September 11 9am-10am

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(9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Atlantic City Non-Alert Military Unit Goes to Wartime Posture
The 177th Fighter Wing, a military unit based at the Atlantic City International Airport in New Jersey, raises its threat protection level to a wartime posture, and, though it is no longer part of NORAD’s alert mission, starts preparing to launch its aircraft with live missiles. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 120-122] Commander Orders Increased Threat Condition - Lt. Col. Brian Webster, who is the acting wing commander for the 177th Fighter Wing, was at home when he learned of the attacks on the World Trade Center. After watching the second attack live on television, he rushes out to drive to the base. Webster calls the command post there on his cell phone and gives the order, “Raise the base’s threat protection level to Charlie!” Threatcon Charlie is a wartime posture, and will mean various security measures are activated in preparation for a possible attack. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 120-121] Command Post Brought Online - For many years, up to 1998 (see May 19, 1997), the 177th FW was part of NORAD’s alert force. It kept two fully armed F-16s on constant alert, and was responsible for providing air sovereignty of the mid-Atlantic, between Long Island, New York, and the Virginia Capes. [NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AND VETERANS AFFAIRS, 1999 ; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 10/29/2001; BERGEN RECORD, 12/5/2003] But since the unit was removed from the NORAD alert mission, its command post has been used just once a month for training. It is now coming to life, though, as personnel switch on the lights, and turn on computers and monitors. The workers increase their pace after hearing an announcement about the transition to Threatcon Charlie. A master sergeant busily calls members of staff and orders them to report to base. Webster Wants Live Missiles on Aircraft - When Webster arrives, he instructs the operations support flight commander to replace practice missiles and munitions on the unit’s fighter jets with live ones. The missiles are not stored by the aircraft, so this will take some time. Webster also orders, “Get me authenticators.” An authenticator is a piece of paper given to pilots with a code in a series of letters on it, and which is only valid for a 24-hour period. If a pilot receives an order to fire, he must ask for an authentication code. If this doesn’t match the code on his authenticator, he cannot legally comply with the order. NORAD’s alert sites receive authenticators each month, but as it is no longer part of the alert mission, Atlantic City has none. Weapons Chief Uncertain - According to author Lynn Spencer, Webster’s orders are unprecedented at a non-alert fighter wing of the Air National Guard. “Air National Guard jets don’t simply fly around the United States with live missiles. Guardsmen train to fight wars overseas, not to fly armed combat over the United States.” The weapons chief with the 177th FW is unenthusiastic, and asks to have a word with Webster. But Webster tells him abruptly, “Just do it!” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 121-122] Within two hours, the first fighters will take off from the Atlantic City unit. These had been preparing for a training mission at the time of the attacks in New York (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 10/2002] Entity Tags: 177th Fighter Wing, Brian Webster Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Between 9:10 a.m. and 9:23 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS Wants Third Jet Launched from Langley, Meaning Unit Will Have No Supervisor of Flying The operations manager with the unit at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, that is involved in NORAD’s air defense mission is instructed to prepare to launch three F-16s from the base, even though the unit only keeps two such jets on “alert.” [CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 4/16/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 118] NEADS Calls Langley - Captain Craig Borgstrom is the operations manager of a detachment at Langley from the North Dakota Air National Guard’s 119th Fighter Wing. In the event of an order to scramble the unit’s two alert F-16s, he would serve as the supervisor of flying (SOF), responsible for informing the pilots about their mission. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 114, 116] The unit has just received the signal to put its alert jets on “battle stations,” with the pilots in the cockpits but the engines turned off (see (9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 64; FILSON, 2003, PP. 55; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] After briefing one of the two alert pilots, Borgstrom is called by the crew chief to answer a phone call from someone at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) who wants to speak to him. In an urgent voice, the caller asks Borgstrom, “How many airplanes can you get airborne?” Borgstrom answers, “I have two F-16s at battle stations right now,” but the caller snaps: “That’s not what I asked! How many total aircraft can you launch?” Although Borgstrom is not on alert duty, he is an F-16 pilot. He responds: “Well, the only other pilot here is me—I can fly. I can give you three!” The caller instructs him: “Suit up and go fly! We need all of you at battle stations!” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 65; CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 4/16/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 118] Third Pilot Means No Supervisor - According to author Lynn Spencer, this order “is almost unthinkable. If [Borgstrom] goes up, there will be no supervisor of flying. During a scramble, it is the SOF’s responsibility to monitor the jets—to work with local controllers to ensure priority handling and to make sure that the pilots are receiving lawful launch orders. The SOF stays in close communication with NEADS to get any and all information about the mission to pass on to his pilots, and assesses weather, airfield status, and spare alert aircraft status in case of an abort by one of the primary fighters. If Borgy flies, there not only will be no SOF, there will be no officer left at the detachment!” Borgstrom Notifies Others, Checks with Commander - Borgstrom heads out to inform others of the instruction. He speaks to one of the alert pilots, Major Dean Eckmann, telling him, “They want us to launch all planes and all pilots if we get scrambled!” According to Spencer, this request “doesn’t make any sense to Eckmann,” and his initial response is ”What?” But “he’s a military officer and he’ll follow orders,” and points Borgstrom to the unit’s third F-16, which is not kept on alert and is therefore unarmed. Borgstrom instructs the crew chief to arm the fighter’s gun; this will be the only ammunition he has when he takes off. After fetching his harness and helmet, he places a phone call to the commander of the 119th Fighter Wing, at the wing’s home in Fargo, North Dakota. Borgstrom is uncomfortable with the unprecedented situation he is in and feels compelled to notify his immediate higher-ups. He tells the commander: “Sir, they’re launching all three of us. I don’t know what’s going on, but there’s no ops supervision here at all!” The commander knows what has happened in New York from news reports, and so is aware of the situation. He tells Borgstrom: “Go! Our thoughts are with you. Godspeed.” Borgstrom then hangs up the phone and runs to his jet. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 118-119] The three Langley jets will receive a scramble order at 9:24 a.m. (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001) and are airborne by 9:30 a.m. (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16 ] Entity Tags: 119th Fighter Wing, Dean Eckmann, Craig Borgstrom, Langley Air Force Base, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

Between 9:10 a.m. and 9:20 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Dispatch Manager Speaks with Counterpart at American Airlines; Suspects Second Crash Was Flight 175 The United Airlines dispatch operations manager speaks with the American Airlines dispatch operations manager, and they discuss the two plane crashes in New York. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25 ] Mike Barber, the United dispatch manager, is at the airline’s System Operations Control (SOC) center, just outside Chicago, while Craig Parfitt, the American dispatch manager, is at that airline’s SOC center in Fort Worth, Texas. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001] At 9:10, United Airlines is aware a second aircraft has hit the World Trade Center, but it does not realize this is one of its own flights. During their call, Parfitt says to Barber he believes both the aircraft that hit the WTC belonged to American Airlines. (At 9:08 a.m., officials at American Airlines’ SOC mistakenly concluded the second aircraft to hit the WTC might have been Flight 77 (see 9:08 a.m. September 11, 2001).) But Barber says he is increasingly “confident” that the second plane was United Airlines Flight 175. “In slow motion and enlarged images of the second impact on CNN, he could see that the airplane did not have the shiny metallic color of American jets.” By 9:20, according to the 9/11 Commission, although Barber believes the second crashed plane was Flight 175, the identity of this aircraft is “still unconfirmed.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25-26 ] Entity Tags: Craig Parfitt, Mike Barber Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:10 a.m. September 11, 2001: Port Authority Tells La Guardia Airport WTC Crashes Are Criminal Acts According to released transcripts, a caller from the Port Authority police desk tells a La Guardia Airport control tower employee that, “they are considering [the crashes into the WTC] a criminal act.” The control tower employee replies, “We believe that, and we are holding all aircraft on the ground.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/29/2003] La Guardia is one of two major New York City airports, and the Port Authority patrol both the WTC and the city’s airports. Entity Tags: La Guardia Airport, New York Port Authority Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Between 9:10 a.m. and 9:22 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Operations Center Sends Message to Flight 93 Co-Pilot, Receives No Reply

Melodie Homer. [Source: Jim Varhegyi] The United Airlines Operations Center at JFK Airport in New York sends a text message to LeRoy Homer, the co-pilot of Flight 93, but receives no response from him. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 37 ] At 9:10, Melodie Homer, the wife of LeRoy Homer, contacts the operations center after seeing the second plane hitting the World Trade Center on television. Knowing her husband is flying, she requests that a message be sent to him, stating, “Your wife just wants to make sure you’re okay.” [PITTSBURGH CHANNEL, 9/19/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 78; NEW YORK OBSERVER, 2/15/2004; DISCOVERY CHANNEL, 2005] Melodie is told, “If you want to hang on, we’ll get a message back in a couple of minutes.” According to journalist and author Jere Longman, after no response is received, a second text message is sent. Although Melodie Homer’s message is later determined to have been received by the flight, there is still no reply. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 81-82] However, the 9/11 Commission will only describe one message—not two—being sent to Homer, which it says happens at 9:22. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 456; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 37 ] The hijacking of Flight 93 is believed to take place at 9:28 (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 11] A text message sent by an airline dispatcher to Flight 93’s pilot Jason Dahl shortly before the hijacking will receive a response from him three minutes later (see 9:23 a.m.-9:26 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 37-38 ] Entity Tags: United Airlines, Melodie Homer, LeRoy Homer Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(Between 9:10 a.m. and 9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: South Tower Employee Sees No Inferno on 78th Floor

Brian Clark. [Source: CTV] Brian Clark, the executive vice president of brokerage firm Euro Brokers, was on the 84th floor of the South Tower, where his firm’s offices are, when Flight 175 crashed into it. He had headed out, going down Stairway A, which is the only staircase in the tower that remains intact from top to bottom, and was soon joined by Stanley Praimnath, who also works in the South Tower. They reach a point that Clark later guesses to have been around the 77th or 78th floor, where the stairway walls are cracked, allowing them to look through. This would be around the lower end of the floors where the plane impacted. However, Clark sees no large fire. He later says, “[Y]ou could look through the cracks and see flames. They were just quietly licking up, not a roaring inferno. And there was some smoke there, but again I think the stairs were pressurized, pushing the air out so we had less smoke in the stairway than you might imagine.” [BBC, 3/7/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 5/26/2002; SUN, 9/6/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/18/2004] This apparently contradicts later claims that the tower was subjected to “extreme fires” prior to its collapse. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/20/2004] Firefighter Orio Palmer will make it up to this level of the tower later on, and also report only finding small fires there (see 9:52 a.m. September 11, 2001). Clark and Praimnath continue down the stairs and make it out just minutes before the collapse. They are two of only four people who were at or above the impact zone after Flight 175 hit, who are able to escape from the South Tower. [CNN, 9/9/2002] A further 14 people are able to get out of the building from its 78th floor, which is the lower part of the crash zone. [DWYER AND FLYNN, 2005, PP. 255] Entity Tags: Stanley Praimnath, World Trade Center, Brian Clark Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center

(9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Vice President Cheney Apparently Goes to White House Bunker; Other Accounts Have Him Moving Locations Later According to counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke and others, Vice President Dick Cheney goes from his White House office to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC), a bunker below the East Wing of the White House, at about this time. There is no video link between response centers in the East and West Wings, but a secure telephone line is used instead. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/16/2001; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001; ABC NEWS, 9/14/2002; CLARKE, 2004, PP. 3-4] Cheney Leaves Office 'Just after 9 a.m.' - One eyewitness, David Bohrer, a White House photographer, will say Cheney leaves for the PEOC just after 9:00 a.m. [ABC NEWS, 9/14/2002] White House adviser Karl Rove, who is with the president in Florida, will appear to corroborate this account, later telling NBC News that when Bush tries phoning Cheney at around 9:16 a.m., he is unable to contact him because “the vice president was being… grabbed by a Secret Service agent and moved to the bunker” (see (9:16 a.m.-9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] And Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta will say that when he arrives at the PEOC, at around 9:20-9:27, Cheney is already there (see (Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; ACADEMY OF ACHIEVEMENT, 6/3/2006] Cheney Leaves Office 'Just before 9:36' - However, there is a second account claiming that Cheney does not leave his office until sometime after 9:30 a.m. (The 9/11 Commission will say he is evacuated “just before 9:36.”) In this account, Secret Service agents burst into Cheney’s office. They carry him under his arms—nearly lifting him off the ground—and propel him down the steps into the White House basement and through a long tunnel toward the underground bunker. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; NEWSWEEK, 12/31/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002; BBC, 9/1/2002; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] According to journalist and author Stephen Hayes, it takes “Less than a minute” for the Secret Service agents to escort Cheney from his office down to the secure tunnel leading to the PEOC. [HAYES, 2007, PP. 335] Although its specifications are highly classified, two sources will tell journalist and author Barton Gellman that the PEOC is located two floors below ground. [GELLMAN, 2008, PP. 420] Arrives at PEOC 'Shortly before 10:00' - Despite admitting that there “is conflicting evidence about when the vice president arrived” in the PEOC, the 9/11 Commission will conclude that the “vice president arrived in the room shortly before 10:00, perhaps at 9:58.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 40] In addition to the eyewitness accounts of Clarke, Mineta, and Bohrer, several accounts will claim that Cheney is in the bunker when he is told Flight 77 is 50 miles away from Washington, at about 9:26 a.m. (see (9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001). This further supports the claims of Cheney going to the PEOC earlier on, rather than after 9:30. Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, David Bohrer, Karl Rove, Norman Mineta, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Dick Cheney

(9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Command Center Requests Information on Unusual Flight Activity, Receives Numerous Reports

The FAA Command Center in Herndon, Virginia. [Source: Federal Aviation Administration] Ben Sliney, the national operations manager at the FAA’s Herndon Command Center, puts the word out that he wants all air traffic control facilities around the US to inform him of anything unusual that occurs with the flights they are handling. In response, news of suspicious activity quickly starts coming in to the Command Center. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 125-126] Command Center Calls Field Facilities - Sliney wants air traffic control facilities to notify him of anything out of the ordinary, such as a radar target disappearing from the radar scope, loss of communication with an aircraft, or an aircraft making an unauthorized change of course. He also wants to know immediately of any glitches that occur, even if these are common, everyday problems, such as a flight deviating from its course, missing a frequency change, overlooking a radio call, or getting a transponder code wrong. The center’s controllers at each regional desk therefore start calling their field facilities, and ask them to report any unusual occurrences. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/22/2003 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 125] The Command Center has telecommunications lines to all the major air traffic control facilities in the US, which enables it to reach out to those facilities and establish the big picture about aircraft activity. [FRENI, 2003, PP. 64] 'More and More' Responses Received - Following the call for information, numerous reports of suspicious activity are received from the air traffic control facilities. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 125-126] Linda Schuessler, the deputy director of system operations at the Command Center, will later recall, “[W]e started getting more and more calls about bomb threats, about aircraft that we had lost communication or radar identification with.” [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 12/17/2001] Center Lists Suspect Aircraft - Sliney wants a list compiled of the reportedly suspicious aircraft. A dry-erase board is set up in the middle of the room. On it a manager keeps track of the reports that are coming in, writing down where each suspect aircraft was last seen, who was working it, where the flight originated, and where it is going. Another person contacts the field facilities to follow up on the reports. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/22/2003 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 126] Two Dozen Suspicious Flights - Author Pamela Freni will later describe, “[F]or the next several hours the call signs and status” of every suspicious aircraft will be recorded. Command Center personnel call “airline operations centers, trying to determine any crises on each flight. Only when each plane landed or was found safe did its identification information disappear from the board. Upward to two dozen were listed at one time, but ultimately the number was whittled to 11 highly suspicious cases” (see (9:09 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001). “Nine of those airplanes would land safely. Two of them—AA 77 and UA 93—would not.” [FRENI, 2003, PP. 64-65] Entity Tags: Linda Schuessler, Ben Sliney, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

(Between 9:10 a.m. and 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Wife Unable to Contact Flight 93 Passenger Tom Burnett on His Cell Phone At her home in San Ramon, California, Deena Burnett has seen the television coverage of the attacks on the World Trade Center. Her husband, Tom Burnett, is due home from a business trip to New York later in the day. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 106] However, he has switched from his original flight to the earlier Flight 93, and has not called ahead to notify her of this. [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 9/17/2001] Deena is expecting Tom to head home some time later this morning, but, concerned in case he finished his business early and took an earlier flight, she tries calling his cell phone. He does not answer. She later recalls, “This was not cause for immediate concern, because if he was on a flight already, use of cell phones was forbidden.” [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 60-61] Minutes later, though, he makes the first in a series of calls to her from Flight 93, apparently using his cell phone (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001 ] Entity Tags: Tom Burnett, Deena Burnett Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Washington Flight Control Sees Unidentified Plane, Apparently Fails to Notify FAA or NORAD Washington flight control notices a new eastbound plane entering its radar with no radio contact and no transponder identification. They do not realize it is Flight 77. They are aware of the hijackings and crashes of Flights 11 and 175, yet they apparently fail to notify anyone about the unidentified plane. [NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Another report says they never notice it, and it is only noticed when it enters radar coverage of Washington’s Dulles International Airport at 9:24 a.m. (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 11/3/2001] Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Richard Clarke Directs Crisis Response through Video Conference with Top Officials Around this time, according to his own account, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke reaches the Secure Video Conferencing Center just off the main floor of the Situation Room in the West Wing of the White House. From there, he directs the response to the 9/11 attacks and stays in contact with other top officials through video links. Clarke claims that on video he can see Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, CIA Director George Tenet, FBI Director Robert Mueller, FAA Administrator Jane Garvey, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson (filling in for the traveling Attorney General John Ashcroft), Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage (filling in for the traveling Secretary of State Colin Powell), and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers (filling in for the traveling Chairman Henry Shelton). National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice is with Clarke, but she lets him run the crisis response, deferring to his longer experience on terrorism matters. Clarke is also told by an aide, “We’re on the line with NORAD, on an air threat conference call.” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 2-4; AUSTRALIAN, 3/27/2004] According to the 9/11 Commission, logs indicate that Clarke’s video teleconference only begins at 9:25 a.m. (see 9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001), which is later than Clarke suggests, and CIA and FAA representatives only join it at 9:40 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 36 AND 462] Other accounts claim that, rather than being involved in Clarke’s teleconference at this time, Donald Rumsfeld is still in his office waiting for his intelligence briefing (see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and Richard Myers is in a meeting on Capitol Hill (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ARMED FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION SERVICE, 10/17/2001; CLARKE, 2006, PP. 218-219] The 9/11 Commission claims that, “While important,” Clarke’s conference has “no immediate effect on the emergency defense efforts.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Yet, as the Washington Post puts it, “everyone seems to agree” Clarke is the chief crisis manager on 9/11. [WASHINGTON POST, 3/28/2004] Even Clarke’s later opponent, National Security Adviser Rice, calls him 9/11’s “crisis management guy.” [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 4/9/2004] The conference is where the government’s emergency defense efforts are concentrated. Entity Tags: Richard Armitage, John Ashcroft, Larry D. Thompson, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Richard A. Clarke, Henry Hugh Shelton, Robert S. Mueller III, Richard B. Myers, George J. Tenet, Jane Garvey, Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, 9/11 Commission, Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Richard Clarke, Donald Rumsfeld

Soon After 9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001: Mistaken Report of Flight 77 Crash Causes Confusion When Indianapolis flight control reported the loss of contact with Flight 77 to the FAA’s Great Lakes Regional Operations Center (see 9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001), an employee at an FAA flight service station (which particular one is unspecified) picks up on the communication and mistakenly calls the Ashland, Kentucky police to report a confirmed crash. Indianapolis controllers had noted the last known position of Flight 77 as being near the Ohio-Kentucky border, so this becomes part of the employee’s report. Indianapolis Center personnel, suspecting that Flight 77 may have crashed, subsequently contact the same police office, requesting information on any crashes. (An FAA report describes them contacting the West Virginia State Police at about 9:15 a.m. Ashland, though in Kentucky, is only a few miles out of West Virginia, so this may be referring the same incident.) Using the flight service station report as an actual accident, the police mistakenly confirm the crash, even though it never actually happened. A state helicopter is even dispatched to the plane’s last known coordinates, but there is nothing there. Time is lost in all the confusion. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; FRENI, 2003, PP. 29] It is not until about 9:20 a.m., when Indianapolis Center learns there are other hijacked aircraft in the system (see (9:20 a.m.-9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001), that it will start to doubt its initial assumption that Flight 77 crashed. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32 ] However, the report of a downed plane persists. Shortly before 10 a.m., Dale Watson, counterterrorism chief at the FBI, will say to counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke over a video teleconference, “We have a report of a large jet crashed in Kentucky, near the Ohio line.” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 13] According to USA Today, “The reports are so serious that [FAA Administrator Jane] Garvey notifies the White House that there has been another crash. Only later does she learn the reports are erroneous.” [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Entity Tags: Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

9:11 a.m. September 11, 2001: Global Guardian Military Exercise Paused, but Apparently Not Yet Terminated The US Strategic Command (Stratcom) orders that its Global Guardian exercise be put on pause at this time, according to a 2006 article in The Bombardier, the newspaper for Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana. [BOMBARDIER, 9/8/2006 ] Global Guardian is an annual exercise sponsored by Stratcom, which has its headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. The exercise tests Stratcom’s ability to fight a nuclear war (see 8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). [OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 2/27/2002; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 4/27/2005] Many aircraft and personnel at Barksdale, as well as other military bases, are involved in it (see 8:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). [TIMES-PICAYUNE, 9/8/2002] Global Guardian will be formally terminated at 10:44 a.m., according to The Bombardier (see (10:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001), although other reports will say it is canceled earlier on, possibly after the second World Trade Center tower is hit at 9:03 a.m. [OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 2/27/2002; OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 9/8/2002; BOMBARDIER, 9/8/2006 ] Entity Tags: Global Guardian, US Strategic Command Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

(9:12 a.m.-11:57 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS and NORAD Experiencing Communications Problems Tape recordings of the operations floor at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) in Rome, New York indicate that both NEADS and NORAD are experiencing significant problems communicating with other agencies: At 9:12 a.m., a member of staff at NEADS tells another military agency over the phone: “We’re trying to reach the military coordinator. We’re having a difficult time.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001] At 9:22 a.m., a women at NEADS calls what is apparently an American Airlines office in New York, to ask about a report NEADS has received that Flight 11 is still airborne and headed towards Washington (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). After being given a phone number she needs to call for more information, the woman at NEADS replies: “[D]o me a favor and have them call us? We cannot call out for some reason.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001] At around 10:31 a.m., someone from the 1st Fighter Wing, which is the host unit at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, calls NEADS. During the conversation, they mention, “I tried to get a hold of NORAD… and their lines are all busy.” NEADS replies, “Yeah, I can believe it,” and adds, “Right now the circuits are so busy.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001] Around 11:50 a.m., someone with the New York Air National Guard’s 109th Airlift Wing is on the phone to NEADS. They mention, “We’re having a tough time getting hold of you guys.” NEADS responds, “We’re having problems with our phone lines as well.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001] At 11:57 a.m., a member of staff at NEADS complains: “They turned off all the goddamned lines to the outside.… No, local. So you can’t make outside phone calls.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, North American Aerospace Defense Command Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:12 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS Takes Control of New York Airspace NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) declares “AFIO” (Authorization for Interceptor Operations) for New York airspace, which gives the military authority over the FAA for that airspace, and will enable the fighter jets launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to Flight 11 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) to head toward the city. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 113] For the last few minutes, the two Otis fighters have been kept in a “holding pattern” in military airspace over the Atlantic Ocean (see 9:09 a.m.-9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001), and NEADS has been unable to get permission from the FAA for them to enter the civilian airspace over New York. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 111-112] Marr Wants AFIO - According to author Lynn Spencer, Colonel Robert Marr, the NEADS battle commander, now “decides that he is done waiting for FAA approval for his fighters to enter New York airspace.… He will play his ace card. There is one method for the military to override the FAA’s authority over the airspace, and it is called AFIO.” The declaration of AFIO will give the military “emergency authority to enter FAA-controlled airspace without permission.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 113] According to an FAA document, “Upon declaring ‘AFIO,’ NORAD assumes responsibility for [interceptor fighter jets] seeing and avoiding all known aircraft and ensuring safe intercept conduct.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 2/19/2004, PP. 4-12-1 - 4-12-2] Nasypany Directed to Declare AFIO - Marr, who is in the NEADS battle cab, speaks over a direct phone line to Major Kevin Nasypany, the NEADS mission crew commander, who is on the operations floor there. He orders him to declare AFIO for New York airspace and to immediately move the Otis fighters over the city. Nasypany then calls out across the operations floor to the weapons team, “Okay, we’re declaring AFIO at this time.” The directive is relayed immediately to the two Otis pilots, who will then leave their holding pattern and head toward Manhattan (see 9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 113] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Robert Marr, Kevin Nasypany Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

(9:12 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Attendant Calls Parents and Confirms Hijacking, but Accounts Are Contradictory

Renee May. [Source: Family photo] Renee May, a flight attendant on Flight 77, calls her parents in Las Vegas and reports her plane has been hijacked. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] According to author Tom Murphy, May previously tried calling the American Airlines flight services office at Washington’s Reagan National Airport, but all the lines there were busy. [MURPHY, 2006, PP. 56-57] However, a summary of the phone calls made from the four hijacked planes that is presented at the 2006 Zacarias Moussaoui trial will make no mention of this earlier call. May’s first attempt at calling her parents, at 9:11 a.m., had not connected, but her second attempt a minute later is successful, and the call lasts for two-and-a-half minutes. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] According to reports shortly after 9/11 in the Las Vegas Review-Journal, May makes her call using a cell phone. [LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, 9/13/2001; LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, 9/15/2001] But at the Moussaoui trial it will be claimed she uses an Airfone. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 7 ] According to most accounts, including that of the 9/11 Commission, she speaks to her mother, Nancy May. [LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, 9/13/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 7 ] But according to Murphy, she speaks with her father, Ronald May. [MURPHY, 2006, PP. 57] Renee reports that her plane is being hijacked. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31 ] Although it will be officially claimed that there are five hijackers on Flight 77, she says six individuals have taken over the plane (see Between 9:12 a.m. and 9:15 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/27/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 2-3 AND 9] Renee says the hijackers have moved people to the rear of the aircraft, though it is unclear whether she is referring to all of the passengers or just the flight’s crew. She tells her parent (either her mother or father, depending on the account) to call American Airlines and inform it of the hijacking. She gives three numbers in Northern Virginia to call. Before the time Flight 77 crashes, Renee May’s mother (or her father, according to Murphy) is able to contact an American Airlines employee at Reagan National Airport and pass on what their daughter has reported (see (Between 9:15 a.m. and 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31 ; MURPHY, 2006, PP. 57] Entity Tags: Ronald May, Nancy May, Renee May Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001: Port Authority Asks New York Airports about Hijacked Planes, Airports Know Little A Port Authority police officer calls a flight controller at La Guardia Airport in New York City. The officer asks, “They are inquiring whether or not you can call Kennedy’s tower, because they can’t get through, and inquire whether or not they had any contact with these aircrafts.” The flight controller responds, “At this time, we do not think that anyone in the FAA had any contact with them.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 12/30/2003] “Kennedy” is a reference to John F. Kennedy Airport, another major airport in New York City. Port Authority police, who patrol both the WTC and the airports, seek information from the controllers about the hijackers. However, the controllers are unable to offer any news. [NEW YORK TIMES, 12/30/2003] Entity Tags: La Guardia Airport, Federal Aviation Administration, New York Port Authority, John F. Kennedy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001: Otis Jets Leave Holding Pattern and Head for New York The two F-15s launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to Flight 11 finally exit their “holding pattern” off the Long Island coast, and fly directly toward New York. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 ] According to the 9/11 Commission, the two fighters had been sent to the military-controlled airspace over the Atlantic Ocean because they lacked a target, and so have been flying in this area for the last few minutes (see 9:09 a.m.-9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001). They are currently about 115 miles from the city. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20 AND 24] Visibility is extremely clear and Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy, one of the two Otis pilots, will later recall that he can see the World Trade Center towers burning in the distance. He has just called NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and asked: “What do you want me to do next? What do you need from me right this second?” [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 63] NEADS Takes Control of Airspace - At NEADS, battle commander Colonel Robert Marr had lost patience waiting for approval from the FAA to send the Otis jets to New York, and so has just declared “AFIO” (Authorization for Interceptor Operations) for New York airspace, which gives the military authority to enter that airspace without permission (see (9:12 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 113] Therefore, a couple of minutes after Duffy made his inquiry, NEADS weapons controller Major Steve Hedrick gets back to him to relay the AFIO directive. Hedrick instructs Duffy: “Proceed direct to Manhattan and set up combat air patrol. NORAD has taken over control of the airspace.” Duffy confirms, “Okay, got that.” Fighters Request Lower Altitude Clearance - Duffy, who is currently flying at 20,000 feet, immediately requests clearance from the FAA to fly at lower altitude. He calls its New York Center and identifies himself with his military call sign, saying, “Panta 4-5 needs to go direct to New York City and I need lower [altitude]… right now.” The controller gives him a heading and clears him to descend to 18,000 feet. After the two Otis jets exit military airspace at 9:13, they descend to 18,000 feet and Duffy asks the New York Center controller again for lower altitude clearance. He is given permission to descend to 16,000 feet, and upon further requests is allowed to go down to 11,000 feet. Finally, Duffy insists, “Guys, I need all the way to the surface!” and the controller replies: “Roger. Panta 4-5 is clear all altitudes.” “They just gave us the airspace,” Duffy will later recall. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 63; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 113-114] Conflicting Times - According to the 9/11 Commission, the two Otis fighters will arrive over Manhattan at 9:25 (see 9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001), but numerous witnesses on the ground there will later recall only noticing fighters overhead after 10:00 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.-10:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] Entity Tags: Daniel Nash, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Timothy Duffy, Steve Hedrick Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

Between 9:12 a.m. and 9:15 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight Attendant Describes Six Hijackers on Flight 77 In a phone call from Flight 77, flight attendant Renee May describes six hijackers on her plane, yet official accounts will state there are only five. May is able to call her parents from Flight 77 to report that her plane has been hijacked (see (9:12 a.m.) September 11, 2001). She says six individuals have carried out the hijacking. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31 ] Yet, despite this, the official claim put forward by the FBI and later the 9/11 Commission will be that there are five hijackers—not six—on this flight. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/27/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 27 ] Apparently, the only other person to make a phone call from Flight 77 is passenger Barbara Olson, who reaches her husband (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/12/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004 ] But Olson does not appear to make any reference to the number of hijackers on the plane. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001 ; CNN, 9/14/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] Entity Tags: Ronald May, Renee May, Nancy May Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001: Jet Fuel in South Tower Burns Up The jet fuel that spilled from Flight 175 when it hit the South Tower (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001) has mostly burned up by this time. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which later investigates the collapses, will say the “initial jet fuel fires themselves lasted at most a few minutes.” [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 183 ] Engineering professor Forman Williams will say the jet fuel “burned for maybe 10 minutes.” [POPULAR MECHANICS, 3/2005] Flight 175, a Boeing 767, had a capacity of 23,980 gallons, but was only carrying about 9,100 gallons of fuel when it hit the WTC. NIST will estimate that less than 1,500 gallons were consumed in a fireball inside the tower and 910 to 2,275 gallons were consumed in the fireballs outside the building. Approximately 6,100 gallons therefore splashed onto the office furnishings and started fires on various floors. However, after the jet fuel is used up, office fires burn until the building collapses. NIST will calculate that there were about four pounds per square foot of combustibles in the office space, or about 60 tons per floor. Offices in the WTC actually had fewer combustibles than other similar spaces due to the small number of interior walls and limited bookshelf space. NIST will later find that only three of sixteen perimeter columns it recovers reached a temperature of 250°C and neither of the two core columns it retrieves reached this temperature. NIST will also find that none of the samples it acquires reached a temperature above 600°C (see August 27, 2003). While steel does not melt until its temperature is about 1,600°C, it may begin to lose significant strength at over 500°C. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 29, 38, 42, 77 ] The jet fuel also burned up in the North Tower about 10 minutes after it was hit (see 8:57 a.m. September 11, 2001). When a group of firefighters reach the bottom impact floor in the South Tower just before collapse, they only find two isolated fires (see 9:52 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: World Trade Center, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Forman Williams Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center

(Before 9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Arab Private Pilot Keeps Trying to Enter Washington Airspace An air traffic controller at Washington’s Reagan National Airport struggles with an Arab-sounding private pilot who keeps veering into Washington airspace. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 144-145] Reagan National Airport is less than one mile from the Pentagon, and just a few miles from the White House and the Capitol building. [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 10/3/2001] The airspace around it and much of Washington is designated class B airspace, which means no one is supposed to fly there without a working transponder and permission from an air traffic controller. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001] Eric Cole, a controller in Reagan Airport’s air traffic control tower, is continually being bothered by the pilot, who has an Arab accent and is flying a banner tow airplane. Cole repeatedly directs the pilot, “Go further south!” The pilot replies, “Okay, I’m going further south,” but does not do so. He keeps infringing the Washington airspace and asking to get closer to the city. Banner tow airplanes are almost unheard of in this area, and Cole cannot understand why the pilot is being so persistent, almost argumentative. Finally, Cole yells at him: “No, you’re not going further south! I can see that you’re not going further south!” Shortly after 9:06 a.m., the control tower receives the instruction to secure the airspace around Washington and turn away all non-airliner aircraft (see Shortly After 9:06 a.m. September 11, 2001). The controllers are then able to order the annoying banner tow pilot out of their airspace for good. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 144-145] Entity Tags: Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, Eric Cole Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

9:14 a.m. September 11, 2001: Indianapolis Center Receives Confirmation of Flight 11 Hijacking, but Apparently Does Not Suspect Flight 77 Is Hijacked An air traffic controller at the FAA’s Indianapolis Center, which was monitoring Flight 77 when it disappeared from radar (see 8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (8:56 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001), receives confirmation from American Airlines that Flight 11 was hijacked, but apparently still does not suspect that the missing Flight 77 may also have been hijacked. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] The controller, a sector radar associate at the Indianapolis Center, called the American Airlines dispatch office in Texas five minutes earlier, and was informed by dispatcher Jim McDonnell that Flight 11 had been hijacked and that two planes had hit the World Trade Center (see 9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 106] He now calls the dispatch office and again speaks with McDonnell. After introducing himself, he asks, “American 11, you guys said he departed off of, uh, New York?” McDonnell replies, “Boston.” The controller continues, “Boston, he was going to LA, and it was a hijacked airplane?” McDonnell confirms, “Yes.” The controller asks, “And you, have you heard anything from American 77?” McDonnell replies, “No,” and then adds, “I talked to a winder in the center up there, and I gave them the information I got.” (What McDonnell is referring to here is unclear.) The controller thanks McDonnell, and the call ends. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001] Despite receiving this information from American Airlines, according to the 9/11 Commission it is not until about 9:20 that the Indianapolis Center begins to doubt its initial assumption that Flight 77 has crashed, and discusses this concern with the FAA’s Herndon Command Center (see (9:20 a.m.-9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32 ] Entity Tags: Jim McDonnell, American Airlines, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Transportation Secretary Mineta Arrives at White House and Is Briefed by Richard Clarke Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta, who saw the second plane hitting the WTC on television while at the Department of Transportation, had been called to the White House (see (8:48 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). When he arrives there, as he later recalls, he sees “People… coming out of the White House, pouring out of the Executive Office Building, running over towards Lafayette Park.” As he enters the White House, Mineta is told he has to be briefed by counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke. He goes to the Situation Room where Clarke talks to him for four or five minutes, briefly informing him of what is going on. Clarke instructs him, “You have to get over to the Presidential Emergency Operation Center to be with the vice president.” The Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) is the bunker located below the White House. As Mineta does not know where it is, a Secret Service agent leads him to it. He will arrive there around 9:20-9:27, according to his own recollections (see (Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [DAILY CALIFORNIAN, 3/18/2002; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; ACADEMY OF ACHIEVEMENT, 6/3/2006] Entity Tags: Norman Mineta, Richard A. Clarke Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke

(9:15 a.m.-9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Air Base Prepares Fighters to Launch, Recalls Jets out on Training Mission

Marty Richard. [Source: Kevin Mingora] Following the second attack on the World Trade Center, Otis Air National Guard Base at Cape Cod, Massachusetts, prepares all its available fighter jets to take off, and recalls six of its jets that are out on a training mission. [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/11/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 155] The base has already launched its two F-15s that are kept on alert, in response to the hijacking of Flight 11 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] Officer Ordered to Prepare Fighters - Jeff Isch, the weapons supervisor for the 102nd Fighter Wing, which is based at Otis, will later recall, “As soon as that second tower was hit, we all started to scramble to action.” [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/8/2002] However, author Lynn Spencer indicates that the base does not begin preparing jets to launch until about 10 to 15 minutes later. She will write that the aircraft maintenance squadron officer, whose job is to get aircraft ready for combat, has been awaiting orders since the time of the second crash. Then, “Less than 15 minutes after the second impact into the World Trade Center, the order came.” An officer from the base’s battle cab gives him the instruction, “Listen, I want you to generate as many airframes [i.e. fighter jets] as you can!” Immediately, the aircraft maintenance squadron officer starts directing all available workers to the flight line (the parking and servicing area for aircraft) to prepare the base’s available F-15s for combat. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 155] Jeff Isch’s crew hurries to fix the jets with live weapons. Some are fitted with newer missiles that are rarely pulled out. [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/8/2002] According to Boston Magazine, “Jets undergoing maintenance [are] rushed back into service, fitted out for combat instead of training.” [BOSTON MAGAZINE, 1/2002] Jets Recalled from Training Mission - Six Otis fighters are away on an ordinary training mission and need to be brought back to base immediately. These jets have just arrived in Whiskey 105, which is military training airspace over the Atlantic Ocean, southeast of Long Island. It was in fact reportedly to this airspace that the two F-15s launched in response to Flight 11 were directed (see (8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The six jets receive a call from a civilian air traffic controller at the FAA’s Boston Center. The controller says, “You guys need to get back to base.” Marty Richard, one of the fighter pilots, then radios the Otis squadron operations center, and is instructed, “Get back here as soon as you can.” Richard tells the other pilots, “It sounds like we’re at war,” and they then head back to base. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 58-59; CAPE COD TIMES, 9/11/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 155] Around this time, a member of staff at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) tells a colleague that these six jets are being recalled to Otis for “possible use, so we’ve got more aircraft [on] standby.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001] Recalled Pilots Told to Prepare Jets for Alert - The jets arrive back at Otis Air Base around 20 minutes later. As they taxi in, the pilots receive an instruction over their radios from squadron commander Lt. Col. Jon Treacy, who tells them, “Cock your jets for alert!” They have never received such an order before. It means that, instead of parking and shutting down their aircraft, they must prepare them to be scrambled from the flight line, with all of the instruments, controls, and switches set ready for immediate takeoff orders. After doing as instructed, the pilots head into the operations building to find out what is happening. They gather around the television in the break room, and stare in amazement at the coverage of the attacks. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 155] The first F-15s to subsequently take off from Otis will launch some time shortly after 10:20 a.m. (see (Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 245-246] Entity Tags: Jeff Isch, Jon Treacy, Otis Air National Guard Base, Marty Richard, 102nd Fighter Wing Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

(Between 9:15 a.m. and 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Head Tells Richard Clarke-Led Videoconference that Flight 11 and 175 Were Hijacked Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke begins a crisis response video conference by asking FAA Administrator Jane Garvey what she knows. Garvey replies: “The two aircraft that went in [to the WTC] were American flight 11, a 767, and United 175, also a 767. Hijacked.” She says that she has put a hold on all takeoffs and landings in New York and Washington, then states, “We have reports of eleven aircraft off course or out of communications.” Clarke and Garvey discuss the feasibility of canceling all takeoffs nationally, and grounding all planes in the air. Garvey says it is possible, but will take time. [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 4-5] Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Jane Garvey Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke

(9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines Orders Its Flights to Land Immediately American Airlines orders all of its airborne flights to land at the nearest airport. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31 ] Managers at the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center in Fort Worth, Texas have learned of the second plane hitting the World Trade Center. Initially, they mistakenly believed this second plane was American Airlines Flight 77 (see 9:08 a.m. September 11, 2001). Gerard Arpey, the airline’s executive vice president for operations, conferred with other operational managers, and they all agreed that the airline needed to land its aircraft immediately. American Airlines’ president Don Carty then arrives at the SOC and also agrees, telling Arpey, “Do it.” So, at about 9:15, the airline orders all its planes to land at the nearest suitable airport. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] This is the first time an airline has ever ordered all its planes to land. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] The FAA will give out a similar order to all its facilities about 30 minutes later (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 29] Around that time, United Airlines will also order its aircraft to land (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] American Airlines ordered a ground stop earlier on that prevented any new takeoffs of its aircraft (see Between 9:00 a.m. and 9:10 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 30-31 ] Most of its domestic flights will have landed by about 11:50 a.m., though it will take longer to ground its international and trans-Pacific flights. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] Entity Tags: Gerard Arpey, American Airlines, Don Carty Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Command Center Asked to Issue Nationwide Cockpit Security Alert, but Does Not Act on Request At “approximately 9:15 a.m.,” according to the 9/11 Commission, Daniel Bueno, a supervisor at the FAA’s Boston Center, asks the FAA’s Herndon Command Center to contact all the FAA centers nationwide and instruct them to issue an alert, informing all airborne aircraft of the events unfolding in New York and advising them to heighten their cockpit security. Boston Center air traffic controllers have recently issued a similar alert to all aircraft in their airspace (see 9:09 a.m.-9:10 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25-26 ] However, the 9/11 Commission will conclude, “We have found no evidence to suggest that the Command Center acted on this request or issued any type of cockpit security alert.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 23] According to author Lynn Spencer, “The request never makes it to Ben Sliney,” the national operations manager at the Command Center. “Tragically, it is lost in the confusion and never gets past the staff person monitoring Sliney’s desk as events rapidly spiral out of control.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 99] But Ellen King, a Command Center manager, offers a different explanation. She will tell the 9/11 Commission that the FAA culture and mindset on 9/11 are such that the FAA “would never have relayed this message directly to all pilots.… [T]he FAA would pass situational awareness to the airline company representatives who, in turn, would determine if such action was necessary.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 AND 92 ] Entity Tags: Daniel Bueno, Ellen King, Federal Aviation Administration, Ben Sliney Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

(9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines Increases Security and Activates Crash Teams After American Airlines confirms that two aircraft have hit the World Trade Center, one of its managers calls for the activation of the airline’s crash teams, which are trained to deal with accidents and the families of crash victims. The airline also begins increasing security at its headquarters in Fort Worth, Texas, and other major stations. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 108] American Airlines has not yet confirmed that its Flight 11 was the first plane to hit the WTC (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but its officials have initially concluded, mistakenly, that the second aircraft to hit the WTC might have been its Flight 77 (see 9:08 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16 AND 30 ] Entity Tags: American Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: DC Air National Guard Intelligence Officer Unable to Obtain Information on Crisis

