A Review of the FBI's Handling:Chapter Six

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RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS Our review found many deficiencies in the FBI’s handling of intelligence information related to the September 11 attacks. In addition to individual failures, which we detail at the end of each chapter, we found significant systemic problems that undermined the FBI’s Counterterrorism Program. For example, before the September 11 attacks the FBI lacked an effective analytical program, failed to use the FISA statute fully, and was inadequately organized to disseminate timely and sufficient information within the Intelligence Community. As we detailed in this report, these systemic problems significantly affected the FBI’s handling of the Phoenix Electronic Communication (EC), the Moussaoui investigation, and the pursuit of intelligence information relating to Hazmi and Mihdhar, two of the September 11 terrorists. Since September 11, 2001, the FBI has taken numerous steps to reorganize and strengthen its Counterterrorism Program. In this report, we have not analyzed each of these changes, many of which are substantial, ongoing, and evolving. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), as well as other OIG and GAO reviews, is assessing the impact of the changes in the FBI since September 11, 2001. In this chapter, we make broad systemic recommendations to address the specific problems examined in our review that we believe the FBI must address as it continues to change its Counterterrorism Program. Our recommendations flow from the analysis of the deficiencies that we found in the way the FBI handled information related to the September 11 attacks.275 275 Attached in the Appendix is the FBI’s response to this report and our recommendations. 364 I. Recommendations A. Recommendations related to the FBI’s analytical program Recommendation No. 1: Improve the hiring, training, and retention of intelligence analysts. As discussed in Chapter Two, the FBI acknowledged shortly after the September 11 attacks that its analytical program was inadequate and in need of improvement. Since then the FBI has made important changes to attempt to address this deficiency. For example, the FBI has established the Office of Intelligence with separate management and career tracks for analysts. In addition, the FBI has created an analytical branch in the Counterterrorism Division and has established the College of Analytical Studies at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, with a 6-week training program for all analysts. In addition to these important changes, the FBI must ensure that it hires, trains, and retains a sufficient number of skilled analysts. Hiring sufficient numbers of qualified analysts is a challenging task. As part of this effort, training for analysts must be improved. For example, we found that training for analysts prior to September 11 was infrequent and often did not occur until months after they began working in their analyst positions. While training for analysts has improved since September 11, the FBI needs to ensure that it provides comprehensive and timely training for all its analysts.276 To retain analysts, the FBI must ensure that it creates an attractive career path for analysts, with sufficient benefits and stature within the FBI. Analysts should have the opportunity to receive promotions to senior positions, such as assistant directors or deputy assistant directors, rather than being supervised solely by special agents who have risen to management positions within the FBI. Prior to September 11, 2001, the FBI did not sufficiently value or support the critical work of its analysts. The FBI must ensure that it elevates the importance of analysts and their work within the FBI. 276 The OIG is currently conducting an audit examining the FBI’s efforts to hire and train intelligence analysts. 365 Recommendation No. 2: Ensure effective management of analysts. Our review revealed problems in the management of analysts within the FBI, particularly the Intelligence Operations Specialists (IOSs) in the International Terrorism Operations Section (ITOS) at FBI Headquarters. Our review revealed that supervisory special agents in FBI Headquarters failed to provide consistent oversight and supervision of these analysts. Part of the problem was that the analysts were long-time FBI Headquarters employees with substantive expertise in terrorism matters, while their supervisors were agents who often lacked analytical expertise and rotated through FBI Headquarters on short assignments. Moreover, prior to September 11, 2001, ITOS worked in crisis mode, with insufficient resources to respond its many tasks. Consequently, overwhelmed analysts had to respond to the emergency of the moment. They did not have sufficient time to conduct comprehensive, proactive analysis to assess the significance or the relationship of disparate pieces of intelligence information. Supervisors also allowed the analysts to make critical decisions independently, without requiring any supervisory consultation even on significant matters. The FBI must ensure effective management of analysts. It must identify the priorities for analysts and ensure that their workload is reasonable enough for them to adequately perform the tasks assigned to them. The FBI should more clearly define supervisors’ responsibilities in managing its analytical programs. On important decisions, including determination of the priority to assign analytical requests, analysts should be required to consult their supervisors. In addition, analysts should not be able to close leads by simply reassigning them, which also occurred with regard to the Phoenix EC. We also believe that the analysts’ supervisors must have greater experience and broader knowledge of the activities under their area of supervision. Moving supervisors rapidly through critical units dealing with counterterrorism undermines the management of the program and the FBI’s critical need for continuity and expertise in these important units. Supervisory positions that oversee analysts should be filled by experienced and permanent personnel, not analysts in acting capacities or agents who rotate through the units for short periods of time. 366 Recommendation No. 3: Require greater coordination and consultation between the operational and analytical units. Various FBI analysts and managers told us that, in the past, operational managers in the FBI frequently overruled the conclusions of analytical work products. Before information could be disseminated to the field, ECs containing the analytical information had to be approved by the operational unit with responsibility for the area. The witnesses stated that the job of operational personnel is to verify that the facts cited by analysts are correct, but that the expertise and judgment of analysts normally should be relied upon in deciding the conclusions to be drawn from those facts. We agree that operational personnel generally should not alter or veto the conclusions of an analyst in an analytical product. At the same time, analytical products need the input and expertise of operational personnel. The FBI therefore should take steps to institutionalize the operational components’ involvement in developing and reviewing analytical products and set up a process for ensuring that these products reflect the consensus of the FBI’s analytical and operational components. Because the FBI combines intelligence and law enforcement components, disputes inevitably will arise between the operational unit and the analytical unit over, among other things, whether certain information should be distributed to the field or should appear in a briefing document because of concerns that it could jeopardize a pending investigation or prosecution. We believe that the FBI should establish a more defined and efficient process for handling these types of conflicts. The process should involve discussions between the disagreeing components and the input of the FBI’s Office of General Counsel in appropriate circumstances, with a decision resting with upper-level FBI management. B. Recommendations related to the FISA process Recommendation No. 4: Ensure adequate training of FBI employees involved in the FISA process and counterterrorism matters. We found that many FBI employees who were assigned to counterterrorism work – whether analysts, special agents in field offices, or FBI Headquarters supervisory special agents – received little formal training 367 about counterterrorism matters in general or FISA in particular. Even in complicated matters, such as the intricacies of terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda, these FBI employees primarily received on-the-job training. We found, in particular, that FBI employees’ knowledge about FISA was limited and uneven. FBI Headquarters employees we interviewed generally were not even familiar with the 1995 Procedures. Although they were knowledgeable about basic steps required for obtaining a FISA warrant, they were not well versed in the requirements of the FISA statute, particularly when the facts of the case did not fit within a standard pattern. We also found that special agents in FBI field offices were not well informed about the FISA process, such as the steps needed to finalize a FISA request, or the types of information needed to meet the requirements for a FISA warrant. After the September 11 attacks, the 1995 Procedures and other restrictions regarding FISA and the dissemination of intelligence information have dramatically changed. By many accounts, the FBI and the Office of Intelligence and Policy Review (OIPR) are now much more aggressive in their approach to obtaining FISA warrants than before September 11. In addition, we were informed that in the spring and summer of 2003, many FISA training sessions were provided for FBI and OIPR employees, as well as employees from other Department of Justice components and intelligence agencies working on counterterrorism matters. This type of training, in our view, should be expanded and provided regularly. In addition, the FBI must ensure that its employees understand the requirements for opening intelligence and criminal investigations that relate to counterterrorism and the tools available to them to conduct these investigations. This training should include detailed information on FISA and how it can be used, even when the case does not fit a standard fact pattern. FBI agents also should receive training about the restrictions on the use of information acquired in intelligence investigations. Formal training should be provided at all levels in FBI Headquarters and for all field office employees who are involved with counterterrorism investigations, including the Chief Division Counsels (CDC) in the field. Widespread and continual training on FISA and other counterterrorism issues is especially important given the increase in the number of FBI employees who, since September 11, 2001, have been reassigned to counterterrorism matters from other programs. 368 Recommendation No. 5: FBI attorneys should be better integrated into counterterrorism investigations. Our review found that the FBI lacked an effective system for ensuring that FBI lawyers were sufficiently integrated into the FISA process or other legal issues arising in counterterrorism investigations. For example, the FBI Headquarters supervisor most involved with the Moussaoui case had to consult with four different National Security Law Unit (NSLU) attorneys about the Moussaoui FISA request because FISA requests were not assigned to a single NSLU attorney who was responsible for seeing it through the process. In addition, none of the NSLU attorneys consulted with anyone from OIPR about the Moussaoui FISA request, despite its unusual nature, partly because one NSLU attorney never was completely responsible for the matter. We believe that one NSLU attorney normally should be assigned to handle a particular FISA request or other legal matter arising in a counterterrorism investigation. This would ensure that an NSLU attorney is familiar with the facts and legal issues from beginning to end of the case, and it would give the attorney greater responsibility for a particular matter. In addition, we believe that NSLU attorneys should have more contact with field agents in important cases. None of the NSLU attorneys in the Moussaoui case spoke with the field agents, or even were provided the underlying documents drafted by the field agents. On the other hand, we found that the Minneapolis field agents in the Moussaoui case did not consult fully with their CDC about what was needed to support their FISA request, despite their frustration and disagreement with the advice they received from FBI Headquarters. Field agents should be encouraged to consult with CDCs about FISA requests or other legal issues that arise out of counterterrorism investigations. CDCs also should be more involved in the FISA process and better trained to be in a position to provide useful guidance to field agents and represent the field office on a particular FISA request. Recommendation No. 6: Ensure closer consultation between the FBI and OIPR, particularly on important or unusual cases. In the Moussaoui case, the FBI never consulted OIPR about the possibility of obtaining a FISA warrant, despite the strong disagreements about 369 the case between FBI Headquarters and the field office. The chief of the NSLU told us that he had never seen a supervisory special agent in Headquarters so adamant that a FISA warrant could not be obtained and at the same time a field office so adamant that it could. We believe that in unusual cases, like in the Moussaoui case where the evidence did not fit a standard fact pattern for FISA and strong disagreement existed within the FBI about the strength of the evidence, FBI lawyers should consult with OIPR about the issues involved in the case. OIPR is responsible for implementing FISA and is the Department’s expert on the requirements of the statute, and the FBI should discuss with it the important and contentious issues involved in such a FISA request. Since the September 11 attacks, much has changed about the requirements and use of FISA, including the legal framework and the way the Department uses the statute. We also understand that OIPR and the FBI now consult more closely on the use of FISAs in particular cases, as well as on the requirements of the statute. We recommend that this closer consultation be enhanced and promoted, and that the FBI be encouraged to seek assistance and advice from OIPR at early stages of investigations involving the use of FISA. C. Recommendations related to the FBI’s interactions with the Intelligence Community Recommendation No. 7: Ensure effective management of FBI detailees. Our review found that the FBI detailees to the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC) lacked defined responsibilities. The detailees told us they were not given specific instructions about their responsibilities and each detailee defined the job individually. As a result, they, as well as the FBI and the CIA, had significant misperceptions and inconsistent expectations about their roles. For example, the detailees did not believe they were to act as “backstops” to ensure that CIA information was passed to the FBI, and they did not scour CIA cable traffic for this purpose. Yet CIA employees believed that at least one of the FBI detailees had been assigned to the CTC specifically for this purpose. The FBI and the CIA did not have any memoranda of understanding describing the detailees’ functions. Moreover, the detailees were not even evaluated based upon what they did at the CTC. Instead, their performance 370 appraisals were based on what they did as FBI employees, not as detailees to the CTC. The FBI needs to formally describe the roles and responsibilities of detailees and communicate this to the detailees and to the CIA. To avoid misunderstandings and ensure continuity in the program, the FBI should document these responsibilities in a formal memorandum of understanding with the CIA. In addition, the performance work plan of each detailee should be revised to reflect the critical elements of the job being performed by the detailee at the CIA, and someone who oversees their daily work should evaluate them. Recommendation No. 8: Ensure FBI employees who interact with other intelligence agencies better understand their reporting processes. As we discussed in Chapter Five of this report on the Hazmi and Mihdhar matter, FBI employees we interviewed did not fully understand the CIA’s system for reporting intelligence information. For example, the FBI’s Assistant Legal Attaché (ALAT) who dealt with the source mistakenly believed that the CIA’s TDs he received contained all source reporting that was available from the CIA. In fact, other operational cables contained significant CIA information about the source, including that the source had identified Mihdhar in the Malaysian meeting photographs. We found that other experienced FBI agents who interacted frequently with the CIA also were unaware of CIA procedures and important ways to obtain additional intelligence information from the CIA. We believe that FBI employees who interact with the CIA should be more familiar with CIA and other intelligence agencies’ processes for reporting intelligence information. Even if FBI employees do not have full access to the reports of other intelligence agencies or the systems from which these intelligence reports are produced, the FBI employees should be aware of the processes and reporting by other intelligence agencies to avoid the misunderstandings that occurred in the Mihdhar matter. Recommendation No. 9: Provide guidance for how and when to document intelligence information received from informal briefings by other intelligence agencies. 