September 11 9:20am-9:30am

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(9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Fire Chief Warns Firefighters at Pentagon that Washington Could be Target for Attack
Alan Wallace. [Source: Michael Norris] A fire chief calls his firefighters who are manning the fire station at the Pentagon’s heliport, and warns them that there could be more attacks, and Washington could be a target. [FIRST DUE NEWS, 4/17/2003; CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 20-21] Chief Charles Campbell works with the fire department at Fort Myer, an army base 1.5 miles northwest of the Pentagon, which sends three of its firefighters each day to man the fire station at the Pentagon heliport. [PENTAGRAM, 11/2/2001] Campbell calls the station to make sure his firefighters there—Alan Wallace, Mark Skipper, and Dennis Young—are aware of what is going on in New York. He tells them, “These were intentional acts of terrorism.” He speaks “to each of the three firefighters, making sure they [are] all on their toes and ready to respond to an unexpected incident.” Wallace will recall that Campbell “wanted to be sure we were aware of everything going on around the fire station.” Campbell says there could be more attacks, and that “If it had happened in New York, it could happen in Washington.” As Wallace recalls, Campbell says “Washington, DC could very well be a target and if that happened, our fire truck could be dispatched to an incident.” [FIRST DUE NEWS, 4/17/2003; CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 20-21] Yet, while Campbell believes an attack on Washington is likely, neither the Pentagon nor any government buildings in Washington will be evacuated before the Pentagon is hit at 9:37 (see Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001 and Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/16/2001] The Fort Myer firefighters will narrowly escape suffering serious injuries when the Pentagon attack occurs (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [PENTAGRAM, 11/2/2001] Entity Tags: Charles Campbell, Dennis Young, Alan Wallace, Mark Skipper Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Fire Chief Concerned about Possible Explosives in the WTC Fire Chief Ray Downey is on the corner of West Street and Vesey Street, where the chiefs in charge of the response at the WTC have gathered to survey the scene. [DOWNEY, 2004, PP. 233] Downey is the head of the New York Fire Department’s Special Operations Command, where he has pioneered techniques for responding to terrorist attacks. [CBS NEWS, 9/11/2006] Reportedly, he had felt certain that a big attack on American soil was due. Worst in his mind had been “a situation in which there was a secondary device timed to explode after rescuers had rushed to the scene” of a terrorist attack. As he now checks in with the fire chiefs who are trying to put together a response plan, he tells them “he is worried about secondary devices in the towers, explosive devices that could hurt the firemen.” [DOWNEY, 2004, PP. 224 AND 233] Shortly after the South Tower comes down, Downey will in fact say he thought bombs in the building had caused it to collapse (see Shortly After 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CITY OF NEW YORK, 12/6/2001] He will be killed when the North Tower collapses at 10:28 a.m. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/9/2005] Entity Tags: Ray Downey Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

(9:20 a.m.-9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA’s Indianapolis Center Finally Aware of National Crisis; Discusses Flight 77 Concerns with Command Center According to the 9/11 Commission, the FAA’s Indianapolis Center, which was monitoring Flight 77 when it disappeared from radar (see 8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (8:56 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001), has learned by 9:20 a.m. that there are “other hijacked aircraft,” and begins “to doubt its initial assumption that American 77 had crashed.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] In fact, a transcript of air traffic controller communications will show that the Indianapolis Center was informed of the Flight 11 hijacking, and that two planes had hit the World Trade Center, at 9:09 a.m. (see 9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001); five minutes later, it received confirmation of the Flight 11 hijacking (see 9:14 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001] And television networks have been covering the crashes in New York since as early as 8:48 a.m. (see 8:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). [BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 16-17] Other Facilities Notified - The manager at the Indianapolis Center now discusses the concern that Flight 77 may not have crashed with the FAA’s Command Center in Herndon, Virginia. This discussion prompts the Command Center to notify some FAA field facilities that Flight 77 is lost. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32 ] Also at around 9:20, the Indianapolis Center operations manager contacts the FAA’s Chicago Center. He advises its operations manager of his concern that Flight 77 may have been hijacked, and says to be on the lookout, based on the events that have occurred in New York. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ] By 9:21, according to the 9/11 Commission, the FAA “Command Center, some FAA field facilities, and American Airlines had started to search for American 77. They feared it had been hijacked.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24-25] Entity Tags: Chicago flight control, Federal Aviation Administration, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center, American Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FBI Washington Office Is Warned Flight 77 Has Been Hijacked

Arthur Eberhart. [Source: Spc. Edgar R. Gonzalez] In a government report analyzing the effectiveness of rescue worker response to the Pentagon crash, it is mentioned that, “At about 9:20 a.m., the WFO [FBI Washington Field Office] Command Center [is] notified that American Airlines Flight 77 had been hijacked shortly after takeoff from Washington Dulles International Airport. [Special Agent in Charge Arthur] Eberhart dispatche[s] a team of 50 agents to investigate the Dulles hijacking and provide additional security to prevent another. He sen[ds] a second team to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport as a precautionary step. At the WFO Command Center, Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) Jim Rice [is] on the telephone with the Pentagon when Flight 77 crashe[s] into the building.” [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. C-55] Yet according to the 9/11 Commission, NORAD is not told that Flight 77 had been hijacked at this time or any time before it crashes. However, the FAA has claimed they officially warned NORAD at 9:24 a.m. (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and informally warned them even earlier (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Arthur Eberhart, US Department of Defense, Federal Aviation Administration, Albert T. Church III, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, FBI Washington Field Office Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Orders No New Takeoffs, at Least for International Flights United Airlines orders its aircraft that have not yet taken off to remain on the ground. However, the exact time and details of this order are unclear. According to the 9/11 Commission, United orders the “ground stop” at an unstated time after about 9:10, when American Airlines had ordered a nationwide ground stop of its aircraft (see Between 9:00 a.m. and 9:10 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 10] The Wall Street Journal reports that Andy Studdert, United Airlines’ chief operating officer, gives the order for United aircraft to remain “frozen on the ground” at 9:20. However, it only describes this order applying to “all international flights,” so whether it also applies to United’s domestic flights is unclear. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001] The FAA will issue an order to all its facilities, initiating a “national ground stop,” at around 9:25 a.m. (see (9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [TIME, 9/14/2001] At around 9:45, United Airlines will order all its airborne flights to land (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] Entity Tags: United Airlines, Andy Studdert Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(After 9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Administrator Frustrated that Military Is Not Involved in Teleconference

Monte Belger [Source: FAA] At 9:20 a.m. (or earlier, according to some accounts), the FAA set up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). FAA records indicate that the National Military Command Center within the Pentagon was included in the communication network “no later than 9:20 a.m.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 ] Yet at some point later in the morning, Acting FAA Deputy Administrator Monte Belger becomes aware that the military is not involved in the teleconference in any meaningful way. Presumably referring to tape recordings of the FAA headquarters, 9/11 Commissioner Jamie Gorelick will later say to Belger, “We heard some rather colorful language came from your mouth at that point.” The absence of the NMCC from the teleconference is unusual. Belger says, “I’ve lived through dozens of hijackings in my 30-year FAA career… and [the NMCC] were always there. They were always on the net, and were always listening in with everybody else.” He adds, “The most frustrating after-the-fact scenario for me to understand is to explain… the communication link on that morning between the FAA operations center and the NMCC.… I know how it’s supposed to work, but… it’s still a little frustrating for me to understand how it actually did work on that day.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 36] Entity Tags: Monte Belger, National Military Command Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001: All New York City Bridges and Tunnels Are Closed The New York City Port Authority closes all bridges and tunnels in New York City. [CNN, 9/12/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/12/2001; MSNBC, 9/22/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002] Entity Tags: NBC, New York Port Authority Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Air Traffic Control Center Mistakenly Tells NEADS Flight 11 Is Still Airborne According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS is contacted by the FAA’s Boston Center. Colin Scoggins, Boston Center’s military liaison, tells it: “I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air, and it’s on its way towards—heading towards Washington.… That was another—it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower. That’s the latest report we have.… I’m going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he’s somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further south.” The NEADS official asks: “He—American 11 is a hijack?… And he’s heading into Washington?” Scoggins answers yes both times and adds, “This could be a third aircraft.” Somehow Boston Center has been told by FAA headquarters that Flight 11 is still airborne, but the 9/11 Commission will say it hasn’t been able to find where this mistaken information came from. Scoggins Makes Error - Vanity Fair magazine will later add, “In Boston, it is Colin Scoggins who has made the mistaken call.” Scoggins will explain why he believes he made this error: “With American Airlines, we could never confirm if [Flight 11] was down or not, so that left doubt in our minds.” He says he was monitoring a conference call between FAA centers (see 8:28 a.m. September 11, 2001), “when the word came across—from whom or where isn’t clear—that American 11 was thought to be headed for Washington.” However, Boston Center was never tracking Flight 11 on radar after losing sight of it near Manhattan: “The plane’s course, had it continued south past New York in the direction it was flying before it dipped below radar coverage, would have had it headed on a straight course toward DC. This was all controllers were going on.” Scoggins says, “After talking to a supervisor, I made the call and said [American 11] is still in the air.” [NORTHEAST AIR DEFENSE SECTOR, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Myers Refers to Mistaken Report - In the hours following the attacks, acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers will apparently refer to this erroneous report that Flight 11 is still airborne and heading toward Washington, telling the Associated Press that “prior to the crash into the Pentagon, military officials had been notified that another hijacked plane had been heading from the New York area to Washington.” Myers will say “he assumed that hijacked plane was the one that hit the Pentagon, though he couldn’t be sure.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001] Entity Tags: Richard B. Myers, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Federal Aviation Administration, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Colin Scoggins Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight AA 77