David McNulty. [Source: Air National Guard] An intelligence officer with the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) at Andrews Air Force Base, 10 miles outside Washington, is unable to obtain further information about the attacks from other agencies, and instead has to make do with what he can learn from television reports. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 79; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 155-156] Having learned of the two attacks in New York, Major David McNulty, the senior intelligence officer of the 113th Wing of the DCANG, checks the SIPRNET—the Department of Defense’s classified version of the Internet—for pertinent information, but apparently without success. He phones anyone he can think of who might be able to provide information, including the Air Combat Command Intelligence Squadron at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, the 609th Air Intelligence Squadron at Shaw Air Force Base in South Carolina, the FBI field office in Washington, and the Secret Service’s White House Joint Operations Center. Yet, as he will later recall, the agencies have “nothing to report.” Even his call to the FBI is “a fruitless effort.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/11/2004 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 155-156] McNulty will say, “I even called the National Security Agency 24-hour information desk and they knew nothing more than I did.” He adds, “We were all getting our information from CNN.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 79] According to Knight Ridder, “Air defense around Washington, DC, is provided mainly by fighter planes from Andrews Air Force Base.” [KNIGHT RIDDER, 9/11/2001] However, author Lynn Spencer will claim that because the DCANG “is a general purpose F-16 unit, no one is specifically tasked with keeping the squadron informed.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 156] Entity Tags: Air Combat Command Intelligence Squadron, David McNulty, District of Columbia Air National Guard, 609th Air Intelligence Squadron, National Security Agency, FBI Washington Field Office, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Between 9:15 a.m. and 12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001: New York City Workers Hear Explosions in WTC 7

Barry Jennings [Source: Public domain] Barry Jennings, a City Housing Authority worker, and Michael Hess, New York’s corporation counsel, hear unexplained explosions inside World Trade Center Building 7, where they become trapped. [UPN 9, 9/11/2001; BBC, 7/6/2008] The two men went up to the emergency command center on the 23rd floor of WTC 7 after the first attack occurred (see (Shortly Before 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001; INDEPENDENT, 9/13/2001] At some point, the power goes out in the building. They then start walking down the stairs to get out. According to Hess, when the two men get down to the eighth floor, “there was an explosion and we’ve been trapped on the eighth floor with smoke, thick smoke, all around us, for about an hour and a half.” [UPN 9, 9/11/2001] Jennings will also recall hearing explosions. He will say: “I made it to the sixth floor and there was an explosion. The explosion was beneath me.” [DYLAN AVERY, 2007] He will add, “[T]he staircase that I was standing on just gave way,” and, “Then we made it back to the eighth floor, I heard some more explosions.” [BBC, 7/6/2008] Jennings says to Hess: “This is it; we’re dead. We’re not gonna make it out of here.” [PENN STATE PUBLIC BROADCASTING, 3/1/2002] The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) will claim the two men head down the stairs after 9:59, when the first collapse occurs, and then become trapped around the time the second tower collapses, at 10:28. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 109-110 ] But according to the London Independent, they start heading down the stairs after the second attack at 9:03, which suggests the explosions begin earlier on. [INDEPENDENT, 9/13/2001] Jennings will confirm this, saying that when he hears the first explosion, “Both [of the Twin Towers] were still standing,” meaning it occurs before 9:59. He says: “I was trapped in there when both [Twin Towers] came down.… All this time I’m hearing explosions.” [DYLAN AVERY, 2007] The cause of the explosions is unclear. Later on, firefighters will rescue Hess and Jennings from the building (see 12:10 p.m.-12:15 p.m. September 11, 2001). [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 109-110 ] Entity Tags: Barry Jennings, Michael Hess Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

(9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Richard Clarke Takes Charge of Video Conference; Condoleezza Rice Says She Is Heading to PEOC

Mike Fenzel. [Source: Wall Street Journal] According to counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, around this time, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice says she is going down to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House to be with Vice President Dick Cheney. Clarke is currently convening a video teleconference with top officials from the Secure Video Conferencing Center, just off the main floor of the Situation Room (see (9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Rice has just walked in with her deputy, Stephen Hadley. Clarke asks her, “Do you want to chair this as a principals meeting?” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 2-4] (A “principals meeting” includes the principals of the National Security Council, but not the president. [BUMILLER, 2007, PP. 141] ) Rice declines, allowing Clarke to run the conference. Clarke will recall that Rice says to him: “You’re going to need some decisions quickly. I’m going to the PEOC to be with the vice president. Tell us what you need.” Clarke replies, “What I need is an open line to Cheney and you.” Clarke then turns to his White House Fellow, Army Major Mike Fenzel, and instructs him to “go with Condi to the PEOC and open a secure line to me. I’ll relay the decisions we need to you.” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 3-4] However, according to her own later recollections, Rice does not head down from the Situation Room to the PEOC until later, at some time shortly after the Pentagon is hit (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [PBS FRONTLINE, 7/12/2002; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/11/2002; BUMILLER, 2007, PP. XIII] Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, Richard A. Clarke, Stephen J. Hadley, Mike Fenzel Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke

(Between 9:15 a.m. and 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Parent of Flight Attendant Informs American Airlines of Daughter’s Call from Flight 77

Toni Knisley. [Source: ReclaimingTheSky.com] At some time before the Pentagon is hit, one of the parents of flight attendant Renee May call an American Airlines employee at Reagan National Airport just outside Washington, DC, and report that their daughter has contacted them from Flight 77, which has been hijacked. May called her parents at 9:12 a.m., reported that her plane was being hijacked, and asked them to pass this information on to American Airlines (see (9:12 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31 ] The Las Vegas Review-Journal reports that it is May’s mother, Nancy May, who makes the call to American Airlines. [LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, 9/13/2001] This claim is repeated at the 2006 Zacarias Moussaoui trial. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 7 ] But according to author Tom Murphy, it is her father, Ronald May, who makes the call. [MURPHY, 2006, PP. 57] The parent describes the information provided by their daughter, including her flight number and her phone number on board the plane. According to the 9/11 Commission, the American Airlines employee initially thinks May’s mother (who the Commission indicates makes the call) is talking about the aircraft that crashed into the World Trade Center. But Nancy May repeats that she is referring to Flight 77, which is still in the air. (The error could possibly be because, by 9:08 a.m., officials at American Airlines’ System Operations Control in Texas mistakenly concluded that the second aircraft to hit the World Trade Center may have been Flight 77 (see 9:08 a.m. September 11, 2001).) [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 30-31 ] The employee, a secretary, then passes on the information about May’s call to Toni Knisley, a flight service manager at the airport. Knisley rushes to her office and enters May’s employee number into the computer to call up her schedule. This shows she was booked on Flight 77, Washington Dulles Airport to Los Angeles, scheduled to depart at 8:10 a.m. Knisley tries to log onto the flight to view its status, but the information is blocked, so she cannot see if it is still flying or where it is. [MURPHY, 2006, PP. 56-57] (It is possible the information is blocked as a result of American Airlines having already initiated “lockout” procedures to protect information about Flight 77 (see 9:05 a.m. September 11, 2001).) Entity Tags: American Airlines, Renee May, Nancy May, Ronald May, Toni Knisley Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

9:16 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Reported Hijacked before Hijacking Supposedly Occurs, According to Some Accounts; One Hijacker May Have Snuck into Cockpit Early According to an early timeline laid out to CNN by unnamed but “informed defense officials,” the FAA informs NORAD at this time that Flight 93 may have been hijacked. [CNN, 9/17/2001] In public testimony before the 9/11 Commission in 2003, NORAD officials will similarly claim that the FAA first reports the possible hijacking of Flight 93 at this time. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Yet this is 12 minutes before the hijacking is meant to have occurred (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 38 ] One explanation is put forward that could possibly help explain the discrepancy: There are media reports that “investigators had determined from the cockpit voice recorder from United Airlines Flight 93… that one of the four hijackers had been invited into the cockpit area before the flight took off from Newark, New Jersey.” Cockpit voice recordings indicate that the pilots believed their guest was a colleague “and was thereby extended the typical airline courtesy of allowing any pilot from any airline to join a flight by sitting in the jumpseat, the folded over extra seat located inside the cockpit.” [FOX NEWS, 9/24/2001; HERALD SUN (MELBOURNE), 9/25/2001] This would be consistent with passenger phone calls from the plane, describing only three hijackers on Flight 93 (see (9:27 a.m.-10:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 120] However, the reports will not be confirmed. The 9/11 Commission Report will dismiss the claim that NORAD was alerted at 9:16, stating, “In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated that at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 from the FAA. This statement was incorrect. There was no hijack to report at 9:16. United 93 was proceeding normally at that time.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 34] No further explanations will be offered for the incorrect timelines. NORAD’s own initial timeline, released on September 18, 2001, will not give a time for when the FAA alerted it to Flight 93. It will only say that the FAA and its Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) “established a line of open communication discussing AA Flt 77 and UA Flt 93.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:16 a.m.) September 11, 2001: President Bush Takes His Time Leaving Classroom Photo-Op

Bush continues to read the goat story. [Source: Lions Gate Films] President Bush leaves the Sarasota classroom where he has been since about 9:03 a.m.(see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). The children finish their lessons and put away their readers. [SARASOTA MAGAZINE, 9/19/2001] Bush advises the children to stay in school and be good citizens. [TAMPA TRIBUNE, 9/1/2002; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/8/2002] He also tells the children, “Thank you all so very much for showing me your reading skills.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] One student also asks Bush a question, and Bush gives a quick response on his education policy. [NEW YORK POST, 9/12/2002] A reporter asks, “Mr. President, are you aware of the reports of the plane crash in New York? Is there any…” This question is interrupted by an aide who has come into the room, saying, “All right. Thank you. If everyone could please step outside.” Bush then says, “We’ll talk about it later.” [CBS NEWS, 9/11/2002] Bush then tells school principal Gwen Tose-Rigell, who is in the room, about the terror attacks and why he has to leave. [WASHINGTON TIMES, 10/7/2002] He then goes into an empty classroom next door and meets with his staff there. [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] Bush’s program with the children was supposed to start at 9:00 a.m. and end 20 minutes later. [SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, 9/16/2001] He leaves the classroom only a couple of minutes earlier than planned, if at all. The “goodbyes” and questions on the way out may have taken another minute or two. Entity Tags: Gwen Tose-Rigell, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

9:16 a.m.-9:18 a.m. September 11, 2001: American Airlines Contacts FAA; Thinks Flight 77 May Have Hit the WTC Bill Halleck, an American Airlines air traffic control specialist at the airline’s System Operations Control (SOC) in Fort Worth, Texas, phones an official at the FAA’s Herndon Command Center, to ask about the status of New York City air traffic. During their two-and-a-half minute conversation, Halleck says American thinks Flight 11 crashed into the WTC, and says that Flight 77 is “missing.” Presently, he receives an update from someone else at SOC, indicating that Flight 77 may also have crashed into the WTC (see 9:08 a.m. September 11, 2001). He wonders how it could have gotten to New York, but updates the FAA official on this news. The FAA official replies that the second WTC crash may not have been Flight 77 because “we have another call sign” for that incident. The FAA Command Center is currently uncertain of the identity of either of the planes that hit the Twin Towers, and provides no further information. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31 AND 94 ] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Bill Halleck, American Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(Between 9:16 a.m. and 9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Secret Service Still Does Not Evacuate Bush From School, Allegedly at the President’s Insistence

Frank Brogan. [Source: Publicity photo] The Secret Service later tells the 9/11 Commission that while he is in the holding room at the Booker Elementary School (see (9:16 a.m.-9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001), they are “anxious to move the president to a safer location, but did not think it imperative for him to run out the door.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 39] Yet according to Philip Melanson, who is an expert on the Secret Service, “With an unfolding terrorist attack, the procedure should have been to get the president to the closest secure location as quickly as possible, which clearly is not a school.” [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/4/2004] Bush himself later recalls that at this time, “[T]he Secret Service and the Mil Aide [military aide] was in the process of getting information about where the president ought to go. One thing for certain, I needed to get out of where I was.” [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 93] Yet he does not immediately leave the school, and will remain there to give a brief statement in its library (see 9:29 a.m. September 11, 2001). According to Frank Brogan, the lieutenant governor of Florida, who is also in the holding room at this time, the Secret Service tries to get the president to return to Air Force One immediately. But Bush refuses, saying he is “committed to staying on the ground long enough to write a statement about what was happening, read it to the nation and lead a moment of silence for the victims.” [UP ONLINE, 9/18/2003] Bush himself later says that while he is in the holding room, “I didn’t spend that much time about my own safety because I knew others were worried about that. What I was interested in is making sure that the response mechanism that was under my control was sharp and ready to go. And that meant defense, for starters.” [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 93] Yet he reportedly will not make any decisions about the response to the attacks until after 9:55 a.m. (see (Between 10:00 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The 9/11 Commission later claims that, while Bush is in the holding room, “No one in the traveling party had any information… that other aircraft were hijacked or missing. Staff was in contact with the White House Situation Room, but as far as we could determine, no one with the president was in contact with the Pentagon.” [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 39-41] In contrast to the Secret Service’s inaction in removing Bush from the school, Vice President Dick Cheney is reportedly “seized by the arms, legs and his belt and physically carried” out of his office by Secret Service agents around this time, in order to get him to the bunker below the White House. Cheney himself says the agents “hoisted me up and moved me very rapidly down the hallway, down some stairs” (see (9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [NBC, 9/16/2001; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001] Entity Tags: Secret Service, Frank Brogan, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

(9:16 a.m.-9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001: President Bush Works on Speech with Staff; Makes No Decisions

Bush in a holding room before giving his speech. Communications director Dan Bartlett points to the TV, and the clock reads 9:25. [Source: White House] After leaving the Booker Elementary School classroom, President Bush returns to an adjacent holding room where he is briefed by his staff, and gets his first look at the footage of the burning World Trade Center on a television that has been set up there. He instructs his press secretary, Ari Fleischer, to take notes to create an accurate accounting of events. According to some accounts, he speaks on the phone with Vice President Dick Cheney who is at the White House, and they both agree that terrorists are probably behind the attacks. [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 92-93; DAILY MAIL, 9/8/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 39] But White House adviser Karl Rove, who is also in the holding room, later tells NBC News that Bush is unable to reach Cheney because the vice president is being moved from his office to the White House bunker at this time. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] The president speaks with New York Governor George Pataki and FBI Director Robert Mueller. Bush learns from Mueller that the planes that hit the WTC were commercial American aircraft, and at least one of them had apparently been hijacked after leaving Boston. According to some accounts, Bush also speaks with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice around this time. However, Rice herself will later suggest otherwise (see (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 93-94; DAILY MAIL, 9/8/2002; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/8/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 39] Fleischer and White House Communications Director Dan Bartlett quickly draft a statement for the president to deliver in the school’s library, which Bush rewords, scribbling three sheets of notes. Bush will deliver this at 9:29 a.m. (see 9:29 a.m. September 11, 2001). While he works on the statement, Bush briefly glances at the unfolding horror on the television. Turning to his aides in the room, he declares, “We’re at war.” [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 94; ALBUQUERQUE TRIBUNE, 9/10/2002] According to the 9/11 Commission, the focus at the present time is on the president’s statement to the nation, and the only decision made by Bush’s traveling party is to return to Washington. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 39] Bush later claims he makes no major decisions in response to the crisis until after Air Force One takes off at around 9:55 a.m. (see (Shortly After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] Entity Tags: George E. Pataki, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Robert S. Mueller III, George W. Bush, Dan Bartlett, Karl Rove, Ari Fleischer, Condoleezza Rice Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush, Dick Cheney

9:17 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Shuts Down All New York City Airports The FAA shuts down all New York City area airports. [CNN, 9/12/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/12/2001] A flight controller at La Guardia airport reports the taxiways, runways, and airspace are completely clear at 9:37 a.m.m [NEW YORK TIMES, 12/30/2003] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, La Guardia Airport Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:19 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Concerned about Delta Flight 1989, Wants It to Increase Cockpit Security The FAA’s New England regional office calls the FAA’s Herndon Command Center, and asks it to tell Cleveland Center to contact Delta Air Lines Flight 1989 and advise it to use extra cockpit security. The reason the New England regional office makes this request is unclear. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 10] As the 9/11 Commission will describe, apparently in response to the request, “[A]t 9:19 the FAA… Command Center in Herndon ordered controllers to send a cockpit warning to Delta 1989 because, like American 11 and United 175, it was a transcontinental flight departing Boston’s Logan Airport.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 455] Minutes earlier, the FAA’s Boston Center asked the Command Center to contact the nation’s FAA centers and instruct them to tell all airborne aircraft to increase their cockpit security (see (9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The Command Center’s instruction to air traffic controllers about Delta 1989 is apparently an exception, as the 9/11 Commission will say it found “no evidence to suggest that the Command Center acted on this request.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 23; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25-26 ] Delta 1989 will subsequently be mistakenly reported as having been hijacked (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:19 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Dispatcher Responsible for Flights 175 and 93 Begins Advising Pilots to ‘Beware of Cockpit Intrusion’ Shortly after he learns a second plane has hit the World Trade Center, United Airlines flight dispatcher Ed Ballinger takes the initiative to begin sending a warning message to the flights he is monitoring, including Flight 93 and Flight 175 (although this aircraft has already crashed). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 11; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 AND 37 ] Ballinger is responsible for monitoring United’s aircraft flying from the East Coast to the West Coast. He has 16 such flights he is in charge of. [CHICAGO DAILY HERALD, 4/14/2004] He sends out a text message to his airborne flights: “Beware any cockpit intrusion… Two aircraft in NY hit [World] Trade Center builds.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 11; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 ] Although United Airlines has suspected Flight 175 as being hijacked since around 9:00 a.m. (see Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001), Ballinger is still responsible for multiple flights. (In contrast to United, American Airlines has a policy that flight dispatchers should only manage the hijacked flight, and be relieved of responsibility for their other flights.) [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 455-456] Ballinger’s warning is therefore sent out to his aircraft in groups, and will not be sent to Flight 93 until 9:23 a.m. (see 9:23 a.m.-9:26 a.m. September 11, 2001). Unaware that it was the second plane that hit the WTC, Ballinger will also send the message to Flight 175 (see 9:23 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 AND 37 ] Ballinger begins sending out these warnings two minutes before United Airlines instructs its dispatchers to warn their flights to secure their cockpit doors (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 455] According to the 9/11 Commission, his text message represents “the first occasion on 9/11 when either American or United sent out such a warning to their airborne aircraft.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 37 ] Ballinger will later recall: “As soon as I had a grasp of what was going on… I sent [the warning] out immediately. It was before [Transportation Secretary Norman] Mineta, and even before the airlines told us to alert the crews.” [CHICAGO DAILY HERALD, 4/14/2004] Entity Tags: Ed Ballinger Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175, Flight UA 93

(9:19 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS Technicians Say They Are Willing to Order an Aircraft Shootdown Personnel on the operations floor at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) confirm to their mission crew commander (MCC) that they are prepared to issue an order to fighter pilots, telling them to fire on a commercial airliner. MCC Concerned about Possible Shootdown - Major Kevin Nasypany, the NEADS MCC, is concerned about what might happen next as the day’s crisis unfolds. He realizes he may need to order fighter jets under his command to shoot down an errant aircraft. He therefore starts walking up and down the operations floor, impatiently asking all his section heads and weapons technicians, “Are you prepared to follow an order to shoot down a civilian airliner?” All of them affirm that they will issue such an order if required to do so. Nasypany Confers with Marr - Satisfied with their answers, Nasypany gets on the phone to Colonel Robert Marr, who is in the NEADS battle cab, and asks him, “Have we already asked the questions?” What Nasypany means is, have they asked about getting authorization to take out a threatening aircraft? According to author Lynn Spencer, “Those authorizations, [Nasypany] knows, are going to have to come from the president himself, passed down from senior NORAD command in Colorado Springs.” Marr replies that Major General Larry Arnold, who is at the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters in Florida, is seeking the necessary authorizations and is prepared to take any action required. Nasypany then briefs Marr on the armaments on board the fighters NEADS has had launched (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). He adds: “My recommendation, if we have to take anybody out, large aircraft, we use AIM-9s in the face. If need be.” He means that if there is another hijacking, the most effective way to bring the plane down would be to fire a missile into its nose. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 140-141] Pilots Do Not Receive Shootdown Authorization - At around 9:35 a.m., according to Spencer, a NEADS weapons controller will ask one of the pilots that launched in response to the first hijacking whether he would be willing to shoot down a hijacked aircraft (see (9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 153] According to the 9/11 Commission, however, NEADS personnel will only learn that NORAD has been cleared to shoot down threatening aircraft at 10:31 a.m., and even then they will not pass this order along to the fighter pilots (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42-43] Entity Tags: Robert Marr, Kevin Nasypany, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

(9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Sets Up Ineffectual Hijacking Teleconference The FAA sets up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies, including the Defense Department. This is almost one hour after the FAA’s Boston flight control began notifying the chain of command (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001) and notified other flight control centers about the first hijacking at 8:25 a.m. (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001). According to the Acting FAA Deputy Administrator Monte Belger, this teleconference (called the “hijack net”) is “the fundamental primary source of information between the FAA, [Defense Department], FBI, Secret Service, and… other agencies.” Yet even after the delay in setting it up, FAA and Defense Department participants later claim it plays no role in coordinating the response to the hijackings. The 9/11 Commission says, “The NMCC [National Military Command Center inside the Pentagon] officer who participated told us that the call was monitored only periodically because the information was sporadic, it was of little value, and there were other important tasks. The FAA manager of the teleconference also remembered that the military participated only briefly before the Pentagon was hit.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 36] According to a statement provided by the FAA to the 9/11 Commission in 2003, this teleconference began significantly earlier—“[w]ithin minutes after the first aircraft hit the World Trade Center” (see (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Monte Belger, US Department of Defense, 9/11 Commission Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

(Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Transportation Secretary Mineta Reaches Bunker, Meets Vice President Cheney

Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta. [Source: US Department of Transportation] Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta arrives at the White House bunker—the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC)—containing Vice President Dick Cheney and others. Mineta will tell NBC News that he arrives there at “probably about 9:27,” though he later says to the 9/11 Commission that he arrives at “about 9:20 a.m.” He also later recalls that Cheney is already there when he arrives. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/4/2004; ACADEMY OF ACHIEVEMENT, 6/3/2006] This supports accounts of Cheney reaching the bunker not long after the second WTC crash (see (9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Questioned about this in 2007 by an activist group, Mineta will confirm that Cheney was “absolutely… already there” in the PEOC when he arrived, and that “This was before American Airlines [Flight 77] went into the Pentagon,” which happens at 9:37. Yet, while admitting there is “conflicting evidence about when the vice president arrived” in the PEOC, the 9/11 Commission will conclude that the “vice president arrived in the room shortly before 10:00, perhaps at 9:58.” Mineta also later claims that when he arrives in the PEOC, Mrs. Lynne Cheney, the wife of the vice president, is already there. Yet the 9/11 Commission will claim she only arrives at the White House at 9:52 (see (9:52 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 40; 911TRUTHSEATTLE (.ORG), 6/26/2007] Once in the PEOC, Mineta establishes open phone lines with his office at the Department of Transportation and with the FAA Operations Center. [ACADEMY OF ACHIEVEMENT, 6/3/2006] Entity Tags: Lynne Cheney, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Norman Mineta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Dick Cheney

(9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Barbara Olson Said to Call from Flight 77, but Account Is Full of Contradictions

Barbara Olson. [Source: Richard Eillis/ Getty Images] A passenger on Flight 77, Barbara Olson, calls her husband, Theodore (Ted) Olson, who is solicitor general at the Justice Department. [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 7/23/2004] Ted Olson is in his Justice Department office watching news of the attacks on the World Trade Center on television when his wife calls. A few days later, he will recall: “She told me that she had been herded to the back of the plane. She mentioned that they had used knives and box cutters to hijack the plane. She mentioned that the pilot had announced that the plane had been hijacked.” [CNN, 9/14/2001] He tells her that two planes have hit the WTC. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 3/5/2002] Barbara Olson says she feels nobody is taking charge. [CNN, 9/12/2001] Ted Olson doesn’t know if she is near the pilots, but at one point she asks: “What shall I tell the pilot? What can I tell the pilot to do?” [CNN, 9/14/2001] Then the call is cut off without warning. [NEWSWEEK, 9/29/2001] Ted Olson's Recollections Vague - Ted Olson’s recollection of the call’s timing will be extremely vague. He will say the call “must have been 9:15 [a.m.] or 9:30 [a.m.]. Someone would have to reconstruct the time for me.” [CNN, 9/14/2001] Other accounts place the call around 9:25 a.m. [MIAMI HERALD, 9/14/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/15/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/21/2001] The call is said to last about a minute. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001] By some accounts, Ted Olson’s message to his wife, that planes have hit the WTC, comes later, in a second phone call. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/21/2001] According to one account, Barbara Olson calls her husband from inside a bathroom. [EVENING STANDARD, 9/12/2001] But in another, she is near a pilot, and in yet another she is near two pilots. [BOSTON GLOBE, 11/23/2001] Conflicting Accounts of Type of Phone Used - Ted Olson’s accounts of how his wife makes her calls are also conflicting. Three days after 9/11, he will say: “I found out later that she was having, for some reason, to call collect and was having trouble getting through. You know how it is to get through to a government institution when you’re calling collect.” He says he doesn’t know what kind of phone she uses, but he has “assumed that it must have been on the airplane phone, and that she somehow didn’t have access to her credit cards. Otherwise, she would have used her cell phone and called me.” [HANNITY & COLMES, 9/14/2001] Why Barbara Olson would have needed access to her credit cards to call him on her cell phone is not explained. However, in another interview on the same day, Ted Olson will say his wife uses a cell phone and her call may be cut off “because the signals from cell phones coming from airplanes don’t work that well.” [CNN, 9/14/2001] Six months later, he will claim she calls collect, “using the phone in the passengers’ seats.” [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 3/5/2002] However, it is not possible to call on seatback phones, collect or otherwise, without a credit card, which would render making a collect call moot. Many other details in Ted Olson’s accounts are conflicting, and he will fault his memory and say he “tends to mix the two [calls from his wife] up because of the emotion of the events.” [CNN, 9/14/2001] Call Supposedly Made through Secretary - According to official reports, Barbara Olson is able to reach her husband through a secretary, Lori Lynn Keyton, twice, at around 9:15 a.m. The first call is collect and comes through a live operator, while the second is direct. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001 ; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/14/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/20/2004] Entity Tags: Barbara Olson, Lori Lynn Keyton, Theodore (“Ted”) Olson Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(9:20 a.m.-9:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Firefighters Responding to Car Crash at Reagan Airport Quickly Respond to Pentagon Attack Shortly before the Pentagon is attacked, firefighters with the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA) respond to a multiple vehicle car crash at the upper level of Terminal B of Reagan National Airport, which is less than a mile from the Pentagon. Captain Michael Defina, the acting shift commander, has seen the World Trade Center attacks on television and, although the airport is not on alert, he later claims he has a feeling that Washington could be another terrorist target. Although the shift commander doesn’t usually respond to motor vehicle accidents, Defina accompanies the rescue engine and medic unit to the crash at Terminal B because, he says, “something didn’t sound right about it.” He then hears a “dull roar” when the Pentagon is struck, and turns to see smoke rising above it. [NFPA JOURNAL, 11/1/2001; JEMS, 4/2002 ] Fire Communications initially tells him that a Boeing 757 crashed off the end of Runway 1-19 at Reagan Airport. This report is soon corrected, and the MWAA is directed to respond to the Pentagon attack. It has substantial resources for this, including two foam units and two mass casualty units. MWAA has authority to automatically respond to plane crashes within 5 miles of Reagan Airport, so two of its heavy rescue units self-dispatch to the Pentagon. Its fire and medical units arrive at the crash site within 5 minutes of the attack. [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. A6-A7] The Airports Authority firefighters are able to set up directly in front of the impact hole, and their foam units knock down much of the fire within seven minutes of arriving. [NFPA JOURNAL, 11/1/2001] Entity Tags: Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, Michael Defina Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(After 9:19 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Flight 23 Cancels Takeoff, Possibly Avoids Being Hijacked United Airlines Flight 23, a Boeing 767 bound from JFK International Airport in New York to Los Angeles, cancels its takeoff and may thus avoid becoming the morning’s fifth hijacked plane. It was scheduled to depart at 8:30 a.m., but was late in pushing back from the gate and is still waiting in line to take off. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/13/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/20/2001] The plane’s pilots, Tom Mannello and Carol Timmons, have heard a report over their radio that a plane has flown into the World Trade Center. They then receive a text message from United Airlines dispatcher Ed Ballinger, which reportedly states: “We have gone to heightened security. Do not open cockpit doors. Secure the cockpit.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 102-103] This is presumably the message Ballinger sent out at 9:19 (see 9:19 a.m. September 11, 2001), though it seems to be more like a description of the message he sends out at 9:32 (see 9:32 a.m.-9:33 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 37 AND 39 ] Pilots Alarmed at Warning - Having never received a warning like this before, the pilots are alarmed. Timmons starts barricading the cockpit door with their suitcases while Mannello grabs the crash ax for protection. Mannello calls the plane’s lead flight attendant to inform her of the threat, and tells her not to open the cockpit door under any circumstances. Soon afterwards, she calls back and informs him: “We [the plane’s flight attendants] just think you should know this because we think it is unusual. We have four young Arab men sitting in first class this morning.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 103] (Other accounts will claim there are three or even six suspicious passengers on the flight. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/13/2001; CHICAGO DAILY HERALD, 4/14/2004] ) Mannello hasn’t been told what the reported threat is about or if it relates to Arabs, so simply thanks the attendant for the information. Minutes later, the pilots receive a radio message from ground control, announcing, “All aircraft, be advised that the airport is now closed.” A subsequent message announces the airport is being evacuated. Mannello decides to move his aircraft back to the terminal. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 103-104] Arab Passengers Become Aggressive - After the passengers are told their flight has been canceled, the Arab men become upset. They stand up and start urgently consulting with each other, and then refuse to return to their seats. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/13/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/20/2001] One official will later describe: “These guys got belligerent, and said something like, ‘We’ve got to be on this plane.’ They expressed a desire to remain on the plane and resisted getting off.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/14/2001] According to the Associated Press, “The argument with a member of the flight crew became so heated that the crew member called airport security. But before security arrived, the men had vanished.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/13/2001] Evidence Indicates Plans for Hijacking Plane - Authorities will later check the men’s unclaimed baggage and find box-cutters, copies of the Koran, and al-Qaeda instruction sheets. [CHICAGO DAILY HERALD, 4/14/2004; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 105] In 2002, apparently referring to this incident, Lt. Gen. Ken Pennie, the deputy commander of NORAD, will state, “We suspect there might have been more than just the four aircraft involved” as targets for the 9/11 attacks. [GLOBE AND MAIL, 6/13/2002] The FBI will investigate this incident and go through the flight manifest to determine the names of the Arab men, who are believed to have had ticketed reservations. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/13/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/14/2001] Investigators will interview the plane’s crew nearly half a dozen times. But no information about the suspicious Arab passengers is ever released to the public. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 105] On September 14, it is reported that investigators believe at least one of these passengers was among a number of individuals taken into custody at JFK and La Guardia Airports the previous day (see September 13-14, 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/14/2001] However, these detained individuals are soon cleared of any connection with the events of 9/11 and are released. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/14/2001] In 2004, Rep. Mark Kirk (R) will say the suspicious Flight 23 passengers were never found and are likely still at large. [CHICAGO DAILY HERALD, 4/14/2004] Entity Tags: Ed Ballinger, Tom Mannello, Carol Timmons, Mark Steven Kirk, Kenneth Pennie Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Fire Chief Warns Firefighters at Pentagon that Washington Could be Target for Attack
Alan Wallace. [Source: Michael Norris] A fire chief calls his firefighters who are manning the fire station at the Pentagon’s heliport, and warns them that there could be more attacks, and Washington could be a target. [FIRST DUE NEWS, 4/17/2003; CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 20-21] Chief Charles Campbell works with the fire department at Fort Myer, an army base 1.5 miles northwest of the Pentagon, which sends three of its firefighters each day to man the fire station at the Pentagon heliport. [PENTAGRAM, 11/2/2001] Campbell calls the station to make sure his firefighters there—Alan Wallace, Mark Skipper, and Dennis Young—are aware of what is going on in New York. He tells them, “These were intentional acts of terrorism.” He speaks “to each of the three firefighters, making sure they [are] all on their toes and ready to respond to an unexpected incident.” Wallace will recall that Campbell “wanted to be sure we were aware of everything going on around the fire station.” Campbell says there could be more attacks, and that “If it had happened in New York, it could happen in Washington.” As Wallace recalls, Campbell says “Washington, DC could very well be a target and if that happened, our fire truck could be dispatched to an incident.” [FIRST DUE NEWS, 4/17/2003; CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 20-21] Yet, while Campbell believes an attack on Washington is likely, neither the Pentagon nor any government buildings in Washington will be evacuated before the Pentagon is hit at 9:37 (see Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001 and Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/16/2001] The Fort Myer firefighters will narrowly escape suffering serious injuries when the Pentagon attack occurs (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [PENTAGRAM, 11/2/2001] Entity Tags: Charles Campbell, Dennis Young, Alan Wallace, Mark Skipper Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Fire Chief Concerned about Possible Explosives in the WTC Fire Chief Ray Downey is on the corner of West Street and Vesey Street, where the chiefs in charge of the response at the WTC have gathered to survey the scene. [DOWNEY, 2004, PP. 233] Downey is the head of the New York Fire Department’s Special Operations Command, where he has pioneered techniques for responding to terrorist attacks. [CBS NEWS, 9/11/2006] Reportedly, he had felt certain that a big attack on American soil was due. Worst in his mind had been “a situation in which there was a secondary device timed to explode after rescuers had rushed to the scene” of a terrorist attack. As he now checks in with the fire chiefs who are trying to put together a response plan, he tells them “he is worried about secondary devices in the towers, explosive devices that could hurt the firemen.” [DOWNEY, 2004, PP. 224 AND 233] Shortly after the South Tower comes down, Downey will in fact say he thought bombs in the building had caused it to collapse (see Shortly After 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CITY OF NEW YORK, 12/6/2001] He will be killed when the North Tower collapses at 10:28 a.m. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/9/2005] Entity Tags: Ray Downey Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

(9:20 a.m.-9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA’s Indianapolis Center Finally Aware of National Crisis; Discusses Flight 77 Concerns with Command Center According to the 9/11 Commission, the FAA’s Indianapolis Center, which was monitoring Flight 77 when it disappeared from radar (see 8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (8:56 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001), has learned by 9:20 a.m. that there are “other hijacked aircraft,” and begins “to doubt its initial assumption that American 77 had crashed.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] In fact, a transcript of air traffic controller communications will show that the Indianapolis Center was informed of the Flight 11 hijacking, and that two planes had hit the World Trade Center, at 9:09 a.m. (see 9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001); five minutes later, it received confirmation of the Flight 11 hijacking (see 9:14 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001] And television networks have been covering the crashes in New York since as early as 8:48 a.m. (see 8:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). [BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 16-17] Other Facilities Notified - The manager at the Indianapolis Center now discusses the concern that Flight 77 may not have crashed with the FAA’s Command Center in Herndon, Virginia. This discussion prompts the Command Center to notify some FAA field facilities that Flight 77 is lost. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32 ] Also at around 9:20, the Indianapolis Center operations manager contacts the FAA’s Chicago Center. He advises its operations manager of his concern that Flight 77 may have been hijacked, and says to be on the lookout, based on the events that have occurred in New York. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ] By 9:21, according to the 9/11 Commission, the FAA “Command Center, some FAA field facilities, and American Airlines had started to search for American 77. They feared it had been hijacked.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24-25] Entity Tags: Chicago flight control, Federal Aviation Administration, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center, American Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FBI Washington Office Is Warned Flight 77 Has Been Hijacked

Arthur Eberhart. [Source: Spc. Edgar R. Gonzalez] In a government report analyzing the effectiveness of rescue worker response to the Pentagon crash, it is mentioned that, “At about 9:20 a.m., the WFO [FBI Washington Field Office] Command Center [is] notified that American Airlines Flight 77 had been hijacked shortly after takeoff from Washington Dulles International Airport. [Special Agent in Charge Arthur] Eberhart dispatche[s] a team of 50 agents to investigate the Dulles hijacking and provide additional security to prevent another. He sen[ds] a second team to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport as a precautionary step. At the WFO Command Center, Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) Jim Rice [is] on the telephone with the Pentagon when Flight 77 crashe[s] into the building.” [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. C-55] Yet according to the 9/11 Commission, NORAD is not told that Flight 77 had been hijacked at this time or any time before it crashes. However, the FAA has claimed they officially warned NORAD at 9:24 a.m. (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and informally warned them even earlier (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Arthur Eberhart, US Department of Defense, Federal Aviation Administration, Albert T. Church III, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, FBI Washington Field Office Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Orders No New Takeoffs, at Least for International Flights United Airlines orders its aircraft that have not yet taken off to remain on the ground. However, the exact time and details of this order are unclear. According to the 9/11 Commission, United orders the “ground stop” at an unstated time after about 9:10, when American Airlines had ordered a nationwide ground stop of its aircraft (see Between 9:00 a.m. and 9:10 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 10] The Wall Street Journal reports that Andy Studdert, United Airlines’ chief operating officer, gives the order for United aircraft to remain “frozen on the ground” at 9:20. However, it only describes this order applying to “all international flights,” so whether it also applies to United’s domestic flights is unclear. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001] The FAA will issue an order to all its facilities, initiating a “national ground stop,” at around 9:25 a.m. (see (9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [TIME, 9/14/2001] At around 9:45, United Airlines will order all its airborne flights to land (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] Entity Tags: United Airlines, Andy Studdert Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(After 9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Administrator Frustrated that Military Is Not Involved in Teleconference

Monte Belger [Source: FAA] At 9:20 a.m. (or earlier, according to some accounts), the FAA set up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). FAA records indicate that the National Military Command Center within the Pentagon was included in the communication network “no later than 9:20 a.m.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 ] Yet at some point later in the morning, Acting FAA Deputy Administrator Monte Belger becomes aware that the military is not involved in the teleconference in any meaningful way. Presumably referring to tape recordings of the FAA headquarters, 9/11 Commissioner Jamie Gorelick will later say to Belger, “We heard some rather colorful language came from your mouth at that point.” The absence of the NMCC from the teleconference is unusual. Belger says, “I’ve lived through dozens of hijackings in my 30-year FAA career… and [the NMCC] were always there. They were always on the net, and were always listening in with everybody else.” He adds, “The most frustrating after-the-fact scenario for me to understand is to explain… the communication link on that morning between the FAA operations center and the NMCC.… I know how it’s supposed to work, but… it’s still a little frustrating for me to understand how it actually did work on that day.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 36] Entity Tags: Monte Belger, National Military Command Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001: All New York City Bridges and Tunnels Are Closed The New York City Port Authority closes all bridges and tunnels in New York City. [CNN, 9/12/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/12/2001; MSNBC, 9/22/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002] Entity Tags: NBC, New York Port Authority Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Air Traffic Control Center Mistakenly Tells NEADS Flight 11 Is Still Airborne According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS is contacted by the FAA’s Boston Center. Colin Scoggins, Boston Center’s military liaison, tells it: “I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air, and it’s on its way towards—heading towards Washington.… That was another—it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower. That’s the latest report we have.… I’m going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he’s somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further south.” The NEADS official asks: “He—American 11 is a hijack?… And he’s heading into Washington?” Scoggins answers yes both times and adds, “This could be a third aircraft.” Somehow Boston Center has been told by FAA headquarters that Flight 11 is still airborne, but the 9/11 Commission will say it hasn’t been able to find where this mistaken information came from. Scoggins Makes Error - Vanity Fair magazine will later add, “In Boston, it is Colin Scoggins who has made the mistaken call.” Scoggins will explain why he believes he made this error: “With American Airlines, we could never confirm if [Flight 11] was down or not, so that left doubt in our minds.” He says he was monitoring a conference call between FAA centers (see 8:28 a.m. September 11, 2001), “when the word came across—from whom or where isn’t clear—that American 11 was thought to be headed for Washington.” However, Boston Center was never tracking Flight 11 on radar after losing sight of it near Manhattan: “The plane’s course, had it continued south past New York in the direction it was flying before it dipped below radar coverage, would have had it headed on a straight course toward DC. This was all controllers were going on.” Scoggins says, “After talking to a supervisor, I made the call and said [American 11] is still in the air.” [NORTHEAST AIR DEFENSE SECTOR, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Myers Refers to Mistaken Report - In the hours following the attacks, acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers will apparently refer to this erroneous report that Flight 11 is still airborne and heading toward Washington, telling the Associated Press that “prior to the crash into the Pentagon, military officials had been notified that another hijacked plane had been heading from the New York area to Washington.” Myers will say “he assumed that hijacked plane was the one that hit the Pentagon, though he couldn’t be sure.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001] Entity Tags: Richard B. Myers, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Federal Aviation Administration, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Colin Scoggins Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight AA 77

9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001: Dulles Airport Control Facility Advised to Look for Flight 77

The air traffic control tower at Dulles International Airport. [Source: Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority] The FAA’s Herndon Command Center informs a supervisor at the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) at Washington Dulles International Airport that the FAA has lost contact with American Airlines Flight 77 and is trying to locate it. The Dulles TRACON then informs its air traffic controllers that a commercial aircraft is missing, and instructs them to look for primary targets on their radar screens. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 25; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32 ] (A primary target is a radar track that provides an aircraft’s position and speed, but not its altitude, and which can still be viewed when the plane’s transponder has been turned off. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/11/2001; SALON, 9/10/2004] ) Dulles Airport is located 26 miles west of Washington, DC, and 22 miles from the Pentagon. [NEW YORK TIMES, 6/19/1994; USA TODAY, 9/13/2001] According to the 9/11 Commission, controllers at its TRACON will locate an unidentified aircraft on their radar screens at 9:32 (see 9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001), although other accounts will suggest they locate the target slightly earlier (see (Between 9:25 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 33 ] Entity Tags: Washington Dulles International Airport, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Advises Dispatchers to Issue Warning to Flights United Airlines issues a companywide order for its flight dispatchers to warn their flights to secure their cockpit doors. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 455] The airline’s air traffic control coordinator sends a message to all of the airline’s dispatchers, telling them: “There may be addnl [additional] hijackings in progress. You may want to advise your flts [flights] to stay on alert and shut down all cockpit access inflt [in flight]. Sandy per Mgmt.” United Airlines dispatchers began notifying their aircraft that planes had crashed into the World Trade Center at 9:03 (see 9:03 a.m. and After September 11, 2001). However, with the exception of one dispatcher (see 9:19 a.m. September 11, 2001), the airline has so far not sent any warnings to its aircraft. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 36-37 ] United Airlines did not initially realize the second plane to hit the WTC was one of its own (see Between 9:10 a.m. and 9:20 a.m. September 11, 2001), and it is not until 9:22 that it notifies its dispatchers that UAL Flight 175 has been involved in “an accident” in New York (see 9:22 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: United Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Sends Routine Message to Airline Dispatcher The pilot of Flight 93 sends a routine text message to United Airlines dispatcher Ed Ballinger, who is monitoring the flight. The message reads: “Good mornin‘… Nice clb [climb] outta EWR [Newark airport] after a nice tour of the apt [apartment] courts y [and] grnd cntrl. 20 N EWC At 350 occl [occasional] lt [light] chop. Wind 290/50 ain’t helping. J.” The J is presumably the signature for the pilot, Jason Dahl, who is personally acquainted with Ballinger. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 37 ] Entity Tags: Jason Dahl, Ed Ballinger Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Begins ‘Lockout’ of Flight 175 Information Just before 9:22, United Airlines headquarters, located outside Chicago, begins the “lockout” procedure to restrict access to passenger and crew information about Flight 175. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 ] This procedure is standard for airlines in safety and security incidents. As the 9/11 Commission will later describe, “It acknowledges an emergency on the flight and isolates information so that the case can be managed by top leadership at the airlines in a way that protects information from being altered or released, and also protects the identities of the passengers and crew.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 12-13 ] This procedure begins almost 40 minutes after Flight 175 was hijacked (see (Between 8:42 a.m. and 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and about 35 minutes after the plane’s transponder signal changed (see 8:46 a.m.-8:47 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 7] Entity Tags: United Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