371 The FBI lacked clear policies and procedures for how and when to document intelligence information received from the CIA, particularly intelligence communicated in an informal manner. For example, FBI employees received verbal briefings on Mihdhar from CIA employees in the FBI’s Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC) around the time of the Millennium threat. One of the reasons the SIOC was activated during this period was to obtain and coordinate the response to threat information from various sources. Yet, the information the FBI received about Mihdhar in the SIOC was never documented in a way that was accessible to other FBI employees. We are not suggesting that every informal communication from the CIA to the FBI must be documented. However, the FBI should establish better guidance for its employees as to how and when such information from such informal briefings should be documented. Recommendation No. 10: Ensure that the FBI’s information technology systems allow FBI employees to more readily receive, use, and disseminate highly classified information. The FBI has acknowledged for several years that its information technology systems are not adequate. The FBI is in the process of implementing widespread changes to its systems, and the upgrading of its information technology systems is one of the highest priorities of the FBI. The OIG and others have monitored and reported extensively on the progress of the upgrade to the FBI’s systems, particularly the FBI’s Trilogy project.277 In this review, we found many examples of how the FBI’s poor information technology systems hindered the handling and use of intelligence information. For example, most of the persons listed on the attention line of the Phoenix EC never saw it. Unless a lead is “set” for a specific person in the 277 The Trilogy project is the largest FBI information technology project, and has been recognized as essential to upgrading the FBI’s archaic and inadequate computer systems. Trilogy’s three main components involve upgrading the FBI’s hardware and software; upgrading the FBI’s communications networks; and upgrading the FBI’s most important investigative applications, including its Automated Case Support (ACS) system and the introduction of the Virtual Case File system. 372 FBI’s ACS system, the system does not notify the person that a document is addressed to them. While it was possible for the addressees to access the document in ACS by searching for documents containing their names, the system was so cumbersome that FBI employees usually did not do this. As the FBI moves forward in upgrading its information technology systems, it must ensure that it is able to disseminate electronically throughout the FBI intelligence information, regardless of the classification level. Agents and analysts at FBI Headquarters and in the field should be able to access intelligence information readily to enable them to adequately perform their jobs. They should also be able to communicate electronically with their counterparts at other intelligence agencies. The FBI’s upgrade of information technology must take into account the needs for access and use of highly classified information. Recommendation No. 11: Ensure appropriate physical infrastructure in FBI field offices to handle highly classified information. In our review, we found that the FBI’s field offices generally lacked the necessary physical infrastructure to readily use highly classified intelligence information from the CIA and NSA. For example, the workspaces in the FBI’s New York and San Diego Field Offices did not permit FBI personnel to handle SCI information at their desks. In addition, the FBI’s sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs) in those offices were not large enough or adequate enough to permit agents to regularly access or handle highly classified information. In addition, many field agents did not have sufficient access to secure telephones. For example, in the New York Field Office, the office most responsible for counterterrorism investigations before the September 11 attacks, an entire squad with as many as 25 individuals shared one secure phone. In order to successfully carry out its counterterrorism functions, the FBI must provide its personnel with adequate infrastructure to handle highly classified information. Recommendation No. 12: Improve dissemination of threat information. Prior to September 11, 2001, the FBI provided little guidance to its employees about what information constituted a “threat” and what threat information should be disseminated in the FBI, to the Intelligence Community, 373 or more widely. FBI employees told us that it was left to the judgment of the supervisory special agent or analyst in FBI Headquarters to decide what constituted threat information and what should be disseminated. For example, in the Moussaoui case the Minneapolis special agent drafted a detailed memorandum providing the facts of the Moussaoui case and an assessment of the threat the agent believed Moussaoui posed, including that his actions were “consistent with facilitating the violent takeover of a commercial aircraft.” One of the purposes of the memorandum was to ensure that other agencies, such as the Federal Aviation Administration, were made aware of concerns about Moussaoui. However, the FBI Headquarters supervisory special agent who prepared a teletype to the Intelligence Community about Moussaoui did not include any assessment of whether he posed a threat, and the teletype omitted significant facts about the Moussaoui case. The teletype was not distributed to all FBI field offices or even to all Intelligence Community agencies. We recognize that threat assessments require judgments, and not every piece of information suggesting some kind of harm should be disseminated throughout the FBI and the Intelligence Community. By necessity, FBI employees must exercise discretion in evaluating potential threat information. However, we believe the FBI should issue clear guidance for evaluating what type of threat information should be disseminated, within and outside the FBI, and how it should be disseminated. D. Other recommendations Recommendation No. 13: Evaluate the effectiveness of the rapid rotation of supervisory special agents through the FBI Headquarters’ Counterterrorism Program. Many FBI supervisory special agents rotate through important FBI Headquarters supervisory positions for a short time, often two years or less. Because of the rapid turnover, the supervisory positions can remain unfilled for months at a time. We believe this turnover of managers in the FBI Counterterrorism Program can harm the operation and management of the program. For example, we found that analysts, often long-time FBI Headquarters employees, were more knowledgeable than their supervisors about the operation of the unit and the substantive subject matter. Brief stints at FBI Headquarters can make it difficult for managers to become fully 374 conversant with the subject matter and procedures in the Counterterrorism Program at FBI Headquarters before they are sent to a new assignment. Part of the job of a manager is to understand the context with respect to a particular terrorist organization or part of the world, and to use this knowledge when advising field offices about their various investigations. The rotation of special agents through supervisory positions in FBI Headquarters is so frequent and rapid that managers often do not have the time, ability, or incentive to acquire the expert knowledge related to their functions. As a result, we believe the FBI should evaluate the effectiveness of rotating supervisory special agents and unit chiefs so rapidly through FBI Headquarters. Recommendation No. 14: Provide guidance on the type of information that agents should obtain for evaluating assets and for documenting the yearly check on assets. In assessing the FBI’s handling of an asset in San Diego with whom Hazmi and Mihdhar lived in 2000, we determined that the FBI control agent who handled the asset did not inquire about the individuals who the asset said was living with him. The asset told the control agent that two young men who recently came to the United States had moved in with him as boarders but the FBI agent did not obtain any additional information about the boarders, other than their first names. Had the control agent pursued information about the asset’s boarders, he might have learned about the CIA information regarding Hazmi and Mihdhar and documented their presence in the United States. We found little FBI guidance about what information the control agent should have obtained from an asset in circumstances such as this. We also found no consensus among the FBI agents we interviewed as to whether they would have requested additional information from an asset in these circumstances. The FBI’s policy at the time was that the FBI agent was required to “continually address” the asset’s “bona fides” and provide a yearly evaluation report to FBI Headquarters. However, the policy did not specify how to assess the bona fides of the asset or what information should be contained in the yearly evaluation. The control agent’s report on the San Diego asset used the same boilerplate language each year, with no substantive information provided about the asset or the checks done on the asset. 375 We believe the FBI should evaluate its policies regarding evaluation of assets and determine if agents are collecting and documenting sufficient information about its assets. For example, the FBI should consider the circumstances when FBI employees should seek information about persons living with or otherwise closely associating with an FBI asset. In addition, the FBI should consider detailing the minimum information an asset file must contain to verify that an adequate background check has been conducted. This information is necessary to allow the FBI to determine whether the control agent is continuing to assess each informational asset’s credibility, as required. Moreover, information from an asset is only accessible and useful if documented. The FBI should evaluate its asset policies and consider what information it should require control agents to obtain and document about assets. Recommendation No. 15: Improve the flow of intelligence information within the FBI and the dissemination of intelligence information to other intelligence agencies. Prior to the September 11 attacks, sharing of intelligence information within and outside the FBI was piecemeal and ad hoc rather than systematic. The FBI’s normal process for disseminating intelligence information was to route it primarily to analysts, who then used their judgment and experience to decide what needed to be disseminated further, and to whom. However, the analysts were overwhelmed and had to address crises and emergencies as they arose, with little time to conduct systemic evaluations or carefully consider what information should be provided throughout the FBI. As a result, information that did not demand immediate attention, such as the Phoenix EC, was not addressed thoroughly or timely. Moreover, the FBI lacked clear priorities or requirements for the dissemination of information once it was collected. There was little guidance regarding the types of information that had to be disseminated or included in reports to other intelligence agencies. In addition, FBI procedures for disseminating intelligence information were cumbersome, requiring many levels of review just to distribute information, even within the FBI. 376 Since September 11, the FBI has made significant changes as to how intelligence is routed and shared, both within and outside the FBI, and we have not examined in detail each of these changes.278 But the FBI’s evolution is a difficult and ongoing process. We believe that, as part of this process, the FBI should continue to examine its policies to ensure that it has clear guidance for its employees to identify what kind of intelligence information must be shared and how it must be shared, both within and outside the FBI. Recommendation No. 16: Ensure that field offices allocate resources consistent with FBI priorities. In 1998, the FBI elevated counterterrorism to a top agency priority. However, the FBI failed to ensure that resources in field offices were redirected to counterterrorism to reflect this change in priority. For example, in our review of the Hazmi and Mihdhar matter, we found that the San Diego Field Office did not shift its resources in response to changed priorities. As a result, the San Diego Field Office focused little attention on counterterrorism in general and al Qaeda in particular. The relatively low priority the San Diego FBI gave to the Counterterrorism Program was not atypical of FBI field offices before September 11. After September 11, the FBI refocused its traditional crime-fighting orientation and placed its highest priority on terrorism prevention, dramatically shifting resources to the Counterterrorism Program. We believe the FBI must ensure that it systematically evaluates the allocation of resources by field offices to ensure that each field office directs its resources in accord with the FBI’s priorities.279 II. Conclusions Our review found significant deficiencies in the FBI’s handling of intelligence information relating to the September 11 attacks. Shortly after the 278 For example, see the OIG report entitled “The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to Improve the Sharing of Intelligence and Other Information” (December 2003). 279 For an evaluation of the changes that the FBI has made in the allocation of its investigation resources, see the OIG report entitled “Federal Bureau of Investigation Casework and Human Resource Allocation” (September 2003). 377 attacks, the FBI indicated that it did not have any information warning of the attacks. However, information was soon discovered that had been in the possession of the FBI and the Intelligence Community before September 11 that related to the hijacking of airplanes by extremists or that involved the terrorists who committed the September 11 attacks. At the request of the FBI Director, we examined what the FBI knew before September 11 that was potentially related to the terrorist attacks. We focused on the FBI’s handling of the Phoenix EC, the Moussaoui case, and the information about Hazmi and Mihdhar, two of the September 11 terrorists. Our review found that the FBI had failed to fully evaluate, investigate, exploit, and disseminate information related to the Phoenix EC, the Moussaoui case, and the Hazmi and Mihdhar matter. The causes for these failures were widespread and varied, ranging from poor individual performance to more substantial systemic deficiencies that undermined the FBI’s efforts to detect and prevent terrorism. By describing the action and inaction of individual FBI employees in this report, particularly the lower-level employees whose conduct we discuss in detail, we do not suggest that they committed intentional misconduct. Nor do we think that they are responsible individually for the FBI’s deficiencies in handling the information related to the September 11 attacks. We believe it would be unfair to blame these individuals, who often worked with insufficient resources and with overwhelming impediments. Many pursued their duties in good faith, making difficult judgments about where to focus their efforts. Some performed aggressively and well. Others did not do all they could have and should have to respond to the information they received. While the FBI should examine the performance of the individuals who we describe in this report, we do not believe they are personally responsible for not preventing the attacks or should be blamed for the tragedy that occurred. Rather, we believe that widespread and long-standing deficiencies in the FBI’s operations and Counterterrorism Program caused the problems we described in this report. For example, the FBI did not handle the Phoenix EC appropriately or give it the attention it deserved. The FBI did little with the Phoenix EC before the September 11 attacks because of the FBI’s inadequate analytical program, insufficient supervision of analysts in the program, the focus on operational priorities at the expense of strategic analysis, the failure to 378 adequately share intelligence information, and the lack of adequate tools to facilitate information sharing within and outside the FBI. With regard to the Moussaoui case, the Minneapolis FBI agents deserve credit for their tenacity and instincts regarding Moussaoui’s suspicious actions. These agents did not receive adequate support, either from field office managers or from FBI Headquarters. Although it is not clear that even if the FBI had pursued the case more aggressively it would have succeeded in obtaining a warrant to search Moussaoui’s possessions before the September 11 attacks, the handling of this case illustrated systemic deficiencies in how the FBI handled intelligence cases. These deficiencies included a narrow and conservative interpretation of FISA, inadequate analysis of whether to proceed as a criminal or intelligence investigation, adversarial relations between the field and FBI Headquarters, and a disjointed and inadequate review of potential FISA requests by FBI attorneys. With regard to Hazmi and Mihdhar, the FBI had at least five opportunities to uncover information that could have informed the FBI about these two terrorists’ presence in the United States and led the FBI to seek to find them before September 11, 2001. But the FBI did not uncover this information until shortly before the September 11 attacks. The FBI’s investigation then was conducted without much urgency or priority, and the FBI failed to locate Hazmi and Mihdhar before they participated in the attacks. Our examination of the five lost opportunities found significant systemic problems with information sharing between the CIA and the FBI, and systemic problems within the FBI related to its Counterterrorism Program. These problems included inadequate oversight and guidance provided to FBI detailees at the CIA, FBI employees’ lack of understanding of CIA procedures, inconsistent documentation of intelligence information received informally by the FBI, the lack of priority given to counterterrorism investigations by the FBI before September 11, and the impact of the “wall” between criminal and intelligence investigations. In evaluating the FBI’s actions in the three matters examined in this report, we cannot say whether the FBI would have prevented the attacks had they handled these matters differently. Such a judgment would be speculative and beyond the scope of our inquiry. But while we cannot say what would have happened had the FBI handled the information differently or if the FBI had pursued these investigations more aggressively, the way the FBI handled . these matters was asignificant failure that hindered the FBI's chances of being able to detect and prevent the September 11 attacks. In this chapter, we make 16 recommendations to the FBI to address the problems we found in our review. In providing these recommendations; we recognize that the FBI has made significant changes since the September 11 attacks, and it is already addressing many of the matters that we describe in this report. But we believe that the FBI should know exactly what happene d with regard to.the PhoenixEC, the Moussaoui case, and the Hazmi and Mihdhar matter to ensure that it fully addresses the systemic failures we found in these matters. We believe that our detailed descriptions of the FBI's actions;, together with our recommendations, can help the FBI improve its counterterrorism operations as it transforms itself to better address the threat of terrorism. Glenn A. Fine Inspector General 379

