Q3 2003

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July 2003: Former German Government Minister Releases Book Alleging US Government Complicity in 9/11
Andreas von Bulow, a former German government minister, releases a book called “Die CIA und der 11. September” (The CIA and September 11), in which he alleges US government complicity in 9/11. Von Bulow was Federal Minister of Research and Technology under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and before that was high up in Germany’s Ministry of Defense. [DER SPIEGEL (HAMBURG), 9/8/2003] He argues that 9/11 was a covert operation in which the CIA and the Israeli Mossad played a role. He suggests remote control could have been used to direct the hijacked planes into their targets; that the WTC towers collapsed due to explosives; that no planes crashed into the Pentagon or in Pennsylvania; and that the CIA had faked mobile phone calls from Flight 93 passengers. [FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (FRANKFURT), 9/9/2003; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/1/2003; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 11/20/2003] Von Bulow tells the Daily Telegraph, “If what I say is right, the whole US government should end up behind bars.” The book is a bestseller in Germany, selling over 100,000 copies. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 11/20/2003] He previewed some of his theories in a January 2002 interview (see January 13, 2002). [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 11/20/2003] Entity Tags: Israel Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks (Mossad), United States, Andreas von Bulow, Central Intelligence Agency, Pentagon, World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: US Government and 9/11 Criticism

July 2003: CIA Claims There Was ‘Steady and Heavy’ Pressure to Find Al-Qaeda-Iraq Link before 2003 Iraq War In a classified report, the CIA states: “Requests for reporting and analysis of [Iraq’s link to al-Qaeda] were steady and heavy in the period leading up to the war, creating significant pressure on the Intelligence Community to find evidence that supported a connection.” This comment will not be publicly mentioned until September 2006, in a media leak of still classified material. [NEWSWEEK, 9/13/2006] Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

July 2003: Madrid Bomber Released from Prison, Falls Under Surveillance

Jamal Ahmidan. [Source: Spanish Interior Ministry] Jamal Ahmidan, alias “El Chino,” has a long history of drug dealing in Spain. In 2000, he returned to his home country of Morocco and was arrested on murder charges there. In July 2003, he is released and returns to Spain. He continues to deal drugs, but he allegedly became a radical Islamist while in prison as well. He soon meets Serhane Abdelmajid Fakhet, the leader of a group of Islamist militants in Madrid, and joins their group. But the group is being heavily monitored and soon Ahmidan is being monitored as well. For instance, Spanish police notice that Fakhet sometimes uses a car owned by Ahmidan’s relatives (see Spring 2003 and After). The wife of one of the militants also informs for the police and reports on Ahmidan (see January 4, 2003). Ahmidan will prove to be the key link between the militants and a group of drug dealers (who are mostly also government informants) that supply the explosives enabling the militants to conduct the Madrid train bombings (see 7:37-7:42 a.m., March 11, 2004). [EL PAIS (SPAIN), 3/8/2007] Entity Tags: Jamal Ahmidan, Serhane Abdelmajid Fakhet Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Spain, 2004 Madrid Train Bombings, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

July 2003: Neoconservative Author Says CIA, State Department Hiding Connections between Iraq and 9/11

The cover of ‘Bush Vs. the Beltway.’ [Source: Oferton de Libros] Neoconservative author Laurie Mylroie, who believes that Saddam Hussein was behind every terrorist attack on the US from 1993 through 2001 (see 1990 and October 2000), publishes her latest book, Bush vs. the Beltway: How the CIA and the State Department Tried to Stop the War on Terror. Mylroie accuses those agencies of suppressing information about Iraq’s role in 9/11, names 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) as an Iraqi agent (whose identity as such is being hidden by shadowy forces within the Bush administration), and calls President Bush “an actual hero… who could not be rolled, spun, or otherwise diverted from his most solemn obligation” to overthrow Saddam Hussein. However, like Mylroie’s other theories, her belief that KSM was an Iraqi agent is not popularly accepted. Author and war correspondent Peter Bergen is contemptuous of her theorizing, noting that Mylroie claims “a senior administration official told me in specific that the question of the identities of the terrorist masterminds could not be pursued because of bureaucratic obstructionism.” Bergen will write: “So we are expected to believe that the senior Bush administration officials whom Mylroie knows so well could not find anyone in intelligence or law enforcement to investigate the supposed Iraqi intelligence background of the mastermind of 9/11, at the same time that 150,000 American soldiers had been sent to fight a war in Iraq under the rubric of the war on terrorism. Please.” Bergen also notes that repeated interrogations of KSM—sometimes verging on torture (see Shortly After March 1, 2003)—have failed to produce a shred of evidence connecting him with Iraq. [WASHINGTON MONTHLY, 12/2003] Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Bush administration, Central Intelligence Agency, Laurie Mylroie, George W. Bush, Saddam Hussein, Peter Bergen, US Department of State Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Neoconservative Influence

July 2003: Bin Laden Hunt Frustrated Because Equipment Is in Iraq Lt. Gen. John R. Vines, commander of US troops in Afghanistan at this time, will later complain that an opportunity to kill bin Laden is lost due to a lack of the right equipment. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) like the Predator are in short supply due to the war in Iraq. Vines receives intelligence that bin Laden is on the move and can take one of three routes. However, there is only one UAV to send. Vines will later recall, “A UAV was positioned on the route that was most likely, but he didn’t go that way. We believed that we were within a half-hour of possibly getting him, but nothing materialized.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/10/2006] Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, John R. Vines Category Tags: Afghanistan, Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism

July 2003: Fired ISI Director Resurfaces as Businessman Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, who lost his position as ISI Director one month after 9/11 (see October 7, 2001), resurfaces in Pakistan as the head of a subsidiary of a prominent business consortium. The New Yorker notes that it is “a position that require[s] government backing.” Ahmed was considered close to the Taliban, and according to some media accounts, ordered money to hijacker Mohamed Atta. He still apparently has not given any media interviews or been interviewed by US intelligence since his firing. [NEW YORKER, 7/28/2003] Entity Tags: Taliban, Mahmood Ahmed Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Mahmood Ahmed

July 2003: Saudi Embassy in US Found to Be Passing Money to Suspect Charities through US Bank that Has CIA Ties

Riggs Bank in Washington, DC. [Source: Washington Post] In late 2002, US federal banking investigators began looking into transactions at Riggs Bank because of news reports that some money may have passed from the Saudi Arabian embassy in Washington through Riggs Bank to the associates of two 9/11 hijackers in San Diego (see December 4, 1999). But in July 2003, the probe expands as investigators discover irregularities involving tens of millions of dollars also connected to the Saudi embassy. The Wall Street Journal will later report, “Riggs repeatedly failed in 2001 and 2002 to file suspicious-activity reports related to cash transactions in the low tens of millions of dollars in Saudi accounts, said people familiar with the matter.” Riggs Bank “handles the bulk of [Washington’s] diplomatic accounts, a niche market that revolves around relationships and discretion.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 1/14/2004] Newsweek will later report that “investigators say the embassy accounts show a large commingling of funds with Islamic charities that have been the prime target of US probes.” In one instance, on July 10, 2001 the Saudi embassy sent $70,000 to two Saudis in Massachusetts. One of the Saudis wrote a $20,000 check that same day to a third Saudi who had listed the same address as Aafia Siddiqui, a microbiologist who is believed to have been a US-based operative for 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (see Late September 2001-March 2003). [NEWSWEEK, 4/12/2004] The Wall Street Journal will later discover that Riggs Bank “has had a longstanding relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency, according to people familiar with Riggs operations and US government officials” (see December 31, 2004). The relationship included top Riggs executives receiving US government security clearances. Riggs also overlooked tens of millions of dollars in suspicious transactions by right wing dictators from Africa and South America such as former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 12/31/2004] A connection between the CIA and Riggs Bank goes back to at least the early 1960s. And in 1977, journalist Bob Woodward tied Riggs Bank to payments in a CIA operation in Iran. [SLATE, 1/10/2005] The CIA tie leads to suspicions that the bank’s failure to disclose financial activity by Saudi diplomats and other foreign officials may have been implicitly authorized by parts of the US government. Some of the suspicious Saudi accounts belong to Saudi diplomats, including Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the US. Shortly after these irregularities are discovered, Prince Bandar meets with Treasury Secretary John Snow and details his work for the CIA. For instance, during the 1980s, Prince Bandar helped fund the anticommunist Nicaraguan Contra rebels at the request of the White House and CIA as part of what became known as the Iran-Contra affair, and he also helped the CIA support Afghan rebels fighting the Soviet Union. It is not known what was discussed but US intelligence officials suggest Prince Bandar disclosed his CIA connections “as an explanation for the prince’s large unexplained cash transactions at Riggs.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 12/31/2004] It will later come to light that for many years $30 million a month were being secretly deposited into a Riggs Bank account controlled by Prince Bandar. It has been alleged that major British arms contractor BAE Systems funneled up to $2 billion in bribes through this account over the years as part of an $80 billion weapons deal between Britain and Saudi Arabia. Riggs Bank never knew the source of the funds. After the probe uncovers these suspicious transactions, the bank cuts off all business with the Saudis. [NEWSWEEK, 6/11/2007] The US Treasury will later impose unusually strict controls on Riggs Bank and fine the bank $25 million. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 1/14/2004] The bank will also plead guilty to one felony count of failing to file suspicious activity reports and pay an additional fine of $16 million. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/28/2005] Entity Tags: Saudi Arabia, Riggs Bank, John W. Snow, BAE Systems, Bandar bin Sultan, Central Intelligence Agency, Aafia Siddiqui, US Department of the Treasury, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Category Tags: Saudi Arabia, Terrorism Financing

July-September 2003: ISI Allegedly Warns British Intelligence 7/7 London Bomber Has Attended Al-Qaeda Training Camp

Anthony Garcia (left) and Omar Khyam (right) facing the camera, in Pakistan in 2003. Both will be sentenced to life in prison for the fertilizer bomb plot. [Source: Corbis] In the summer of 2003, a group of young Pakistani-Briton men rent a room in a hostel in Lahore, Pakistan. The group is very noisy at night, talking and playing music, which draws complaints from neighbors. One neighbor will later tell the Times of London that it was obvious they were violent militants: “We knew what they were doing and we were afraid at those boys being here, but we couldn’t do anything about it.” The neighbors finally call the police after hearing a series of late night explosions coming from their room. The group tells police that a propane gas cylinder had exploded. But the police do not believe it and begin a surveillance operation. Investigation - Investigators learn the group recently traveled to Malakand, a very mountainous region of Pakistan near the border with Afghanistan. It is known that al-Qaeda maintains training camps there. Members of the group are also seen making regular visits to an office complex in Lahore where Al-Muhajiroun and other militant groups rent space. Most of the group members are linked to Al-Muhajiroun back in Britain. One member of the group is Omar Khyam, who is a key figure in a fertilizer bomb plot in Britain that will be foiled by British intelligence in March 2004 (see Early 2003-April 6, 2004). Another member is Mohammad Sidique Khan, the head suicide bomber in the 7/7 London bombings (see July 7, 2005). Yet another member is Mohammed Junaid Babar, an al-Qaeda operative living in Britain who is important enough to attend a key al-Qaeda summit in 2004 (see March 2004). Return Home - Khan returns to Britain in August 2003 and Khyam returns one month later (Khyam is already under surveillance in Britain). It is unknown when Babar returns exactly, but in early April 2004 he flies from Britain to the US, is arrested, and begins telling all he knows about his associates in return for a reduced sentence (see April 10, 2004). He only knows Khyam by his alias “Ausman” and Khan by his alias “Ibrahim,” and it is unknown just how much he reveals about their training together in Pakistan. Warnings - But the Pakistani ISI will later claim that they twice gave warnings to British intelligence about the monitored group in Lahore. Apparently the ISI decided the group was not a threat in Pakistan but was planning a bombing in Britain. A high-ranking ISI official will later claim: “There is no question that 7/7 could have and should have been stopped. British agencies did not follow some of the information we gave to them.” [LONDON TIMES, 5/1/2007] Surveillance - If the ISI does not in fact warn British intelligence, then it is likely the British have at least some awareness of this group in Lahore attending training camps through another source. British intelligence has been closely monitoring Mohammed Quayyum Khan, who is believed to be a key al-Qaeda operative living in Britain and sending funds and militant recruits to Pakistan (see March 2003 and After). Quayyum remains in phone contact with Khayam in Pakistan. He also is monitored as he talks on the phone with Salahuddin Amin, a member of the fertilizer bomb plot who lives in Pakistan. [BBC, 5/25/2007] Entity Tags: Salahuddin Amin, Omar Khyam, Mohammed Junaid Babar, Mohammed Quayyum Khan, Al-Muhajiroun, Mohammad Sidique Khan, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence Category Tags: 2005 7/7 London Bombings, Pakistan and the ISI, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Omar Bakri & Al-Muhajiroun

Early July 2003: Background Checks Not Finished for Almost Half of US Airport Screeners At a Congressional hearing, Transportation Security Administration (TSA) officials admit that almost half of the background checks for US airport screeners have still not been completed. Of the 30,000 screeners who have been checked, 1,200 were fired. Even scores of federal air marshals have been put on leave for discrepancies in background checks. [TIME, 7/8/2003] Entity Tags: Transportation Security Administration Category Tags: Internal US Security After 9/11

July 2, 2003: CIA Report Says KSM Claims Moussaoui Not for 9/11, but Second Wave of Attacks The CIA drafts a report containing statements reportedly made by alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) under interrogation at a black site. According to the report, KSM claims that Zacarias Moussaoui was not handled by al-Qaeda for the 9/11 attacks, but for a second wave of attacks. KSM will reportedly repeat this claim in a later interrogation (see September 11, 2003). The claim appears not to be entirely true, as in an intercepted conversation from July 2001 KSM and his associate Ramzi bin al-Shibh discussed possibly using Moussaoui for 9/11 (see July 20, 2001). In addition, the report says KSM claims he did not hear about Moussaoui’s arrest, which occurred on August 16, 2001 (see August 16, 2001), until after the 9/11 attacks. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 247, 531] Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Zacarias Moussaoui, High Value Detainees