(9:21 a.m.-9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001): Exterior Wall of South Tower May Bow Outwards or Inwards before Collapse The exterior wall on the east side of the World Trade Center’s South Tower apparently bows before the building collapses. The first inquiry into the collapse, by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the American Society of Civil Engineers, states that the perimeter walls bow outward. “Expansion of floor slabs and framing results in outward deflection of columns and potential overload,” the investigation concludes. [FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, 5/1/2002, PP. 2-25] However, a subsequent report by the National Institute of Standards and Technology states that the east wall of the South Tower bows inward. In places the wall is said to bow inward by between seven and nine inches at floor 80, and NIST interprets this bowing to mean that the floors must be sagging. NIST will find that the sagging and bowing are two of the seven major factors that led to the collapse of each tower, as the bowing walls are no longer able to support their share of the buildings’ weight, causing the buildings to tilt and the upper sections to fall. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 43-46, 87 ] A wall in the North Tower also apparently bows before the building collapses (see 10:23 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Federal Emergency Management Agency, World Trade Center, National Institute of Standards and Technology Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center

(Shortly After 9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Dispatchers Issue Warnings to Flights, Implement ‘Positive Contact’ Procedure Following a company-wide order instructing them to warn aircraft to secure their cockpits (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001), flight dispatchers at United Airlines’ headquarters issue an alert to all their pilots, stating: “There may be terrorist acts in progress. Do not open cockpit doors. Secure the cockpit.” Furthermore, Joseph Vickers, the director of flight dispatch, initiates a procedure for “positive contact.” This means the dispatchers must make direct contact with each aircraft every 10 to 15 minutes and confirm that its cockpit is still secure. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 109] Entity Tags: Joseph Vickers, United Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(Between 9:22 a.m. and 9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Airline Managers Join Teleconference but Receive No Guidance; Timing Unclear Managers from American Airlines and United Airlines are added by the FAA to a teleconference, but they receive no guidance from top government officials on what to do. According to author Lynn Spencer, at some point after the second aircraft hit the World Trade Center, the executives from the two airlines are “quickly on the phone to FAA headquarters and the FAA Command Center.” They are brought into “a conference call that has now been set up with Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta and Vice President Dick Cheney at the White House. The airline executives inform the secretary that they are each dealing with additional aircraft that they are unable to contact. They seek guidance, but there is none.… The nation is under attack, but there is no plan in place, and no guidance is forthcoming from the top as the crisis escalates.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 109] The time when the airline executives join the teleconference is unclear. In Spencer’s account, she places it after United Airlines dispatchers have warned their aircraft to secure their cockpits (see (Shortly After 9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001), which would mean some time after 9:21. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 37 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 109] But Spencer also says that, when the executives join the conference, the “president is still reading to children in a Florida school room” (see (9:06 a.m.-9:16 a.m.) September 11, 2001), which would be roughly between 9:05 and 9:15. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 38-39; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 109] If Norman Mineta is already participating in the teleconference when the airline executives join it, the time would have to be after around 9:20, which is when Mineta later says he arrived at the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House (see (Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] And Cheney, who Spencer also says is participating in the teleconference when the executives join it, arrives at the PEOC as late as 9:58, according to the 9/11 Commission, although other accounts indicate he arrives there much earlier than this (see (9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ABC NEWS, 9/14/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 40] According to the Wall Street Journal, American Airlines president Don Carty and United Airlines CEO Jim Goodwin are talking on the phone with Mineta (presumably over the conference call) about five minutes before the FAA shuts down all US airspace (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001), which would mean they are participating in the teleconference by around 9:40 a.m. [US CONGRESS. HOUSE. COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 9/21/2001; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Don Carty, United Airlines, Norman Mineta, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, American Airlines, Jim Goodwin Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

Shortly After 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Technicians Unable to Locate Flight 11 Following Incorrect Report It Is Still Airborne Having just received an incorrect report that Flight 11—which has already hit the World Trade Center—is still airborne and heading toward Washington (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001), technicians at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) try, unsuccessfully, to locate the aircraft on their radar screens. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 137-139] At NEADS, Major James Anderson says the hijackers are “probably not squawking anything anyway,” meaning their plane’s transponder is not broadcasting a signal. He adds, “I mean, obviously these guys are in the cockpit.” Major Kevin Nasypany, the mission crew commander, replies, “These guys are smart.” Another member of staff adds, “Yeah, they knew exactly what they wanted to do.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] After giving the order to launch the F-16s kept on alert at Langley Air Force Base (see 9:23 a.m. September 11, 2001), Nasypany calls out, “I need more trackers!” He needs his technicians to locate the hijacked plane on radar so that his weapons team can pass on its coordinates to the Langley fighters. But the trackers are unable to find the transponder code for Flight 11 on their radar screens. They begin calling up, one at a time, the tracks on their screens that are in the airspace between New York and Washington, and attach a tag to each after it has been identified. One technician draws a line on a map between New York and Washington, showing the area across which Flight 11 would be traveling. It includes Philadelphia, Atlantic City, and Baltimore. He looks at his radar screen and sees there are hundreds of tracks in that area. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 138-139] Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, who gave NEADS the incorrect report about Flight 11, will later say he’d only heard the plane was still airborne and heading for Washington on a conference call between FAA centers. According to Vanity Fair, air traffic controllers “were never tracking an actual plane on the radar after losing American 11 near Manhattan, but if it had been flying low enough, the plane could have gone undetected.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Entity Tags: Kevin Nasypany, Colin Scoggins, James Anderson, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11

(9:22 a.m.) September 11, 2001: White House Begins Slowly Evacuating In a 9:52 a.m. report, CNN White House correspondent John King will state that, “about 30 minutes ago,” the White House had begun slowly evacuating. This evacuation proceeds in an orderly fashion. But later on, around 9:45 a.m., those evacuating will be ordered to run (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/11/2001] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:22 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Manager Issues Advisory Stating Flight 175 Was in Accident Rich Miles, the manager of United Airlines’ System Operations Control center, located outside Chicago, issues an advisory to all United Airlines facilities, including the flight dispatchers. This advisory, which is issued under the name of UAL Chief Operating Officer Andy Studdert, states that Flight 175 has been involved in an accident in New York City, and that the airline’s crisis center has been activated. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 ] This appears to be United Airlines’ first proper confirmation that Flight 175 has crashed. However, it will not issue a press release confirming the crash until 11:53 a.m. (see 11:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). [UNITED AIRLINES, 9/11/2001] Entity Tags: Rich Miles, United Airlines, Andy Studdert Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

9:23 a.m. September 11, 2001: Airline Dispatcher Sends Warning to Flight 175, Unaware It Has Already Crashed Unaware that this aircraft has crashed, United Airlines flight dispatcher Ed Ballinger sends a warning message to Flight 175. The text message reads: “Beware any cockpit intrusion… Two aircraft in NY hit [World] Trade Center builds.” Ballinger began sending this text message to the 16 transcontinental flights he is monitoring at 9:19 a.m. (see 9:19 a.m. September 11, 2001). He is already aware that United Airlines suspects Flight 175 has been hijacked (see (9:01 a.m.-9:04 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and recently learned that a second plane has hit the World Trade Center, but does not yet know this was Flight 175. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 AND 37 ] United Airlines did not initially realize the second plane to hit the WTC was one of its own (see Between 9:10 a.m. and 9:20 a.m. September 11, 2001), and it was not until 9:22 that it sent out an advisory to its dispatchers stating that Flight 175 had been involved in “an accident” in New York (see 9:22 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Ed Ballinger Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

9:23 a.m.-9:26 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Dispatcher Sends Warning Message to Flight 93, Flight 93 Responds Ed Ballinger, the United Airlines flight dispatcher monitoring Flight 93, sends a warning message to this flight, telling the pilots to beware of any cockpit intrusion. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 11] At 9:21, United Airlines instructed its dispatchers to warn their flights to secure their cockpit doors (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001), but Ballinger had already taken the initiative two minutes earlier to begin warning the 16 flights he is monitoring (see 9:19 a.m. September 11, 2001). His text message reads: “Beware any cockpit intrusion… Two aircraft in NY hit [World] Trade Center builds.” Because this message is sent out to Ballinger’s 16 aircraft in groups, it is not until 9:23 a.m. that it is transmitted to Flight 93. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 AND 37 ] The warning is received in the plane’s cockpit one minute later. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 11] Then, at 9:26, Flight 93 pilot Jason Dahl responds with the text message, “Ed confirm latest mssg plz [message please]—Jason.” Apart from a routine radio contact with the FAA’s Cleveland Center a minute later (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001), this is the last normal communication made from Flight 93’s cockpit before the hijacking occurs. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 38 ] Ballinger will later complain: “One of the things that upset me was that they knew 45 minutes before that American Airlines [Flight 11] had a problem. I put the story together myself [from news accounts]. Perhaps if I had the information sooner, I might have gotten the message to [Flight] 93 to bar the door.” [CHICAGO DAILY HERALD, 4/14/2004] Entity Tags: Jason Dahl, Ed Ballinger Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:23 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Wants Fighters to Track Phantom Flight 11

Major Kevin Nasypany inside NEADS [Source: Mark Schafer/ Vanity Fair] According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS has just been told that the hijacked Flight 11 is still in the air and heading toward Washington. Major Kevin Nasypany, the mission crew commander, says to NEADS Commander Robert Marr, “Okay, uh, American Airlines is still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he’s heading towards Washington. Okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now. And I’m gonna take the fighters from Otis, try to chase this guy down if I can find him.” After receiving approval to do so, Nasypany issues the order. “Okay… scramble Langley,” he says. “Head them towards the Washington area.” The Langley, Virginia, base gets the scramble order at 9:24 a.m. (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). NEADS keeps its fighters from the Otis base over New York City. In 2004 the 9/11 Commission will state, “this response to a phantom aircraft, American 11, is not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued by FAA or [Defense Department]. Instead, since 9/11, the scramble of the Langley fighters has been described as a response to the reported hijacking of American 77, or United 93, or some combination of the two.” Yet the “report of American 11 heading south as the cause of the Langley scramble is reflected not just in taped conversations at NEADS, but in taped conversations at FAA centers, on chat logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD, and in other records.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Robert Marr, Kevin Nasypany Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001: Fighter Jets Scrambled from Langley Air Force Base

Major Brad Derrig. [Source: ABC] At Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, the pilots of three F-16s receive the order to scramble (i.e. take off immediately). A Klaxon horn sounds and the status lights in the hangars change from yellow to green, notifying them of the order. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 65; FILSON, 2003, PP. 63; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 141] The fighter jets belong to the North Dakota Air National Guard’s 119th Fighter Wing. The wing has a small detachment at Langley that serves as one of NORAD’s seven “alert” sites around the US, responsible for defending the nation against attack. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 114] The jets are already at “battle stations,” with the pilots in the cockpits but the engines off (see (9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 55; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 117-119] The scramble order has just been issued by NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16 ] Third Pilot Launched - The unit at Langley keeps two F-16s on “alert”—armed, fueled, and ready to take off within minutes if called upon. [AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, 2/2002; BERGEN RECORD, 12/5/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 17] But NEADS has instructed it to launch as many aircraft as it can (see (Between 9:10 a.m. and 9:23 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and so the unit’s operations manager Captain Craig Borgstrom is also preparing to take off in a third jet. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 118-119] Major Dean Eckmann calls the other two pilots, saying, “Quit check,” indicating a radio check. Major Brad Derrig responds, “Two.” Borgstrom replies: “Three. I’m going with you!” This is news to Derrig. According to author Lynn Spencer, Derrig is “stunned.… [N]ot much surprises him, but this does.” Borgstrom joining them as a pilot will mean that, in the middle of this unprecedented crisis, their unit will be left without a commanding officer. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 142] Only Two Jets Fully Armed - The two jets that are kept on alert are fully armed. As Eckmann will later recall, “We can carry M9 heat seekers, Sidewinders for the M7 Sparrow, plus we have an internal 20 mm Vulcan cannon, and we were pretty much armed with all that.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] However, Borgstrom’s jet has guns only, and though the six-barrel 20 mm gun can fire 6,000 rounds per minute, it requires close range. Pilot Unqualified to Lead Three Jets - As the three aircraft taxi out to the runway, Eckmann is concerned that he has not yet qualified as a mission commander—a “four-ship”—and is therefore not authorized to lead more than one fighter jet. He calls the other pilots, saying, “Hey, I’m only a two-ship!” But Derrig, who is a full-time instructor pilot for the Air National Guard, urges him not to worry. He responds: “Press! I’m an instructor,” giving his approval for the flight to operate as a “three-ship” under Eckmann’s lead. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 142] The three jets will take off and be airborne by 9:30 a.m. (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16 ] Entity Tags: Brad Derrig, 119th Fighter Wing, Craig Borgstrom, Dean Eckmann, Langley Air Force Base Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Orders Jets Scrambled from Langley; Conflicting Explanations Later Given for Order

Alan Scott. [Source: United States Air Force] NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) processes and transmits an order to Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, to scramble three of its F-16 fighter jets. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 4/16/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16 ] NEADS mission crew commander Major Kevin Nasypany instructed his personnel to issue this order one minute earlier (see 9:23 a.m. September 11, 2001). Although he’d originally wanted the Langley jets sent to the Washington area, he will soon adjust this heading to send them to the Baltimore area. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27] NEADS Orders Jets North - A NEADS officer calls Langley Air Force Base and instructs: “Langley command post, this is Huntress with an active air defense scramble for Quit 2-5 and Quit 2-6.… Scramble immediately.… Scramble on a heading of 010, flight level 290.” This means the jets are to head in a direction just east of north, at an altitude of 29,000 feet. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/9/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 96 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 142] At Langley Air Force Base, a Klaxon horn will sound, notifying the pilots of the scramble order (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001), and they will be airborne by 9:30 (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 63; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 141] Fighters Launched in Response to Flight 77? - In later testimony, military officials will give contradictory explanations for why the Langley F-16s are scrambled. An early NORAD timeline will indicate the fighters are launched in response to NORAD being notified at 9:24 that Flight 77 has been hijacked (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001] Colonel Alan Scott, the former vice commander of the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR), will suggest the same, telling the 9/11 Commission: “At 9:24 the FAA reports a possible hijack of [Flight] 77.… And at that moment as well is when the Langley F-16s were scrambled out of Langley.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; 1ST AIR FORCE, 8/8/2006] And a timeline provided by senior Defense Department officials to CNN will state, “NORAD orders jets scrambled from Langley” in order to “head to intercept” Flight 77. [CNN, 9/17/2001] In Response to Flight 93? - However, Major General Larry Arnold, the CONR commander, will give a different explanation. He will tell the 9/11 Commission, “we launched the aircraft out of Langley to put them over top of Washington, DC, not in response to American Airline 77, but really to put them in position in case United 93 were to head that way.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] In Response to Incorrect Report about Flight 11? - In 2004, the 9/11 Commission will dispute both these previous explanations, and conclude that the Langley jets are scrambled in response to an incorrect report that Flight 11 is still airborne and heading toward Washington, DC (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 26-27; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 15 ] Tape recordings of the NEADS operations floor will corroborate this account. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] According to the 9/11 Commission, its conclusion is also confirmed by “taped conversations at FAA centers; contemporaneous logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD; and other records.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 34] Major Nasypany will tell the Commission that the reason the Langley jets are directed toward the Baltimore area is to position them between the reportedly southbound Flight 11 and Washington, as a “barrier cap.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27 AND 461] John Farmer, senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission, will later suggest that NORAD deliberately misled Congress and the Commission by hiding the fact that the Langley scramble takes place in response to the erroneous report that Flight 11 is still airborne. He will write that the mistaken report “appears in more logs, and on more tapes, than any other single event that morning.… It was the reason for the Langley scramble; it had triggered the Air Threat Conference Call. Yet it had never been disclosed; it was, instead, talked around.” [FARMER, 2009, PP. 266-267] Conflicting Times - Early news reports will put the time of the scramble order slightly later than the 9/11 Commission places it, between 9:25 and “about 9:27.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001; CNN, 9/19/2001] But a NORAD timeline released a week after the attacks will give the same time as the Commission does, of 9:24. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27] Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Kevin Nasypany, Alan Scott, Larry Arnold, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Langley Air Force Base, US Department of Defense, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Regional Center Contacts Headquarters about Flight 77 The FAA’s Great Lakes Regional Operations Center notifies the Operations Center at FAA’s Washington headquarters of the simultaneous loss of radar identification and radar communications with Flight 77. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32 ] This is almost 30 minutes after this loss of contact occurred (see 8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001), and 15 minutes after the Great Lakes regional center was informed of it (see 9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Continental NORAD Region Headquarters Wants Otis Fighters Details Sent over Chat System At NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), Master Sergeant Joe McCain, the mission crew commander technician, receives a call from the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida. Major General Larry Arnold and his staff at Tyndall AFB are trying to gather as much information as they can about the ongoing crisis, and want to know the transponder codes for the two fighter jets scrambled from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to the first hijacking (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), so they can monitor their positions. The CONR officer that makes the call tells McCain to “send [the transponder codes] out on chat,” meaning on NORAD’s own chat system. NORAD's Computer Chat System - According to author Lynn Spencer, NORAD’s chat system “is similar to the chat rooms on most Internet servers, but classified.” It has three chat rooms that can be used by anyone with proper access. One room is specifically for NEADS, and connects its ID, surveillance, and weapons technicians to its alert fighter squadrons, and is where NEADS gets status reports on fighter units and their aircraft. Another chat room is for CONR, and is where the three CONR sectors—NEADS, the Western Air Defense Sector (WADS), and the Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS)—communicate with each other and can “upchannel” information to CONR headquarters. The third room is the Air Warfare Center (AWC), where senior NORAD commanders from the three NORAD regions—CONR, Canada, and Alaska—communicate with each other. NEADS is allowed to monitor this room, but not type into it. When there is a training exercise taking place, as was the case earlier this morning (see (6:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), one or two additional chat windows will be open specifically for communicating exercise information, to help prevent it being confused with real-world information. McCain Falling Behind - McCain’s responsibilities at NEADS include monitoring these chat rooms, keeping paper logs of everything that is going on, and taking care of “upchanneling” operational reports to higher headquarters. According to Spencer, “These chat logs help to keep everyone on the same page, but in a situation like the one unfolding they have to be updated almost instantaneously to achieve that end.” But, “The fact that CONR has had to call McCain to get information that by now he would normally have posted alerts him that he is falling behind despite his best efforts.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 139-140] Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Joe McCain, Larry Arnold Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

9:24 a.m.-9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Checks in with Cleveland Air Traffic Control, Mentions No Problems Having entered the center’s airspace, Flight 93 establishes radio contact with the FAA’s Cleveland Center, a regional air traffic control center that guides long-range, high altitude flights. The pilot reports simply that his flight is experiencing intermittent light choppy air, and does not indicate there being any problems on board, saying, “Good morning Cleveland, United 93 with you at three-five-oh [35,000 feet], intermittent light chop.” The controller, John Werth, is busy with other flights, so does not initially respond. A minute later, Flight 93 radios again, “United 93 checking in three-five-oh.” Werth replies, “United 93, three-five-zero, roger.” [GREGOR, 12/21/2001 ; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 69; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 37 ; CBS NEWS, 9/10/2006] Two minutes later, Flight 93 will make its final radio communication before the hijacker takeover occurs (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: John Werth, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001: By Some Accounts, FAA Notifies NORAD Flight 77 Is Hijacked and Washington-Bound; 9/11 Commission Claims This Never Happens Shortly after 9/11, NORAD reported that the FAA notified them at this time that Flight 77 “may” have been hijacked and that it appears headed toward Washington. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001; NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002] Apparently, flight controllers at Dulles International Airport discover a plane heading at high speed toward Washington; an alert is sounded within moments that the plane appears to be headed toward the White House. [WASHINGTON POST, 11/3/2001] In 2003, the FAA supported this account, but claimed that they had informally notified NORAD earlier. “NORAD logs indicate that the FAA made formal notification about American Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m. (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but information about the flight was conveyed continuously during the phone bridges before the formal notification.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 5/22/2003] Yet in 2004, the 9/11 Commission claims that both NORAD and the FAA are wrong. The 9/11 Commission explains that the notification NEADS received at 9:24 a.m. was the incorrect information that Flight 11 had not hit the WTC and was headed south for Washington, D.C. Thus, according to the 9/11 Commission, NORAD is never notified by the FAA about the hijacking of Flight 77, but accidentally learns about it at 9:34 a.m. (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: Washington Dulles International Airport, Federal Aviation Administration, North American Aerospace Defense Command Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Key Day of 9/11 Events

9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Command Center Finally Tells FAA Headquarters about Flight 77 According to the 9/11 Commission, the FAA Command Center advises FAA headquarters that American 77 is lost in Indianapolis flight control’s airspace, that Indianapolis has no primary radar track, and is looking for the aircraft. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] When exactly the Command Center first learned that Flight 77 was lost is unclear. The earliest time reported by the 9/11 Commission is when an American Airlines employee mentioned it when calling the center at 9:16 a.m. (see 9:16 a.m.-9:18 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] American Airlines headquarters was notified of the loss of contact with Flight 77 before 9:00 a.m. (see 8:58 a.m. September 11, 2001), but had mistakenly thought this was the aircraft that hit the second WTC tower minutes later (see 9:08 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, American Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001: 9/11 Commission’s Conflicting Account of Clarke-Led Video Conference Begins at This Time According to his own account, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, started a video teleconference from the White House’s Secure Video Conferencing Center, next to the Situation Room, at around 9:10 a.m.(see (9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, the 9/11 Commission says that logs indicate this conference beginning 15 minutes later than this. Included in the conference are the FBI, the CIA, the FAA, the departments of State, Justice, and Defense, and the White House shelter. The FAA and CIA join at 9:40 a.m. The 9/11 Commission says, “It is not clear to us that the video teleconference was fully under way before 9:37, when the Pentagon was struck.” Furthermore, it states: “We do not know who from Defense participated, but we know that in the first hour none of the personnel involved in managing the crisis did. And none of the information conveyed in the White House video teleconference, at least in the first hour, was being passed to the NMCC [in the Pentagon].” Clarke’s video teleconference is not connected into the area of the NMCC from where the crisis is being managed. Consequently, “the director of the operations team-who was on the phone with NORAD-did not have the benefit of information being shared on the video teleconference.” And, “when the Secretary [of Defense Rumsfeld] and Vice Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Myers] later participated in the White House video teleconference, they were necessarily absent from the NMCC and unable to provide guidance to the operations team.” Clarke, however, gives a specific recollection of Myers speaking over video at 9:28, which is seemingly at odds with the 9/11 Commission’s account (see 9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). One witness later recalls: “[It] was almost like there were parallel decision-making processes going on; one was a voice conference orchestrated by the NMCC… and then there was the [White House video teleconference].… [I]n my mind they were competing venues for command and control and decision-making.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004] Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Central Intelligence Agency, US Department of Justice, US Department of State, US Department of Defense, Federal Aviation Administration, Richard A. Clarke Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke, Donald Rumsfeld

9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001: Otis Fighters Arrive over New York, According to Later Report by 9/11 Commission According to the 9/11 Commission, the two fighters launched from Otis Air Force Base (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) arrive over Manhattan at this time, after exiting their holding pattern off the Long Island coast at 9:13 a.m. They then establish a combat air patrol (CAP) over New York. The commission bases this conclusion on its analysis of FAA radar data and interviews with the two Otis pilots. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24 AND 460; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 AND 92 ] However, numerous eyewitnesses on the ground will report first noticing fighters over New York significantly later, more than an hour after the 9/11 Commission claims according to some accounts (see (9:45 a.m.-10:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

(9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Langley Jets Take off, but Are Delayed during Launch

Captain Craig Borgstrom. [Source: US Air Force / Austin Knox] The three F-16 fighter jets ordered to scramble from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001) take off and, radar data will show, are airborne by 9:30 a.m. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 4/16/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27] Delayed during Launch - Major Dean Eckmann will recall that, after receiving the scramble order, he and the two other pilots have “a pretty quick response time. I believe it was four to five minutes we were airborne from that point.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] According to the 1st Air Force’s book about 9/11, the three fighters are “given highest priority over all other air traffic at Langley Air Force Base” as they are launching. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 63] But, according to author Lynn Spencer, in spite of this, the jets are delayed. As Eckmann is approaching the runway, he calls the control tower for clearance to take off, but the tower controller tells him, “Hold for an air traffic delay.” Air traffic controllers at the FAA’s Washington Center “have not had time to clear airliners out of the way for the northerly heading. Dozens of aircraft at various altitudes fill the jets’ route.” After having to wait two minutes, Eckmann complains: “We’re an active air scramble. We need to go now!” Finally, the tower controller tells him, “Roger, Quit flight is cleared for takeoff, 090 for 60,” meaning the fighters are to fly due east for 60 miles (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Taking Off - The three jets launch 15 seconds apart, with Eckmann in front and the two other jets following. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 143-144] Pilot Craig Borgstrom will later recall, “[W]e took off, the three of us, and basically the formation we always brief on alert, we’ll stay in a two- to three-mile trail from the guy in front.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 63] According to the BBC, the pilots get a signal over their planes’ transponders, indicating an emergency wartime situation. [BBC, 9/1/2002] Could Reach Washington before Pentagon Attack - F-16s have a maximum speed of 1,500 mph at high altitude, or 915 mph at sea level, so the three fighters could plausibly travel the 130 miles from Langley Air Force Base to Washington in just minutes. [CHANT, 1987, PP. 404; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6/16/2000; USA TODAY, 9/16/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/16/2001 ; US AIR FORCE, 10/2007] Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region, will tell the 9/11 Commission, “I think if those aircraft had gotten airborne immediately, if we were operating under something other than peacetime rules, where they could have turned immediately toward Washington, DC, and gone into burner, it is physically possible that they could have gotten over Washington” before 9:37, when the Pentagon is hit. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Yet according to the 9/11 Commission, the jets are redirected east over the Atlantic Ocean and will be 150 miles from the Pentagon when it is hit (see 9:30 a.m.-9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27] Conflicting Times - Some early news reports after 9/11 will say the Langley jets take off at the later time of 9:35 a.m. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/14/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/15/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001] But according to Colonel Alan Scott, the former vice commander of the Continental US NORAD Region, though the jets are airborne at 9:30, the report of this does not come down until 9:35, so this fact may account for the conflicting times. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Entity Tags: Brad Derrig, Alan Scott, Craig Borgstrom, Dean Eckmann, Langley Air Force Base, Larry Arnold Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

(Between 9:25 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Dulles Airport Controllers Reportedly Notice Flight 77, Earlier than 9/11 Commission Claims According to an FAA report, between 9:25 a.m. and 9:30 a.m., air traffic controllers at the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) at Washington Dulles International Airport notice an unidentified blip, later identified to be Flight 77, on their radar screens. This is several minutes earlier than the 9/11 Commission will claim they notice it. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] Plane Flying East at High Speed - The TRACON at Dulles Airport, which is about 22 miles west of the Pentagon, learned several minutes earlier that the FAA had lost contact with Flight 77. It then advised its controllers to look out for “primary targets” (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 9/13/2001; NAVY TIMES, 9/22/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32 ] These are radar tracks that can still be viewed when a plane’s transponder has been turned off. [SALON, 9/10/2004] Several of the facility’s controllers now observe a primary radar target heading eastbound toward Washington at high speed, almost 500 miles per hour. Although the aircraft has no transponder signal to identify it, it is later determined to be Flight 77. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Conflicting Times - According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the Dulles TRACON controllers only notice this aircraft at 9:32 a.m. (see 9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] The FAA report, which is published less than a week after 9/11, will state that its time of between 9:25 and 9:30 is “approximate, based on personnel statements from Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ] But this earlier time will receive some corroboration from a report in USA Today, which states that the FAA’s Command Center is notified by a Dulles controller of the unidentified aircraft at “just before 9:30 a.m.” [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Furthermore, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta, who is currently at the White House, will tell the 9/11 Commission that at “about 9:25 or 9:26” he overhears someone warning Vice President Dick Cheney of an aircraft approaching Washington (see (9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Radar evidence obtained by CBS News will show that “at 9:30 a.m.… radar tracked the plane as it closed to within 30 miles of Washington.” [CBS NEWS, 9/21/2001] Entity Tags: Washington Dulles International Airport, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(9:25 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Dulles Airport Controllers Mistake Flight 77 for a Military Fighter

Todd Lewis. [Source: NBC] After air traffic controllers at Washington Dulles International Airport notice an unidentified aircraft, later determined to be Flight 77, approaching Washington on their radar screens (see (Between 9:25 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001), they initially think it is a military fighter plane, due to its high speed and the way it is being flown. [ABC NEWS, 10/24/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] Yet the alleged hijacker pilot of Flight 77 has been known for his poor flying skills. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/30/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 5/4/2002] Aircraft Performs Elaborate Maneuver - The Dulles controllers are unable to identify the plane because its transponder—which transmits identifying information about an aircraft to radar screens—has been turned off (see 8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 9/11/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001] It is flying at almost 500 miles per hour while approaching Washington, and then performs a rapid downward spiral, “dropping the last 7,000 feet in two and a half minutes,” before hitting the Pentagon (see 9:34 a.m.- 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CBS NEWS, 9/21/2001; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Moving 'Like a Military Aircraft' - Controller Danielle O’Brien will later recall: “The speed, the maneuverability, the way that he turned, we all thought in the radar room, all of us experienced air traffic controllers, that that was a military plane. You don’t fly a 757 in that manner. It’s unsafe.” [ABC NEWS, 10/24/2001] Another controller, Todd Lewis, will recall: “[N]obody knew that was a commercial flight at the time. Nobody knew that was American 77.… I thought it was a military flight. I thought that Langley [Air Force Base] had scrambled some fighters and maybe one of them got up there.… It was moving very fast, like a military aircraft might move at a low altitude.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Alleged Pilot 'Could Not Fly at All' - Yet many people who have met Hani Hanjour, the hijacker allegedly at the controls of Flight 77, considered him to be a very poor pilot (see October 1996-December 1997, 1998, February 8-March 12, 2001, and (April-July 2001)). Just a month previously, an airport refused to rent him a single-engine Cessna plane because instructors there found his flying skills so weak (see Mid-August 2001). [GAZETTE (GREENBELT), 9/21/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001] And an employee at a flight school Hanjour attended earlier in the year will later comment: “I’m still to this day amazed that he could have flown into the Pentagon. He could not fly at all” (see January-February 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/4/2002] Entity Tags: Hani Hanjour, Todd Lewis, Danielle O’Brien, Washington Dulles International Airport Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(After 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Passenger Call Reaches Justice Department and Beyond

Ted Olson. [Source: US Justice Department] Theodore (Ted) Olson, the Justice Department’s Solicitor General, calls the Justice Department’s control center to relate his wife Barbara’s call from Flight 77. Accounts vary whether the Justice Department already knows of the hijack or not. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; CHANNEL 4 NEWS (LONDON), 9/13/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/15/2001] Olson merely says, “They just absorbed the information. And they promised to send someone down right away.” He assumes they then “pass the information on to the appropriate people.” [HANNITY & COLMES, 9/14/2001] Entity Tags: Theodore (“Ted”) Olson, US Department of Justice Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Rookie FAA Manager Bans All Take Offs Nationwide, Including Most Military Flights? Mineta Asserts He Issues Order Minutes Later

FAA Administrator Jane Garvey. [Source: FAA] Time magazine later reports that Jane Garvey, head of the FAA, “almost certainly after getting an okay from the White House, initiate[s] a national ground stop, which forbids takeoffs and requires planes in the air to get down as soon as is reasonable. The order, which has never been implemented since flying was invented in 1903, applie[s] to virtually every single kind of machine that can takeoff—civilian, military, or law enforcement.” Military and law enforcement flights are allowed to resume at 10:31 a.m. (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001) A limited number of military flights—the FAA will not reveal details—are allowed to fly during this ban. [TIME, 9/14/2001] Garvey later calls it “a national ground stop… that prevented any aircraft from taking off.” [US CONGRESS. HOUSE. COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 9/21/2001] Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta later says he was the one to give the order: “As soon as I was aware of the nature and scale of the attack, I called from the White House to order the air traffic system to land all aircraft, immediately and without exception.” [US CONGRESS. SENATE. COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, 9/20/2001] According to Mineta, “At approximately 9:45… I gave the FAA the final order for all civil aircraft to land at the nearest airport as soon as possible.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] At the time, 4,452 planes are flying in the continental US. A later account states that Ben Sliney, the FAA’s National Operations Manager, makes the decision without consulting his superiors, like Jane Garvey, first. It would be remarkable if Sliney was the one to make the decision, because 9/11 is Sliney’s first day on the job as National Operations Manager, “the chess master of the air traffic system.” [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] When he accepted the job a couple of months earlier, he had asked, “What is the limit of my authority?” The man who had promoted him replied, “Unlimited.” [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Yet another account, by Linda Schuessler, manager of tactical operations at the FAA Command Center where Sliney was located, says, “… it was done collaboratively… All these decisions were corporate decisions. It wasn’t one person who said, ‘Yes, this has got to get done.’” [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 12/17/2001] About 500 planes land in the next 20 minutes, and then much more urgent orders to land are issued at 9:45 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [TIME, 9/14/2001; US CONGRESS. HOUSE. COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 9/21/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; NEWSDAY, 9/10/2002] Entity Tags: Jane Garvey, Ben Sliney, Norman Mineta, Federal Aviation Administration, Linda Schuessler Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Cheney Given Updates on Unidentified Flight 77 Heading toward Washington; Says ‘Orders Still Stand’; but Accounts Differ on Timing and Identity of the Plane According to some accounts, Vice President Dick Cheney is in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House by this time, along with Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta and others. Mineta will recall that, while a suspicious plane is heading toward Washington, an unidentified young man comes in and says to Cheney, “The plane is 50 miles out.” Mineta confers with acting FAA Deputy Administrator Monte Belger, who is at the FAA’s Washington headquarters. Belger says to him: “We’re watching this target on the radar, but the transponder’s been turned off. So we have no identification.” According to Mineta, the young man continues updating the vice president, saying, “The plane is 30 miles out,” and when he gets down to “The plane is 10 miles out,” asks, “Do the orders still stand?” In response, Cheney “whipped his neck around and said, ‘Of course the orders still stand. Have you heard anything to the contrary?’” Mineta will say that, “just by the nature of all the events going on,” he infers that the order being referred to is a shootdown order. Nevertheless, Flight 77 continues on and hits the Pentagon. [BBC, 9/1/2002; ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/4/2004] However, the 9/11 Commission will later claim the plane heading toward Washington is only discovered by the Dulles Airport air traffic control tower at 9:32 a.m. (see 9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001). But earlier accounts, including statements made by the FAA and NORAD, will claim that the FAA notified the military about the suspected hijacking of Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m., if not before (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The FBI’s Washington Field Office was also reportedly notified that Flight 77 had been hijacked at about 9:20 a.m. (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will further contradict Mineta’s account saying that, despite the “conflicting evidence as to when the vice president arrived in the shelter conference room [i.e., the PEOC],” it has concluded that he only arrived there at 9:58 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] According to the Washington Post, the discussion between Cheney and the young aide over whether “the orders” still stand occurs later than claimed by Mineta, and is in response to Flight 93 heading toward Washington, not Flight 77. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Monte Belger, Norman Mineta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93, Dick Cheney

9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Tells NEADS that Delta 1989 Is Missing The FAA’s Boston Center contacts NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and reports that another aircraft, Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, is missing. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2004] Why the Boston Center does this is unclear, since Delta 1989 is currently being handled by the FAA’s Cleveland Center, not the Boston Center. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 10] And, according to the 9/11 Commission, Delta 1989 “never turned off its transponder,” so it should still be clearly visible on radar. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 16, 28] Twelve minutes later, at 9:39, Boston Center will call NEADS and incorrectly tell it that Delta 1989 is a possible hijack (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Entity Tags: Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001: Passenger Reportedly Says Hijacker Has a Gun; 9/11 Commission Later Concludes Otherwise According to Deena Burnett, when her husband Tom Burnett first calls her from Flight 93 (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001), he mentions that one of the plane’s hijackers has a gun. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 107; SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 4/21/2002; SACRAMENTO BEE, 9/11/2002] She will recall him telling her: “The hijackers have already knifed a guy. One of them has a gun. They’re telling us there’s a bomb on board.” [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 61] However, contradicting this account, the 9/11 Commission will conclude that the Flight 93 hijackers do not possess a gun. It will state: “[N]one of the other callers [from Flight 93] reported the presence of a firearm. One recipient of a call from the aircraft recounted specifically asking her caller whether the hijackers had guns. The passenger replied that he did not see one. No evidence of firearms or of their identifiable remains was found at the aircraft’s crash site, and the cockpit voice recorder gives no indication of a gun being fired or mentioned at any time. We believe that if the hijackers had possessed a gun, they would have used it in the flight’s last minutes as the passengers fought back.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 13] News reports shortly after 9/11 and later in 2001 will mention Tom Burnett describing the hijackers having knives and claiming to have a bomb, but say nothing about him referring to a hijacker with a gun. [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 9/12/2001; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/13/2001; SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 9/17/2001; NEWSWEEK, 12/3/2001] According to notes of her initial interview with the FBI (see (12:30 p.m.) September 11, 2001), Deena Burnett tells the investigators that her husband described to her a passenger being knifed and the hijackers claiming to have a bomb. But the notes will make no mention of her saying she was told about a hijacker possessing a gun. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001 ] And Deena apparently does not mention any gun in early interviews with the press, saying only: “[My husband] said, ‘I’m on the airplane, the airplane that’s been hijacked, and they’ve already knifed a guy. They’re saying they have a bomb. Please call the authorities.’” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/15/2001] But she will later state: “He told me one of the hijackers had a gun. He wouldn’t have made it up. Tom grew up around guns. He was an avid hunter and we have guns in our home. If he said there was a gun on board, there was.” [LONDON TIMES, 8/11/2002] Entity Tags: Tom Burnett, Deena Burnett, 9/11 Commission Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(9:27 a.m.-10:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Passengers See Only Three Hijackers on Flight 93 According to journalist and author Jere Longman, “On all phone calls made from [Flight 93], passengers reported seeing only three hijackers. Not a single caller reported four hijackers.” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 120] (As an exception, one article in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette claims that passenger Todd Beamer describes four hijackers; however, other reports say he describes only three (see 9:45 a.m.-9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001). [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001] ) Yet the official claim is that there are four hijackers on this plane. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/27/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 4] Some family members of the passengers and crew will later be suspicious that one of the hijackers was in the plane’s cockpit from takeoff (see 9:16 a.m. September 11, 2001). However, according to Longman, “Investigators, pilots, flight attendants and United officials tended to discount this theory.… Paperwork would have to be filled out in advance if an observer requested to sit in the cockpit. No request was made for Flight 93, United officials later reported.… Flight 93 was hijacked approximately forty-five minutes after it left Newark. Other pilots agreed that Captain Dahl likely would have requested that any observer return to his regular seat by that time.” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 120] The 9/11 Commission’s explanation for the reports of three hijackers instead of four is that Ziad Jarrah, “the crucial pilot-trained member of [the hijacker’s] team, remained seated and inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside, he would not have been visible to the passengers.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 12] Entity Tags: Jere Longman Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Passenger Tom Burnett Calls Wife Using Cell Phone; Reports that His Plane Has Been Hijacked

Tom Burnett. [Source: Family photo] Tom Burnett, a passenger on board Flight 93, calls his wife Deena Burnett at their home in San Ramon, California. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 106-107] She looks at the caller ID and recognizes the number as being that of his cell phone. She asks him if he is OK, and he replies: “No, I’m not. I’m on an airplane that’s been hijacked.” He says, “They just knifed a guy,” and adds that this person was a passenger. [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 61] (According to journalist and author Jere Longman, this would likely have been Mark Rothenberg in seat 5B; Burnett was assigned seat 4B. Rothenberg is the only first class passenger who does not make a call from the flight. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 107] ) Deena asks, “Are you in the air?” She later recalls, “I didn’t understand how he could be calling me on his cell phone from the air.” According to Deena Burnett, Tom continues: “Yes, yes, just listen. Our airplane has been hijacked. It’s United Flight 93 from Newark to San Francisco. We are in the air. The hijackers have already knifed a guy. One of them has a gun. They’re telling us there’s a bomb on board. Please call the authorities.” [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 61] (However, the 9/11 Commission will later conclude that the hijackers did not possess a gun, as Tom Burnett apparently claims here (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 13] ) At the end of the call, which lasts just seconds, Tom says he will call back and then hangs up. [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 62] Deena does not have time to tell him about the planes crashing into the World Trade Center. [SACRAMENTO BEE, 9/11/2002] But she writes down everything he tells her. [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 62] She notes the call having occurred at 9:27 a.m. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 107] Yet, the 9/11 Commission will later conclude that the hijacker takeover of Flight 93 does not occur until a minute later, at 9:28 (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 38 ] Deena later wonders if her husband made this call before the hijackers took control of the cockpit, as he’d spoken quietly and quickly, as if he were being watched. He has an ear bud and a mouthpiece attached to a cord that hangs over his shoulder, which may have enabled him to use his phone surreptitiously. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 107] According to Deena Burnett’s account, this is the first of four calls Tom makes to her from Flight 93, all or most of which he makes using his cell phone. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001 ; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/13/2001; BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 75] However, a summary of passenger phone calls presented at the 2006 Zacarias Moussoui trial will state that Burnett makes only three calls from the plane; uses an Airfone, not his cell phone; and makes his frst call at 9:30, not 9:27 (see 9:30 a.m.-9:45 a.m. September 11, 2001). [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 9-10 ] This is the first of over 30 phone calls made by passengers from Flight 93. [MSNBC, 7/30/2002] Entity Tags: Mark Rothenberg, Deena Burnett, Tom Burnett Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Makes Last Contact with Air Traffic Control Flight 93 makes its last normal communication with air traffic control before being hijacked, acknowledging a routine radio transmission from the FAA’s Cleveland Center. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28] Flight 93 checked in with the Cleveland Center a couple of minutes earlier (see 9:24 a.m.-9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001). At 9:27, the Cleveland controller, John Werth, alerts it to another aircraft 12 miles away and to its right, at 37,000 feet: “United 93, that traffic for you is one o’clock, 12 miles east, bound three-seven-zero.” Seconds later, Flight 93 responds, “Negative contact, we’re looking, United 93.” Less than a minute after this, the hijackers appear to enter Flight 93’s cockpit (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [GREGOR, 12/21/2001 ; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 69; CBS NEWS, 9/10/2006] Entity Tags: John Werth, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:28 a.m. (or Before) September 11, 2001: Erratic Flight 93 Movements Noticed by Cleveland Flight Controller

