heads toward Washington. However, when Ben Sliney, the national operations manager at the FAA’s Command Center, hears about this, he will reportedly be “livid,” and Ashcroft’s plane will be ordered to land (see 10:40 a.m. September 11, 2001). [ASHCROFT, 2006, PP. 117; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 258] Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, John Ashcroft, Federal Aviation Administration, David Clemmer Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Navy Leaders Gather at Antiterrorist Center

Vern Clark. [Source: US Navy] The Navy Command Center at the Pentagon is mostly destroyed when the building is hit at 9:37 a.m. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/20/2002] After the attack, the Navy’s leaders start arriving instead at the Navy’s Antiterrorist Alert Center (ATAC), which is located at the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) headquarters in southeast Washington, DC. [US NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, N.D.; US DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, 2/2002 ; CNN, 8/27/2002] Those who arrive at the center include Admiral Vern Clark, the chief of naval operations; Admiral William Fallon, the vice chief of naval operations; Gordon England, the secretary of the Navy; and Rear Admiral Jeffrey Hathaway of the US Coast Guard, who is currently in charge of Navy Anti-Terrorism Force Protection. According to Hathaway, the NCIS headquarters is “not the official backup,” but “There was not a plan in place that if somebody flew into the Pentagon where would we take folks.” From the center, these officials are able to hold secure video-teleconferences throughout the rest of the day, and also on the following day. Eventually the Naval Operations staff will relocate to the Navy Annex, which is about a mile away from the Pentagon. This will act as their temporary base in the following weeks. [US COAST GUARD, 6/20/2002; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 4/26/2005] Entity Tags: Gordon England, Vern Clark, Jeffrey Hathaway, William Fallon, US Department of the Navy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Clarke Possibly Told to Pass on Shootdown Authorization, Earlier than Other Accounts Claim According to one account, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke is given the go-ahead to authorize Air Force jets to shoot down threatening aircraft around this time. In late 2003, Clarke will recall to ABC News that, minutes earlier, he’d picked up the phone in the White House Situation Room and called Vice President Dick Cheney, who is in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House. He’d told him: “We have fighters aloft now. We need authority to shoot down hostile aircraft.” [ABC NEWS, 11/29/2003] This call appears to be one Clarke also describes in his 2004 book Against all Enemies, though in that account he will describe having made his request to Army Major Mike Fenzel, who is also in the PEOC, rather than directly to Cheney. According to that account, the call occurred shortly before Clarke learns of the Pentagon attack, so roughly around 9:36 (see (Between 9:30 a.m. and 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 6-7] Clarke describes to ABC News, “I thought that would take forever to get that [shootdown] authority.” But, “The vice president got on the phone to the president, got back to me, I would say within two minutes, and said, ‘Do it.’” [ABC NEWS, 11/29/2003] If correct, this would mean the president authorizes military fighters to shoot down threatening aircraft at around 9:37-9:38. However, around this time, the president and vice president are reportedly having difficulty communicating with each other, while Bush heads from the Booker Elementary School to the Sarasota airport (see (9:34 a.m.-11:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 6/18/2004; CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/10/2006] Furthermore, this account contradicts several others. In his 2004 book, Clarke will describe being told to inform the Pentagon it has shootdown authorization slightly later, some time between 9:45 and 9:56 (see (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 8] According to journalists Bob Woodward and Bill Sammon, Bush gives the shootdown authorization in a phone call with Cheney shortly after 9:56 (see (Shortly After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 102; WOODWARD, 2002, PP. 17-18; WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] The 9/11 Commission will say he gives it in a call at 10:18 (see 10:18 a.m.-10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 41] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Richard A. Clarke Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, George Bush, Dick Cheney, Richard Clarke

(9:38 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Senior Officials Unable to Contact Defense Secretary Rumsfeld