July 7, 2003: 9/11 Commission Denounces Lack of Cooperation, Chairman Complains about Government ‘Minders’ The 9/11 Commission releases a status report showing that various government agencies are not cooperating fully with its investigation. Neither the CIA nor the Justice Department have provided all requested documents. Lack of cooperation on the part of the Department of Defense “[is] becoming particularly serious,” and the Commission has received no responses whatsoever to requests related to national air defenses. The FBI, State Department, and Transportation Department receive generally positive reviews. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 7/9/2003] Commissioner Tim Roemer complains: “We’re not getting the kind of cooperation that we should be. We need a steady stream of information coming to us.… Instead, We’re getting a trickle.” [GUARDIAN, 7/10/2003] The Commission is eventually forced to subpoena documents from the Defense Department and FAA (see November 6, 2003). Commission Chairman Tom Kean also highlights the presence of government “minders” at Commission interviews. The minders accompany witnesses the Commission is interviewing and come from the witnesses’ parent agencies. Kean says: “I think the Commission feels unanimously that it’s some intimidation to have somebody sitting behind you all the time who you either work for or works for your agency. You might get less testimony than you would.” He adds, “We would rather interview these people without minders or without agency people there.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 7/8/2003; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 7/9/2003] However, Kean will later play down the effect minders are having on witnesses (see September 23, 2003), the full scope of which will be revealed in an internal Commission memo (see October 2, 2003). Entity Tags: US Department of Transportation, US Department of Justice, US Department of Defense, US Department of State, Tim Roemer, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/11 Commission, Bush administration, Central Intelligence Agency, Thomas Kean Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Commission

July 9, 2003: Neoconservative Author’s Testimony Dismays 9/11 Commission Members and Staff Members and staff of the 9/11 Commission are skeptical about testimony to the commission by Laurie Mylroie on this day. Mylroie is a scholar with the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute and is considered by many to be one of the academic architects of the recent Iraq invasion (see April 27, 1987 and October 2000). Support from Zelikow - Mylroie’s testimony is arranged by the commission’s executive director, Philip Zelikow, who places her in a prominent place at the witness table for the day’s testimony at a public hearing. Mylroie expounds her theory that Iraq was secretly behind 9/11 and other al-Qaeda attacks. Some commission staffers are surprised that she is testifying at all, as they think her testimony will work in concert with the White House’s efforts to convince the public that Iraq and al-Qaeda are, in essence, one and the same, which they strongly doubt. Zelikow will later say he had never met Mylroie before the hearings, and was skeptical of her theories himself, but because at least one unnamed commissioner wanted her testimony aired before the commission, he felt impelled to grant her a place in the hearings. Zelikow must have been aware of Mylroie’s popularity with, and her access to, the highest levels of the Bush administration and the Pentagon. Most of the commissioners do not fully understand the full import of Mylroie’s testimony, or that by allowing her to testify so early in the proceedings, the commission may appear to endorse her views. "Batty" - If Mylroie’s testimony is an attempt to influence the commission, it falls flat; after her testimony, several see her as “batty,” if not entirely disconnected from reality. Several members of the commission and its staff are dubious about Mylroie’s claims (see July 9, 2003). Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste, one of those who believes her appearance is part of the administration’s efforts to justify the war with Iraq, forces her to admit that “95 percent” of Middle East experts do not accept her theories about a connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Testimony later the same day by Judith Yaphe, a CIA expert on Iraq, further discredits Mylroie’s theories (see July 9, 2003). Both Yaphe and Ben-Veniste feel that Mylroie’s theories are shown to be little more than wild speculation with no evidence to bolster them, but the media coverage of her testimony is far different. She is given great credence by almost all of the mainstream media reports of her appearance before the commission. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 130-134] Additionally, many of those who lost family members in the attacks are angered by Mylroie’s testimony (see July 9, 2003). Shortly after her testimony, Mylroie’s new book Bush vs. the Beltway will be published, expounding further on her theories. [WASHINGTON MONTHLY, 12/2003] Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Philip Zelikow, American Enterprise Institute, Al-Qaeda, 9/11 Commission, Laurie Mylroie, Bush administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links, Role of Philip Zelikow

July 9, 2003: ’Jersey Girls’ Lambast Zelikow over Author’s Testimony Linking 9/11 to Iraqi Government While some find neoconservative author Laurie Mylroie’s testimony before the 9/11 Commission of a terrorist conspiracy between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda to be compelling (see July 9, 2003), others do not. One group that is not convinced is the so-called “Jersey Girls,” the group of widows who lost their husbands in the 9/11 attacks and then worked to force the Bush administration to create the Commission (see 9:15 a.m. - 9:45 a.m. March 31, 2003). They lambast Commission director Philip Zelikow for allowing Mylroie to testify. “Jersey Girl” Lorie Van Auken, who has learned a great deal about Mylroie’s theories in her research, confronts Zelikow shortly after the hearings. “That took a lot of nerve putting someone like that on the panel,” she tells Zelikow. “Laurie Mylroie? This is supposed to be an investigation of September 11. This is not supposed to be a sales pitch for the Iraq war.” Van Auken later recalls “a sly smile” crossing Zelikow’s face, as he refuses to answer. “He knew exactly what he was doing,” Van Auken will say. “He was selling the war.” After the hearing, Zelikow informs the staff that he wants them to aggressively pursue the idea of a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Author Philip Shenon will later write, “To some members of the staff, Zelikow seemed determined to demonstrate that whatever the evidence to the contrary, Iraq and al-Qaeda had a close relationship that justified the toppling of Saddam Hussein.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 130-134] Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, ’Jersey Girls’, 9/11 Commission, Philip Shenon, Al-Qaeda, Lorie Van Auken, Laurie Mylroie, Philip Zelikow Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow

July 9, 2003: CIA Expert on Iraq Discredits Theory of Connection between Iraq and Al-Qaeda Judith Yaphe testifies before the 9/11 Commission. Yaphe, a CIA veteran who now teaches at the Pentagon’s National Defense University, is considered one of the agency’s most experienced and knowledgeable Iraq analysts. Yaphe states that while Saddam Hussein was indeed a sponsor of terrorism, it is improbable, based on what is currently known, that Hussein and Iraq had any connections to the 9/11 attacks, nor that a connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda is believable. [NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 7/9/2003] Yaphe is disturbed by the commission’s apparent acceptance of the testimony of Laurie Mylroie (see July 9, 2003), whose theories about connections between Iraq and al-Qaeda have long been discredited by both intelligence analysts and outside experts. She wonders why Mylroie’s “crazed theories” were being heard at all, and why the commission would risk its credibility by giving Mylroie this kind of exposure. She even speculates that Mylroie’s testimony is some sort of setup by the commission or the staff, and hopes that her own testimony can offset Mylroie’s theories and help discredit Mylroie before the commission. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 130-134] Yaphe tells the commission, in apparent reference to Mylroie, that the use of circumstantial evidence is “troubling” and that there is a “lack of credible evidence to jump to extraordinary conclusions on Iraqi support for al-Qaeda.” She also calls Mylroie’s theories of Iraqi spies using false identities to help execute the 1993 World Trade Center bombings (see February 26, 1993) worthy of a fiction novel and completely unsupported by fact. [NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 7/9/2003] Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, Al-Qaeda, 9/11 Commission, Central Intelligence Agency, Judith Yaphe, Laurie Mylroie, National Defense University Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

July 9, 2003: Mylroie Testifies Before 9/11 Commission, Airs Theories of Connections between Iraq and al-Qaeda The 9/11 Commission holds its first set of public hearings on al-Qaeda and its connections to other nations and terrorist groups. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 130-134] 'Political Theater' - The first person to testify is Laurie Mylroie, of the conservative American Enterprise Institute. Mylroie’s testimony is, in the words of author Philip Shenon, “a bizarre bit of political theater.” Mylroie, considered by some to be “one of the most influential political academics of her generation, whose research was cited by the United States government to justify a war,” sits in front of the Commission, “spouting what would later be shown to be—and what many experts in the field already knew to be—nonsense.” Mylroie says that both the 1993 WTC bombing (see February 26, 1993) and 9/11 were planned and carried out by Iraqi intelligence agents, and the planner of the 1993 attacks, Ramzi Yousef (see December 1991-May 1992 and Late July or Early August 2001), and the chief 9/11 planner, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (see 1987-1991), were both Iraqi spies. Iraq had planted phony identification documents—“legends”—in Kuwaiti government offices during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990, she says. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 130-134] “The odds are high that these people are not whom they claim to be, and demonstrating that would constitute a clear link between Iraq and the 9/11 attack, as reasonably only Iraq could have created these legends while it occupied Kuwait,” she states. Al-Qaeda was a front group for Iraq in the same way that Hezbollah is a front group for Syria, she claims, and tells the Commission, “We went to war because senior administration officials believe Iraq was involved in 9/11” (see July 31, 2002). [SHENON, 2008, PP. 130-134] Discrediting Mylroie - Several members of the Commission and its staff are dubious about Mylroie’s claims (see July 9, 2003). Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste, one of those who believes her appearance is part of the Bush administration’s efforts to justify the war with Iraq, forces her to admit that “95 percent” of Middle East experts do not accept her theories about a connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Testimony later the same day by CIA expert Judith Yaphe further discredits Mylroie’s theories (see July 9, 2003). Both Yaphe and Ben-Veniste feel that Mylroie’s theories are shown to be little more than wild speculations with no evidence to bolster them, but the media coverage of her testimony is far different. She is given great credence by almost all of the mainstream media reports of her appearance before the Commission. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 130-134] Additionally, many of those who lost family members in the attacks are angered by Mylroie’s testimony (see July 9, 2003). Shortly after her testimony, Mylroie’s new book Bush vs. the Beltway will be published, expounding further on her theories. [WASHINGTON MONTHLY, 12/2003] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, American Enterprise Institute, Hezbollah, 9/11 Commission, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Richard Ben-Veniste, Laurie Mylroie, Philip Shenon, Ramzi Yousef Category Tags: 9/11 Commission

July 9, 2003: Expert Claims KSM Told Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit about Planes as Weapons Plot Targeting US

Rohan Gunaratna. [Source: George Washington University] Counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna claims to know what was discussed at the al-Qaeda summit held in Malaysia in January 2000 (see January 5-8, 2000). Gunaratna has been described as an “ad hoc adviser to US intelligence officials,” and it is believed he has seen top secret transcripts of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s (KSM) recent interrogations in CIA prisons. It has not been explained how he saw such transcripts, but the CIA has not disputed the assertion that he saw them. [BERGEN RECORD, 7/10/2003] In public testimony before the 9/11 Commission, Gunaratna says that “Khalid Shaikh Mohammed chaired that meeting [in Malaysia]. The first two hijackers to enter the United States, they were present at that meeting. So the 9/11 operation is an extension of old Plan Bojinka (see January 6, 1995). So the players of old plan Bojinka, they were not all arrested.… If you read the interrogation of [KSM], who is now in US custody, he has very clearly stated how 9/11 was planned, that it originated from [Bojinka].” However, the 9/11 Commissioners do not ask him any follow-up questions about this. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/9/2003 ] In the 9/11 Commission’s final report, there will be no mention of any suggestions KSM was at the Malaysia meeting or any clear accounting as to who all the attendees were. Their report will also downplay any connections between the 1995 Bojinka plot and the 9/11 plot, which they will claim began in 1999. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 153-154] However, later on the same day as his testimony, Gunaratna will give more details of what he claims to have learned from KSM’s interrogations in an interview with a reporter. He says that at the summit KSM said al-Qaeda operatives would need to learn to fly commercial airliners in the US as part of a “suicide operation.” However, although KSM had already agreed on the targets with bin Laden, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were not mentioned at the summit. KSM “was careful not to discuss all the specific plans at that meeting.” The reporter who interviewed Gunaratna notes that “some US intelligence officials” have “pooh-poohed the significance of the Malaysian meeting as a link to Sept. 11,” and if KSM was at the meeting, that “further underscores how the CIA missed an opportunity” to stop the 9/11 attacks. [BERGEN RECORD, 7/10/2003] The CIA had Malaysian intelligence photograph and film the attendees of the summit as they were coming and going, but apparently there was no attempt to monitor what was said in the summit meetings (see January 5-8, 2000 and Shortly After). If Gunaratna is correct, it suggests that the CIA and 9/11 Commission may have withheld some details of KSM’s interrogations to the public that are embarrassing to US intelligence agencies. Note also that doubts have been expressed about the reliability of KSM’s testimony, which was at least partly obtained through the use of torture (see June 16, 2004). Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, 9/11 Commission, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Rohan Gunaratna Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

July 14, 2003: Al-Qaeda Leader and Two Associates Escape Philippine Prison in Dubious Circumstances