Stacey Taylor. [Source: NBC News] Cleveland flight controller Stacey Taylor has been warned to watch transcontinental flights heading west for anything suspicious. She later recalls, “I hear one of the controllers behind me go, ‘Oh, my God, oh my God,’ and he starts yelling for the supervisor. He goes, ‘What is this plane doing? What is this plane doing?’ I wasn’t that busy at the time, and I pulled it up on my screen and he was climbing and descending and climbing and descending, but very gradually. He’d go up 300 feet, he’d go down 300 feet. And it turned out to be United 93.” (Note the time of this incident is not specified, but presumably it is prior to when Cleveland controllers note Flight 93 descends 700 feet at 9:29 a.m. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Stacey Taylor Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Cleveland Center Controllers Mistakenly Think Delta 1989 Is Hijacked

A Delta Air Lines Boeing 767, the same kind of aircraft as Delta 1989. [Source: Public domain] The FAA’s Cleveland Center incorrectly concludes that Delta Air Lines Flight 1989 has been hijacked, but accounts will conflict over how it comes to this conclusion. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 167] Delta 1989, a Boeing 767, is currently in the sector of airspace being monitored by Cleveland Center air traffic controller John Werth. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/2/2003 ; USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] It is flying west over Pennsylvania, approaching the Ohio border, and is about 25 miles behind Flight 93. FBI agents suspected Delta 1989 might be the next plane to be hijacked and called the Cleveland Center after the second attack on the World Trade Center, with the warning to watch this flight (see Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] A supervisor at the center told Werth to keep an eye on the flight because, as Werth will later recall, “he was a suspected hijacking because he had taken off from Boston at approximately the same time as” the first two hijacked aircraft, Flights 11 and 175. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/1/2003 ; USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] Controllers Hear Suspicious Communications - When, at 9:28, Werth hears the sound of screaming (subsequently determined to have come from Flight 93) over the radio (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001), he is unsure which of seven or eight possible aircraft it is coming from. The radio frequency is put on the speaker so other controllers can hear it, and they subsequently make out the words, “get out of here.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/1/2003 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 11, 28] Controllers Think Delta 1989 Is Hijacked - According to USA Today, when Cleveland Center controllers then hear a voice with a heavy accent over the radio, saying “Ladies and gentlemen: Here the captain.… We have a bomb on board” (see (9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001), they mistakenly think it is coming from Delta 1989, not Flight 93. They suspect the flight has been hijacked, and start informing their chain of command. “Officials at Cleveland Center rush word to Washington: Hijackers have another flight. At the Federal Aviation Administration’s Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, Delta Flight 1989 joins a growing list of suspicious jets.” [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 12] Werth Decides Hijacked Aircraft Is Flight 93 - Werth then calls all of the aircraft in his sector, and Flight 93 is the only one that does not respond. He also sees Flight 93 go into a quick descent and then come back up again. Werth therefore concludes that it is Flight 93, not Delta 1989, that has been hijacked, and instructs his supervisor to “tell Washington” of this. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/1/2003 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 10/2/2003 ] However, events in the following minutes will cause Cleveland Center controllers to remain suspicious of Delta 1989 (see (Shortly After 9:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 9:45 a.m. September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 10/2/2003 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 168; USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] Book Gives Alternative Account - In a book published in 2008, author Lynn Spencer will give a different explanation for why Cleveland Center becomes suspicious of Delta 1989. According to her account, after hearing a later radio transmission where a hijacker again says “There is a bomb on board” (see (9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001), Werth begins to hand off his flights to other controllers so he can devote his full attention to Flight 93. “In the distraction of the emergency, the crew of Delta 1989 misses the hand-off to the new frequency. The new sector controller for Delta 1989 calls out to the plane several times and gets no response.” As a result, “News travels fast,” and “Soon, word on the FAA’s open teleconference call is that a fifth aircraft is out of radio contact: Delta 1989… is added to the list of suspect aircraft.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 167] At 9:39 a.m., even though it is not responsible for handling Delta 1989, the FAA’s Boston Center will call NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and incorrectly tell it that Delta 1989 is another possible hijack (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Entity Tags: John Werth, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: NORAD Possibly Holding ‘Live-Fly’ Training Exercise According to former counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, around this time the acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers speaks to him via video link (see 9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). During their conversation, Myers mentions, “We are in the middle of Vigilant Warrior, a NORAD exercise.” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 5] However, no other references have been found to this exercise, “Vigilant Warrior.” Considering that exercise terms are “normally an unclassified nickname,” [CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 4/23/1998 ] this is perhaps a little odd. Could Richard Clarke have mistakenly been referring to the Vigilant Guardian exercise (see (6:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), which is taking place on 9/11? According to a later news report though, NORAD confirms that “it was running two mock drills on Sept. 11 at various radar sites and Command Centers in the United States and Canada,” one of these being Vigilant Guardian. [NEW JERSEY STAR-LEDGER, 12/5/2003] If this is correct then there must be another NORAD exercise on 9/11. If not “Vigilant Warrior,” a possibility is that the exercise referred to by Richard Clarke is in fact “Amalgam Warrior,” which is a NORAD-sponsored, large-scale, live-fly air defense and air intercept field training exercise. Amalgam Warrior usually involves two or more NORAD regions and is held twice yearly, in the spring for the West Coast and in the autumn for the East Coast. [US CONGRESS, N.D.; AIRMAN, 1996; ARKIN, 2005, PP. 254; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 4/27/2005] Is it possible that in 2001 the East Coast Amalgam Warrior is being held earlier than usual (like Global Guardian (see 8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001)) and is taking place on 9/11? In support of this possibility is a 1997 Defense Department report that describes the Stratcom exercise Global Guardian, saying it “links with other exercise activities sponsored by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Commands.” The exercises it links with are Crown Vigilance (an Air Combat Command exercise), Apollo Guardian (a US Space Command exercise), and—significantly—the NORAD exercises Vigilant Guardian and Amalgam Warrior. [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 5/1997; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 4/27/2005] Since in 2001, Vigilant Guardian (see (6:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) is occurring the same time as Global Guardian, might Amalgam Warrior be as well? In his book Code Names, William Arkin says that Amalgam Warrior is “sometimes combined with Global Guardian.” [ARKIN, 2005, PP. 254] Amalgam Warrior tests such activities as tracking, surveillance, air interception, employing rules of engagement, attack assessment, electronic warfare, and counter-cruise-missile operations. A previous Amalgam Warrior in 1996 involved such situations as tracking unknown aircraft that had incorrectly filed their flight plans or wandered off course, in-flight emergencies, terrorist aircraft attacks, and large-scale bomber strike missions. Amalgam Warrior 98-1 was NORAD’s largest ever exercise and involved six B-1B bombers being deployed to Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, to act as an enemy threat by infiltrating the aerial borders of North America. [AIRMAN, 1996; ARKIN, 2005, PP. 254; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 4/27/2005] Another Amalgam Warrior in fall 2000 similarly involved four B-1 bombers acting as enemy forces trying to invade Alaska, with NORAD going from tracking the unknown aircraft to sending up “alert” F-15s in response. [EIELSON NEWS SERVICE, 10/27/2000; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/29/2000] If either one (or both) of these exercises ending with the name “Warrior” is taking place on 9/11, this could be very significant, because the word “Warrior” indicates that the exercise is a Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved, Commander in Chief, NORAD-sponsored field training exercise. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 8/25/1989] Real planes would be pretending to be threats to the US and real fighters would be deployed to defend against them. Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Vigilant Warrior, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Ellington Air National Guard Base, Amalgam Warrior, Richard A. Clarke, Richard B. Myers, Vigilant Guardian Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: CNN Reports US Officials Think Attacks Caused by Terrorists CNN quotes the Associate Press as reporting that a US official believes the attacks are believed to have been carried out by terrorists. [OTTAWA CITIZEN, 9/11/2001] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: Myers Updates Clarke Videoconference on Fighter Response According to his own account, during a video conference with top officials that he is directing, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke asks Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Richard Myers, “I assume NORAD has scrambled fighters and AWACS. How many? Where?” Myers, who is at the Pentagon, replies, “Not a pretty picture, Dick. We are in the middle of Vigilant Warrior, a NORAD exercise, but… Otis has launched two birds toward New York. Langley is trying to get two up now [toward Washington]. The AWACS are at Tinker and not on alert.” Vigilant Warrior may be a mistaken reference to either the on-going war game Vigilant Guardian, or perhaps another exercise called Amalgam Warrior (see 9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). Otis Air National Guard Base is in Massachusetts, 188 miles east of New York City; Langley is in Virginia, 129 miles south of Washington; Tinker Air Force Base is in Oklahoma. Clarke asks, “Okay, how long to CAP [combat air patrol] over DC?” Myers replies, “Fast as we can. Fifteen minutes?” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 5] The first fighters don’t reach Washington until perhaps more than 30 minutes later (see (Between 9:49 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, this account—or at least the time Clarke alleges the conversation occurs—is contradicted by Myers himself and Senator Max Cleland (D). Myers claims he has been at a meeting on Capitol Hill with Cleland since about 9 o’clock, and does not arrive back at the Pentagon until after it is hit, which is at 9:37 a.m. [AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 10/23/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; CNN, 4/15/2003; AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 9/8/2006] Cleland confirms the existence of this meeting, and claims that Myers is with him until around the time of the Pentagon attack. [CNN, 11/20/2001; ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, 6/16/2003] (There are, though, some inconsistencies in Myers and Cleland’s accounts of this period (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Otis Air National Guard Base, Vigilant Warrior, Richard B. Myers, Richard A. Clarke, Vigilant Guardian, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Amalgam Warrior, Max Cleland Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke

(9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Hijackers Take over Flight 93 The 9/11 Commission will later conclude that the four hijackers take over Flight 93 at 9:28 a.m., one minute after the plane’s crew made their last communication with the FAA’s Cleveland Center (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001). According to the Commission, the hijackers “wielded knives (reported by at least five callers); engaged in violence, including stabbing (reported by at least four callers and indicated by the sounds of the cockpit struggle transmitted over the radio); relocated the passengers to the back of the plane (reported by at least two callers); threatened use of a bomb, either real or fake (reported by at least three callers); and engaged in deception about their intentions (as indicated by the hijacker’s radio transmission received by FAA air traffic control).” Flight 93 suddenly drops 685 feet in the space of just 30 seconds, and the Cleveland Center hears two suspicious radio transmissions from its cockpit (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, the 9/11 Commission will add, “While this appears to show the exact time that the hijackers invaded the cockpit, we have found no conclusive evidence to indicate precisely when the terrorists took over the main cabin or moved passengers seated in the first-class cabin back to coach.” The four hijackers waited about 46 minutes after takeoff before beginning their takeover of Flight 93. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 38-39 ] Yet, the Commission claims, when alleged hijacker ringleader Mohamed Atta met with fellow Hamburg cell member Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Spain about two months earlier (see July 8-19, 2001), he’d said that the “best time [for the hijackers] to storm the cockpit would be about 10-15 minutes after takeoff, when the cockpit doors typically were opened for the first time.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 245] The Commission will state, “We were unable to determine why [the Flight 93 hijackers] waited so long.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 39 ] The long wait is particularly notable, considering that Flight 93 had already been significantly delayed before taking off from Newark Airport (see 8:01 a.m. September 11, 2001). In fact, in an early timeline, Pentagon officials will state the hijacking occurred significantly earlier, at around 9:16, and in 2003, NORAD officials repeat this claim (see 9:16 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/17/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Cleveland Flight Control Hears Sounds of Struggle as Flight 93 Is Hijacked

Jason Dahl. [Source: Publicity photo] According to the 9/11 Commission, less than a minute after Flight 93 acknowledged a routine radio transmission from the FAA’s Cleveland Center (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001), John Werth—the controller handling the flight—and pilots of other aircraft in the vicinity of Flight 93 hear “a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; CBS NEWS, 9/10/2006] Someone, presumably Flight 93’s pilot Jason Dahl, is overheard by controllers as he shouts, “Mayday!” [NEW YORK TIMES, 7/22/2004] Seconds later, the controller responds, “Somebody call Cleveland?” Then there are more sounds of screaming and someone yelling, “Get out of here, get out of here.” [TORONTO SUN, 9/16/2001; NEWSWEEK, 9/22/2001; OBSERVER, 12/2/2001; MSNBC, 7/30/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Then the voices of the hijackers can be heard talking in Arabic. The words are later translated to show they are talking to each other, saying, “Everything is fine.” [NEWSWEEK, 12/3/2001] Later, passenger phone calls will describe two dead or injured bodies just outside the cockpit; presumably these are the two pilots. [NEW YORK TIMES, 7/22/2004] Entity Tags: Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, John Werth, 9/11 Commission, Jason Dahl Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(Between 9:28 a.m. and 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Executive Jet Tracks Flight 93 A small jet plane—ExecuJet 956—tracks Flight 93 for what is described as “a substantial period of time” before it crashes, and picks up some of the radio transmissions from it, as both planes are operating on the same frequency. [GOVERNMENT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER PURSUANT TO 49 USC 1154. UNITED STATES V. ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, 8/8/2002 ; WASHINGTON POST, 8/9/2002] The exact period over which ExecuJet 956 follows Flight 93 is unclear. But as early as 9:31 it calls the FAA’s Cleveland Center and, referring to Flight 93, reports: “[W]e’re just answering your call. We did hear that, uh, yelling too.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 461] At 9:40, after being asked, “did you understand that transmission [from Flight 93]?” ExecuJet 956 tells Cleveland Center: “Affirmative. He said that there was a bomb on board.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 4/12/2006] Cleveland Center then asks the ExecuJet pilot if he can change course and try to spot Flight 93. He sees it, loses it, and then sees it again. He then has to make an evasive turn, as Flight 93 is heading directly for him. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 104] ExecuJet 956 is one of a fleet of small jets available for hire from a company based in Woodbridge, New Jersey called NetJets, which sells shares in private business aircraft. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/8/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 8/9/2002] NetJets’ owner is the multi-billionaire Warren Buffet. [KNIGHT RIDDER, 11/6/2001; OBSERVER, 1/12/2003] Another small business jet is reportedly within 20 miles of Flight 93 when it crashes, but this is apparently a different one, belonging to a North Carolina clothing firm (see 10:07 a.m. September 11, 2001). [PITTSBURGH CHANNEL, 9/15/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/16/2001] Entity Tags: Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:29 a.m. September 11, 2001: Autopilot on Flight 77 Disengaged Flight 77’s autopilot is disengaged. The plane is flying at 7,000 feet and is about 38 miles west of the Pentagon. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] Information from the plane’s recovered flight data recorder (see September 13-14, 2001) later will indicate the pilot had entered autopilot instructions for a course to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (which is nearby the Pentagon). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

9:29 a.m. September 11, 2001: President Bush Makes a Scheduled Speech; Proclaims Terrorist Attack on Our Country

President Bush begins speaking at 9:29 in the library of Booker Elementary School. [Source: Booker Elementary website] (click image to enlarge) Still inside Booker Elementary School, President Bush gives a brief speech in front of about 200 students, plus many teachers and reporters. [DAILY MAIL, 9/8/2002] He says, “Today we’ve had a national tragedy. Two airplanes have crashed into the World Trade Center in an apparent terrorist attack on our country.” [FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, 9/11/2001] The talk occurs at exactly the time and place stated in his publicly announced advance schedule—making Bush a possible terrorist target. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/12/2001; MSNBC, 9/22/2001] This is the last most Americans will see of Bush until the evening. reporters at Booker Elementary School. Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush, Key Day of 9/11 Events

(9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Clarke Orders US Embassies Closed and Military Bases to Raise Alert Level Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, who is in the White House Situation Room, instructs that US embassies overseas be closed and that US military bases raise their alert level. According to his own recollection, just after he has spoken to the acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers (see 9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001), Clarke is thinking about the simultaneous attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). As he describes, “There was the possibility now of multiple simultaneous attacks in several countries.” He therefore issues instructions to the State Department and the Department of Defense: “We have to assume there will be simultaneous attacks on us overseas. We need to close the embassies. Move [Department of Defense] bases to combat Threatcon.” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 5-6] (“Threatcon” is short for “terrorist threat condition.” [SLATE, 9/12/2001] ) According to CNN, all US military forces will be ordered to the highest alert level at 10:10 a.m. (see (10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/4/2002] But the 9/11 Commission Report will state that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld only orders the US armed forces to Defcon 3, an increased state of readiness, at 10:43 a.m. (see (10:43 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 326 AND 554] The State Department will tell US embassies to make the decision whether to close based on their own local security requirements. Around 50 US embassies or consulates around the world will therefore close, though at what time they do so is unstated. [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 9/12/2001] Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke

(9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Cleveland Air Traffic Controller Thinks Flight 93 Is Hijacked

John Werth. [Source: CBS] Shortly after hearing strange noises from the cockpit of Flight 93, Cleveland air traffic controllers notice the plane has descended about 700 feet. John Werth, the controller who is handling the plane, tells the supervisor nearest to him, “I think we have another one [i.e., another hijacking].” He will repeatedly radio the cockpit over the next four minutes, asking the pilot to confirm the hijacking, but receive no response. At 9:30 a.m., Werth begins asking other nearby flights on his frequency if they’ve heard screaming; several say that they have. [GREGOR, 12/21/2001 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28; CBS NEWS, 9/10/2006] The Cleveland Center immediately notifies United Airlines’ headquarters of the loss of communication with Flight 93 (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, the FAA chain of command is apparently not also immediately informed. And the Cleveland Center will not contact NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) about Flight 93 until 10:07 a.m. (see 10:05 a.m.-10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28 AND 30] Entity Tags: John Werth, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:29 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Pentagon Command Center Begins High Level Conference Call

The National Miilitary Command Center, inside the Pentagon. [Source: National Military Command Center] Captain Charles Leidig is temporarily in command of the National Military Command Center (NMCC), “the military’s worldwide nerve center.” In response to the attacks on the World Trade Center, he convenes a conference call. [CNN, 9/4/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 ] Telephone links are established between the NMCC located inside the Pentagon (but on the opposite side of the building from where the explosion will happen), Canada’s equivalent Command Center, Strategic Command, theater commanders, and federal emergency-response agencies. At one time or another, President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, key military officers, leaders of the FAA and NORAD, the White House, and Air Force One are heard on the open line. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] NORAD command director Captain Michael Jellinek claims this call was initiated “at once” after the second WTC tower was hit. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002] However, the 9/11 Commission concludes it starts at 9:29 a.m. According to the commission, it begins as an all-purpose “significant event” conference. But at 9:30, Leidig states that it has just been confirmed that Flight 11 is still airborne and is heading toward Washington, DC. (This incorrect information apparently arose minutes earlier during a conference call between FAA centers (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001).) In response to this erroneous report, the significant event conference is ended at around 9:34. It then resumes at about 9:37 as an air threat conference call, which lasts for more than eight hours. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 37] This is broadcast over a loudspeaker inside the NMCC. [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 8/31/2003] Brigadier General Montague Winfield, who later takes over from Leidig in charge of the NMCC, says, “All of the governmental agencies that were involved in any activity going on in the United States at that point, were in that conference.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] The call continues right through the Pentagon explosion; the impact is not felt within the NMCC. [CNN, 9/4/2002] However, despite being in the Pentagon when it is hit, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld doesn’t enter the NMCC or participate in the call until 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Mike Jellinek, Montague Winfield, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush, National Military Command Center, Federal Aviation Administration, Charles Leidig, Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93, George Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Pentagon

9:40 a.m. September 11, 2001: Langley Jets Directed toward Washington but Given Wrong Coordinates
NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) issues coordinates to the three F-16 fighter jets launched from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), sending them to Washington. However, the fighters head off in the wrong direction, reportedly because NEADS has accidentally given them incorrect coordinates. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 180-181] Communications Problems - The Langley AFB jets have already mistakenly been sent east over the ocean (see 9:30 a.m.-9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). At 9:36 a.m., the NEADS mission crew commander ordered that they be directed toward the White House (see 9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27] However, weapons director Master Sergeant Steve Citino has been having difficulty communicating with the jets. According to author Lynn Spencer, “NEADS radio coverage east of Washington is poor, and the noise level on the [NEADS] operations floor has only been exacerbating the problem.” NEADS Issues Wrong Coordinates - Citino now forwards coordinates to the Langley jets, telling them to establish a combat air patrol over Washington. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 180] Apparently, it is Tech. Sgt. Ronald Belluscio, a senior weapons director technician, who contacts the jets at this time, although he will claim he orders them specifically toward the Pentagon. He will say: “I jumped on a frequency, per the senior director, and was told to ask the Langley birds to vector over the Pentagon. I didn’t know it had been hit.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 65] However, Citino has apparently given out the wrong coordinates. According to Spencer, “He inadvertently transposed two of the coordinates, and the F-16s turned onto a flight path that would take them 60 miles southwest of Washington.” Aircraft Instrument Malfunctioning - What is more, as soon as the Langley jets turn onto their new heading, lead pilot Major Dean Eckmann has a problem with his aircraft. The bearing pointer on its horizontal situation indicator (HSI)—the instrument that shows a plane’s position relative to its intended destination—freezes. Eckmann therefore has to get the heading from one of the other Langley pilots, Captain Craig Borgstrom. Shortly after sending the three jets in the wrong direction, Citino will contact them again with the correct coordinates (see (Between 9:41 a.m. and 9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 180-181] Entity Tags: Craig Borgstrom, Ronald Belluscio, Dean Eckmann, Steve Citino Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(Between 9:40 and 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Johnstown Airport Control Tower Is Evacuated Following Reports of Approaching Plane

Johnstown-Cambria County Airport. [Source: JMSA Today] At some time shortly before 10 a.m.—as early as 9:40 a.m. according to one report—air traffic manager Dennis Fritz, in the control tower at Johnstown-Cambria County Airport, 70 miles east of Pittsburgh, receives a call from Cleveland Air Traffic Control reporting a large, suspicious aircraft about 20 miles south of them, descending below six thousand feet. Despite the clear day, Fritz and his colleagues can see no plane approaching through binoculars. Soon afterwards, in response to another call from Cleveland, Fritz orders trainees and custodial staff to evacuate the tower, yet he is still unable to see any plane approaching. Less than a minute later, though, Cleveland calls a third time, saying to disregard the evacuation: The plane has turned south and they have lost radar contact with it. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/12/2001; KNIGHT RIDDER, 9/13/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 197] Wells Morrison is the agent in charge of the FBI’s Mon Valley Resident Agency, a satellite of its Pittsburgh field office. He too receives a phone call informing him of this flight, though he doesn’t say whom it is from. He contacts the Johnstown FBI office and instructs its agents to head to the Johnstown Airport. [KASHURBA, 2002, PP. 109-110] Flight 93 crashes around 10:03 a.m. or soon thereafter (see (10:03 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001), going down in a field just 14 miles south of Johnstown. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/13/2001] Entity Tags: Dennis Fritz, Wells Morrison Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

(Between 9:40 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: DC Air National Guard Pilots Authorized to Take Off and Briefed on Mission

Marc Sasseville. [Source: CBC] Four pilots with the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) at Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington, finally receive authorization to get airborne in their fighter jets, and are given instructions on their mission. The pilots are Lieutenant Colonel Marc Sasseville, Lieutenant Heather Penney Garcia, Captain Brandon Rasmussen, and Major Daniel Caine. Pilot Waiting 'for Somebody to Task Me with Something' - Rasmussen will later recall that, although he and his colleagues at the unit had been aware of the attacks in New York, it is only after the Pentagon is hit (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001) that “we knew that we were going to be sticking around home and being quite busy.” And until the pilots are authorized to take off, he is “just kind of standing back, waiting for somebody to task me with something.” He will recall, “I was just waiting at the ops desk for someone to say, ‘Okay, we’ve been cleared to take off and go.’” Sasseville Briefs Other Pilots - Rasmussen says that, after Sasseville and Caine receive authorization from their wing commander to get airborne and to use missiles, Sasseville, who is the acting operations group commander, looks at Penney Garcia and says, “You’re flying with me, and [Caine] you’re flying with [Rasmussen], do suit up and get out there as quick as possible.” According to another account, Sasseville gives his three fellow pilots a short briefing, telling them: “I have no idea what’s going on, but we’re flying. Here’s our frequency. We’ll split up the area as we have to. Just defend as required. We’ll talk about the rest in the air.” [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 82-84; RASMUSSEN, 9/18/2003] Sasseville will recall, “There wasn’t a whole hell of a lot to talk about, because we didn’t know what was going on.” [VOGEL, 2007, PP. 446] Pilots Prepare to Fly - According to Rasmussen: “We were relieved to actually be given permission to go up and do something instead of feeling totally helpless. I mean we are fighter pilots, just like guard dogs chomping at the bit ready to go.” The four pilots run down the hallway and throw on their gear, grabbing their helmets, g-suits, and parachute harnesses, before heading to the operations desk to get their aircraft assignments. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002; RASMUSSEN, 9/18/2003] Commander Gives Instructions - According to author Leslie Filson, before Sasseville and Penney Garcia head to their jets, Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the DC Air National Guard, gives them instructions, regarding their mission. As Wherley will later recall, “My translation of the rules [of engagement] to [Sasseville] was, ‘You have weapons free flight-lead control.’” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 82] “Weapons free” means the decision whether to shoot at a hostile aircraft rests with the lead pilot. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 44] Wherley says, “Do you understand what I’m asking you to do?” and both pilots respond, “Yes.” Wherley then tells them to be careful. “It was important for them to understand that this was weapons free,” he will recall. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 82] However, Sasseville will tell the 9/11 Commission that he does not remember receiving the rules of engagement he is supposed to follow until later on, after he has taken off. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/8/2004 ] Jets Don't Launch until 10:42 and After - The exact times when the four pilots are authorized to get airborne and receive their mission instructions are unclear. But Sasseville and Penney Garcia will take off from Andrews at 10:42 a.m., with their planes armed only with guns, and no missiles (see 10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001). Rasmussen and Caine take off at 11:11 a.m., by which time their jets have been armed with missiles (see 11:11 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 82-84; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2004] Entity Tags: David Wherley, Daniel Caine, Heather Penney Garcia, Leslie Filson, District of Columbia Air National Guard, Marc Sasseville, Brandon Rasmussen Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:40 a.m.-9:43 a.m. September 11, 2001: First Responders Arrive at Pentagon within Minutes of Attack

Initial firefighting efforts after the attack on the Pentagon. [Source: US Department of Defense] (click image to enlarge) Numerous area firefighters and other emergency workers promptly learn of the Pentagon crash and are able to arrive at the crash scene within 5 or 6 minutes of the attack. These responders include members of the Arlington County Fire Department (ACFD) and the Fort Myer Fire Department, plus units belonging to the Fire and Rescue Department of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA). [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 66] ACFD’s training officer, Captain Chuck Gibbs, reaches the crash site within 3 minutes of the attack, followed a minute later by Battalion Chief Bob Cornwell, who assumes initial incident command responsibilities. ACFD Captain Edward Blunt arrives at 9:42 and establishes Emergency Medical Services control. ACFD Truck 105 is the first unit to arrive, reaching the scene at 9:41. [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. A5-A6 AND 1-1] A minute after it, Rescue Engines 161 and 162 of the Fort Myer Fire Department arrive, followed by a reserve pumper, Engine 163. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 68] MWAA fire and medical units, and the first contingent of the FBI’s National Capital Response Squad, also arrive within 5 minutes of the crash. By 10:00 a.m., most of the ACFD duty shift will be engaged at the Pentagon. [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. A7] Federal, state, and local civilian police officers also arrive within minutes of the attack. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 161] Most Arlington County Police Department officers will have reached the scene within 3 hours. [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. C6] Several factors have contributed to the prompt emergency response: The Arlington County Emergency Communications Center (ECC), which is the focal point of all police and fire 911 calls for the county, received several calls from emergency workers who saw the low-flying plane approaching the Pentagon (see (9:36 a.m.-9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 66] Some fire and rescue units responded after hearing the radio message of Fire Captain Steve McCoy, reporting the crash. [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. A4] Numerous emergency units were already on the road near the Pentagon, and were able to quickly respond, after being called out to an apartment fire that was found to have already gone out (see (Shortly Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FIRE ENGINEERING, 11/2002] And MWAA firefighters were already responding to a car crash at nearby Reagan National Airport, had heard the sound of the crash, and saw the resulting smoke rising into the air (see (9:20 a.m.-9:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 69-70] Entity Tags: Chuck Gibbs, Arlington County Fire Department, National Capital Response Squad, Bob Cornwell, Fort Myer Fire Department, Edward Blunt, Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

Shortly After 9:37 a.m.: FISA Judge Grants Five Warrantless Surveillance Requests Minutes after Pentagon Attack Royce Lamberth, head of the FISA court which grants warrants for intelligence cases, grants five warrantless surveillance requests minutes after the Pentagon attack. Lamberth will later report being stuck in a carpool lane near the Pentagon when it is hit. With his car enveloped in smoke, he calls US marshals to help him get to his office. Lamberth will later say that by the time officers reached him, “I had approved five FISA coverages [warrants] on my cellphone.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6/24/2007] Presumably this represents the start of a flurry of surveillance activity in response to the 9/11 attacks, but it is not known who was to be monitored or how their names were learned and acted on so quickly. Entity Tags: Royce Lamberth Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, FBI 9/11 Investigation

9:40 a.m. September 11, 2001: Cleveland Center Notifies Regional Operations Center about Flight 93
The FAA’s Cleveland Center notifies the FAA’s Great Lakes Regional Operations Center about the screams and statements it heard from an unknown origin, but that are believed to have come from Flight 93. These transmissions were heard between 9:28 and 9:39 (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001, (9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ] The FAA’s Herndon Command Center and Washington headquarters were alerted to Flight 93 several minutes earlier (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 39 ] Entity Tags: Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:40 a.m.-9:41 a.m. September 11, 2001: Airline Dispatcher Again Warns Flight 93 to Secure Cockpit
United Airlines flight dispatcher Ed Ballinger sends two messages to Flight 93, which he is monitoring, warning its pilots (who in fact are no longer in control of the plane) to secure the cockpit. At 9:40, he sends the text message to Flight 93: “High security alert. Secure cockpit. Two airliner hit NY Trade Center. And 1 aircraft in IAD missing. And one in EWR missing… too. UAL 175/93 missing.” A minute later, he again sends this message to Flight 93, but with “UAL 175/93 found” added at the end. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 43 ] “IAD” is the code for Washington’s Dulles International Airport, from where Flight 77 took off, while “EWR” is the code for Newark Airport, from where Flight 93 took off, so presumably it is these missing aircraft that Ballinger is referring to. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ] Ballinger sent previous warning messages to Flight 93 earlier on, telling it to “Beware any cockpit intrusion” at 9:23 (see 9:23 a.m.-9:26 a.m. September 11, 2001), and to “Secure cockpit” at 9:33 (see 9:32 a.m.-9:33 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 37 AND 39 ] Entity Tags: Ed Ballinger Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(Shortly After 9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001: DC Air National Guard Commander Learns of Pentagon Attack, Rushes to Squadron Headquarters
The commander of the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) at Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington, finally heads across the base to the headquarters of the 121st Fighter Squadron, which is part of the DCANG, and joins his officers in responding to the terrorist attacks. [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 445-446] Squadron Leaders Not yet Gone 'Into Action' - Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the 113th Wing of the DC Air National Guard, is in his office at Andrews. He has already given his officers the go-ahead to use the unit’s missiles, so they can be unloaded from storage and put onto fighter jets (see (Shortly After 9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 156-157, 184] However, according to Captain Brandon Rasmussen, one of the DCANG pilots, it is only after the Pentagon is hit that “the squadron leadership went into action.” [RASMUSSEN, 9/18/2003] Wherley Runs across Base - The Washington Post will report that Wherley’s “first inkling that the attacks would go beyond New York was when one of his officers, whose husband worked at the Pentagon, saw on television that the building had been hit and began shrieking.” After briefly comforting the woman, Wherley dashes from his office and runs several hundred yards across the base to the headquarters of the 121st Fighter Squadron. Wherley Doesn't Want Jets Launched Yet - Unlike other Air National Guard units, the DCANG reports to the president, rather than a state governor. [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 445] Furthermore, since the Secret Service provides protection to the president, who is the commander in chief of the US military, it has some authority over the military, including the DCANG. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 123] DCANG squadron officers have already heard from their Secret Service contacts, who have asked them about getting fighters launched (see (Shortly After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 78] But after arriving at the 121st FS headquarters, Wherley says he wants more explicit authorization before launching aircraft. He tells the squadron officers: “We have to get instructions. We can’t just fly off half-cocked.” [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 445-446] Takes over Call from White House - At the operations desk, Major Daniel Caine has recently been called by a Secret Service agent at the White House Joint Operations Center, who is requesting armed fighter jets over Washington. After Wherley has arrived at the 121st FS headquarters, Caine passes the phone to him, telling the caller, “Here’s my boss.” Caine then says, “I’m going to fly.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 78; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/8/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/11/2004 ] Despite his responsibilities as the unit’s supervisor of flying, Caine has decided to get airborne himself, and heads off to join the other pilots preparing to take off from Andrews. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 76; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 184] Wherley will talk over the phone with the Secret Service, and try to obtain instructions for the launching of his fighter jets (see (Shortly After 9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001, (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001, (10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001, and (Between 10:16 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/28/2003; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 184-185, 218] Entity Tags: David Wherley, Daniel Caine, District of Columbia Air National Guard, Brandon Rasmussen, 121st Fighter Squadron Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Hijacking Simulation Scheduled as Part of NORAD Exercise As part of a NORAD training exercise, a simulated plane hijacking was scheduled to occur around this time. It was to have been based around politically motivated perpetrators taking command of an aircraft, landing it on a Cuba-like island, and seeking asylum there. The hijacking was one of several simulated scenarios prepared for the day. Details of the other scenarios are unknown. Major Kevin Nasypany, the mission crew commander at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) who’d helped designed the exercise, initially thought the reports of Flight 11 being hijacked were because “Somebody started the exercise early.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] The exercise was canceled after the second plane hit the World Trade Center (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Vigilant Guardian, Kevin Nasypany, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

Soon after 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Pentagon Medical Staff Implement Mass Casualty Plan; Aided by Pre-9/11 Exercises

Medical workers at the first triage area set up outside the Pentagon after it is attacked. [Source: Mark D. Faram / US Navy] Soon after the Pentagon is hit, medical workers initiate their mass casualty plan (MASCAL) for dealing with disasters. Sergeant Matthew Rosenberg, a medic at the Pentagon’s DiLorenzo Tricare Health Clinic, arrives at the center courtyard. Seeing smoke rising from the side of the building and patients staggering out, he radios the clinic: “You need to initiate MASCAL right now! We have mass casualties! I need medical assets to the courtyard!” Major Lorie Brown, chief nurse of the DiLorenzo Clinic, says that as soon as she sees people running down the corridor to evacuate, “we initiated the MASCAL, started galvanizing all of our assets and put our plan in action.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/16/2001; OFFICE OF MEDICAL HISTORY, 9/2004, PP. 7, 39] The Pentagon has actually conducted at least three MASCAL training exercises in the previous 12 months, based around a plane crashing into the place (see October 24-26, 2000)(see May 2001)(see Early August 2001). Lieutenant Colonel John Felicio, the deputy commander for administration of the DiLorenzo Clinic, says, “The saving grace to our efforts was the two MASCAL exercises we previously had conducted.… Our scenario for both MASCALS was a plane flying into the Pentagon courtyard.” Furthermore, the nearby Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC), which sends ambulances in response to the attack, has recently recovered from a four-day power loss (see August 27-31, 2001). A military report will later state: “Many believe that [this] extended emergency… helped WRAMC in its response on September 11.” [OFFICE OF MEDICAL HISTORY, 9/2004, PP. 18, 146] Entity Tags: Pentagon, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Lorie Brown, John Felicio, DiLorenzo Tricare Health Clinic, Matt Rosenberg Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Transponder Signal Turned Off; Flight Still Closely Tracked The transponder signal from Flight 93 ceases. [CNN, 9/17/2001; MSNBC, 9/3/2002; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] However, the plane can be—and is—tracked using primary radar by Cleveland flight controllers and at United headquarters. Altitude can no longer be determined, except by visual sightings from other aircraft. The plane’s speed begins to vary wildly, fluctuating between 600 and 400 mph before eventually settling around 400 mph. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 77, 214; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: United Airlines, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Command Center Identifies Ten Possible Hijacked Planes Newark, New Jersey, air traffic controller Bob Varcadipane is talking on the phone with the FAA Command Center. He is told that the Command Center is still suspicious of at least ten planes for one reason or another, all possible hijackings. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Bob Varcadipane Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(Between 9:41 a.m. and 9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Langley Jets Heading in Wrong Direction, Redirected to Washington A weapons director at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) notices that the three F-16s launched from Langley Air Force Base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) are going in the wrong direction, and so he contacts them to get them on the correct course. Citino Thinks FAA Has Redirected Fighters - The weapons director, Master Sergeant Steve Citino, recently forwarded coordinates to the jets, sending them to Washington, DC. However, according to author Lynn Spencer, he inadvertently gave them incorrect coordinates (see 9:40 a.m. September 11, 2001). Now, shortly afterwards, Citino notices that the jets are going in the wrong direction. However, he does not realize his mistake with the coordinates, and instead assumes that the FAA’s Washington Center has redirected the jets so as to avoid air traffic. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 180-181] He makes this assumption even though NEADS recently declared AFIO (Authorization for Interceptor Operations) for Washington airspace, thereby giving the military authority over the FAA for that airspace (see 9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 113, 150] Fighters Given Correct Destination - Citino radios one of the three Langley AFB pilots, Captain Craig Borgstrom, and gives him the correct course heading. Citino adds: “Just to reiterate. You are under AFIO control! Take all direction from Huntress!” (“Huntress” is the call sign for NEADS.) Borgstrom acknowledges the order, but mentions that the new heading conflicts with the coordinates he has just been given. He says, “We’re showing a CAP [combat air patrol] point of 250 [heading], 20 miles.” Citino snaps back at him: “Negative! That’s incorrect! The CAP is 312, 20 miles!” Borgstrom then relays the correct coordinates to his lead pilot, Major Dean Eckmann, and the three Langley jets set off toward their new destination. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 181] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Craig Borgstrom, Steve Citino, Dean Eckmann Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(Shortly After 9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: DC Air National Guard Commander Wherley Wants Orders from Someone More Senior before He Will Launch Fighters Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG), speaks to a Secret Service agent over the phone, but declines the agent’s request to launch DCANG fighter jets without first receiving an order to do so from someone more senior. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 184] Wherley Takes over Call - Wherley has just arrived at the headquarters of the DCANG’s 121st Fighter Squadron at Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington (see (Shortly After 9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001). At the operations desk there, Major Daniel Caine passed Wherley a phone he was talking over, before heading off to prepare to get airborne. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 78; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 445] Caller Wants Jets over Washington - Wherley finds that the caller Caine was speaking with is from the Secret Service. They want the DCANG to put up a combat air patrol (CAP) over Washington. But, according to author Lynn Spencer: “Wherley knows that there has never been a CAP anywhere over this country, much less over Washington. Such a request—coming from someone not even in the military—is unheard of.” Wherley understands the power of the Secret Service, and knows that with its responsibility to protect the president it clearly has some authority over other agencies, including the military. “But still, such an order from a Secret Service agent seems rather far-reaching.” He therefore tells the caller, “I would feel more comfortable receiving such an order from someone higher in the chain of command, preferably in the military.” Wherley Told to Call 'Operations Center' - According to Spencer, the agent gives Wherley “a phone number and tells him to call over to the White House Operations Center, where Vice President [Dick] Cheney has been ushered.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 184] Presumably the “Operations Center” is the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House, where Cheney is evacuated to by his Secret Service agents (see (9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ABC NEWS, 9/14/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 39-40] However, other accounts, including Wherley’s interview with the 9/11 Commission, will state that Wherley subsequently calls someone at the Secret Service’s White House Joint Operations Center (JOC), not the PEOC (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 79; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/28/2003] (Wherley’s current call is also with an agent at the JOC. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/8/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/11/2004 ] ) Entity Tags: District of Columbia Air National Guard, David Wherley, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:41 a.m.-9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Command Center Notifies FAA Headquarters about Flight 93 Problems The FAA’s Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, provides updates to FAA headquarters in Washington, DC, about the problems with Flight 93. At 9:41 a.m., John White, a manager at the Command Center, is talking to Doug Davis, the special assistant for technical operations in air traffic services at FAA headquarters. White says that Flight 93 has reversed course from its intended flight path (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001), its transponder signal has been lost (see (9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and it is now descending and heading east. From 9:42 a.m., one of the Command Center managers (exactly who is unstated) gives the headquarters several updates on Flight 93’s progress and location. At 9:46 a.m., White tells Jeff Griffith, the FAA’s deputy director of air traffic, that Flight 93 is “29 minutes out of Washington, DC, and tracking toward us.” Two minutes later, in another conversation with Griffith, White confirms that Flight 93 has reversed course and is heading toward Washington. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 10/21/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 43-44 ] Entity Tags: Doug Davis, Federal Aviation Administration, Jeff Griffith, John White Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:41 a.m.-9:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Mysterious White Jet Seen Circling above White House

The ‘white jet’ seen circling above the White House and Capitol. [Source: Discovery Channel] Several television networks interrupt their coverage of events in New York to report that a mysterious white aircraft is circling over the White House and the Capitol. At 9:41 a.m., Peter Jennings of ABC News reports that “there is a plane circling the White House at the moment. And they’re clearing the grounds there.… And this plane circling the White House adds to the trauma that people are feeling today, but we have no idea precisely what the means.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2001] At 9:52 a.m., CNN correspondent John King, who is standing about 200 yards from the White House, says: “About 10 minutes ago, there was a white jet circling overhead. Now, you generally don’t see planes in the area over the White House. That is restricted air space. No reason to believe that this jet was there for any nefarious purposes, but the Secret Service was very concerned, pointing up at the jet in the sky. It is out of sight now, best we can tell.” [CNN, 9/11/2001] Another CNN correspondent, Kate Snow, also reports seeing a plane at around this time, “circling over the Capitol.” She says: “Now whether that may have been an Air Force plane, it’s unclear. But that seemed to be the reason, according to security guards that I talked with, towards the evacuation of the Capitol.” [CNN, 9/11/2001] (The Capitol is reportedly evacuated at 9:48 a.m. (see 9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FOX NEWS, 9/11/2003] ) At 9:55 a.m., NBC News turns to a live report from its correspondent Bob Kur, who recalls: “And in the most surreal of this morning’s scenes here at the White House, a white plane, a very big jet, was flying an unusual pattern near the White House over Lafayette Park, very slowly. It made one circle and then we have not seen it since. There was a lot of concern about what that plane might be. But, again, it’s only speculation, but most people say that since flights have been cleared from US air space, and it was a totally white plane, looked unusual to all of us, that it was a government plane of some kind.” [NBC 4, 9/11/2001] A CNN comparison between video footage of this plane and an official Air Force photograph will suggest it is an E-4B. This is a militarized version of a Boeing 747 that is used as a flying command post. An E-4B has in fact just been launched from an airfield outside of Washington (see (Shortly Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001), so this could plausibly be the same plane as is witnessed by the reporters. Two government sources familiar with the incident will later tell CNN the plane was a military aircraft, but that its details are classified. Even by 2007, the Pentagon, FAA, and Secret Service will have offered no public explanation for this plane over the White House. [VERTON, 2003, PP. 143-144; CNN, 9/12/2007] In 2009, John Farmer, the former senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission, will claim that this “mystery plane” is an E-4B with the call sign “Venus 77” that takes off from Andrews Air Force Base, just outside Washington, at 9:43 a.m. (see 9:43 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FARMER, 2009, PP. 206-207, 372] Entity Tags: Bob Kur, Peter Jennings, John King, E-4B National Airborne Operations Center, Kate Snow, John Farmer Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:41 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FBI Agent Already Aware of Flight 93 Hijacking