ACS - Autamated Cme Support System ADPC - Assistant Director in Charge AG Guidelines - Attorney General Guidelines AGRT - Attorney General:$ Review Team ALAT - Assistant Legal Attwhe - ASAC - Assistant Special Agent in Charge AUSA - Assistant United States Attorney. CDC - Chief Division Counsel CEA - Central Intelligence Agency CIR - Centmdl Intelligence Report (CIA) CIRG - Critical Incidents Response Grc~up CZ'C - Counter Terrorist Center (CIA) CTD - Coun~tertemrismD ivision (FBI) M3I - Direetcor of Central Intelligence DEA - Drug Enforcement Adnmi8isbra~m DTOS - Domestic Terrorism Operations Seetion I EC - Electronic Corrmunication IFAA - Feded Aviation Administration FBI - Federal Bureau d Investigation FCIt - Foreign Counterintelligence FFI - Full Field Investigation FISA - Foreign Intelligence Surveillarnce Act FISC - Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court FTO - Foreign Terrojrist Orrgamimtion GAO - General Accounting Office IIIA - Integrated Intelligence Information Application INS - Immigration and Naturalization Service. 10s - Intelligence Operations Specialist IRS - ~ntelpi~encRke search Specialist ISD - Investigative Services Divi-sion ITOS - Intemtational Terrorism Operations Section JICI -Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry JTTF - Joint Terrorism Task Force LEGAT - Legal Attache. . LHM - Lettdhead Memorandm MOP - Manual of Administrative Operations and Pkooedi&m MIOG - Manual of Investigative 0perati.onsand Guidel.ines NSA - National Security Agency I NDPO - National Domestic Prep8pedness Office NIPC - Nationd paulbrocke R O ~ CPr~ogrOamI ~ Nmp - N8~tior~aF.lo reign Intelligence Pnu~gam NSD - Natiod Security Division NSL - National Security Letter NSLU - National Security Eaw Unit OGC - Office of General Cowel OIG - Oflice of the Inspector Gened OIPR - Offiw, of Intelligence Policy and Review OLC - Office of Legal Counsel OPR - Office of Professional RespomibiPity ORCON'- miginator controlldl RRI - W c a d Fundamentallist Unit SAC - Special Agent in Charge SCI - Sensitive compartmented infomation SCIF - Sensitive Compa.rtmented Information Facility SDNY - Southern District of New York SIOC - Strategic Information Bc Operations Center SSA - Supervisory Special Agent STeT 111 - Secure Telephone Unit third generation TAOG - Threat Assessment On,eratiom Group. TD - Te~egraphicD issemination (CIA) TECS - Treasury Enforcement ComicatioSyns tem UBL-Us- Bin Laden , I UBLU - Usama Bin Laden Unit USA0 - Un.ited States Attorney's Odce i. 1 USIC - U;S. Intelligence Community i WTC - World Trade Center

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Precedence: ROUT1 NE. Bate: 67/10/2001 )' ., . \ TO:, Countert6rrorisrn ., IS E ,aa-a. ~i3 , .e-\tm (JJb .. - . . . - . :. \ . Hew Yor k From :. Phbeni:x Squad16 Contact: SA Kenneth 9. Williams Approved By: Dref ted B ~.: ~ illiarnsK. .e nneth J T i t l e : 81 ~ b o ~ s: i8s1 UBL and AL-MUHAJIROZPN supporters attending civil avi.a t ion unive~rsitiea/colleges in the State! of Arizona. . . . 8 ) . ~etiv@d.'rhom: 0-3, Declassify OR: X I . 1 -11' ~ i e l dI nvestigation.I nstituted: 04./$7/2bl10. (NONVSPER)- ' Details: fl The purpose of this ccmunicrtion is to advise the *- Bureau an w York of the possibility of -a coordinated. ef fort by USAMA-BEN-U~IXN [UBL) to- send studentsl to the United States to attend c i v i l aviation universities and colleges. Phoernix has observed an inordinate number of individuals of lnves tigat ive interest who are at tending or who have attended c i v i l aviation universities and co-ges i n the State of Arizona. The inordinale number of these i n d i v i d u a l s att(ending these type of schools and fatwas issued by ALrom: ,' Phoenix 07/10/2602 MUHJ I ROUIl spi r i tua l 1 eader SHEIKH 0JU.R BAKRI HOHiUfl4ED FOSTOK, an 'ardent supporter of UBb, gives reason to believe that a coordinated e f f o r t, is underway to establish a cadre of individuals who will one day be. working i n the civi 1 .@viation community around the world. These individuals w i l l be in a position i n the future to conduct terror activity a g a i n s t civil aviation tirgets. . . . , . ,, . .. .. Phoenix believes that the FBI s h ~ u l da ccumuiate a 'll s t i n g , 0 : c ~ w L 1 'aviation universities/college!3 around the country. .FBI field of.ik6s. with these types of schools '$n their area should es tab'l'ish h h o p r i a t q liaison. fBlHQ should discqss this matter with other elernent.8 bf tfie U.S.: .intelligence comm~nn!.ty and task the . . comnuni ty for,a. ny intormat ion that support;' l?hoenfx@s suspicions. f BIHQ should ;c,ms:ider geeking' the necessary authority to obtain visa inf om& tioh I;$;km the USDOS on individuals obtaining visas to at tend chese r*es of 'schools and notify the appropriate FBI f i e l d office when these iridividuals are scheduled to arrive in their area of. . re--.s ponsibil.i r. y.,. ' i.. . ' <. ., hoenix nix' 'has qraw the a&. v_ i.; !c.. on. slhggion -:f ram, several Phoenix investigati w Phoenix has igentif ied several. arsociates of at who arrived at the u y around the same ese individuals are Su ims who have the fundamentalists views as They come from om: Phoenix. , 07/10/2001, The above indivia~ans are invoi and regularly participate in meetings with him in na. 'wT he. AL-MUHAJ~ROUNw~h ich in English means THE EMIGRANTS, is a -Sunni Muslim fundamentalist organization based in the ~ ntied K ingdom. he orge~ization's spiritual, leader is SHEIKH OMAR. BAKRI MOHAMMED FOSTOK. The .organization is dedicated to the overthrow om: Phoenix,. , ,. . Re t 07/10/2001 . . of western society. British off lciels have !reported that FOSTOK first came to their e.ttentlon, during the Gulf War after calling for the assassination of Brit lsh Prime Minister John Major. FOSTOK has connect ions to O p t, JAjllUT .AL-*IJIUSLIBbIhIJ (JM) , HAMPSI*H.I.Z BALLAH. and the ALGERIAN SALVATIOF'R OIR. -.t .. . . C. FOSTOK has made severel contrbverr~iel statements ta the press. For example; he st,q.fed la public interviews that the bomb$nga.cf the United $tateat Embassies in Africg were "legitimate targets. .. . ( :. . . . . . . - FosWx, whl Le eepresent~n. MO: d h ~ - ~ ~ ~ i ~ Q U l l, . &ned .,a
 * , -faiwa( r ,:, g oua.?3~reed) uri..n g. 'F ebruary. 1998 wh9clh s tbt ed the, ,

, ' f o l ' ~ o w i h ~ : ;. " . . . . . > . . . . . ,09.' . . . . . . . . . The Fatwa ,is j ihad 'akatrnr th& tl .s ;~.a nd . ~ rtiish ., crbver.rke.ht, nnies, ipte.rests, -ad,cperts( e~nphi$.~'.'abdy dFeBdI ~hoenixi),. and: instrurti ons,'a nd i.t'''hebs een given Because of the U .S . and Qri t i s h ' affgiess3on against ~usl$msa,n d the MhlSlim land of . Iraq. . .we. ..c on$i r m that the :only: :I.sl,ami:qF a..tyaa, g~i~stijth3.s.,'expli~it gg re,^ c,ioh 4 ', J f had,. :Pheref ore.. trices sa~@i?~f.alf!'bk.~iec~iS~h~ h~ id.&: ' ' " g. o v r ~ ~ n t s i. ~ o r :a~thpery sl g ~ v ~ ~n~onnrM~vsl:irn,.. q~&fd~ t:ries.:-*to ' stay.8 way~'~from...Il~asleqs,t dne, Pakistan.,:.,.:#abi.a,,~tc.fa:c.e:. ~f ur l l scale wat-'of Jihad s-hich it is -the.r.e,s pons$:bil.$ly'antdh e duty of. ,, . every Muslim around the .k*~rld,.t@o artkipate', in.:. iKe. ., ..c@11: . upon. .. Mbslims. ciroubd the- vg.r~d."i~ncluding::~l"I:~l~t mhs6:. ; ' ~ ~ ~,,:ci'nh. d ' Br:it Ian.t o .-c~n$rotr i'. by k i ' l $eiieans.-:*he ther -:vekbail:~,. f inancially , politlcall~o r m i l i t a r i l y the ~;~.:.~a,,nd:+f)r$t.%.sh04:57, September 25, 2010 (UTC)~$gideo s.! &'i6~jand t h e i r Islamic .gutty in.r eliavihg,,:thk$':d a.gi -pe'ogle,$r orn the..,unjust,' . . : . ' .. . .. sanc t ionsf...! ' ., . a . . . . . . . . . .. ' I . . . , . . .. . . . rems 'Phoenix o7/no/zoo1 . . . . . on 06#200l; the ,.arres e, two irndli to being members of W3L:s AL-QAtI DA organization. Evidence was developed demons tra t.i.ny that 'these indBviduals were planning an operation, to a U;S. E U.S. Milifary . forces' in Saudif Arabia. passport in the name of . . . . , . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-.. :" . . . . . , ':aO,' - : ...,. (. . . ..-: ..., .. .. &.enik: 6ddlievas th&l;t"'%s, more than-d =oin~idence that""s. ubj ects who hze .Ir sllppog-tees :ofU.B L, i b tt j.en@$ng diviP *viati-. uni've,ssit .,ie~./ct$l&eges, in tha state of ~ri'zonla..: As'r.e ceiv'ng ..offi ces are -aware, Phoen.ix'h asis had siqj'n3.fi e@n.t : l O ~ ta sscic%iti es/operatiyes. '. living in the State off Arizona and'ebndpcting alctliv'lty insupport of ' UBL. . WWIH EL- I,#GE, ga - UBL ldeutena,nt recently ' convicted: for his role in. the 19918 bo~nbings af -u. S. .-$sles--,$n Africa, lived in Tucson, . Arizona for severel.' yearg .:.'duringk, hk 138.08..E SSiM',A L-R~DX, a personal pilo.t<"f6rUBLei kav@aedt. .o.'lPucink~i,z onB:di$r$n,g1, 993.a$'t he . . . . . . ' established sulpport network in place in Arizlone. This network was most l i k e l y estiblished during the time periled that EL-HAGE lived in Arizona. To: Coun r : Phoeoix ' Re: Q 07/10,/2001 This information, is being prcvided to receiving off ices for information, analysis a n d comments.. To: Countert Re: rom: Phoenix 0711 0/20.01 LEAD (s) : 0 . Set Lead 1: Ob The RFU/UBLU is requested to cassider implementing' the. suggested actions put forth by Phoenix at the beginning of this c'ornmunieation. . .. s e t Lead 2: PEId WORK &T IdFw YORX, R?EW YORy 8 Read and Clear

The Honorable elam A. Fine Oflice of the I[nfp~&r &and United Statce Dbjputmeat of Justice. Rsom 4322 950 Penwylvmia venue^. N.W. Wmhingt~nD, .C. -20530. . Deer ~ rF h.: ]Re: OIG DRAFT AUDIT REPORT - A R3BVII3W OF THE FBI's HANDLING) OF mumCE nlFOIwA.oN RELATED -TO TEE SBPTBMBER 11 AmACKS R-eficeis made to ELu r.aemomrrm~d, ate~Ml ay 2#, 2004 amd June 10, 2004, requdg the PBI d mth e five olhagtem arad ths r~m~enW0polf sth e subject draA andit report for fitdud muracy andl for whdha anythine: ixn the recmmenWon~*cis~ ~ or too sdtive for public m1euw. L dLditi01a the ' memorandum sought our ccmmmb ss to whether g not the FBI belicwd the b. r e c o ~ o aensd co~cfusio1[1w8 aa bitha i.nmamte or mwmmed, Thb document is the PBrs fomd r a p o ~be the insccraaCm uhioh is &achRd and the report's ncormnealWonm. The cla9fldm a ds dtisrity r d a v . ~ a nplr' oviciedl mder separate cover. . . Onbehdfofther,Iwantbthankyuum&od u r:staEforthisreprt and for the wuntlIcm hours of hadl work that it required. As you low, the FBI values the Office of the Idspsdor h d ' ain put as a m]m~)rehensivieu 2dq~egdent.$sswsmmotf our opemti011a~n das a cans f g waknnes~etsh at re&3 mmxtive action to. stmqthen our 3 *om. I ~" ihdis wt my thc ~Tr requcx~yo ur ~ffiwto anduct this revim shortly the 9/11 tragedy Based upon our revimv, your h(B3('mi d recomenMons apre wmi8&ent with the F'Ws internal paulbrocks id with those of other oversight entities. I am pleasd.toM om you tPnaa the FBI haa nnad~e igpifica9.tprogress not only on th6 m~mmenb~ions E din y ~ urrep ort but om, all the iasuss covered by our own intend aa8cssmants. E Before responding to the individual nmmmendatiam, the GIG and the American public n~eedto be made aware of dhc progrew madle by tha Pecid Bureau of InvestigEbtim gin@ tihe hodc atbclf$ of September 1 1,2(Y01. If we only responded to the rmmmmdatiom in the report, madm w6uld an incornplate . I picture of the progress we hve made and pdup8 have a ~ E o u lt~imte piedng together the i n f o d mu nder sixteen di~81~mmbm ~endtiomW. ~rpMr hebr hae implemented a oomprehmive plan tmat thadammtally tranefo:m the FBI to enharice our ability to p d c t and p e n t fitwe atts of tcmorim. W e havo ov(huld-wt 00unMsmq eratiomsq mddo ur intelligence capmbilitie~m~ d wour bkinegs pmticm and technology, and hpmvwd coordimtion with our partnm. (U) -tor Mueller replaoed a priority system whioll allt~wedsu penieors a great deal bf flexibility with a set of 10 priadtim tbat Wtrictly'gvvam the allcsation ofpersome1 qnd ~ O U T Wh &cay FBI program and field ofFloe. Coum~tertemdsmii,e now the overriding priofi~tya~n d e v qt amoh lead io addressed, avee if it requires a ctivmion o l m o u r&~o m other priority areas. 0 To hpl~meatth esenew prioritiesOw e increased ths number dSpdalA gate' adgned to tanotiemmattsra'and W additionad intelli&mce tmndlrni end tnmsm. We also estabW~dr number off o p d o de at ahd mtitiea ithat provide n mo r bpmvd. @i]litia to address the terrorist tkmt. Thme hc11ade tPle 2447 Chm&@moh~W atch (CT Watch) and the National Joint Tsmih Tssk FOICC 0t o rrmaulga' d dmre thrarat M d o qth e Tanxima Fimmciq optmtion Sdon Crpos). to centdh esrb to stop terrorist kmcw, docmsntrneditn exploitasion equads to exploit mateaid found both domdlcally d ovemeaz3 hr ita - intelligence xPlae; deployable "Ply T W :fo 4atd w ~ ~eaq-~amar itn ie d e d ;t ho Terrarist.SareomingW er od.Faj l~r.T(m3mh ~kir~Tgas k .Force (FITIF) to help identify tcxmkta anal keep them out of#e United States; the paulbrock the'do$lmaed Uhe Mcabrn of tamrid$ d~vitayp dnd:t he U.S. fixxq a &'8b@~P C ~ X S ~ ~ ~CVU~) B . We cent- faaaa~&o four -rim Ikgrma~t Headqnartgs to Wt "s&ovqpipiaag"o figfodoom, b egma mmistmcy f~foa,~:cxt@em&tWies and drategy m I wth e orgaahtiofn, to integrate oo~lflterkarcirompa ations here and ovemwas, to improve &dimation with other qpnciea aod pvtmnab, and to make senior 1&-1e for tho o v d duweloprnent end sanaws of our o o u R m * emnts. @J) -, Tha mI b bdw m&@S43-Wiide ilIbfigC%lCe PKD- ahat has. mibsbntiaUy impbved our ability to &ntte@dyd irect our in6(~Iligmceb lleotion and to &, analyze, an(! disc our tm*-mMd inteIligena3. Aftsr pwsag6 of the USA PATRIUI?A ct, related Attorney &mad GuidelinaDa nd tho eoeuing aphion by thc Fodgn Intelligence $UI'V-C~C ourt of Review i'e~novodth e, badw to shsting idomtion betweem intelligence and criminal hvestigatio~ww, e qkickly implemented a plan to integrate all our cqabfih to better pmvr&t tmri'lprt attach. I f h Q o f Muellla elevated intelligence t6 p r n ~ l e w l .pu~bcln,g in place e fad dmctunm and ooncglpb ofopm~omto govern FBI-widle hbU1"um.eb .&o~rna, md ~wtablidiqFg ield -7 I.. ki ii. 1: [[ 4 ~ n r tthatt we ~orno~t def eat terrorism 1wiC~uat t mp~a~rt~nd ps, we have t x b n o e j the ldvet of OOO&~OIR amd hfbmatio~ub~n h gw ith etete md muicipd 1~ d0I'WIBM%ltp 60fptn61W. WqBm dl0d thb INllIlba 0fJ0ht Tmd8&lT & PoIUW (JTTFa), Pnm~medt ech010~caIm mdvity with our parhors, andl impl8mented new' way of &&I$ ~&IPI&OII ~ U @~I~ h b ls0u8~ ha~ tho PE)I Int~Ili~Bgdal&~, ths Alext $yetem, md the TeProrist S d gCk ntweaThoy prr,v~ws ordionw ith other fedd sgencius and mmbmo f bhe ItiteIligme Comunitwye~ j oimed with our federal ' prtnem.to estrblish the TermfisQ Theat htegmtion Calk, excrlmnged pmom01, instituted joint &MwBDdp & utd wing saouae networks to abum iaiformation. We dso by bddhqj on ths ovemea$ . I by offkiag i n v t b d g a t i v 4, and forensic on task fo~cesa nd joint 6pdqne. Finally, andl hqmbved c o o W a with . ' . ?he WI is making ab&imtidp mpea~in uppuling (ouri p l f o n technology to &earnhe aa businas proosrrws sad to improve our 8bfityto sesroh for aad analyze infodq.drmwc otltldom, dpnd.sBaitr eb oth inside ths Bmmu amd out. We have ' dep10a~ s aoura high-speed nefm& gut nsw or upgraded e~qmte~orsn desktops, and ~IliMterro rist i n f b d o ni n a s ~ lcenetral d atabase. W43 developed, and am pii$sring to launch, the V iCPs s IPib armqpment tystaa tbsd win revolutionize haw:t.h e F. BI dew b a r n .0 Rwmgin-eB* :y mom cfi~5enat nd mon r@@onsiveto q d o dne eds. to st~rntegiclp lmmhgpa nd we r6ficused our redting and hiriag to ettrarot Wviduals with dkilI,~cr itical t~ our .. wunterterrohl and intellii~wat hiom. FYe have devalbped a more'con;lpfehmivc training program ad Wtarded now l&&p Mtidvtx to keep our worlborcs flm'ble. We am r n o d k n k t~he storage and of FBI ruoonls. We nlso bdt, md continao to hpr~vea,n sxted\~de % y p g r a mwi th ccmhkdl ad-, professional security permme&m ore rigomus seourlty 1~8mad ~ih~qp mvd security edmtioblandm~0. These i~tnpmvemmtsh ave ptoduced tangible end rneas&]Ie 1xm.lts. We signiflcantly incrcasbd the hukber of human s o m and We amount dsurvdmce coverage to support our e o mc&rOs~r.,We.d ev6bped aad mimed aprocess for briefing daily threat Momtion, ead O c ~ d d lhy-ed tfnb nnrmbtr of PBI intelligence reparts produced and dheanioated Berheps most ifirqorkiint, since September 1 1,2001, we have participated in dkqpting hams of tmdat op&am by developing donab16 htefige21ce and be- 000- our count~#rOrTiamffo~t ta. 0 Prior to ~epiember 11,2001, the Bureau had no cathWw1 stnucture for the national rm~nagmemot f its C o u n t ~ r i Pmro gram, and tmh oasm were routinely managed out of h~dlividuafl ield offices. An d-Qa9ida& q j6pr ~:mnplem,i,g ht have been m o u t New YO* I P ~ ~OM~ W8; a ~ t~eghah~,e~t~ m Wdhgton Held OftimeT lnie hctjPonedfo r y w q , md of impwsive prosecutiom. Once countamrim beoame om overddix~gp riority, howws, it became clear that UMa a t had a ndbsp of fhiliqpe in that it 1) "ertove=pipd"h ~rdgativein telli mna~hlonm a gf ield offlow; 2) clifbd respm'billty and mmtability bdwem c m m n m h l of]EiidaIs at PBI H a d q m and tho SACS whb had pnImcpy rqpodbWity.for the individwd ternmi invatigtttiomq 3) allowed floldl a ~ f l i i c kt o ais~igtnv arying pfidti.a and fe8Iome lweb~to tendig p u p a md threats; 4) impeded ovmfght by FBI l d a p ,s ad 5) co~pltioatadm a o n with other federal agaeciea and emtitiw involved in the war a g k t Qer:mrisllo. For d thee@r saeom, it leoamapsp arent that ths Co~%1tatemoh~np cigpbmm ~dedcm - leadcrshp. 0 In Deca110ezl2001;the Dimcbr mrg- and !qanded&e Corn. DivMon (CIP)i d &t he poon.of'A:e~avk:Qe& dm (BAD) foo . 