From left to right: Omar Opik Lasal, Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, and Abdulmukim Edris. [Source: All three pictures Agence France-Presse / Getty Images] Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, said to be an important operative for both al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah, al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian affiliate, escapes from Camp Crame, the highest security prison in the Philippines. Two Abu Sayyaf figures, Omar Opik Lasal and Abdulmukim Edris, escape with him. There are many oddities about their escape: The three men apparently have a spare set of keys, unlock their cell door, relock it, walk out of the jail building and through the prison gates, and then use a small guardhouse to vault over a compound wall. Additionally, the cell door was so rusted that it could simply be lifted by its hinges and moved aside. The nearest guards are either sleeping or out shopping. A prisoner left behind tries to notify the guards about the escape, but is ignored. Only when the guards are changed five hours later is the escape discovered, and many more hours pass before Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and other top leaders are notified. All four guards on duty at the time of the escape will later fail lie detectors tests. One will say they were set up by higher-ups to take the fall. [ASIA TIMES, 7/26/2003] The janitor in the prison at the time is Cosain Ramos (a.k.a. Abu Ali). Ramos worked with major al-Qaeda figure, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law, and was part of Konsonjaya, a front company run by Hambali used to fund the 1995 Bojinka plot. He had given al-Ghozi explosives which were used in a 2000 bombing. After he was arrested in 2002, not only was he not charged, but he was made a protected witness and given the janitor job (see Shortly Before December 24, 2000). [RESSA, 2003, PP. 136; GULF NEWS, 6/10/2003; AUSTRALIAN, 7/18/2003] Lasal will be rearrested on October 8, 2003, and will admit, “I am a government asset, a deep penetration agent.” He will say he helped the Philippine military track al-Ghozi after the escape. He says he joined Abu Sayyaf in 1992 and soon began informing on the group. He claims he has a brother and a cousin who were informants on Abu Sayyaf as well. “Wherever we went, the military knew our whereabouts, because I was giving them the information.” He is seen after his rearrest walking into Manila’s Hall of Justice without any handcuffs on and only one escort. [PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, 10/15/2003] He will be arrested in 2007 and then let go after it is reported he was confused with his cousin and in fact is in a witness protection program. [PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, 3/20/2007] One week after the escape, the Philippine Daily Inquirer reports that Edris, the alleged leader of the Abu Sayyaf’s explosives team, has long-time links to the Philippine military and police. A police intelligence source says that he has been a government asset since 1994. He had been arrested in November 2002 and proclaimed “the No. 1 bomber of the Abu Sayyaf” by the Philippine president. Edris was implicated by other captured Abu Sayyaf suspects as the mastermind of a series of bombings in Zamboanga City in October and November 2002 that killed over a dozen people, including a US Green Beret. [PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, 7/23/2003] Supt. Reuben Galban, chief of the police Intelligence Group’s Foreign Intelligence Liaison Office, is fired after failing a lie detector test about the escape. He fails questions about planning the escape and getting paid for it. An intelligence source will claim that Galban and Senior Supt. Romeo Ricardo were in on the escape as handlers for Edris, one of the escapees and an alleged government informant. Ricardo does not take a lie detector test. The source claims: “Edris was deliberately delivered to Al-Ghozi for them to develop trust and confidence. It’s what we call in the intelligence community as human agents manipulation but what is so wrong in this case was the fact that they did it at the expense of the national security.” A police investigator admits that this angle is being pursued as a theory to explain the escape, but “no target would justify the humiliation brought about by this incident.” [PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, 7/23/2003] Galban was at the prison outside of his usual hours during the escape, which took place in the middle of the night. He also had recently moved al-Ghozi from a secure floor in the prison to the least secure floor. [ASIA TIMES, 7/26/2003] Six officers of the Philippine National Police’s Intelligence Group are charged with graft and gross negligence in relation to the escape. Galban is one of those charged but Ricardo is not. [MANILA BULLETIN, 7/25/2003] However, about one month after the escape, an investigative team concludes there was no collusion between any officials and the escapees. Apparently the charges against the six officers are quietly dropped. Twenty police or intelligence officers are fired, but no higher-up officials. [ASIA TIMES, 7/26/2003; MANILA SUN STAR, 8/28/2003] Intelligence agents from the Armed Forces Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF) will later implicate police director Eduardo Matillano in the escape. Two intelligence agents will be caught monitoring Matillano’s house one week after the escape. Armed Forces chief Gen. Narciso Abaya will say of the agents, “Somebody gave them a license plate number of a car allegedly connected with the escape of al-Ghozi and they traced it to the home of Matillano.” Mantillano threatens to press charges against the ACTAF, but apparently does not do so. He also is not fired. [ASIA PULSE, 7/22/2003] Edris and al-Ghozi will be shot and killed in August and October 2003 respectively by Philippine authorities (see October 12, 2003). Supposedly they are killed while resisting being rearrested. But many, including Aquilino Pimentel, president of the Philippines Senate, will suggest they were both summarily executed after being arrested in order to silence them from potentially revealing their confederates in the escape. [MANILA BULLETIN, 10/18/2003] Some elements in the Philippine military are so suspicious about the circumstances of the escape that two weeks later they stage a mutiny to protest this and other issues. They claim the Philippine government has been manipulating rebel groups and even staging or allowing terrorist bombings to manipulate the population (see July 27-28, 2003). Entity Tags: Aquilino Pimentel, Romeo Ricardo, Cosain Ramos, Abdulmukim Edris, Al-Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf, Reuben Galban, Omar Opik Lasal, Eduardo Matillano, Philippine National Police, Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, Narciso Abaya, Jemaah Islamiyah Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, Philippine Militant Collusion

July 18, 2003: Former Clinton National Security Adviser Improperly Removes Own Notes from National Archives Sandy Berger, a former national security adviser to Bill Clinton, takes notes he has made on classified documents at the National Archives out of the archives. As the papers on which the notes are based are classified, the notes are also classified, even though they are about documents Berger saw during his time as national security adviser. Berger is at the archives to prepare for an interview with the 9/11 Commission, but he had previously visited them to prepare for discussions with the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry (see May 30, 2002). As the proper security procedures are not followed, Berger is able to create a distraction and remove the top fifteen pages of the notes, leaving only two pages. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 6-7] Berger will later steal copies of a classified document from the archives (see September 2, 2003). Entity Tags: National Archives and Records Administration, Sandy Berger Category Tags: 9/11 Commission

July 23, 2003: Survey Finds Fifth of Germans Believe US Government Behind 9/11 The German weekly newspaper Die Zeit publishes a survey by the respected organization Forsa which finds that 19 percent of Germans believe the US government, or elements within it, were behind the 9/11 attacks. 31 percent of those under 30 are found to believe this. [REUTERS, 7/23/2003; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (FRANKFURT), 9/9/2003; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 11/20/2003] Several popular books are on the market in Germany, questioning who was behind 9/11. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 9/29/2003; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/1/2003] In response, the newsmagazine Der Spiegel runs a major cover story rebutting some of the theories proposed in these books. [DER SPIEGEL (HAMBURG), 9/8/2003] A senior German government official dismisses the poll result, saying:“There’s a group of people in every country who will believe any nonsense.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/1/2003] In June 2005, a popular German crime show on German state television (ARD) will air an episode involving the premise that the Bush administration ordered the 9/11 attacks. [WASHINGTON TIMES, 6/9/2005] Entity Tags: Der Spiegel, Die Zeit, Bush administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: US Government and 9/11 Criticism

July 24, 2003: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry Says Almost Every Government Agency Failed

Representative Porter Goss and Senator Bob Graham co-chair the Congressional Inquiry. [Source: Ken Lambert/ Associated Press] The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry’s final report comes out. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 ; US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003] Officially, the report was written by the 37 members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, but in practice, co-chairmen Bob Graham (D-FL) and Porter Goss (R-FL) exercised “near total control over the panel, forbidding the inquiry’s staff to speak to other lawmakers.” [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/29/2002] Both Republican and Democrats in the panel complained how the two co-chairmen withheld information and controlled the process. [PALM BEACH POST, 9/21/2002] The report was finished in December 2002 and some findings were released then, but the next seven months were spent in negotiation with the Bush administration over what material had to remain censored. The Inquiry had a very limited mandate, focusing just on the handling of intelligence before 9/11. It also completely ignores or censors out all mentions of intelligence from foreign governments. Thomas Kean, the chairman of 9/11 Commission says the Inquiry’s mandate covered only “one-seventh or one-eighth” of what his newer investigation will hopefully cover. [WASHINGTON POST, 7/27/2003] The report blames virtually every government agency for failures: Newsweek’s main conclusion is: “The investigation turned up no damning single piece of evidence that would have led agents directly to the impending attacks. Still, the report makes it chillingly clear that law-enforcement and intelligence agencies might very well have uncovered the plot had it not been for blown signals, sheer bungling—and a general failure to understand the nature of the threat.” [NEWSWEEK, 7/28/2003] According to the New York Times, the report also concludes, “the FBI and CIA had known for years that al-Qaeda sought to strike inside the United States, but focused their attention on the possibility of attacks overseas.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 7/26/2003] CIA Director George Tenet was “either unwilling or unable to marshal the full range of Intelligence Community resources necessary to combat the growing threat.” [WASHINGTON POST, 7/25/2003] US military leaders were “reluctant to use… assets to conduct offensive counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan” or to “support or participate in CIA operations directed against al-Qaeda.” [WASHINGTON POST, 7/25/2003] “There was no coordinated… strategy to track terrorist funding and close down their financial support networks” and the Treasury Department even showed “reluctance” to do so. [WASHINGTON POST, 7/25/2003] According to the Washington Post, the NSA took “an overly cautious approach to collecting intelligence in the United States and offered ‘insufficient collaboration’ with the FBI’s efforts.” [WASHINGTON POST, 7/25/2003] Many sections remain censored, especially an entire chapter detailing possible Saudi support for the 9/11 attackers. The Bush administration insisted on censoring even information that was already in the public domain. [NEWSWEEK, 5/25/2003] The Inquiry attempted to determine “to what extent the president received threat-specific warnings” but received very little information. There was a focus on learning what was in Bush’s briefing on August 6, 2001 (see August 6, 2001), but the White House refused to release this information, citing “executive privilege.” [WASHINGTON POST, 7/25/2003; NEWSDAY, 8/7/2003] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Bob Graham, Bush administration, Central Intelligence Agency, 9/11 Commission, Saudi Arabia, National Security Agency, Porter J. Goss, Federal Bureau of Investigation, George J. Tenet, Thomas Kean, US Department of the Treasury Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry

July 24, 2003: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry Suggests Hijackers Received Considerable Assistance Inside US The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry’s final report concludes that at least six hijackers received “substantial assistance” from associates in the US, though it’s “not known to what extent any of these contacts in the United States were aware of the plot.” These hijackers came into contact with at least 14 people who were investigated by the FBI before 9/11, and four of those investigations were active while the hijackers were present. But in June 2002, FBI Director Mueller testified: “While here, the hijackers effectively operated without suspicion, triggering nothing that would have alerted law enforcement and doing nothing that exposed them to domestic coverage. As far as we know, they contacted no known terrorist sympathizers in the United States.” CIA Director Tenet made similar comments at the same time, and another FBI official stated, “[T]here were no contacts with anybody we were looking at inside the United States.” These comments are untrue, because one FBI document from November 2001 uncovered by the Inquiry concludes that the six lead hijackers “maintained a web of contacts both in the United States and abroad. These associates, ranging in degrees of closeness, include friends and associates from universities and flight schools, former roommates, people they knew through mosques and religious activities, and employment contacts. Other contacts provided legal, logistical, or financial assistance, facilitated US entry and flight school enrollment, or were known from [al-Qaeda]-related activities or training.” [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 ] The declassified sections of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry’s final report show the hijackers have contact with: Mamoun Darkazanli, investigated several times starting in 1993 (see 1993; Late 1998); the CIA makes repeated efforts to turn him into an informer (see December 1999). Mohammed Haydar Zammar, investigated by Germany since at least 1997 (see 1996), the Germans periodically inform the CIA what they learn. Osama Basnan, US intelligence is informed of his connections to Islamic militants several times in early 1990s but fails to investigate (see April 1998). Omar al-Bayoumi, investigated in San Diego from 1998-1999 (see September 1998-July 1999). Anwar Al Aulaqi, investigated in San Diego from 1999-2000 (see June 1999-March 2000). Osama “Sam” Mustafa, owner of a San Diego gas station, and investigated beginning in 1991 (see Autumn 2000). Ed Salamah, manager of the same gas station, and an uncooperative witness in 2000 (see Autumn 2000). An unnamed friend of Hani Hanjour, whom the FBI tries to investigate in 2001. An unnamed associate of Marwan Alshehhi, investigated beginning in 1999. Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, who had contact with Basnan, al-Bayoumi, Aulaqi, Mustafa, and Salamah, “maintained a number of other contacts in the local Islamic community during their time in San Diego, some of whom were also known to the FBI through counterterrorist inquiries and investigations,” but details of these individuals and possible others are still classified. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 ] None of the above people have been arrested or even publicly charged with any crime associated with terrorism, although Zammar is in prison in Syria. Entity Tags: Osama Basnan, Omar al-Bayoumi, Osama (“Sam”) Mustafa, Anwar Al Aulaqi, Mohammed Haydar Zammar, Mamoun Darkazanli, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Robert S. Mueller III, George J. Tenet, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Central Intelligence Agency, Ed Salamah Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi Connection

July 27, 2003: Still Many 9/11 Mysteries after 9/11 Congressional Inquiry’s Report Shortly after the public release of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry’s final report (see July 24, 2003), the Los Angeles Times claims that “for all that it answers about the attacks, the nearly 900-page report is stocked with reminders of the many questions that remain—about other puzzling aspects of the [9/11] plot, the possible role of foreign governments, and even such politically charged matters as what Presidents Clinton and Bush had been told about al-Qaeda.… [E]ven lawmakers privy to the fuller, classified version of the report… acknowledge that the picture is incomplete.” Representative Porter Goss (R-FL), co-chairman of the Congressional Inquiry, says, “I can tell you right now that I don’t know exactly how the plot was hatched. I don’t know the where, the when and the why and the who in every instance. That’s after two years of trying. And we will someday have the documents to exploit, we will have the people to interrogate, we will have ways to get more information to put the rest of the pieces of this puzzle on the table. But right now, we don’t have it.” Congressman Tim Roemer (D-IN), also part of the Congressional Inquiry, says, “I still don’t think we know about the 19 hijackers—where they were, why they did certain things.” [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 7/27/2003] Entity Tags: Porter J. Goss, Tim Roemer, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry Category Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, FBI 9/11 Investigation