Greg Callahan. [Source: NBC News] Newark, New Jersey, flight controller Greg Callahan is talking on the phone to an FBI agent. The agent says about Flight 93: “We suspect that this aircraft has now been taken over by hostile forces.” The agent describes the sharp turn it has made over eastern Ohio and that it is now heading back over southwestern Pennsylvania. Callahan says he could tell the plane is on a course for Washington. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] The FBI has been in contact with Deena Burnett and informed of what her husband, Flight 93 passenger Tom Burnett, has been saying since at least 9:34 a.m. (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001) [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 110] It is unclear where in the chain of command details of these Flight 93 calls reach, and the 9/11 Commission has not clarified the issue of what the FBI knew and when. Entity Tags: Tom Burnett, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Deena Burnett, Greg Callahan Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:41 a.m.-10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Cleveland Controller Tracks Flight 93 Cleveland Center flight controller Bill Keaton is responsible for guiding high-altitude flights in the airspace where Flight 93 turned off its transponder (see (9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). After its transponder goes off, he follows Flight 93 on his radar scope as it travels across his sector, headed toward Washington, DC, and is instructed not to let any other aircraft come within 20 miles of it. Because its transponder is off, he cannot tell the plane’s altitude. He sees it disappear from his scope at the time it crashes. [USA TODAY, 8/11/2002; CLEVELAND FREE TIMES, 9/6/2006] Entity Tags: Bill Keaton Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

After 9:40 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Talks to Cleveland Flight Control about Hijacking, United 93 Not Mentioned After learning that Delta flight 1989 may have been hijacked from Boston flight control (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001), NEADS calls Cleveland flight control, which is handling the flight, to discuss this. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 14] Although Cleveland flight control has been aware that United 93 has been hijacked since before 9:30, it apparently fails to mention this to NEADS. According to the 9/11 Commission, the NMCC is not notified of United 93’s hijacking until 10:03 (see 10:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(Shortly After 9:41 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS Tries Unsuccessfully to Get Minnesota Jets Scrambled after Delta 1989

An F-16C Fighting Falcon of the 148th Fighter Wing. [Source: Brett R. Ewald / US Air Force] NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) tries to get fighter jets from a military unit in Duluth, Minnesota, sent after Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, but the unit is unable to respond. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/22/2004 ] NEADS has been contacted by the FAA’s Boston Center and incorrectly told that Delta 1989 is a possible hijacking (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). The aircraft is just south of Toledo, Ohio, and Colonel Robert Marr and Major Kevin Nasypany order the troops at NEADS to call Air National Guard bases in that area to see if any of them can launch fighters. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] NEADS Calls Duluth - The staff attempts to get a unit in Duluth to send jets toward the Delta flight. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/22/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/23/2004 ] Presumably the unit they call is the 148th Fighter Wing of the Minnesota Air National Guard, which is located at the Duluth International Airport and flies the F-16 Fighting Falcon. [GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 8/21/2005] Unlike Otis Air National Guard Base and Langley Air Force Base, the 148th FW at Duluth is not one of NORAD’s seven “alert” sites around the US. However, its mission does include “air superiority and air defense functions.” [AIRMAN, 12/1999; US AIR FORCE, 2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 17] Duluth Has 'Nobody Available' - The Duluth unit is unable to respond to NEADS’s request for help. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/22/2004 ] The reason for this is unclear. At 9:46 a.m., a member of staff on the NEADS operations floor will report that “Duluth has night flying, so there’s nobody available.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001; DONALDSON AND JOHNSON, 6/2008, PP. 47 ] Marr will subsequently instruct NEADS personnel to contact every Air National Guard unit in the Northeast US with instructions to get their fighters airborne (see (Between 9:50 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). NEADS will also order Air National Guard jets from Selfridge and Toledo to intercept Delta 1989 (see (9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 10:01 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178-180] Entity Tags: 148th Fighter Wing, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Kevin Nasypany, Robert Marr Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:42 a.m. September 11, 2001: Passenger Mark Bingham Tells of Bomb Threat on Flight 93

Mark Bingham. [Source: Family photo] From Flight 93, Mark Bingham calls his mother and says, “I’m on a flight from Newark to San Francisco and there are three guys who have taken over the plane and they say they have a bomb.” [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001] In an alternate version, he says, “I’m in the air, I’m calling you on the Airfone. I’m calling you from the plane. We’ve been taken over. There are three men that say they have a bomb.” [TORONTO SUN, 9/16/2001; BOSTON GLOBE, 11/23/2001] Entity Tags: Mark Bingham Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Key Day of 9/11 Events, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(9:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Delta Air Lines Tells Flight 1989 to Land at Cleveland Airport, but FAA Not Informed

The Delta Air Lines operations control center in Atlanta, Georgia. [Source: Public domain] Delta Air Lines instructs one of its aircraft, Flight 1989, to land at Cleveland Hopkins Airport, but the FAA’s Cleveland Center, which is handling the aircraft, is not notified of this. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/15/2002] Pilots Instructed to Land - The pilots of Delta 1989 receive an ACARS text message from their airline’s dispatch office in Atlanta, Georgia, instructing them to “Land immediately in Cleveland.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 167] According to USA Today, “Since early reports that a bomb, then hijackers, might be aboard” Delta 1989, Delta Air Lines’ headquarters in Atlanta has been tracking the flight, and receiving reports on it every five minutes. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] The plane’s pilot, Captain Paul Werner, quickly types a response to the message, “ok.” But, a couple of minutes later, he receives another ACARS message from the airline. It says: “Confirm landing in Cleveland. Use correct phraseology.” Werner and First Officer David Dunlap are puzzled. According to author Lynn Spencer: “There’s such a thing as correct phraseology on the radio, but there is no such thing when typing back and forth with dispatch on ACARS. Those messages are usually casual.” Werner carefully types a response: “Roger. Affirmative. Delta 1989 is diverting to Cleveland.” He calls the Cleveland Center at 9:44 a.m. and requests a diversion to Cleveland Airport. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 167-168; USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] Cleveland Center Not Informed - About 15 minutes earlier, Cleveland Center heard the sounds from Flight 93 as it was being hijacked, but initially thought these came from Delta 1989, and mistakenly believed the Delta flight was being taken over (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] But the Delta pilots’ normal responses to radio transmissions soon led air traffic controller John Werth, who is handling Delta 1989, to conclude that this aircraft was fine. [USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] However, controllers at the Cleveland Center are unaware that Delta Air Lines has instructed Flight 1989 to land, and so Werner’s request for a change of course will make them suspicious of it again (see (Shortly After 9:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Entity Tags: David Dunlap, Delta Airlines, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Paul Werner Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:42 a.m. September 11, 2001: FBI Arrives at the Pentagon; Assumes Responsibility for Investigation
Logo of the FBI’s National Capital Response Squad. [Source: FBI] Within five minutes of the Pentagon being hit, the first group from the FBI’s National Capital Response Squad arrives there. Due to this being a terrorist attack, the Pentagon and its grounds are immediately declared a federal crime scene. Under the terms of a 1995 presidential directive, this makes them the exclusive responsibility of the FBI. The FBI immediately begins collecting evidence and is also responsible for recovering bodies. Its agents are able to confiscate security videos from a nearby gas station within minutes of the crash (see (After 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). More than 700 FBI agents, assisted by hundreds of individuals from other organizations, will participate in the recovery operation. [US PRESIDENT, 6/21/1995; WASHINGTON TIMES, 9/12/2001; US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. A-7, A-23, C-1, C-54] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Pentagon Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, FBI 9/11 Investigation, Pentagon

9:43 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Passenger Todd Beamer Reaches Phone Operator

Lisa Jefferson. [Source: Lisa Jefferson] Flight 93 passenger Todd Beamer reaches a GTE operator using one of the plane’s seatback phones. He had tried using his credit card on the phone, but been unable to get authorization, so his call is routed to a customer service center in the Chicago area. [NEWSWEEK, 9/22/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 198-199; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 11 ] Beamer initially reaches operator Phyllis Johnson, who calls customer service supervisor Lisa Jefferson over and informs her of the call. As Jefferson later recalls, “I asked [Johnson] information that I needed to report to our surveillance center. And by the time I came back, she appeared to be traumatized, and that’s when I told her I would take the call over… She was just dazed.” Having immediately contacted the FBI, airline security, and GTE operations personnel, Jefferson gets on the line and speaks to Beamer for the next 13 minutes (see 9:45 a.m.-9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001). [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/22/2001; ORLANDO SENTINEL, 9/5/2002; BELIEFNET (.COM), 2006] She later informs Beamer’s wife Lisa, “[I]t was a miracle that Todd’s call hadn’t been disconnected. Because of the enormous number of calls that day, the GTE systems overloaded and lines were being disconnected all around her… She kept thinking, This call is going to get dropped! Yet Todd stayed connected… all the way to the end.” [BEAMER AND ABRAHAM, 2002, PP. 217] According to journalist and author Jere Longman, “GTE-Verizon [does] not routinely tape its telephone calls. As a supervisor, [Jefferson] would have been the one to monitor the taping, but she did not want to risk losing the call.” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 199] Yet an early article in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette will claim that, “because it was to an operator,” Beamer’s call “was tape-recorded.” [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/19/2001] Lisa Beamer will only be informed of her husband’s call from Flight 93 three days later, and be read a summary of it written by Jefferson (see September 14, 2001). [NEWSWEEK, 12/3/2001] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Phyllis Johnson, Lisa Jefferson, Todd Beamer Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

9:43 a.m.-9:53 a.m. September 11, 2001: Associated Press First to Report a Plane Hit the Pentagon; CNN Still Unsure What Happened for Ten More Minutes An Associated Press news alert at 9:43 a.m. states, “An aircraft has crashed into the Pentagon, witnesses say.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2001 ; BROADCASTING AND CABLE, 8/26/2002] This is apparently the first news of the crash. Initial television reports stated there had been an explosion at the Pentagon, but not that a plane caused it (see 9:39 a.m.-9:44 a.m. September 11, 2001). Minutes later, there is still uncertainty over what caused the explosion. At 9:49, CNN’s Chris Plant reports from the Pentagon, “[I]nitial reports from witnesses indicate that there was in fact a helicopter circling the building, contrary to what the AP reported, according to the witnesses I’ve spoken to anyway, and that this helicopter disappeared behind the building, and that there was then an explosion” (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/11/2001] It is not until 9:53 that CNN confirms, “it was a plane that crashed into the Pentagon.” [CNN, 9/11/2001] Entity Tags: CNN, Associated Press Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

9:43 a.m. September 11, 2001: President Bush Reaches Sarasota Airport and Boards Air Force One

Bush boards Air Force One in Sarasota, Florida, waving to people below as if the day were like any other. [Source: Agence France-Presse] President Bush’s motorcade arrives at Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport, racing across the tarmac there and pulling up close to Air Force One. Bush ascends the stairs by the left wing onto the plane. [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 98-99; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 39] He pauses in the doorway to wave to photographers. The St. Petersburg Times will later note that this raises “further questions about security [on 9/11].” [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/4/2004] Meanwhile, 13 members of the press, and others such as congressmen Dan Miller (R) and Adam Putnam (R), hurry onto the plane through its rear entrance. [SARASOTA MAGAZINE, 9/19/2001; BBC, 9/1/2002] Secret Service agents with dogs hurriedly check people’s luggage. [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/8/2002] Even White House employees who are wearing special lapel pins identifying themselves as such have their belongings checked by the bomb-sniffing dogs. According to journalist and author Bill Sammon, the mood is “extraordinarily tense.” A military aide snaps: “We gotta hurry up and get out of here. Let’s go!” [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 99] Secret Service agents are yelling, “Move it, move it, move it!” [BBC, 9/1/2002] But White House chief of staff Andrew Card is reportedly “frustrated because so many guests [have] come on the plane and [are] delaying the takeoff.” [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/8/2002] Air Force One will not take off until about 9:56 (see (9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] Entity Tags: Adam Putnam, Andrew Card, George W. Bush, Secret Service, Dan Miller Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

9:43 a.m. September 11, 2001: National Airborne Operations Center Plane Launches from Andrews Air Force Base An E-4B National Airborne Operations Center plane, with the call signal “Venus 77,” is launched from Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington, in response to the Pentagon attack, and is initially directed toward Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha, Nebraska. Shortly after taking off, the plane’s pilot asks to change his destination to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, near Dayton, Ohio. He is cleared to do so and turns west. At 9:47, the pilot will ask to turn back east and hold south of Washington. The plane will settle into a holding pattern over Richmond, Virginia, possibly waiting there to receive a decision on where to fly the president. This incident, which is recorded on air traffic control tapes, will first come to light in 2009, in the book The Ground Truth by John Farmer, the senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission. According to Farmer, Venus 77 is the “mystery plane” seen over Washington around this time (see (9:41 a.m.-9:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FARMER, 2009, PP. 206-207, 372] However, journalist and author Dan Verton will write that an E-4B took off from “an airfield outside of the nation’s capital” slightly earlier on, apparently just before the time of the Pentagon attack (see (Shortly Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to Verton, it was due to participate in “a previously scheduled Defense Department exercise.” [VERTON, 2003, PP. 143-144] Whether that aircraft was Venus 77, described by Farmer, is unclear. Entity Tags: John Farmer Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001: President Bush Requests Protection for His Family

President Bush’s daughters Barbara and Jenna. [Source: ABC News] After boarding Air Force One, President Bush is concerned about the safety of his wife and daughters. [NEW YORKER, 9/25/2001] He heads directly to his private cabin near the front of the plane, and then his first act is to order his Secret Service agents to get additional protection for his twin daughters Barbara and Jenna, who are both at university, and his wife Laura, who is on Capitol Hill. By about 10:35, Bush will learn that all three have successfully been moved to safe locations. [WOODWARD, 2002, PP. 16; SAMMON, 2002, PP. 99-100 AND 108] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

9:44 a.m. September 11, 2001: NMCC Conference Thinks Flight 1989, Not Flight 93, Is Fourth Hijack NORAD briefs the NMCC teleconference on the possible hijacking of Delta Flight 1989. Four minutes later, a representative from the White House bunker containing Vice President Cheney asks if there are any indications of other hijacked planes. Captain Charles Leidig, temporarily in charge of the NMCC, mentions the Delta Flight and comments, “that would be the fourth possible hijack.” Flight 1989 is in the same general Ohio region as Flight 93, but NORAD doesn’t scramble fighters toward either plane at this time. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: National Military Command Center, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Charles Leidig, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:44 a.m.-9:51 a.m. September 11, 2001: Pittsburgh Airport Control Tower Evacuated due to Concerns over Approaching Flight 93 The air traffic control tower at Pittsburgh International Airport is evacuated, because of concerns that Flight 93, which is heading in the direction of the airport, could crash into it. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/23/2001; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002, PP. 11-13 ; LANCASTER NEW ERA, 11/3/2006] Cleveland Center Notifies Pittsburgh Tower - At 9:44 a.m., an air traffic controller at the FAA’s Cleveland Center calls the Pittsburgh Airport control tower and notifies it of the loss of radio contact with Flight 93, and the loss of a secondary radar return from that aircraft (see (9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The Cleveland Center controller also says Flight 93 has made an unanticipated turn (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and its flight path will take it close to Pittsburgh Airport, if not directly over it. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002, PP. 11-12 ] The controller at the Pittsburgh tower who answers the call, apparently Paul Delfine, begins tracking Flight 93’s primary target on radar, and calls over his operations supervisor, Mal Fuller. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; LANCASTER NEW ERA, 11/3/2006] Supervisor Orders Evacuation - Delfine points to a plane—which Fuller only later learns is Flight 93—on a radar scope. He tells Fuller it was hijacked over Cleveland, and controllers don’t know where it is heading. Fuller will later recall: “In two sweeps of the radar, I could tell it was going very fast. It was headed directly for the control tower.” Fuller is aware of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and, at 9:49, gives the order, “Evacuate the facility.” [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/23/2001; LANCASTER NEW ERA, 11/3/2006] By 9:51, the facility has been evacuated. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ] However, one controller refuses to leave his post and remains in the tower. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 193-194] Employees Do Not See Flight 93 Overhead - Some of the evacuated employees are so upset that they immediately head home. Others mill around in a parking lot. Fuller will later guess that Flight 93 passed directly overhead as he was heading outside, but he assumes it was too high for anyone to see it. He will recall: “We watched and watched and watched. We never saw anything.” [LANCASTER NEW ERA, 11/3/2006] Controllers Return to Facility - Minutes after evacuating, at 9:56 a small number of tower controllers will volunteer to return to their facility. Once back inside, they find that Flight 93’s track is no longer visible on their radar screens. At 10:05 a.m., tower personnel will contact the FAA’s Herndon Command Center to explain why they evacuated. They say they did so because there had been an aircraft, thought to be Flight 93, which appeared to be on a collision course with the tower, and this aircraft allegedly had a bomb on board. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002, PP. 12-13 ] Around the time the Pittsburgh Airport control tower evacuates, while Flight 93 is heading east, NEADS battle commander Colonel Robert Marr hears that the FAA’s Cleveland Center is being evacuated (see (Between 9:45 a.m. and 12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 73] Entity Tags: Paul Delfine, Pittsburgh International Airport, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Mal Fuller Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: White House Evacuated after Secret Service Learns of Plane en Route to Washington

Secret Service with automatic weapons directing people away from the White House. [Source: Associated Press] The White House is evacuated after the Secret Service receives what the Associated Press describes as a credible threat of a terrorist attack against it. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2001 ; CNN, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001] Minutes earlier, in the White House Situation Room, Secret Service Director Brian Stafford informed counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke that an aircraft was heading in their direction, and said he was going to order the evacuation of the White House (see (9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 7] The Secret Service learned of this aircraft by monitoring radar and over an open line with the FAA (the “hijack net”), which enable them to receive real time information about the hijacked aircraft. The Secret Service, which has been using an air surveillance system called Tigerwall for some time (see (September 2000 and after)), tracks both American 77 and United 93 as they approach Washington and assumes the White House is a target. Secret Service agent Barbara Riggs will later say, “The Secret Service prepared to defend the facility,” although the precise nature of the preparations is unclear. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/12/2001; MSNBC, 9/22/2001; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; PCCW NEWSLETTER, 3/2006] A slow and orderly evacuation of the White House had in fact begun earlier on (see (9:22 a.m.) September 11, 2001). But now the Secret Service orders people to run so as to evacuate faster. [CNN, 9/11/2001; ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: Barbara Riggs, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: DC Air National Guard Commander Wherley Calls Secret Service Operations Center, Wants Instructions for Fighters Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) at Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington, calls the Secret Service at the White House, seeking instructions from someone senior—preferably a military person—to launch his fighter jets, but the only people available are Secret Service agents. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 79; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 184-185] Wherley Calls Joint Operations Center - Wherley has just spoken over the phone with a Secret Service agent. After he asked to talk to “someone higher in the chain of command, preferably in the military,” the agent gave him a number at the White House to call (see (Shortly After 9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 184] Wherley now calls the Secret Service’s White House Joint Operations Center. He will later recall making this call “while watching TV footage of employees evacuating the White House complex.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 79; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/28/2003] This would mean he makes it at around 9:45 a.m., when people start running from the White House, or shortly after (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001] Delay before Call Answered - It takes some time before anyone answers the call. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 184] According to Wherley, “the phone rings about eight times before somebody picks up.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 79] The Secret Service agent that answers is Kenneth Beauchamp. Wherley knows Beauchamp from other routine work with the DC Air National Guard. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/28/2003] Beauchamp had spoken to DCANG officer Major Daniel Caine earlier on and told him the Secret Service did not require help from his unit (see (Between 9:05 a.m. and 9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/8/2004 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 124] Beauchamp Requests Fighters - But now Beauchamp asks Wherley to launch aircraft to protect Washington. He implores: “We want you to put a CAP [combat air patrol] up over the city. We need some fighters now.” However, Wherley is reportedly “not very comfortable taking orders from a Secret Service agent. That’s just not how things are done.” He wants to “speak to someone a little higher up the food chain,” and asks, “Is there anybody else there from the military available to talk?” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/28/2003; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 185] But, as Wherley will later comment, “[T]hey have nobody in uniform, it was all Secret Service people and a team communicating with the president.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 79] Wherley therefore decides he will accept orders from the Secret Service, and says to Beauchamp: “Okay, then. What exactly do they want me to do?” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 185] Wherley Wants Precise Instructions - Wherley wants specific instructions about setting up a CAP over Washington, and Secret Service agents at the White House will work hard to get these for him. He will wait until senior agent Becky Ediger comes on the line and gives him the information he needs (see (10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 79; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/28/2003; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 3/22/2004 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 218] Wherley will reportedly receive the instructions for his pilots “within a half-hour.” [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002] Entity Tags: Secret Service, Kenneth Beauchamp, District of Columbia Air National Guard, David Wherley Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:45 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Tells FAA’s Cleveland Center that Delta 1989 Is a Confirmed Hijack, Controller Disagrees The FAA’s Cleveland Center receives a call from NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), incorrectly notifying it that Delta Air Lines Flight 1989 is a confirmed hijacking. A supervisor then rushes around the center, informing all the controllers and managers of this. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/2/2003 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 10/2/2003 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2004] Cleveland Realized Delta 1989 Not Hijacked - At around 9:30 a.m., Cleveland Center air traffic controllers heard the sounds from Flight 93 as it was being hijacked, but initially thought these came from Delta 1989 (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Due to the Delta pilots’ normal responses to subsequent radio transmissions, John Werth—the controller monitoring both flights—concluded that the hijacked aircraft was in fact Flight 93. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/1/2003 ; USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] However, at around 9:39, the FAA’s Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might be hijacked and called NEADS to report the plane as a possible hijacking (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28] NEADS then begins alerting FAA centers of this. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] NEADS Calls Cleveland Center - Greg Dukeman, the military operations specialist in the traffic management unit at Cleveland Center, receives a call from a female member of staff at NEADS, one of its ID technicians. He passes the call on to supervisor Kim Wernica. The caller says Delta 1989 is “a confirmed hijack.” Wernica then goes “running back and forth” around the center, informing controllers and managers of what she has been told. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 10/2/2003 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 10/2/2003 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2004] Controller Disputes NEADS's Information - Wernica rushes up to John Werth and tells him, “It’s the Delta, it’s the Delta!” She says a military liaison on the phone has confirmed that the Delta jet has been hijacked. Werth responds that he is pretty sure that Flight 93, not Delta 1989, has been hijacked. When Wernica returns a few moments later, Werth tells her that Delta 1989 is “fine—at least for now.” Wernica consults again on the phone and then comes back, saying, “They said it’s a confirmed hijack and a bomb threat.” Werth thinks to himself that the bomb threats had come from Flight 93 (see (9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and is therefore convinced the caller must be confusing the two flights. He tells Wernica, “Tell them they’re full of it!” [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/1/2003 ; USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] Entity Tags: John Werth, Kim Wernica, Greg Dukeman, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Langley Pilot Instructed to Identify Unknown Aircraft and Survey Pentagon; Doesn’t Realize a Plane Hit It An F-16 launched from Langley Air Force Base is directed toward two unidentified aircraft and then asked to inspect and report on the damage to the Pentagon. Major Dean Eckmann, one of the three F-16 pilots who took off from Langley at 9:30 (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), is reportedly flying in the Washington area. He will later recall, “I set up a combat air patrol with air traffic controllers,” and then, at around 9:45, “they come back to me and say there are a couple [of] unknowns heading north on the Potomac River toward the White House.” He is flying above 20,000 feet but heads straight down and reaches his target in “no time,” he says. The unknowns turn out to be a military helicopter and a law enforcement helicopter apparently heading towards the Pentagon to assist there. Eckmann flies over the Capitol and Mall area, he recalls, “to clear the area and make sure nothing else was coming in.” Instructions to Inspect the Pentagon - Then Captain Craig Borgstrom, one of the other two Langley pilots, calls him and says that NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) wants to know the extent of the damage at the Pentagon. Eckmann flies over it and reports that the two outer rings have been damaged. NEADS wants to know if he can tell what has happened. He guesses it was “a big fuel tanker truck because of the amount of smoke and flames coming up and nobody indicated anything about an airplane. And there was no airplane wreckage off to the side.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 66] But he will give a different account to the 9/11 Commission, telling it: “I reverted to the Russian threat.… I’m thinking cruise missile threat from the sea. You know you look down and see the Pentagon burning and I thought the bastards snuck one by us.… [N]o one told us anything.” According to the Commission, the Langley pilots have not been briefed about why they were scrambled. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 45 AND 465] Eckmann will in fact say, “[W]e didn’t actually find out it was an airliner [that hit the Pentagon] until the next day.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/19/2002] Conflicting Times - Eckmann’s F-16 is presumably the first fighter to arrive over the Pentagon following the attack there. When precisely this occurs is unclear (see (Between 9:49 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, according to numerous witnesses on the ground, the first fighter does not fly over the Pentagon until significantly later than Eckmann describes, at around 10:40 a.m. (see (10:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 130-131] And according to some accounts, this is not Eckmann’s plane, but an F-16 from Andrews Air Force Base, piloted by Major Billy Hutchison. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 81-82; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 235-236] Entity Tags: Dean Eckmann, Craig Borgstrom Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Richard Clarke Initiates Continuity of Government Plan At some point after the White House is ordered to evacuate and while Air Force One is preparing to take off in Florida, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke activates the Continuity of Government (COG) plan. The coordinator for Continuity of Government has joined Clarke in the White House Situation Room. Clarke asks, “How do I activate COG?” Recalling this conversation, he will later comment, “In the exercises we had done, the person playing the president had always given that order.” But the coordinator replies, “You tell me to do it.” Soon after, Clarke instructs him, “Go.” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 8] First Time COG Plan Activated - The Continuity of Government plan, which dates back to the Reagan administration, had originally prepared to set up a new leadership for the US in the event of a nuclear war. This is apparently the first time it has ever been put into effect. Clarke will recall, “Every federal agency was ordered… to activate an alternative command post, an alternative headquarters outside of Washington, DC, and to staff it as soon as possible.” Cabinet officers are dispatched around the country, and people in Congress are taken to alternative locations. Clarke Regularly Particiated in COG Exercises - Since the 1980s, Clarke has in fact been a regular participant in secret COG exercises that rehearsed this plan (see (1984-2004)). [WASHINGTON POST, 4/7/2004; ABC NEWS, 4/25/2004] Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also participated (see 1981-1992). [ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 3/2004] Kenneth Duberstein, formerly President Reagan’s White House chief of staff, who took part in the exercises as well, will recall: “I said to myself, as we proceeded through the day [of 9/11], ‘It’s working.’ All those days of patriotic duty were coming back and they were working.” According to ABC News, “If executive branch leaders and large numbers of congressmen had been killed in an attack on the United States, the plan could have gone further, officials suggest, perhaps even with non-elected leaders of the United States taking control and declaring martial law.” [ABC NEWS, 4/25/2004] Entity Tags: Continuity of Government, Richard A. Clarke, Kenneth Duberstein Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, Civil Liberties Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke

(Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Clarke Informed that President Has Issued Shootdown Order, Earlier than Claimed by 9/11 Commission According to his own account, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke is informed that President Bush has authorized the military to shoot down threatening aircraft. Clarke had requested that this authorization be given at around 9:36 (see (Between 9:30 a.m. and 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). In his 2004 book Against all Enemies he will state that he receives a response shortly after the time people begin rapidly evacuating from the White House, and while Air Force One is getting ready to take off. This would therefore be sometime between 9:45 and 9:56. He gets a phone call from the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House, where Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice are located. On the other end is Army Major Mike Fenzel. Fenzel tells Clarke: “Air Force One is getting ready to take off, with some press still on board. He’ll divert to an air base. Fighter escort is authorized. And… tell the Pentagon they have authority from the president to shoot down hostile aircraft, repeat, they have authority to shoot down hostile aircraft.” Clarke replies, “Roger that.” In his recollection of this call, Clarke comments, “I was amazed at the speed of the decisions coming from Cheney and, through him, from Bush.” Clarke then gets the attention of those on the video conference screen for the Pentagon, and informs them, “the president has ordered the use of force against aircraft deemed to be hostile.” [CNN, 9/12/2001; CLARKE, 2004, PP. 7-8] This description contradicts several other accounts of when the president gives the shootdown authorization. In late 2003, Clarke tells ABC News he gets the go-ahead from the vice president “within two minutes” after he requested shootdown authorization, meaning therefore around 9:37-9:38 (see (9:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ABC NEWS, 11/29/2003] Some accounts say that Bush gives the authorization later, at shortly after 9:56 (see (Shortly After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 102; WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] According to the 9/11 Commission, it is not given until around 10:18 (see 10:18 a.m.-10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 41] Entity Tags: Mike Fenzel, Richard A. Clarke Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, George Bush, Dick Cheney, Richard Clarke

(9:45 a.m.-9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Vice President Cheney Tells President Bush to Stay Away from Washington Shortly after boarding Air Force One, President Bush speaks by phone with Vice President Dick Cheney for approximately ten minutes. [HAYES, 2007, PP. 335-336] According to the 9/11 Commission, Cheney had reached the underground tunnel leading to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House at 9:37. He and the Secret Service agents escorting him had paused in an area of the tunnel with a secure phone and a television. He’d then asked to speak to the president, but it had taken a while for his call to be connected. However, elsewhere in its final report, the Commission will indicate that Bush, not Cheney, makes this phone call, saying that after he’d boarded Air Force One, the president “called the vice president.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 39-40] Cheney later recalls making “one phone call [to the president] from the tunnel. And basically I called to let him know that we [at the White House] were a target and I strongly urged him not to return to Washington right away, that he delay his return until we could find out what the hell was going on.” [NEWSWEEK, 12/31/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 464] He recalls, “What I was immediately thinking about was sort of continuity of government.” [HAYES, 2007, PP. 335-336] According to notes made by White House press secretary Ari Fleischer, who is with the president on Air Force One, at about 9:45 Bush tells Cheney: “Sounds like we have a minor war going on here, I heard about the Pentagon. We’re at war… somebody’s going to pay.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 39 AND 463; FLEISCHER, 2005, PP. 141] Bush instructs Cheney to call the congressional leadership and give them a briefing. [NEW YORKER, 9/25/2001] (However, around this time, Capitol Hill is being evacuated (see 9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001).) The 9/11 Commission states that, according to “contemporaneous notes,” at 9:55 “the vice president [is] still on the phone with the president advising that three planes [are] missing and one had hit the Pentagon.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 40] In his book Against All Enemies, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke indicates that it is around the time this call occurs that he is informed that the president has authorized the military to shoot down hostile aircraft (see (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 8] Yet various accounts of Bush and Cheney’s call make no mention of the president and vice president discussing any orders or making any decisions. [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 101; WOODWARD, 2002, PP. 16; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 39-40; HAYES, 2007, PP. 335-336] Their call apparently ends around 9:56-9:57, as, according to the 9/11 Commission, Cheney enters the PEOC “shortly before 10:00, perhaps at 9:58.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 40] (However, some accounts indicate that he first enters the PEOC significantly earlier than this (see (9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001).) After hanging up, Bush turns to the men who are with him at his desk: his chief of staff Andrew Card, his senior adviser Karl Rove, military aide Lt. Col. Tom Gould, and Fleischer. He tells them: “That’s what we’re paid for, boys. We’re gonna take care of this. When we find out who did this, they’re not gonna like me as president. Somebody’s going to pay.” [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 101; WOODWARD, 2002, PP. 17] According to some accounts, shortly after finishing this call, the president and vice president will be back on the phone with each other (see (Shortly After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (Between 10:00 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush, Dick Cheney

(9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Orders Its Flights to Land United Airlines orders all its flights to land at the nearest airport. Andy Studdert, the airline’s chief operating officer, will tell the 9/11 Commission, “At approximately 9:45 I order the entire United fleet grounded, for the first time in United history.” He will add, “Even before this, some individual dispatchers were already grounding their flights.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] Studdert gives the instruction, “Tell them to get to the nearest airport they can.” [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] The FAA gives out a similar order to all its facilities around this time (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 29] American Airlines ordered its aircraft to land earlier on, at around 9:15 (see (9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31 ] United Airlines has already ordered a ground stop, preventing any new takeoffs of its aircraft (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 10] Entity Tags: Andy Studdert, United Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:45 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Hijackers Want ‘Pilot’ Brought Back Into Cockpit According to the later-recovered Flight 93 cockpit voice recording, around this time one hijacker in the cockpit says to another, “Let the guys in now.” A hijacker says, “Should we let the guys in?” and another says, “Inform them, and tell him to talk to the pilot. Bring the pilot back.” It’s not clear if this is a reference to an original pilot or a hijacker pilot. According to one description of passenger Todd Beamer’s call from the plane, a flight attendant can be overheard in the background saying that two men lying on the floor in first class are the plane’s captain and co-pilot, indicating that they are already dead (see 9:45 a.m.-9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001). But it is not possible to determine the fate of the two pilots from the cockpit voice recording, and investigators will be unsure as to whether they were killed or allowed to live. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 199 AND 208-209; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 4/12/2006] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:45 a.m.-10:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Witnesses First Notice Military Jets over New York, Later than Claimed in 9/11 Commission’s Account According to the accounts of numerous witnesses on the ground near the World Trade Center, military fighter jets are first noticed flying over Manhattan either shortly before or soon after the second collapse, at 10:28 a.m. Some witnesses recall fighters arriving just before this collapse: Emergency medical technicians Dulce McCorvey and Michael D’Angelo hear fighters flying over Manhattan at unspecified times after the first tower’s collapse. [CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/3/2001; CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/24/2001] Fire Lieutenant Sean O’Malley and firefighters Pete Giudetti and Dan Potter notice jet fighters flying overhead soon before the second collapse. [CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/12/2001; CITY OF NEW YORK, 12/6/2001; SMITH, 2002, PP. 49-50] Other witnesses say the fighters arrive soon after this collapse: Deputy Fire Chief Robert Browne, police officer Peter Moog, and emergency medical technicians Richard Zarrillo and Jason Katz notice fighters overhead immediately after, or fairly soon after, the second tower’s collapse. [CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/24/2001; CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/25/2001; CITY OF NEW YORK, 12/20/2001; FINK AND MATHIAS, 2002, PP. 79-80] Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik, and Office of Emergency Management Director Richard Sheirer are heading north together after leaving their temporary command post on Barclay Street (see (9:50 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). In some accounts, all three of them recollect hearing the first military jets overhead soon after the second tower’s collapse. [KERIK, 2001, PP. 339-340; GIULIANI, 2002, PP. 14; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/18/2004 ] However, according to another account, Giuliani hears the first jet slightly earlier, at around 10:20 a.m. And, in his private testimony before the 9/11 Commission, Kerik claims to have heard a fighter jet coming when he was heading to the temporary command post on Barclay Street, i.e. shortly before 9:50 a.m. [BARRETT AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 348-349] A few witnesses claim the fighters arrive earlier on, before the first collapse at 9:59 a.m.: Emergency medical technician Frank Puma and Port Authority Freedom of Information Administrator Cathy Pavelec say they see fighter jets overhead at unspecified times before the first collapse. [CITY OF NEW YORK, 12/12/2001; FINK AND MATHIAS, 2002, PP. 68] The fighter(s) are presumably the F-15s launched from Otis Air Force Base at 8:46 a.m. (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). However, the 9/11 Commission will claim that these arrived over Manhattan at 9:25 a.m. (see 9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001), which is significantly earlier than most of the witnesses on the ground recall. Entity Tags: Dulce McCorvey, Jason Katz, Frank Puma, Dan Potter, Sean O’Malley, Pete Giudetti, Peter Moog, Rudolph (“Rudy”) Giuliani, Robert Browne, Richard Sheirer, Michael D’Angelo, Cathy Pavelec, Richard Zarrillo, Bernard Kerik Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

9:45 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Headquarters Learns Flight 77 Has Crashed into the Pentagon United Airlines headquarters receives a report that an aircraft has crashed into the Pentagon. They learn it is Flight 77. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] Entity Tags: United Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: On Orders of Secret Service, Condleezza Rice Heads to White House Bunker National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice heads down to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC), the bunker below the White House. [FELIX, 2002, PP. 227] According to her own later recollections, Rice was in the White House Situation Room when the Pentagon was hit at 9:37 a.m., and had subsequently looked up and seen the television footage of the burning building. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 464; BUMILLER, 2007, PP. XIII] She will recall: “[T]he picture had just come up on television of the plane lodged in the side of the Pentagon. And no one had told me. I literally turned and looked at the picture and saw it.” She describes: “And then there were incoming reports that there had been a car bomb at the State Department, that there was a large fire on the Mall near the Washington Monument, and [I was] just trying to sort through the information when a Secret Service agent came and said: ‘You have to go to the bunker. The vice president is already there. There may be planes heading for the White House.’” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Rice phones President Bush and warns him not to return to Washington, either before she leaves the Situation Room or while on her way to the PEOC (see (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FELIX, 2002, PP. 227; PBS FRONTLINE, 7/12/2002] However, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke will contradict Rice’s account, indicating that she headed to the PEOC significantly earlier, roughly around 9:15 a.m. (see (9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 3-4] Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:45 a.m. September 11, 2001: Tom Burnett Makes Third Call; Says Flight 93 Passengers Are Making Plans to Defeat Hijackers Flight 93 passenger Tom Burnett calls his wife Deena Burnett for the third time. She is able to determine that he is using his cell phone, as the caller identification shows his number. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001 ] She had just seen the television reports about the Pentagon being hit, and mistakenly thought Tom’s plane had crashed into it. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 111] She asks, “Tom, you’re okay?” but he replies, “No, I’m not.” Deena tells him, “They just hit the Pentagon.” She hears him repeating this information to people around him. She continues: “They think five airplanes have been hijacked. One is still on the ground. They believe all of them are commercial planes. I haven’t heard them say which airline, but all of them have originated on the East Coast.” She doesn’t know who is involved in the attacks. [SACRAMENTO BEE, 9/11/2002; BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 65-66] The hijackers had earlier told the passengers there was a bomb on Flight 93 (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001 ; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 107] But now Tom appears to doubt this. He asks Deena, “What is the probability of them having a bomb on board?” He then answers himself: “I don’t think they have one. I think they’re just telling us that for crowd control.” Based on her experience as a former flight attendant, Deena says, “A plane can survive a bomb if it’s in the right place.” Tom continues: “[The hijackers are] talking about crashing this plane into the ground. We have to do something. I’m putting a plan together.” He says “several people” are helping him. “There’s a group of us.” Deena is surprised, but reassured, at her husband’s calmness. She will recall that it is as if he were at work, “sitting at his desk, and we were having a regular conversation.” He tells her he will call back, and then hangs up. A policeman then arrives at Deena Burnett’s house, no doubt in response to her earlier 911 call (see 9:31 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001), and follows her inside. [SACRAMENTO BEE, 9/11/2002; BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 66] Entity Tags: Tom Burnett, Deena Burnett Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

9:45 a.m.-9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001: American Airlines Briefly Loses Contact with Third Plane, Thinks It Is Hijacked American Airlines employees are panicked when they lose contact with a third of their aircraft, and mistakenly think this flight has been hijacked. At 9:45 a.m., the airline loses radio contact with the plane, which is flying from Boston to Seattle. Personnel at the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center in Fort Worth, Texas, are convinced it is a third hijacking, following American Airlines Flights 11 and 77. But, according to the Wall Street Journal, the loss of communication is due to a “radio glitch,” and everyone calms down when contact with the aircraft is restored after 10 minutes. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001] Entity Tags: American Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Shortly After 9:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Change of Course and Pilot’s Failure to Respond to Message Lead Cleveland Center to Again Suspect Delta 1989 Is Hijacked Having earlier concluded that it was not hijacked, air traffic controllers at the FAA’s Cleveland Center again become suspicious of Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, after its pilot requests a change of course and then fails to respond to a message. Pilot Requests Diversion - Cleveland Center controllers initially thought the sounds from Flight 93 as it was being hijacked had come from Delta 1989, but soon decided they had come from Flight 93 (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] However, without notifying the Cleveland Center, Delta Air Lines has just instructed Delta 1989 to land at Cleveland Hopkins Airport (see (9:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001). After the plane’s pilot, Captain Paul Werner, calls the Cleveland Center at 9:44 a.m., requesting an immediate diversion, controllers there become suspicious. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 167-168; USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] Supervisor Reports Concerns over Teleconference - USA Today will later describe: “The Delta flight wants to land in Cleveland? And the captain’s request comes before he can know that the FAA wants every flight down. On this day, the fact that the pilot requests to be rerouted before he is ordered to land seems suspicious. Why the urgency? Controllers don’t know that Delta officials, also concerned about the flight, have ordered Werner to land in Cleveland.” After Delta 1989 makes an abrupt 30-degree turn back toward Cleveland Airport, a supervisor at the Cleveland Center announces the apparently suspicious development on an FAA teleconference. Coded Message Confirms No Hijacking - As Delta 1989 begins its descent toward Cleveland, a Cleveland Center controller radios Werner with a coded message to check whether his plane has been hijacked. The controller says, “Delta 1989, I hear you’re ‘late’ today.” (The controller is using the code word for a hijack, which has been replaced with the word ‘late’ in subsequent accounts of this incident, for security reasons. Pilots can use this code word to alert controllers to their situation if they are unable to do so openly because hijackers are in the cockpit.) Werner reassures the controller that all is okay, saying: “Negative. Delta 1989 is not a ‘late.’” Lack of Response Causes More Suspicion - Then, as the plane descends, it receives another message from the Cleveland Center. But Werner, who is busy, fails to respond to it. This arouses further suspicion. According to USA Today: “On the ground, controllers in Cleveland Center grow alarmed. Why didn’t he respond? Have both jets—the United [Flight 93] and the Delta flights—been hijacked?” [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 168-169] Entity Tags: Paul Werner, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Condoleezza Rice Calls President Bush, Tells Him Not to Return to Washington National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice speaks with President Bush, and warns him against returning to Washington. [BBC RADIO 4, 8/1/2002 ] At around 9:45 a.m., Rice is in the White House Situation Room, and a Secret Service agent orders her to go to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to some accounts, Rice calls Bush before she leaves the Situation Room. [FELIX, 2002, PP. 227; O, THE OPRAH MAGAZINE, 2/1/2002] In other accounts, she makes the call during a stop on the way to the PEOC. [PBS FRONTLINE, 7/12/2002] Rice speaks only briefly with Bush. [CBS NEWS, 9/10/2003] She says: “Mr. President, here’s what’s going on. The Pentagon has been hit.” He tells her, “I’m getting ready to come back [to Washington].” But Rice says: “Sir, you can’t come back here. Washington’s under attack.” After the call ends, she goes on to the PEOC. Rice will refer to this call as the “second time” she speaks with the president this morning. She initially called him after hearing of the first plane hitting the World Trade Center (see (9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] But, according to some accounts, she spoke to the president a second time between about 9:16 and 9:29, while he was still at the Booker Elementary School (see (9:16 a.m.-9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001), which would make this the third call. [DAILY MAIL, 9/8/2002; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/8/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 39] Rice will say that, when she makes this call, the president is “now at the airport” in Sarasota, Florida, after having left the school. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