Stephen Cambone. [Source: US Department of Defense] Immediately after the Pentagon was hit, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld left his office and headed to the crash scene (see 9:38 a.m. September 11, 2001). For the 20 minutes or so that he is gone, others are desperately trying to contact him. Among those seeking Rumsfeld are Stephen Cambone, his closest aide, who is currently in the Pentagon’s Executive Support Center (see Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), and also the National Military Command Center (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). Officer Aubrey Davis of the Pentagon police, who is accompanying Rumsfeld, is receiving frantic calls over his radio saying, “Where’s the secretary? Where’s the secretary?” Davis is unable to answer these requests. He later recalls, “I kept saying, ‘We’ve got him,’ but the system was overloaded, everyone on the frequency was talking, everything jumbled, so I couldn’t get through and they went on asking.” A senior White House official, who is in its Situation Room trying to coordinate a response to the attacks, will later angrily condemn Rumsfeld for having been out of touch during such a critical period. He says, “What was Rumsfeld doing on 9/11? He deserted his post. He disappeared. The country was under attack. Where was the guy who controls America’s defense? Out of touch! How long does it take for something bad to happen? No one knew what was happening. What if this had been the opening shot of a coordinated attack by a hostile power? Outrageous, to abandon your responsibilities and go off and do what you don’t need to be doing, grandstanding.” [COCKBURN, 2007, PP. 2-4; C-SPAN, 2/25/2007] Entity Tags: Stephen A. Cambone, Donald Rumsfeld, National Military Command Center, Aubrey Davis Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Donald Rumsfeld, Pentagon

9:39 a.m.-9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Begins Rapid Descent Despite Being Hundreds of Miles from Presumed Target At 9:39 a.m., after having maintained a maximum altitude of 41,000 feet for about two minutes, Flight 93 begins a rapid descent, going down at a rate of 4,000 feet per minute. At 9:46, it interrupts this, going up from 19,000 feet to 20,500 feet, but then resumes its descent at the slower rate of 1,300 feet per minute. At 9:59, it has reached an altitude of 5,000 feet. [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 ] The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) will later describe this as a “surprising element in the navigation of Flight 93,” since the aircraft begins its “rapid descent from cruise altitudes while still approximately 260 nautical miles [about 300 miles] from the (presumed) target.” [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/13/2002, PP. 3 ] The target of Flight 93 is later believed to be either the White House or the Capitol building. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 14] The NTSB will note that by the times Flights 11, 175, and 77 had descended below 5,000 feet, they were all within 10 nautical miles (11.5 miles) of their targets. “UAL 93, on the other hand, descended to 5,000 feet while still 135 [nautical miles] from Washington.” [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/13/2002 ] Entity Tags: National Transportation Safety Board Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

Between 9:38 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Rumsfeld Spends Brief Time at Pentagon Crash Scene and Helps Carry a Stretcher; Accounts Conflict over Details

Rumsfeld show on a video broadcast on CNN helping carry a stretcher shortly after the Pentagon attack. He is in the center of the picture, wearing a dark jacket. [Source: CNN] Within seconds of the Pentagon being hit, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld rushed out of his office and headed toward the crash scene (see 9:38 a.m. September 11, 2001). According to Officer Aubrey Davis, who is currently accompanying Rumsfeld as his bodyguard, when they reach the site, “There were the flames, and bits of metal all around. The secretary picked up one of the pieces of metal. I was telling him he shouldn’t be interfering with a crime scene when he looked at some inscription on it and said, ‘American Airlines.’” According to Rumsfeld, a person who’d seen the attack on the Pentagon informs him a plane had flown into it. Rumsfeld later recalls: “I saw people on the grass, and we just, we tried to put them in stretchers and then move them out across the grass towards the road and lifted them over a jersey wall so the people on that side could stick them into the ambulances. I was out there for a while, and then people started gathering, and we were able to get other people to do that, to hold IVs for people. There were people lying on the grass with clothes blown off and burns all over them.” [PARADE MAGAZINE, 10/12/2001; COCKBURN, 2007, PP. 1-2] Versions of this story will appear elsewhere. [STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 9/12/2001; LARRY KING LIVE, 12/5/2001; ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002; VANITY FAIR, 5/9/2003] Video footage confirms that Rumsfeld helps carry a stretcher at the crash scene. [CNN, 8/17/2002] One report will even describe him pulling budget analyst Paul Gonzales to safety from the burning wreckage. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 9/16/2001] However, Gonzales later offers his own detailed recollections of pulling other people to safety, which fail to involve Rumsfeld in any way. [WASHINGTON POST, 3/11/2002] Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Torie Clarke will say Rumsfeld is gone from the building for “about half an hour.” [WBZ RADIO 1030 (BOSTON), 9/15/2001] A Pentagon spokesperson has Rumsfeld helping at the crash site for “15 minutes or so.” [REUTERS, 9/11/2001] Another account will claim he loads the wounded onto stretchers for 15 minutes. [SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, 9/11/2001] However, considering the time it would have taken to walk to the crash site—each side of the enormous Pentagon is the length of three football fields—journalist Andrew Cockburn later concludes that Rumsfeld could only have been at the crash scene for a brief period. [COCKBURN, 2007, PP. 3] Rumsfeld reportedly heads back into the Pentagon at the urging of a security agent, though in an interview soon after 9/11 he will claim the decision to go back inside was his own, saying, “I decided I should be in [the building] figuring out what to do, because your brain begins to connect things, and there were enough people there to worry about that.” [PARADE MAGAZINE, 10/12/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] He tells the 9/11 Commission, “I was back in the Pentagon with a crisis action team shortly before or after 10:00 a.m.” (see (10:00 a.m.-10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/23/2004] While Rumsfeld is at the crash scene, others are frantically trying to get in touch with him but are unable to do so (see (9:38 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Aubrey Davis, Donald Rumsfeld, Pentagon, Paul Gonzales Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Donald Rumsfeld, Pentagon