July 27-28, 2003: Philippine Soldiers Hold Brief Mutiny, Fearing Their Government Is Staging Terrorist Attacks A group of Philippine soldiers mutiny, claiming they are trying to prevent the Philippine government from staging terrorist attacks on its own people. About 300 soldiers, many of them officers, rig a large Manila shopping mall and luxury hotel with explosives, evacuate them, and then threaten to blow up the buildings unless President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and other top Philippine leaders resign. After a twenty hour siege, the soldiers surrender and no one is hurt. Their leaders are jailed for mutiny. While Arroyo remains in power, other top leaders resign, including the county’s defense minister, police chief, and military intelligence chief. [GUARDIAN, 7/28/2003; GUARDIAN, 8/15/2003] The mutineers had a number of grievances. They complain: Senior military officials, in collusion with President Arroyo, are secretly behind recent bombings that have been blamed on Muslim militant groups. They specifically claim that a series of bombings in March and April 2002 in the southern city of Davao that killed 38 people were actually false flag operations. (Their allegations could be related to a May 2002 incident in which a US citizen staying in the area was injured when a bomb he was making exploded in his hotel room; see May 16, 2002. The Philippines media suggested that he was a CIA operative taking part in false flag operations.) The government is selling weapons and ammunition to rebel groups such as Abu Sayyaf even as these groups fight the government. The Guardian will later note that local newspaper reports describe the military’s selling of weapons to rebels as ‘an open secret’ and “common knowledge.” [GUARDIAN, 8/15/2003] Gracia Burnham, an American missionary who was kidnapped in 2001 and held hostage by Abu Sayyaf rebels for more than a year, claims that her captors told her their weapons came from the Philippine government. [ASIA TIMES, 7/29/2003] Islamic militants are being allowed to escape from jail. Just two weeks before the mutiny, Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, a bomb maker with the al-Qaeda allied Jemaah Islamiyah group, was inexplicably able to escape from a heavily guarded prison in Manila. There are many dubious circumstances surrounding his escape (see July 14, 2003). The government is on the verge of staging a new string of bombings to justify declaring martial law so Arroyo can remain in office past the end of her term in 2004. The Guardian will later note, “Though the soldiers’ tactics were widely condemned in the Philippines, there was widespread recognition in the press, and even inside the military, that their claims ‘were valid and legitimate’…. Days before the mutiny, a coalition of church groups, lawyers, and NGOs launched a ‘fact-finding mission’ to investigate persistent rumors that the state was involved in the Davao explosions. It is also investigating the possible involvement of US intelligence agencies.” [GUARDIAN, 8/15/2003] CNN comments, “While the government issued a statement calling the accusation ‘a lie,’ and saying the soldiers themselves could be victims of propaganda, the soldiers’ accusation plays on the fears of many Filipinos after the infamous 21-year term of President Ferdinand Marcos, during which he did the same thing. Marcos instigated a series of bombings and civil unrest in the late 1960s and early 1970s, using that as an excuse to declare martial law in 1972. It took the People Power Revolt of 1986 to end Marcos’ dictatorship.” [CNN, 7/26/2003] Entity Tags: Jemaah Islamiyah, Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, Abu Sayyaf, Gracia Burnham, Philippines Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, Philippine Militant Collusion

July 28, 2003: President Bush Opposes Release of Full 9/11 Congressional Inquiry Report

Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal after meeting Bush over the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry’s report. [Source: Associated Press] In the wake of the release of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry’s final report, pressure builds to release most of the still-censored sections of the report, but on this day President Bush says he is against the idea. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 7/29/2003; NEW YORK TIMES, 7/29/2003] Through an obscure rule, the Senate could force the release of the material with a majority vote [USA TODAY, 5/29/2003], but apparently the number of votes in favor of this idea falls just short. MSNBC reports that “the decision to keep the passage secret… created widespread suspicion among lawmakers that the administration was trying to shield itself and its Saudi allies from embarrassment.… Three of the four leaders of the joint congressional investigation into the attacks have said they believed that much of the material on foreign financing was safe to publish but that the administration insisted on keeping it secret.” [MSNBC, 7/28/2003] Senator Richard Shelby (R), one of the main authors of the report, states that “90, 95 percent of it would not compromise, in my judgment, anything in national security.” Bush ignores a reporter’s question on Shelby’s assessment. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 7/29/2003] Even the Saudi government claims to be in favor of releasing the censored material so it can better respond to criticism. [MSNBC, 7/28/2003] All the censored material remains censored; however, some details of the most controversial censored sections are leaked to the media. Entity Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, George W. Bush, Richard Shelby, Saudi Arabia Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry

July 30, 2003: Saudi Interior Minister Vows to Never Extradite Omar Al-Bayoumi or Anyone Else Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdul-Aziz vows not to extradite Omar al-Bayoumi, who has been alleged to be a Saudi spy who assisted two of the 9/11 hijackers in the US. He says, “We have never handed over a Saudi to a state or a foreign side, and we will never do it.” [GRAHAM AND NUSSBAUM, 2004, PP. 224, 277] Entity Tags: Omar al-Bayoumi, Nayef bin Abdul-Aziz Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi Connection, Saudi Arabia

July 30, 2003: President Bush Says US Needs More Time to Prove Iraq-Al-Qaeda Link During a press conference, Bush is asked if the White House is planning to provide the public with “definitive evidence that Saddam was working with al-Qaeda terrorists” or if the alleged al-Qaeda links had been “exaggerated to justify war.” Bush responds that the US needs more time to analyze documents uncovered in Iraq. Bush explains: “Yes, I think, first of all, remember I just said we’ve been there for 90 days since the cessation of major military operations. Now, I know in our world where news comes and goes and there’s this kind of instant-instant news and you must have done this, you must do that yesterday, that there’s a level of frustration by some in the media. I’m not suggesting you’re frustrated. You don’t look frustrated to me at all. But it’s going to take time for us to gather the evidence and analyze the mounds of evidence, literally, the miles of documents that we have uncovered.” [US NEWSWIRE, 7/30/2003; US PRESIDENT, 8/4/2003] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

Late July, 2003: Mock Terrorist Attack on Nuclear Plant Called Unrealistic, Inadequate The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) announces that security forces at the Indian Point nuclear plant, in upstate New York, have thwarted a mock terrorist attack. The mock attack was held under quite different circumstances from a possible real strike by terrorists: the guards were told exactly what date the mock attack would be held on, the mock terrorists were required to attack during daylight hours, and the number of attackers was limited to three. [CARTER, 2004, PP. 18-19] Representative Nita Lowey (D-NY) calls the drill inadequate. Lowey asks: “Were guards required to defend against airborne and water-based threats, two of Indian Point’s greatest vulnerabilities? Why does poor performance in these drills carry no penalties? Our nuclear facilities must be protected by top-notch security forces that undergo regular, rigorous exercises that reflect the real-world terrorist threats we face today” (see Between July 9 and July 16, 2001). Alex Matthiessen, the director of the environmental organization Riverkeeper, agrees with Lowey: “When the NRC conducts a drill that tests post-9/11 terrorist scenarios and when they allow truly independent observers and experts to observe the drill, only then will I begin to believe that Indian Point’s security is robust or adequate. At this point the NRC has no credibility with the public, having just rubber-stamped a patently flawed emergency plan.” A spokesman for Entergy, the corporation that owns and operates the plant, calls the mock attack “rigorous and realistic.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/12/2003] Entity Tags: Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Alex Matthiessen, Entergy, Nita Lowey, Riverkeeper Category Tags: Internal US Security After 9/11

July 31, 2003: FBI Claims 9/11 Money Came from Pakistan

John Pistole. [Source: Marshall Center] John S. Pistole, deputy assistant director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, testifies before a Congressional committee. He states the 9/11 investigation “has traced the origin of the funding of 9/11 back to financial accounts in Pakistan, where high-ranking and well-known al-Qaeda operatives played a major role in moving the money forward, eventually into the hands of the hijackers located in the US.” [US CONGRESS, 7/31/2003] Pistole does not reveal any further details, but in India it is noted that this is consistent with previous reports that Saeed Sheikh and ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed were behind the funding of 9/11. [TIMES OF INDIA, 8/1/2003; PIONEER, 8/7/2003] However, the FBI will tell the 9/11 Commission that when Pistole used the word “accounts”, he did not mean actual accounts with a bank, merely that 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was based in Pakistan, handled the money. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 144 ] Entity Tags: Mahmood Ahmed, Saeed Sheikh, John S. Pistole Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh, Mahmood Ahmed

August 2003: FAA Falsely Claims It Has Produced All 9/11-Related Documents for 9/11 Commission The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) tells the 9/11 Commission it has already given the Commission all the documents it asked the FAA for. John Farmer, head of the Commission team investigating what happened on the day of 9/11, finds this hard to believe, as the boxes of material the FAA has provided do not contain many tapes or transcripts of FAA communications on the day of the attacks. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 201] Later interviews of FAA staff will reveal there is a mountain of evidence the FAA is withholding from the Commission (see September 2003). Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Federal Aviation Administration, John Farmer Category Tags: 9/11 Commission

August 2003: 9/11 Commission Staffer Reviews NSC Documents; Favors Clarke’s Account of Bush Administration’s Treatment of Terrorist Warnings over Rice’s Warren Bass, the 9/11 Commission staffer allocated to review National Security Council documentation, comes to favor an account of events in the Bush administration given by former counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke over one given by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. Clarke has claimed that the administration did not take the risk of an al-Qaeda attack seriously enough in the summer of 2001, whereas Rice claims the administration did everything it could to prevent one. Documentation, Speeches, Briefings - Bass comes to this judgment partly because of the small amount of Rice’s e-mails and internal memos about terrorism from the spring and summer of 2001: there is, in author Philip Shenon’s words, “almost nothing to read.” In addition, she made very few references to terrorism in speeches and public appearances. For example, a speech she was to give on 9/11 itself about national security contained only a passing reference to terrorism (see September 11, 2001). On the contrary, Clarke left a pile of documents and a “rich narrative” of events at the White House concerning al-Qaeda, including warnings about an upcoming catastrophic terrorist attack in the summer of 2001. Bass also sees that Clarke was not allowed to brief President Bush on al-Qaeda before 9/11, whereas he repeatedly talked to President Bill Clinton about it. Memo Warned of Attacks One Week before 9/11 - He is especially astounded to find a memo dated September 4, 2001 warning of a forthcoming attack by Osama bin Laden (see September 4, 2001). However, when he shows this to his team leader, Michael Hurley, they both realize it may be difficult to get this memo included in the commission’s report due to expected opposition from 9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow, who the staff suspects is biased towards Rice (see January 3, 2001, Before December 18, 2003, May-June 2004 and February 28, 2005). [SHENON, 2008, PP. 146-149] Memo Called a "Jeremiad" - The September 4 memo is mentioned in the commission’s final report, but is followed by a comment from Rice saying she saw it as a warning “not to get dragged down by bureaucratic inertia.” The report then calls the memo a “jeremiad” (a prolonged lamentation) and attributes it to Clarke’s inability “to persuade [the CIA and Pentagon] to adopt his views, or to persuade his superiors to set an agenda of the sort he wanted or that the whole government could support.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 212-213] Entity Tags: Philip Zelikow, Michael Hurley, Warren Bass, Richard A. Clarke, 9/11 Commission Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow

August 2003: Anti-US Asian Alliance Holds First Military Exercises Together Five of the six members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) conduct their first ever military exercises together. Experts say the joint-maneuvers demonstrate how important the SCO is to China in its effort to counter the growing US military presence in Central Asia. Alex Vatanka, of the London based Jane’s Intelligence, suggests the point of the exercises is to show the Central Asian states what China can offer as a partner that the US cannot. [RADIO FREE EUROPE, 8/5/2003] Entity Tags: Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran Category Tags: US Dominance

August 2003: FBI and CIA Forced to Reopen Investigation into Saudi Link to 9/11 In the wake of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry report, and “under intense pressure from Congress,” as the Boston Globe puts it, the FBI and CIA reopen an investigation into whether Saudi Arabian officials aided the 9/11 plot. [BOSTON GLOBE, 8/3/2003] In early August, Saudi Arabia allows the FBI to interview Omar al-Bayoumi. However, the interview takes place in Saudi Arabia, and apparently on his terms, with Saudi government handlers present. [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/5/2003; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/6/2003] Says one anonymous government terrorism consultant, “They are revisiting everybody. The [FBI] did not do a very good job of unraveling the conspiracy behind the hijackers.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 8/3/2003] But by September, the Washington Post reports that the FBI has concluded that the idea al-Bayoumi was a Saudi government agent is “without merit and has largely abandoned further investigation… The bureau’s September 11 investigative team, which is still tracking down details of the plot, has reached similar conclusions about other associates named or referred to in the congressional inquiry report.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/10/2003] Yet another article claims that by late August, some key people who interacted with al-Bayoumi have yet to be interviewed by the FBI. “Countless intelligence leads that might help solve” the mystery of a Saudi connection to the hijackers “appear to have been underinvestigated or completely overlooked by the FBI, particularly in San Diego.” [SAN DIEGO MAGAZINE, 9/2003] Not only were they never interviewed when the investigation was supposedly reopened, they were not interviewed in the months after 9/11 either, when the FBI supposedly opened an “intense investigation” of al-Bayoumi, visiting “every place he was known to have gone, and [compiling] 4,000 pages of documents detailing his activities.” [NEWSWEEK, 7/28/2003] Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, US Congress, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Omar al-Bayoumi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Saudi Arabia, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi Connection