8istmth-r ofC'IDrep0r$ tosthe . . ~ t o n r m a ~ ~ r m ~ m d ~ ~ - t o o o o r a l m P t e o o ~ ~ r m r o p ovawss; b d l u dW an with other agedm and gov~rne~l~lmtdsl; t o establish clear ha o f a o c ofo~i fh~s o~v~db 8 1 ~ e g t .irmd-1 ofour corn-- JiVe.di*Mtho CXnmMkm&n.Di.vis:im Intolxttmhq . .WOIbW&a, 1b9e aoh hvdta ap- wlho work clo acJms campal&& lines. '1w i g l f e i o n d qdclk 0 The Bpn.esn is dedgnd, md hos dwap opeimbd, m a1 law edo~pcane6tn d im intelligence agea~cyI. t has the dual midox 1) to iavdig~deam d anwt p of mnpleted h a s(t he law ~ o r c e mm~Mt d) and 2) tab ietelligenm tbat will help prevent futuw crimes aad assist policy &em in 4hdr decision qdiing (the . htdigencem idon). Hiwry has &own that we rrs most effective in p m t wth e U.S. whsn We pd01llldt hese tW0 &I~W~OMh (U) . . The FBI[ mm that iarvdgatiom could pn!oduce inbfligpce benefits ' ' beyond amst rnnd prosecution. S mwitlb the Ku Khu #fmc cmes in Uhe 1960'a and the M aoa ses oft he 1970t~o,u r began to vim crimhlal ir~v&gartiom not only as a meme of axreat&& amul P ~ K m)ar~ime~ fau a co~mp lated o h e , b at also as a mazms of obtabhg Wodm to prevent fibre mime. Tha pall waal not &ply to erregt indiiw memlm of the Klan or the Mafia, batt to pm&rate and hnmtle the whole ~ o ~ o(Up r ~ . h fhb ia~f)mw~wh ndopted, tha PBI Mar developed the intelligence t ~- ~ b euoh I&.e leabdo anwillm~d t he dti.Won of hmm kirooea -#thata ra mitical to m d p~mmtingc fbdd d~tyw.e also learned to think 8tmtedcally before ddng arrwts1, sometinn88 opting to &hy 8 tmqwtt'e elrest to dowr more oppmbdty for e M O i i i a ~ du might dlis,01O~Oe thar 0o~batot8or C ~pleWae. we have Ueed I! tslis app~roachto'greataEeotinorg odme casw and qpionage) hwstigatiione, man8 mabeera of our Safe Stm& Taak Farm we it in their !fight againsd etrsst gange. (0) I Thie is the approah that ie needed to prevent ternfitme Rior to September. I L 11 th, howevery we wem ]handcapped in our ability to implenaent this approach in the comtatmrrirnq ark for two primary rwor~(U. ) I! Firsf judicial nillea and DOJ irntamI pdmm11 prohibittxt ow t o u n t e r t d agcnts woddn~h telligmw oases Born cwdmtiqs nd e h i q ;j i a f ~ ~ ~woitdh t I! - crhhd agents who o hwc p.0 sandp-~lM-wforefolly f'hd0nhgi n l b 3 ~a~pm~U6b & We b ad&wt381 eaoh 0ftfi~%~em ,bkm I i iqmgidiately a hth e s q w e r nn, 2001 tlmGk8. (U) . By &£hition, inveeti- of-Onal Qnvrisln am both %teIligmceyD I' and "crimbd irnvdguticms. They am intelligence investigertio~wb tm-uset hair objective, pursnent to Executive Order 12333, is 'Wle detection md oountezhg of international '-& wgvitim," db eoauss thsy q 1 o yt he ~ I i e s - - rhdvd &atiive too18 - I' sub-asF od@lb t 6 I l i g&~U VdhM - ' - thrd designed #or the 4. . ht&@nw of pWUbg the U.S. ig&t W krn althw k mby iomign entities: "-. p* m ygl 3criminal Wdflm arinw iInWd tfzm1h !agai$stt he U.8. dm ir - a uioILaticm of the f d d criminal code.- (U) '$ - / . . ,-.#...- ~ t h e p ~ t w c d e c a d ~ o m ~ e o f o o u r t r u l o s d & ~ d ~ ~ ir • beloped #txml )omwthe use ofPISA wanam$ that barred FBI agea altar. do ther Intelligence Community peasomel woddng hbllligenm c& that mployedtbe FIBA tool h mo o o r r da~nd aww6np l& with ageids w~;bdckcl :Mndlc ases. As a l i result of thie lq,d %w %kIlipwn agents rml criminal" agents woadng on a. k m i s t target mad to PF& without howiq what the otha may hve been biag ff hutM m eta rgot. In &or&w e ware fighting intematisonal~ karmriarnw ith one arm tied behind our bade. (U) I I The USA PATIHOT Act, emadd on October 26,2001 eliqbtd this '%dl" d avthoM c o o r ~ oanm ong qmta working crhhtal m&km and tho88 working intellipm invtdgatiom. On Maroh 6,2002 dhe Attorney G a ~isdeu d new hblligenoe Sharing Rocsdurss for Fomign~Intdigenma nd Foreign C o m ~ ~ U ~ c e [I . hvestigations Conduihxi by the FBI (Intelligence Sharing Procdm:) to capitalize on this legblative change. The new prod- speoifically ar;~thm,'rigI tm&s working I intelligence oases to disseminate to cdminal pmswutom and h v ~ ~ oalrl daw mt i fforeiign intelligence infom8tion, including inf~nmtionob tainad fbm l[lISA, in. acoot-0 with-applicablem inimhation &unBaada and otha specific n~cti0ns I' (originator controb): i t h o w pmecutors and oriminal ~b agt?ntS @ mdvh B'BI Q888610b d €l@W&! of &It€@ intelligence inveatigtltlm, heludhg the use of PISA. 0 r iaeued am apinio]r~-qpViptSho hblligeaa~S lbarbq Prwedarq &meby authdzhq the FBI b inlf8&0& hcl- mkdbd~@iDfdOI "m&OaD b&Wa8~1O, W Cllhhd and htelligmca iwaig8atiom, With thb ophiom, we wem hdly able to oonduot rn tamrim hvashigations d t l h the Atll use amd CXM-Q~I, of our cxidnd and htelligam tooh and pemm~l. To formdim tbi8 merger ofht'e.llligence and arbdnal optd~omw, e have dmiondt he asepmat4 csee clwific&(bm~fa r %imhd* intamdoma bmrh~ hvdgptiom (with the oM&oa aunib80r 265) and O)i~mtdlj!paulbrockeelC tarroriem invdgatraas ( G ~ ~ CIX~UI&IZ P19 9), and Jtmye c o n s o ~thia m itlr6 s ah@@e hsdfWim for mb&mpulid'm*IB (nbw oifd(2adons n~umk31 5). TMs I u 3 G h ~ o ~oo n@ a y pn temoRism.hd,* ae om thrt orn a n p l o y ~ 1 l i ~Wc els crs walp ils ~i mdpmdun#.I n hrly20(n9 we ffm tP1h approach in ollr-M&l.&m~Hirm InverMgartiive Strategy (Mcns), which w& b m dt o rrll ffield afSices aprd has bemi the aubjecfto ff ~ Vfidd Q 0 With the dimadng oftbe legal ''W'!snd t h e w S ~ ' i oofna m ctiminal and b t e I l i ~ - ~ o r nee ff m dI wln~o~w -h~h;~v~e*tlha eb it~tL6~I1obo - om . - and * hd&a..md b hse the .mtamp ofb &el amspscted tmxiht to learn abut hicr t n o van~d id~m fi4rpo&ktddmw im ~0xQ1le c l t g wa ide, we have ty to &veRop i n t d l i u ~ n a ~ ~ ~ 0 U t h i e G a o d s t plans. This htegmtd qpmmh has @Mo m.qd611a~a3dl wn h i es nocsgsfUny foilad temniaaeW q d o m md tlimpM calls fimn Sa&JleO W-n, to W i t , Michigaq Q L a c bN~mY & (U) Illthoun,ghw e are now able towardirontc our hte~Bligeaccec ollection and criamiaal law mhrcmmt opdotuOw e oan only make our MI poitentid lus a WTO &III p m n t a b~y de nqinugh e inteIlipee sb- capabilities, end prowses to &led those opdm. an effdvet intelPligmec3 c$paeity, we For a variety ofl~hricdm m;U he B- had ncO dwel~opdth is intelligcmw capacity prior to Sqtemba 11. While tlae PBI Bas almy beea one of the world's best ~011ector~ofM)&ora, we nwa e&bBirslhd the infmtmkm b arploit tbat information Wly for it8 intel&pwd v h ; hdvidual FBI ageakl havd amfyzed the d h oin their parti& casss, and thbn wed that :dy~intPo guide tbi4ir inMgatiw. 'The FBI bn brdwo& ho7AP$(rer, had not blmabd lhat d y t i d . p m sa bove the individual owe or invdgdion to an o~ill.efM%to d y m The atwbo f S q W e a1 1 ,2001 highlighted lthe n~eedtlo develop an ' iatefigm66 pmeee for the ~ulllmmrigmh ograp and the I& of the hmau. Since then, we have umbrtakm to build the capacity to fi\se, adyze, ~Rhdd iaemhate our tmfism-mMedl intelligence, d and direct tnvdgativs acti~itifwrb a~edo n cpur analysis of gaps in our collection a@mt mti~ndh blEgmce q h n ~ l l brh.a t effort haei p d din. fi)~)#r&"g ee. . . Our fir& stcg wae to hcztmm the number of dtysts working on c o m m aIr mmdately.PftotS eptmba 11, we t a ~ o dtayisi gaedd y& from ths paulbrockv&gatMivv. idoa an@ ~lountmintt'rpaulbrockm7 to0 6 Utlits h& el Cot W M aI n July 2002,25 amtdyttta wan, Mdfix mi the ab tKl& 01It C Q- ~ffbl'bJw* ~y of pVid0d b&d inkIligence milyie; o&em PTOv&xl atmtegio "big pictumn ad1rais. All ofthem wodked &aptionally hard cand h e wp e d y mt he mass of &i gea~eratdii &e rrffeamaSh of tha fsnprist a#a~bT.h ese dqdoyanmts wtas a tempmq mwmm, but the progrew msdc, the contiderrce gained, ad the lessone leatned during lhia @od s$rted us down -,. &bqdb dd ~ f i m c t i ~ ~dmy sti seo gpaulbrockic m'.W ea ha)e stablkhed the &-nee of hdytiod SQadie8 to be@ %'ah tlpd dtWd0p OW C&\ ddm. % .-- - -- ".*, gil --- On Da:mk 3,2001, the Dhctor establishd the 01Ece of InteIligenoe (00 within the C o l m F fiM091, The 02 was reBp0mQle boa esteblishiag and executing st&&& f id~ t@b,itin g, mid ~bvelq3htgh e h&uim~ analtitlo workfo~xxa, nd egsming thnt dy& am asdgml to cpadld d field &amba sad on Wlligeaux priofitke. Reoog~uMngth at intdi-e and dm' cm integral to dl of the Bureau's program, in P & m 2003, Din=* Mheller movsd the 01 out of the C o m m b Division and mated a stand-alone Oh headed by an Bxecutive Assistant Dirador osOo p v i C o d dsup port tmd guidance for the Bureau's htc.,Illiv Iimtim* (U) Tlhe next &ep in our inbfi~c6in kgnation was to elewto Intelligmce fimctions to program-level &hu, instituting Crm-dnnwemg;nt and implmmoting s.dWed . bluepint for the Intelligence hogranno (UP The Wctoi articulated a clear mission for the Int~lligmcePr ogram -to position the FBI to meet ournnt and emegging Wonal s d t y and csiiial tbm& by 1) aiming invdgalivc work pma~tiv~ly threats; 2) hrildirng and mutabiq enteqriare-wide intelligence policies and capa&%ties; a d3 ) p~w~vidimugs em appropriate, and timely infom~ationa nd d y s i e t o the natiomal aecuriltyBh omeland securityBa nd law dofcment communiti~W. e then set out to.mbedi ntelligence plmoessea into the daytoday work of the FBI, b a a the idtitttion.of a pm- inve@igEstioa to the development of FBI-wide drategia. (U) ti. Now thst the Intemgmce hgami e wbbb&@adn d d8nf81qphgs& 8 b ' moving on to t h e next ageo ftramfomiq the aureau into cm in~teIlitgenoea gency- ' refonnulahg pcmogel and prooedm to insti withiin our woMm an expeathe h tbb ] w e t gm d objdvw o f h l b ~ g mlr~or~k. ~(U~) ) . A major .olomcat of the Bmlgzl0at rmufo&on b our im~ws~isbingt egration cndl m w o n wilL our parhem in the U.S. md htmmtiond lm emfazmmt end hteUigatx oo~mdtieaM. ore than my other type of mibrnbmmt mieeion, oountarttxroriam~q uhs the pdcipation of every level o f I ~ @ ~ ~dotaea~l, and - htemliod pvammeat. A god emmpfer is the cam o f b Imlkawmm taroris0 cell o d & Baalo,,N sw YodL Ram the polEaw officem w hb~4 ?dto iidcmtlfy md conduct e n r v m~-~ wll a pmddled hfimmt3rn.W dhtd rotmP eff- with w @ e v = invdption la Wem fiwN!x-0 h&rmation sharing an a mgdar d - b d yb ab, we ml ow partnam cannot expect to align our opa&mal efkts to bsst auxmmpw owshred ddm. ~hmhglyw;e hthn takan-&q.mt o.a&d4i& unified ~ ~ [ ~ ~ e p o l i c&ir~ing--iinoSirm lat90n md Wlligmw. -0 To easm a ds appm~hI, hs*M- recaltly . ddgnatad (bs IW-I' to ']FBI offid&firirmfmnafi&anad inte-.*w policy. h m tqpdty, ,fhe BAD-f 6 ae tm. to the ~ r ~ f l l ~ d d e s p o l i ~ ~ ~ o n ~ ~ ~ m d * t n l a t l i wgitehian mido s ' outside them with tfsa law emfbmmmt andl inteIliwcm w~m11tiaib, w ell as . fbreiga govmnmss. (U) On Fdbmary 20,2004 we hmd tm i.mfbmatkn.&hg policy grwp, comprised of Executive AsskUmU M m OAP sistant D*&om and other d o r exehiv6 managers. Under the lkedionoff tPlo BAa-I, lthh i pup is mt&Whg PBI Mdion anrl inmgmw l?!hmhgplicies. (U) On Fdb- 11,2004 tha Attorney General atmoun~edt h e , d o no f the DOJ Intelligence C h o w Camd. The ComcliP is comprised1 ofthe haads off DOJ ageaciw with iabIligemx mspmtiemnnd, h ~ 1 l t l y ~tlyc thJe F~BI 's BAD-I. The Council wfl wo& to improve Wodm sharing vvithiln DOJ rlnd to snsum that DOJmeeb the hMligmca aaeede of oWih cwtomm and acts in um*a with inblligenw priorities. It will also ideati@ mmonc W l ~(sw h 88 electronic connectivity, o c ~ r a ~dvyct i ot ools, and htelligm~:e.skillbs .aiw)a nd dablish policies and pmgpants.90 address than. ' coonhadon with our stab, f- and h~onaIpaEtnaaan a numb& of bnb. (U) . . We have estsbfiehed mnofn atmngm worfdng rt~lationshipbw ith the -CIAa nd , otha mmiblm~o f the hteItigmce ComdtyOF'ro m tPLs Director's M yme &@ wit$ the Rimtor olT C h U dI ntel&pnco ad CIA. brief=# t~iourrq pdar e1xdmng0o f pe%80&el among ttge!aici&#to our joint efforb in spboifio invdgatiok and'in tPls Tanorkt Thrat I n t e ~ c mCe nterBth e T d s tS cresning CenterBm d othar mdtiagency entities* the WP and i$ pmtnm in the Intelligence Commdty are now integp&xl at viaually QVwlevel ofoulrop~om(.U r Ths Tm& TI.nwat btegmtion Cat& ia a good ezrlmpP6 of our coUlaborative ' rda.ti&p with the CU and 0lPlcir fkdmiil partnere. lktsbli&ed aa May 1,2003 at the direction of hddeat Bush, TTIC coonllnrntes m g i c id* of threats bawd on intelligent& ffom tho FBI, CICh, DM, and MID. Adywts fhnq each ageaoy work sida bydde in one location to lpi'm togder the big pi- of ttareats to the US. a& om !inbmmd*m rc anal* $ynth& p-a-dh M ~ m g * . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a m i p t o a w l e t t S e ~ ~ a l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~. r t f o r Tho FBI pemtmncl rt TIT<: am part dthe Office of Imtslig9ince d wo* clomly W& d y s ba t PBIHBadquarterrirncod~do mestic mdtintemationalmriatn dmlop~lmtari u to a coqmhamive d y s i s& terroristysis-. In dtimt o the analysis developed by FBI d y ~d@etail ed to TIIC, RBI[ d y s t sa t HerPdqasm rs"&.hpaulbrockon l3"i'~bdud~ee f 3 tha Mdmtt'8@ hlll)r&m b'& CU) The FBI olmrerUy1haa &eR@ and ws$ de&iied to CLA aiives, iaan* the M'e Counter Tmriam Cmt&(CTC). We also bvtf FBI agents snd intdIigmce adpts detailed to tha NSA, Ihe National Security Cognkil, DIA, the Defae i ~ ~ c o s &my, DOD'r Regional C a m & ,t he IhprtmeLlf oflBnergy, aind otha f Wand . &&agencies. C?A ~ a ~ o aaree alh wdchg in key positions 1bmughout the B m aT~ho ~ ~ ~ r ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ o o 8 i n t h c C o ~ ~ D i u - '' r i S i CIA dl&dm. (CIA offiaxa ars d d e dC the S d t yD ivbici~n cIdng the Adistant ,-. the CM4:f of fhe Pmme1S ecurity Section, and I ~ ~ ~ wBo&LhgB w ith the Secret C0mpartfm.d hhndm (SCI) pmgam clod the PBX PoGw* An experienced manager fbm he) CIA'S Direotcorata of Science md Teohnology now haads the .Investigative Talhologia IXvMon and a Sdon Chief in1 that diddon is on rowon hrnC!IA.(U) This atdmge off permme1 is taking place in out ileldl offibes ae wdt 1.m 33 field locatiom, the CIA laas offieem 00-located with FBI agents ilt JTTF aitss, and thae rnra plans to add CIA officaa to several additid sites. The NSA Bae malyete detailed to FBI Headq-,,, the Wuhington Field Officq the New Yo& Field Office, a@ the Baltimore Field OBIioe. 0 && mhg, in addition to &ie$ the Dktxtor is brieffbd by a brief= The Diaeotor ofCeu&al InUelHgendd and the PBI Dimtop &mi jointly brief the Rkident on cment ~ o l k tbmm 8b. h blddkitio~'C IA aad Dm pemmef attend the D~mtor9e internal krmrienl briefltnga every w mmingand 1 h o o a (Ur I fieP BILls now Usang swuw sptenu~to dbsdtlato olasaified htelligmw reporb and andydeal prod~notst o tha htbIliggwce Com~dtya nd otbm fedmad sgemiwm The PBl hoete a' web site rnt~he Top--Sea@% rpWJoMW mld-Wide htelligace '&mIU&y $ J ! ' ~ Q ~ B I P ~ 'f(h~ Clly~ )-,~ wb8d~- dhldtt ~Illlt3CbY& m tham 100 Daparhncmt of'Def$mse, CIA, 4 other PflteUgm c!Ormrmdty eitsa. We atsa, host a web site on SIPRMTOct shdw eylhm wed by DOD for sharing U o d m lass if id at the Secret MI. In addi@(onn, new TS/SCI network him ae "SCNIW9i e-€I pilow in I B Wdat~ oflcq, conmsct FBIl6 t-- & fielid'6fIBwt a . the- d other tnembae of 8h4 I'nblligq Cbimdtys and will hmme op-tia fior iol,b I'-=8~tmccy~ t l a b O ~ O(Ul ?) ~ mv~iag ti~ei~ mpatiiili&l~& i d o n te~b timu- the InOdCam~tywillinarsare~speSdaed~o mebt and' coMdan. A.cwrdingIis the IFBIfr bfkmmlirn Wholtlagy team hPs wgricedl dWly . with the Wef U-on . .(CICh) of DIIS md: dhar I[nteUgmce Colxagencies, to ~ ~ I Iobur p&t rmLd ongoing Ib&qolo1 ~)gmdTwh.i s C O O ~ ~basO P aff8ctd-ouid scirb om.q w dk ey ~ ~ 1 0 g y ,1 <uiS. To E a c : ~ i hB- tlnero oordiuationq tho ]PBIcIo eits on the lihteUg- Comrm@q CIO tr@e@iw@ uwilL T h e . . a dd enrelo@er rnd remmmmds technical zlx#mnep1& pQIicne8 ama g!zwmdww aardoooFdinatas.Wt~oe isIl lpmve-ana : intempability o ~ l ~ m ~ I s V o ~ , ~ ~ ~ & e , : h t r eIt U ~ e k m d was establishedl ' t r i m ro f ~atn6rahl tdigeaux dhoti~rea md ie.chairsd by tRe CIA'S CIO.(U) ' . Dm plays a dtid role in assessing and pro@ctin,gv uheaabilitiw in our national idbstmm mid om budemor nad in ovem&o om ~xzqpnaem pabiliiies. We haw WOIcMloe blywith DlEB to aukre that @ have the minkgationa ml cmmpmhde i n f d o nd mkw betwam~omtt gmciw tld ras vital to Xbs eaooees off our miresiw. The PBI a dD YiSl share tlatahs~,&C W at Tl"ICs in fhe.Nl&mal JTTF at PBI Headquuta, i n (ha FTTTF and tb TSC, and in local JTTFs h om field officeri mmd the country. We aronked olomtjb~ gt&er to get the new Tatmrbt Bamxmhq bbru p and mdng. f e hold weekly briefhis in which our CIlD d y e t s brief their Dm oountaperts on cuwnt temoh developme. We o c o d i all FBI waning with Dm,a nd we nowro o o ~ ~wmoh~gs htu ght hs M.orn~hdS eomity Ad System to addrag our owtonersoa' ~rnccwsa but multiple and dupI.icativsw arn designated an expziend a@ve hm the .-M(D~ S - t y M d d o n to run the TSC and dtW& a eenior DltIS akuUive to the FBI's Office of Melligimee to ensure coordinade~na nd ttanspmcy b&wem the agencia~(.U ) On Madl 4,2003, the Attorney bd thq $mStary of Homeland seourity, and the Mreotol. dmM I n t e ~ o e o mxqxehagvp Memom* of Un- ewtab- poIlicim snd procedm~h r infixmation aharin& handling, and we. Pmauant b that NfOUD infixmation mnated to tam& threats and . II [I / I1 II [ ' 1 I .: - I..: I: I - ' I. t - I. I.. I I I. vubndiEti~is\ pmvideef to DHB mbdlody wlthond DHS b* to rqw it . Consht with Uls pmtsetiolon d emidve IBOUIWS clrad :metho& and the probtion of privacy ti@, we now sham ne a MeP and withhold by 8xcbption. (U) With tem,figb trrtveUng, ccfmmunid p~l d gm ker all 8t~)umdth c world, ccordip&n IV& OW fbfip p hab e m ~m~o8re critical than ever before. We havp steadily inemas& m overeeas pwmce and IUOW mutinely deploy age@ md crime soeplb axpate to asgist i the hvtxtigatiion of ovmeew akcImp 8UOb tw the May 2003 bombi~qpin S dA; rabia rand Mmm.A D dJ81ttw 7,2004.4i3 FBI XBOIUI~I were awlgad IDVVXS~o, m2 00 ofwhom spa p ~ ~ ~ m ~asnsilgidyd T heir eEorb.)a nd themlatio-~e that grow bmt hea~h,a vs played a ctbtioa% role h the ~tlocesfid i n t d dq ~donewr e have c m d wo va the pael 3 t moriths. (U) Bumat pexso3me1 have plan%icipakdin nume~ouvil nvdgatiollls oftmmrist &k~ in fwlpl ooua~esov w t~tmp ast 33 wntiu. OW 8)matcoh a we invaiigatim diffim fkom.tBu qpmzwh we Witionally havo takmAiohto September '1 lW, our ovsnoas i n v d ~ d bplr~im~ar ilywae mb fldhg cases fiwpnvps8oina thc U.S. Today, ow Fbau hu bmdemd to provide our Wign pubam with inv&@ve, ' fimmsicS and gtulQ typm of suppart which eabnoe oup joint efforts tb p & i andjiisrupt tem&t attaab. Our pm&s~ hve~an bracad tfiis q q m a u * d it ie paying & ~ v i h & with greeter r~i@ocal ampenttio~a~ad mare jo*& investigations. (U) ' . The ibursnUon of a.mtrcWed mdl effective coun-h aperaticon is ths capability to mst-b, -hilab, md investigidim and opWonr% ifi&mti~bfol th intermally and with fellow intdigame tad ~ I Wemf bmeapent agenoics. his 'capability requires hfb&ioo technology 0.