9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001: Dulles Airport Control Facility Advised to Look for Flight 77

The air traffic control tower at Dulles International Airport. [Source: Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority] The FAA’s Herndon Command Center informs a supervisor at the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) at Washington Dulles International Airport that the FAA has lost contact with American Airlines Flight 77 and is trying to locate it. The Dulles TRACON then informs its air traffic controllers that a commercial aircraft is missing, and instructs them to look for primary targets on their radar screens. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 25; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32 ] (A primary target is a radar track that provides an aircraft’s position and speed, but not its altitude, and which can still be viewed when the plane’s transponder has been turned off. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/11/2001; SALON, 9/10/2004] ) Dulles Airport is located 26 miles west of Washington, DC, and 22 miles from the Pentagon. [NEW YORK TIMES, 6/19/1994; USA TODAY, 9/13/2001] According to the 9/11 Commission, controllers at its TRACON will locate an unidentified aircraft on their radar screens at 9:32 (see 9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001), although other accounts will suggest they locate the target slightly earlier (see (Between 9:25 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 33 ] Entity Tags: Washington Dulles International Airport, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Advises Dispatchers to Issue Warning to Flights United Airlines issues a companywide order for its flight dispatchers to warn their flights to secure their cockpit doors. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 455] The airline’s air traffic control coordinator sends a message to all of the airline’s dispatchers, telling them: “There may be addnl [additional] hijackings in progress. You may want to advise your flts [flights] to stay on alert and shut down all cockpit access inflt [in flight]. Sandy per Mgmt.” United Airlines dispatchers began notifying their aircraft that planes had crashed into the World Trade Center at 9:03 (see 9:03 a.m. and After September 11, 2001). However, with the exception of one dispatcher (see 9:19 a.m. September 11, 2001), the airline has so far not sent any warnings to its aircraft. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 36-37 ] United Airlines did not initially realize the second plane to hit the WTC was one of its own (see Between 9:10 a.m. and 9:20 a.m. September 11, 2001), and it is not until 9:22 that it notifies its dispatchers that UAL Flight 175 has been involved in “an accident” in New York (see 9:22 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: United Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Sends Routine Message to Airline Dispatcher The pilot of Flight 93 sends a routine text message to United Airlines dispatcher Ed Ballinger, who is monitoring the flight. The message reads: “Good mornin‘… Nice clb [climb] outta EWR [Newark airport] after a nice tour of the apt [apartment] courts y [and] grnd cntrl. 20 N EWC At 350 occl [occasional] lt [light] chop. Wind 290/50 ain’t helping. J.” The J is presumably the signature for the pilot, Jason Dahl, who is personally acquainted with Ballinger. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 37 ] Entity Tags: Jason Dahl, Ed Ballinger Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Begins ‘Lockout’ of Flight 175 Information Just before 9:22, United Airlines headquarters, located outside Chicago, begins the “lockout” procedure to restrict access to passenger and crew information about Flight 175. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 ] This procedure is standard for airlines in safety and security incidents. As the 9/11 Commission will later describe, “It acknowledges an emergency on the flight and isolates information so that the case can be managed by top leadership at the airlines in a way that protects information from being altered or released, and also protects the identities of the passengers and crew.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 12-13 ] This procedure begins almost 40 minutes after Flight 175 was hijacked (see (Between 8:42 a.m. and 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and about 35 minutes after the plane’s transponder signal changed (see 8:46 a.m.-8:47 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 7] Entity Tags: United Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

(9:21 a.m.-9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001): Exterior Wall of South Tower May Bow Outwards or Inwards before Collapse The exterior wall on the east side of the World Trade Center’s South Tower apparently bows before the building collapses. The first inquiry into the collapse, by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the American Society of Civil Engineers, states that the perimeter walls bow outward. “Expansion of floor slabs and framing results in outward deflection of columns and potential overload,” the investigation concludes. [FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, 5/1/2002, PP. 2-25] However, a subsequent report by the National Institute of Standards and Technology states that the east wall of the South Tower bows inward. In places the wall is said to bow inward by between seven and nine inches at floor 80, and NIST interprets this bowing to mean that the floors must be sagging. NIST will find that the sagging and bowing are two of the seven major factors that led to the collapse of each tower, as the bowing walls are no longer able to support their share of the buildings’ weight, causing the buildings to tilt and the upper sections to fall. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 43-46, 87 ] A wall in the North Tower also apparently bows before the building collapses (see 10:23 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Federal Emergency Management Agency, World Trade Center, National Institute of Standards and Technology Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center

(Shortly After 9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Dispatchers Issue Warnings to Flights, Implement ‘Positive Contact’ Procedure Following a company-wide order instructing them to warn aircraft to secure their cockpits (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001), flight dispatchers at United Airlines’ headquarters issue an alert to all their pilots, stating: “There may be terrorist acts in progress. Do not open cockpit doors. Secure the cockpit.” Furthermore, Joseph Vickers, the director of flight dispatch, initiates a procedure for “positive contact.” This means the dispatchers must make direct contact with each aircraft every 10 to 15 minutes and confirm that its cockpit is still secure. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 109] Entity Tags: Joseph Vickers, United Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(Between 9:22 a.m. and 9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Airline Managers Join Teleconference but Receive No Guidance; Timing Unclear Managers from American Airlines and United Airlines are added by the FAA to a teleconference, but they receive no guidance from top government officials on what to do. According to author Lynn Spencer, at some point after the second aircraft hit the World Trade Center, the executives from the two airlines are “quickly on the phone to FAA headquarters and the FAA Command Center.” They are brought into “a conference call that has now been set up with Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta and Vice President Dick Cheney at the White House. The airline executives inform the secretary that they are each dealing with additional aircraft that they are unable to contact. They seek guidance, but there is none.… The nation is under attack, but there is no plan in place, and no guidance is forthcoming from the top as the crisis escalates.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 109] The time when the airline executives join the teleconference is unclear. In Spencer’s account, she places it after United Airlines dispatchers have warned their aircraft to secure their cockpits (see (Shortly After 9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001), which would mean some time after 9:21. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 37 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 109] But Spencer also says that, when the executives join the conference, the “president is still reading to children in a Florida school room” (see (9:06 a.m.-9:16 a.m.) September 11, 2001), which would be roughly between 9:05 and 9:15. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 38-39; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 109] If Norman Mineta is already participating in the teleconference when the airline executives join it, the time would have to be after around 9:20, which is when Mineta later says he arrived at the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House (see (Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] And Cheney, who Spencer also says is participating in the teleconference when the executives join it, arrives at the PEOC as late as 9:58, according to the 9/11 Commission, although other accounts indicate he arrives there much earlier than this (see (9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ABC NEWS, 9/14/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 40] According to the Wall Street Journal, American Airlines president Don Carty and United Airlines CEO Jim Goodwin are talking on the phone with Mineta (presumably over the conference call) about five minutes before the FAA shuts down all US airspace (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001), which would mean they are participating in the teleconference by around 9:40 a.m. [US CONGRESS. HOUSE. COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 9/21/2001; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Don Carty, United Airlines, Norman Mineta, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, American Airlines, Jim Goodwin Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

Shortly After 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Technicians Unable to Locate Flight 11 Following Incorrect Report It Is Still Airborne Having just received an incorrect report that Flight 11—which has already hit the World Trade Center—is still airborne and heading toward Washington (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001), technicians at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) try, unsuccessfully, to locate the aircraft on their radar screens. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 137-139] At NEADS, Major James Anderson says the hijackers are “probably not squawking anything anyway,” meaning their plane’s transponder is not broadcasting a signal. He adds, “I mean, obviously these guys are in the cockpit.” Major Kevin Nasypany, the mission crew commander, replies, “These guys are smart.” Another member of staff adds, “Yeah, they knew exactly what they wanted to do.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] After giving the order to launch the F-16s kept on alert at Langley Air Force Base (see 9:23 a.m. September 11, 2001), Nasypany calls out, “I need more trackers!” He needs his technicians to locate the hijacked plane on radar so that his weapons team can pass on its coordinates to the Langley fighters. But the trackers are unable to find the transponder code for Flight 11 on their radar screens. They begin calling up, one at a time, the tracks on their screens that are in the airspace between New York and Washington, and attach a tag to each after it has been identified. One technician draws a line on a map between New York and Washington, showing the area across which Flight 11 would be traveling. It includes Philadelphia, Atlantic City, and Baltimore. He looks at his radar screen and sees there are hundreds of tracks in that area. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 138-139] Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, who gave NEADS the incorrect report about Flight 11, will later say he’d only heard the plane was still airborne and heading for Washington on a conference call between FAA centers. According to Vanity Fair, air traffic controllers “were never tracking an actual plane on the radar after losing American 11 near Manhattan, but if it had been flying low enough, the plane could have gone undetected.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Entity Tags: Kevin Nasypany, Colin Scoggins, James Anderson, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11