August 2003 and After: 9/11 Commission Sends Single Analyst to Review CIA Material The 9/11 Commission sends a single member of staff, Alexis Albion, to the CIA to review its material. Although other commission staff and some commissioners will also work on CIA material for the commission, the review conducted at the agency is performed by Albion, who has a PhD in the history of intelligence from Harvard. According to author Philip Shenon, she reads “years’ worth of case files on the CIA and its history of dealing with terrorist threats,” as the CIA is happy to make a lot of information available to the commission. She is also given her own reading room, and free rein of the building. Soon after she starts coming to the CIA in August 2003, she receives a document referred to as “the Scroll.” Shenon will describe the Scroll as “a massive chronology prepared after 9/11 to document every element of the CIA’s antiterrorist effort before the September 11 attacks,” adding that a CIA employee “thought the Scroll must have measured about 150 feet across—a day-by-day, hour-by-hour, almost minute-by-minute chronology of the agency’s battles against al-Qaeda.” In addition: “The information was broken down by activity. On one line was a timeline of the CIA’s covert operations, set against another line that offered a chronology of the work of the agency’s analysts; another line showed the agency’s counterterrorism budget over time.” After Albion finishes this, she begins to read “thousands of other documents” the CIA has prepared for her. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 135-139] Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Central Intelligence Agency, Alexis Albion Category Tags: 9/11 Commission

August 1, 2003: Wolfowitz Says Iraq Might Not Have Been Involved in 9/11 Paul Wolfowitz says in an interview with Nancy Collins of the Laura Ingraham Show: “I’m not sure even now that I would say Iraq had something to do with [9/11]. I think what the realization to me is—the fundamental point was that terrorism had reached the scale completely different from what we had thought of it up until then. And that it would only get worse when these people got access to weapons of mass destruction which would be only a matter of time.” [LAURA INGRAHAM SHOW, 8/1/2003] Entity Tags: Paul Wolfowitz Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism, Internal US Security After 9/11

Late Summer 2003: 9/11 Commission Requests Some Presidential Daily Briefs from CIA, Knows Credibility Is on the Line The 9/11 Commission files a request to see some Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) items it believes it may need for its investigation. Filed with CIA - The Commission had conducted preliminary discussions about the PDBs with White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, but they have not borne fruit (see Late January 2003 and June 2003) and the Commission understands it may have to fight to get the documents. Therefore, it submits the request to the CIA, which writes and keeps the PDBs, as the Commission’s lawyers think it will be easier to enforce a subpoena against the CIA than the White House. Credibility - Commission Chairman Tom Kean and Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton are aware the Commission must get the PDBs, or at least be seen to try hard, to maintain its credibility. This is particularly because, according to author Philip Shenon, “the PDBs were becoming the ‘holy grail’ for the 9/11 families and for the press corps.” Hamilton will say if the Commission’s investigation ended without it seeing them, “that would be the only thing the press would be interested in.” Shenon will add, “It seemed as if no other evidence unearthed by the Commission mattered; if the Commission did not see the PDBs, it would be seen in history as having failed.” Scope of Request - The request is not for the full library of PDBs from the Clinton and Bush administrations. The Commission requests items from 1998 on that mention al-Qaeda, domestic terrorist threats, terrorist plots involving airlines used as weapons, and intelligence involving Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, and Germany. White House Says No - Although the request was addressed to the CIA, Gonzales replies for the White House in September, saying the Commission cannot see the PDBs, or even brief extracts. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 214-215] Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Alberto R. Gonzales, Philip Shenon, 9/11 Commission, Thomas Kean, Lee Hamilton Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB, 9/11 Commission

August 1-3, 2003: Leaks Hint at Saudi Involvement in 9/11 In the wake of the release of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry’s full report, anonymous officials leak some details from a controversial, completely censored 28-page section that focuses on possible Saudi support for 9/11. According to leaks given to the New York Times, the section says that Omar al-Bayoumi and/or Osama Basnan “had at least indirect links with two hijackers [who] were probably Saudi intelligence agents and may have reported to Saudi government officials.” It also says that Anwar Al Aulaqi “was a central figure in a support network that aided the same two hijackers.” Most connections drawn in the report between the men, Saudi intelligence, and 9/11 is said to be circumstantial. [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/2/2003] One key section is said to read, “On the one hand, it is possible that these kinds of connections could suggest, as indicated in a CIA memorandum, ‘incontrovertible evidence that there is support for these terrorists… On the other hand, it is also possible that further investigation of these allegations could reveal legitimate, and innocent, explanations for these associations.’”(see August 2, 2002) Some of the most sensitive information involves what US agencies are doing currently to investigate Saudi business figures and organizations. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/2/2003] According to the New Republic, the section outlines “connections between the hijacking plot and the very top levels of the Saudi royal family.” An anonymous official is quoted as saying, “There’s a lot more in the 28 pages than money. Everyone’s chasing the charities. They should be chasing direct links to high levels of the Saudi government. We’re not talking about rogue elements. We’re talking about a coordinated network that reaches right from the hijackers to multiple places in the Saudi government.… If the people in the administration trying to link Iraq to al-Qaeda had one-one-thousandth of the stuff that the 28 pages has linking a foreign government to al-Qaeda, they would have been in good shape.… If the 28 pages were to be made public, I have no question that the entire relationship with Saudi Arabia would change overnight.” [NEW REPUBLIC, 8/1/2003] The section also is critical that the issue of foreign government support remains unresolved. One section reads, “In their testimony, neither CIA or FBI officials were able to address definitely the extent of such support for the hijackers, globally or within the United States, or the extent to which such support, if it exists, is knowing or inadvertent in nature. This gap in intelligence community coverage is unacceptable.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 8/3/2003] Entity Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Omar al-Bayoumi, Osama Basnan, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Anwar Al Aulaqi, Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Saudi Arabia, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Key Hijacker Events, Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi Connection

August 5, 2003: Suicide Bombing Hits Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia; Al-Qaeda-Linked Group Blamed

Damage to the front of the Marriott Hotel. [Source: CNN] A suicide bomber crashes into the lobby of the J. W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, killing 16 people and wounding 150. All of those killed are Indonesian except for one Dutch man. No group takes credit for the bombing, but US and Indonesian officials quickly blame Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), al-Qaeda’s main affiliate in Southeast Asia. The New York Times calls the Marriott “the most visibly American building in the city, [leaving] little doubt about the intentions of the terrorists.” Two weeks before, a militant captured in a raid in central Java revealed that he had recently delivered two carloads of bombmaking materials to Jakarta. Furthermore, drawings were found indicating that JI was planning an attack on one of the following targets: the Grand Hyatt, Mulia, or Marriott hotels, two Jakarta shopping malls, or some Christian sites. Police claim they went on high alert. But the Marriott says they were never given any warning, and there was no public alert of any kind. The US ambassador to Indonesia, Ralph Boyce, says the US was not given any warning. Time magazine will later comment that “serious questions remain about just how much more police might have done to prevent the attack in the first place.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/7/2003; TIME, 8/10/2003] One Indonesian later convicted for a role in the bombing, Mohammad Rais, will later testify in court that he had frequently met Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in recent years, and the bombing was inspired by bin Laden’s talk about waging war against the US and its allies. “We saw the Marriott attack as a message from Osama bin Laden.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/2/2004] US treasury official Stuart Levey will later claim that al-Qaeda funded the attack by having a courier bring $30,000 in cash to Indonesia. [USA TODAY, 6/18/2006] The funds for the bombing allegedly passed through Hambali, an al-Qaeda and JI leader arrested in Thailand several days later (see August 12, 2003). [CNN, 8/19/2003] JI leaders Azhari Husin and Noordin Mohammed Top are said to have masterminded the bombing, together with Hambali. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/7/2005] Entity Tags: Ralph Boyce, Noordin Mohammed Top, Mohammad Rais, Azhari Husin, Hambali, Stuart Levey, Jemaah Islamiyah Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks

August 6, 2003: Two Investigative Journalists Say Almihdhar and Alhazmi Worked for Saudi Intelligence and Were Protected by CIA

Joe Trento. [Source: Canal+] After 9/11, an unnamed former CIA officer who worked in Saudi Arabia will tell investigative journalist Joe Trento that hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar were allowed to operate in the US unchecked (see, e.g., February 4-Mid-May 2000 and Mid-May-December 2000) because they were agents of Saudi Arabia’s intelligence agency. “We had been unable to penetrate al-Qaeda. The Saudis claimed that they had done it successfully. Both Alhazmi and Almihdhar were Saudi agents. We thought they had been screened. It turned out the man responsible for recruiting them had been loyal to Osama bin Laden. The truth is bin Laden himself was a Saudi agent at one time. He successfully penetrated Saudi intelligence and created his own operation inside. The CIA relied on the Saudis vetting their own agents. It was a huge mistake. The reason the FBI was not given any information about either man is because they were Saudi assets operating with CIA knowledge in the United States.” [STORIES THAT MATTER, 8/6/2003] In a 2006 book the Trentos will add: “Saudi intelligence had sent agents Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi to spy on a meeting of top associates of al-Qaeda in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, January 5-8, 2000. ‘The CIA/Saudi hope was that the Saudis would learn details of bin Laden’s future plans. Instead plans were finalized and the Saudis learned nothing,’ says a terrorism expert who asks that his identity be withheld… Under normal circumstances, the names of Almihdhar and Alhazmi should have been placed on the State Department, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and US Customs watch lists. The two men would have been automatically denied entry into the US. Because they were perceived as working for a friendly intelligence service, however, the CIA did not pass along the names.” [TRENTO AND TRENTO, 2006, PP. 8] Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Saudi General Intelligence Directorate, Central Intelligence Agency, Nawaf Alhazmi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi Connection, Other Possible Moles or Informants, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Yemen Hub, Saudi Arabia

August 7, 2003-August 11, 2003: Seventy Percent of Americans Misled by Bush Administration Insinuations of Iraq-9/11 Links According to a Washington Post survey, 7 in 10 Americans believe that it is “likely or very likely Saddam Hussein was involved in September 11.” Sixty-two percent of Democrats, 80 percent of Republicans and 67 percent of independents polled suspect there is a link between Saddam Hussein and 9/11. Additionally, eight in 10 Americans believe that it was likely that Saddam had provided assistance to al-Qaeda, and a similar percentage say the believe he developed weapons of mass destruction. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/6/2003] Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

August 12, 2003: Hambali and Aides Arrested in Thailand; Handed to US Hambali (a.k.a. Riduan Isamuddin) is arrested in Thailand in a joint US-Thai operation. He has been considered the operational leader of al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. He was involved in the Bojinka plot in 1995, attended the January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000), and was said to be involved in the 2002 bombing of two nightclubs in Bali, Indonesia (see October 12, 2002), the 2003 bombing of a Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia (see August 5, 2003), and other similar acts. He is taken into US custody and is said to quickly and fully cooperate with his captors. [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 12/7/2003] According to the Washington Post, at some point he will be transferred to the US naval base at the British island colony of Diego Garcia, where the CIA is believed to have a secret interrogation center. [WASHINGTON POST, 12/17/2004; WASHINGTON POST, 1/2/2005, PP. A01] Two of Hambali’s associates - Mohamad Farik Amin (a.k.a. Zubair), and Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep (a.k.a. Lillie) - are arrested with him. Both are Malaysians and are said to be al-Qaeda operatives. Supposedly they were members of a four person suicide squad working for Hambali and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to hijack an airplane (see October 2001-February 2002). [TIME, 10/6/2003] The US will later classify both of them, and Hambali, as about a dozen of the top al-Qaeda operatives in US custody (see September 2-3, 2006). Entity Tags: United States, Hambali, Thailand, Mohamad Farik Amin, Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Hambali, High Value Detainees, Key Captures and Deaths, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, 2002 Bali Bombings, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia

Shortly After August 12, 2003: Hambali Tortured in Secret CIA Prison
Shortly after he is arrested in Thailand (see August 12, 2003), al-Qaeda leader Hambali is taken to an unknown location and tortured. [MSNBC, 9/13/2007] Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Hambali Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Hambali, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics August 17, 2003: Arms Dealer Victor Bout Hints He Has Numerous Government Connections

Victor Bout in 2003. [Source: James Hill / Contact Press] The New York Times Magazine publishes an article based on an interview with Victor Bout, the world’s biggest illegal arms dealer. Bout worked extensively with the Taliban in the years before 9/11, and because of this, he claims, “I woke up after Sept. 11 and found I was second only to Osama,” in terms of being a wanted criminal. But he hints that he has powerful connections. “My clients, the governments… I keep my mouth shut.” He also points to the middle of his forehead and adds, “If I told you everything I’d get the red hole right here.” When asked about his possible ties to Russian intelligence, he says, “Until now you’ve been digging in a big lake with small spoons. There are huge forces…” He breaks his sentence, and explains to the reporter that he cannot explain too much about what the report calls “the triangulated relationship between him, governments, and his rogue clients.” An unnamed British arms investigator claims, “Bout is encouraged by Western intelligence agencies when it’s politically expedient.” Bout, a Russian, is interviewed in Moscow, where “he lives in plain sight… under the apparent protection of a post-Communist system that has profited from his activities as much as he has.” [NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 8/17/2003] It will later be alleged that Bout began working with US intelligence shortly after 9/11, if not before, despite being the main arms dealer to the Taliban (see Shortly After September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Victor Bout Category Tags: Victor Bout, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

August 25, 2003: Condoleezza Rice Says US Needs to Transform Middle East in Order to Stop Terrorist Attacks National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice says in a speech, “The transformation of the Middle East is the only guarantee that it will no longer produce ideologies of hatred that lead men to fly airplanes into buildings in New York or Washington.” She adds, “Transformation in the Middle East will require a commitment of many years.” [WHITE HOUSE, 8/25/2003] Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice Category Tags: US Dominance, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