- mak es inhmmtion easily aocassible andl wable by elX p ~ nwhi~le prlote ctkg tbe security ~fttudin fo~mation 0 Prior to Sqmh 1l th, the Buremfa infodo11~ 011ogywa s inad~eq& q o z ti ts o o u & ~ ~h W OhaIp&Lou ay eare, substantial investments were made to upgrade -tedmBogitet hat cktlym peporced hv~stiflon~q~w h as ww&mce .fi - equipment.md f e n d c mxuices like the Integrated A a e d Fingerprint cation system. hmffiicient aUmbion wss plaid, howe~&to~ t sChh~logyr ekted to the mora fimdamental tasks of rm& mation, ~ ~ c~ ~ef f,i a~n do rdrniev,dl In 2001, , many anploytees still used vintage 1987 386 dtaldop canputem. Some reddent sgencim ' cwld only accms! Bata in heit field office via s slow dial-p1rp madm Many Burm programs were us* m1~71pU.ehy steagS that-olxmtdh w e t va nd did mt a interopaate with systsms in other programs Or other parb (of the Bureau; (U) The FBI also had a (deficient h f o d o a managanmeat system. The I W s legacy investigative infomation W~Mthe A,u tomated Case Sqqport (ACS), was not very effec'tive in identifiying Mmnation or supporting invdptiom. Users navigatedl with the I r hction keya iasbsgd ofthe "point and ogcE'm&od oomnon to wthbmed appUdom. ' ! Shq1d tasks, mwt~rs es.tow an s1w1tPonicv sision of a tba1111~fltr, equired a wat o . perform 12 sepmite b d 0 m itla "gpxm somaw enviromcat. Aleo,.the system lacked multimedia fhac~ldhdityto allow for the Wmge of infrnostion in its ori- :km, ' [I ~ ~ e q0tbeuld n01s; tore ~ Q P ! didtan hd- e1c- fdnnat, iaete9cn having to dsdk~tehe evidonw end Mate whem the ai~idmoew as stored in k mtmf mama (v) l i Wcs to the chactmr and rssolve of its pawtmd, &elFBI wee aeie to achieve nwntmus bv&i@ve ~ c w e e ei,n qiboftbae.obm!letii. It wae.oka s of Sqtermbsr ll,lasweves,.th at we an ht IT hnhstmomre to manage ow infcmmticm l i . - ~ e b u g h.otn -Qloatda MgMy .$killledt eam ofparospte aad)m et out to meate an lT idbtm&m~r,$ a& is fibst and secunq and thpt ties togdba!t he capg1lcdofls & daEabaees used ~&&@o'II% the. We ddpedl~86~&iduwy&, &aaed mWars . 1: applieatim.t o nd-ycem h mw ,p apa raootdr cOLd :bd mdhe~ ~ ow.v ~ Thdso impmvmimte &'-oing our ability to colleot, &ms mh, d y z o , and sluae . inf-(m) I l i I ! The dhet aep ha~emJ'q iR the M1ogy:hgran1, a mdki- I ; yaar-em eml- o ye ff3lW,kh8IW @ techrm0161fl8~t hat doww -to aceam, oqpdm,, and paulbrock&~ Tho Trilogylhmgam h bed c i t p r ~ ~ ~ a l l FBI dB&, inohmdisgovk hpl Attach6 otBcaDw i l h m df petkotk mmin~cqtio&,a -al 4a ofoffim~ b& Qole, &d.\~set-&id~ - - Web-baseti ap@Eariaro. Wogyup also wnttrob to pllovide an I egihaxl laval off r d t y for FBI infwmatioa CU) . . . 8 .I' ' ~ ~ u ~ o g s ~ b & . i i , ~ ~ s g. w ~ ~ ~ t inv-m amdl $matysrS yvitb sasy uxasrrto*fi bm&&&- 6mf ati ion r e l d q t o t s r r o r h g a W a ~ ~ r plsnthaDwomldpmvi& i&nnxdi* supportto~counit ' . a dth m i m m m ~idycf egse Qe mjge mil effe*e8sv 0fth.t sllppa( f i r * b i d w a pbgL tiamitions us hm separate qmtemi mmbhhg separate Bats, towads m hvdgatlve Database ~ W ~ O U ~ Q @IW)fhato0nb~-rlldatatluat0l~1~flyb~boT~h&e~f~I DWmi&Wb Bmwu with a dagle access point to wed dorta sopross that were jywiow1y adbible ' only 4hpugh ~rqmabd, ovk$ped aytame~ yprovidiqco mmli& a x ht o the data, . f o r Q e ~ t i m e d ~ d t o o b o r m B e ~ ~ ~ d a Q s o i u w s ~ ~ ~ ~ e a m o i a c0~1ete'visglf~ft he i d o h m1 p o ~ ~ sbeyd th e B m u0 Thq imiltid &ep toymdqt3beI bw wee the imp1-don of the Seom3 Cow@ertmdlst @ d o , d .btotype Ihvhmn8flf (SCOPE) program. Under the SCOPE pfogmm we quioklly wmliw c a m t a t d m bdbmatioa &om dou us data SO^^ prnvi,ulimg anal* at Heah- with subsCemlially grater m sto m om in GW 1- b eth an wiah ~thma imreatigttti~e~ yatcans. SCOPB database also gave us an o m ' I t y to tat new capab%lim in a controldl anhnunata This prototype en-mt has now been qW by the IDW. 0 . . The d d v d h ib first phaoe bo the 0fic'a off 1nblli8mce in Jim- 2004, now proviidb analysts with fW acoass to inved@ive hhmatiom within YBI ma, inclu~dingA CS t n dV GTelF &@, open rrome nowr Ms, rmd the fUes of oth(%f M agmcim suoh ae Dm.T fieXDW9p mvidm physical: alagge fbz Pr d aliow~u sm fo access that &b without needin8 to know ite physloal bation or fbmmt. The) data in the. IDW is at the Beard lavel, md q e addition of TS/SCI level Wa is in the phnning stagwt 0 Latea tlhis yew, we ppletl to abnce &0 IDW by adhg additional data soumw, such as Sus~)io.iouAe ctivity Repallte, end by making itoasier to s m h . When the IDW t complete, agan~te and analysts using n m dytioal toohi will be able to scardh napidy fop pictures of knom tmIri8ts and n u Wo r oompars the piotutes with o hi n d i v i ub minutee mtElsip than day. They win be abfe to axtraot subjoote' t ~ i & e s 8 ~p,b m~nu mbezs, and otha dala En rather than ssmm for it mu1Wy. Thsy will haw the ability to identify rehtionahipps across caw. They will be able to search up to I00 laemon pages of international tamh-1t'6lated docunna in sm&* 0' Ul-teb, wwa plan to tnrn tha IDW into a Masts Data Wmhowe 0 that will include the uhinhtdve data required by the FBI to manage ite i n t a d bwinem prooessaa in addition Q tha h v ~ ~davta. MeDW will grow to evmWypvi~e physid.&a dxxqge fix9P nd became tha ry&m of rtxm~rdfo P, all FBI ePm1aic tila. (U) We are hMw dvmcedl d y t i d tools to lhelp'h make fhe moa* afthe datr &oral in tPie IDW* These tooh &OW F+ agents a d dm to look ~UXOSB multiple casee and multiple data mums to jldatify m ~and othero pieces of ~M d n~ - - that were not ~:adilay vdbls wdn8 older FBI -. ?o:'b~tass k 1) make &r4abase S ~&@Kc S id 2) give d y e Qn tw v b d i ,&-dB ~ ~ Jhkc~ht caprbgitMs and r q o~u~p& iEtiesm; d 3) tiillow dy$s to recpuest automatic q&bs to their qnay mdts whmever nsw, nRamt is domiunloaded mto the cbtabm* (U) As the first part of our IT m n m o ne &rb near coma,1&~F BI agents, aaalys$, and support momel era already eqioying naw caprabilitfim Pnd applying those capabilities to the& co-L mhdak 'Theyhw6 qpbdats de&opq fist d secm connd~tgr,a ussr-~diyn taf" to the ACS awe artmagpa( system, the ability to accccls and a& ~orisoIiMkm xbm-reld idah, and new oapabilities'for sharing.infodq9m inside end outside the Burean. (U) While hqm is still muoh to be hndp these effotts me starting to &liver the' . tecfatology we sad to stay ahead off evolving &mats. Vpgdng our tecbology'wlll remain an FBI pribtity for the foiwdle fbm, a d our mnn II'H' management will guntre that we cx)tinSube impnmre our $ma With th~ai recent h t i v ai n~lmatingth e inielbi~gemea gsat ~areetrr aok ad the administrative refom dated to b an intelligme~w~o rkfbrce, we have in place the essential a t r w b d el&ents of atu intelligeneadriveg counterternrim opdon. The challenge now i~ refine ahdl cocontinutoe develop that opmation - mn e&rt that will require additional I W O co~ntin~ued attention by FBI lmclmlhitp, ad constant kaining of FBI pmonndI in htelligaoe ptocmses 'and objeotiva. 0 m ews clady dataatid prom ova the 33 months, it ie dif&dtfowm~lo~,wi&aa'erx&a of thq mmt @ffdsnee@.oowf oouatertmmd~gne fbrta. ~baid& ahd abeamo f etucooaef~rt tacks on the homeland aim sepmb~I n th, thas is eingtd m-0 that ~mpltttd~ya pturmth e pmgmge we hcva made. Thgps am several ymdkicbBh owevar, &t daupondrab the effc#:tivenme of the core h ~ t i c ~onf sca Count-* Program. Thed~oy mMc!w include tha folb*: D&dopmem1; ;dhuman asseta NdardFlLAe Bff&vmw q P o o ~ ~ i i B Pqr nd o m ~ontind'prot#:t&d&c ia h i d a I . An application dlt these pvbtielb the p p a s we have mhiwd &C8 Sqt€mbw 11, X01. (LTP ~heFJ31'hrls o ~ m ~ t h a t b m a a n ~ ~ i n f o ~ ~ m e o f f h e m o s t impolZant wap'tcsb vdga@.u$daP1ac tivity. We h m m l t m g@~w~ in , teading a dw ibg human 8oma1,'mdw e have wed thaw ekille to gaset effect maa - wide rsngs of.h~rd@vc pmgnmwP iracludiq organizedl crime, hg, public oomption, dl a&ite wlkr oiime. 0 * . ~ e w o a l s ~ ~ a v e ~ e ~ ~ p e d ~ ~ o v a t h. s. ~cnoxnami r s i n ~ t h e ~ ProgmqSepemba ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ c . ~ e o alQa'i68 both ia tha US. and &ha& Wn& tho Q.s. golprcm.qit kving.mlativefy fiw asseta who were &le to pmetrtih and report m al-~a'iddps b ,w e were V u f ~ ~to~ l e 8uq&e.-k. QrJ)' .. The Ban= b plaotd 'a pWty on develop& bumam intelligence soimes repatine on Ioltawitiod teaorb. We have ndsed our l r e i n i n g po~m permme1 m ~ t i~w ~d Ouur cpm,tiodp rioQitia~.tfoix us on rwnrce belqpmd Wtile we Va to pow fhb o~paoi,tyw, okve ahadgr men a mduked in- in thb amumber o f h u m s n *mpaulbrock 04:57, September 25, 2010 (UTC) he L8la paulbrockP rogram, Bestween Al?gu& 30,2001, amd Selptmhx 30,2003, the m d a r of aouroas related to i n ~ o n a l ~ ~ ~ i n o I Pbaymeneomdl hsn60pemmt0,8edthe~udmrsocfm ces related-to damiMic tmm* in- by more than 39 pmemt. (U) PISA covaag'e has also hcmisd sign@~ant%r3~fl eotiqb oth our i n c m e ~ focus on countadmh and munt&blligmw ations and impaovenxmt in the opemtion of the I'ISA p r m .P rom 2001 to 2003, the nunmbsl of FLSA ~licationfsil ed y with ffne~F oreign htelligenm Survdrtflce Cow increased by 85 pmmt. We have seen a aindlailar hmwe'in the nss of tho emergency PISA procwt3 that peer& us to obtain iman9di1ac1o vmge in meagemy eiWons. In 9032, hre rwamplei5 the . Depadment of Justice obtailmd r total of 170 onnagency W;r][SA aubdzatiuns, which irs mom than three timas the rmmbqrof mtqpncy p n ~wheb obtabd hi the 23 yam . betwem the 1978 machat of .lFISA and sqptmber'l.l, 21001. (U) In lhe~ pBthe F BI prod& idre than 3,000i npaulbrockmcqs~E$odwti,, ~ C ~'taUw" Wrnm ,~ nteuig61lli1i~nd1e1p1th0 ~ d~ ~ m a b , special evmt threat aaeammtsr, d fmd Prddantial brlehnge. Wc ate0 mnductd nmmu8 in~bl~genbrcie~'li nge to manbeas of Congra13o~& ez gov-md a~gmciaa, nd the law do~aneaatn d htUigaccoem mdtiee. I l ~ e e~ffwor ts mark a n& beginniw for the PBI'B hltelligmc8 operation. 0 Prim to Sqtsmbca 11,2001, tlhe FBI produced vsry few raw inteluig~ceie gom. 'In PY 2003, WID proSuod and digs* 2,425 ItBbUigenw Itnfma Rqporta (we) o o nraw~ itat digumce derived &an PBI invdg&ions and intellligmce caU&m 'Ihe majoririty amtaiad i n t e111t~etdo i~n t d o ~tedrm -, ths next peatwt n&m.mnt&td fi,@ InblUiv aad w W B X W Uhfh~m~at~iq i dth e ~ ~ . o oorimi,nal d~v i tdl qa~a d c y kc baIT h-is IIRs weas diwto r wide custuxnar mt ifl FBI ffie1d ofl&, lPle Intefliigmce CMmndty, D e f e Community, c~tlh& fsdsnt law d o ~ m t onil U.S. policy entities. 0 . h addition to W era w irab ' d y t i oi asskt~abon s par witlibom offhe InteIligcmce Clmummity. The mPBl I developed issued, in January 2003,~cl aWied compmhdve iseeeemmt J the terrorist tbreai to the U.S. This wsessme~fti xus88 on tha tbmat~th at the F'BI sees kIopiog OM. tPld nixt two year^; 0mbd0a pn WWJ& ofiamf-ion ~6gadlingth e motivatioiu* o b ~ d vmq&& , andl q&Btio~f d t h gt eraiSt groups and.&- . potential Iot..th6m ergence of sew tarorlst gmups and tBPdaEe hugbout the ~ w dT.h is thieat-ass-krd ts wed rs a guide in the dlllwaticm ofinv-ve ~ 9 a~s a , , useful wmpMIon of tfmaat i s & d ~ o n for hvesti- and inten- personnel within end evithc)w.t the PBI, and ts a reso- for deciia-&mah - in1 the governmait. Ths 2004 threat .ssesm& was m l d in Apri12Q04. PBI anallysib have produced over l(Li0 in-depth d y s e s snd several hunchdl cnmznt intelligence articles in addition to the wro& they do saaistbng FBI i n v ~ o a d p{.IU ) - We lure pr%p* to produce, in Ohe heat futcao, the FBIDaUy Report and the FBIMatlonal Rqvott to provide daily inBeIligm~8b riefhqps to permnkel h, the fiad and exteml cwtoinek. One willl be ptodnced at the c M dl den 8 .hied in distxi'tiurtion 'to upper-level field managem. the^ other v@ be uncIm*[d and uidcly distri'bW to field office personnel and our partaQs ip (he law enfbnm~aot omdty. (U) . A g dIB X-1e of OUR ability to exploit & h c e fw L intelligence valve and share that htelfi8:ence ia 0u.r urn ofthe d-Qdib t e m h handbook A tmrislm bandbook s&xd a m m al-Qasida location ovsrseas in Dlns mid-1990's was decbaed ' and releaad by DOJ shortly affer the wmts of September 11,2001. We dketmmhed that intelligence glm~edfr om .tho handbook could provide wef'i.g uidasfde about al-(Qa'ida's interests end capabilities. Amfi@yOwe produced and ~BS- a seria of intelligence products to sham thls interllipnw With our pa,g~cnmeiln the field add with'burlaw dmma ~pwtnem. Mine hblligmee Bull- wm baed in whole or in patt on this hblligenm. h addition, we ueed ~ ~deriid'fmm~t hs d-Qa'id~a Hamlbookt l to updab our coua-h in01- the 1nnIMgmAcd8 yst~ asi'oC oke at the College of.hwlytid SWa, the &t&ldon 00 CgiunWaroh Course at ths li National Academip a d 8~851im T Wow laPd Qfi9om Ssfsty in ow SLATT tddqg,'Tham qbsifbd vmion a f bh m&oalk b now &M ~IBa refaehce in the FBI LIibrsry and is soomdble to dl the et~idemts at the Academy. It also is I1 inoltadd in the mf-ce rmmd C23-R.m di&i%uted ss part of ~ ' Mhh'in g. (U). . . It Onc t e d l i q me- of ow irmgmvd oounteatam~rismo pdomi s tbs develogrpmt of our o~&ili,tyto bfleftlp M yta m& tlmat idbmdat Tiw ~ 1 0 B ) r no~f tlt& oapabiliity 1r&ts the &8 ofovut ~61~- c!ornmdm %P=(U). -. I . . . . . . . .. . - . . . .Ri&t o ikptenib~1i th, hkedt he capacity to provide a ct~qrehdve w-'b i l a h ~ t o d W ~ ~ e w .h a t rtcqre was^* mt a @-,of ~ lh~ h ' ~mdth s BUNXUIPI ? oior=mi6he &ttamep~. . G e na~do thew in thb khhhbhdon who make aparmtid and policy dsl.,Mm. With s c b e a r d i d - p v im which i i t r M m wars nm by WVid0181 fidd offim, t h e - ~ a a v ~ h a d t o ~ e l q t h i s s p . akill.Withtbelleed.&mmM hthcQ8 oftb m3W@ W W~iO& dOD b@B8dingb the ' . ll!%&~ouae s a o l h r n ~ ~ ~ W $ o!n$.c!o~-bt *sw wmts. We badno medyniam'inlplnoe f o P gtha~dM~mu~tbn , sa ~ ~wee p initially ~hhni$nrg thq, paat 3 3 r n ~ : w i t h ; t n e r ~ ~:ohmEt hve ~ a ' IntdQmw CommunityOm h e6s tabWedthn idhwdxa- d the cadrs of pro-W to p d u we ffipe aIdybri~5gas dt o dhere briefing mateddls mare widely within. fie! emmi and with om pwtnem* (U) . I . . . b l 2 0 ( ~ 2 ~ ~ a ~ ~ d ~ ~ b ~ s ~ s , ~ ~ o ~ p ~ t h i n Co- IDivbion to prepam dainy Eefifig matmiale. In the summer of 2003, this group .was rtmmad the Strategic Andy& Wt and mw~tdo thd OfEd off Ink;Ugence. ,, Be&miq.ln Aqm 2003, the S-gic Aadpis UnIt bgaoprodndng Uho Dimotor'e ~ ~ ebrie~fing th~at h:lcudw eMo dono n tamximn threatss and infbmatioa reW to all mm of FBI TO pllUdl~pc8t he DD& tha S-@C h d y ~ iUSI NI0  and r0fbWS 'infixmation itl a aldmdhd &mat by infdigmce pm-el in each divisioa Each modq,i p&donh u tn mt hm& is add& md irnfodomebo -uft tbat have 6aen thoro~1..$dyv ettad dmhg the night ie removd The DDR is alktri'butd to executive8 in all :FBI opodod divhiom. The Director usss the DDR to brief' the . Rsaident n a yi ~wddqay m o w .'I ha PBI aleo.pudwcsst he paulbrock 04:57, September 25, 2010 (UTC) ' ~nteligenc~e sl~a'u~talm iinti~d wdP BI hamep md~wot oredng tapim a f p ~ ~ in- to the lhddent,, and ae iobdearlia, mq pemom%a~ts lT ITC and at PBI. . . H@a&pwt& ~ X h ~ bt0~ tthe8 f0 IllIUhblon 0f.the draify 15midimt '8 ~mo&t? %reat. Rqo?t (U) I > li* ~ h 1 ' 0hrh tiilep holde h t t tb riefings twice a [iac an htelligtmcd brieding in . the morning an~d a oasesrimbd brie5g in the evmhg. At thee@ briebgp, a brief= and the qeratiod executive maamgem provide r eummary of the o m ttb raats nnd our ' I I operations. With CIA and DHS repmsaMva in atkmdmcq, these meetiags atso ~ o v e - . to ~m that all threat infodon hi qpqriably pwad to thorn agenaiee. (U) I I 1 The dfwdopm&t of (hle deify brie@ opadof~is ie tmgib~erneamure of the pmgess we have mode clime the day when Utzrorlm isnregtl@m wem rim by individual field oJB[Ic68 md little s&rt was mode to ctzr&aUy ditaol or coodin- them [ I.. hugboutt he :bm8um d with the o hog a& i1nv011rsdi n pmbding ths US.a gainst . -- (U) II . . . T ~BB h i k o r i ~@ae~m~re d it$ pafbmmue tq a extent, by tho nmimba of c r i m i it d While weN for traclitioal law donxmmt, ~Nhem the 1 . - @my objtxtiivo is awst and p d mthi s &UIMis u nder-inchdive aa applied to 00-=L arh- the primary objective is to neub&e tam* thrats* It only caphnas lhat d b w to flbamdd thaeats that are n e t 1by anesting tezmris~be urd prose&ng -11 with dmgea ufrriminnt gxrwism. It fails to apUum (he termrist threats 1 1 I .-.. , wnneutnlizetkmu&rm~o t b g ~ ~ d ~ ~ p r o ~ 1 1 ~ 8 - s l - a o- h u r depmWon, d&don, arest on n a h mch orgea, e bof ass[*,- and the I1 ' s w ' . o fin fondnw ith foreign jpv- ioP I&& use in taking d o n -I . . ~ ~ w i ~ t h s i i b o ~ ~ c u ) [I , , . A more wefirl measure is one we bve,usedi n m m&Q oases --the number of &y?~mand dimmtl=ae This meaauaa counts evaybime we ~eitbex by oursalvcs CDI with QUP partnem'in the km laweaforommt amd ingengcoem udties - cadact an opim~onw bich~d isables, pmventa, or intempt8 fimddw 1. dpd&cigpa,td ~ in doze~nosr oofp ~ g , beill. 2001, the FBI[ has I U iotcrnationsl mo* m d a ~0;- the number dtiimptiom is siguiscabt, the most t e w m a mq~fo ur progress is the m.ankef'inw hich we have oonducted indiwi~dtaaol pconsirsbx~nt with ~ ourpvention mission. The axteat'ofow -00 L most olmly seen in the aqqmaoh we take, whan Fdnhnthg ~pecificte rrorist ~ bOur q.pnw h to these operatiom d e m o ~ twhe extent to which tmdhtion ad pwmtion through the development of a~ctiodlein telligence have'bmme our guiding o p d dpd nciples. 0' . The Sep~hber11 ,2001, tenmist attach awakenod all of us to the d a yth reat of modem ttmdm atld to the naad for bold action. We im thn FBI havi undataken that bold action ova the past 33 mm*. While them3 is still m h work to be done, we have made ~leca1hI8p I.v~. With these a&&, md with ths tmmv- q o r to fthe h e r i m people, vie are oonfidmt lhat we will prevail in our war  txxrmriem .. . mdysQ. 0 -is@: The lPBI hae Mtem a bmbao f t a d l o h wto @IWO the Pliring, trainimg, and retantion of dm &OD the Septembcl 1 li attmb. 0 The rni'jl offim (OQ- nlad by aa E K ~ ~@W M W E a 2e o atma: intelligence mdyst in the U.9. PntelIIigtmce CmmidtyI has ckwislqped .. a + d & ~ p l aton OhaD the FBI dvelyrndfac adi- 4th critical sltjn vb pro* wm11d-chs imattjflgapc8 d y hfo r tluo FJ3h d o m I~n S qptmhet 2003, the k t o rq qmvcd tb FBI's Hmnen 1?denft or . ~ i cWm t of O pemtlw-(CIDNOPS), wldch  on the lxsmitmera hirhng, 4leVdM.dtl rahhg of immm rnaIpsts:(lf) to tho qqmd of the EIurmrn Tdmt CON0:PS'the FBI stlrort q d i l o tti the WbEgcmiic a@ytposildc+ AB .mzm~ot mutbdy par( o f e a m tU ~ W * b'bn pmpamdto rmeataraqipg'dtrrha(ladbw . oakstdl imelligsaoe a~Iyst~s( RBIIIQ &ml. Tho intblligencis mdyd '* r0cnmideveruts r, t s w e ~ a s ~ ~ k i ' ' ~o-e~rnd- y. RVIIRO otob~20 03 - April m,ahte PBI pd*W in maabfhan 10 m*lthae v%lxtad p h st o patidpatein at lea@f in, Witidw mt~tb mugh Sqt.s m.b er %M4. (U) * ' . A maicc~iimgphw es ~ISO i n ~to  ImL thdO M e~Uig~mcQe ~ y t ~ &- e&rbO On F&wy 8; 2004, an advathermamSnt bpedic to the ~ ~ o d ~ ySafshsPBtIwaa~ pMI~'mtP~lqW ~addqnbnP ost, . I on Tiunm, imd the New Yo& T'itne~dl ha s dm6 been re-dvriiSe8 nes. chn F~rruary9 ,2004, t* first gBl%%flpl- addmsing ir:~bflipw -'tidyitr edtammt a t t he PBI'wasm f ~ ~beyd t h 3P BI.Natbd Prese Office t ,kicking off an ~g.qigpA,n d, kt P e m 17,2004, the 8 btmiog rmh~ewvkith for W1E,gema Manraea A. B arqd two Intelligence Analms. (U) 1 In 2004, the FBI rcwised its hiring pdurcw for Intelligence Analysts to mom 1 effdvety ramit and hire cmdidatm with neoesaary critical t U . T ~InBew system is a remime and weighted questioe-basd tgmtm. Tha weighted questions were dwt:l@ by a group bfsamim inateIli-w amalyste and inbUigcmoe d . y s t I mamgeiy urndm the drmtiori.of the BAD for In~1:I@oes a d wsn, designed t~ . idapaiest the m08t hi#dy-d cm&dab$ at dl entry grade iweb. ~ddhe m . t direct r@Olt%rf&mdld8h h'bb l&3h~0& @ ~8id081t,h e 01 L I dUGd0n 000~&8d~pI@K) @tW~ IhtWdICl OIlf@&t! 8bdhlb ~ 0 dhdav e W ir m~emakt, w srlr tPle FBI and a r ia~ E ouim:yem d@gme; Sbdatam ay alW~69em - of'work wlth paulbrocke study or may work in the w-m in. tnwhqgo for tuition aeai&moe.