(9:22 a.m.) September 11, 2001: White House Begins Slowly Evacuating In a 9:52 a.m. report, CNN White House correspondent John King will state that, “about 30 minutes ago,” the White House had begun slowly evacuating. This evacuation proceeds in an orderly fashion. But later on, around 9:45 a.m., those evacuating will be ordered to run (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/11/2001] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:22 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Manager Issues Advisory Stating Flight 175 Was in Accident Rich Miles, the manager of United Airlines’ System Operations Control center, located outside Chicago, issues an advisory to all United Airlines facilities, including the flight dispatchers. This advisory, which is issued under the name of UAL Chief Operating Officer Andy Studdert, states that Flight 175 has been involved in an accident in New York City, and that the airline’s crisis center has been activated. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 ] This appears to be United Airlines’ first proper confirmation that Flight 175 has crashed. However, it will not issue a press release confirming the crash until 11:53 a.m. (see 11:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). [UNITED AIRLINES, 9/11/2001] Entity Tags: Rich Miles, United Airlines, Andy Studdert Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

9:23 a.m. September 11, 2001: Airline Dispatcher Sends Warning to Flight 175, Unaware It Has Already Crashed Unaware that this aircraft has crashed, United Airlines flight dispatcher Ed Ballinger sends a warning message to Flight 175. The text message reads: “Beware any cockpit intrusion… Two aircraft in NY hit [World] Trade Center builds.” Ballinger began sending this text message to the 16 transcontinental flights he is monitoring at 9:19 a.m. (see 9:19 a.m. September 11, 2001). He is already aware that United Airlines suspects Flight 175 has been hijacked (see (9:01 a.m.-9:04 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and recently learned that a second plane has hit the World Trade Center, but does not yet know this was Flight 175. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 AND 37 ] United Airlines did not initially realize the second plane to hit the WTC was one of its own (see Between 9:10 a.m. and 9:20 a.m. September 11, 2001), and it was not until 9:22 that it sent out an advisory to its dispatchers stating that Flight 175 had been involved in “an accident” in New York (see 9:22 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Ed Ballinger Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

9:23 a.m.-9:26 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Dispatcher Sends Warning Message to Flight 93, Flight 93 Responds Ed Ballinger, the United Airlines flight dispatcher monitoring Flight 93, sends a warning message to this flight, telling the pilots to beware of any cockpit intrusion. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 11] At 9:21, United Airlines instructed its dispatchers to warn their flights to secure their cockpit doors (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001), but Ballinger had already taken the initiative two minutes earlier to begin warning the 16 flights he is monitoring (see 9:19 a.m. September 11, 2001). His text message reads: “Beware any cockpit intrusion… Two aircraft in NY hit [World] Trade Center builds.” Because this message is sent out to Ballinger’s 16 aircraft in groups, it is not until 9:23 a.m. that it is transmitted to Flight 93. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 AND 37 ] The warning is received in the plane’s cockpit one minute later. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 11] Then, at 9:26, Flight 93 pilot Jason Dahl responds with the text message, “Ed confirm latest mssg plz [message please]—Jason.” Apart from a routine radio contact with the FAA’s Cleveland Center a minute later (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001), this is the last normal communication made from Flight 93’s cockpit before the hijacking occurs. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 38 ] Ballinger will later complain: “One of the things that upset me was that they knew 45 minutes before that American Airlines [Flight 11] had a problem. I put the story together myself [from news accounts]. Perhaps if I had the information sooner, I might have gotten the message to [Flight] 93 to bar the door.” [CHICAGO DAILY HERALD, 4/14/2004] Entity Tags: Jason Dahl, Ed Ballinger Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:23 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Wants Fighters to Track Phantom Flight 11

Major Kevin Nasypany inside NEADS [Source: Mark Schafer/ Vanity Fair] According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS has just been told that the hijacked Flight 11 is still in the air and heading toward Washington. Major Kevin Nasypany, the mission crew commander, says to NEADS Commander Robert Marr, “Okay, uh, American Airlines is still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he’s heading towards Washington. Okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now. And I’m gonna take the fighters from Otis, try to chase this guy down if I can find him.” After receiving approval to do so, Nasypany issues the order. “Okay… scramble Langley,” he says. “Head them towards the Washington area.” The Langley, Virginia, base gets the scramble order at 9:24 a.m. (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). NEADS keeps its fighters from the Otis base over New York City. In 2004 the 9/11 Commission will state, “this response to a phantom aircraft, American 11, is not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued by FAA or [Defense Department]. Instead, since 9/11, the scramble of the Langley fighters has been described as a response to the reported hijacking of American 77, or United 93, or some combination of the two.” Yet the “report of American 11 heading south as the cause of the Langley scramble is reflected not just in taped conversations at NEADS, but in taped conversations at FAA centers, on chat logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD, and in other records.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Robert Marr, Kevin Nasypany Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001: Fighter Jets Scrambled from Langley Air Force Base

Major Brad Derrig. [Source: ABC] At Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, the pilots of three F-16s receive the order to scramble (i.e. take off immediately). A Klaxon horn sounds and the status lights in the hangars change from yellow to green, notifying them of the order. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 65; FILSON, 2003, PP. 63; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 141] The fighter jets belong to the North Dakota Air National Guard’s 119th Fighter Wing. The wing has a small detachment at Langley that serves as one of NORAD’s seven “alert” sites around the US, responsible for defending the nation against attack. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 114] The jets are already at “battle stations,” with the pilots in the cockpits but the engines off (see (9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 55; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 117-119] The scramble order has just been issued by NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16 ] Third Pilot Launched - The unit at Langley keeps two F-16s on “alert”—armed, fueled, and ready to take off within minutes if called upon. [AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, 2/2002; BERGEN RECORD, 12/5/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 17] But NEADS has instructed it to launch as many aircraft as it can (see (Between 9:10 a.m. and 9:23 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and so the unit’s operations manager Captain Craig Borgstrom is also preparing to take off in a third jet. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 118-119] Major Dean Eckmann calls the other two pilots, saying, “Quit check,” indicating a radio check. Major Brad Derrig responds, “Two.” Borgstrom replies: “Three. I’m going with you!” This is news to Derrig. According to author Lynn Spencer, Derrig is “stunned.… [N]ot much surprises him, but this does.” Borgstrom joining them as a pilot will mean that, in the middle of this unprecedented crisis, their unit will be left without a commanding officer. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 142] Only Two Jets Fully Armed - The two jets that are kept on alert are fully armed. As Eckmann will later recall, “We can carry M9 heat seekers, Sidewinders for the M7 Sparrow, plus we have an internal 20 mm Vulcan cannon, and we were pretty much armed with all that.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] However, Borgstrom’s jet has guns only, and though the six-barrel 20 mm gun can fire 6,000 rounds per minute, it requires close range. Pilot Unqualified to Lead Three Jets - As the three aircraft taxi out to the runway, Eckmann is concerned that he has not yet qualified as a mission commander—a “four-ship”—and is therefore not authorized to lead more than one fighter jet. He calls the other pilots, saying, “Hey, I’m only a two-ship!” But Derrig, who is a full-time instructor pilot for the Air National Guard, urges him not to worry. He responds: “Press! I’m an instructor,” giving his approval for the flight to operate as a “three-ship” under Eckmann’s lead. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 142] The three jets will take off and be airborne by 9:30 a.m. (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16 ] Entity Tags: Brad Derrig, 119th Fighter Wing, Craig Borgstrom, Dean Eckmann, Langley Air Force Base Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Orders Jets Scrambled from Langley; Conflicting Explanations Later Given for Order