August 27, 2003: NIST Investigators Rule Out Weak Steel as a Factor in Collapses At the end of a two-day meeting to discuss the progress of their investigation of the WTC collapses on 9/11, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) investigators say that early tests on steel beams recovered from the World Trade Center showed they met or were stronger than design requirements. NIST has collected 236 pieces of steel from the wreckage of the towers. Tests have found that the steel beams exceeded requirements to bear 36,000 pounds per square inch, and were often capable of bearing around 42,000 pounds per square inch. Lead investigator Shyam Sunder says that if further testing corroborates these findings, this will rule out weak steel as a factor in the collapses. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 8/26/2003; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/28/2003] The final report of the NIST investigation, released in 2005, will corroborate this finding: “Overall, approximately 87 percent of all perimeter and core column steel tested exceeded the required minimum yield strengths specified in design documents. Test data for the remaining samples were below specifications, but were within the expected variability and did not affect the safety of the towers on September 11, 2001.” It also will point out: “Of the more than 170 areas examined on 16 perimeter column panels, only three columns had evidence that the steel reached temperatures above 250°C.… Only two core column specimens had sufficient paint remaining to make such an analysis, and their temperatures did not reach 250°C.… Using metallographic analysis, NIST determined that there was no evidence that any of the samples had reached temperatures above 600 °C.” [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 89-90 ] Entity Tags: World Trade Center, National Institute of Standards and Technology Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: WTC Investigation

September 2003: 9/11 Commission Executive Director Zelikow Lunches with National Security Adviser Rice and Her Staff Philip Zelikow, executive director of the 9/11 Commission, goes to the White House to have lunch with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and her staff. Zelikow is close to Rice and defends her interests on the Commission (see 1995, Before December 18, 2003, and May-June 2004). Zelikow’s White House passes are arranged by Karen Heitkotter, an executive secretary on the Commission. According to author Philip Shenon, during the Commission’s life, “More than once she [is] asked to arrange a gate pass so Zelikow [can] enter the White House to visit the national security adviser in her offices in the West Wing.” Allegedly, at the same time, “Zelikow [is] telling people how upset he [is] to cut off contact with his good friend Rice.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 107] Entity Tags: Karen Heitkotter, 9/11 Commission, Condoleezza Rice, Philip Zelikow Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow

September 2003: 9/11 Commission Discovers FAA Has Withheld Documents from Investigators Investigators for the 9/11 Commission discover that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has withheld a large amount of documents from it about the day of the attacks and falsely claimed it had provided everything the Commission asked for (see August 2003). The discovery is made on a day when the Commission’s investigators begin interviewing air traffic controllers at centers on the East Coast and in the Midwest. John Farmer, the staffer who leads the Commission’s team dealing with this aspect of its work, is only a few minutes into interviews at the FAA’s Indianapolis Center when he realizes, in the words of author Philip Shenon, “just how much evidence the FAA had held back.” His interviewees tell him that there is “extensive information the Commission has not seen, including tape recordings of conversations between the individual air traffic controllers and the hijacked planes.” He also discovers that what the FAA has provided is merely the “accident package,” rather than the much larger “accident file.” Farmer is “furious” and contacts the Commission’s lawyer in Washington. Asked to explain the situation, the FAA rapidly admits there is other material and, within days, several boxes of new material, including the air traffic control tapes, arrive at the Commission’s offices. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 201-202] However, the Commission has lost confidence in the FAA and will issue it with a subpoena next month (see October 14, 2003). Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Federal Aviation Administration, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center, John Farmer Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Commission

September 2003: US Not Sharing Evidence about Darkazanli with Germans German prosecutors claim that an inquiry is still under way against Mamoun Darkazanli, the Syrian businessman with ties to the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell. However, while the US had promised to share evidence against him, it is reported that the promised information has yet to be delivered. [DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR (HAMBURG), 9/7/2003] Entity Tags: United States, Germany, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Mamoun Darkazanli, Al-Qaeda in Germany

September 2003-February 2004: Majority of Participants in Deal to Buy Explosives for Madrid Bombings Are Informants

Carmen Toro. [Source: Spanish Interior Ministry] In September 2003, Emilio Suarez Trashorras, Rafa Zouhier, Antonio Toro, his wife Carmen Toro, Rachid Aglif, Jamal Ahmidan (alias “El Chino”), and Mohammed Oulad Akcha meet at a McDonald’s restaurant in Madrid. The first five people are linked to a mine in the Asturias region of Spain and have no Islamist militant background. Ahmidan and Akcha are members of a group of Islamist militants and are meeting the others to buy explosives stolen from the mine. Ahmidan goes to Asturias at least five times from December 2003 to February 2004 to work out the explosives deal. He, Akcha, and others in their militant group will then use the explosives in the March 2004 Madrid train bombings (see 7:37-7:42 a.m., March 11, 2004). Interestingly, at least four of the five—Trashorras, Zouhier, and both Toros—are government informants at the time. Supposedly, none of them tell their handlers about this explosives deal. [EL MUNDO (MADRID), 6/10/2004] However, Zouhier will later claim that he repeatedly told his handler about the deal. He will say: “I told them. I mentioned all the suspicions I had regarding the explosives. In 2003 I warned that ‘these people want to sell 150 kilos’. I told them 1,000 times.” [AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 2/28/2007] His handler, known by the alias Victor, will initially dispute this, but in 2007 he will finally admit that Zouhier did tell him in March 2003 that Trashorras and Antonio Toro were dealing in stolen explosives and had 150 kilograms of explosives ready to sell. Zouhier even passed on that they asked him about using cell phones as detonating devices. Police then began monitoring Trashorras and Toro (see March 2003). Trashorras, Zouhier, and Aglif will eventually be sentenced to various prison terms, while the Toros will be acquitted. Trashorras will get life in prison (see October 31, 2007). Entity Tags: Rachid Aglif, Rafa Zouhier, Jamal Ahmidan, Carmen Toro, Antonio Toro, Emilio Suarez Trashorras, Mohammed Oulad Akcha Category Tags: Other Possible Moles or Informants, Al-Qaeda in Spain, 2004 Madrid Train Bombings

September-November 2003: CIA Informant Uncovers Bosnia Network Sending Al-Qaeda Fighters to Iraq

The King Fahd Mosque in Sarajevo, Bosnia. [Source: Ca adian Broadcasting Corporation] Abdurahman Khadr is a CIA informant (see November 10, 2001-Early 2003) and has been posing as a prisoner in Guantanamo so he can inform on the other prisoners there (see Spring 2003). But in September 2003, he leaves Guantanamo because the CIA gives him a new assignment, to infiltrate al-Qaeda-linked groups in Bosnia. He is given a brief training course in undercover work and then sent to Bosnia on a false passport. US intelligence believes that Bosnia has become an important pipeline for al-Qaeda volunteers who want to fight in Iraq. Khadr spends time at the King Fahd mosque, a large Sarajevo mosque which the US believes is a center of al-Qaeda activity. He becomes friendly with a suspected recruiter for al-Qaeda operations in Iraq. The CIA then wants him to follow the pipeline to Iraq and inform on al-Qaeda operations there. But Khadr considers Iraq far too dangerous. He is a Canadian citizen, and he contacts his grandmother in Canada and has her go public with part of his story so he will not be of use as an informant any more. In November 2003, he returns to Canada, after the CIA fails to give him most of his promised salary for his informant work. In February 2004, he contacts Canadian reporters and tells them his full story about being a CIA informant. His father, Ahmed Said Khadr, was a founding member of al-Qaeda, and his family disowns him when they find out about his involvement with the CIA. [PBS FRONTLINE, 4/22/2004] Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Abdurahman Khadr Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Balkans, Other Possible Moles or Informants, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

September 2, 2003: Former Clinton National Security Adviser Steals Apparently Compromising Document from National Archives

The National Archives building. [Source: Dan Smith] Sandy Berger, a former national security adviser to Bill Clinton, steals a document he believes could be used against him and the Clinton administration from the National Archives. Berger is at the archives to prepare for an interview with the 9/11 Commission, but had previously visited them to prepare for discussions with the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry (see May 30, 2002) and had improperly removed classified notes he had made on the documents (see July 18, 2003). The document he takes is an after-action report drafted by counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke following a period around the millennium when the administration thought al-Qaeda might attack US interests. The report included 29 recommendations for government counterterrrorism programs, several of which were not implemented before Clinton left office. Although Berger thinks the Clinton administration took counterterrorism very seriously, he believes the document could be used against him. One of the workers at the archives sees Berger behaving suspiciously with the documents in a corridor, and alerts a superior. However, the documents are not cataloged, and the archives do not know what documents, if any, have been taken. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 7-8] Berger will be caught taking a document the next time he comes to the archives (see October 2, 2003). Entity Tags: Sandy Berger, National Archives and Records Administration Category Tags: 9/11 Commission

September 4-15, 2003: Karl Rove Again Calls 9/11 Commission Executive Director Zelikow White House adviser Karl Rove makes two telephone calls to 9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow, one on September 4, the other on September 15. The subject of the calls, which are unofficially logged by Karen Heitkotter, an executive secretary with the Commission, is unclear. Zelikow and Rove had a previous exchange of calls in June (see June 23-24, 2003). [SHENON, 2008, PP. 107, 171-174] According to Zelikow, it concerns “this matter of his elderly friend who had these papers. It had no relation to contemporary problems; he [Rove] was being gracious to someone.” [ZELIKOW AND SHENON, 2007 ] This will be confirmed by a White House official, who will say that Rove calls Zelikow on behalf of an elderly neighbor who had been a senior lawyer at the State Department at the end of World War II. The neighbor wonders whether the Miller Center, a historical research institute Zelikow used to work for, would like to see his papers and talk to him. However, a “senior White House official familiar with Rove’s memory of the contacts with Zelikow” will say this is not the only topic discussed and that there are also “ancillary conversations” about the workings of the Commission. Interviewed around mid-September 2003, 9/11 Commission Chairman Tom Kean and Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton say that they are not aware of the calls and seem surprised by them, but accept Zelikow’s innocent explanation. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 173-174] Entity Tags: Karl Rove, Karen Heitkotter, Philip Zelikow, Lee Hamilton, Thomas Kean, 9/11 Commission Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow

September 5, 2003: Homeland Security Warns Al-Qaeda Planning New US Attacks The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issues an advisory warning that al-Qaeda is working on plans to hijack airliners flying between international points that pass near or over the continental US. The DHS spokesman states that most of the flights fitting this description would originate in Canada. Reasons for this advisory include concerns regarding the second anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, a recent increase in intelligence information, and threats to aviation that continued through the summer. However, the advisory states that the information is not specific enough to raise the National Alert Level from yellow to orange. The advisory contains non-specific warnings about multiple attacks against “soft” targets in both the US and abroad. [CNN, 9/5/2003] No such attacks occur. Entity Tags: US Department of Homeland Security, Al-Qaeda Category Tags: Terror Alerts, Internal US Security After 9/11

September 6, 2003: British Cabinet Minister Hints US Government Knew of 9/11 in Advance

Michael Meacher. [Source: Global Free Press] British government minister Michael Meacher publishes an essay entitled, “The War on Terrorism is Bogus.” Meacher is a long time British Member of Parliament, and served as Environmental Minister for six years until three months before releasing this essay. The Guardian, which publishes the essay, states that Meacher claims “the war on terrorism is a smoke screen and that the US knew in advance about the September 11 attack on New York but, for strategic reasons, chose not to act on the warnings. He says the US goal is ‘world hegemony, built around securing by force command over the oil supplies’ and that this Pax Americana ‘provides a much better explanation of what actually happened before, during and after 9/11 than the global war on terrorism thesis.’ Mr. Meacher adds that the US has made ‘no serious attempt’ to catch the al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden.” [GUARDIAN, 9/6/2003] Meacher provides no personal anecdotes based on his years in Tony Blair’s cabinet, but he cites numerous mainstream media accounts to support his thesis. He emphasizes the Project for the New American Century 2000 report (see September 2000) as a “blueprint” for a mythical “global war on terrorism,” “propagated to pave the way for a wholly different agenda—the US goal of world hegemony, built around securing by force command over the oil supplies” in Afghanistan and Iraq. [GUARDIAN, 9/6/2003] Meacher’s stand causes a controversial debate in Britain, but the story is almost completely ignored by the mainstream US media. Entity Tags: Michael Meacher, Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Media, US Government and 9/11 Criticism

September 7, 2003: ’Propaganda’ Docudrama of 9/11 Airs, Portrays Bush as ‘Action-Movie Superhero’