9:45 a.m.-9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001: Passenger Todd Beamer Describes Situation on Flight 93, Though Accounts Are Contradictory

Todd Beamer. [Source: Family photo] After having trouble getting authorization on an Airfone to call his family (see 9:43 a.m. September 11, 2001), Flight 93 passenger Todd Beamer is able to speak to GTE customer service supervisor Lisa Jefferson. Jefferson, who quickly alerts the FBI about Beamer’s call, talks to him for 13 minutes. According to a report in the London Observer, she has the FBI simultaneously on another line, offering guidance. She immediately asks Beamer for details of the flight, like “What is your flight number? What is the situation? Where are the crew members?” With the help of a flight attendant sitting next to him, Beamer details the numbers of passengers and crew on the plane. He says the hijackers have divided the passengers into two groups, with ten of them in first class at the front of the plane, and 27 in the back. (Jefferson’s written summary of the conversation will say that the larger number of passengers was in the front. However, Beamer’s wife later says that Jefferson informed her it was in fact the other way around.) According to some reports, Beamer says three people have hijacked the plane. Two of them, armed with knives, are in the cockpit and have locked the door; the third is in first class with what appears to be a bomb strapped around his waist. A curtain has been closed separating first class from the coach section of the plane. Other accounts claim the hijacker with the bomb is in fact in the rear of the plane. According to one report in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Beamer describes four hijackers in total: the two in the cockpit, the one with the bomb guarding the passengers in the back of the plane, and a fourth in first class. But the Orlando Sentinel says Beamer tells Jefferson he is free to talk because the hijacker in first class has closed the curtain, indicating there is no hijacker at the back of the plane. (Beamer himself is at the back of plane, calling from a phone in row 32.) According to an early article in Newsweek, he says that one passenger is dead and he doesn’t know about the pilots. However, journalist and author Jere Longman later writes that Beamer describes to Jefferson two people on the floor in fist class, possibly dead. The flight attendant next to him can be overheard saying these are the plane’s captain and co-pilot. The attendant does not mention their names or say they are wearing uniforms, but she sounds certain. Beamer then repeats what the attendant has told him. At some point in the call, Beamer asks, “Do you know what [the hijackers] want? Money or ransom or what?” He seems unaware of the other hijackings that have occurred. Jefferson informs him of the two planes crashing in New York. [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 9/16/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/19/2001; NEWSWEEK, 9/22/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/22/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; OBSERVER, 12/2/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 198-200; ORLANDO SENTINEL, 9/5/2002; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 11 ] Beamer says of the hijackers, “It doesn’t seem like they know how to fly the plane.” [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 9/17/2001] He also tells Jefferson about himself, including where he is from, that he has two sons, and that his wife is expecting a third child in January. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/22/2001] He tells her, “I just want to talk to somebody and just let someone know that this is happening.” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 204] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Lisa Jefferson, Todd Beamer Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Senior FAA Manager, on His First Day on the Job, Orders All Planes Out of the Sky Nationwide

FAA National Operations Manager Ben Sliney. [Source: Publicity photo] Ben Sliney, FAA’s National Operations Manager, orders the entire nationwide air traffic system shut down. All flights at US airports are stopped. Around 3,950 flights are still in the air. Sliney makes the decision without consulting FAA head Jane Garvey, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta, or other bosses, but they quickly approve his actions. It’s Sliney’s first day on the job. [CNN, 9/12/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/12/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; MSNBC, 9/22/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/12/2002; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; NEWSDAY, 9/10/2002] Seventy-five percent of the planes land within one hour of the order. [USA TODAY, 8/12/2002] The 9/11 Commission will later remark that this “was an unprecedented order” that the “air traffic control system handled… with great skill.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 29] The Washington Post has reported that Mineta told Monte Belger at the FAA: “Monte, bring all the planes down,” even adding, “[Expletive] pilot discretion.” [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] However, it is later reported by a different Post reporter that Mineta did not even know of the order until 15 minutes later. This reporter “says FAA officials had begged him to maintain the fiction.” [SLATE, 4/2/2002] Entity Tags: Ben Sliney, Federal Aviation Administration, Jane Garvey, Monte Belger, Norman Mineta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Key Day of 9/11 Events

(9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Bush Aides Debate Where to Fly Air Force One According to the 9/11 Commission, Chief of Staff Andrew Card, the lead Secret Service agent, the president’s military aide, and Air Force One pilot Colonel Mark Tillman, confer on a possible destination for Air Force One around this time. According to witnesses, some support President Bush’s desire to return to Washington, but the others advise against it. The issue is still not decided when Air Force One takes off around 9:55 a.m. (see (9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Mark Tillman, Secret Service, Andrew Card Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

(Between 09:45 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Construction Trailer Is Source of Smoke, Small Explosions According to a fireman’s account, firefighting efforts at the Pentagon are hampered by smoke and small explosions coming out of a construction trailer near the impact site. On the morning of 9/11, Russell “Rusty” Dodge, Jr., an assistant chief with the Fort Belvoir Fire Department, is at Fort Meyer, about a mile from the Pentagon, for a training exercise (see Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). He is one of the first to arrive on the scene. He tries to put out the fires, but a construction trailer is a serious obstacle. He will later recall, “[T]hat trailer was the main producer of smoke on the outside of the building….” The trailer “was producing some severe fires and subsequent mini explosions due to highly flammable chemicals in it…. Luckily the chemical containers were caged. Otherwise the fires would have been worse.” [MDW NEWS SERVICE, 10/4/2001] Entity Tags: Russell “Rusty” Dodge, Jr., Pentagon, Fort Belvoir Fire Department Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(Between 9:45 a.m. and 12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA’s Cleveland Center Evacuated; Timing Unclear While flight controllers are working to clear the skies of all aircraft, they notice a small plane flying erratically above the FAA’s Cleveland Center. Consequently, the center is evacuated, with people withdrawing to its parking lot. According to Rick Kettell, the Cleveland air traffic manager, the errant plane is never identified. He says it “flew off to the north, and we lost radar on it.” Eleven months later, the FAA will reportedly still be investigating what the plane was and what it was doing. There are contradictory accounts of when the evacuation occurs. NEADS Commander Robert Marr reportedly is informed of it while Flight 93 is still airborne (see 9:44 a.m.-9:51 a.m. September 11, 2001). Cleveland flight controller Stacey Taylor will later recall, “They’re evacuating the Center,” at a time when Flight 93 is still airborne. However, she and another Cleveland controller say they see Flight 93 disappear from their radar scopes when it crashes, suggesting that the center is not fully evacuated, or is only fully evacuated later on. Rick Kettell claims the evacuation occurs after most planes have already been landed from the region’s skies, which would be later in the morning. [NEWSNET5, 8/12/2002; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 73; CLEVELAND FREE TIMES, 9/6/2006] Entity Tags: Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(Shortly After 9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Langley Pilots Start Receiving Confused Radio Communications
The three pilots launched from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia start receiving confusing communications over their radios. Apparently, shortly after one of them first sees the Pentagon on fire (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001), the pilots’ radio frequencies become cluttered with orders and chatter. One of them will later describe: “It was like getting 10 hours of conversation in about 10 minutes. No one knew what was going on.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/15/2001] Journalist and author Jere Longman will refer to the pilots receiving a “jumble of radio communications.” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 76] According to one of the pilots, Craig Borgstrom, he and the two others are on different frequencies but share a common intra-flight channel, and are “hearing a lot of chatter but nothing about airliners crashing into buildings.” He will later recall: “There was some confusion for us, this was very abnormal. We were all three on different frequencies… and were getting orders from a lot of different people.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 66] Entity Tags: Craig Borgstrom Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: NMCC Teleconference Still Looking to Include Rumsfeld and Myers Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s office, and acting Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Myers’ office, report to the NMCC teleconference that they are still trying to track down Rumsfeld and Myers, respectively, and bring them into the conference. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Rumsfeld is apparently outside the Pentagon looking at the Flight 77 crash site (see Between 9:38 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001), though counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke suggests Rumsfeld is elsewhere in the Pentagon for much of the time (see (Between 9:38 a.m. and 9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Myers’ whereabouts in the period after the Pentagon crash have not been fully explained (see (Between 9:55 a.m. and 10:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Rumsfeld and Myers do not enter the NMCC until about 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: National Military Command Center, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard B. Myers Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Donald Rumsfeld, Pentagon

9:47 a.m. September 11, 2001: Internal Collapse at WTC South Tower Reported A man who is on the 105th floor of the South Tower calls emergency 9-1-1 to report that floors below his location, “in the 90-something floor,” have collapsed. The 9-1-1 operator types a record of this call into the Special Police Radio Inquiry Network (SPRINT) data link, which will be passed on to the New York fire department’s Emergency Medical Service (EMS). It isn’t known when the call is made exactly, but the EMS Dispatch computer apparently receives the call record at this time. However, because it is classified as a “supplement message,” it is not yet read by anyone. The police dispatcher dealing with the area around the WTC also receives the call record, but misinterprets it as meaning that the floor the person is on has collapsed. EMS dispatchers are dealing with an enormous volume of calls as well as performing many other tasks under extreme pressure during the crisis, so a report later concludes that the EMS operators didn’t have the time to review the information before the collapse of the South Tower at 9:59 (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001), and the fire chiefs never received the information. [NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT, 8/19/2002] Entity Tags: World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center

(9:47 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Passenger Jeremy Glick Tells of Vote to Take Over Flight 93 On Flight 93, Jeremy Glick is still on the phone with his wife, Lyz. He tells her that the passengers are taking a vote if they should try to take over the plane or not. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001] He later says that all the men on the plane have voted to attack the hijackers. [TORONTO SUN, 9/16/2001] When asked about weapons, he says they don’t have guns, just knives. This appears to contradict an earlier mention of guns. His wife gets the impression from him that the hijacker standing nearby, claiming to hold the bomb, would be easy to overwhelm. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 153-154] Entity Tags: Jeremy Glick, Lyz Glick Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001: Capitol Building Evacuated due to Reports of Approaching Plane, but Evacuation Is Chaotic

Senator John Kerry looks up to the sky as he and others flee. [Source: CBC] The Capitol building in Washington, DC is evacuated. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002] It is the first time in US history this has ever happened. [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 9/12/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/12/2001] Both the Senate and the House are in session at the time. [CNN, 8/17/2002] Capitol Police officers go through the building and order people to leave at once. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/11/2002] Reports of Plane Approaching the Capitol - The evacuation appears to be in response to reports of a plane heading toward the Capitol. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001; CNN, 8/17/2002; BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 80-81] According to CNN congressional correspondent Dana Bash, “the Capitol Police were hearing, in their radio, that there was a plane—another plane in the air, likely headed for the Capitol.” [CNN, 9/11/2006] When a Capitol Police officer instructs Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D) to leave the building, he says: “We have word that an airplane is heading this way and could hit the building anytime. You need to evacuate.” 'Nothing Orderly' about Evacuation - However, there are problems with the evacuation. According to Daschle, “The fire alarm system, which was working in the nearby Senate office buildings, was never activated in the Capitol, so there were people who weren’t aware that an evacuation was taking place.” Also, some individuals are reluctant to leave. [DASCHLE AND D'ORSO, 2003, PP. 109-110] Rep. Bob Stump (R) will recall: “They tried to throw me out three times, but they didn’t succeed. I figured I was safer in the building than out on the street.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001] Daschle will recall that there is “nothing orderly” about the evacuation. Outside the building “No one knew what to do or where to go. People congregated on the grass and in the parking lot. Senators and staff were mixed in with tourists, all staring up at the sky, wondering what might be headed our way.” [DASCHLE AND D'ORSO, 2003, PP. 110] CNN will report, “[S]ome of the most high ranking officials in the United States government were just kind of scattered around this area without a gathering point.” [CNN, 9/11/2006] Sergeant at Arms Concerned over Poor Security - Al Lenhardt, the Senate’s sergeant at arms, will later say how alarmed he was “to see members of Congress and their staffs mixed in with visitors and passersby wandering in the open around the Capitol grounds. One of the tactics that terrorists have been known to employ is to create a diversion to move their intended target to the area where the actual attack will take place. Al imagined a bomb or gunfire erupting right there on the lawn outside the Capitol.” [DASCHLE AND D'ORSO, 2003, PP. 111] Eventually, many of the members of Congress go to the Capitol Police headquarters, which then serves as their command center for the day (see (9:55 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001 and (10:00 a.m.-6:30 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/11/2002; DASCHLE AND D'ORSO, 2003, PP. 112] Entity Tags: Al Lenhardt, Tom Daschle, Capitol Police (Washington, DC), Robert Lee Stump Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:49 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Command Center Suggests Launching Fighters in Response to Flight 93; FAA Headquarters Unable to Request Them

Doug Davis. [Source: Federal Aviation Administration] John White, a manager at the FAA’s Command Center, suggests to Doug Davis, the special assistant for technical operations in air traffic services at FAA headquarters, that fighter jets should be launched in response to Flight 93. However, FAA headquarters is apparently unable to act on this suggestion. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 10/21/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 29; CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/10/2006] In the last few minutes, the Command Center has warned headquarters that Flight 93 is “29 minutes out of Washington” and approaching the city (see 9:41 a.m.-9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 44 ] Command Center Asks about Launching Fighters - Davis now tells White, “They’re pulling Jeff [Griffith, the FAA’s deputy director of air traffic] away to go talk about United 93.” White asks, “Uh, do we want to think, uh, about scrambling aircraft?” Davis replies, “Oh, God, I don’t know.” White says, “Uh, that’s a decision somebody’s gonna have to make probably in the next 10 minutes.” However, Davis only responds, “Uh, ya know everybody just left the room.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 10/21/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 29] This conversation takes place 13 minutes after the FAA’s Cleveland Center asked the Command Center whether anyone had asked the military to launch fighter jets to intercept Flight 93 (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 40 ] Person Who Could Request Fighters Is Unavailable - Apparently there is only one person at FAA headquarters who is authorized to request military assistance, and Ben Sliney, the Command Center’s national operations manager, is told that no one can find him. Sliney will later recount: “I said something like, ‘That’s incredible. There’s only one person. There must be someone designated or someone who will assume the responsibility of issuing an order, you know.’ We were becoming frustrated in our attempts to get some information. What was the military response?” [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/10/2006] This lack of response to Flight 93 contrasts with the FAA’s earlier reaction to Flight 11, when Boston Center air traffic controllers contacted NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) themselves (see (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and even called military bases directly (see 8:34 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (8:34 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] Entity Tags: Ben Sliney, John White, Doug Davis, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(Between 9:49 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Langley Fighters Finally Reach Washington; Accounts of Timing Are Contradictory

A fighter and helicopter both fly directly above the Pentagon on 9/11 on the morning of 9/11. Exact time is unknown. [Source: Agence France-Presse] The three F-16s scrambled from Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, at 9:30 a.m. finally reach Washington and the burning Pentagon. The 129 mile distance could theoretically have been covered by the fighters in six minutes, but they’ve taken a wide detour over the ocean (see 9:30 a.m.-9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). The exact time they arrive is unclear. An early timeline laid out to CNN by senior Defense Department officials will claim they arrive as early as 9:49 a.m., but the 9/11 Commission later claims they only establish “a combat air patrol (CAP) over Washington” at “approximately 10:00 a.m.” [CBS NEWS, 9/14/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001; NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 34 ] Conflicting Press Accounts - Press accounts of when the first fighters reach Washington are highly contradictory. Early news accounts describe fighters arriving from Andrews Air Force Base, not Langley, “within minutes,” “a few moments,” or “just moments” after the Pentagon crash. [DENVER POST, 9/11/2001; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 9/16/2001; ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] Other newspaper accounts inaccurately deny that fighters from Andrews are deployed [USA TODAY, 9/16/2001], and some deny Andrews even has fighters available. [USA TODAY, 9/16/2001] Defense officials will initially claim, “There were no military planes in the skies over Washington until 15 to 20 minutes after the Pentagon was hit”—in other words, 9:53 a.m. to 9:58 a.m. [SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, 9/14/2001] But an ABC News report will suggest that by around 10:00 a.m., “Dozens of fighters are buzzing in the sky” over Washington. [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] Fighter Jets Don't Arrive until Later? - In contrast, the New York Times reports: “In the White House Situation Room and at the Pentagon, the response seemed agonizingly slow. One military official recalls hearing words to the effect of, ‘Where are the planes?’” The Pentagon will insist it had air cover over its own building by 10 a.m. However, numerous witnesses on the ground, including a reporter for the New York Times who is headed toward the building, will say they did not see any fighters until around 10:40 a.m., or “closer to 11” (see (10:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/16/2001; CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 130-131] According to some accounts, the plane that flies over the Pentagon at that time is Major Billy Hutchison’s F-16, launched from Andrews Air Force Base. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 81-82; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 235-236] NORAD will initially claim the Langley fighters were about 105 miles from the Pentagon when it was hit at 9:37, and the 9/11 Commission will later claim they were 150 miles away (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27] Entity Tags: Pentagon, North American Aerospace Defense Command, US Department of Defense, 9/11 Commission Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Pentagon

9:49 a.m. September 11, 2001: Air Sovereignty Fighters Directed to ‘Battle Stations’ Nationwide

General Ralph Eberhart. [Source: NORAD] As the 9/11 Commission will later describe, the commander of NORAD, General Ralph Eberhart, now directs “all air sovereignty aircraft to battle stations, fully armed.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 38] Being at “battle stations” means the pilots have to suit up into their flight gear and get into their planes, ready to start the engines and taxi out if a scramble order follows. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 27] Senior NORAD officials will subsequently give the order to launch available fighter jets across the nation (see (Between 9:50 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178, 180] Clarke Requested Combat Air Patrols - A few minutes earlier, according to his own account, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, who is in the White House Situation Room, learned of an aircraft hitting the Pentagon and instructed his deputy: “Find out where the fighter planes are. I want combat air patrol over every major city in this country” (see (Between 9:38 a.m. and 9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Whether Clarke’s actions influenced Eberhart to issue his order is unknown. [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 7-8] Fighter Units Possibly Offered Help Much Earlier - The Toledo Blade will state that NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) only begins calling bases across the US to request help “[b]y 10:01 a.m.” [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001] But an article in Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine will indicate that NORAD and NEADS began receiving calls from various fighter units, asking, “What can we do to help?” right after the second World Trade Center tower was hit at 9:03, when it had become obvious the US was under attack (see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002] It is therefore unclear why the instruction to put available fighters on battle stations—or to scramble them—was not issued significantly earlier. Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Richard A. Clarke, Ralph Eberhart, Northeast Air Defense Sector, North American Aerospace Defense Command Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(After 9:48 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Communications Problems Experienced around Capitol Building

Candy Crowley. [Source: CNN] After the Capitol building in Washington is evacuated (see 9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001), those located around it—including members of Congress—experience serious problems communicating by phone and other means. CNN senior political correspondent Candy Crowley will describe: “Nobody knew anything.… Nobody had any way to communicate.… The cell phones went down. Eventually… the personal BlackBerrys that bring your e-mail to you, they went down. And inside the Capitol, remember [there are] still switchboard operators there. Inside the Capitol, the phones worked only on and off.” According to Senator Edward Kennedy (D), there is “no communication whatsoever going on.” [CNN, 9/11/2002] Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D) will recall: “People were punching their cell phones to no avail. The lines were jammed.” [DASCHLE AND D'ORSO, 2003, PP. 110] Consequently, for more than an hour Daschle’s own staff is unable to establish where he is. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R) was experiencing communications problems even before he was evacuated from the Capitol, while trying to contact Vice President Dick Cheney by phone (see (9:04 a.m.-9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [HASTERT, 2004, PP. 6; HAYES, 2007, PP. 336] Whether others at the Capitol also experienced similar difficulties prior to the evacuation is unclear. What causes these problems is uncertain. However, numerous other people in the Washington area, including senior government officials, also experience serious communications problems throughout the day (see (After 8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Tom Daschle, Edward Kennedy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:49 a.m.-9:53 a.m. September 11, 2001: Passenger Marion Britton Says Two Other Flight 93 Passengers Had Their Throats Cut

Marion Britton. [Source: US Census Bureau] Flight 93 passenger Marion Britton calls her longtime friend Fred Fiumano at his auto repair shop in New York City, and talks to him for just under four minutes. According to the Chicago Tribune, she is using a cell phone. [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 9/30/2001; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] Journalist and author Jere Longman writes that, because her own cell phone is not working, Britton is using a borrowed phone (i.e. a cell phone). She gives Fiumano the phone number belonging to another passenger and tells him to write it down. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 162 AND 166] However, during the 2006 Zacarias Moussaoui trial, the prosecution claims that Britton, who had been assigned a seat in row 12 of the plane, makes her call from a phone in row 33, presumably meaning a seatback phone rather than a cell phone. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 12 ] Britton is crying. She tells Fiumano her plane has been hijacked and has made a U-turn. When he tells her that the World Trade Center is on fire, she replies, “I know, and we’re going to go down.” [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/22/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001] Britton says, “They’re gonna kill us, you know, we’re gonna die.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2006] Fiumano tries to reassure her, but she responds, “Two passengers have had their throats cut.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 4/13/2006] (In passenger Todd Beamer’s call from Flight 93 (see 9:45 a.m.-9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001), a flight attendant is reportedly heard in the background saying that two men lying on the floor in first class, possibly dead, are the plane’s pilot and co-pilot. It is unclear if these are the two people that Britton refers to as having had their throats cut, and she’d simply mistaken them for passengers. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 199] ) Fiumano hears a lot of yelling and screaming, and then the line goes dead. He tries calling Britton back but is unable to get through. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/22/2001] Entity Tags: Marion Britton, Fred Fiumano Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(9:49 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Police Helicopter Reports ‘Large Pieces’ Falling from South Tower About ten minutes prior to its collapse, a New York Police Department (NYPD) helicopter unit reports over the Special Operations Division radio channel that “large pieces” are falling from the South Tower. While police hear this transmission, the fire department does not, and there is no police representative at the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) command post to pass the information on. [FIRE ENGINEERING, 9/2002; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 95 ] None of the NYPD helicopter pilots predict the South Tower collapse in advance. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 304] Entity Tags: New York City Police Department, World Trade Center, New York City Fire Department Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

(9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Manager Tries Unsuccessfully to Initiate Lockout of Flight 93
Rich Miles, the manager of United Airlines’ System Operations Control center outside Chicago, tries to initiate the “lockout” procedure for Flight 93, which would acknowledge an emergency on the flight and safeguard information about it, but he is unable to do so. At some time between 9:45 a.m. and 9:50 a.m., the United Airlines maintenance facility in San Francisco contacted Miles about a call it had just received from an attendant on Flight 93, reporting that her plane had been hijacked (see 9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001). In response, Miles attempts to initiate a lockout of Flight 93. Lockout is a standard procedure for airlines in safety and security incidents, which isolates information about a flight so the case can be managed by the airline’s top leadership, and protects the identities of the passengers and crew. But Miles is unable activate this procedure. According to the 9/11 Commission, this is because United Airlines has already conducted a lockout of Flight 175 (see (9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and its computer system is not presently set up to deal simultaneously with two such procedures. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 12-13 AND 43 ] Entity Tags: United Airlines, Rich Miles Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Speaker of the House Hastert Evacuated to Secure Location outside Washington Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (R), who is third in line for the presidency, is evacuated from the US Capitol building and flown to a secret underground bunker in Virginia, where he remains until late in the afternoon. [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2001; ABC NEWS, 9/15/2002] Around 9:48, the Capitol building had begun evacuating (see 9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). At that time, Hastert was on the House floor. Two members of his security detail now enter the chamber and tell him, “We’re going to evacuate the Capitol, and you’re going to a secure location.” They take him out of the building and drive him hurriedly to Andrews Air Force Base, ten miles southeast of Washington. After he arrives there, Hastert is finally able to communicate with Vice President Dick Cheney, who is at the White House. (Hastert had been trying to contact Cheney earlier on, but without success (see (9:04 a.m.-9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001.) Cheney tells Hastert: “There’s a real danger. I want you to go to a secure location.” [HASTERT, 2004, PP. 8-9] Hastert gets on a helicopter and is flown to the secret underground bunker at Mount Weather in Bluemont, Virginia, 48 miles outside Washington—about 20 minutes journey by air. [BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 11/2001; ABC NEWS, 9/15/2002; BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 81] In the following hours, other top members of the House and Senate leaderships will join him there (see (Between Late Morning and Early Afternoon) September 11, 2001). [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2001; HASTERT, 2004, PP. 10] Hastert remains at the secure facility for several hours, and will return to Washington late in the afternoon (see (Between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [DAILY HERALD (ARLINGTON HEIGHTS), 9/11/2002] Hastert’s evacuation to Mount Weather is the result of “Continuity of Government” (COG) orders, which provide for evacuating the third and fourth in the line of presidential succession during a national emergency, in order to protect the nation’s constitutional leadership. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke activated the COG plan shortly before 10:00 a.m. this morning (see (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 8] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Mount Weather, Dennis Hastert Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, Civil Liberties Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Dick Cheney

(9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Delta Air Lines Reports Four Missing Planes

Leo Mullin. [Source: Publicity photo] Leo Mullin, the CEO of Delta Air Lines, calls FAA Administrator Jane Garvey at FAA headquarters in Washington, DC, and reports that four Delta aircraft are missing. Mullin, who is at his company’s headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, tells Garvey: “We can’t find four of our planes. Four of our transponders are off.” [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 186] The identities of these aircraft are unstated. Whether they include Delta Flight 1989, which FAA air traffic controllers have mistakenly reported as being a possible hijacking (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001), is unclear. At 9:27 a.m., the FAA’s Boston Center reported that this plane was missing (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] But, according to the 9/11 Commission, Delta 1989 “never turned off its transponder.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28] USA Today will report that, after “early reports that a bomb, then hijackers, might be aboard, Delta CEO Leo Mullin, 58, had nervously tracked [Delta 1989] from the company’s headquarters in Atlanta. Every five minutes, a new report came in. None seemed clear.” [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Entity Tags: Leo Mullin, Jane Garvey, Delta Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:50 a.m. September 11, 2001: Passenger Sandy Bradshaw Tells of Preparations to Fight Three Men with Knives

Sandra Bradshaw. [Source: Family photo] Sandy Bradshaw calls her husband from Flight 93. She says, “Have you heard what’s going on? My flight has been hijacked. My flight has been hijacked with three guys with knives.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 11/23/2001] She tells him that some passengers are in the rear galley filling pitchers with hot water to use against the hijackers. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001] Entity Tags: Sandy Bradshaw Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(Between 9:50 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Myers Wants Clarification of Rules of Engagement for Fighter Pilots; Clarke Wants This Issued Promptly Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers wants clear rules of engagement for military fighter pilots, according to counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke. In his book Against All Enemies, Clarke will describe hearing that the president has authorized the military to shoot down hostile aircraft some time between about 9:45 and 9:56 (see (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). From the White House Situation Room, where he is located, he then gets the attention of those on the video conference screen for the Pentagon, and informs them of this decision. Myers asks, “Okay, shoot down aircraft, but what are the ROE [rules of engagement]?” As Clarke will comment, “It was one thing to say it’s okay to shoot down a hijacked aircraft threatening to kill people on the ground, but we needed to give pilots more specific guidelines than that.” Clarke asks his colleague Franklin Miller and Marine Colonel Tom Greenwood—a member of Miller’s staff—to ensure that the Defense Department has “an answer to that question quickly.” He tells them, “I don’t want them delaying while they lawyer that to death.” Clarke recalls that he is then informed: “CNN says car bomb at the State Department. Fire on the Mall near the Capitol.” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 8-9] It is therefore unclear exactly what time he is describing, as CNN first makes the incorrect report of the State Department car bomb at 10:33, but it reports the fire on the Mall at 9:45. [CNN, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/11/2001; BROADCASTING AND CABLE, 8/26/2002] Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld will tell the 9/11 Commission that he works on fashioning the rules of engagement for fighter pilots, in collaboration with Myers, after he enters the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) at around 10:30 (see (10:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/23/2004] Yet he does not complete and issue these rules until 1:00 p.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 465; COCKBURN, 2007, PP. 7; MYERS, 2009, PP. 157-158] Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Richard B. Myers, Franklin Miller, Tom Greenwood Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke

(9:50 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001: Cleveland Airport and City Buildings Evacuated due to Possibly Hijacked Aircraft Coming in to Land

Michael White. [Source: Publicity photo] Cleveland Hopkins Airport and numerous buildings in the city of Cleveland are evacuated, following the decision to land Delta Air Lines Flight 1989—which is wrongly thought to be hijacked and with a bomb on board—at the Cleveland airport. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001; WKYC, 9/11/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 191-192] Airport Concerned about Delta 1989 - Delta Air Lines was concerned about Flight 1989, and instructed it to land as soon as possible in Cleveland (see (9:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 167; USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] FAA and military personnel have mistakenly suspected that this aircraft has been hijacked (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001, 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001, and (Shortly After 9:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and their concerns have reached personnel at Cleveland Airport. Fred Szabo, the airport commissioner, will later recall: “There was an indication that this might be a terrorist plane. We didn’t know if there were bombs on board, or if it was a hijacked plane.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27-28; WKYC, 9/11/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 167-168] Airport Evacuated as Plane Approaches - As Delta 1989 heads in to land, air traffic controllers instruct it to follow a long path that initially takes it far past the airport. According to author Lynn Spencer, the “controllers are giving themselves time to evacuate the airport since [Delta 1989] has been confirmed hijacked and since they believe it contains a bomb intended to detonate when the aircraft crashes into the terminal.” Even FAA personnel at the airport evacuate their building and make their way to a huge NASA hangar next door. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 191-192] After Delta 1989 lands, police block off all entrances to the airport terminal, and bomb-sniffing dogs are brought to baggage pickup areas. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001] City Buildings Evacuated - Furthermore, for the first time in his administration, Cleveland Mayor Michael White orders the evacuation of all federal and city buildings. [WCPN, 9/20/2001] Schools are closed and a parking ban is issued downtown. [WCPN, 9/12/2001] White also asks owners of large commercial high-rises to evacuate. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001] These evacuation efforts presumably benefit from the fact that Cleveland is one of six major Ohio cities that has, for a number of years, been part of a federal program to help defend against domestic terrorism. [WCPN, 9/20/2001] NASA Facility Evacuated - Even the 3,500 employees at the NASA Glenn Research Center, which is located adjacent to the Cleveland airport, are ordered to evacuate their facility. Directors there had in fact met and decided to evacuate the center after seeing the television coverage of the second attack on the World Trade Center. It takes about an hour and a half to get everyone out of the building. [CLEVELAND FREE TIMES, 9/6/2006] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Fred Szabo, Cleveland Hopkins International Airport, Michael R. White Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Between 9:50 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS Commander Orders Jets Launched from All Air National Guard Units in Northeast US In the battle cab at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), Colonel Robert Marr instructs his troops to contact every Air National Guard unit in the Northeast US and tell them to get their fighter jets airborne. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 180] NEADS has already launched the four fighters in the Northeast US that are kept on alert, ready to take off at a moment’s notice: Two F-15s were scrambled from Otis Air National Guard Base at 8:46 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) and two F-16s were scrambled from Langley Air Force Base at 9:24 (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 17, 20, 27] NEADS Calls Air National Guard Units - Marr now realizes these four jets are not enough, and tells his troops: “The nation is under attack. Get ‘em in the air!” Officers in the NEADS battle cab and on its operations floor begin calling Air National Guard units, one after another. The NEADS officers are surprised to find that wing commanders have been anticipating their call for help, and have already started arming fighter jets. According to author Lynn Spencer: “Although wing commanders do not necessarily have the authority to arm their planes with live missiles, nor Marr the authority to call them into action, these are not ordinary times. Marr can’t help but think that the incredible response is due to the fact that the Guard units are Title 32, or state-owned. They report to the governors of their respective states, and the wing commanders have every confidence that their governors will support them.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/30/2003 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 180] Time of Order Unclear - Exactly when Marr instructs his officers to contact the Air National Guard units is unclear. It appears to be at around 9:50 a.m., or some time shortly after. At the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters in Florida, CONR commander Major General Larry Arnold began contacting all three CONR sectors (which includes NEADS) at around 9:45 a.m., after learning the Pentagon had been hit and realizing the attacks were no longer isolated to New York. His instruction to the sectors was, “Generate, generate, generate!” meaning, “Get as many fighters as you can into the sky now!” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 177-178] General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, directed “all air sovereignty aircraft to battle stations, fully armed,” at 9:49 a.m. (see 9:49 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 38] But “battle stations” means only that pilots get into their aircraft with the engines turned off, so they are ready to launch if a scramble order follows. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 55; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 27] The Toledo Blade will report, “By 10:01 a.m., [NEADS] began calling several bases across the country for help.” [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001] According to the Newhouse News Service, though, Marr apparently gave his order significantly earlier. It will report that, when the South Tower was hit at 9:03, NEADS personnel “looked to Col. Robert Marr, who rallied the operation: Get to the phones. Call every Air National Guard unit in the land. Prepare to put jets in the air. The nation is under attack” (see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, 1/25/2002] Air National Guard jets will reportedly take off from Toledo Express Airport in Ohio at 10:17 a.m., in response to NEADS’s call for help, and, according to Spencer, NEADS instructs Otis Air Base to launch all its available aircraft at around 10:20 a.m. (see (10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 244-245] Entity Tags: Robert Marr, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Air National Guard Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Supervisor Tells DC Air National Guard Pilots on Training to Hurry Back to Base Three F-16 fighter jets that are on their way back from a training mission over North Carolina finally make contact with their supervisor of flying (SOF) and are instructed to return to Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland as quickly as possible. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 79; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 216-217] The jets belong to the 121st Fighter Squadron, part of the 113th Wing of the DC Air National Guard, which is based at Andrews AFB, 10 miles from Washington, DC. [DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AIR NATIONAL GUARD, 7/24/2001; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 10/21/2001; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 11/15/2001; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002] They left Andrews at 8:36 for a routine training mission on a range about 200 miles away from there, in North Carolina (see 8:36 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 79; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/8/2004 ] Supervisor Wants Jets Back Immediately - Major Daniel Caine, who is the SOF with their unit, had been concerned about the three F-16s since the time of the second crash in New York. He’d felt certain that airspace restrictions would be implemented around Washington, and realized he needed to get the jets back to base right away before the Washington airspace was closed. Because the jets were outside his radio range, he called a refueling plane they were scheduled to meet, and asked its pilot to tell them to return to Andrews. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 122-124] Pilots Told to Return as Fast as Possible - Having met with the refueling plane (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), the lead pilot of the F-16s, Major Billy Hutchison, is now about half way back from the training mission and finally in radio range of Andrews, so he calls the SOF there. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 79; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 216-217] By this time, Caine has left his post, as he intends to take off in a jet himself (see (Shortly After 9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and Lieutenant Colonel Phil Thompson has replaced him as SOF. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 184] Thompson says to Hutchison: “[W]e need you here now! You need to return to base ‘buster’!” The code word “buster” means Hutchison is to push his thrust lever into afterburner and fly as fast as his plane will go. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 217] Thompson does not tell Hutchison anything about the terrorist attacks. Hutchison’s only awareness of the morning’s crisis is what little he’d been told by the pilot of the refueling plane. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004] But he has never heard the code word “buster” used before, and realizes something very bad is going on. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 217] Hutchison Sees Burning Pentagon - Hutchison will later recall: “So we light afterburners and we are coming back at Mach as quick as we can get back.… As I get back, I cross the Potomac River on the south end of Maryland and Virginia, and I see a big column of smoke. It was so clear and there was no haze in the air.” He again talks over the radio with Thompson. Hutchison says: “It looks like there’s been an explosion near [Washington’s Reagan] National Airport. What’s going on?’” Thompson replies: “We know. Just keep coming.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 79] The first of the three F-16s returning from the training mission will land back at Andrews AFB at 10:14 a.m. (see 10:14 a.m. September 11, 2001). The other two land at 10:36 a.m., but Hutchison will be instructed to take off again immediately (see (10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004] Entity Tags: 121st Fighter Squadron, District of Columbia Air National Guard, Billy Hutchison, Phil Thompson Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines CEO Carty Questions Transportation Secretary Mineta about Plane that Hit Pentagon Don Carty, the CEO of American Airlines, asks Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta to confirm which airplane has hit the Pentagon, but is frustrated when Mineta cannot provide a definite answer. Carty, who is at the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center in Texas, and Mineta, who is in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House, are participating in a phone conference call (see (Between 9:22 a.m. and 9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Carty asks Mineta what type of plane hit the Pentagon, to see if it belongs to American Airlines. Receiving no firm answer, he exclaims: “For God’s sake, it’s in the Pentagon. Can’t somebody go look at it and see whose plane it is?” Mineta replies: “They have. You can’t tell.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 186] American Airlines will not learn until later on that the plane that hit the Pentagon was its Flight 77. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] At around 11:18 a.m., it will issue a statement in which it mentions Flight 77 (see (11:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but this statement will only say that Flight 77 is one of two planes the airline has “lost” in “tragic incidents this morning.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001] Entity Tags: Norman Mineta, Don Carty, American Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:50 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Giuliani Goes to Temporary Command Post but Soon Evacuates It After spending about 40 minutes at the disaster scene, on the World Trade Center site, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani relocates to a small office building at 75 Barclay Street, about two blocks from the WTC, hoping to establish a command post there. His usual command center, in WTC 7, was evacuated at around 9:30 a.m. (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). With him are several colleagues, including Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik and Office of Emergency Management Director Richard Sheirer. [KERIK, 2001, PP. 334; GIULIANI, 2002, PP. 10; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/18/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/19/2004; BARRETT AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 10] While at Barclay Street, Giuliani is able to get in touch with the White House, and speaks to Chris Henick, the deputy political director to President Bush (see 9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001). Immediately afterwards, he receives a phone call from Vice President Cheney, though this is cut off before either one is able to speak. Giuliani also claims he is given advance warning of the South Tower’s collapse while at this command post (see (Before 9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). After the South Tower collapses outside, Giuliani and his colleagues all decide to evacuate, going through the basement into a neighboring building, 100 Church Street. They will then leave this and head north, being joined by cameras and press. [FINK AND MATHIAS, 2002, PP. 112; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/19/2004; BARRETT AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 348] Entity Tags: Rudolph (“Rudy”) Giuliani, Bernard Kerik, Richard Sheirer Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Reports of Unresponsive Aircraft Prompt Evacuation of CIA Headquarters By 9:50 a.m., CIA Director George Tenet is in his office on the seventh floor of the agency’s Langley headquarters. He later describes: “[E]veryone was wondering, what next? Reports came in of several airplanes that were not responding to communications from the ground and perhaps heading toward Washington. Several [Counterterrorist Center] officers reminded us that al-Qaeda members had once discussed flying an airplane into CIA headquarters, the top floor of which we were presently occupying.” Tenet himself later recalls that, in the minutes after he’d learned of the first attack, he’d “thought about the ‘Bojinka’ plot to blow up twelve US airliners over the Pacific and a subsequent plan to fly a small airplane into CIA headquarters” (see (8:55 a.m.-9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WOODWARD, 2002, PP. 7-8; TENET, 2007, PP. 162 AND 164] According to CIA contractor Billy Waugh, people at the headquarters are aware that Flight 93 is currently unaccounted for, and it is “a widespread assumption within the building that this flight [is] headed straight for us in the CIA headquarters” (see (Before 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WAUGH AND KEOWN, 2004, PP. 293-294] Tenet asks Mike Hohlfelder, the chief of his security detail, for his recommendation, and is advised, “Let’s evacuate.” Though he later claims he was “reluctant” about this, Tenet tells his senior leadership: “We have to save our people. We have to evacuate the building.” Therefore, at about 10 a.m., the word goes out for a large number of the CIA’s thousands of employees to go home. Initially, the senior leadership team moves from Tenet’s seventh-floor conference room to another room on the first floor, but it then exits the headquarters building and heads across the campus to the CIA’s printing plant, where a crude operational capability has been set up. However, due to the objections of CIA counterterrorism chief Cofer Black, those in the Counterterrorist Center and the Global Response Center are allowed to stay in place in the headquarters (see (10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Tenet and his staff will leave the printing plant and return to the headquarters at around 1 p.m., by which time they will consider the danger to be over. [WOODWARD, 2002, PP. 8-9; TENET, 2007, PP. 164-165 AND 168] The CIA headquarters evacuation is aided by the fact that a fire had occurred there just over a month earlier. Consequently, new evacuation procedures had been laid out, which Tenet follows on this day (see August 7-September 10, 2001). [KESSLER, 2003, PP. 222-223] Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency, Mike Hohlfelder, Billy Waugh Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:50 a.m.-9:51 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Dispatcher Warns Flights to Land at Nearest Airport, Told Flight 93 Possibly Hijacked United Airlines dispatcher Ed Ballinger sends messages to the flights he is responsible for, telling them to land, and is also informed that Flight 93 is possibly hijacked. At 9:50, Ballinger sends a text message to Flight 93 and United’s other transcontinental flights, instructing them to “land ASP at nearest UAL airport—ORD terrorist.” (“ASP” is presumably short for “as soon as possible”; what “ORD” stands for is unreported.) The message also warns to beware of cockpit intrusion, stating, “No one in to cockpit—Land asp.” Over the next minute, Ballinger sends two more text messages to his flights, advising them to land as soon as possible. He still receives no response from Flight 93. United Airlines ordered that all its aircraft be grounded about five minutes earlier (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 44 ] However, Ballinger will later say that United dispatchers are told by their superiors, “Don’t tell the pilots why we want them to land.” [CHICAGO DAILY HERALD, 4/14/2004] Also around this time, Rich Miles, the manager at United’s System Operations Control center, informs Ballinger about a call recently received by United’s maintenance facility in San Francisco, from an attendant on Flight 93, who reported that her plane had been hijacked (see 9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001). [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 43 ] Entity Tags: Rich Miles, Ed Ballinger Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Marine Fighter Squadron Offers Assistance to NEADS

An F/A-18A Hornet belonging to Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 321. [Source: Robert Carlson / Naval Aviation News] A US Marine with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 321 (VMFA-321) calls a friend of his at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) to ask what his unit can do to assist the military response to the attacks. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 188] Former Marine Heads to NEADS - Trey Murphy is a former Marine who now works as a weapons controller at NEADS. He learned of the first crash in New York while still at home. After seeing the second crash on television, he realized it was a coordinated attack and hurried to work. When he arrived on the NEADS operations floor at around 9:45, the head of the weapons team, Major James Fox, informed him that fighter jets were coming up from Selfridge and Toledo; both sets of jets had been told to contact NEADS and would require instructions. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 179-180] Marine Calls Murphy - After Murphy reportedly checks in the F-16 pilots from Selfridge Air National Guard Base and gives them orders (see (9:56 a.m.-10:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001), his cell phone rings. On the other end is a friend of his from VMFA-321, a Marine Corps Reserve squadron at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland that flies the sophisticated F/A-18 Hornet fighter jet. Murphy’s friend says: “Dude, get us in the war. I’ve got wrench-turners on our planes uploading weapons.” He then asks, “What can we do?” Normally, Murphy would not issue orders to the Marine squadron. As author Lynn Spencer will explain, VMFA-321 trains “to deploy overseas and they respond only to the US Joint Forces Command, commonly known as JiffyCom, and based in Norfolk, Virginia.” However, with the day’s unprecedented circumstances, Murphy instructs, “Convince your higher-ups at JiffyCom to get you transferred over to us!” Minutes later, Murphy is called by a general from VMFA-321. By this time, his attention is devoted to dealing with the possibly hijacked aircraft, Delta 1989. But before hanging up, he exclaims: “General! Can’t talk! But we could use your airplanes.” [DC MILITARY (.COM), 6/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 188] Entity Tags: Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 321, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Trey Murphy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Molten Metal Pours from South Tower