Alan Scott. [Source: United States Air Force] NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) processes and transmits an order to Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, to scramble three of its F-16 fighter jets. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 4/16/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16 ] NEADS mission crew commander Major Kevin Nasypany instructed his personnel to issue this order one minute earlier (see 9:23 a.m. September 11, 2001). Although he’d originally wanted the Langley jets sent to the Washington area, he will soon adjust this heading to send them to the Baltimore area. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27] NEADS Orders Jets North - A NEADS officer calls Langley Air Force Base and instructs: “Langley command post, this is Huntress with an active air defense scramble for Quit 2-5 and Quit 2-6.… Scramble immediately.… Scramble on a heading of 010, flight level 290.” This means the jets are to head in a direction just east of north, at an altitude of 29,000 feet. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/9/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 96 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 142] At Langley Air Force Base, a Klaxon horn will sound, notifying the pilots of the scramble order (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001), and they will be airborne by 9:30 (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 63; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 141] Fighters Launched in Response to Flight 77? - In later testimony, military officials will give contradictory explanations for why the Langley F-16s are scrambled. An early NORAD timeline will indicate the fighters are launched in response to NORAD being notified at 9:24 that Flight 77 has been hijacked (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001] Colonel Alan Scott, the former vice commander of the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR), will suggest the same, telling the 9/11 Commission: “At 9:24 the FAA reports a possible hijack of [Flight] 77.… And at that moment as well is when the Langley F-16s were scrambled out of Langley.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; 1ST AIR FORCE, 8/8/2006] And a timeline provided by senior Defense Department officials to CNN will state, “NORAD orders jets scrambled from Langley” in order to “head to intercept” Flight 77. [CNN, 9/17/2001] In Response to Flight 93? - However, Major General Larry Arnold, the CONR commander, will give a different explanation. He will tell the 9/11 Commission, “we launched the aircraft out of Langley to put them over top of Washington, DC, not in response to American Airline 77, but really to put them in position in case United 93 were to head that way.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] In Response to Incorrect Report about Flight 11? - In 2004, the 9/11 Commission will dispute both these previous explanations, and conclude that the Langley jets are scrambled in response to an incorrect report that Flight 11 is still airborne and heading toward Washington, DC (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 26-27; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 15 ] Tape recordings of the NEADS operations floor will corroborate this account. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] According to the 9/11 Commission, its conclusion is also confirmed by “taped conversations at FAA centers; contemporaneous logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD; and other records.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 34] Major Nasypany will tell the Commission that the reason the Langley jets are directed toward the Baltimore area is to position them between the reportedly southbound Flight 11 and Washington, as a “barrier cap.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27 AND 461] John Farmer, senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission, will later suggest that NORAD deliberately misled Congress and the Commission by hiding the fact that the Langley scramble takes place in response to the erroneous report that Flight 11 is still airborne. He will write that the mistaken report “appears in more logs, and on more tapes, than any other single event that morning.… It was the reason for the Langley scramble; it had triggered the Air Threat Conference Call. Yet it had never been disclosed; it was, instead, talked around.” [FARMER, 2009, PP. 266-267] Conflicting Times - Early news reports will put the time of the scramble order slightly later than the 9/11 Commission places it, between 9:25 and “about 9:27.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001; CNN, 9/19/2001] But a NORAD timeline released a week after the attacks will give the same time as the Commission does, of 9:24. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27] Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Kevin Nasypany, Alan Scott, Larry Arnold, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Langley Air Force Base, US Department of Defense, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Regional Center Contacts Headquarters about Flight 77 The FAA’s Great Lakes Regional Operations Center notifies the Operations Center at FAA’s Washington headquarters of the simultaneous loss of radar identification and radar communications with Flight 77. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32 ] This is almost 30 minutes after this loss of contact occurred (see 8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001), and 15 minutes after the Great Lakes regional center was informed of it (see 9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Continental NORAD Region Headquarters Wants Otis Fighters Details Sent over Chat System At NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), Master Sergeant Joe McCain, the mission crew commander technician, receives a call from the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida. Major General Larry Arnold and his staff at Tyndall AFB are trying to gather as much information as they can about the ongoing crisis, and want to know the transponder codes for the two fighter jets scrambled from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to the first hijacking (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), so they can monitor their positions. The CONR officer that makes the call tells McCain to “send [the transponder codes] out on chat,” meaning on NORAD’s own chat system. NORAD's Computer Chat System - According to author Lynn Spencer, NORAD’s chat system “is similar to the chat rooms on most Internet servers, but classified.” It has three chat rooms that can be used by anyone with proper access. One room is specifically for NEADS, and connects its ID, surveillance, and weapons technicians to its alert fighter squadrons, and is where NEADS gets status reports on fighter units and their aircraft. Another chat room is for CONR, and is where the three CONR sectors—NEADS, the Western Air Defense Sector (WADS), and the Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS)—communicate with each other and can “upchannel” information to CONR headquarters. The third room is the Air Warfare Center (AWC), where senior NORAD commanders from the three NORAD regions—CONR, Canada, and Alaska—communicate with each other. NEADS is allowed to monitor this room, but not type into it. When there is a training exercise taking place, as was the case earlier this morning (see (6:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), one or two additional chat windows will be open specifically for communicating exercise information, to help prevent it being confused with real-world information. McCain Falling Behind - McCain’s responsibilities at NEADS include monitoring these chat rooms, keeping paper logs of everything that is going on, and taking care of “upchanneling” operational reports to higher headquarters. According to Spencer, “These chat logs help to keep everyone on the same page, but in a situation like the one unfolding they have to be updated almost instantaneously to achieve that end.” But, “The fact that CONR has had to call McCain to get information that by now he would normally have posted alerts him that he is falling behind despite his best efforts.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 139-140] Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Joe McCain, Larry Arnold Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

9:24 a.m.-9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Checks in with Cleveland Air Traffic Control, Mentions No Problems Having entered the center’s airspace, Flight 93 establishes radio contact with the FAA’s Cleveland Center, a regional air traffic control center that guides long-range, high altitude flights. The pilot reports simply that his flight is experiencing intermittent light choppy air, and does not indicate there being any problems on board, saying, “Good morning Cleveland, United 93 with you at three-five-oh [35,000 feet], intermittent light chop.” The controller, John Werth, is busy with other flights, so does not initially respond. A minute later, Flight 93 radios again, “United 93 checking in three-five-oh.” Werth replies, “United 93, three-five-zero, roger.” [GREGOR, 12/21/2001 ; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 69; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 37 ; CBS NEWS, 9/10/2006] Two minutes later, Flight 93 will make its final radio communication before the hijacker takeover occurs (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: John Werth, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001: By Some Accounts, FAA Notifies NORAD Flight 77 Is Hijacked and Washington-Bound; 9/11 Commission Claims This Never Happens Shortly after 9/11, NORAD reported that the FAA notified them at this time that Flight 77 “may” have been hijacked and that it appears headed toward Washington. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001; NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002] Apparently, flight controllers at Dulles International Airport discover a plane heading at high speed toward Washington; an alert is sounded within moments that the plane appears to be headed toward the White House. [WASHINGTON POST, 11/3/2001] In 2003, the FAA supported this account, but claimed that they had informally notified NORAD earlier. “NORAD logs indicate that the FAA made formal notification about American Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m. (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but information about the flight was conveyed continuously during the phone bridges before the formal notification.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 5/22/2003] Yet in 2004, the 9/11 Commission claims that both NORAD and the FAA are wrong. The 9/11 Commission explains that the notification NEADS received at 9:24 a.m. was the incorrect information that Flight 11 had not hit the WTC and was headed south for Washington, D.C. Thus, according to the 9/11 Commission, NORAD is never notified by the FAA about the hijacking of Flight 77, but accidentally learns about it at 9:34 a.m. (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: Washington Dulles International Airport, Federal Aviation Administration, North American Aerospace Defense Command Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Key Day of 9/11 Events

9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Command Center Finally Tells FAA Headquarters about Flight 77 According to the 9/11 Commission, the FAA Command Center advises FAA headquarters that American 77 is lost in Indianapolis flight control’s airspace, that Indianapolis has no primary radar track, and is looking for the aircraft. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] When exactly the Command Center first learned that Flight 77 was lost is unclear. The earliest time reported by the 9/11 Commission is when an American Airlines employee mentioned it when calling the center at 9:16 a.m. (see 9:16 a.m.-9:18 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] American Airlines headquarters was notified of the loss of contact with Flight 77 before 9:00 a.m. (see 8:58 a.m. September 11, 2001), but had mistakenly thought this was the aircraft that hit the second WTC tower minutes later (see 9:08 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, American Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001: 9/11 Commission’s Conflicting Account of Clarke-Led Video Conference Begins at This Time According to his own account, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, started a video teleconference from the White House’s Secure Video Conferencing Center, next to the Situation Room, at around 9:10 a.m.(see (9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, the 9/11 Commission says that logs indicate this conference beginning 15 minutes later than this. Included in the conference are the FBI, the CIA, the FAA, the departments of State, Justice, and Defense, and the White House shelter. The FAA and CIA join at 9:40 a.m. The 9/11 Commission says, “It is not clear to us that the video teleconference was fully under way before 9:37, when the Pentagon was struck.” Furthermore, it states: “We do not know who from Defense participated, but we know that in the first hour none of the personnel involved in managing the crisis did. And none of the information conveyed in the White House video teleconference, at least in the first hour, was being passed to the NMCC [in the Pentagon].” Clarke’s video teleconference is not connected into the area of the NMCC from where the crisis is being managed. Consequently, “the director of the operations team-who was on the phone with NORAD-did not have the benefit of information being shared on the video teleconference.” And, “when the Secretary [of Defense Rumsfeld] and Vice Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Myers] later participated in the White House video teleconference, they were necessarily absent from the NMCC and unable to provide guidance to the operations team.” Clarke, however, gives a specific recollection of Myers speaking over video at 9:28, which is seemingly at odds with the 9/11 Commission’s account (see 9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). One witness later recalls: “[It] was almost like there were parallel decision-making processes going on; one was a voice conference orchestrated by the NMCC… and then there was the [White House video teleconference].… [I]n my mind they were competing venues for command and control and decision-making.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004] Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Central Intelligence Agency, US Department of Justice, US Department of State, US Department of Defense, Federal Aviation Administration, Richard A. Clarke Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke, Donald Rumsfeld