9:39 a.m.-9:44 a.m. September 11, 2001: Passenger Lauren Grandcolas Phones Husband From Flight 93 and Leaves Message, but Accounts Are Contradictory

Lauren Grandcolas. [Source: Family photo / AP] At 9:39 a.m., Flight 93 passenger Lauren Grandcolas calls her husband in San Rafael, California, leaving him a 46-second message on the answering machine. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 42 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] Some reports state that she is using a cell phone. [HOUSTON CHRONICLE, 9/12/2001; CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 9/14/2001; USA TODAY, 9/25/2001] But the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette says she uses an Airfone. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001] Her husband, Jack Grandcolas, later describes that she sounds “very, very calm.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/12/2001] According to some early reports, she says, “We have been hijacked,” and “They”—presumably meaning the hijackers—“are being kind.” [HOUSTON CHRONICLE, 9/12/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 9/14/2001; TIME, 9/16/2001] But in other accounts, she does not specify that her plane has been hijacked. She reportedly begins, “Honey, are you there? Jack, pick up sweetie. Okay, well I just wanted to tell you I love you. We’re having a little problem on the plane.” She continues, “I’m comfortable and I’m okay… for now. Just a little problem. So I just love you. Please tell my family I love them too. Bye, honey.” According to some accounts, Grandcolas then passes the phone to fellow passenger Elizabeth Wainio, who is sitting next to her, and tells her to call her family. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 128; MSNBC, 9/11/2006] The Wall Street Journal reports that Grandcolas’s voice can be heard at the end of her recorded message saying to another passenger, “Now you call your people.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 5/26/2005] Yet, according to a summary of passenger phone calls presented at the 2006 trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, this could not be the case, as Grandcolas tries to make a further seven calls over the following four minutes. These are apparently either unsuccessful or quickly disconnected, lasting between “0 seconds” and “7 seconds.” They appear to include four more attempts at calling her husband, and one attempt to call her sister Vaughn Lohec. According to the summary, Wainio does not make a phone call until later, at just before 9:54 a.m. The summary also claims that, although Wainio and Grandcolas had originally been assigned seats next to each other in row 11, they are now in different parts of the plane. While Wainio is in row 33, Grandcolas is now in row 23, and there is no passenger next to her who also makes a phone call. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] Entity Tags: Elizabeth Wainio, Lauren Grandcolas, Jack Grandcolas Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001: Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Is Wanted at Pentagon Teleconference but Cannot Be Reached