Molten metal pouring out of the side of the World Trade Center. [Source: Cameraplanet] Video footage later reveals that in the minutes immediately before the collapse of the WTC’s South Tower, a stream of molten metal starts pouring out of a window opening around the northeast corner of its 80th floor. FEMA later suggests that this is “possibly aluminum from the airliner,” and comments, “This is of particular interest because, although the building collapse appears to have initiated at this floor level, the initiation seems to have occurred at the southeast rather than the northeast corner.” [CIVIL ENGINEERING, 5/2002; FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, 5/1/2002, PP. 2-34; DWYER AND FLYNN, 2005, PP. 207] According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, “The composition of the flowing material can only be the subject of speculation, but its behavior suggests it could have been molten aluminum.” [PITTS, BUTLER, AND JUNKER, 9/2005, PP. 375] However physics professor Steven E. Jones will in 2006 dispute this, saying that molten aluminum is silvery and never turns yellow, like what is in the video footage. He will instead claim the presence of this molten metal supports the theory that explosives, specifically thermite, are what caused the Twin Towers to collapse. He says thermite can cause steel to melt and become yellowish. [DESERET MORNING NEWS, 4/10/2006] Entity Tags: World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center

(Between 9:50-10:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Numerous False Reports of Terrorist Acts in Washington

A television broadcast falsely describes smoke coming from Washington Mall instead of its true source, the Pentagon. [Source: CNN] There are numerous false reports of additional terror attacks. Before 10:00 a.m., some hear reports on television of a fire at the State Department. At 10:20 a.m., and apparently again at 10:33 a.m., it is publicly reported this was caused by a car bomb. [OTTAWA CITIZEN, 9/11/2001; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001; BROADCASTING AND CABLE, 8/26/2002] At 10:23 a.m., the Associated Press reports, “A car bomb explodes outside the State Department, senior law enforcement officials say.” [BROADCASTING AND CABLE, 8/26/2002] Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke hears these reports at this time and asks Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in the State Department to see if the building he’s in has been hit. Armitage goes outside the building, finds out there’s no bomb, and calls his colleagues to inform them that the reports are false. Reports of a fire on the Capitol Mall also appear and are quickly found to be false. [ABC NEWS, 9/15/2002; CLARKE, 2004, PP. 8-9] There are numerous other false reports over the next hour, including explosions at the Capitol building and USA Today headquarters. [BROADCASTING AND CABLE, 8/26/2002] For instance, CNN reports an explosion on Capitol Hill at 10:12 a.m. CNN then announces this is untrue 12 minutes later. [OTTAWA CITIZEN, 9/11/2001] Entity Tags: Richard Armitage, Richard A. Clarke, US Department of State Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke

9:51 a.m. September 11, 2001: Langley Jets Request and Receive Altitude Clearance over Washington

Controllers at the FAA’s Washington Center. [Source: FAA] The three F-16 fighter jets launched from Langley Air Force Base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) that have been directed toward Washington request and are given permission to fly at high altitude over the city. After the Langley AFB pilots are given the correct coordinates they are to head to (see (Between 9:41 a.m. and 9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001), at 9:51 lead pilot Major Dean Eckmann looks on his radar screen and sees that the area where he has been directed to set up a combat air patrol is filled with air traffic. He therefore contacts the FAA’s Washington Center and tells the controller, “I need 3,000 feet of altitude in a 20-mile ring around DC.” When the controller asks the reason, Eckmann replies, “Higher headquarters’ request!” The controller gives him an altitude range of 25,000 to 27,000 feet. Eckmann radios the other two Langley pilots and gives them their altitude assignments: he’ll fly at 25,000 feet, Major Brad Derrig will be at 26,000 feet, and Captain Craig Borgstrom at 27,000 feet. According to author Lynn Spencer, the jets then head toward Washington at 700 miles per hour, just under the speed of sound. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 180-182] However, Spencer’s account of this incident conflicts with the 1st Air Force’s book about the 9/11 attacks. According to that account, several minutes before Eckmann reportedly asks for altitude clearance—at around 9:45 a.m.—he had been directed to drop to lower altitude to check out two unidentified aircraft, and was then told to inspect the Pentagon (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 66] Entity Tags: Dean Eckmann, Craig Borgstrom, Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center, Brad Derrig Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:52 a.m. September 11, 2001: Firefighters Reach 78th Floor of South Tower; Find Two Isolated Fires

Ronald Bucca. [Source: Public domain] Two firefighters climbing up the South Tower, Orio Palmer and Ronald Bucca, have reached its 78th floor, the lower end of the impact zone where Flight 175 hit. [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/4/2002] They are just two floors below the level where, minutes later, its collapse initiates. [FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, 5/1/2002, PP. 2-34] Over radio, Palmer tells firefighter Joseph Leavey, “We’ve got two isolated pockets of fire. We should be able to knock it down with two lines.” [DWYER AND FLYNN, 2005, PP. 206] The fact that they reached so high up the tower only comes to light almost a year later, when a tape of radio communications from 9/11 is made public (see August 4, 2002). The New York Times will report “[N]owhere on the tape is there any indication that firefighters had the slightest indication that the tower had become unstable or that it could fall.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/9/2002] Palmer’s communication appears to contradict claims that “extreme fires” contributed to the tower’s collapse. [BBC, 9/13/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/20/2004] Ronald Bucca, a Special Forces veteran, had actually conducted his own private research into Islamic militancy following the 1993 WTC bombing. He’d even taken time, in 1996, to attend the beginning of the trial of Ramzi Yousef, a mastermind of the bombing (see September 5, 1996). [LANCE, 2003, PP. 180-183, 333-334] Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Orio Palmer, Ronald Bucca Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center

(9:52 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Lynne Cheney Joins Husband in White House Bunker

Lynne Cheney conferring with Dick Cheney in the early afternoon on 9/11. [Source: David Bohrer/ White House] According to the 9/11 Commission, the Secret Service logs Lynne Cheney’s arrival at the White House at 9:52 a.m. She joins her husband, Vice President Dick Cheney, in the tunnel leading to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) bunker below the White House, and then enters the PEOC alongside him. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 40] She had been at her downtown office around the time the second tower was hit, at 9:03, when she was driven by the Secret Service to the White House. [NEWSWEEK, 12/31/2001] Yet, in a brief interview with an activist group in 2007, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta will claim that Lynne Cheney was already in the PEOC when he arrived there. [911TRUTHSEATTLE (.ORG), 6/26/2007] According to Mineta’s recollections, this was at around 9:20-9:27 (see (Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Lynne Cheney will sit in a corner of the PEOC, and write down notes on the various reports that are received this morning by the vice president. [CHENEY, 9/11/2001; NEWSWEEK, 12/31/2001] Entity Tags: Norman Mineta, Secret Service, Lynne Cheney, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Dick Cheney

9:53 a.m. September 11, 2001: NSA Intercepts Al-Qaeda Phone Call Predicting Fourth Attack The National Security Agency (NSA) reportedly intercepts a phone call from one of bin Laden’s operatives in Afghanistan to a phone number in the Republic of Georgia. The caller says he has “heard good news” and that another target is still to come (presumably, the target Flight 93 is intended to hit). [CBS NEWS, 9/4/2002] The caller is also supposed to say that the attackers are following through on “the doctor’s program.” This is said to be a reference to al-Qaeda’s number two leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has a doctorate in medicine. [NEW YORKER, 9/9/2002] Since the 9/11 crisis began, NSA translators have been told to focus on Middle Eastern intercepts and translate them as they are received instead of oldest first, as is the usual practice. This call is translated in the next hour or two, and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld hears about it just after noon. [CBS NEWS, 9/4/2002; BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 54] Entity Tags: Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda, National Security Agency, Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Ayman Al-Zawahiri, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Remote Surveillance

9:53 a.m. September 11, 2001: Hijackers Fear Passenger Retaliation According to Flight 93’s cockpit voice recording, the hijackers grow concerned that the passengers might retaliate. One urges that the plane’s fire axe be held up to the cockpit door’s peephole to scare the passengers. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 209-210] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:53 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Headquarters Still Only Talking About Telling NORAD of Flight 93 Hijack According to the 9/11 Commission, FAA headquarters informs the FAA Command Center that the deputy director for air traffic services is talking to Deputy Administrator Monte Belger about scrambling aircraft after Flight 93. Yet in interviews with the commission, neither Belger nor the deputy director recall this discussion, and Belger subsequently e-mails the commission saying he does not believe the conversation took place. However, tape recordings reveal a staff person from headquarters at this time telling the Command Center, “Peter’s talking to Monte now about scrambling.” FAA headquarters is also informed that the flight is 20 miles northwest of Johnstown, Pennsylvania. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 461] When questioned about this, Belger will point out that there are military people on duty at the FAA Command Center and in a situation room at the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization, and that they are participating in what is going on. In addition, Belger will later tell the commission that he thought the NMCC was on the hijack net and would therefore have received notification on this channel at the same time as all other agencies. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Incredibly, FAA headquarters has known since 9:34 A.M. about hijackers talking about a bomb on board the flight, and more evidence has since been passed on confirming a hijacking in progress. Still, reportedly, no one tells NORAD anything about the plane. Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Monte Belger Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

Before 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001: AWACS Planes on Training Missions in Florida and Near Washington, DC While President Bush is still in Sarasota, an AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System plane) is flying a training mission off the coast of Florida. Referring to the AWACS plane, NORAD Commander Larry Arnold later says: “I had set up an arrangement with their wing commander at Tinker [Air Force Base, Oklahoma] some months earlier for us to divert their AWACS off a normal training mission to go into an exercise scenario simulating an attack on the United States. The AWACS crew initially thought we were going into one of those simulations.” Another AWACS is also flying a training mission, near Washington, DC, the morning of 9/11. [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002] When its pilot, Anthony Kuczynski, hears of the first WTC crash, he mistakenly believes he is involved in a planned military simulation. He says, “We sometimes do scenarios where we’re protecting the United States from bombers coming in from unknown areas.” [ST. THOMAS AQUIN, 4/12/2002] Entity Tags: Larry Arnold, Anthony Kuczynski Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

Before 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001: AWACS Plane on Training Mission Instructed to Follow Air Force One

Ben Robinson. [Source: US Air Force] An Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) plane is directed toward Sarasota, Florida, where President Bush is currently located, and will accompany Air Force One as it carries Bush back to Washington, DC. The AWACS has been flying a training mission off the east coast of Florida (see Before 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001). NORAD now instructs it to head toward Sarasota, on Florida’s west coast. Pilot Thinks This Is an Exercise - Several months previously, Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region, made arrangements with Brigadier General Ben Robinson, the commander of the 552nd Air Control Wing at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, for AWACS support to be provided during training exercises simulating attacks on the United States. As Arnold will later recall, the pilot of the AWACS that NORAD now contacts “thought it was an exercise.” However the pilot is then told “what happened at the World Trade Center” and realizes “his responsibility was to follow the president.” Arnold will say: “We told him to follow Air Force One, and he asked the question we all asked: ‘Where is it going?’ We said: ‘We can’t tell you. Just follow it.’” [FILSON, 2002; CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 86-87] AWACS Escorts President to Washington - The time the AWACS plane gets close enough to Air Force One to be of assistance to it is unclear. According to journalist and author Bill Sammon, by around 10:30 a.m., it has not yet arrived to protect the president’s plane. [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 107] Arnold will recall that NORAD maintains “the AWACS overhead the whole route,” as Air Force One flies to Barksdale Air Force Base, then Offutt Air Force Base, and then back to Washington. [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002] AWACS Is a 'Wonderful Asset' - According to Mark Rosenker, the director of the White House Military Office, AWACS planes “give you the big picture in the sky. They’re able to identify what’s a friend, what’s a foe.” Rosenker, who will fly with Bush on Air Force One after it takes off from Sarasota (see (9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001), says the AWACS is “a wonderful asset to have up there for us, it tremendously helped us to be able to guide for where we needed to go, to what potential problems we might encounter.… [I]t was an important part of what we needed to do to guarantee the safety of the president of the United States.” [WHITE HOUSE, 8/29/2002] Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Larry Arnold, Mark Rosenker, 552nd Air Control Wing Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

(9:54 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Passenger Elizabeth Wainio Calls Stepmother from Flight 93

Elizabeth Wainio. [Source: Family photo] Honor Elizabeth Wainio, a 27-year-old passenger on board Flight 93, calls her stepmother Esther Heymann, who is in Cantonsville, Maryland. [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 9/30/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001] According to journalist and author Jere Longman, the call starts “shortly past nine-fifty.” Official accounts say it starts at 9:54, or seconds before. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 167; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 44 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] Wainio begins, “We’re being hijacked. I’m calling to say good-bye.” She says a “really nice person” next to her has handed her the phone and told her to call her family. News reports suggest this person is Lauren Grandcolas, who had been assigned a seat by Wainio in row 11 of the plane. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 167-168; MSNBC, 9/3/2002; MSNBC, 9/11/2006] But according to a summary of passenger phone calls presented at the 2006 Zacarias Moussaoui trial, Wainio and Grandcolas are now separated and sitting in different areas of the plane. Wainio is now in row 33 along with fellow passenger Marion Britton and an unnamed flight attendant. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] According to some reports, Wainio is using a cell phone. Newsweek states that she actually tells her stepmother she is using a cell phone loaned to her by another passenger. [NEWSWEEK, 9/22/2001; CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 9/30/2001] But the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette claims she uses an Airfone. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001] According to Longman, there are “long silences” throughout the call. [MSNBC, 7/30/2002] Heymann cannot hear anyone in the background: “She could not hear any conversation or crying or yelling or whimpering. Nothing.” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 172] Longman describes that Heymann gets the feeling her stepdaughter is “resigned to what was going to happen to her. And that she actually seemed to be leaving her body, going to a better place. She had had two grandmothers who were deceased, and at one point she told her [step]mother, ‘They’re waiting for me.’” [MSNBC, 7/30/2002] Wainio also talks about her family, and says she is worried about how her brother and sister will handle this terrible news. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 168] Accounts conflict over how long her call lasts and when it ends (see (Between 9:58 a.m. and 10:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Jere Longman, Lauren Grandcolas, Esther Heymann, Elizabeth Wainio Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

9:54 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Passenger Tom Burnett Calls for Fourth Time; Details Plan to Take Control of Plane Passenger Tom Burnett makes his fourth and final call from Flight 93 to his wife Deena Burnett. Deena makes a note of the time of the call. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 118] Tom asks her, “Anything new?” and then, “Where are the kids?” When Deena says their three young daughters are asking to talk to him, Tom says, “Tell them I’ll talk to them later.” After a pause, he explains that he and some of the other passengers are going to try and seize control of the plane from the hijackers: “We’re waiting until we’re over a rural area. We’re going to take back the airplane.” He adds: “If they’re going to crash this plane into the ground, we’re going to have to do something.… We can’t wait for the authorities. I don’t know what they could do anyway. It’s up to us. I think we can do it.” He remains calm throughout the conversation. He tells Deena to just pray. [SACRAMENTO BEE, 9/11/2002; BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 66-67] According to notes of Deena Burnett’s initial interview with the FBI (see (12:30 p.m.) September 11, 2001), Tom tells Deena he may not speak to her again. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001 ] But in her 2006 book, Deena Burnett will describe Tom saying: “Don’t worry. I’ll be home for dinner. I may be late, but I’ll be home.” Finally he says, “We’re going to do something,” and then hangs up. The call lasts less than two minutes. [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 67] Tom does not give any personal message to his wife during the call. [CNN, 9/12/2001] Deena will later reflect: “He honestly expected to be home later that morning. If he thought he was going to die on that plane, he would have called his parents and sisters and talked to his daughters. At the very least, he would have given me a message for them. But he didn’t ask to speak to any of them. He was fighting to live.” [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 68] Entity Tags: Tom Burnett, Deena Burnett Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(9:55 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001: Some Members of Congress Establish ‘Central Command Center’ at Capitol Police Headquarters, Others Go Home After the US Capitol building in Washington is evacuated (see 9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001), many members of Congress go to the nearby Capitol Police headquarters for safety, but others head elsewhere and some go home. [DASCHLE AND D'ORSO, 2003, PP. 111-112] Although the Capitol began evacuating around 9:48, no one has instructions on where to go. “Rank-and-file lawmakers didn’t have guidance from their leaders or from Capitol Police.” [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] Many of them therefore remain in the vicinity of the Capitol building. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/12/2001] Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D) is quickly driven away by his security detail after being evacuated from the Capitol. However, according to Daschle, the contingency plan for emergencies “directed us to convene at the Hart Senate Building, right next to the Capitol. But that was considered unsafe in this situation.” Therefore, “Some members of Congress who lived in the area decided to simply go home.” Others convene at the 116 Club, a restaurant on Capitol Hill. “The remaining senators were finally directed to the Capitol Police headquarters a block and a half away, where it was decided members of Congress would be safest. That became Congress’s central command center for the rest of the day” (see (10:00 a.m.-6:30 p.m.) September 11, 2001). However, while Daschle and some others are taken there early on (Daschle will recall being at the headquarters when the first World Trade Center tower collapses at 9:59), many others do not go there until later. [DASCHLE AND D'ORSO, 2003, PP. 111-112] Deputy Chief James Rohan of the Capitol Police keeps hearing complaints from his officers nearby the Capitol building, saying: “I’ve got all these congressmen wandering around here. What do you want me to do with them?” According to CNN, “the police assumed that those who weren’t in the [Congressional] leadership… would go home, but of course they didn’t.” Therefore, they are eventually brought to the Capitol Police headquarters as well. Several hundred members of Congress go to the headquarters during the day. [CNN, 9/11/2002] Around late morning or early afternoon, Congressional leaders leave there and are flown to a secure bunker outside Washington (see (Between Late Morning and Early Afternoon) September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] Many other members of Congress remain at the headquarters throughout the afternoon. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; DASCHLE AND D'ORSO, 2003, PP. 116-117] Entity Tags: James Rohan, Tom Daschle, Capitol Police (Washington, DC) Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:55 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001: Numerous International Flights to US Transmit Emergency Transponder Codes FAA radar displays begin showing that a growing number of international flights approaching America are transmitting warning codes from their transponders. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 196-197] Airspace Shut Down - At around 9:45 a.m., the FAA shut down US airspace and ordered all aircraft to land (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Shortly afterwards, Canada took similar action. However, international flights that are over the oceans and approaching America are getting low on fuel. As their crews establish radio contact with air traffic controllers, they are told that American airspace is closed. Many of the worried pilots dial emergency codes into their transponders. [US CONGRESS. HOUSE. COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 9/21/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 29; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 196] Radar Screens Highlight Numerous Flights - A plane’s transponder is a device that sends that aircraft’s identifying information, speed, and altitude to radar screens. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/16/2001] There are three specific codes that pilots can dial into their transponder to signal an emergency: “7500” signifies a hijacking, “7600” signifies a loss of radio, and “7700” signifies other emergencies. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 25-26] Amid the current crisis, FAA radar screens begin highlighting a growing number of flights over the oceans that are transmitting warning codes. According to author Lynn Spencer, “One foreign crew dials in the four-digit code for ‘hijack,’ just to let the authorities know they are aware of what is taking place.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 196-197] In response to a request from the FAA, Canada will agree to open its airspace to all international flights that are diverted away from the United States, allowing those flights to land at Canadian airports (see 10:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/12/2001; TIME, 9/14/2001; NAV CANADA, 7/22/2005] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Between 9:55 a.m. and 10:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Myers Finally Enters NMCC; Prior Whereabouts Disputed Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers enters the National Military Command Center (NMCC) within the Pentagon, though exactly when this happens remains unclear. According to his own statements, he was on Capitol Hill, in the offices of Senator Max Cleland (D), from just before 9:00 a.m. until around the time the Pentagon was hit. He’d then headed back to the Pentagon (see Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (Shortly After 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ARMED FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION SERVICE, 10/17/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 6/29/2006] According to the 9/11 Commission, Myers joins the air threat conference call from the NMCC at “shortly before 10:00.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 38] But the American Forces Press Service reports that he arrives at the NMCC “about 15 minutes” before Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (who arrives around 10:30), meaning at about 10:15 a.m. [AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 9/8/2006] Rumsfeld claims that, as he enters the NMCC, Myers has “just returned from Capitol Hill.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/23/2004] Max Cleland concurs that Myers was with him on Capitol Hill until around the time of the Pentagon attack. [CNN, 11/20/2001; ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, 6/16/2003] But counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke claims that Myers has been taking part in a video conference since shortly after the second attack on the WTC, and has been visible on the Pentagon screen (see (9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001), thereby implying Myers has been at the Pentagon all along. [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 3 AND 5] Myers tells the 9/11 Commission, “After I reached the National Military Command Center (NMCC), I asked questions to determine where Secretary Rumsfeld was, how the FAA was handling airborne flights, and the status of fighters prepared to intercept any hijacked aircraft inbound to Washington.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 ] Entity Tags: Richard B. Myers, National Military Command Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS Contacts Selfridge Air Base to Get Unarmed Jets Sent after Either Delta 1989 or Flight 93, according to Conflicting Accounts

F-16 Fighting Falcons from the 127th Wing at Selfridge Air National Guard Base. [Source: John S. Swanson / US Air Force] NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) contacts Selfridge Air National Guard Base in Michigan to arrange for two of its F-16 fighter jets that are out on a training mission to intercept a suspicious aircraft. Accounts will conflict over whether this aircraft is Flight 93 or Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, which is wrongly thought to have been hijacked. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/30/2002; ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178] Delta 1989 was flying about 25 miles behind Flight 93 when air traffic controllers mistakenly suspected it might be hijacked (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and since then it has been instructed to land at Cleveland Hopkins Airport in Ohio (see (9:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] Flight 93 is currently flying east across Pennsylvania. [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 ] NEADS has already tried getting fighter jets from a unit in Duluth, Minnesota, sent after Delta 1989, but the unit was unable to respond (see (Shortly After 9:41 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/22/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/23/2004 ] NEADS Calls Selfridge Base - A NEADS weapons technician now calls the 127th Wing at Selfridge Air National Guard Base. He knows the unit has two F-16s in the air on a training mission. Although these jets are unarmed and only have a limited amount of fuel remaining, the commander at the Selfridge base agrees to turn them over to NEADS. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178] The commander says: “[H]ere’s what we can do. At a minimum, we can keep our guys airborne. I mean, they don’t have—they don’t have any guns or missiles or anything on board.” The NEADS technician replies, “It’s a presence, though.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Fighters May Have to Crash into Hijacked Plane - Military commanders realize that, without weapons, the Selfridge fighter pilots might have to slam their jets into a hijacked plane to stop it in its tracks. Colonel Robert Marr, the NEADS battle commander, will later reflect, “As a military man, there are times that you have to make sacrifices that you have to make.” [ABC NEWS, 8/30/2002; ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] However, the Selfridge jets never have to intercept either of the two suspect aircraft, and instead are able to head back to base. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 70; WOLVERINE GUARD, 9/2006 ] Selfridge Called due to Concerns about Delta 1989? - According to author Lynn Spencer, the NEADS weapons technician’s call to the Selfridge unit is made in response to a report NEADS received about the possible hijacking of Delta 1989 (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178] Vanity Fair magazine and the 9/11 Commission will also say NEADS calls the Selfridge unit in response to this report about Delta 1989. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] NORAD Commander Gives Different Account - However, Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region, will suggest the Selfridge unit is called due to concerns about both Delta 1989 and Flight 93. He will say: “We were concerned about Flight 93 and this Delta aircraft [Flight 1989] and were trying to find aircraft in the vicinity to help out. We didn’t know where it was going to go. We were concerned about Detroit… and the fighters up there were out of gas with no armament.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 71] NEADS Commander Claims Fighters Sent toward Flight 93 - Robert Marr will give another different account. He will claim that NEADS contacts the Selfridge base solely because of its concerns over Flight 93. He tells author Leslie Filson that before Flight 93 reversed course and headed back east (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001), NEADS thought it was “headed toward Detroit or Chicago. I’m thinking Chicago is the target and know that Selfridge Air National Guard Base has F-16s in the air.” NEADS contacts “them so they could head off 93 at the pass.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 68] Marr will tell the 9/11 Commission that the Selfridge F-16s are going to be “too far from Cleveland to do any good,” and so he believes NEADS directs them to intercept Flight 93. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/23/2004 ] (Presumably, he means the jets cannot be responding to Delta 1989, which has been told to land in Cleveland [USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] ) 9/11 Commission Disputes Arnold's and Marr's Accounts - The 9/11 Commission will reject Arnold’s and Marr’s accounts. It will state, “The record demonstrates, however, that… the military never saw Flight 93 at all” before it crashes, and conclude, “The Selfridge base was contacted by NEADS not regarding Flight 93, but in response to another commercial aircraft in the area that was reported hijacked (Delta Flight 1989, which ultimately was resolved as not hijacked).” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 101 ] Lt. Col. Doug Champagne, the pilot of one of the Selfridge F-16s, will recall that “he and his colleague never received orders to intercept [Flight 93] in any way.” [MOUNT CLEMENS-CLINTON-HARRISON JOURNAL, 9/6/2006] Reports based on interviews with the two Selfridge pilots will make no mention of the jets being directed to intercept Delta 1989 either (see (9:56 a.m.-10:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 68-70; WOLVERINE GUARD, 9/2006 ; MOUNT CLEMENS-CLINTON-HARRISON JOURNAL, 9/6/2006] Entity Tags: Larry Arnold, 127th Wing, Doug Champagne, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Robert Marr, Selfridge Air National Guard Base Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Reagan Airport Control Tower Evacuated due to Report of Approaching Aircraft The air traffic control tower at Washington’s Reagan National Airport is evacuated, after it is informed that a suspicious aircraft—presumably Flight 93—is heading its way. Warning of Approaching Aircraft - In the control tower, supervisor Chris Stephenson receives a call from the FAA’s Herndon Command Center, telling him: “You have another [aircraft] headed your way. Confirmed bomb on board.” This information also makes it to the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) at the airport. Around this time, the Command Center changes the information it has for Flight 93’s flight plan, so that it shows a destination of Reagan Airport (see 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001). This means air traffic controllers are now able to track the flight on their situation displays. But in response to the news that the approaching aircraft has a bomb on board, the facility manager at Reagan Airport becomes concerned about the safety of his employees and decides to evacuate the control tower. Tower Controllers Evacuated - Dan Creedon, a controller in the TRACON, tries calling the tower repeatedly, to pass on the manager’s instruction to evacuate, but he is unable to get through. He therefore leaves his post and takes the elevator up the tower. Once he reaches the control tower cab, he announces that there are to be “minimum bodies” in the tower, with only a skeletal staff remaining. Four controllers therefore volunteer to leave. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 215-216] (Seven or eight controllers usually work in the tower during a given shift, so this would mean three or four controllers remain there. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/28/2003 ] ) Terminal Being Evacuated - When they make it down to the airport terminal, the controllers find that it too is being evacuated. Police are yelling at the crowd: “Everybody’s got to go! There are no more flights! Leave your stuff! Just go! It doesn’t matter where you go, just get away from the airport.” Other Controllers Head to Mobile Unit - The controllers who had remained behind decide they too should leave the tower and relocate to an emergency mobile unit. Before doing so, they temporarily turn over the command and control of their airspace to Washington, DC, police helicopters. They are then escorted by members of the Secret Service down from the tower and through the terminal. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 216] Entity Tags: Chris Stephenson, Federal Aviation Administration, Dan Creedon, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Changes Its Destination The pilot hijacker of Flight 93 (presumably Ziad Jarrah) reprograms the plane’s navigational system for a new destination. He dials in the navigational code for Washington’s Reagan National Airport, which is just four miles from the White House, and an arrival time of 10:28 a.m. The 9/11 Commission says this further indicates that the plane’s intended target is the nation’s capital. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 78 AND 182; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 457; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 45 ] According to the St. Petersburg Times, a minute later, at 9:56, “the destination code for [Flight 93] in FAA computers was changed from ‘SFO,’ the code for San Francisco, to ‘DCA,’ the code for Reagan National Airport in Washington. That indicates an air traffic controller probably changed the destination. Typically, that is done only when it is requested by the pilots.” [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/12/2001] Twenty-five minutes earlier, someone in Flight 93’s cockpit had radioed in and requested a new flight plan from the FAA, with a final destination of Washington (see 9:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS Officers Quickly Create Battle Plan for Responding to Attacks At NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), two weapons controllers are instructed to come up with a battle plan for defending the US, and in response quickly piece together an extensive strategy. Major James Fox, the leader of the weapons team, comes over to the weapons station on the NEADS operations floor. He points at weapons controllers Trey Murphy and Michael Julian, both of whom are graduates of the Air Force’s Fighter Weapons School, and says, “The boss wants you two.” Murphy and Julian head upstairs to the glass-enclosed battle cab, where battle commander Colonel Robert Marr is waiting for them. Murphy asks, “What do you need me to do?” Marr responds, “Un-f_ck this!” Murphy takes this to mean: “Right now, I have chaos. Bring me order. Make me a battle plan.” Murphy and Julian head back to the operations floor to get their notebooks and pens, and then look for somewhere quiet to work. They find an empty conference room, and immediately begin working on a defense strategy for the United States. The two men come up with everything that needs to be in place to defend the major cities: the fighter jets required, the altitudes the jets should fly at, the requirements for tanker planes, and the radio frequencies that will be needed. Within minutes, they have pieced together an extensive plan. Murphy and Julian then return to the battle cab, where they set about putting it into action. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 188-190] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Michael Julian, Robert Marr, James Fox, Trey Murphy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

After 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001: Ellington Fighters Airborne on Local Training Mission Two F-16s from the 147th Fighter Wing, Ellington Air National Guard Base, Texas, are said to be already airborne on a local training mission when they are instructed to escort Air Force One after it departs Sarasota, Florida, with President Bush on board. [AMERICAN DEFENDER, 12/2001 ; CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002] Entity Tags: Ellington Air National Guard Base, 147th Fighter Wing, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

(9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Air Force One Gets Airborne Without Fighter Escort

Air Force One departs Sarasota. [Source: Associated Press] President Bush departs from the Sarasota, Florida, airport on Air Force One. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/12/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/16/2001; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002; DAILY MAIL, 9/8/2002; ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002; CBS NEWS, 9/11/2002; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 3/22/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Amazingly, his plane takes off without any fighters protecting it. “The object seemed to be simply to get the president airborne and out of the way,” says an administration official. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001] There are still 3,520 planes in the air over the US. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] About half of the planes in the Florida region where Bush’s plane is are still airborne. [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/7/2002] Apparently, fighters don’t meet up with Air Force One until about an hour later. Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke claims to have heard around 9:50 a.m. from the bunker containing Vice President Cheney that fighter escort had been authorized. [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 8-9] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush, Key Day of 9/11 Events

(9:56 a.m.-10:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Selfridge Jets Apparently Not Instructed to Intercept Suspicious Plane as NEADS Wants, Return to Base Instead

Douglas Champagne. [Source: David Kujawa / US Air Force] Although NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) has contacted Selfridge Air National Guard Base in Michigan, reportedly to arrange that two of its F-16s be diverted from a training mission to intercept either Flight 93 or Delta Air Lines Flight 1989 (accounts conflict over which aircraft is concerned), the pilots of those jets apparently never receive an order to intercept a plane, and so return directly to their base. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 68, 71; WOLVERINE GUARD, 9/2006 ; MOUNT CLEMENS-CLINTON-HARRISON JOURNAL, 9/6/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178] However, some accounts will claim the pilots are indeed ordered to intercept the suspect aircraft. [ABC NEWS, 8/30/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/30/2002; POST-STANDARD (SYRACUSE), 3/27/2005; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 188] Jets Returning from Training Mission - The F-16s, piloted by Lieutenant Colonel Tom Froling and Major Douglas Champagne of the 127th Wing, had taken off from Selfridge Air National Guard Base at around 8:50 a.m. for a routine training mission at Grayling Range in central northern Michigan. The two pilots were oblivious to the attacks taking place in New York and Washington. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 68; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 4/26/2005; WOLVERINE GUARD, 9/2006 ] When they started heading back to Selfridge after completing their training mission, they began hearing “unusual radio traffic” as air traffic controllers began diverting flights from their original destinations. [MOUNT CLEMENS-CLINTON-HARRISON JOURNAL, 9/6/2006] Pilots Learn of Plane Hitting Pentagon - Froling will later recall: “Something strange was occurring and I couldn’t put my finger on what was happening. I could hear [the FAA’s] Cleveland Center talking to the airlines and I started putting things together and knew something was up.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 68-70] Champagne hears an air traffic controller stating that a plane has crashed at the Pentagon. He then hears the Cleveland Center announcing a “demon watch,” which means pilots have to contact their operations center for more information. Commander Asks if Pilots Have Used up Their Ammunition - When Champagne calls the Selfridge base, his operations group commander, General Michael Peplinski, wants to know if he and Froling have used up their ammunition during the training mission. Champagne will recall: “[Peplinski] asked if we had expended all our munitions and specifically asked if we had strafed. We replied that all ordnance was gone. I assumed we had strafed without clearance and had injured someone down range. We had no idea what was happening on the Eastern seaboard.” [WOLVERINE GUARD, 9/2006 ; MOUNT CLEMENS-CLINTON-HARRISON JOURNAL, 9/6/2006] Pilots Directed to Return to Base - According to author Lynn Spencer, because a commander with the 127th Wing agreed to turn the two F-16s over to NEADS (see (9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001), Champagne and Froling are instructed to call NEADS. When they do so, they are ordered to intercept Delta 1989. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178, 180, 188] But according to other accounts, they are “ordered south in case United Airlines 93 was targeting Chicago.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002; POST-STANDARD (SYRACUSE), 3/27/2005] However, according to two reports based on interviews with Champagne, Peplinski only instructs the two pilots to return to their base and land on its auxiliary runway. Pilots Apparently Not Ordered to Intercept Aircraft - Accounts based on interviews with the pilots will make no mention of the jets being directed to intercept Delta 1989 or Flight 93. According to Champagne, the air traffic controller’s announcement that an aircraft hit the Pentagon “was the only indication we received that other aircraft and buildings were involved.” Champagne will say that “he and his colleague never received orders to intercept [Flight 93] in any way.” The two pilots “had no ammunition… and only an hour’s worth of fuel remaining. And as they approached Selfridge amid the puzzling radio transmissions, they still were oblivious to what was transpiring.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 68-70; WOLVERINE GUARD, 9/2006 ; MOUNT CLEMENS-CLINTON-HARRISON JOURNAL, 9/6/2006] Jets Land at Base - The two F-16s land back at Selfridge Air National Guard Base at 10:29 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/27/2003 ] As Champagne pulls in his aircraft, his friend Captain Sean Campbell approaches and mouths the words to him: “It’s bad. It’s really, really bad.” [WOLVERINE GUARD, 9/2006 ; MOUNT CLEMENS-CLINTON-HARRISON JOURNAL, 9/6/2006] Entity Tags: Doug Champagne, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Tom Froling, 127th Wing, Sean Campbell, Michael Peplinski, Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:56-10:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Air Force One Takes Off, Then Flies in Circles While Bush and Cheney Argue Air Force One takes off and quickly gains altitude. One passenger later says, “It was like a rocket. For a good ten minutes, the plane was going almost straight up.” [CBS NEWS, 9/11/2002] Once the plane reaches cruising altitude, it flies in circles. Journalists on board sense this because the television reception for a local station generally remains good. “Apparently Bush, Cheney, and the Secret Service argue over the safety of Bush coming back to Washington.” [SALON, 9/11/2001; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001] For much of the day Bush is plagued by connectivity problems in trying to call Cheney and others. He is forced to use an ordinary cell phone instead of his secure phone. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush, Dick Cheney

(After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Texas Air National Guard Jets Directed toward Air Force One

Two F-16s belonging to the 147th Fighter Wing. [Source: Gonda Moncada / Texas Military Forces] Four armed F-16 fighter jets belonging to the Texas Air National Guard are directed toward Air Force One in order to escort the president’s plane. [BBC, 9/1/2002; CBS NEWS, 9/10/2003; BOMBARDIER, 9/8/2006 ; ROSENFELD AND GROSS, 2007, PP. 40] SEADS Sends Fighters toward Air Force One - Air Force One has taken off from Sarasota, Florida (see (9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and the White House has requested a fighter escort for it (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001). [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/4/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 38] NORAD’s Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS) orders jets that belong to the 147th Fighter Wing of the Texas Air National Guard toward the president’s plane. [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 4/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 87; ROSENFELD AND GROSS, 2007, PP. 40] Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region, will later recall: “We were not told where Air Force One was going. We were told just to follow the president.” [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002] Ellington Field an 'Alert' Site - The 147th Fighter Wing is based at Ellington Field, a joint civil and military use airport about 15 miles south of Houston. [HOUSTON CHRONICLE, 12/9/2003; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 8/21/2005; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 1/21/2006] Ellington Field is one of NORAD’s seven “alert” sites around the US, which all have a pair of armed fighters ready to take off immediately if called upon. [AIRMAN, 12/1999; AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, 2/2002] Pilots Not Told What Their Target Is - Two of the F-16s sent toward Air Force One are on the ground at Ellington Field and have been placed on “battle stations,” with the pilots sitting in the cockpits, when the scramble order is received. [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 4/2002] The other two have been flying a training mission (see After 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001), and are pulled off it to escort Air Force One. [AMERICAN DEFENDER, 12/2001 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 255] Among the four pilots are Shane Brotherton and Randy Roberts. Their new mission is so secret that their commander does not tell them where they are going. When they ask what their target is, the commander says, “You’ll know when you see it.” Brotherton will later recall, “I didn’t have any idea what we were going up [for] until that point.” [CBS NEWS, 9/10/2003; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 255] Jets First to Reach Air Force One - At least two of the 147th Fighter Wing F-16s will be seen from Air Force One at around 11:30 a.m., although an official will tell reporters on board that fighters are escorting the plane about 15 minutes before that time (see (11:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). They are the first fighters to reach Air Force One after it left Sarasota, according to most accounts. [USA TODAY, 9/11/2001; FILSON, 2003, PP. 87; CBS NEWS, 9/10/2003; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/4/2004; ROSENFELD AND GROSS, 2007, PP. 40; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 255] However, a few accounts will indicate the first jets to reach it belong to a unit of the Florida Air National Guard located at Jacksonville International Airport (see (10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 9/2001; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001] The 147th Fighter Wing F-16s will accompany Air Force One all the way to Washington, DC. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 87-88; GALVESTON COUNTY DAILY NEWS, 7/9/2005] Entity Tags: Larry Arnold, 147th Fighter Wing, Randy Roberts, Southeast Air Defense Sector, Shane Brotherton Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

(Shortly After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Bush and Cheney Confer; Bush Supposedly Gives Shootdown Authorization President Bush talks on the phone to Vice President Dick Cheney. Cheney recommends that Bush authorize the military to shoot down any plane that might be under the control of hijackers. “I said, ‘You bet,’” Bush later recalls. “We had a little discussion, but not much.” [USA TODAY, 9/16/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002; CBS NEWS, 9/11/2002] Bush recalls that this isn’t a difficult decision for him to make, “once I realized there was a protocol… because again, I now realized we’re under attack. This is a war.” According to journalists Bob Woodward and Bill Sammon, this call between Bush and Cheney takes place shortly after 9:56, when Air Force One took off from the Sarasota airport. [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 102; WOODWARD, 2002, PP. 17-18; WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] Consistent with this, Bush and Cheney will tell the 9/11 Commission that Bush gives the shootdown authorization during a call estimated to occur between about 10:00 and 10:15 (see (Between 10:00 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). But the 9/11 Commission will say the authorization is given in a later call, at 10:18 (see 10:18 a.m.-10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 40-41] Bush later indicates that he doesn’t make any major decisions about how to respond to the attacks until after boarding Air Force One, which fits with these accounts of him approving shootdown authorization after take off. [WHITE HOUSE, 12/4/2001; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 3/22/2004 ] But according to counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, the authorization is given earlier, at some point between about 9:38 and 9:56 (see (9:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ABC NEWS, 11/29/2003; CLARKE, 2004, PP. 8] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, George Bush, Dick Cheney

(Shortly After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Deena Burnett Informs FBI of Husband’s Phone Calls from Flight 93 Deena Burnett has just minutes earlier spoken by phone with her husband, Tom Burnett, a passenger on Flight 93 (see 9:54 a.m. September 11, 2001). According to Deena Burnett’s account that she presents in her own book in 2006, an FBI agent she talked with after her husband’s first call (see 9:31 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001) now calls and speaks to her again, briefly. She tells the agent she has just got off the phone with her husband. He wants to know if Tom provided any details of the hijackers, such as how many there are and what language they speak, but Deena says no. She says the only background noise she heard was other people who seemed to be sitting near her husband, speaking English. During Tom’s final call, the background was silent. The agent says the FBI has tried calling Tom’s cell phone, but there was no answer. [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 68-69] According to the account in Deena Burnett’s book, this appears to be her first contact with the FBI since she made her 911 call at 9:31. But according to journalist and author Jere Longman, Deena called the FBI shortly after 9:35, following her second call from her husband (see (Between 9:36 a.m. and 9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 110] Deena will speak with the FBI again more than two hours later, when three agents arrive at her house to interview her (see (12:30 p.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Deena Burnett, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Tom Burnett Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

9:57 a.m. September 11, 2001: Passengers Begin Attempt to Regain Control of Flight 93 One of the hijackers in the cockpit asks if anything is going on, apparently meaning outside the cockpit. “Fighting,” the other says. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 210] An analysis of the cockpit flight recording suggests that the passenger struggle actually starts in the front of the plane (where Mark Bingham and Tom Burnett are sitting) about a minute before a struggle in the back of the plane (where Todd Beamer is sitting). [OBSERVER, 12/2/2001] Officials later theorize that the Flight 93 passengers reach the cockpit using a food cart as a battering ram and a shield. They claim digital enhancement of the cockpit voice recorder reveals the sound of plates and glassware crashing around 9:57 a.m. [NEWSWEEK, 12/3/2001] Entity Tags: Todd Beamer, Mark Bingham, Tom Burnett Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Key Day of 9/11 Events