9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001: Otis Fighters Arrive over New York, According to Later Report by 9/11 Commission According to the 9/11 Commission, the two fighters launched from Otis Air Force Base (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) arrive over Manhattan at this time, after exiting their holding pattern off the Long Island coast at 9:13 a.m. They then establish a combat air patrol (CAP) over New York. The commission bases this conclusion on its analysis of FAA radar data and interviews with the two Otis pilots. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24 AND 460; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 AND 92 ] However, numerous eyewitnesses on the ground will report first noticing fighters over New York significantly later, more than an hour after the 9/11 Commission claims according to some accounts (see (9:45 a.m.-10:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

(9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Langley Jets Take off, but Are Delayed during Launch

Captain Craig Borgstrom. [Source: US Air Force / Austin Knox] The three F-16 fighter jets ordered to scramble from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001) take off and, radar data will show, are airborne by 9:30 a.m. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 4/16/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27] Delayed during Launch - Major Dean Eckmann will recall that, after receiving the scramble order, he and the two other pilots have “a pretty quick response time. I believe it was four to five minutes we were airborne from that point.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] According to the 1st Air Force’s book about 9/11, the three fighters are “given highest priority over all other air traffic at Langley Air Force Base” as they are launching. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 63] But, according to author Lynn Spencer, in spite of this, the jets are delayed. As Eckmann is approaching the runway, he calls the control tower for clearance to take off, but the tower controller tells him, “Hold for an air traffic delay.” Air traffic controllers at the FAA’s Washington Center “have not had time to clear airliners out of the way for the northerly heading. Dozens of aircraft at various altitudes fill the jets’ route.” After having to wait two minutes, Eckmann complains: “We’re an active air scramble. We need to go now!” Finally, the tower controller tells him, “Roger, Quit flight is cleared for takeoff, 090 for 60,” meaning the fighters are to fly due east for 60 miles (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Taking Off - The three jets launch 15 seconds apart, with Eckmann in front and the two other jets following. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 143-144] Pilot Craig Borgstrom will later recall, “[W]e took off, the three of us, and basically the formation we always brief on alert, we’ll stay in a two- to three-mile trail from the guy in front.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 63] According to the BBC, the pilots get a signal over their planes’ transponders, indicating an emergency wartime situation. [BBC, 9/1/2002] Could Reach Washington before Pentagon Attack - F-16s have a maximum speed of 1,500 mph at high altitude, or 915 mph at sea level, so the three fighters could plausibly travel the 130 miles from Langley Air Force Base to Washington in just minutes. [CHANT, 1987, PP. 404; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6/16/2000; USA TODAY, 9/16/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/16/2001 ; US AIR FORCE, 10/2007] Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region, will tell the 9/11 Commission, “I think if those aircraft had gotten airborne immediately, if we were operating under something other than peacetime rules, where they could have turned immediately toward Washington, DC, and gone into burner, it is physically possible that they could have gotten over Washington” before 9:37, when the Pentagon is hit. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Yet according to the 9/11 Commission, the jets are redirected east over the Atlantic Ocean and will be 150 miles from the Pentagon when it is hit (see 9:30 a.m.-9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27] Conflicting Times - Some early news reports after 9/11 will say the Langley jets take off at the later time of 9:35 a.m. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/14/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/15/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001] But according to Colonel Alan Scott, the former vice commander of the Continental US NORAD Region, though the jets are airborne at 9:30, the report of this does not come down until 9:35, so this fact may account for the conflicting times. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Entity Tags: Brad Derrig, Alan Scott, Craig Borgstrom, Dean Eckmann, Langley Air Force Base, Larry Arnold Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

(Between 9:25 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Dulles Airport Controllers Reportedly Notice Flight 77, Earlier than 9/11 Commission Claims According to an FAA report, between 9:25 a.m. and 9:30 a.m., air traffic controllers at the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) at Washington Dulles International Airport notice an unidentified blip, later identified to be Flight 77, on their radar screens. This is several minutes earlier than the 9/11 Commission will claim they notice it. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] Plane Flying East at High Speed - The TRACON at Dulles Airport, which is about 22 miles west of the Pentagon, learned several minutes earlier that the FAA had lost contact with Flight 77. It then advised its controllers to look out for “primary targets” (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 9/13/2001; NAVY TIMES, 9/22/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32 ] These are radar tracks that can still be viewed when a plane’s transponder has been turned off. [SALON, 9/10/2004] Several of the facility’s controllers now observe a primary radar target heading eastbound toward Washington at high speed, almost 500 miles per hour. Although the aircraft has no transponder signal to identify it, it is later determined to be Flight 77. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Conflicting Times - According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the Dulles TRACON controllers only notice this aircraft at 9:32 a.m. (see 9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] The FAA report, which is published less than a week after 9/11, will state that its time of between 9:25 and 9:30 is “approximate, based on personnel statements from Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ] But this earlier time will receive some corroboration from a report in USA Today, which states that the FAA’s Command Center is notified by a Dulles controller of the unidentified aircraft at “just before 9:30 a.m.” [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Furthermore, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta, who is currently at the White House, will tell the 9/11 Commission that at “about 9:25 or 9:26” he overhears someone warning Vice President Dick Cheney of an aircraft approaching Washington (see (9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Radar evidence obtained by CBS News will show that “at 9:30 a.m.… radar tracked the plane as it closed to within 30 miles of Washington.” [CBS NEWS, 9/21/2001] Entity Tags: Washington Dulles International Airport, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(9:25 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Dulles Airport Controllers Mistake Flight 77 for a Military Fighter

Todd Lewis. [Source: NBC] After air traffic controllers at Washington Dulles International Airport notice an unidentified aircraft, later determined to be Flight 77, approaching Washington on their radar screens (see (Between 9:25 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001), they initially think it is a military fighter plane, due to its high speed and the way it is being flown. [ABC NEWS, 10/24/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] Yet the alleged hijacker pilot of Flight 77 has been known for his poor flying skills. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/30/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 5/4/2002] Aircraft Performs Elaborate Maneuver - The Dulles controllers are unable to identify the plane because its transponder—which transmits identifying information about an aircraft to radar screens—has been turned off (see 8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 9/11/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001] It is flying at almost 500 miles per hour while approaching Washington, and then performs a rapid downward spiral, “dropping the last 7,000 feet in two and a half minutes,” before hitting the Pentagon (see 9:34 a.m.- 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CBS NEWS, 9/21/2001; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Moving 'Like a Military Aircraft' - Controller Danielle O’Brien will later recall: “The speed, the maneuverability, the way that he turned, we all thought in the radar room, all of us experienced air traffic controllers, that that was a military plane. You don’t fly a 757 in that manner. It’s unsafe.” [ABC NEWS, 10/24/2001] Another controller, Todd Lewis, will recall: “[N]obody knew that was a commercial flight at the time. Nobody knew that was American 77.… I thought it was a military flight. I thought that Langley [Air Force Base] had scrambled some fighters and maybe one of them got up there.… It was moving very fast, like a military aircraft might move at a low altitude.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Alleged Pilot 'Could Not Fly at All' - Yet many people who have met Hani Hanjour, the hijacker allegedly at the controls of Flight 77, considered him to be a very poor pilot (see October 1996-December 1997, 1998, February 8-March 12, 2001, and (April-July 2001)). Just a month previously, an airport refused to rent him a single-engine Cessna plane because instructors there found his flying skills so weak (see Mid-August 2001). [GAZETTE (GREENBELT), 9/21/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001] And an employee at a flight school Hanjour attended earlier in the year will later comment: “I’m still to this day amazed that he could have flown into the Pentagon. He could not fly at all” (see January-February 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/4/2002] Entity Tags: Hani Hanjour, Todd Lewis, Danielle O’Brien, Washington Dulles International Airport Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(After 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Passenger Call Reaches Justice Department and Beyond