This picture of Rumsfeld (center), taken from the US Army website, is captioned, “Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld returns to Pentagon inner offices Tuesday morning after surveying the damage from the hijacked plane which crashed into the building moments before.” This contradicts his claim that he was helping victims for nearly an hour after the attack. However, there is video footage of Rumsfeld helping a person on a stretcher and it is not known when this picture is taken exactly. [Source: US Army] Captain Charles Leidig, a deputy who is temporarily in charge of the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC), is handling the NMCC’s crisis teleconference. He opens the call saying, “An air attack against North America may be in progress.” He mentions reports of a crash into the opposite side of the Pentagon, and requests that Defense Secretary Rumsfeld be added to the conference. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 ] Rumsfeld has a crucial role to play in coordinating the military response to an attack on the US. According to journalist and author Andrew Cockburn, since the Cold War, “In an age when an enemy attack might allow only a few minutes for detection and reaction, control of American military power became vested in the National Command Authority, which consists of the president and the secretary of defense. Collectively, the NCA is the ultimate source of military orders, uniquely empowered, among other things, to order the use of nuclear weapons. In time of war, therefore, Rumsfeld was effectively the president’s partner, the direct link to the fighting forces, and all orders had to go through him. Such orders were supposed to be transmitted from… the National Military Command Center.” Cockburn adds that the NMCC is “the operational center for any and every crisis, from nuclear war to hijacked airliners.” Yet, rather than join the NMCC conference, Rumsfeld has already gone out of the Pentagon to see the crash site, without telling any of his command staff where he was going, and remains out of contact for some time (see Between 9:38 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). Therefore, a few minutes after Leidig makes his request, Rumsfeld’s office will report back that he is nowhere to be found. Cockburn concludes, “The chain of command was broken.” [COCKBURN, 2007, PP. 4-5; DEMOCRACY NOW!, 3/7/2007] It is unknown whether Rumsfeld has a cell phone or pager on him, and if so, why he cannot be reached. Entity Tags: Charles Leidig, Donald Rumsfeld, National Military Command Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Donald Rumsfeld, Pentagon

9:39 a.m.-9:44 a.m. September 11, 2001: Media Reports Pentagon Explosion Television news reports describe an explosion and fire occurring at the Pentagon, but do not specify that a plane hit it: Two seconds after 9:39 a.m., reporter Jim Miklaszewski states on NBC News: “I don’t want to alarm anybody right now, but apparently, there—it felt, just a few moments ago, like there was an explosion of some kind here at the Pentagon. We’re on the E-ring of the Pentagon. We have a window that faces out toward the Potomac, toward Kennedy Center. We haven’t been able to see or—or hear anything after the initial blast. I just stepped out in the hallway. Security guards were herding people out of the building, and I saw just a moment ago as I looked outside, a number of construction workers who have been working here, have taken flight. They’re running as far away from the building as they can right now. I—I hear no sirens going off in the building; I see no smoke, but the building shook for just a couple of seconds. The windows rattled and security personnel are doing what they can momentarily to clear this part of the building. Again, I have no idea whether it was part of the construction work, whether it was an accident or what is going on. We’re going to try to find those details and get them to you as soon as possible. But interestingly enough, one intelligence official here in the building said when he saw what appeared to be the coordinating attack on the World Trade Center, his advice was to stay away from the outside of the building today just in case.” [NBC, 9/11/2001] At 9:40, CNN coverage includes a banner stating, “Reports of fire at Pentagon.” [CNN, 9/11/2001] Three minutes later, CNN producer Chris Plant reports from the Pentagon, “It’s impossible for me to say… exactly what caused this. I did not hear an explosion but there is certainly a very, very significant fire in this enormous office building.” [CNN, 9/11/2001] At 9:42, ABC News reports smoke coming from somewhere behind the Old Executive Office Building, next to the White House. Two minutes later it reports a “fire confirmed at the Pentagon.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2001] At 9:43, CBS News reports “smoke pouring out of the Pentagon,” but adds, “We don’t know whether this is the result of a bomb or whether it is yet another aircraft that has targeted a symbol of the United States’ power.” [CBS, 9/11/2001] However, no media outlets record video footage of the Pentagon crash, and the cause of the explosion remains unknown for some minutes afterward. The Associated Press is apparently the first source to report that a plane hit the Pentagon (see 9:43 a.m.-9:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Jim Miklaszewski, Pentagon Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Informs NEADS of Possible Hijacking of Delta 1989