~ The.pmgmm taurge$ who inW to , i 1. complete a four-y~azd egree in dledplinw nded for PBI IntdUgqnoe~M yat work ta ~luc%uxb bmatiolnap Studlee; F d g nL anguagm; $tudisr patbmt ta li . sp~ag m h i-c8 1 ~ mi^ dm, ~ i ~ t ~I ErCyO;~ O ~ B~ W~ S~;R WS~; olitioal Scis~a~P;u blic M d m t i ~ o nW;y deal Soime(* and J o d m . In addition to fhnci,ailq sei&c4, studmta~w ouM bemefit by o t ~ h i dsqig nificant wQtk ( 1 t~xpdam8a, nd the PBI wduld beaeffit hughi a- mi by the st\~dmttd contimua working for the FBI fix a p&& of tima npamb 6mpfdm ofibb . educ&~l& (U) Cohtg~o f&dyti~S tudim Shoe F i dY EBp 21002, the CbUege ofk-c SUmI [Wh)~ deli~am'13d it emtiom of tbe Bash 1n.U-w AnaJ.)wls Course fop nWly hired anal@. In addifion, h1ugh hte~gmceco mmd@ partnemllipa and private v a h , thc @AS has co(* e p b c i W bahhg for . .mviq! ad carpdad FBI ErabB- AtM4yBts1; 0 I 264 PBI ansJyr& have 'bona the Colleg;els &-week BGc In~teUgeace .Wyt 43nnse its e a t a b b e (U) 11 - - 1,389 FBI field and pewbanel (Amla@tasn d Agents) hava attended ,' f &dhd wun-w oomaea offsred in WI jWoIP with CIAUaidity. - (v) % A- X: Thc Basic InteUgence Analyst Come cimm41y offered by.b CAS'is boing r e v i ~ - W Upon eoqletim of this effort Ohc oourse will be m-ti41d Adytioal cadre 13duWion &mbgy I (ACES I) aa outlined in the HWtn Taleat Conq. The ACES L cpme will incopnite 8evdn1 core-elme tor inteIligence training for new agm$ and new d y e t s . Addipaulbrocknalthley n ew corn &eulma bachw advmd analytic tndd oraA practice, thinking and writing &ills, r m o m , and field ddb. -An intmmd* come entitled ACBS II b mddfs8td h the fimae that wodd m m d-t!d (U) li .: i Mentoring:P ID~$~PZ: he OIi s matag a C& mfmtoring~ TO~IIUtoI Ip 1.3vib guiw amd advice to Ithtelligenoe Analysts on the andytid oaaear in the PBI. Once jmplegld~nteQa, ll new Irntelligemce Analysts (new to thd position or law to 1 I the FBI) will have a mentor to assist them. This pn~grhm will be imp1emmM in' calenuiar yaat2004. (U) Rec6me1~da~0N1o1. 2 : E1tl8ure@ ffdveIn mMgemeRnd tot 81tldy8b. (U) . , . I . . ' thetitmwt'dodthaiitomto e m u m t h a t ~ d d o ~ ~ 0 ~ c n dS~ b0 & phoe to impmv6 tb6.mhrtgmmt ofMIligmw AdysbOll heBAB3[d @ 01have h n ~ p teeponsbility Ror qw &I'e d y d o df h&ms nd p d - for the ~ I B e, I! oomprehapeive aWgyf or aPtIre &ytid arena The htelR%ge~M~lawg t ea t the PBI W0 k~ypk~BIh'$ & * tho mI% S I ~ T $ ) ~ V ~ h~&V&C$Bltl ~6 mte&jr. 0 I i i don gaihee &I aU TntdUgmce am, qdmthZ8 s g eaad a ~ i n ~ n d f o l n I y t 0 , . keep mpxvbom hfbmed as to odtiak :mo1Eh- . . I ~conBolt or rIl ~ ~ ~l ~l oni BC&ary1 , 2009. The 01i a l%wpom'b1lfe b* d'ed cmemw 8Eenbrds for m bnhhg, rnai dmlqhg the PBh.htdHm d y t i c wcddbew3. is well as fix emmbg -mLm~sfmda-@& a d field divkiom based on inbum pdodtim. Opaatic~dm d field divisioms are . -ib fw d n y - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t to f&la&I* fm' d* hlopmeprt dmd#lyh OL \ . This new managad mp&l wros impfme8Wby plgoing &a section cIhiefb at . mass d Y p d ~ ~ ~ ~ g ~ ~ i . f i ~odp e-mdi d& . b m'tm1 &the OL %hose section chiefi;; m rated by the eppaopriadt oB.eid in 01 . and reviawed by the investigative division into which they are . w1.0 pSs~onse:~ 'PI ~ s P B I a ~ ~ a n ~ i o n o f t h e 6 ~ ~ ~ m ~ t h s % Sqtcmiber 1 l .a@Eadb a ncad bba iqmvement.$ the -amdhWion betscwm operatiom ad &dytiio dts. W c b e ~ w ~ o o o ~ ~ . ;hmas ddrw~c~all(y~ f f itnpmved, Consistent with the l3imcbfs May 2002 mounmmt of the FBI Stratedc L Fww, the Count- DiMoo was mrm'0o inSplmmt a that-tem a~lpmachto better dim the FBh effh to pawent tem01kamT hs &al apprnwh mom away froin i traditiolnal ld&Gd sfnmtmand ~cparatlonb etween analytic and' I q d 0 dh ot'rons md employ mat&-~gementt.ec)ncqtwa ed in mccasefhl bwinasae and private o r g ~ 0 1an1d ~ govmmt agencies. (Up I , The goal dtha raotgmhtion wae imp18~1paQI~oonfn a n a~qmhtionat @ntctum and concept of opdona that empowem Pad snablm the FBI to $chitwe the phrity of p ~ ~ t ~tthsh Ugdt d S.Eetds ~ I IteI~ mri8at tMk by Mt&g the flow of I II . omd don befwm opdU~dtBa and 6heir 4uapio mum&* The PlBg the -t thraat OHO OWE ~adl~hdh msie, oi~ba~t d~ aad Domdo Tcolwiste. M t i o d y ,~ aarose-ouMqg& erst h'ebh of&eso mmi s the tamrid acqpddtion of wqone of mass dedructfon (WMD) md the mime of U.S. and intmiWionaJ. m n o ny~urle s andl proceduree. 0 Usiq ithis threat-based &mm4)*t he FBI s h t Mth s qaations ofthe (3TD along a --teaon ooraoept that wt&d the bulk of H!b hvdgdve, fhmc& reporb and req&matll@Ba nd d y t i a dm e o mi ato three L ~ atetaa m. TBg c o ~ o ~ totf a e'acIh threat teavn ers ~ 1do .&a0md ay-to~* itl-la~ns and creata ~ ~ 8 ) F -between the hvdgtttive ad intelHgmce dsciplinae. Iha CTD .hsdatant Dinetor and Deputy As&ta~nIt Dimatsr~( IPADQj)o intly ihtig.t he invdgativi add analytic prioriti~as~tr ab)Piehi ntegrated q 4 o dP nd analytical objsotivw, @ allocnb CIp . mmow fm ad teesn based an thow pd&t%m md &jd-. ' Tha opmdd~@ ~@ega~d~ponfarwhtPllootteamhavebesnQ$rw~torllPBIfie.l d offices wharr, tfwy will gwido field q40d 8ctivitia. The ccmponenta o f e h threat team are co-loeatad to hilitat8 day-to&y " m a ~saod cr~wt s synergy between thehvd@ ivs snd htelUgmc6 &uiplina. (U) . - The Office of bblligq meambites has e&&Mghe'dprinciplea within the Be~egtle st h @ d o nbs 1-. bt bre B- rather thn a dngh ficld ofhoe a h mm~on enatn d will be &wed with .II thwe with a l e @ mn dI-@how. R m m msidn to .. Since the Septmnbar 11 sttacks, the FBI's Offim a~fh tdigmw hes pubbhed o ckmpt of ftstints b o r b B B i vM diopl -aaBU &O'P*h is po13bIication guih ths ht he &'a08 off~ W-Q h @ltdhs d, eo f the qcompme~ bb cam@m m commeaa on the aclclaraoy of b1'8 snd the pmtediop to be a£hdd Tho IEhacnrtiw As&@art Director for MeIligleacp iB the &Ill etwm opdons laQ inteIligenc6 oomponenb in the pmdwtion imd ~ s s ~of ointelnligen ce ghduds. (U) The PBI has put into place a nmba of other m w h m thaf hava vastl.y impmved ooordinrdion between opdom and malytic oo~qmnenti. 'H'h-0 indude: 0 Q Twioe daily inblligmce and operations briefinga'ohairsd by the Dimtor end addb ;y msxetivq l ~ w ~ - l m l ~ k g eanrds l,i b d g g t s f tom both the o p d wa nd inbIligen& components d the invmtigative &visionsDa s well as the ExwUivivs. Assistant Direct& for hQeIligencs @dD-I) and.othsr 01 mamagem. Coordindkon *huesa n bwdm d directions an, given fot both o p d o f la~n d inteBlipnaou issues in cx)mection with tPle pio4ty heab and important inveatig~cms*. o II A daily Zintc~lligenw onB od (IPB) was ~rbli&edin August 2003. . The , WB met&? &dly end is ohaired by the W-I. RqmamWvw incBu.de sdm . i I a The Direcbr has him' the BAD-I as the FBI's chief policy official for Inbllipnce city, the EAI34 bas policy '.&thodtty to . &as i a d d tekefica, md she hesimthdcdaad~o ea that huve*dgmifimtryi rnpmvd ' c c ~ a a g n , - . aqd'ooasuW01)h. -w C oftho FBrs nqx~nseto Uhe threat of tumxirhq both domc;SticaUy and Anmad, ~rthioh buin mati.d-Upwdm .mutltri8&e3f ib- d o q d cm - wsapona~flllrrmfs i e m l d it~e rn*. qJ!bm&nhmpa. - ' SllRsillanoe Ad,, Natiod Smnity %,'mum divdbpna& M e p y and hmkmrogatim tdmiqym, rapid dsp10ymem4 and digital and e 1 6 d c exploiWiq. The ~ . h p . ~ d a ptheis dtra ialag ~ ~ n ~idtsalti6mdc mofb~ed mait$?R.~& &>mw ithiq ffis m&. Ag8~1eiwa nd private ob-ra. m ~ o ~ t l n i s t r a i n i t l g t o W I Ime ibdyais &om both the field aed h c d q m ag v v d as to thw tmfbmmmt pemomeI assigned to the Joint Teeladm Task Forws,(PF9~tb m@n@ ho omtry. CTD hna m~rtri'lpubdd ~ c ~the ~ ~ t o comes deveIoped by @ College of Wfld S M a ad the Cantran TmntBIligmce Agency Wvemity for FBI-. flheae oomm ah 1.0 improve ad &a analytical capability to quickly amxtdn Ohe mlbbility, incpliddnae, detail$ of t%m,rist M g stln d Bow tbeat-re1latsd Wmation is &II* to local, &&qa nd fddagencicrs. (U) . CfD's p'mfocoa is Uo s the most bmadliate tmhhg nee& oft@ FEBh WOWC~lD@ he~s b m~ 011khw.gi thetheT raining M~tlrPOi~fl~ic e of Thhhg Deve1opment, b '&reab cdcd8 which d h s e s the needs of Agmb, M y s t $ and Task Force Officers r~aignedto &un&atemWr elated matte9.s. T bcu rriculum bwd . approach begim with a baaia u d m t a b g ofthe fioumbtiora of both domestic and r , . being condu&d on a bphr b@b iu01:ude:h tenndmat T ~ ~ m . BO~pdiocm S . Internatonal Tm* $ o mD wdo~anta,n d Intarvim and Intawgatio~no f IeWo I B ~TIrae,e hiin ins && w being dweloped'to me@ the needs'oft he PBPo [ 1 . , &er dunging corn-- ~ ~ B ~ O (IULp, . (TD has dwelopd the course, "&pugl=h: A Strategic a d Tactical Apprhb'" 1,-8 ths ~ v d d m hag dfor O rathhg of -6 d looid law enfbrcemmt oiBosn enwed in oommWmWad invedgatiom tbou.gh the The comopntamt ofthis tadhg e m p mm ud&* o t ~ ~and v e opkDtiod rqphmmb in c o - m h inv~gatio118'~op~orhirirm. e psrtioipante ase bpiefsdon o variety ofh-cmal Umadst o r m o w , Middle Bae( ooltare spd @ad est;,and unr eaposad uo ooincepte inv~lviagtl es~anmami~e mitmemt ~IMB Q~S~,UWW~ paulbrockUCMXWIOi aI!QwWid,~ rimM01p;1;o bh~, ' itechiqqa inhareat in hMMlt fzrlm- d;ad -cka-s e ?his oomee ie presented m g i o d ye nd h v i h . t h o l aw d m m ~oSto eb, assigned to wqnk bn 'thcfirP,abQttsl - ' of 8bsir.vital role in the PBPI oomtertmh mission. Twennty five i t x z d x u r ~mee P hndfo r && ;pa, r*R I) \ LgtroutF Y ~C,ID pwticipatt~i n designimg a nevi qipiod to tew- N ' ~ i nfourg mon~tb of~ New Agent Training at dtae FBI m y . ~ % D ~ ~ 2 0 0 2 , a ~ b w a s ~ @ d b i n ~ d l a r m m ~ h ( ~ m d qntaktelli~m( 0im &u&id lblooli hb.fhe MI?d o include 110 bum ofm andl ~l%estigactuivxrek d- .Tine dew b w t m t i . 4b loakc is m qpmach~oin vestigative tniniqgwhi&.awesrMddIe~GPhniaalBn~see(MBCE)escanWWng!h thlgmtire se8Sjiom~ of New Agent Tkdhg* Th6 new CT mnd CI h s t n d d blolck begins with %asic in~mtiBptivek dmiquwna nd cmlminatcs in "a&.anca kestigative Etaahb lsio rmd .dm& ~ o d i o n abll ~ikn mm i n f e w a d v ew itadmsab e]Bqpm& as well i w . h Wi n . i v e techniques. (U) I . - Codmc;as that have been co* by CTD have targeted SACS, ASACs, -SS& SAs, Mysb aa8 JTTP Officers and havd included Suicide B m k Awamness, WarlriPg Together in C o u a m h( F B V aa mdinadorn), mdst Pb43ing, Domestic Tm~pmW,e qotlg of Maw Dastrwtion, lTlT h u a l C omfbence, mdl Special Bvent hdeoagement M d dan me oantsat is apecificallp designed $0 addm6 u andmeet tho ndls of a'group'e activities. Additional oonf'mces rn lbejng schdded to address reomring issum on a Mrigh ts, eco-dmrism, black sepmW, domer~c ,  fi@&R%cl d hkXll&~d PUP8 of ink& suoh Hth&3 li Q a W CTD contirnw to support count+aterroiista inb~onal'traiaiagb uglh the htead008f Law lEhfbnmt Acaddw (ILEA) and bvidm btmction by the Terrorist Fhciqg Opmtions S d o nt o the har~law~ e d0rcana.t partnm world wid&. [ j ' 0 I t ' , The FBra (Office of Thinbg md Development, h coo-on with the , I Counteainte~ceID iMoS @ Q UM~vis~ia isiWd the .N &oml Sccuhity Law Btm& 0, OBlceofthe O a n d el (OW), hm prepwed and'-- I ~ m - w B dee P IISMmip hQ6W g $ a ~ ' C o ~ ~ r l ' d 1 0 1 ~ intawtive 'OD~&~GLBe mrhg hmmfor N aw Agmb anQ all 0thP BI pdsoand dpedP CMT 1wmflitf8.s.l.T hm rnt~apl~lti~tld~'ll rISAa nd WO-m Sharing Th&'Impaot om ~[nvdgdocwea*n d mvm tme fb1lowing topias: lbndhgChmedE Infbdbn; Shaahg hvestlgative M o d mw ith tlbs l ~ ~ t e ~ gCmom~Ulebi i.ty; HSA RsqW- midl P I U O ~m;d $h&tig h68lli$&owitI~hS WU&KBSS p ~ tho Ahch 6, 2002 P m d m . ~h;,m um? pvidea the helnee~w ith afamhtioa on'iafbrmation dmhg and its impact on hvesti~h~tuho,, h &g md safew&jp ofobMeci matmial, r;ad the -A admSairdve8pm.A ll &mb~c md a d y @*s yoddq& b ~ r n f i i e md t OO&wgm dis-l-counre. Itie aecebarnlle to .dU i thePBh- ' .wme~$p~ i ~ga d ~m~opinmb~ta ~aet so W- w ~fthpe ~mrys mw e e ~ n y p gQp d~ev~eE~op m eer=ma . .- the psltriot kot. a (U) . - , I .- tb 56 field divWoris bveq ' nalteamsm,wbMbyb l o o n s i s t o f r m ~ m d u ~ C), r sqaad s u p ~ z pa,n d ar -%lai -*of hdellim d P & I E Q ~ l ~ i O h l P n c a i ~ ~ e ~ P I S A zatlimi- anid the M3, end -tinued thmrrgh Additio~m~My, LB assigned twp hwym Q t ~ q i p 1t)h~e .a-ripm Mvi.don'r Natiial Soanrity Pro- 'Ihddng Uiiit (On]) afthe PBI Academy* OTU lhas carpadled 9 Nm to include Foreign ' ' C c a e U ~ rannd C h u n m him hdion. Thlt training is ~m,vid&b1y OTU I U U X I N S L B ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ( U ) * , . NSLB slso ~ Wjo&--.ari~Ih OIPR, DOJ, h selected fidd di~idonast least once a month. In add@on to ehr-w ofdassimm i i i m md .&ay'sia spentmvi* c&t @,c108td fISh'ciues with the assigned cub agcmts lmld && sup-m* 0. NSU &&sir pmvidle~F ISA imtmchn for all Fo~dgnC om.t%lligmd~ Coa~tat&fiw,m (CmMiotuP1 Tamxhm 0 h-8lWce cl(a8aea eonduc~teda t the PBI Acadhy. Thie tmhdq is  fot mord caphenod FBI p e ~ o m e 1 ' ( i i c l ~ ASACs, Chief Di.vbion &Jow%~llS, pwial 'Agmts, JnteUigtmce Opdom Spacialiste, Intelligence Ragearch Specidli* and other w o r t pmommel) who an, now aasigned FcI/CI/IT matten$ and for persome1 who ars tmdtioning to baa assigtunmb~. 0 . NSLB - p ~ g s e s PJJSA MA tdd FBIHQ! a p d o a nni$ ad~itiod r&ornm am tladgnd ~ L Bhal8 -8m k1yaibd~ a t i o ~&~ma ld ~Pro ky end ~!awU & vdd&f, when I ~ mb6o d l rdn@j mqomibilities for both PBMQ and field division trwi io I@A end mlatcd mathm. ' 0 / # The C'lD md Ohb FBI%W ioe of bdC oua~elN, ational Security Law Bmoh, have vvofkd 0 provide national munrity tmhiq to field Sup&on~ and ASAC . a at Departman@o f JwUiw National Security 9ek.abhg ~onfbrmce8h eld at the Department of Jwtice'e National Advooaoy Ceanter. Ths NSLB asdgned sevcaal attorney? ae hstmtom to wgpoft the codmow which wem cbnd~1icteda t the N&W Advocacy Gentes (NACpsDQJ, in Cobbi4 SC. Tins dix-tqws wwae four days in lapeth. 'XI& ooegaWcsUI &e~o~)edt!o oddn#re the o v d e - nnnmm c e g ~to ' ~ ~ ths Natid S e d t yI mesfi- Wdehm add implem~olo~fz th e Fomign PnteUgmce SUUY*~ Act (PISA). The Tha cooonf$rencc was held beginning on May 6, 2003. Atotal of& m h d - a were coadwkd athNAC dwhg ihe tNhnner . month, md twu 'dm- wge bldl at ~ o r~te I w ) i p ~ 'i~n SrePrp~ta n.2 003, The attslldees wae !SAG, ChitlfMm- ~ 8 &Sp scial A&!atB, Ae* PFnia St*.. Attenmey, mend the a t t o m dpd to tha 08Bcs dInQcdUigmc6 Policy and Mew, WJ, who wac rtso paridhag imtmclim TBe ~ d u m ' ~ 1 uimdbdm tioe on fbe &m md 0=dZ&h of&@In bu@lllC$ alIlIlld&a Q V ~ Wofth a F(3reip ' htdligeace ~ v d mA~ct, ied b d o ns h h g , d i1oqWm'inte11'i- Pnd , .* * G- v,fodg n ..jnteIligmcea mti wpaulbrockWIb]uct0g11e~nxtcio~n 4:. - Q@, the h eo f.mSAi dimda in'kpprt offo riminal IlitiMm andl pmctkid ..- &cal decision- me mnf-w nlso tncludod 8 day-lmg, pmbItm-saI~ exemise, qonduetdl in Wvidd "br%&outn satiom, Q rehfbxce the teaching objectives of lfic cOaferer1cc:. 0 dbrtmce' with the DOJ to train ;both " Gmta and An6dlysUs on infbd011 ooomion bmm Pho InteIjligmce . Community and raw cmhwxnw PIS& foreign inteUiga~cea nd f d g n . c o ~ t e l l i gi~nvadg atio~psm dBPS~Uetcotoilms; a ndl the Patriot Ad. Based UXQt fno su!qcss of both ad-- Clp 5mp1egrmmW and deMe1c)ped a mpional tmbhg mume . to guide all 56 1Pit;ldl bivhiofls on .b Attorney General Onridekes for National Security Inv-om encl the PCTA .pmxm. (U) ' ,_I The Comlgistelligence Law M Uin NSLB routhelypd~ipateisn country- 1 .. pirfic confm~cath at Chmtexhtdgaace Division dbu' spansor( mually on ;a p l y basis). The topics taught byNSU3 include thi National Set:urQ auideliws aad the FISA process. (U) ' 1 Before 09/11; NSLB (then the N d d S d t y Unit) pmidsd extensive training at PBI wmferencaa held rannually fot Cmief Diviaio11 CQmel (PBI Agemt 1 . attorney in the field'didsiom), hcldng one mh eesoion @ioh was funded by the J Couatertemrim Section and devoted entirely to inteIligmce law iumes. Additiotdy, NSLU provided iPlteUigence law training Pbr Chief Division Come1 at tfaree regi4ntd T training confmow in 1996 a d 199.7 which fioeued dtfWIy on inbfigmw lew hm. i t I I NsLU afso mutir~dpl[m~ vidfed hblligtmoe frwv.hhhg at m d i asp omored by the Counmr9ma S d a 0 > 0 I NSLB l op rovih PLSA and @~uE@p ario&c 00rr~muSnicaQio~ diesemxhated to all dvisiom: e.g., NSLB guidance entifled ' ~SMw ~ ~ ( i Prowdm for otordgn I&e~ligme &untarhntemiigehoe h v ~ e ; s r 9 ~ to all fidkd divisionti in Novmba 2002. Crr) ll NSLB-~m~aOin tains tbe WC hfrm$ [&tti.labb:toH Q and all 6eld diPvbim). ~ t ' ~ qidofgwild1 spb~cifi~g uidance on infotmabblan sharitlg. Thb'NS:LB.- I I . .wMbab o fakes on-lineD& doWl@6.' broobmpe'n titledl 'Wow Do I Get a ' . FI$A3m(U)- . . 1 1 o heloplad implanmt ~detate'andlooalisw ofimtrochtcsng, with the ~olbsaion0fCIP~t I. T h e R 4 p o r n M d 3-mmin - m aammgqe.** to intolligrPoe; diesemidm of i n t e r n ~ * # ~ W ~ , . ' i I l & m d a llxp9*o.(U) ' - CTD brPs wel loped a CQmtcztamh Traiaing Traok to ttdckes8 the most immsdi.a. t.s edua~dionanl eeds ofAgenb@~ ~a ad DTlrP O~camaa dgned to - co-lreM- ' 8 w i t h a b p s i o d ~ o f p s n w i s ( t ~ @W d n ~ ~ d . y Oh Rg^ -h m e4 ~hm& 1 d 8(U ) Spcoific C OrWg~nd fo r @e Basic lml oftraining fob age at^^ Analyts,rmdl llTP Ofeoasb%Ud8r([T) . . . I e Intematio~dT mrism WCQ d o m- apprndimdely 850 trained e I n ~ i ~ n~a l mSomhe D m l ~ e n-t q ~m-ly 300 trained (U) a C ommhm~ A SW~@ca nd Tactical Appmach- ~ ~2110 plus 50 l y I '8 lla&u&m?.*d (lu) D O P E P ~ G~ Q ~ T O W39 -W0C~)L I ~ Middle ~ tChlhWLA M 101 - online amma (U) 1 CT Wg for $tats Pad Local Law Eldbrcmmt - 130 Agents tminedl as instrum1 fa 26,880 isw officem;(er]~ I College of ~ ~ c d S t u d ioeEms a mriw ol?come8 for andm that support the CT mitsion - appmhbly 250 trai~aL(ZP) I I Co- designed for ths httamdiats level blud8t (0) IT Interd~wa nd hmgatrm- dee~in i-dm GOm8 for summer 2004 for 40
 * %tat~IIligaGcem utp~@ inI w&ay )fie ld office. (U)