Ted Olson. [Source: US Justice Department] Theodore (Ted) Olson, the Justice Department’s Solicitor General, calls the Justice Department’s control center to relate his wife Barbara’s call from Flight 77. Accounts vary whether the Justice Department already knows of the hijack or not. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; CHANNEL 4 NEWS (LONDON), 9/13/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/15/2001] Olson merely says, “They just absorbed the information. And they promised to send someone down right away.” He assumes they then “pass the information on to the appropriate people.” [HANNITY & COLMES, 9/14/2001] Entity Tags: Theodore (“Ted”) Olson, US Department of Justice Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Rookie FAA Manager Bans All Take Offs Nationwide, Including Most Military Flights? Mineta Asserts He Issues Order Minutes Later

FAA Administrator Jane Garvey. [Source: FAA] Time magazine later reports that Jane Garvey, head of the FAA, “almost certainly after getting an okay from the White House, initiate[s] a national ground stop, which forbids takeoffs and requires planes in the air to get down as soon as is reasonable. The order, which has never been implemented since flying was invented in 1903, applie[s] to virtually every single kind of machine that can takeoff—civilian, military, or law enforcement.” Military and law enforcement flights are allowed to resume at 10:31 a.m. (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001) A limited number of military flights—the FAA will not reveal details—are allowed to fly during this ban. [TIME, 9/14/2001] Garvey later calls it “a national ground stop… that prevented any aircraft from taking off.” [US CONGRESS. HOUSE. COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 9/21/2001] Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta later says he was the one to give the order: “As soon as I was aware of the nature and scale of the attack, I called from the White House to order the air traffic system to land all aircraft, immediately and without exception.” [US CONGRESS. SENATE. COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, 9/20/2001] According to Mineta, “At approximately 9:45… I gave the FAA the final order for all civil aircraft to land at the nearest airport as soon as possible.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] At the time, 4,452 planes are flying in the continental US. A later account states that Ben Sliney, the FAA’s National Operations Manager, makes the decision without consulting his superiors, like Jane Garvey, first. It would be remarkable if Sliney was the one to make the decision, because 9/11 is Sliney’s first day on the job as National Operations Manager, “the chess master of the air traffic system.” [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] When he accepted the job a couple of months earlier, he had asked, “What is the limit of my authority?” The man who had promoted him replied, “Unlimited.” [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Yet another account, by Linda Schuessler, manager of tactical operations at the FAA Command Center where Sliney was located, says, “… it was done collaboratively… All these decisions were corporate decisions. It wasn’t one person who said, ‘Yes, this has got to get done.’” [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 12/17/2001] About 500 planes land in the next 20 minutes, and then much more urgent orders to land are issued at 9:45 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [TIME, 9/14/2001; US CONGRESS. HOUSE. COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 9/21/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; NEWSDAY, 9/10/2002] Entity Tags: Jane Garvey, Ben Sliney, Norman Mineta, Federal Aviation Administration, Linda Schuessler Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Cheney Given Updates on Unidentified Flight 77 Heading toward Washington; Says ‘Orders Still Stand’; but Accounts Differ on Timing and Identity of the Plane According to some accounts, Vice President Dick Cheney is in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House by this time, along with Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta and others. Mineta will recall that, while a suspicious plane is heading toward Washington, an unidentified young man comes in and says to Cheney, “The plane is 50 miles out.” Mineta confers with acting FAA Deputy Administrator Monte Belger, who is at the FAA’s Washington headquarters. Belger says to him: “We’re watching this target on the radar, but the transponder’s been turned off. So we have no identification.” According to Mineta, the young man continues updating the vice president, saying, “The plane is 30 miles out,” and when he gets down to “The plane is 10 miles out,” asks, “Do the orders still stand?” In response, Cheney “whipped his neck around and said, ‘Of course the orders still stand. Have you heard anything to the contrary?’” Mineta will say that, “just by the nature of all the events going on,” he infers that the order being referred to is a shootdown order. Nevertheless, Flight 77 continues on and hits the Pentagon. [BBC, 9/1/2002; ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/4/2004] However, the 9/11 Commission will later claim the plane heading toward Washington is only discovered by the Dulles Airport air traffic control tower at 9:32 a.m. (see 9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001). But earlier accounts, including statements made by the FAA and NORAD, will claim that the FAA notified the military about the suspected hijacking of Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m., if not before (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The FBI’s Washington Field Office was also reportedly notified that Flight 77 had been hijacked at about 9:20 a.m. (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will further contradict Mineta’s account saying that, despite the “conflicting evidence as to when the vice president arrived in the shelter conference room [i.e., the PEOC],” it has concluded that he only arrived there at 9:58 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] According to the Washington Post, the discussion between Cheney and the young aide over whether “the orders” still stand occurs later than claimed by Mineta, and is in response to Flight 93 heading toward Washington, not Flight 77. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Monte Belger, Norman Mineta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93, Dick Cheney

9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Tells NEADS that Delta 1989 Is Missing The FAA’s Boston Center contacts NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and reports that another aircraft, Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, is missing. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2004] Why the Boston Center does this is unclear, since Delta 1989 is currently being handled by the FAA’s Cleveland Center, not the Boston Center. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 10] And, according to the 9/11 Commission, Delta 1989 “never turned off its transponder,” so it should still be clearly visible on radar. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 16, 28] Twelve minutes later, at 9:39, Boston Center will call NEADS and incorrectly tell it that Delta 1989 is a possible hijack (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Entity Tags: Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001: Passenger Reportedly Says Hijacker Has a Gun; 9/11 Commission Later Concludes Otherwise According to Deena Burnett, when her husband Tom Burnett first calls her from Flight 93 (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001), he mentions that one of the plane’s hijackers has a gun. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 107; SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 4/21/2002; SACRAMENTO BEE, 9/11/2002] She will recall him telling her: “The hijackers have already knifed a guy. One of them has a gun. They’re telling us there’s a bomb on board.” [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 61] However, contradicting this account, the 9/11 Commission will conclude that the Flight 93 hijackers do not possess a gun. It will state: “[N]one of the other callers [from Flight 93] reported the presence of a firearm. One recipient of a call from the aircraft recounted specifically asking her caller whether the hijackers had guns. The passenger replied that he did not see one. No evidence of firearms or of their identifiable remains was found at the aircraft’s crash site, and the cockpit voice recorder gives no indication of a gun being fired or mentioned at any time. We believe that if the hijackers had possessed a gun, they would have used it in the flight’s last minutes as the passengers fought back.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 13] News reports shortly after 9/11 and later in 2001 will mention Tom Burnett describing the hijackers having knives and claiming to have a bomb, but say nothing about him referring to a hijacker with a gun. [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 9/12/2001; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/13/2001; SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 9/17/2001; NEWSWEEK, 12/3/2001] According to notes of her initial interview with the FBI (see (12:30 p.m.) September 11, 2001), Deena Burnett tells the investigators that her husband described to her a passenger being knifed and the hijackers claiming to have a bomb. But the notes will make no mention of her saying she was told about a hijacker possessing a gun. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001 ] And Deena apparently does not mention any gun in early interviews with the press, saying only: “[My husband] said, ‘I’m on the airplane, the airplane that’s been hijacked, and they’ve already knifed a guy. They’re saying they have a bomb. Please call the authorities.’” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/15/2001] But she will later state: “He told me one of the hijackers had a gun. He wouldn’t have made it up. Tom grew up around guns. He was an avid hunter and we have guns in our home. If he said there was a gun on board, there was.” [LONDON TIMES, 8/11/2002] Entity Tags: Tom Burnett, Deena Burnett, 9/11 Commission Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(9:27 a.m.-10:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Passengers See Only Three Hijackers on Flight 93 According to journalist and author Jere Longman, “On all phone calls made from [Flight 93], passengers reported seeing only three hijackers. Not a single caller reported four hijackers.” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 120] (As an exception, one article in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette claims that passenger Todd Beamer describes four hijackers; however, other reports say he describes only three (see 9:45 a.m.-9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001). [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001] ) Yet the official claim is that there are four hijackers on this plane. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/27/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 4] Some family members of the passengers and crew will later be suspicious that one of the hijackers was in the plane’s cockpit from takeoff (see 9:16 a.m. September 11, 2001). However, according to Longman, “Investigators, pilots, flight attendants and United officials tended to discount this theory.… Paperwork would have to be filled out in advance if an observer requested to sit in the cockpit. No request was made for Flight 93, United officials later reported.… Flight 93 was hijacked approximately forty-five minutes after it left Newark. Other pilots agreed that Captain Dahl likely would have requested that any observer return to his regular seat by that time.” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 120] The 9/11 Commission’s explanation for the reports of three hijackers instead of four is that Ziad Jarrah, “the crucial pilot-trained member of [the hijacker’s] team, remained seated and inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside, he would not have been visible to the passengers.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 12] Entity Tags: Jere Longman Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Passenger Tom Burnett Calls Wife Using Cell Phone; Reports that His Plane Has Been Hijacked