Shortly Before 9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001: Todd Beamer Describes Flight 93 Passengers’ Plan to Fight Back; He and Others Join Takeover Attempt Since 9:45 a.m., Flight 93 passenger Todd Beamer has been talking by Airfone to Lisa Jefferson, a GTE customer service supervisor (see 9:45 a.m.-9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001). Beamer is a devout Christian, and asks Jefferson to recite the Lord’s Prayer with him. He then recites the 23rd Psalm. He also gives her his home phone number and tells her to contact his wife if he does not survive, and let his family know how much he loves them. [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 9/17/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/22/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 198-200] He tells Jefferson that some of the passengers are going to “jump” the hijacker who claims to have a bomb, and try to seize control of the plane. He says, “We’re going to do something. I know I’m not going to get out of this.” In the background, Jefferson can hear an “awful commotion” of people shouting, and women screaming, “Oh my God,” “God help us,” and “Help us Jesus.” Beamer lets go of the phone but leaves it connected. Jefferson can hear him speaking to someone else, saying the words that later become famous: “Are you ready guys? Let’s roll” (alternate version: “You ready? Okay. Let’s roll”). [NEWSWEEK, 9/22/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 203-204] Beamer reportedly talks to Jefferson for 13 minutes, meaning his last words to her are at 9:58 a.m. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/16/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/19/2001] Jefferson then hears more screaming and other commotion. She remains on the phone until after the time Flight 93 crashes (see (9:59 a.m.-10:49 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ORLANDO SENTINEL, 9/5/2002] Entity Tags: Lisa Jefferson, Todd Beamer Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(9:57 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001: Passengers and Hijackers Struggle in the Flight 93 Cockpit “In the cockpit! In the cockpit!” is heard. The hijackers are reportedly heard telling each other to hold the door. In English, someone outside shouts, “Let’s get them.” The hijackers are also praying “Allah o akbar” (God is great). One of the hijackers suggests shutting off the oxygen supply to the cabin (which apparently would not have had any effect since the plane was already below 10,000 feet). A hijacker says, “Should we finish?” Another one says, “Not yet.” The sounds of the passengers get clearer, and in unaccented English “Give it to me!” is heard. “I’m injured,” someone says in English. Then something like “roll it up” and “lift it up” is heard. Passengers’ relatives believe this sequence proves that the passengers did take control of the plane. [OBSERVER, 12/2/2001; NEWSWEEK, 12/3/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 270-271; MSNBC, 7/30/2002; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 7/31/2002] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Requests Help from Western Air Defense Sector

McChord Air Force Base. [Source: Michel Teiten] Major Kevin Nasypany, the mission crew commander at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), calls NORAD’s Western Air Defense Sector (WADS), which is at McChord Air Force Base in Washington State, to request assistance. He says: “I’d like to… steal some aircraft out of Fargo from you guys.… Bring up the weapons too, if possible,” to which WADS replies: “Yep, ok. We will do that.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001] The three F-16s launched from Langley Air Force Base at 9:30 (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) are in fact from the North Dakota Air National Guard’s 119th Fighter Wing, which, though based at Fargo, ND, has had a detachment of two F-16s on alert at Langley since late 2000. However, these are under the command of NEADS, not WADS. [VIRGINIAN-PILOT, 9/22/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; MCCHORD AIR MUSEUM, 2007] It is therefore not clear what specific fighters are now being referred to when Nasypany speaks of the “aircraft out of Fargo,” nor is it clear if and when these planes are launched. Colonel John Cromwell, the commander of WADS, will later recall that he calls every fighter wing commander west of the Mississippi, and by midday (3:00 p.m. ET) has more than 100 fighter jets on alert. [NEWS TRIBUNE (TACOMA, WA), 6/3/2006] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Western Air Defense Sector, Kevin Nasypany Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001: Fighters to New York City Possibly Scrambled 56 Minutes Late, According to Giuliani and Early Reports According to New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s 9/11 Commission testimony in 2004, about one minute before the first WTC tower falls, he is able to reach the White House by phone. Speaking to Chris Henick, deputy political director to President Bush, Giuliani learns the Pentagon has been hit and he asks about fighter cover over New York City. Henick replies, “The jets were dispatched 12 minutes ago and they should be there very shortly, and they should be able to defend you against further attack.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/19/2004] If this is true, it means fighters scramble from the Otis base around 9:46 a.m., not at 8:52 a.m., as most other accounts have claimed. While Giuliani’s account may seem wildly off, it is consistent with reports shortly after 9/11. In the first few days, acting Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers, and a NORAD spokesman, Marine Corps Major Mike Snyder, claimed no fighters were scrambled anywhere until after the Pentagon was hit. [US CONGRESS, 9/13/2001; BOSTON GLOBE, 9/15/2001] This story only changed on the evening of September 14, 2001, when CBS reported, “contrary to early reports, US Air Force jets did get into the air on Tuesday while the attacks were under way.” [CBS NEWS, 9/14/2001] Entity Tags: Rudolph (“Rudy”) Giuliani, Mike Snyder, Chris Henick, Richard B. Myers, Pentagon Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(Between 9:58 a.m. and 10:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Elizabeth Wainio Ends Call, Saying Flight 93 Passengers Are Going to Break into Cockpit Since around 9:54, Flight 93 passenger Elizabeth Wainio has been speaking by phone with her stepmother Esther Heymann (see (9:54 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 44 ] Wainio ends her call saying, “They’re getting ready to break into the cockpit. I have to go. I love you. Good-bye.” She then hangs up. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 172] The 9/11 Commission concludes that the passengers’ revolt against the hijackers that Wainio is referring to begins at 9:57 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 45 ] Yet according to journalist and author Jere Longman, Wainio’s call lasts 11 minutes, and ends at “just past ten” o’clock, which is several minutes after the revolt starts. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 171-172] In fact, if Wainio’s call began around 9:54, as is officially claimed, and lasts 11 minutes, it would end around 10:05. This is after official accounts claim Flight 93 crashed, but before the crash time of 10:06 later provided by an analysis of seismic records (see (10:03 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, according to the 9/11 Commission and a summary of passenger phone calls presented at the 2006 Zacarias Moussaoui trial, Wainio’s call only lasts four-and-a-half minutes. This would mean it ends just shortly after the passenger revolt begins. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; KIM AND BAUM, 2002 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 30; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 44 AND 46 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] Entity Tags: Elizabeth Wainio, Esther Heymann Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(Before 9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Gold Transported Through WTC Basement Large amounts of gold are stored in vaults in the massive basement below the WTC, and some of this is being transported through the basement this morning. Several weeks later, recovery workers will discover hundreds of ingots in a service tunnel below WTC 5, along with a ten-wheel lorry and some cars (which were, presumably, transporting the gold) (see (Mid-October-mid November 2001)). The lorry and cars had been crushed by falling steel, but no bodies will be reported found with them, so presumably they were abandoned before the first WTC collapse, at 9:59 a.m. [NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, 10/31/2001; LONDON TIMES, 11/1/2001] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

Shortly Before 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001: Police Officers Concerned that WTC Will Collapse Shanthy Nambiar, a reporter for BridgeNews in New York, is standing on Vesey Street, beneath World Trade Center Building 7. She hears someone shout, “You guys shouldn’t be in this area.” As she later recalls, “Police officers ordered people to start fleeing the area, saying the towers were in danger of collapse.” She runs north one block and then sees the South Tower coming down. [CASEY, 2001, PP. 156 AND 315] Although a New York City Police Department (NYPD) helicopter has reported “large pieces” falling from the South Tower (see (9:49 a.m.) September 11, 2001), the 9/11 Commission states, “Prior to 9:59, no NYPD helicopter pilot predicted that either tower would collapse.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 304] Why these officers believed in advance that the towers were in danger of collapsing is therefore unclear. Entity Tags: Shanthy Nambiar, New York City Police Department Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001: Most Workers in South Tower Who Could Evacuate Have Done So Almost all the occupants of the South Tower who are able to evacuate the building have done so and have crossed the street to safety. Only eleven occupants who were below the impact floors are still in the building when it collapses. However, 619 building occupants in or above the impact zone have either already died or perish in the collapse, as do many emergency workers. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. XXXIX, 44 ] Most workers in the North Tower also leave the building before it collapses (see 10:27 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center

(Before 9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001: EMT Worker Given Message That WTC Towers Are Going to Collapse; High-Level Officials Evacuate Lobby of North Tower

Fireman Mike Kehoe heads upstairs while others flee downstairs. Kehoe luckily survived the building collapses. [Source: John Labriola] In the lobby of Building 7 of the WTC, EMS Division Chief John Peruggia is in discussion with Fire Department Captain Richard Rotanz and a representative from the Department of Buildings. As Peruggia later describes, “It was brought to my attention, it was believed that the structural damage that was suffered to the [Twin] Towers was quite significant and they were very confident that the building’s stability was compromised and they felt that the North Tower was in danger of a near imminent collapse.” Peruggia grabs EMT Richard Zarrillo and tells him to pass on the message “that the buildings have been compromised, we need to evacuate, they’re going to collapse.” Zarrillo heads out to the fire command post, situated in front of 3 World Financial, the American Express Building, where he relays this message to several senior firefighters. He says, “OEM says the buildings are going to collapse; we need to get out.” (OEM is the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management, which has its headquarters in WTC 7.) Fire Chief Pete Ganci’s response is, “who the f___ told you that?” Seconds later, they hear the noise of the South Tower as it collapses. [CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/23/2001; CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/25/2001; CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/25/2001; CITY OF NEW YORK, 11/9/2001] Others also appear to have been aware of the imminent danger. Fire Chief Joseph Pfeifer, who is at the command post in the lobby of the North Tower, says, “Right before the South Tower collapsed, I noticed a lot of people just left the lobby, and I heard we had a crew of all different people, high-level people in government, everybody was gone, almost like they had information that we didn’t have.” He says some of them are moving to a new command post across the street. [CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/23/2001; FIREHOUSE MAGAZINE, 4/2002; DWYER AND FLYNN, 2005, PP. 214] Mayor Giuliani also says he receives a prior warning of the first collapse, while at his temporary headquarters at 75 Barclay Street (see (Before 9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Richard Rotanz, Joseph Pfeifer, John Peruggia, World Trade Center, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, Key Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

Shortly Before 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001: Ground Shakes Prior to South Tower Collapse Some witnesses near the World Trade Center feel the ground shaking just before the South Tower starts to collapse: EMT Joseph Fortis is heading across West Street, when, he says, “the ground started shaking like a train was coming.” He then looks up and sees the South Tower starting to collapse. [CITY OF NEW YORK, 11/9/2001] Lonnie Penn, another EMT, is outside the Marriott Hotel, which is adjacent to the North Tower. He and his partner “felt the ground shake. You could see the towers sway and then it just came down.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 11/9/2001] Bradley Mann is at the EMS staging area on Vesey Street. He says, “Shortly before the first tower came down I remember feeling the ground shaking. I heard a terrible noise, and then debris just started flying everywhere.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 11/7/2001] Battalion Chief Brian O’Flaherty is walking into the lobby of the Marriott Hotel. He says, “I hear a noise. Right after that noise, you could feel the building start to shudder, tremble, under your feet.” He then hears the “terrible noise” of the South Tower collapsing. [CITY OF NEW YORK, 1/9/2002] Witnesses will also notice the ground shaking before the North Tower collapses (see Shortly Before 10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Joseph Fortis, Lonnie Penn, Bradley Mann, Brian O’Flaherty Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center

(Between 9:58 a.m. and 9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Passenger Edward Felt Reports Explosion and Smoke, Supervisor Will Claim; Others Dispute This According to an emergency call center supervisor who listens in on the call, when passenger Edward Felt phones 911 from Flight 93 to report that his plane has been hijacked, he says he has heard an explosion and sees smoke coming from the plane. But others will explicitly deny this. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 3/27/2002] Felt called 911 on his cell phone at 9:58 a.m., and talks to a dispatcher at the 911 center in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania (see 9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001). [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 193; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 45 ] Said to Mention Explosion - Glenn Cramer, a supervisor at the center, listens in on the call on a separate line. The following day, he will tell the FBI that Felt said “some sort of explosion had occurred aboard the aircraft,” and “that there was white smoke somewhere on the plane.” [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/12/2001 ; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 12/7/2001] Cramer will similarly tell the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette that Felt said he “did hear some sort of an explosion and saw white smoke coming from the plane, but he didn’t know where.” [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/12/2001] Some people will later cite this account as evidence that Flight 93 was shot down by the military to prevent it reaching its target, or was brought down when a bomb on board went off. [PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, 11/15/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 3/27/2002; INDEPENDENT, 8/13/2002; MIRROR, 9/12/2002; PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, 9/16/2002] Account Disputed - However, others dispute Cramer’s account. John Shaw, the dispatcher who Felt talks to, will apparently make no mention of Felt reporting an explosion or smoke when he is interviewed by the FBI later in the day. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001 ] And, in 2002, Shaw will state specifically that Felt made no mention of any explosion or smoke. “Didn’t happen,” he will say. Sandra Felt, the wife of Edward Felt, will hear the recording of the 911 call and subsequently also say her husband did not mention an explosion or smoke. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 264; NEW YORK TIMES, 3/27/2002; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 4/21/2002; VALLEY NEWS DISPATCH, 9/11/2002] Authorities will not explain Cramer’s contradictory account, and in September 2002 Britain’s Daily Mirror will report, “Glenn Cramer has now been gagged by the FBI.” [PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, 11/15/2001; MIRROR, 9/12/2002] Entity Tags: Sandra Felt, John Shaw, Glenn Cramer, Edward Felt Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(Shortly Before 9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Condoleezza Rice Enters White House Bunker and Calls Relatives; Exact Time Unclear National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice arrives in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC), the bunker below the White House, and takes a seat next to Vice President Dick Cheney. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 40; BUMILLER, 2007, PP. XIII] The Secret Service ordered Rice to go down to the PEOC at around 9:45, when she was in the White House Situation Room (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FELIX, 2002, PP. 227; BBC RADIO 4, 8/1/2002 ] According to some accounts, the first thing she does after arriving there is call her aunt and uncle in Birmingham, Alabama, to tell them to inform her family that she is okay. [O, THE OPRAH MAGAZINE, 2/1/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/11/2002] But other accounts say she called them just before she headed out from the Situation Room. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/19/2002; BUMILLER, 2007, PP. XIII] When exactly Rice arrives in the PEOC is unclear. According to the 9/11 Commission, she enters the room “shortly after the vice president,” who, it will conclude, arrives there “shortly before 10:00, perhaps at 9:58.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 40] However, there are conflicting reports, with some accounts indicating Cheney arrived at the PEOC significantly earlier (see (9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/4/2004] And Rice must arrive before 9:59 a.m., since she is in the PEOC at the time the South Tower of the World Trade Center collapses, as is confirmed by a photo taken at that time (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NEWSWEEK, 12/31/2001; BUMILLER, 2007, PP. XIII; WASHINGTON POST, 6/24/2007] Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke will later indicate that Rice in fact went to the PEOC significantly earlier than other accounts suggest, at roughly around 9:15 (see (9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 3-4] Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

Shortly Before 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001: Some Witnesses See Ground-Level Explosion Just Before WTC 2 Collapses

Will Jimeno. [Source: Todd Plitt / USA Today] Some witnesses reportedly see a massive fireball at ground level, coming from the South Tower just before it starts to collapse. According to a report by the Mineta Transportation Institute (a research institute founded by Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta), “People inside the South Tower felt the floor vibrate as if a small earthquake were occurring.… The vibration lasted for about 30 seconds. The doors were knocked out, and a huge ball of flame created by the exploding diesel fuel from the building’s own supply tank shot from the elevator shaft and out the doors of the South Tower, consuming everything in its path. Minutes later, at 9:59 a.m., the tower collapsed.” [JENKINS AND EDWARDS-WINSLOW, 9/2003, PP. 16] Around the same time, Port Authority Police Officer Will Jimeno is in a corridor leading toward the North Tower. “Suddenly the hallway began to shudder,” and he sees “the giant fireball explode in the street,” when the South Tower begins to collapse. [BOWHUNTER, 1/2003] Ronald DiFrancesco is the last person to make it out of the South Tower before it collapses. As he is heading toward the exit that leads onto Church Street, he hears a loud roar as the collapse begins. According to the Ottawa Citizen, “Mr. DiFrancesco turned to his right in the direction of Liberty Street, to see a massive fireball—compressed as the South Tower fell—roiling toward [him].” He bolts for the exit, before being knocked unconscious and blown many yards across the street. [USA TODAY, 12/18/2001; OTTAWA CITIZEN, 6/4/2005; OTTAWA CITIZEN, 6/5/2005; PBS NOVA, 9/5/2006] A number of other witnesses report feeling the ground shaking just seconds before the South Tower collapses (see Shortly Before 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Will Jimeno, World Trade Center, Ronald DiFrancesco Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001: Passenger CeeCee Lyles Cries ‘They’re Doing It;’ Strange Sounds Follow

CeeCee Lyles. [Source: Family photo] CeeCee Lyles says to her husband, “Aah, it feels like the plane’s going down.” Her husband Lorne says, “What’s that?” She replies, “I think they’re going to do it. they’re forcing their way into the cockpit” (an alternate version says, “they’re getting ready to force their way into the cockpit”). A little later she screams, then says, “they’re doing it! they’re doing it! they’re doing it!” Her husband hears more screaming in the background, then he hears a “whooshing sound, a sound like wind,” then more screaming, and then the call breaks off. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 180] Entity Tags: CeeCee Lyles Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Passengers Run to First Class Sandy Bradshaw tells her husband, “Everyone’s running to first class. I’ve got to go. Bye.” She had been speaking with him since 9:50 a.m. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; BOSTON GLOBE, 11/23/2001] Entity Tags: Sandy Bradshaw Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Passenger Edward Felt Makes 911 Call from Bathroom Using Cell Phone

Edward Felt. [Source: Family photo] An emergency call is received at the 911 center in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, from Edward Felt, a passenger on Flight 93. [PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 9/8/2002] Felt makes the 911 call using his cell phone. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 45 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] It is answered by dispatcher John Shaw, on a line at the center specifically for incoming cell phone calls. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/12/2001 ; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 193] Glenn Cramer, a supervisor at the 911 center, hears Shaw responding to the caller, “You are what hijacked?” and consequently picks up a phone that allows him to listen in on the rest of Felt’s call. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/12/2001 ; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 12/7/2001] Call Center Workers Mishear Name - Felt identifies himself. Shaw and Cramer apparently mishear, and both will recall that he says his name is “Ed Wart.” [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001 ; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/12/2001 ] (The FBI will initially refuse to disclose the caller’s name to the press, but he is later revealed to have been Edward Felt, a 41-year-old engineer from New Jersey. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 194; NEW YORK TIMES, 3/27/2002] ) Felt says, “We are being hijacked, we are being hijacked!” He repeatedly states that his call is not a hoax. [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001] He says the passengers need help immediately. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001 ] Felt Answers Questions about His Flight, but Does Not Describe Hijackers - Shaw asks Felt standard questions, such as where is he? What type of plane is he on? And what has happened? [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/11/2002] Felt tells Shaw his cell phone number and says he is on United Airlines Flight 93 from Newark to San Francisco. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 193-194; PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 9/11/2002; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, A/K/A SHAQIL, A/K/A ABU KHALID AL SAHRAWI, DEFENDANT., 4/11/2006 ] He says he is locked in the bathroom of the plane, but does not say if this is its front or rear bathroom. He does not say anything about how many hijackers are on board, nor make any statements about any weapons the hijackers may possess. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/12/2001 ] Nor does he mention any attempt by the passengers to regain control of the plane. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 196] Felt Describes 'Lots of Passengers,' though Plane Is Mostly Empty - Shaw will recall to the FBI that Felt tells him the plane is loaded with numerous passengers. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001 ] Glenn Cramer will similarly tell the FBI that Felt describes “lots of passengers” on board. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/12/2001 ] Yet there are only 37 passengers (including the four hijackers) on Flight 93, constituting just 20 percent of its passenger capacity of 182. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 36 ] Felt says: “We’re going down. We’re going down.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 3/27/2002; PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 9/11/2002] Cramer will say that Felt describes an explosion on the aircraft and smoke coming from it, but others—including Shaw—will deny this (see (Between 9:58 a.m. and 9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/12/2001 ; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 264; VALLEY NEWS DISPATCH, 9/11/2002] Call Ends after One Minute - Shaw will tell the FBI the call lasts “less than five minutes” before the line disconnects. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001 ] According to other accounts, it lasts just over one minute. [DAYTON DAILY NEWS, 9/12/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 197; PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 9/8/2002; VALLEY NEWS DISPATCH, 9/11/2002] After the call ends, other employees at the Westmoreland County 911 center are instructed to notify the FBI and the FAA about it. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/12/2001 ] When the FBI arrives at the center, it will immediately take possession of the tape of Felt’s call. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, 11/15/2001] Entity Tags: Glenn Cramer, Edward Felt, John Shaw Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(Before 9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Giuliani Apparently Told WTC Towers Will Collapse When Fire Chiefs Think Otherwise

Mayor Rudolph Giuliani will become well known for his walking press conferences in the middle of the 9/11 crisis. [Source: Time Magazine/ Salient Stills] Between 9:25 a.m. and 9:45 a.m., one senior New York fire chief recommends to the Fire Department Chief of Department that there might be a WTC collapse in a few hours, and, therefore, fire units probably shouldn’t ascend much above the sixtieth floor (presumably this assumes the collapse would be gradual so those on lower floors would still have time to evacuate). This advice is not followed or not passed on. Apparently, no other senior fire chiefs mention or foresee the possibility of the WTC towers falling. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/19/2004] However, New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani recounts, “I went down to the scene and we set up headquarters at 75 Barclay Street, which was right there, with the police commissioner, the fire commissioner, the head of emergency management, and we were operating out of there when we were told that the World Trade Center was going to collapse. And it did collapse before we could actually get out of the building, so we were trapped in the building for ten, 15 minutes, and finally found an exit and got out, walked north, and took a lot of people with us.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2001] As can be seen by another account of similar events, this happens before the first WTC tower falls, not the second. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/19/2004] It is not clear who tells Giuliani to evacuate when no fire chiefs were considering the possibility of an imminent collapse. However, an EMT is also given a message around this time, warning that the towers are going to collapse. The origin of this information is apparently the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management, so this may also have been from where Giuliani heard of the imminent collapse (see (Before 9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Rudolph (“Rudy”) Giuliani Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: WTC Investigation, All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001: Vice President Cheney Appears Unemotional as South Tower Collapses

Dick Cheney and senior staff witness the collapse of the WTC South Tower. Directly behind Cheney are Norman Mineta and I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby. [Source: David Bohrer / White House] (click image to enlarge) In the conference room of the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC), Vice President Cheney, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and their aides watch the South Tower collapsing on television. [NEWSWEEK, 12/31/2001] Cheney will later say that the WTC coming down “was a shock to everybody—it certainly was to me.” [PBS, 9/9/2002] However, if he is indeed shocked, this is not how Cheney appears to others in the room. One witness who is present will later recall that, as the South Tower collapses, there is “a groan in the room that I won’t forget, ever. It seemed like one groan from everyone.” However, Cheney makes no sound, but closes his eyes for a long, slow blink. The witness says, “I remember turning my head and looking at the vice president, and his expression never changed.” [WASHINGTON POST, 6/24/2007] According to Mary Matalin, a counselor to the vice president, Cheney says nothing in response to the collapse, but “he emoted in a way that he emotes, which was to stop.” [CNN, 9/11/2002; CNN, 9/11/2002] When he is told that a casualty estimate ranges well into the thousands, the vice president reportedly just nods grimly. [NEWSWEEK, 12/31/2001] According to the Washington Post, three people who are present say they see no sign now or later “of the profound psychological transformation that has often been imputed to Cheney.” What they see is “extraordinary self-containment and a rapid shift of focus to the machinery of power. While others assessed casualties and the work of ‘first responders,’ Cheney began planning for a conflict that would call upon lawyers as often as soldiers and spies.” He will promptly begin assembling the legal team that subsequently assists him in expanding presidential power (see (After 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 6/24/2007] Entity Tags: Mary Matalin, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Dick Cheney

(9:59 a.m.-10:49 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Supervisor Remains on Phone to Flight 93, Yet Does Not Hear Plane Crashing

A GTE Airfone recovered from the debris of Flight 93 in Pennsylvania. [Source: Smithsonian National Museum of American History] After Flight 93 passenger Todd Beamer has finished speaking to GTE customer service supervisor Lisa Jefferson (see Shortly Before 9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001), he puts down the seatback phone he has been talking on but leaves the line connected. Jefferson continues listening until after the time the plane crashes, yet does not hear any sound when the crash occurs. As she later recalls, “I was still on the line and the plane took a dive and by then, it just went silent. I held on until after the plane crashed—probably about 15 minutes longer and I never heard a crash—it just went silent because—I can’t explain it. We didn’t lose a connection because there’s a different sound that you use. It’s a squealing sound when you lose a connection. I never lost connection, but it just went silent.” She says that soon afterwards, “they had announced over the radio that United Airlines Flight 93 had just crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, and a guy put his hand on my shoulder and said, ‘Lisa, you can release the line now. That was his plane.‘… [E]ventually I gave in and I hung the phone up.” [BELIEFNET (.COM), 2006] According to a summary of the passenger phone calls presented at the 2006 trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, Beamer’s call lasts for “3,925 seconds.” As it began just before 9:44 a.m., this would mean it ends around 10:49 a.m. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] Entity Tags: Todd Beamer, Lisa Jefferson Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Controller Tells Otis Pilots They May Have to Shoot down a Hijacked Aircraft

An F-16 flies over New York City on September 12, 2001. Smoke is still rising from the World Trade Center. [Source: Air National Guard] An air traffic controller at the FAA’s New York Center radios the pilots launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to Flight 11 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) and tells them they may have to take out a hijacked aircraft. One of the two Otis pilots, Major Daniel Nash, will later recall, “The New York controller did come over the radio and say if we have another hijacked aircraft we’re going to have to shoot it down.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] However, he will add that this is just “an off-the-cuff statement.” [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002] It is unclear at what time this communication occurs, though a BBC documentary will place it at about the time the South Tower collapses, which would be around 9:59 a.m. [BBC, 9/1/2002] NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) has already radioed one of the Otis pilots to check that he is prepared to shoot down a hijacked aircraft (see (9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 153] But according to most accounts, the two pilots never receive an order from the military to shoot down hostile aircraft (see (After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 43; BOSTON GLOBE, 9/11/2005] Entity Tags: New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Timothy Duffy, Daniel Nash Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001: White House Finally Requests Continuity of Government Plans, Air Force One Escort, and Fighters for Washington According to the 9/11 Commission: “An Air Force lieutenant colonel working in the White House Military Office [joins] the [NMCC’s air threat] conference and state[s] that he had just talked to Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley. The White House request[s]: (1) the implementation of Continuity of Government measures, (2) fighter escorts for Air Force One, and (3) the establishment of a fighter combat air patrol over Washington, DC.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke gave the order to implement the Continuity of Government plan a few minutes earlier, from inside the White House Situation Room (see (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Before that, he had requested a fighter escort for Air Force One (see (Between 9:30 a.m. and 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and combat air patrols over all major US cities (not just Washington), according to his own recollection (see (Between 9:38 a.m. and 9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 7-8] Entity Tags: Stephen J. Hadley, Richard A. Clarke, National Military Command Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, Civil Liberties Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Richard Clarke

9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001: South Tower of WTC Collapses

The South Tower of the World Trade Center collapses. [Source: Associated Press] The South Tower of the World Trade Center tilts to the southeast and then collapses. It was hit by Flight 175 at 9:03 a.m., 56 minutes earlier (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/12/2001; MSNBC, 9/22/2001; USA TODAY, 12/20/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 44 ] The first sign of the collapse is visible on floor 82. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 87 ] The angle of the tilt will be disputed after 9/11 (see September-November 2005), as will the time it takes the towers to fall to the ground (see September 12, 2001-September 2005). [SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, 10/9/2001; EAGAR AND MUSSO, 12/2001; PBS NOVA, 5/2002; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 8/30/2006] Entity Tags: World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, Key Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

(Before 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: CIA Headquarters Staff Assumes Flight 93 Is Headed towards Them Employees at CIA headquarters are aware that Flight 93 is unaccounted for, and assume their building is its intended target. This is according to CIA contractor Billy Waugh, who is currently doing some work for the agency and is at its Langley headquarters at the time of the attacks. In a 2004 book, Waugh will describe: “We had witnessed the hits on the World Trade Center and knew the hijacked United Airlines Flight 93 remained unaccounted for. It was a widespread assumption within the building that this flight was headed straight for us in the CIA headquarters.” [WAUGH AND KEOWN, 2004, PP. 293-294] At around 10:00 a.m., much of CIA headquarters is evacuated, following reports of unresponsive aircraft possibly heading toward Washington (see (9:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [TENET, 2007, PP. 164] Waugh recalls, “There was no panic, just an understanding that those in my division needed to walk to the west parking lot, away from the buildings, and await the inevitable impact.” He adds that, “Upon hearing that Flight 93 had gone down in a Pennsylvania field, a couple of us returned to the HQ building to pick up any necessary gear.” [WAUGH AND KEOWN, 2004, PP. 294] The 9/11 Commission will state that Flight 93’s intended target is either the Capitol building or the White House, not CIA headquarters. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 14] However, in 2006 MSNBC will note, “to this day, the ultimate target of the terrorists on this aircraft has never been confirmed.” [MSNBC, 9/12/2006] Entity Tags: Billy Waugh, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001: Some Witnesses Hear Explosions as South Tower Collapses Numerous witnesses, including firefighters and other rescue workers, hear explosions at the start of, and during, the collapse of the south WTC tower. Some of them report hearing a single explosion: Jeff Birnbaum: “There was an explosion and the whole top leaned toward us and started coming down.” [ELECTRICAL WHOLESALING, 2/1/2002] Battalion Chief John Sudnik: “[W]e heard a loud explosion or what sounded like a loud explosion and looked up and I saw Tower Two start coming down.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 11/7/2001] Firefighter Edward Kennedy hears “a tremendous boom, explosion… and the top of the building was coming down at us.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 1/17/2002] Firefighter Edward Sheehey hears “an explosion, looked up, and the building started to collapse.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 12/4/2001] Battalion Chief Thomas Vallebuona: “I heard ‘boom,’ an exploding sound, a real loud bang. I looked up, and I could see the Trade Center starting to come down.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 1/2/2002] EMT Julio Marrero: “I heard a loud bang. We looked up, and we just saw the building starting to collapse.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/25/2001] Other witnesses report hearing multiple explosions: Journalist Pete Hamill: “We heard snapping sounds, pops, little explosions, and then the walls bulged out, and we heard a sound like an avalanche.” [NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, 9/11/2001] Police officer Sue Keane, who is an Army veteran, is located in the north WTC tower: “[I]t sounded like bombs going off. That’s when the explosions happened.… It started to get dark, then all of a sudden there was this massive explosion.” [HAGEN AND CAROUBA, 2002, PP. 65] Firefighter Keith Murphy, who is in the lobby of the North Tower: “[T]he first thing that happened, which I still think is strange to me, the lights went out.… I had heard right before the lights went out, I had heard a distant boom boom boom, sounded like three explosions.… At the time, I would have said they sounded like bombs, but it was boom boom boom and then the lights all go out.… I would say about 3, 4 seconds, all of a sudden this tremendous roar.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 12/5/2001] Firefighter Craig Carlsen hears “explosions coming from building two, the South Tower. It seemed like it took forever, but there were about ten explosions.… We then realized the building started to come down.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 1/25/2002] Firefighter Thomas Turilli, who is in the lobby of the North Tower: “[A]ll of a sudden you just heard like it almost actually that day sounded like bombs going off, like boom, boom, boom, like seven or eight, and then just a huge wind gust just came… It just seemed like a huge explosion.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 1/17/2002] Firefighter Stephen Viola: “[T]hat’s when the South Tower collapsed, and it sounded like a bunch of explosions. You heard like loud booms.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 1/10/2002] Firefighter Lance Lizzul: “[W]e heard some bangs. That made us look up, and that’s when the first Trade Center came down.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 12/10/2001] Paramedic Kevin Darnowski: “I heard three explosions, and then we heard like groaning and grinding, and Tower Two started to come down.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 11/9/2001] However, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, which conducts a three-year study of the WTC collapses, will subsequently claim it found “no corroborating evidence for alternative hypotheses suggesting that the WTC towers were brought down by controlled demolition using explosives” (see October 26, 2005). [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 146 ] Entity Tags: Julio Marrero, Stephen Viola, John Sudnik, Craig Carlsen, Ed Kennedy, Keith Murphy, Kevin Darnowski, Pete Hamill, Edward Sheehey, World Trade Center, Lance Lizzul, Thomas Vallebuona, Sue Keane, Jeff Birnbaum, Thomas Turilli Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center, WTC Investigation

9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Passenger Told of WTC Tower Collapse Contradicts Passenger Revolt Timing According to Lyz Glick, as recounted in the book “Among the Heroes,” she is speaking to her husband Jeremy Glick on Flight 93 when he tells her that passengers have been hearing from other phone calls that planes are crashing into the World Trade Center. He asks her, “Are [the hijackers] going to blow this plane up?” Lyz replies that she doesn’t know, but tells him that it is true two planes have crashed into the World Trade Center. He asks her if they’re going to crash the plane into the World Trade Center. She replies, “No. They’re not going there.” He asks why, and she replies that one of the towers has just fallen. “They knocked it down.” The first World Trade Center tower collapses at 9:59 and is seen by millions on television. The book makes clear that this exchange takes place at “almost ten o’clock” —within a minute of the tower collapse. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 147] This account contradicts the 9/11 Commission’s conclusion that the passenger assault on the cockpit begins at 9:58, because the tower collapse was definitely at 9:59. Only later in the same phone call does Jeremy Glick mention that passengers are still taking a vote on whether or not to attack the hijackers. He confers with others and tells Lyz that they’ve decided to do so, and then gets off the phone line. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 153-54] Entity Tags: Jeremy Glick, World Trade Center, Lyz Glick Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001: Some Witnesses Think South Tower Collapse Resembles a Controlled Demolition

Deputy Fire Commissioner Thomas Fitzpatrick. [Source: City of New York] Numerous witnesses to the collapse of the south WTC tower think it resembles a demolition using explosives. Some initially believe this is what is occurring: Reporter John Bussey watches the collapse from the Wall Street Journal’s offices across the street from the WTC. He says, “I… looked up out of the office window to see what seemed like perfectly synchronized explosions coming from each floor, spewing glass and metal outward. One after the other, from top to bottom, with a fraction of a second between, the floors blew to pieces.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 9/12/2001] Deputy Fire Commissioner Thomas Fitzpatrick: “I remember seeing, it looked like sparkling around one specific layer of the building.… Then the building started to come down. My initial reaction was that this was exactly the way it looks when they show you those implosions on TV.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/1/2001] Assistant Fire Commissioner Stephen Gregory: “I saw low-level flashes. In my conversation with Lieutenant Evangelista… he questioned me and asked me if I saw low-level flashes in front of the building, and I agreed with him… I saw a flash flash flash and then it looked like the building came down.… You know like when they demolish a building, how when they blow up a building, when it falls down? That’s what I thought I saw.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/3/2001] Firefighter Richard Banaciski: “It seemed like on television they blow up these buildings. It seemed like it was going all the way around like a belt, all these explosions.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 12/6/2001] Firefighter Joseph Meola: “As we are looking up at the building, what I saw was, it looked like the building was blowing out on all four sides. We actually heard the pops.… You thought it was just blowing out.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 12/11/2001] Fire Chief Frank Cruthers: “[T]here was what appeared to be at first an explosion. It appeared at the very top, simultaneously from all four sides, materials shot out horizontally. And then there seemed to be a momentary delay before you could see the beginning of the collapse.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/31/2001] Battalion Chief Brian Dixon: “I was watching the fire… the lowest floor of fire in the South Tower actually looked like someone had planted explosives around it because the whole bottom I could see—I could see two sides of it and the other side—it just looked like that floor blew out.… I thought, geez, this looks like an explosion up there, it blew out.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/25/2001] Firefighter Timothy Burke: “Then the building popped, lower than the fire… I was going oh, my god, there is secondary device because the way the building popped I thought it was an explosion.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 1/22/2002] Firefighter Edward Cachia: “It actually gave at a lower floor, not the floor where the plane hit, because we originally had thought there was like an internal detonation explosives because it went in succession, boom, boom, boom, boom, and then the tower came down.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 12/6/2001] Firefighter Kenneth Rogers: “[T]here was an explosion in the South Tower… I kept watching. Floor after floor after floor. One floor under another after another and when it hit about the fifth floor, I figured it was a bomb, because it looked like a synchronized deliberate kind of thing.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 12/10/2001] Reporter Beth Fertig: “The tower went down perfectly straight, as if a demolition crew had imploded it. I wondered if it was being brought down deliberately.” [GILBERT ET AL., 2002, PP. 78] Paramedic Daniel Rivera: “[D]o you ever see professional demolition where they set the charges on certain floors and then you hear ‘Pop, pop, pop, pop, pop’? That’s exactly what—because I thought it was that.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/10/2001] Battalion Chief Dominick DeRubbio: “It was weird how it started to come down. It looked like it was a timed explosion.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/12/2001] The Guardian will report that police on the scene said the collapse “looked almost like a ‘planned implosion’ designed to catch bystanders watching from the street.” [GUARDIAN, 9/12/2001] However, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, which conducts a three-year study of the WTC collapses, will reject suggestions that the WTC towers were brought down with explosives (see August 30, 2006). CTV will assert, “[F]lashes of light that seemed to indicate bombs detonating were not explosions. They were pockets of airs being forced out of windows as the sagging floors pushed downward.” [CTV, 9/12/2006] Entity Tags: Stephen Gregory, Edward Cachia, Dominick DeRubbio, Beth Fertig, Frank Cruthers, John Bussey, Richard Banaciski, Kenneth Rogers, World Trade Center, Joseph Meola, Timothy Burke, Brian Dixon, Daniel Rivera, Thomas Fitzpatrick Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center, WTC Investigation

(9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Richard Clarke Is Told Some Hijackers Have Al-Qaeda Connections Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke is told in private by Dale Watson, the head of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, “We got the passenger manifests from the airlines. We recognize some names, Dick. They’re al-Qaeda.” Clarke replies, “How the f_ck did they get on board then?” He is told, “Hey, don’t shoot the messenger, friend. CIA forgot to tell us about them.” As they are talking about this, they see the first WTC tower collapse on television. [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 13-14] Some hijacker names, including Mohamed Atta’s, were identified on a reservations computer over an hour earlier. Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Mohamed Atta, Richard A. Clarke, Dale Watson Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke

(After 9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001: WTC Building 7 Appears Damaged

Damage to World Trade Center Building 7. [Source: New York City Police Department] World Trade Center Building 7 (WTC 7) appears to have suffered significant damage at some point after the Twin Towers collapsed, according to some firefighters at the scene. Firefighter Butch Brandies tells other firefighters that nobody is to go into Building 7 because of creaking and noises coming out of there. [FIREHOUSE MAGAZINE, 9/9/2002] According to Deputy Chief Peter Hayden, there is a bulge in the southwest corner of the building between floors 10 and 13. [FIREHOUSE MAGAZINE, 9/2/2002] Battalion Chief John Norman will later recall, “At the edge of the south face you could see that it was very heavily damaged.” [FIREHOUSE MAGAZINE, 9/2/2002] Deputy Chief Nick Visconti also later recalls, “A big chunk of the lower floors had been taken out on the Vesey Street side.” [FIREHOUSE MAGAZINE, 9/9/2002] Captain Chris Boyle will recall, “On the south side of 7 there had to be a hole 20 stories tall in the building, with fire on several floors.” [FIREHOUSE MAGAZINE, 9/9/2002] The building will collapse hours later (see (5:20 p.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: John Norman, Chris Boyle, Nick Visconti, World Trade Center, Butch Brandies, Peter Hayden Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

Around 10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Someone in Hijackers’ Room Tells Housekeeper Not to Enter It, Although Hijackers Have Already Left When a housekeeper at the Park Inn in Boston, where 9/11 hijackers Wail and Waleed Alshehri stayed before the attacks, attempts to clean their room, a “male of foreign descent” tells her she should not clean it yet and should return in the early afternoon, as someone is still asleep there. The hijackers are thought to have left the hotel and checked in for their flights several hours previously (see (6:20 a.m.-7:48 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The male’s identity is unknown and the housekeeper’s story appears to confuse the FBI, as an entry about it in an FBI timeline drafted after the attacks ends with five question marks. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 292 ] Entity Tags: Wail Alshehri, Waleed M. Alshehri Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, All Day of 9/11 Events

(10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS Notified of Suspected Hijacked Aircraft out of Canada NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) receives a call from a NORAD unit in Canada, reporting another suspected hijacked aircraft that is heading south from Canada, across the border toward Washington, DC. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Aircraft Reported on Chat System - A member of staff at NEADS relays to their colleagues that the aircraft is from an “unknown departure airport, heading towards Washington,” but they do not “know any codes or anything” else about it. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001] Another member of staff at NEADS calls the Canadian unit for more information. A Lance Corporal Nicholson there says only that he has seen “something on the chat” about a “possible” aircraft. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001; NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001] (Nicholson is presumably referring to NORAD’s computer chat system. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 139] ) Fighter Unit Contacted - According to author Lynn Spencer, NEADS battle commander Colonel Robert Marr contacts a military unit in Syracuse, New York, to get fighter jets sent after the suspicious flight. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 223] However, the first jets to launch from Syracuse will not take off until 10:42 a.m. (see 10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001). [POST-STANDARD (SYRACUSE), 9/12/2001] Report Is a False Alarm - The suspected hijacking is soon revealed to be a false alarm. Nicholson will call from Canada and tell NEADS: “Be advised… that our [intelligence team] is not assessing that there is an actual aircraft problem. It’s just that there could be problems from our area.… There’s no actual aircraft that we suspect as being a danger.” He will add that his intelligence people “haven’t got any particular aircraft in mind.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Numerous Erroneous Reports - This is one of the numerous mistaken reports of hijackings received during the course of the morning (see (9:09 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001). According to Vanity Fair: “In the barrage of information and misinformation, it becomes increasingly difficult for the controllers [at NEADS] to keep count of how many suspected hijackings are pending. So far, it is known that three have hit buildings, but given the uncertainty about the fates of American 11 and American 77—no one knows yet that this is the plane that hit the Pentagon—the sense at NEADS is that there are possibly three hijacked jets still out there, and who knows how many more yet to be reported.” At the time NEADS is informed of the suspicious aircraft coming in from Canada, “no one on the military side is aware that United 93 has been hijacked.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Entity Tags: Robert Marr, Northeast Air Defense Sector, North American Aerospace Defense Command Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Shortly After 9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Navy Commander Tells New York City Deputy Mayor He Has Permission to Send Planes Over New York

Robert Natter. [Source: CBS] Rudy Washington, who is one of Rudolph Giuliani’s deputy mayors, had earlier on called Admiral Robert Natter, the commander of the US Atlantic Fleet at Norfolk Naval Station, Virginia, and requested air cover over New York (see (Between 8:46 a.m. and 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). After the WTC’s South Tower collapses at 9:59, Washington heads to City Hall, where he again communicates with Natter. Natter informs him that the Pentagon has been hit, and says he has now gotten permission from NORAD to send some fighter jets over the city. [NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, 5/20/2004] However, when exactly these jets are launched and when they arrive over New York is unstated. Patrick Burns, who is currently at the Norfolk Naval Station for his two-week Naval Reserve obligation, later recalls, “Air cover was already up with Navy jets out of Naval Air Station Oceana.” Naval Air Station Oceana, in Virginia Beach, Virginia, is home to F-14 Tomcat and F/A-18 Hornet fighters. But Burns does not state a time for when these fighters are airborne. [VIRGINIAN-PILOT, 9/22/2001; DIGITAL JOURNALIST, 10/2001; NOTRE DAME MAGAZINE, 4/2007] The 9/11 Commission Report will make no mention of any Naval fighters. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004] Entity Tags: Robert Natter, Rudy Washington, North American Aerospace Defense Command Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events