LP.*Wd* with ComqWxwies F'utum Comm in DevePopmefhO: Ovarseau Deployment - Survival Tmbhg for &fenreas Deployments in hostile envirQM1mts CU) r Analysts Trainirng - Suppod Rq0rt~O ffica Training at least once pea quuter/2.5 ~ysW. ASAC/$SA 'I'raiining - PIBYCIA Pathdip#S podh~T q i ~Oa ~pM ofl~rm~d . ~ m p n & tO,u t& Spdmf or HQs once/matth. . .. . I I.. I ' [1 'Or&ui,~ouis-es 1 deeatif~w hich come infmttia ahpm eesilyto oditm *, Virtual Acdmy sponsored by the 'hhing W~tigion. 11 Rec6mendldlaitioNno . 5: PBf AtOomeyr ~houldbe b4~tterf ntegrrded into co~ntetcrmo~Cimn vatlgatlo~0~ I [I IFBE Re8v)onsc; Aftar 911 1, th6 N a t i d Security Low Bvch (WLB) wps mtdruc- SO SW b IIlhlDll the op&llS&dU &llM 0f.mH 0 d & ~ d ~bkf l0dt@th e ( ~ d 0 I d didonb etvv~cnth e ~m DivMon (C"jDIDt ha Coqte1int0Mgcanc~m vhioa II (CD), end thcCzrt,~D i v b i ~t~l,~ ~ u d b& tbMd aPi& NSLB - two tb haidle colPltateorairrm ma#eps (Comtxntamb Lrw Unib (CILU) 1 d II).'d ane unit 80 hsDdle ~ - m ~ gan~d cybcm m~a#a re (Counteih~tellji~Lwaw Unit (ClLv)); (A It fEp~unitheerso~tlylbssa~wto~rrpompoliGyandtraininglewnaa.) W~tbhe achof'tb threa -pfmd NSLB db, thb atkmeys are nsbigned to ppticulardb or sdom wiW CTZ), CD ar Cybesr* Fmthga, with re@ to li htwmtbd T t m h S'ectioms I od II ofCPP, NSEB hna ksdgnd.two attcmmoy to be co-locd m client spaceem I Tbw, wit& tP)ep&gnm~t of an abbacy to each of the @od units or - . sdans, them ie mutho contact b&wm agent, analyst and attcmh rn.lb&al~i&mts that dm. With 1sgm3 to rwicerw. dFE3h9 NSLB atbmm 1bve sp o d £bawd htowledga of tt~6 targets far wlhieh their rmit .or aecticm h beking to initiate or mew covaag8. At'& pint of hitide the attorney M respfrsibf~fo r rdewjng and approving the hitistion submilied to him by his clieat, &a opbmtid unit. Any ' subscqusbt ismor w a d n g that PISA which come to tihe attention of the operational unit with respaasifi@ for the pa&@ is thQl muted to the attorney assigned that Mit. The long~termn d to f= athqgmdis ro increased f f i m wb etween client andl. come& and in i-vd wod@ mlrntimship. A seam of troet and purpose d~816p6. between tha parties which lgegtly in-ear the litrelitnd that legal ast&ance1m in faot - be sought when it is necessary8 and it iol-m the e-vmms of the attorney in rqmdngt o rap- for legal assistpaulbrockP'ew.t bzmors, the bistori~k nowledge that the attorney gains bjr being sad@ to a pdcollq unit cJso i11- his. effi@ivaams, re has ha busb oth pmamt h dp ast M%iari€nyo t amly with the particular invdgation tltus~it s the mbject of the legal quest, but with related invdgatiationa Pnd the errbjeut matter in genml. 0 The matiion of new rmi$ within NSLB prrhlch havo sped0 respbmibilitim for CTD,C D &d Q&Pd t am d ~BOI~OIhMPI l also.inmasdc coabct with the ffi.e16 N$LB attorneys havd this opportunity for incmd interaction with th6 field agents who ate handling the investigations that are being wrpemked by tht; mhbntivb wits to ~wlaicht he attorney8 a& assigned R. m eth at it is often the field ofket hat will haw questions fequipisc~ga n h d a t er qomeo r Mb&m ~iddby the NSLB attorney, parbicdtuly if the Pssw ia thr, atftici-y oq wmlmaa o)fa for PLSA iniM011, ' tha NSLB altcxney and ths field agents have mhed their w o wre latinehip, whereby the NSLB attcmy how68 wham to tun to get -ma to hie quxdoruLa ad th(s field agents know wham to sssk out fn orda to mdve legd iawO-(U) Countat&n&tai on o p d d wnits db to the planned move to mew offloe spaw in Tysom Comer, Virginia The FBI, CIA, DOJ, and onhtn agmoiw!of the U.Se - Intelligence Community will bq oo-looabed fot the hrst hme in Isge wmb& in a dngle hilitye At p e n t, a Uotd of 20 NSLB attorneys are paulbrock to movsto ths maw hWyi n Virginis. We expect that thie move will mdti n the total inteption~o f NSW attcnneya into cormtcatmwd~m.ipVdgatio. (mU~) 3 . . mi-6~ ' ~i*n a i rdiw er comation bf:twat be m~a nd OIFR, ~ .. o.o r ~ggm~s.u i~cpr sa.q. t0 m i P ~ ~ i s i o ~ ~ w i t h, ~ ~ 'dhiclet&~gts,~@.~t@tthisiapaulbrock@&&& Inmid.2003,tfLe 'CTD's &&smtiadT d m@ emtiom S d o pI (IlT'OiS I) initiated bi-weekly opastidasl Bldeeti h. D O J QPIEL and WJ to earn tihat t n e p n s l m f(n) c d i-ON ha ae md rmd(2)~ongoing iiblttgemm qmdiom coo* though OF& wme in sp. . . A t t ea t fha w d ym* hc0& Dhe ms I SwQii~31hCbiefAoass isEPnt sbotion %hiof; ceoh of uht - 0 K. @ M h ~-av~@~8 d fmmrnagldo1 pm dw-fipub r s d. a a l m w, ccm* mwtirwaesinth~;w~ id ofM@--ty invdgatiw m ltlre-field, dm otp$d]~d&g t b s s t o t u s o f D O J ~ ~ a ~ ~ ~m't~bosi WM ndndez tWh 3~. pa~u~ ~ o frras~'(ar). WOS 1. q p m d v e sw em h hfljt invbld~'ih.th~e t;itb6gf the-IPISA. Tiaing.eystemw hich pBni&s ov&isle ~ r ~ ~pi3id-n P R o f FISA 8ppHcrdiw await@ prmqWon to Ohe In light o f m $ I% largs pensentage of odUSIC: PISA app@&, S a $ i m. m h hold r d & o f experitsice $I PISA ma#ers and w. a.r a able to mm* 0- I a M. y, 2 0 0 4 ~ C I P l ~ $ I ~ ~ d d. a n d ~ t i r b e d b o ~ o f i w ~ y meding with CDEDR Sttictly fbr Opdon on the ofpsllding ad adim.PISA applid0818. This m* doe8 nit dlimasa o p d d. & l r g u a d is Baldsepamb.d dwmt b nthe weekly cqxabtid ~s of J U ~2Im, sll PBI a-h nr~lwd with Ina8enting FSA q p l i d ~ m were in rorth6 attadmce and tho F]rO$ I tracking aytan wed intanally hr the sdon was modidd and adloptd for overall FBI wee 'At this mdhg OPR amd the FBI bdancb the liet of pdhg PISC applio~atiom t r U o u g h ~ ~ aorf nth e lawt week's dock& my anergm@ymSAeM een p CO~urtb ut rrct yet inc1udd-ina ny datdhse, and PLSA withdraw&. T$iR c o m b ~ oonf wdkly m-, the FHA Tier Systann, end the FCPA Tracking Slystem b v p mmlted i i closa c o o ~ obnahv em.tbeF BI and OPR (U) . a. . . ' InaddMop, thmk is 1~6gdaarn d dgdfimt. d t ~ obenbv 68~1th o FBIa nd the 0iPR an-1 iesues that arise with m@to the initiation and mmmd of Pomign ht&&&W~1 rn-A GUE t(mSc)-$u&&d 0kWtd0 -eill~u%68 asld ~hyld6d eeimh,pwh~ekSpta ndard IkWdWion hmdura, inlmpxMioon ofthe &&dmB mdl myriad dthca matters. Mom qwis*, qm aaq biw&, bckm OIPR mpervhom and National S d t yL aw BmOh (NSL3B) eupewbomOin cluding ths &nerd CouyeI, and tt;b CIA IIhm ara also biweekly rnmtiqp an PPSA hsws between OPR, NSLB, and the-Officeo f the Deputy AGtomey &ad.b.r i ' ~ ) ~ ~, impromptu meetings between supervbom of OIPR and INSLB, as will aa. rneathqip betwem line attorney, ars held idmoat ddy. At pen4 there i8 mguh and mwh6 dialogus be. tw.c :a the FBI andl OIPR, at all lamla, on ibwt mdtmWc wm. 1 T . , O n ~ l i l ~ , ~ ~ , t h e ~ # ~ ~ ~ ~ d ~ ~ ~ ~ . d t h [I c& ohan@! in th4 PLSA p11'0tm8.T hie hcludpd the 118dmmotf five NSLB &mmep.tboei * finu-he orn;c~*d- to tb 'mtxmwi~dT d m ~ ~ ~ 4 d ~ 1 P I S A ~ a s l t ~ 0 ~ ~ r t m ~ t q . a a i ~ b p. a a d i n I1 . eowrage. ~dditims ~tot,a l of 10 motc FSLB atbiaoys will be rssigned oms have already begun the hcpmaaa) to wwodt,m-he on thc Ii'JSApiocess within 0PRr8 chain ofoonrmendamdnndaOlPR~m~otpejrid~fomoycaTrh.i sasg@rmentof [I - - athneyss hasbmhefid ia ~ ~r@meys ~ t o o~o m m h ~ o p ~ o n(sa B d dh rac0mmUon# 5). Ovw WSLB befievm.. that thle ! + @gtmerat ofIW1 a#ome%g will not only allcdab OIPR stdbg ataortagas, l i but- w ill. olso $ayet o &m@hen cloyr wo& mlPti&i between the FBI dl OPR' Co) -, i. C Reakme~dhtiomm Ilatd to the FlBP* innbradone with the ~ntxdligke n t2dilme:QID).-. b L b - Recommendaoliom NO*.z Ensure &&be mnnagemmeg~to ff* FBId etailem. 0 The FBI is m ageemeat thot the W's ~xymmedatitioo pn de effmtive management to lthe emplomea detailed to tha CIA% Cubter-Tentob Chi- (CTC). Tha PBra Corn.- 19iivbia m t l yh rs one $;EB navpl mgea .Q a rG~S -15 SppgpiSOrS, & 0s-14 Snpdsoxk md thrm ~ I l i ~Mcy~&o d eta3d.bf ive CLA cieprtmats, hadhgths Clmsnt M m StafE Ut the C'r'D d are s u p u through both tha FBI Prnd CXA chain ofccmmmd for the g p d c depment &ey are detailad, with the SBS apanqex bzling their dth& mthg offidal. Baoh dWlm has been ma& ameo ftheir ddeg .and xqpmiiatie~w ithin the& specified ma df opaation and tfLi has been d&edllttd ~ ~In additioyn, alt CtD d.etailassigned to tho CTC meet daily with the SBS maanagex, and the GS-15 Supenviaom meet again in the ~p1mwnit h the 9BS manager to prepare for the DCTa evening brio The PBX Ylas detemhedl tbet the eummt 'pd-~ce p bfor the GS-15 Supavisor, OS-I14 Supdwiaor snd the htelMgmce Analpte are suffidently inc1Iusive to detpbly reflect the critical elements ofthe job being parformed by the individual .detailmeA s stat~da bove, Hhe FBI SBS manager d d dto C'YX swe~a s tha rating or reviewing offich9 as qpropriato. CIA menaga input is also solicitad fin the mud P&mce &aieal a n d l s, d - ~ uPddo -08 Update. It should be noted thst the SBS manager rb CTC doos not havb WQrepo rt authority to those PBI anployoea. . debited to CIAL-F~IE~OT.h ese d P Pm~ pmbed by the T- IFirmcb Opdm S d c m( 'I'F08) wWII'WTfra. FEE! mm~cpdo = qmreBh owpva, piodhj rosoessary guihce lvhd hppnt while tbay aas W i e d to ym Noe 88 employees who idiract witb other hellMgemm agencies better aademand.t bclr ' r e p ~ ~ g ~ p r o c e(Ua)~ w ~ fib P B 8- ~ w m~ dbad i ~bi b #er -ag &the. cass~ess. nd mpabilitib ofsthes U;S. Inte~g~rnCe'Connmtdti&a,n d it hae bhl, and wifl C C > I ~ ~aWe O -8 b IWhid~efh le lllldi- UZO@! the :mE.'1E h6 FBI does belime, how~a,'thaUt. S. me Cmmimity qpnciea htqacRiplg with the PBI hPvb an !pbU@m rb i m b p M i. s n s t a e tlnaa ihs FBI ie' #idly W0rm.d h u t sbmanm rad 911 of the thaihlbbMd~tha t po&~.&ogt' iarrmee BIbd i#v&@m. (U) ., ' . S i n o e S q ~ ~ e ~ ~ I l , ~ l , t 6 s P B I ~ ~ W 5 a ~ 1 ~ o. f f p d ~ s P paulbrock 60 instill s bs#a utmhmtmm of US. ~eUgence~Coiqm,pnitjr pcam. Thme itlchk'(U-p . ' ' Iddditioq,t he tcsini4g ~d@uuwfo rboth~&d&tes ad Iatelligeme ' Andm b being nwhd to impmve Uhe knod~gethst mployexs have 2ib0utU.B; l h t d i g m k 'a~gen~cies, their r 0 1 a~p arbadca, andl b&c plxmmc%l.(U) , 1 . .me w,ce o t h ~ n i ihais ~ 8 g l o wo ftha varim of i n k w er eparb prcxUuosd by tb U.S. l n t e l E g s n c e . C o ~o.n~ it8 FBI intla.lle-lt sv&SiQe. (U) . 6 Aad~rCIA~ffi~idbb~detaadbtottaelrs~-hi~&~nt~ '' anhanc,e 4the knowledgp of CIA wmmv3b operatiow and i i i w oo~dh@k~ioTnh. ie O B C-dS ~ hd aily bl'i6flw de8CdW. di0&w, hac~h e I cliscmwa~ key reporthg stream and coom%tultes nqm* exchange between the two aqgmcies. 0 I

... ' . to tha inblMg~aen d b m ee~d t y~ o m d ~ajt t&hs S EWT level ie provided via D,qarhomt ofDef=e SBCREE Wamd Pmtoeol Rmm,. NBtBVorlr: (SIPRNlBT) M6h pm8oe ths &~mmmhdomb~ w m, bIN TBLd[NIG '; Swmt, Olrr god b to provide 8m-LINK-stm~ acaeee though s&m. dynamic virtuat privatb nehr& to alU PBI w o m m in theneat fWm, Today you o ~ t d i r e o t l y ~ ~ ~ ~ y ~ ~ o ~ ~ m t h b ~ 1 P T S T e n d ~ y W ~ d b tramadions tbr~,$sagPclir e ate pormi#ed Ths Autti-Drug Network (AIM'B'T) ridsa the SIPRNE$ ccmndc&ione bis;o&me &d prvvida tcaminalrr @ aootxk aess V~MCIfQw the domestic aohahge,pfintem on.sndi+wo B a h SE=,ie rtso wed to twppmt ti10 Teanriat ~aq,~ddvDtdjv iw Anal@%C W ,th e N & Qwp~&- m1~1- &ti&%, md the 1~;irqpT m* ~ k i q g 1 rmd~ ~. ' . . III the fm di1paulbrock:61)0. . madi inf-m mid$ mi a\th e De* ME@- ' System (DM$). :Phe FBI is the fmt civilian agency to q$rab fhe ctesei6ed DM8. FAMS rrrillpviide an- czwali~al wim, dc.mwMtiaSim~-e camrscZad to PIB~CNW: ~lp(h s capability to.pnda nd mdve& tied ' ~o~ msiqpifmftia to aiyof t@e ~,OQW addrum oa DM$ or ibtmmtd Digital Nembtk (:AWODIN)a.T h6 TSISd=L,wmiono f?AMS isi sclaaDdly inbaing lind will provide the samb capWty toiehyme o~)~S~3&mr4SNEEby~(~&-f.t.Mesny edar. Tha RBP~it ~491m1dani+of&B US wilP provide writm-bmade seama mlain ta. drlILteIlilgaoce1 8eome 8-d ays off the &a.wh wm. Thoendsdty. 0 3 .@tyg :: a ., web sites @omm BI xc ~ a tMaa rt (ICDM) is ounaultly in development and ahould be on limp by the and of 2004 Tba WI Chidf Jnfodoa' OfBw ii also woddqj with the DqrlhbnmQo f J ' c eo a intdbm betweeh ICSIS am3 the Law l3dbmmmt W d o m Shmrbg initiative and with the PBI Criminal I&A ' b f l m n a & ~ d S d(~ aD)ivisi o~to~ d inpaset ha sharing of inteEpnce related hfbm&on fbm and to atate and l dow ale. (U). Ths mI is cumenfly dqloylng the SElCRBT versions of PM, which uses DM$ and secure Outlook like 0 - df or o]rgahtioeal rnm~qg~3s8o,- thato ur aslalysts a d reporb ofticem om aend and rsoaiva timely htelligetwb adth othaagaadm in near red time. The PBI il alao woddng on a digital prodhtion oeqpabUty for IIRe ~. mrdrop 1-ge (XML) taslt d l ' with FAUF'm d q p o r to n-line di@M - ' Ii c p h d o n of ~tellilgmo@ prpliiappryhg&dabretandardeimdrn* ofidbrmation with &e hteUigcu~'oom&ty~ T h e ~ ~ I i e & ~ $ ~ ~ l y b g o s wtew b~ogtyo +ploy a htecticm h v e3~ b ats 1: Mat capability with ilbardom aocese oontrola end :Publie Key hfhutqudm dfi'cates in.1 mppOrt d ofosed Corn&@ sf Int- whioh will p ~ stam. e &win8 dour most eaylitive data with trustea mmbm of o&ar agemi=. Tho FBI is also I I [. 1 [i. C O ~ O ~kdI lLs~u o h l ~Wr OW dS pa~we hich is th~f~m&bnf ix athe InbIuigmm c o ~ t y ~ I ~ & n ~ o r t lmicr~wtseionfe m*ca GO~Had0& I i TIW FBI p~nm to lnre &id system as the adation for sdditiaial a mat ion tiharhq with fho E, Fcnbrl Stab cmd Lad mtitia. (er] [ i . i opd~da n uninmeo f sew@ M-d FT- amd [ I h01- maw@'W.)a wm. T h a N D B x i s ~ b e a q d ~ o f d o l a a l M m m d a i p ~ ~ & ' 8 & d ~ ~ e8%Ild hdkI '-pW&3tlIl€%h&d d0-6[1t 4-%. The-mEIL also D. be.a fixion poiab for lfie ookl.ektion off Woally-basad a- jdce M~maticnwi ith cc;ssindod l~&Ulity.d?xtCaU ) . . . II Low E n f i ~ m a~t Oprovide~s web-beased m ~mmuniWntso the law . enfomaqedls coglrnuni@ to exchange i n f o d mF OUFOSPL* :$ edwtibn p ~ a g ma~nd, parthipate in p ~ f m s i opd i dhi - aad topically fow-add ialog. The system has baaa II o p d dsin ce! 1995 laad prwmtIy eeaViqg &out 30,Wius&. LBO hea scaam coltlnectivity bo thb Regiohal m m mta ming Systemal nm&-(rlssaet). 'Ib PBI Intea$eflceprodm are di9 8cminatcd w d yv ia LBO to over 17B000in w &mmt ti agencies and tb 60 federal agencies, cnad providing infhm~;Btioanb out temdsm, oriminal and 'oyber thrsa$ to patrol oi3lq anbd other l dla w &&m& peamanel who haw dinst dailyoonttwts wi'Xh(ha gmdp&lic. 'I'hePBPplens to ihhance~L BO forrobwt, high- U. svsilahility opm,tion. The PrSi wiPl h e the b c c d as dhe primany chann~d fot s d ~ v rbeu t'mc1!as%edu mnmddom with d t kf cded, .slate an4 local agencies. LEO and the Depar6mrmt of Homeld Securities Joint RegidI MxmaUbn Bxchaqge System li. (mEs) will be iI1md1a. The Invwitigative Data Warehouse OW)is fillowing 'a mu.ltiPlephased $f)~maotho II quickly provide m w r tt o FBI hvdgat~rsa,n d Task Fomob m&m Ip the form of a . s p ~ y d g y e l6~pi d dp totrpe eystaq, the Secpnte Cbuntwtmo~qp eratlotltll I I T Pmtotpe Mro~tm& (ent(SICC)PQ. Ths emtQpphe sy&m wihiohbuilds upon SCOPE is the I A 1DWsystam; tha 1W deployment of IDW 'ie scheduled for Dwmber 2004. The LIDW will help msat the law do~cemenatn d tOle IC nesd f*r rapid, BI=# d c p ~ lipsb xed ttd'wlp~t bviip~da ta d h gt ~ ~ 1 'PtBo I ~ ~ ~ ~ f&haV CBU) . ' . he ~ ~ l t l ~ ~ ngfdolml~oo~f p %ni~vtr eip tenw'to d i e~ dase, and 100ai hw edomment f51w end prc)vi&pow~t tooh for ow)~=blae d p i. m ~ ~in St; .L~ouit~W; aad y demonstration eitm am ti& ~ m i e t o [ l ) ~ ~ t P l e valae of dmhg irivdgdve ,data which cso bb amlynx1 by mdqp .titoffwarp toole; d (2) help dehe tsobniod and oqgq&ationd apphwhes for m@od ~M6tytems. P&m,l dmM&.hut dqbymnaart bftb'MtSW I be based on d b d hor the dm-- end the m Wwi d* p~ fbr irw c;Pfoampt iafdzxmatiaa]a~I uwing bsing hqwe~!opexbty the Deparhndidof~ueti'bd0 ' . " amta slad &~taip.the FBI's btdigeme W.au widbin tbe PBI. ElCd have ' r ~ ~ ~ r c c e a ~ t o ~ c m d S ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a b y w i t f b o a b l e t a W m]pl~shdar ing tbis h f b d r nw ifh eae~e8w &hfb a8 w da s our custom- . rndp~mwithhBnahrmdhwd~:~dtia. .(U) I \ X8grees lfltltl t h e . ~ a a i ~ 0 1 1 1 . @N. ~bp.t ~o m thelsmlc To 0 0B &~&sm hdema hd fix mw'toS auiitfvS Comprtmimted Mimation ($.C4[) Ithe f01110wiq actions haw been taken: (U) . . . 1) ~atg~s ~ ~ ' ~ 8 an~d in'mq~mitsgd@ nton eew FdB~. ~&itie.s .. . Tthbw. . isll dot+a d6i td,o ot m&h 6~h.ianisf vl d@,@ww,.omfdh inbte~a,lnleidg a cammpe~ml emme -n,.ttqo &.he hliogchelt:eyd c$lans.ssirfiriqrda s, .,. . . . ~ o n ~ m. ( . U. ) ~ '. I. . . . ~Vidsd~.hJ'W4Xto> ~. 8 ' ' 'Queetionsf or the ~kndw hich followed .hui-theM aroh 342 004 kwtimony. of D~WHS mkgtorn end Ford w n c d gt he bunt-* bud* for FY bdeqtmderat on the FBI . . ., dhm to ths Natiod $wwity : fepked with STBs by 22005 ..-.,. -. . . . . . . . . . . . I.. . il that, like other inteUpo8 and law ~ ~ tagenmcim, t it needed to htpmve in 0vay way poasible tlne pmcmsea wed to dieeemidstc threat I I M o d o n. . Sines Sqtmbar 11,2001, the FBI haa bawd olear guibce far tPld diesemhatiion dk8M o ~ o n n~ O ipoloby d~mlop msnt and traiw idti@ivem am in pmgresa to flmrtha strengthen the Fprr h a t hhmatie)n diw-on prumw6[oa Below am ths'etsp~th e .IF331 has taka: od 1-1 . o As hndl.i~sMac prlica, tb FBI's lBAD4, a edor 1~1te11u~anCodo muniity oareg I 1. profd.od, hae'atablbhed amcqltar of opdom, plicitw, and procd& mhtd (to the B s w bbmally a d c m y, ofilrae31 $&dm 0 [I h Decnmba 2003,m BC ma to all.lE?ieldO ffices and Leg&, entitled,. . YRqmrb'w Raw WIliv." ThSs BC pmviddI guIcbmm, reportingj-oP& [I . - md ~uthgaiaspivc&mfwmm w intemii:genceW Ivedlhm PBI hyestigationg and tabIligem COB~CMaOnd~ s, mpbuized threat Mdcmr epding and. d i s s d L a t i ~ r ] r ~ - a ' * I ' I -' Ths FBI hae pmpda nd db&iiut& md& md doh offj .nteQpnce rer~uhmanhCrm ateIli- m81&orn ahd mpd&g guidance) br qpnay-*de we. ir - . - 'Ihose . m ~ ~ . a r s pt!bo ~in tmad: a$d available to all e q 1 0 p s . .1 . 2 The reqi1immtntts pvide ~ ~ c ~ ~and weePTdvefinede intdlligenc~e - h& 001belXd@th e'- t Z l . . l U l l ' ~T he ~ @ l l X i~l ~ ~(md ' o & ~ li . fbimjd h1~1uda detailed m p t i q tlmosholda, tbno &aanm, and rqprtiqg i n s t m & ~ t o ~ W ~ ~ ~ ~ s n d b w W ~ a t s l t h e idbm.d.ons hould lbe mported (U) . r 1 I 11' -. 0 The FBI lhas dev@lOpaaa tbd @Bemedtltd a two-week ~gcdalizedtr eining come for amalp* and agaata in reporting and dkmdnad* raw htellligencea This [I comse tmilches the evaldon of collectad intelligence fix dissemhatioa,, lls well as reporting and dm-i W eon rft using dhn motit q-bdate FBI bwiness procams, fbnna&$a ndpoliciw. (W) I I 11. he PBI is nearing completion ddfia ~wel~pmemoft a new wab-bmcxi li - . Intelligm~wI nfoenR eport (IDK) qplicatior$ which will senvs to vastly iolprov~P lhe efficiency and ~ffdarenmsso f reporthg and tikmhnating &reat infbdon The ww application will contain a hlgle W format fbr use througbc~ud~lt of the PB19ep rograms, and will hv4: a number of advan~xl I! fbahm, asuh As electronic appro* datb and timt~& amping, work now tracking, amd&ar.&td & a e o n bb. The application w i l l be suppor3ea by a 1, co-Iha&&re IW handbook which will be didribz~tedth mughout the P13I in June 2W.