Stacia Rountree. [Source: Vanity Fair] Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, contacts NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and incorrectly notifies it that another aircraft, Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, is a possible hijacking. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Boston Center previously called NEADS at 9:27 and said that Delta 1989 was missing (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] NEADS Technicians Respond - At NEADS, Stacia Rountree, the ID technician who takes Scoggins’s call, announces to her colleagues: “Delta ‘89, that’s the hijack. They think it’s possible hijack.… South of Cleveland.” The plane’s transponder is still on, and she adds, “We have a code on him now.” Rountree’s team leader, Master Sergeant Maureen Dooley, instructs: “Pick it up! Find it!” The NEADS technicians quickly locate Delta 1989 on their radar screens, just south of Toledo, Ohio, and start alerting other FAA centers to it. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 177] NEADS mission crew commander Major Kevin Nasypany will be notified by his staff of the suspected hijacking at about 9:41 or 9:42 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/22/2004 ] NEADS never loses track of Delta 1989. It will follow it on radar as it reverses course over Toledo, heads east, and then lands in Cleveland (see (10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28] It will order Air National Guard fighter jets from Selfridge and Toledo to intercept the flight (see (9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 10:01 a.m. September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178-179] But it will soon learn that Delta 1989 is not in fact hijacked. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28] Cleveland Center, Not Boston, Handling Delta 1989 - Although Boston Center notifies NEADS of the suspected hijacking, Delta 1989 is in fact being handled by the FAA’s Cleveland Center. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 10-12] Cleveland Center air traffic controllers suspected that Delta 1989 had been hijacked at around 9:30 a.m. (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but apparently only informed the FAA’s Command Center, and not NEADS, of this. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] To explain why Boston Center alerts NEADS to the flight, the 9/11 Commission will later comment that, “Remembering the ‘we have some planes’ remark” (see 8:24 a.m. September 11, 2001), the Boston Center simply “guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked.” Similar to First Two Hijacked Planes - Like Flights 11 and 175, the two aircraft that have crashed into the World Trade Center (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), Delta 1989 took off from Boston’s Logan Airport. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27-28] According to the New York Times, it left there at about the same time as Flights 11 and 175 did, meaning around 8:00 to 8:15 a.m. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/18/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 32] Like those two aircraft, it is a Boeing 767. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27-28] But, unlike those flights, its transponder has not been turned off, and so it is still transmitting a beacon code. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] It is unclear what Delta 1989’s intended destination is. According to some accounts, like Flights 11 and 175 were, it is bound for Los Angeles. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/18/2001; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; ARIZONA DAILY STAR, 9/24/2007; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 167] Other accounts will say that its destination is Las Vegas. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Personnel at NEADS are apparently informed that Las Vegas is the intended destination. Around this time, one member of staff there tells her colleagues that the flight is “supposed to go to Vegas.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001] One of Numerous Incorrect Reports - The 9/11 Commission will comment: “During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft (see (9:09 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001). The report of American 11 heading south was the first (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001); Delta 1989 was the second.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28] Entity Tags: Maureen Dooley, Stacia Rountree, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Colin Scoggins, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Kevin Nasypany Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Hijacker Again Warns of Bomb on Board, Flight Controllers Again Overhear; NORAD Still Not Notified The Flight 93 hijackers (probably inadvertently) transmit over the radio: “Hi, this is the captain. We’d like you all to remain seated. There is a bomb on board. And we are going to turn back to the airport. And they had our demands, so please remain quiet.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 11/23/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 209; MSNBC, 9/3/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] The controller responds, “United 93, understand you have a bomb on board. Go ahead,” but there is no response. There was a very similar “bomb on board” warning from the same flight at 9:32 a.m. (see (9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The 9/11 Commission indicates that these are separate incidents. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Cleveland flight control apparently continues to wait for FAA superiors to notify NORAD. Earlier in the morning, Boston flight control directly contacted NORAD (see (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and local air force bases when they determined Flight 11 was hijacked. Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93