The video sleeve for ‘DC 9/11.’ [Source: Internet Movie Database (.com)] Showtime broadcasts a “docudrama” about the 9/11 attacks and the White House’s response, entitled DC 9/11: Time of Crisis. According to New York Times author and media critic Frank Rich, the film drastically rewrites history to portray President Bush as “an unironic action-movie superhero.” In the movie, Bush—portrayed by actor Timothy Bottoms, who played Bush in Comedy Central’s satiric That’s My Bush!—is shown overruling his Secret Service detail and ordering Air Force One to return to Washington immediately, an event which never happened (see 10:32 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (4:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). “If some tinhorn terrorist wants me, tell him to come and get me!” the movie Bush shouts. “I’ll be at home, waiting for the b_stard!” The movie Bush has other lines that establish his desire to get back to Washington, including, “The American people want to know where their damn president is!” and “People can’t have an AWOL president!” In one scene, a Secret Service agent questions Bush’s demand to return to Washington by saying, “But Mr. President—” only to be cut off by Bush, who snaps, “Try ‘Commander in Chief.’ Whose present command is: Take the president home!” In reality, most of the orders on 9/11 were given by Vice President Dick Cheney and counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, but in the movie, Bush is the man in charge. “Hike military alert status to Delta,” he orders Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. “That’s the military, the CIA, foreign, domestic, everything,” he explains. “And if you haven’t gone to Defcon 3, you oughtta.” To Cheney, he barks: “Vice? We are at war.” The White House team are, in Rich’s words, “portrayed as the very model of efficiency and derring-do.” [WASHINGTON POST, 6/19/2003; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/5/2003; RICH, 2006, PP. 25-26] New York Times reviewer Alessandra Stanley notes that Bush is the unquestioned hero of the film, with British Prime Minister Tony Blair portrayed as “not very eloquent” and Cheney depicted as “a kowtowing yes-man.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/5/2003] Conservative Pundits Influenced Script - The movie is produced by Lionel Chetwynd, whom Rich calls “the go-to conservative in B-list Hollywood.” For the movie script, Chetwynd was given unprecedently broad access to top White House officials, including Bush. He also received the assistance of conservative Washington pundits Charles Krauthammer, Morton Kondracke, and Fred Barnes, who cover the Bush White House for such media outlets as Fox News, the Weekly Standard, and the Washington Post. Rich later writes that much of the film seems based on Bob Woodward’s “hagiographic [book] Bush at War (see November 25, 2002).” [WASHINGTON POST, 6/19/2003; RICH, 2006, PP. 25-26] Propaganda Effort? - Before the movie airs, Toronto Sun columnist Linda McQuaig called the film an attempt to mythologize Bush in a fashion similar to Hollywood’s re-creation of the Wild West’s Wyatt Earp, and wrote that the film “is sure to help the White House further its two-pronged reelection strategy: Keep Americans terrified of terrorism and make Bush look like the guy best able to defend them.” Texas radio commentator Jim Hightower added that the movie would present Bush as “a combination of Harrison Ford and Arnold Schwarzenegger.… Instead of the doe-eyed, uncertain, worried figure that he was that day, Bush-on-film is transformed into an infallible, John Wayne-ish, Patton-type leader, barking orders to the Secret Service and demanding that the pilots return him immediately to the White House.” Chetwynd himself has acknowledged that he is a “great admirer” of Bush, and has close ties to the White House. In late 2001, Bush appointed him to the President’s Committee on the Arts and the Humanities. “This isn’t propaganda,” Chetwynd insisted during the shooting of the movie, adding: “Everything in the movie is [based on] two or three sources. I’m not reinventing the wheel here.… I don’t think it’s possible to do a revision of this particular bit of history. Every scholar who has looked at this has come to the same place that this film does. There’s nothing here that Bob Woodward would disagree with.… It’s a straightforward docudrama. I would hope what’s presented is a fully colored and nuanced picture of a human being in a difficult situation.” [WASHINGTON POST, 6/19/2003] Rich will later write that the film is “unmistakably a propaganda effort on behalf of a sitting administration.” [RICH, 2006, PP. 25-26] Blaming the Clinton Administration - Perhaps most questionably, Stanley writes, the film “rarely misses a chance to suggest that the Clinton administration’s weakness was to blame for the disaster.” Bush, she notes, is portrayed as a more decisive leader than his predecessor: in the film, he tells Blair over the telephone: “I want to inflict pain [on the attackers]. Bring enough damage so they understand there is a new team here, a fundamental change in our policy.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/5/2003] 9/11 Widow Unhappy with Film - Kristen Breitweiser, who lost her husband in the attack on the World Trade Center, calls the film “a mind-numbingly boring, revisionist, two-hour-long wish list of how 9/11 might have gone if we had real leaders in the current administration.” She adds: “It is understandable that so little time is actually devoted to the president’s true actions on the morning of 9/11. Because to show the entire 23 minutes from 9:03 to 9:25 a.m., when President Bush, in reality, remained seated and listening to ‘second grade story-hour’ while people like my husband were burning alive inside the World Trade Center towers, would run counter to Karl Rove’s art direction and grand vision.” Breitweiser questions numerous aspects of the film: “Miscellaneous things that surprised me included the fact that the film perpetuates the big fat lie that Air Force One was a target. Forgive me, but I thought the White House admitted at the end of September 2001 that Air Force One was never a target, that no code words were spoken and that it was all a lie (see 10:32 a.m. September 11, 2001 and September 12, 2001). So what gives?… Not surprisingly, there is no mention of accountability. Not once does anyone say, ‘How the hell did this happen? Heads will roll!’ I was hoping that, at least behind closed doors, there were words like, ‘Look, we really screwed up! Let’s make sure we find out what went wrong and that it never happens again!’ Nope, no such luck.” [SALON, 9/8/2003] Entity Tags: Charles Krauthammer, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Richard A. Clarke, Showtime, Alessandra Stanley, Tony Blair, Bob Woodward, Morton Kondracke, Lionel Chetwynd, Timothy Bottoms, Kristen Breitweiser, Donald Rumsfeld, Clinton administration, Fred Barnes, Frank Rich, Karl Rove, George W. Bush, Linda McQuaig, Jim Hightower Timeline Tags: Domestic Propaganda, 2004 Presidential Election Category Tags: Media

September 7, 2003: Rice Is ‘Absolutely’ Convinced There Was Link Between Al-Qaeda and Iraqi Government National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice says there is “absolutely” a connection between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda “[W]e know that there was training of al-Qaeda in chemical and perhaps biological warfare. We know that [Abu Musab] al-Zarqawi was networked out of there, this poisons network that was trying to spread poisons throughout…. And there was an Ansar al-Islam, which appears also to try to be operating in Iraq. So yes, the al-Qaeda link was there.” [FOX NEWS SUNDAY, 9/7/2003; GLOBAL VIEWS, 9/26/2003; US HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, 3/16/2004] Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Ansar al-Islam Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

September 10, 2003: SEC, Others Still Keep Mum About Insider Trading Investigations Slate reports that two years after the 9/11 attacks, neither the Chicago Board Options Exchange nor the Securities and Exchange Commission will make any comment about their investigations into insider trading before 9/11. “Neither has announced any conclusion. The SEC has not filed any complaint alleging illegal activity, nor has the Justice Department announced any investigation or prosecution.… So, unless the SEC decides to file a complaint—unlikely at this late stage—we may never know what they learned about terror trading.” [SLATE, 9/10/2003] Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, US Securities and Exchange Commission, Chicago Board Options Exchange Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge, Other 9/11 Investigations

September 10, 2003: Stowaway Flies From New York to Dallas, Highlighting Porous Airport Security A New York man is caught hiding in a crate that had been flown by cargo jet from New York to Dallas, raising questions about airport security. Charles McKinley wanted to go home, and had already had himself shipped as freight from Newark to Buffalo, then from Buffalo to Fort Wayne, Indiana, and on to Dallas, where his crate was shipped by truck to his mother’s house. The deliveryman reports McKinley to the local police. Critics say the McKinley incident is the latest in a string of episodes highlighting the vulnerability of the nation’s airports and cargo shipments. Representative Edward Markey (D-MA) tells a reporter: “Today, it was just a guy trying to fly cheaply from New York to Dallas to visit his parents. But in the future, a member of al-Qaeda could have himself packed into an air cargo container.” [CNN, 9/10/2003; CARTER, 2004, PP. 15] Entity Tags: Edward Markey, Charles McKinley Category Tags: Internal US Security After 9/11

September 11, 2003: CIA Report Says KSM Again Claims Moussaoui Not for 9/11, but Second Wave The CIA drafts a report containing statements reportedly made by alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) under interrogation at a black site. According to the report, KSM claims that Zacarias Moussaoui was not handled by al-Qaeda for the 9/11 attacks, but for a second wave of attacks. KSM also made this claim in an earlier interrogation (see July 2, 2003). The claim appears to be not entirely true, as in an intercepted conversation from July 2001, KSM and his associate Ramzi bin al-Shibh discussed possibly using Moussaoui for 9/11 (see July 20, 2001). The report apparently contains a mention of this call. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 246, 247, 530, 531] Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Zacarias Moussaoui, High Value Detainees

September 12, 2003: Bush Administration Is Sued for Supposedly Having Foreknowledge of 9/11 Attacks

Ellen Mariani. [Source: Ellen Mariani] 9/11 victim’s relative Ellen Mariani sues the US government, claiming that certain officials had foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks. “I’m 100 percent sure that they knew,” she says. In doing so, she is ineligible for government compensation from what she calls the “shut-up and go-away fund.” She believes she would have received around $500,000. According to a statement by her lawyer, her lawsuit against President Bush, Vice President Cheney, the CIA, Defense Department, and other administration members “is based upon prior knowledge of 9/11; knowingly failing to act, prevent or warn of 9/11; and the ongoing obstruction of justice by covering up the truth of 9/11; all in violation of the laws of the United States.” As the Toronto Star points out, this interesting story has been “buried” by the mainstream media, at least initially. Coverage has been limited mostly to Philadelphia where the case was filed and New Hampshire where Mariani lives. [PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, 9/23/2003; TORONTO STAR, 11/30/2003; PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, 12/3/2003; VILLAGE VOICE, 12/3/2003; AL JAZEERA, 12/9/2003; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/24/2003] Entity Tags: United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Ellen Mariani, George W. Bush, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, US Department of Defense Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Related Lawsuits, US Government and 9/11 Criticism

September 14, 2003: Cheney Insists Iraq Supported Al-Qaeda and WMDs Have Been Found in Iraq Vice President Dick Cheney appears on Meet the Press and tells host Tim Russert that Iraq’s support for al-Qaeda was “clearly official policy.” As evidence, he cites the alleged meeting between Mohamed Atta and Iraqi diplomat Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani (see April 8, 2001). Cheney also insists that the two trailers found in Baghdad (see April 19, 2003 and May 9, 2003) were mobile biological weapon factories, even though he was told by David Kay, the head of the Iraq Survey Group, that that was probably not the case (see July 29, 2003). [MEET THE PRESS, 9/14/2003; ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 313] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Iraq under US Occupation Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

September 14, 2003: Cheney Claims Atta’s Alleged Meeting in Prague Has Neither Been Confirmed nor Refuted Vice President Dick Cheney brings up the long discredited claim that Mohamed Atta had met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official in April of 2001. He says, “With respect to 9/11, of course, we’ve had the story… the Czechs alleged that Mohamed Atta, the lead attacker, met in Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official five months before the attack, but we’ve never been able to develop anymore of that yet, either in terms of confirming it or discrediting it.” [DEMOCRACY NOW!, 9/16/2003; WASHINGTON POST, 9/29/2003] But at the same time, he cites the meeting to support his contention that Iraq’s support for al-Qaeda was official government policy (see September 14, 2003). Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

September 14, 2003-September 17, 2003: Cheney Links Iraq to 9/11; Bush, Rumsfeld, and Rice All Disavow Cheney’s Claim Vice President Cheney says on NBC’s Meet the Press, “I think it’s not surprising that people make [the] connection” between Iraq and 9/11. He adds, “If we’re successful in Iraq… then we will have struck a major blow right at the heart of The Base, if you will, the geographic base of the terrorists who had us under assault now for many years, but most especially on 9/11.” [MEET THE PRESS, 9/14/2003] However, two days later, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld states that he hasn’t “seen any indication that would lead” him to believe there was an Iraq-9/11 link. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/16/2003] National Security Adviser Rice says the administration has never accused Hussein of directing the 9/11 attacks. [REUTERS, 9/16/2003] The next day, Bush also disavows the Cheney statement, stating, “We’ve had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September the 11th… [but] there’s no question that Saddam Hussein has al-Qaeda ties.” [CBS NEWS, 9/17/2003; WASHINGTON POST, 9/18/2003] Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

September 15, 2003 or Shortly After: Some 9/11 Commission Staffers ‘Furious’ at Executive Director Zelikow’s Contacts with Karl Rove A 9/11 Commission staffer notices a record of phone calls made to Philip Zelikow, the Commission’s executive director, on the desk of Zelikow’s secretary. Glancing at it, the staffer notices the name “Rove,” a reference to White House adviser Karl Rove, who recently called Zelikow (see September 4-15, 2003). Paging through the records, the staffer finds other references to calls made by Rove to Zelikow (see June 23-24, 2003), as well as calls from National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice to Zelikow. According to author Philip Shenon: “The next day, word of Zelikow’s contacts at the White House began to spread wildly through the Commission. For many of the staff, it was just what they had suspected: Zelikow was some kind of White House mole, feeding information back to the administration about the Commission’s findings. Now, they thought, they had proof of it.” Some of the staffers debate whether to make a formal protest to the Commission’s chairman and vice chairman, but decide against doing so, worrying about the scandal if the news ever leaked. Shenon will add: “They were furious with what Zelikow had done and how his conflicts had threatened the integrity of the investigation. But they knew how valuable this work was and how valuable their affiliation with the 9/11 Commission would be to their careers. They wanted its legacy to be untarnished.” Despite this, some of the 9/11 victims’ family members will learn of the contacts, as will a reporter (see September 16, 2003 or Shortly After). [SHENON, 2008, PP. 107, 172] Entity Tags: Philip Zelikow, 9/11 Commission Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow

September 17, 2003: Spain Charges Darkazanli, 34 Others with Involvement in 9/11 Plot

The 2007 PBS documentary “America at a Crossroads: The Brotherhood” will claim that Spanish investigators discovered this picture of Darkazanli holding a Kalishnikov rifle in Afghanistan. [Source: PBS] A Spanish judge issues an indictment against Mamoun Darkazanli and 34 others, alleging that they belonged to or supported the al-Qaeda cell in Madrid, which assisted the 9/11 hijackers in planning the attack. Darkazanli’s name appears 177 times in the 690-page indictment. He is accused of acting as bin Laden’s “financier in Europe.” “The list of those with whom Darkazanli has done business or otherwise exchanged money reads like a Who’s Who of al-Qaeda: Wadih El-Hage, bin Laden’s one-time personal secretary; [Tayyib al-Madani], the husband of bin Laden’s niece and, before 9/11, al-Qaeda’s chief financial officer; and Mustafa Setmariam Nasr, the head of a training camp for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan who journeyed to Hamburg to visit Darkazanli in 1996.” [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 10/5/2003] The CIA had been monitoring Darkazanli sometime before December 1999 and had tried to convince Germany to “turn” him into an al-Qaeda informant. However, the CIA refused Germany’s request to share information regarding Darkazanli’s terrorist ties in the spring of 2000 (see Spring 2000). [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 11/17/2002] Entity Tags: Tayyib al-Madani, Mustafa Setmariam Nasr, Mamoun Darkazanli, Wadih El-Hage, Spain Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Germany, Mamoun Darkazanli, Al-Qaeda in Spain