(u)' . The Natic~md'f hPaat 1 Corn-- DiivMon'e (m)f dpi p$f or thp re d assmi 8111&t r imrt~ldb. action of all ema:ging h w dTa ron& 0 mdlDmdc T m h0 thmb. The NTCS d i n s t e e& we &utwb with amds apSltiw rd ag~bloimt,o inclub the ' Tenoriet 'I;hreat l i i t e g m t i o n ,0~ I[,'&)rSi st m eCe mtm 0i d the . FO~SpaulbrockT*mI& w~aek~ar~(eu)m . The WC! hbUc Aaadrwa~ta UnB (PAW)S;h 1- Tm& Watch and WarningUnitO,anbTBreatMd~Unit~Iv)*T MUmdCIWm mpmiblo ~OIE: L Oh~@ dbhgd thm c, 4'$c,a nd NqITPi( U) h&fd\~0nf h f!lU@Ofi &@m 8 Id@i~ &',&hldhihge w&d hnthsthtesjt o:itam&mbydv& thrsat idbmabtl~and wtivity h ooojdm with FBHQ, FBIFlsld Offices, Legal Attache$ and tine U.S. En~gemoe OUtfityJIc0)O Baob rn~@.TJhhU& va q p m ~ y t, ~ l ~ m da:vi~ty i W ~ ~ ~ v e d ~ ~ 8 f ~ ~ ~ ' % Q o a l ~ v ~ ~ c EuhOf-tfaes8 k e f d , h the fbrb ofbPnail pedrsooneet TMUr inmn-1ym the rppropziate mIWlt,mam dts, Jc>a T dTesk I ?ome (JTlF) agdqs, or ~ ~ g ~ V~ t i o'w l y~ i ~ - ~ o f t h e o l ~ i n f o n s a t i a n , d ~ a r s o o n d o f . W ~ . M d t m & d ~dlditio~y,paulbrockbrurmeitbe&im s rs me&, these tbtept amdl qicicms.t stiPrity npcab tk assigned ta Twb~calM ~ O&TdaliI&i who him the threat i d d o o ni e ===Ched.=narized,6ll~ andm&mdhthe~habla1[UUtW database* 0' Dmiqf i dy ear 2003, TMU &vd and ilesm~sda ppr uxhUe11ely 11,000 threat a dm spi~i~us.attivirtye f d . TMU mibs@y tanaoriidizmdo re than 5700 individual ttrreat andlor euapidous activity reports in the 'W detabase. TI&J . disiwmhbd tha threat and mpicioud activity i n f d ~ tmo th e orgtxnbatims and entities that had oardpaight repm'bi%iity or incident. 'I'MUr ohely pmvidwd ~bba eliae criteria to the Tenaim Wqm~tasn d R q, W m$ don- 1 diasaminatae the informaton in the form.of am1 htelllieence Worn&o~tRl eper( tr~mu ltiple oouReatear0dsm owtamem, including TaaC. Bebm the FBI became t~Ai~r0liyn volired in tfie pubIication of IlRs, TMU had d i d contact with ITIC on a daily basis. (U) Over 300 hdividuW searches of tha TMU paulbrock database ware queabd of; thd oonduckd by, TMW to fkditate theat trend analyda by FBI mi@t,h a Deptutmmt of amm, lind 0 t ha~gm cim of Also, in 2003, oysr 200 puQfie&on in Ghe joint W d Q nwar n &en didbuted to the Prmidenttaar well 0s rnultiplle f d d . ugmdesa TMU also ieogival requests for, and conduct& mom tba Wmty epeoidix& b t t t database eemhes for major wen@O .e.. Sqpeabowl World and fa.16@~btd ata m hc rs tho88 cbmspondinng with mILigiow oe1ebdlone. . . @ouuttiv$morh Wdck W 'FTIC ppaulbrock 04:57, September 25, 2010 (UTC) wit31 soowls toP'.BIh temsl cbman have begl p~tcdpr oxy ai@s to the m.& CT .Watch a dfb ldefdt md thc %f WUoh Daily Log. Many nsw issUesandqdsteeprareporbdOoCTWbyed Allactimsbken,h~telephone ~ k ~, b e l s t y p e s d ~ m a i l e m ~ ~ & i n & ~ h t h e ~ aWi P~yg~b o g. t h i r ~ ~ ~ h e u r o s s e ~ b o t h i & b a m a i l a a b l o g. d ~ o n ~ ~ t o d T W&b is also al-le to TLPC. l?whxmm a CTW ~malyaite -physicallya d@ to m C whm thsy senre in a &&?rn emukg i,nfbmdm ir sSlared between the FBI and mC*C b~ivtmellyC, I'W pmomel lol have amas to TITC Chhe Mum TIZC mo& all nm theat Modm ad ppvide8 npdatesr on amat tfrreat inve,&gatiaau. I ~ihelatesuam-toeaf~f.lfo,~willbadl~toanewb~,ing~ss sm.b ..*.r, w i l l b e p ~ l ~ d y o o - ~ m c * (U) , Id0nnam~01S11h uia~w kth the TemrbQ- - .p ,Gj$k$$,L. - . .: . he TSCi aitiar~e~ce iva an inqnay itiwn a darw drcemmt ngw ~.u~sqy&t ~ ~ 0 1-m8t an d T8mr0& Orgddon Pile record match, Tha TSC -rmi-.1dth the hq* law &men:t rga:yto pmvide M o nim d comfinn a ma06h~o n the mbject(s). - If a possible match i made, the TSC genaatw a report 0 0 a U. g all psthent biogqhid data md a ~h~gcltlshfta ay.meamhc onducted - The TSC &en dimat confact with tho CTW &a bllkphane ad/ox ireare hMlc to pmYide the i i a f o d ~ rnsg srding the po&ble mafch,.~(U) Upon meipt of the telephonic notificlption fmm th6 TSC, an analyst h ~ mthe - CIW will d a v dl idat@hg Wodon regarding the pogsible temriat ajPject and. oonfinn my iIatab8~se-b M y w n d d bytheTSC, swh as NationaJ Ckhhal htmt Baqkgm'~md'Chw&A CS and Tip-OfE If nwmmry, ths mdy3t will initiate dcli~d &hllse semlies to hcl*. a am detailed ikC8 search, .Telephona Applications, Msgratsd hteUigmce l d b d o n Appliation, Trsseury Enfbmtment Chmtmi&on Systan, WatchM, Dqmmfof SClrte, ~lmmipxtioma nd Nahudhtion. Service,rtsltioSwnr ority Administration, B m uo f Wsoe, INTERPOX, and pertinent public ctabsbases such as ChoimPoirat, Auto-19, and LaxisiMexis. (U) I The CTW d y e tp vidm a Mef eynqsis to a @INm t, who theq. coordhta &ive imd hvestigatiw d o n with ,$he field vir the FBI J'T'ITB,. FieldEEC3AT BfEe88, PBI case agen$;Wox FBI Aiqm~Lt iaiam Agmba The CTW disseminafes the : (roo- find -idmv tlimtrfywiththe, I ' hmtbeJTTP, U1e mmluatea in the CTW/TSIC @up Daily LO&B. Wha5e TSC gAoup Daily m@iac onhib:qmh mob as llwnwO looathasi dm~ffiimd, -bick illlaanbaq; mi r Wptioxi of how the math vm. 1: r8801vd. 'Ibe lojg sntpiw; am raad f n ' d ti& by pcmmd at the TSC m ~@jmta,l City, Virginia, auld used tp hmat a fitrsl wltudon for the encounter and wcloset hs loop:' The TSC'dthabfy repo* all pedmnt invdptive a d o r i91blUligemm 11 Mnanatiion baok. b the respective agemy W nomhtsd thb tmmfist-mM subjwt for inchdon into the, VaTOF databass (TIlC or FBI). (U) \ I: . . ~ ' ~ e& ITT~I'F have been &egmd~'m-h~e.to C TW. Ad4t$mdlys unrk the nasw CTD 4 ow FlPrrPhas bsar.phcm3 nasdar.&e wnbmh of tho PllES. Tbi. mudm of fmtuqeb will fbilit,ab the flow of - ildimw. i. ag mrm ths ma.,m d mL,(C1) . . teqPiPes that tlheiy s u k a y compete h d g n m a gmsuhnt to the dem8m~di.s . S W t o otha inb11Bigmw agdaq, tha FBI '8 gpwtng oadra ofexp~dmodl mppok htenipm dys(e atnd other sptxdalb pvide a &@ant portion. ma& tb@ cp-t -1lhe taam. HOW-$ it is not P- hmt b P~Woff W the FBI to otunractmka a two-par comnhamft to hn PBIHQ podtion as a 'krqpidl mtgti0fzu hnplyiii fhat S S h on -0 Uwo-year aecigrmnmta contribute at.a lass-then optimum ld 61, the FBFs oounteptarraism misisiod due to their length off service* The intention of amice at PBIWQ is Q provide rs, selected on the basis oftheir dmondmbd ac~briwmmwSit h a wries o doufmly d€!lmdq clbdle9iga. T&e~'d-m.pdde an a d 0 n a l - d global scale4 Pimt lins manqgm, w o w wifh tLWrmore sxlpedeand--dm ant1 mqqmtd I 40 ' [-I . by a l m w b d ~ij~iaeteig~tw e play a vitaI rn~ein the idtm&io~ntiOllo fqaationd k A prioritia, dw~eIopm81~a1g0d Drnplem&~e'no f ag63~6y1widein itiativrsb, the aeeeeamend of the effecdvm#reo fttnosel Wdvm; and the p r e p d mo fprodve ntspowtao ~ I1 addrsge ~wgitltgrm dk PBMQ SSAe subsqumtIy utilize thie gabtxit : knowledge atld eatpaimc0 in tha domatie field and ovmeu in ikhrmce ofthe PBH'k mission. (UJ, II If the EvBI L to foetcl th6 belopmmt of true ladq to h wib. r]c~mggle ' cadra, it is i m p d y e all line and mid-twet ri~mgasd.v ely~ d M ya vail theanselves ofthe i h s tp ossible mp of ledemhip cl!~allmgmm, ost parti~ly,those available in lPBIWQ SSA,]godtio~T. he PBrs atwdv(3D welqrnent @ S ~ W O ~ Pfc>pmh as'mught to atdke the appropi& b a c e b s t w kp rdding.fhst lline. w ith o nuqe of (devdopmentd qqmhmitiesS~tm d & m ya dchm hccessim m wtib still prod- cmmlin- irm the numag- of priority Pm PB@=~Y &om pmgrmm with tbe. ns. w ~ e o t i i vadnb approaches ofmlsw Grst &me mmagm. ~mflsmendsnBhI?nN O. 14: Pplodde should obtain ilar mahatfng.r~r& g the ydyIy deck on me& 0 ,* . .. r* f ;. 1 i-1 . d*J I I I step to vtdidaQ6 iha assit ars condud by the handliqg agent and are asod to cletennine the wet's' reliability rnd v d vof the informata they ~pmvided.T hem aqms of repoaing lad th-eIva t6 the facet . .. . of wset developme& and operation. l i 0 Witho us yeat ofqahg md way 18 months t h e ,th e handliq~ag ent is 11 . ' required to mbdt a case agent wmmt to tolHQ. I[t$i wsesment is a Wf n d v e based on the handler's obsm&m of and inm$m with the asset, -amd ~ I CiaDsig~ht i~ntoH &otiwion and mtrol, bnilefs, Mita laad my 6gniiicant [ i behadoral ohaqga TI& time teble do- not pmlu(te the agcart ttom mM#in;a~ mised case agat assesmat in the h eif th e assat8 behavibr c b q ps ipoicantly. Additionally, a revbed vdon of the NFPM section 27 iR cumentry in the draft age. 1 I Thenew NmPM will inclmde language that direota agents-to not@ Qheir*m&e' supervisor if they idlaw a dpdficmt change in the asset. The SSA will #hen dkamhe r f if th&paulbrocksebtesl hwvid chaqe rises to a l dwh ich wdcl q r a q P l i r e l@llKQ nothEica$ioa . it contmt, rgem rectiv~,iiomatiofnt om assm which; altp16ua aimitl~imiiva I - in nature, cmd depomding onathei nfmaddbb & ~ on thtt i~vb)stia&~ptivnei m, . . rogllur followup. 'W1e8e ~ eofs rep a tbemselv~to1 h e 17ea!!of . ossd developmepi%a do petodon FutohepOth ir f b to famp~dt cvdopnn8nt.hndq d o n are dictatsd by tln~lo gical pmgmsipn ifthe iivmtigative proass snd 'oa~oits limited . to or defined in adnnlhistiativa poilcy. ~ a i n l n e n d ~ t ~ ~ a n 'Improve tbe h wo f ~ntellfgemwtn fformitlon'w ~hlm~,c lFBI a dtb adbki of .brtelleidnklo neraw c lother bteUl&acr rgbem'eIw;'. . . . . . I . .... . - . ., . . ,. . . . . .: . . . 0'. .. .. . . ... * . . . , - , . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . - . . . . : . . . . : . . . . . . ;. . . . . * . . . . . . .. . . . . .. - . 1 . . .. . . . " ? . . . i ' ~ e P B I ~ y ~ r ~ q d b i l i i t y t o . ~ a s d o o , ~ ~ , F d .m' ~:. S ~ 6 ~ ~ ~ t eaforcaneat.tod f & d t dh hmtio~ ta ds so is aa h h tp ~of-t it^ ^ lhisrrla $h&&mlh b1~1M~U0 1tb8l th e ~ 1 ~%ta hg.theb fbhk!Uda bs ths & w o n,. ~ b i aigd q$p0yr p q ~-6. 1 ~ The !B?r)rfr ll dclivq its. infb~n.Qhto&gdhhe qmmt the FBI a di ts imtorncm i 0 j ~pIa rtners u~t;--(U) be FBI is c~fis?attt~ ~th~e M t, ~ f O f t h a a s ha t e l i l i ~Ca& Q (~atTt w. &re% ~]Scniitiiwa& m i e t 01 1lpt40(n$ ~ ~ ). k dv:ila tha pew SCI ": -- O p d r i a 1N Won'lr (SCION]).T Be SCmp roject wrb M~lstcdinl S q t ~ B ,20~01,, . ' - od has met d rohsae, budget and - M M & i W ~ U a W- to dhe . . . - L SCIONi p cywktly '~lle-io ovq 1000 ausen & IF431 ~ & ~ w u atndt t~lhd ml has initiated r pilot dI~1~pmpmltj eot to the fallowhg FitBd OfiEu%%'~sw' fork,I Mon, ., and KaPses City*''% he plan b to deewx SCION io dl .FBIF idld Offices, as fimding becoma availabre. lLMtd access to Itntclidk from other Field Oflfim is available . i through the old FBI lhttlligeece I&-09 System Nktwo&: (nsNBT). Mpk of the . Field'Offia-Rirvet wo w6h0adow~h~ich havo a conwctiomi to PBl hcadq-. 'IIbese . ' . wo-OW M ~ I ' q & 6m d difficult tc~u sq and they m located in &all ~ecm ICompsrbnentdM numatiomFum ilitim that are not Ita theageast or ordyat work . meas. An irnpdjmemlt to field expydm oCSClQN is the blc ot'$CIF qace fbt the Reld I '. IIntelligqce Gt6ups.(m0s) 'and the Joint Tmrim Task P m % (J'MF8) pei1mnne1. (U). . . . Accesa to' dhe intelligence and homeland security cm~muniitigY. the SECRET level is provided via ithe Depmtmernt of Defencs SBCRBT htemet h t c h l Router htwofk (SIPIWBT) which provida thc oomdmd~nbsa c1'cb.o1[1teo dlN'IBHdINKm ' Secnt, Olu god L t a p provide' S ~ l P ~ ~ ~ L ~ -acSmee thcrourghd ss ixas - dynamic virtual pivats nepvo&a to 1F BI w o ~ t i o nisn the nmr f i r ~ e .T oday jrou. omnot &#att m w mtwo& 'Mths IB'INBT d ' o d yl ibitad batoh tmmmtiom thou@ m.p d W'T he k d - h gN etwork (,M3T) the $I@'lmT~ U J d O ~ O lbl~Bk blMm d paulbrock'~ and 8M2&8a: W 8. vebiole for tho &m&c 8xclmge ofinbllig-e on mItf&g dEorta. SERMT le sleo used to $uppart the ~ e a ' r~oI~o d vHd) dw& U@IhI b,t he I am (FM) whloh is brae& on the Defwre Mesaqjhg Sygtsm (DM).Th s PBX b the firsd clvlMm agency to opeads tI401$8fleDc?m . p mwi ll pov'ide on-he mewbge o p d o a, ~6paulbrock $nd s m hc apabilltiei~to everyone PAM$ gives ua ths capability to eead imd &ve critid W ato any ~fths'&~fMO+~a$cwb& DM S or Automat& Digital N ~ k ~ A ~ D IThNo T)S/.SQ &an c f l ~ Mis a nix&tly in and will prouide.c~a~m o cqabdityta e1veaym6 on saob! in!'- by dhe d6d of tbis par. The FBra implLmdono f the DMS will pvide W f i t w + ~s ecure e Mto internaatsdmU-. ~ ~ l b i n t f s e p ~ e n ? , ~ & ~ w i l l ~ b ~ ~ ~ t n d &wase my ofemail ttystam qmmaly in use thto@(rnrt Pine Ddpmant oi!Deq@m aad Intelligenoe Ageaim. In its final form. DMS will Bmme the p v h a d 1g~lo bal e-dB system. It will provide d e din tempexability o f ~ o wcaor nmeaoialy off t h e & ~ m ~ m p d ~ d c o m r s c t o o r r r 2 ~ o n o i ~ & ~, y &. The isydm rndd+in* at@ch. m. abt a mnmmgws andlgnbviii adto: andsdty. (ell I,\. . * +2* . In the axit of conndvity for.dUaprodu&, the IBI ie juet begirming tto hg&maat our idti4 pm~mafso r BaLa marts -part of $bh tellipnw Comthrmity SJBkiIll f0r I r $ ~ d ~slbiaslin g @a@)m). tmI bdbBWCP@l d lU G b hi &tB f0X3ll of WIligernee IP~WgneeA ssam-, and IIBs are being publish~do n PBI web sites ~ e oto SdHPR NBT d JWICS. The bret PBI TS/SCI IC Plats E M (1CZ)M) is oux~e~diny d 6vel~mPtn d should bs am %("bJy the md of 2004. The PBI ChidW~ooaO ffioa b aPso wodkhg with the'Dqarltm81tlU of Justice on intafhm b0Wm~ CSIStt rsd tlme hvv3bfbmm& I a f d O n :& wing initiative-endw ith the PBI crhllbd hl.&OB h4&0d80n$ &~e8 (afiV)iSio I¶b h mthe d d f l ga & intelligence related infodm bm md to stab. and lootal offi*. 0. TheFBI is currently deploying the SlKRBT.vd~mof F AMS, whbh ass DMS and secure Qutll~blkik e amail ibr a-d messag@~*theaot om amdm tiad reparts officem om send lILd &ve ,holy irablligmce with other agencies in near teal time, The FBI L also worline; on a digital production aap&iUity for IIRs using'sxtended markup bgugg:( l(haL) tbnt dl ht-e with F McaKd sllpport on-line digitdl pmduction of intelligence reports. The FBI h qpfying XhL data sQan&& and metadata tagging to facilitate the 8xc- of idbmatioa with the intelligence oommtlmity. Tha FBI is also kpplying new security tabnology to deploy a b ~ m U v e lD3at a Mart capability aith diecrationery mess omtrgle and PnloYio Key hfbtmdm. - I I. . . . .. . ofo ur moet s d ~ vdeata with ofotha rmmO.* IbsF BI b aha invd- the -to~ VQWO@QbIwDm awdty aamaineandtog d ~ tnbie a f a - g m t i m comm*.Hi@ mVi& hl! fhe two mT'I tmsfi o n d e d e a ~ rwimle comdvity and Virtaal PtiWLt6 N lmkd at to pdide inatwed acmw to intslligence to deployed pckormel. The PBI is also startibrng to use On-line* d8shp colhboradan too:le Buah ee It& Work,Spww - in the ~OUIDfaWt thOe hB1'e lUgmw Coqndty Cc~fihorationP ortal to in-e inteUigmm~x)h0~a e, \ .~haPBIpkia SharhrgwIthtbdl I . ThoCJISN~idData Fq kWb-8 rystcm OPparOpto tbe o p d m iartcaoolslsotedrT-adstel- amidt .*nine (LBO) cnad W.WAN; neNDBxistot Nine-& I -@- adm. TheWBrwriUadfK, Gbrhsimpint c e d d , d t y h ( u ) , ~aw.w. 1.m a, ot n Z ~ 3 n O ~wd h~ d * C a O d d o l tlos if rs.kw fldhwa~ m p to ~ ~ . i t & d o n , = ~ w ~ : ~ ~ t siad~ - o n . pdcipatu bpi6 w s d d i ~ T h e s y 6 ~ h a s- k @@&w u~cer8. m0 ha8 s~GU~W ct3ImaiViV t0.a ~ ~ ~ .!~ I ~ (Q ~ ~ d Inblllim prod1 r d ~ ~ .lT@OO:m~d~a agda mdta 60 fwnin agmdw n n d f # o V i ~. ~ r n ~ ~ ~ daily ambwts @tb.fie general public. The ~ I ~td mpilumlce L~BO h tow high- - a ~ U i t y ~ f i o a T h e P B I w i U ~ t h b ~ s d W D m b ~. e W l f. h d d v eb ut r m o l w dw m t ~ d Wwith oths fdea and loo& agmcies* LBO d& mm~l0ftB [WXk8hllld S d ~ fJS0h. t wWJ5 lfb&XEUbdian;-ge SySkIQ (JlWS) will ba b i m W 1 l s. (U) @&IYPM)@J Tat& Force m m h in the fim of a $piranydwe@pbdo p d o d p ro the Sam ~ ~ ~qpmtPksnal F o P m ~ E i w i r(SoCO~PE ). sy&em&ohbuilh upon SCOlPB Is& I D W ' ~fi;e f w1 deplop- O~DWie soheduld aha 24304. ~ h~oll w help maet fba law cmibremat and the I@ mxdl.fbr rapid, am, dependable i n d d data and wi..l l .p rovide {da-ta.m ining was to PBI ) - hvdgaliv6'EiIIwQ( U) The Mtllltiiwagancy lrnf-on Sharing IKnitiativ~ intaxhi to amble Fd- atate, and l o d law db-mt cngmdes to Bhffe m g i d inwdgativc fHss aid p~vi~powaful to6b fm mmfUi d p w .A ~ P ~effWf 18f ~ l r n~hiny S t~. Louie; tWtioha nl. . I dtmomtralflolrn gitm b d gp m dT IIg~o d de~h~mmtiowto.i (t~ij (he vahw of s W m @ v e deta wgd~hc an' be dywdb y modan oftwto~om& md (2) helpdeb ~oM& orgardmtid spproachea Be regional eharsd eyetcmoe. Find cieoi~ioae& ont deploy~nento fthe MIS will be based aa the d t so fthe d e n a o ~ o m. ~ u d tho dspma~wt ide plan for hw dolacmat Wormtion ahwing being de~vdopedb y the Dwarhnmt! o;fJwtice. 0 With tlhe.creation of the Oftice bfht~lliganosid the FBI, each PBI field office Plas attbhhed a ITield ][rrtpIli:genceG roup 0.It is the r~eqmnsiblityo f'thme mOS to manage, ~tsttaen d mgintain the FBI%i ntdigence ibtlcdam within the PBI. m0 pmmel havo muthi~m cwgt o TS and SCI i n f o d ~sno t hey will be able to receive, d y z qd e wa nd racome4nd dmhg thie M o d o nw ith ~ ~ t i tw3istb in thb PBI m well as our matornem and pafbnm within the InbIli$emn~;ea nd Law tmfiman& u3olmwee. (U) ~ m m e n ~ ~ iNOi.o n E~ma~uruteh at fiie~uta & a~ocatere sources consisteut with m priodtia: The FBI1 egnts with the gand concept thit the recorn-on ia baaed upon sad hasin fact i i M w h fieid ofice to addre86 Wher priority ma#as bofm Iowa. ows. .Tile Dhwc@r has instructed the field omc861 to we w.lmwa mm am necersery to h ~ d e - aCl lo -h lcada0 Howam, it must be pointed cut that&@ l e dd resoumw d dto e ach priority is not budr p nb e rslatvi ranlr oftha priority but u p o l mt he level andl aim& of thc tbraot in a ~pihiori ty arso and the em&mt;to hioht he he1 has sob j m~ c t idvoer~ the matter. Thw,.tsd etamtne that uhe appropriate lewd of resom*m is pllocatcd (o a@ priority, a simplq formula &mot be usdL & detailwl d y s i 8 of tfna thoat d . w d o a d ia awry FBI division must ba CQThis analysis of the fhreat and workload is con-by each PBI prog~mas part of the FBI's resource adPwSion pnmess. In addition, the IPBI has developed and implemented sad-annd program review to snsure ac1R11f ield office is appropriately addassing &'I331 and the national program pridties. IfIeedqParta's program m;anagas are required to review w ho ffi~*ps& )gramd e ws llbmbsion and maike apprqwiate managemept decjkiom. In addition, the FBI's ~nsp&tionD i ~ ownil l use the remiannual TeYim Imlbdssi~m8s a some d&\amat of ood~sottihnag f ield office . iqspettions. If field1 offices rn not rtdhyfn%p riod@.matta:ma ppmpriately, the. . i k p d ~ ~ ~ D i \ iwiilsl ~wr~rink' s "flsdisg".and mq&e a & N ! ~ t i ~ ~b~e toakneq~... T he . lnqmtion Division will 3scr h wthe donso f the ntgio~ndp. d~gmmm anager to. - ensure that approPdiak instruction and d o n s werp amO \ . sh&ly yours;. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . &W,j.K )W.;. f . : . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . .: . .a I - . - . . . . . - . . &pn&ofi'.aib.n.d. . . . .. .. .. a I. . I . . - . . . . . - . . I . ' ' < . - : ' . . a . . !:.