September 16, 2003 or Shortly After: 9/11 Commission Executive Director Zelikow Reportedly Understates Amount of Contacts with Rove in Interview with Reporter 9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow is interviewed by New York Times reporter Philip Shenon about contacts between Zelikow and White House adviser Karl Rove. According to Shenon, “Zelikow said that there had been only one exchange of phone calls with Rove months earlier and that they involved questions involving his old job at the Miller Center at the University of Virginia” (see June 23-24, 2003). However, there has recently been another exchange of calls (see September 4-15, 2003) and this is the source of some controversy on the Commission, so it is unclear how Zelikow could have failed to mention it (see September 15, 2003 or Shortly After). Shenon writes a “modest article” about the issue for the Times, but it will not be published due to a number of other, seemingly more important, stories. Shenon will later speculate that there were more than just two exchanges of calls between Rove and Zelikow, pointing out that, although records of some calls into the Commission were kept, outgoing calls were not logged in any way: “The General Services Administration, which maintains some of the telephone records from the 9/11 Commission, would not release records showing the specific telephone numbers called by Zelikow on his cell phone. But the records do show frequent calls to phone numbers in area code 202, which is Washington, that begin with the prefix 456-. That prefix is exclusive to phone numbers at the White House.” However, Shenon will also point out that “many if not most of the calls were almost certainly routine.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 172-174] Entity Tags: Philip Zelikow, Philip Shenon, 9/11 Commission Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow

September 16, 2003 or Shortly After: 9/11 Commission Executive Director Zelikow Tells Secretary Not to Log His Calls, Following Controversy over Contacts with Rove Philip Zelikow, executive director of the 9/11 Commission, tells his secretary Karen Heitkotter not to keeps records of his calls. Although there is no formal process for logging calls, Heitkotter has been keeping records of them for Zelikow in a notebook she purchased herself. However, Commission staffers recently learned of contacts between Zelikow and White House adviser Karl Rove, leading to bad feeling on the Commission (see September 4-15, 2003 and September 15, 2003 or Shortly After). Zelikow calls Heitkotter into his office and gives her the order without explaining why. According to Heitkotter, Zelikow is “insistent,” but she is worried about doing something improper so she asks a lawyer friend on the Commission what she should do. The friend tells her to contact someone in authority, to protect herself in case the information ever becomes public. She chooses Dan Marcus, the Commission’s counsel and a Democrat, telling him Zelikow has “asked me to stop keeping records—phone logs—for his contacts with the White House.” Marcus tells her not to obey Zelikow’s instruction and to continue to log the calls, although he does not raise the matter with Zelikow, the Commission’s Chairman Tom Kean, or Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton. Marcus will later say that Zelikow’s order “looks bad—it certainly doesn’t look good.” Asked about the matter later, Zelikow will simply deny that the Commission kept formal phone logs: “I think this is recycled, garbled office gossip. I don’t think my office kept phone logs.” [ZELIKOW AND SHENON, 2007 ; SHENON, 2008, PP. 171-172; DEMOCRACY NOW!, 2/7/2008] Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Daniel Marcus, Karen Heitkotter, Philip Zelikow Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow

September 18, 2003: Questions of ISI Leader’s Ties to 9/11 Resurface A Wall Street Journal review of Bernard-Henri Levy’s book “Who Killed Daniel Pearl?” notes, “It is a fact that Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, then head of the ISI, wired $100,000 to Mohamed Atta before 9/11 through an intermediary. (This was reported in the Journal on Oct. 10, 2001.) So what have we done about it?” The article notes that few are willing to look into this issue or take action against Pakistan since Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is considered a close ally and cooperative in the fight against terrorism. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 9/18/2003] Other reviews of the book raise similar points, and even the conservative columnist George Will notes in the Washington Post, “It is not fantasy that there have been many reports that the then-head of Pakistani intelligence was responsible for $100,000 being wired to Mohamed Atta, the lead 9/11 hijacker.” [WASHINGTON POST, 10/5/2003] Entity Tags: Daniel Pearl, Pervez Musharraf, Mohamed Atta, Mahmood Ahmed Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Mahmood Ahmed

September 19, 2003: FBI Finds No Proof of 9/11 Insider Trading Spokesperson Paul Bresson announces that the FBI has concluded that there was no insider trading in US securities markets by people with advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks. According to Bresson, the “vast majority” of a pre-attack surge of trading in options that bet on a drop in the stock of AMR Corp., which owns American Airlines, and UAL Corp., which owns United Airlines, was conducted by investment hedge funds implementing bearish investment strategies or hedging a line position of common stock, and was not linked to terrorists. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/18/2003 ; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/19/2003; WASHINGTON POST, 9/19/2003] Independent research will indicate otherwise a few months later. Entity Tags: United Airlines, Paul Bresson, Federal Bureau of Investigation, American Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge, FBI 9/11 Investigation

September 21, 2003: Associated Press Reports Details from KSM Interrogations An Associated Press (AP) report provides details of what alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) has apparently told his CIA interrogators. The article, based on “interrogation reports” reviewed by the AP, makes the following claims: KSM worked on the Bojinka plot in 1994 and 1995 in the Philippines with Ramzi Yousef, Abdul Hakim Murad, and Wali Khan Amin Shah; After Yousef and Murad were captured (see January 6, 1995 and February 7, 1995), KSM began to devise a new plot that focused on hijackings on US soil; KSM first pitched the 9/11 plot to Osama bin Laden in 1996. He wanted bin Laden “to give him money and operatives so he could hijack 10 planes in the United States and fly them into targets”; After bin Laden agreed in principle, the original plan, which called for hijacking five commercial jets on each US coast, was modified several times. Some versions even had the planes being blown up in mid-air, possibly with the aid of shoe bombs. Bin Laden scrapped various parts of the plan, including attacks on both coasts and hijacking or bombing some planes in East Asia as well; The original four al-Qaeda operatives bin Laden offered KSM for the plot were eventual hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, as well as Khallad bin Attash and Abu Bara al-Yemeni. “All four operatives only knew that they had volunteered for a martyrdom operation involving planes,” one interrogation report apparently states; The first major change to the plans occurred in 1999 when the two Yemeni operatives could not get US visas (see April 3, 1999). [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/21/2003] (According to the 9/11 Commission Report, KSM actually says Abu Bara al-Yemeni never applied for a US visa); [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 492] Bin Laden then offered KSM additional operatives, including a member of his personal security detail; At that time the plot was to hijack a small number of planes in the United States and East Asia and either have them explode or crash into targets simultaneously; In 1999, the four original operatives picked for the plot traveled to Afghanistan to train at one of bin Laden’s camps, where they received specialized commando training (see Late 1999); Al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit (see January 5-8, 2000) was, according to the report, a “key event in the plot,” although it does not say whether KSM was physically present. On the other hand, it confirms the presence of Jemaah Islamiyah leader Hambali; KSM communicated with Alhazmi and Almihdhar while they were in the US using Internet chat software; KSM has never heard of Omar al-Bayoumi, an apparent Saudi intelligence agent who provided some assistance to future 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi when they arrived in California. Neither did he arrange for anyone else in the US to assist Almihdhar and Alhazmi when they arrived in California. Despite this, Almihdhar and Alhazmi soon made contact with a network of people linked to Saudi intelligence services (see January 15-February 2000 and June 23-July 2001); Bin Laden canceled the East Asian portion of the attacks in the spring of 2000, because, according to a quote from KSM contained in a report, “it would be too difficult to synchronize” attacks in the United States and Asia; Around that time, KSM reached out to Jemaah Islamiyah, an al-Qaeda affiliate in Southeast Asia. He began “recruiting JI operatives for inclusion in the hijacking plot as part of his second wave of hijacking attacks to occur after Sept. 11,” one summary reportedly says; Zacarias Moussaoui also went to Malaysia in the run-up to 9/11 (see September-October 2000); In its final stages, the plan called for as many as 22 terrorists and four planes in a first wave, followed by a second wave of suicide hijackings that were to be aided possibly by al-Qaeda allies in Southeast Asia; The hijacking teams were originally made up of members from different countries where al-Qaeda had recruited, but in the final stages bin Laden chose instead to use a large group of young Saudi men to populate the hijacking teams; KSM told interrogators about other terror plots that were in various stages of planning or had been temporarily disrupted when he was captured, including one planned for Singapore (see June 2001 and November 15-Late December 2001); KSM and al-Qaeda were still actively looking to strike US, Western, and Israeli targets across the world as of this year. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/21/2003] These statements attributed to KSM are similar to later statements attributed to him by the 9/11 Commission Report. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004] The Associated Press article cautions that US authorities are still investigating what KSM is telling them, “to eliminate deliberate misinformation.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/21/2003] KSM made some or all these statements under torture, leading some to question their reliability (see Shortly After March 1, 2003, After March 7, 2003, June 16, 2004, and August 6, 2007). Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, High Value Detainees

September 23, 2003: 9/11 Commission Plays down Extent of Minders’ Effect on Witnesses Asked about the intimidation of 9/11 Commission witnesses by government “minders,” the Commission’s chairman, Tom Kean, downplays the effect minders are having. Although he had previously complained about intimidation (see July 7, 2003), now he says: “Talking to staff, what they have told me is that as they’ve done these interviews, that the interviewees are encouragingly frank; that they by and large have not seemed to be intimidated in any way in their answers.… I’m glad to hear that it’s—from the staff that they don’t feel it’s inhibiting the process of the interviews.” The Commission’s Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton comments, “it is our feeling that thus far, the minders have not been an impediment, in almost all cases.” He adds that there were “one or two instances where the question has arisen,” but “neither are we aware at this point that the presence of a minder has substantially impeded our inquiry. And nor have we run into a situation where we think a witness has refrained from speaking their minds.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 9/23/2003 ] Kean’s comments about the staff’s feelings are untrue. Nine days later, one of the Commission’s team leaders and two other staffers will send an internal memo entitled “Executive Branch Minders’ Intimidation of Witnesses” (see October 2, 2003). Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Lee Hamilton, Thomas Kean Category Tags: 9/11 Commission

September 25, 2003: ’Envoy’ of Bin Laden’s Brother-in-Law Arrested in Philippines Then Deported

Mahmoud Afif Abdeljalil. [Source: Joel Nito / Agence France-Presse] An “envoy” of bin Laden’s brother-in-law is accused of running al-Qaeda front companies in the Philippines and is deported. Mahmoud Afif Abdeljalil, a Jordanian, was arrested in the Philippines in early 1995 and accused of supporting the Bojinka plot, but then was let go (see January 6, 1995 and April 1, 1995-Early 1996). He is arrested in the Philippines again on this day while attempting to sell some properties owned by Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, bin Laden’s brother-in-law. [CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA, 12/1/2002; TIME, 10/27/2003] Philippine officials call him a suspected al-Qaeda operative who had been in close contact with militants from the Abu Sayyaf and other groups. He is called an “envoy” or “point man” for Khalifa, and reputedly took over some of Khalifa’s business front companies after Khalifa left the country in 1994 (see December 1, 1994). His house was used as a safe-house and meeting place for al-Qaeda operatives. [AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 10/23/2003; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/23/2003] However, despite all these serious allegations, Abdeljalil is deported back to Jordan in early 2004. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 3/1/2004] Entity Tags: Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Abu Sayyaf, Mahmoud Afif Abdeljalil, Al-Qaeda Category Tags: 1995 Bojinka Plot, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Philippine Militant Collusion, Key Captures and Deaths, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia

September 28, 2003: Condoleezza Rice Links Iraq to Al-Qaeda Again Appearing on Meet the Press, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice presumes to link Hussein to Osama bin Laden. “Saddam Hussein—no one has said that there is evidence that Saddam Hussein directed or controlled 9/11, but let’s be very clear, he had ties to al-Qaeda, he had al-Qaeda operatives who had operated out of Baghdad.” [MSNBC, 9/28/2003; US HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, 3/16/2004] Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

September 28, 2003: Al-Zawahiri Apparently Calls for Overthrow of Pakistani President Musharraf A man thought to be al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri calls for the overthrow of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in an audio cassette made public on this day. The man calls on Pakistanis to “unite and cooperate to topple this traitor and install a sincere leadership that would defend Islam and Muslims.” [RASHID, 2008, PP. 230, 436] There will be two apparently al-Qaeda-linked assassination attempts against Musharraf in December 2003 (see December 14 and 25, 2003). Entity Tags: Ayman al-Zawahiri, Pervez Musharraf Category Tags: Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Pakistan and the ISI, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

September 30, 2003: Would-Be Suicide Bomber Sentenced to Ten Years in Prison Al-Qaeda operative Nizar Trabelsi is sentenced to ten years in jail in Belgium for his part in a plot to attack the NATO base in Kleine Brogel in the country’s north-east. A couple of hundred US troops were stationed at the base, which was also home to nuclear weapons. The plan was for Trabelsi to pack a van with as much explosive as it could carry, and drive it into the base canteen at lunchtime. Trabelsi admits his participation in the attack and boasts he was to be the first suicide bomber in Europe, but he refuses to give any details about other plots he is alleged to have been involved in, such as a planned bombing of the US embassy in Paris, France. [O'NEILL AND MCGRORY, 2006, PP. 227] Entity Tags: Nizar Trabelsi Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11