Tom Burnett. [Source: Family photo] Tom Burnett, a passenger on board Flight 93, calls his wife Deena Burnett at their home in San Ramon, California. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 106-107] She looks at the caller ID and recognizes the number as being that of his cell phone. She asks him if he is OK, and he replies: “No, I’m not. I’m on an airplane that’s been hijacked.” He says, “They just knifed a guy,” and adds that this person was a passenger. [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 61] (According to journalist and author Jere Longman, this would likely have been Mark Rothenberg in seat 5B; Burnett was assigned seat 4B. Rothenberg is the only first class passenger who does not make a call from the flight. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 107] ) Deena asks, “Are you in the air?” She later recalls, “I didn’t understand how he could be calling me on his cell phone from the air.” According to Deena Burnett, Tom continues: “Yes, yes, just listen. Our airplane has been hijacked. It’s United Flight 93 from Newark to San Francisco. We are in the air. The hijackers have already knifed a guy. One of them has a gun. They’re telling us there’s a bomb on board. Please call the authorities.” [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 61] (However, the 9/11 Commission will later conclude that the hijackers did not possess a gun, as Tom Burnett apparently claims here (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 13] ) At the end of the call, which lasts just seconds, Tom says he will call back and then hangs up. [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 62] Deena does not have time to tell him about the planes crashing into the World Trade Center. [SACRAMENTO BEE, 9/11/2002] But she writes down everything he tells her. [BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 62] She notes the call having occurred at 9:27 a.m. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 107] Yet, the 9/11 Commission will later conclude that the hijacker takeover of Flight 93 does not occur until a minute later, at 9:28 (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 38 ] Deena later wonders if her husband made this call before the hijackers took control of the cockpit, as he’d spoken quietly and quickly, as if he were being watched. He has an ear bud and a mouthpiece attached to a cord that hangs over his shoulder, which may have enabled him to use his phone surreptitiously. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 107] According to Deena Burnett’s account, this is the first of four calls Tom makes to her from Flight 93, all or most of which he makes using his cell phone. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001 ; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/13/2001; BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 75] However, a summary of passenger phone calls presented at the 2006 Zacarias Moussoui trial will state that Burnett makes only three calls from the plane; uses an Airfone, not his cell phone; and makes his frst call at 9:30, not 9:27 (see 9:30 a.m.-9:45 a.m. September 11, 2001). [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 9-10 ] This is the first of over 30 phone calls made by passengers from Flight 93. [MSNBC, 7/30/2002] Entity Tags: Mark Rothenberg, Deena Burnett, Tom Burnett Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Makes Last Contact with Air Traffic Control Flight 93 makes its last normal communication with air traffic control before being hijacked, acknowledging a routine radio transmission from the FAA’s Cleveland Center. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28] Flight 93 checked in with the Cleveland Center a couple of minutes earlier (see 9:24 a.m.-9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001). At 9:27, the Cleveland controller, John Werth, alerts it to another aircraft 12 miles away and to its right, at 37,000 feet: “United 93, that traffic for you is one o’clock, 12 miles east, bound three-seven-zero.” Seconds later, Flight 93 responds, “Negative contact, we’re looking, United 93.” Less than a minute after this, the hijackers appear to enter Flight 93’s cockpit (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [GREGOR, 12/21/2001 ; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 69; CBS NEWS, 9/10/2006] Entity Tags: John Werth, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:28 a.m. (or Before) September 11, 2001: Erratic Flight 93 Movements Noticed by Cleveland Flight Controller

Stacey Taylor. [Source: NBC News] Cleveland flight controller Stacey Taylor has been warned to watch transcontinental flights heading west for anything suspicious. She later recalls, “I hear one of the controllers behind me go, ‘Oh, my God, oh my God,’ and he starts yelling for the supervisor. He goes, ‘What is this plane doing? What is this plane doing?’ I wasn’t that busy at the time, and I pulled it up on my screen and he was climbing and descending and climbing and descending, but very gradually. He’d go up 300 feet, he’d go down 300 feet. And it turned out to be United 93.” (Note the time of this incident is not specified, but presumably it is prior to when Cleveland controllers note Flight 93 descends 700 feet at 9:29 a.m. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Stacey Taylor Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Cleveland Center Controllers Mistakenly Think Delta 1989 Is Hijacked

A Delta Air Lines Boeing 767, the same kind of aircraft as Delta 1989. [Source: Public domain] The FAA’s Cleveland Center incorrectly concludes that Delta Air Lines Flight 1989 has been hijacked, but accounts will conflict over how it comes to this conclusion. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 167] Delta 1989, a Boeing 767, is currently in the sector of airspace being monitored by Cleveland Center air traffic controller John Werth. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/2/2003 ; USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] It is flying west over Pennsylvania, approaching the Ohio border, and is about 25 miles behind Flight 93. FBI agents suspected Delta 1989 might be the next plane to be hijacked and called the Cleveland Center after the second attack on the World Trade Center, with the warning to watch this flight (see Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] A supervisor at the center told Werth to keep an eye on the flight because, as Werth will later recall, “he was a suspected hijacking because he had taken off from Boston at approximately the same time as” the first two hijacked aircraft, Flights 11 and 175. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/1/2003 ; USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] Controllers Hear Suspicious Communications - When, at 9:28, Werth hears the sound of screaming (subsequently determined to have come from Flight 93) over the radio (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001), he is unsure which of seven or eight possible aircraft it is coming from. The radio frequency is put on the speaker so other controllers can hear it, and they subsequently make out the words, “get out of here.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/1/2003 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 11, 28] Controllers Think Delta 1989 Is Hijacked - According to USA Today, when Cleveland Center controllers then hear a voice with a heavy accent over the radio, saying “Ladies and gentlemen: Here the captain.… We have a bomb on board” (see (9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001), they mistakenly think it is coming from Delta 1989, not Flight 93. They suspect the flight has been hijacked, and start informing their chain of command. “Officials at Cleveland Center rush word to Washington: Hijackers have another flight. At the Federal Aviation Administration’s Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, Delta Flight 1989 joins a growing list of suspicious jets.” [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 12] Werth Decides Hijacked Aircraft Is Flight 93 - Werth then calls all of the aircraft in his sector, and Flight 93 is the only one that does not respond. He also sees Flight 93 go into a quick descent and then come back up again. Werth therefore concludes that it is Flight 93, not Delta 1989, that has been hijacked, and instructs his supervisor to “tell Washington” of this. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/1/2003 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 10/2/2003 ] However, events in the following minutes will cause Cleveland Center controllers to remain suspicious of Delta 1989 (see (Shortly After 9:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 9:45 a.m. September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 10/2/2003 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 168; USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] Book Gives Alternative Account - In a book published in 2008, author Lynn Spencer will give a different explanation for why Cleveland Center becomes suspicious of Delta 1989. According to her account, after hearing a later radio transmission where a hijacker again says “There is a bomb on board” (see (9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001), Werth begins to hand off his flights to other controllers so he can devote his full attention to Flight 93. “In the distraction of the emergency, the crew of Delta 1989 misses the hand-off to the new frequency. The new sector controller for Delta 1989 calls out to the plane several times and gets no response.” As a result, “News travels fast,” and “Soon, word on the FAA’s open teleconference call is that a fifth aircraft is out of radio contact: Delta 1989… is added to the list of suspect aircraft.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 167] At 9:39 a.m., even though it is not responsible for handling Delta 1989, the FAA’s Boston Center will call NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and incorrectly tell it that Delta 1989 is another possible hijack (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Entity Tags: John Werth, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: NORAD Possibly Holding ‘Live-Fly’ Training Exercise According to former counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, around this time the acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers speaks to him via video link (see 9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). During their conversation, Myers mentions, “We are in the middle of Vigilant Warrior, a NORAD exercise.” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 5] However, no other references have been found to this exercise, “Vigilant Warrior.” Considering that exercise terms are “normally an unclassified nickname,” [CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 4/23/1998 ] this is perhaps a little odd. Could Richard Clarke have mistakenly been referring to the Vigilant Guardian exercise (see (6:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), which is taking place on 9/11? According to a later news report though, NORAD confirms that “it was running two mock drills on Sept. 11 at various radar sites and Command Centers in the United States and Canada,” one of these being Vigilant Guardian. [NEW JERSEY STAR-LEDGER, 12/5/2003] If this is correct then there must be another NORAD exercise on 9/11. If not “Vigilant Warrior,” a possibility is that the exercise referred to by Richard Clarke is in fact “Amalgam Warrior,” which is a NORAD-sponsored, large-scale, live-fly air defense and air intercept field training exercise. Amalgam Warrior usually involves two or more NORAD regions and is held twice yearly, in the spring for the West Coast and in the autumn for the East Coast. [US CONGRESS, N.D.; AIRMAN, 1996; ARKIN, 2005, PP. 254; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 4/27/2005] Is it possible that in 2001 the East Coast Amalgam Warrior is being held earlier than usual (like Global Guardian (see 8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001)) and is taking place on 9/11? In support of this possibility is a 1997 Defense Department report that describes the Stratcom exercise Global Guardian, saying it “links with other exercise activities sponsored by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Commands.” The exercises it links with are Crown Vigilance (an Air Combat Command exercise), Apollo Guardian (a US Space Command exercise), and—significantly—the NORAD exercises Vigilant Guardian and Amalgam Warrior. [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 5/1997; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 4/27/2005] Since in 2001, Vigilant Guardian (see (6:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) is occurring the same time as Global Guardian, might Amalgam Warrior be as well? In his book Code Names, William Arkin says that Amalgam Warrior is “sometimes combined with Global Guardian.” [ARKIN, 2005, PP. 254] Amalgam Warrior tests such activities as tracking, surveillance, air interception, employing rules of engagement, attack assessment, electronic warfare, and counter-cruise-missile operations. A previous Amalgam Warrior in 1996 involved such situations as tracking unknown aircraft that had incorrectly filed their flight plans or wandered off course, in-flight emergencies, terrorist aircraft attacks, and large-scale bomber strike missions. Amalgam Warrior 98-1 was NORAD’s largest ever exercise and involved six B-1B bombers being deployed to Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, to act as an enemy threat by infiltrating the aerial borders of North America. [AIRMAN, 1996; ARKIN, 2005, PP. 254; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 4/27/2005] Another Amalgam Warrior in fall 2000 similarly involved four B-1 bombers acting as enemy forces trying to invade Alaska, with NORAD going from tracking the unknown aircraft to sending up “alert” F-15s in response. [EIELSON NEWS SERVICE, 10/27/2000; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/29/2000] If either one (or both) of these exercises ending with the name “Warrior” is taking place on 9/11, this could be very significant, because the word “Warrior” indicates that the exercise is a Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved, Commander in Chief, NORAD-sponsored field training exercise. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 8/25/1989] Real planes would be pretending to be threats to the US and real fighters would be deployed to defend against them. Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Vigilant Warrior, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Ellington Air National Guard Base, Amalgam Warrior, Richard A. Clarke, Richard B. Myers, Vigilant Guardian Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: CNN Reports US Officials Think Attacks Caused by Terrorists CNN quotes the Associate Press as reporting that a US official believes the attacks are believed to have been carried out by terrorists. [OTTAWA CITIZEN, 9/11/2001] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: Myers Updates Clarke Videoconference on Fighter Response According to his own account, during a video conference with top officials that he is directing, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke asks Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Richard Myers, “I assume NORAD has scrambled fighters and AWACS. How many? Where?” Myers, who is at the Pentagon, replies, “Not a pretty picture, Dick. We are in the middle of Vigilant Warrior, a NORAD exercise, but… Otis has launched two birds toward New York. Langley is trying to get two up now [toward Washington]. The AWACS are at Tinker and not on alert.” Vigilant Warrior may be a mistaken reference to either the on-going war game Vigilant Guardian, or perhaps another exercise called Amalgam Warrior (see 9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). Otis Air National Guard Base is in Massachusetts, 188 miles east of New York City; Langley is in Virginia, 129 miles south of Washington; Tinker Air Force Base is in Oklahoma. Clarke asks, “Okay, how long to CAP [combat air patrol] over DC?” Myers replies, “Fast as we can. Fifteen minutes?” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 5] The first fighters don’t reach Washington until perhaps more than 30 minutes later (see (Between 9:49 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, this account—or at least the time Clarke alleges the conversation occurs—is contradicted by Myers himself and Senator Max Cleland (D). Myers claims he has been at a meeting on Capitol Hill with Cleland since about 9 o’clock, and does not arrive back at the Pentagon until after it is hit, which is at 9:37 a.m. [AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 10/23/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; CNN, 4/15/2003; AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 9/8/2006] Cleland confirms the existence of this meeting, and claims that Myers is with him until around the time of the Pentagon attack. [CNN, 11/20/2001; ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, 6/16/2003] (There are, though, some inconsistencies in Myers and Cleland’s accounts of this period (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Otis Air National Guard Base, Vigilant Warrior, Richard B. Myers, Richard A. Clarke, Vigilant Guardian, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Amalgam Warrior, Max Cleland Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke

(9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Hijackers Take over Flight 93 The 9/11 Commission will later conclude that the four hijackers take over Flight 93 at 9:28 a.m., one minute after the plane’s crew made their last communication with the FAA’s Cleveland Center (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001). According to the Commission, the hijackers “wielded knives (reported by at least five callers); engaged in violence, including stabbing (reported by at least four callers and indicated by the sounds of the cockpit struggle transmitted over the radio); relocated the passengers to the back of the plane (reported by at least two callers); threatened use of a bomb, either real or fake (reported by at least three callers); and engaged in deception about their intentions (as indicated by the hijacker’s radio transmission received by FAA air traffic control).” Flight 93 suddenly drops 685 feet in the space of just 30 seconds, and the Cleveland Center hears two suspicious radio transmissions from its cockpit (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, the 9/11 Commission will add, “While this appears to show the exact time that the hijackers invaded the cockpit, we have found no conclusive evidence to indicate precisely when the terrorists took over the main cabin or moved passengers seated in the first-class cabin back to coach.” The four hijackers waited about 46 minutes after takeoff before beginning their takeover of Flight 93. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 38-39 ] Yet, the Commission claims, when alleged hijacker ringleader Mohamed Atta met with fellow Hamburg cell member Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Spain about two months earlier (see July 8-19, 2001), he’d said that the “best time [for the hijackers] to storm the cockpit would be about 10-15 minutes after takeoff, when the cockpit doors typically were opened for the first time.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 245] The Commission will state, “We were unable to determine why [the Flight 93 hijackers] waited so long.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 39 ] The long wait is particularly notable, considering that Flight 93 had already been significantly delayed before taking off from Newark Airport (see 8:01 a.m. September 11, 2001). In fact, in an early timeline, Pentagon officials will state the hijacking occurred significantly earlier, at around 9:16, and in 2003, NORAD officials repeat this claim (see 9:16 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/17/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Cleveland Flight Control Hears Sounds of Struggle as Flight 93 Is Hijacked

Jason Dahl. [Source: Publicity photo] According to the 9/11 Commission, less than a minute after Flight 93 acknowledged a routine radio transmission from the FAA’s Cleveland Center (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001), John Werth—the controller handling the flight—and pilots of other aircraft in the vicinity of Flight 93 hear “a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; CBS NEWS, 9/10/2006] Someone, presumably Flight 93’s pilot Jason Dahl, is overheard by controllers as he shouts, “Mayday!” [NEW YORK TIMES, 7/22/2004] Seconds later, the controller responds, “Somebody call Cleveland?” Then there are more sounds of screaming and someone yelling, “Get out of here, get out of here.” [TORONTO SUN, 9/16/2001; NEWSWEEK, 9/22/2001; OBSERVER, 12/2/2001; MSNBC, 7/30/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Then the voices of the hijackers can be heard talking in Arabic. The words are later translated to show they are talking to each other, saying, “Everything is fine.” [NEWSWEEK, 12/3/2001] Later, passenger phone calls will describe two dead or injured bodies just outside the cockpit; presumably these are the two pilots. [NEW YORK TIMES, 7/22/2004] Entity Tags: Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, John Werth, 9/11 Commission, Jason Dahl Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(Between 9:28 a.m. and 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Executive Jet Tracks Flight 93 A small jet plane—ExecuJet 956—tracks Flight 93 for what is described as “a substantial period of time” before it crashes, and picks up some of the radio transmissions from it, as both planes are operating on the same frequency. [GOVERNMENT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER PURSUANT TO 49 USC 1154. UNITED STATES V. ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, 8/8/2002 ; WASHINGTON POST, 8/9/2002] The exact period over which ExecuJet 956 follows Flight 93 is unclear. But as early as 9:31 it calls the FAA’s Cleveland Center and, referring to Flight 93, reports: “[W]e’re just answering your call. We did hear that, uh, yelling too.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 461] At 9:40, after being asked, “did you understand that transmission [from Flight 93]?” ExecuJet 956 tells Cleveland Center: “Affirmative. He said that there was a bomb on board.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 4/12/2006] Cleveland Center then asks the ExecuJet pilot if he can change course and try to spot Flight 93. He sees it, loses it, and then sees it again. He then has to make an evasive turn, as Flight 93 is heading directly for him. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 104] ExecuJet 956 is one of a fleet of small jets available for hire from a company based in Woodbridge, New Jersey called NetJets, which sells shares in private business aircraft. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/8/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 8/9/2002] NetJets’ owner is the multi-billionaire Warren Buffet. [KNIGHT RIDDER, 11/6/2001; OBSERVER, 1/12/2003] Another small business jet is reportedly within 20 miles of Flight 93 when it crashes, but this is apparently a different one, belonging to a North Carolina clothing firm (see 10:07 a.m. September 11, 2001). [PITTSBURGH CHANNEL, 9/15/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/16/2001] Entity Tags: Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

9:29 a.m. September 11, 2001: Autopilot on Flight 77 Disengaged Flight 77’s autopilot is disengaged. The plane is flying at 7,000 feet and is about 38 miles west of the Pentagon. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] Information from the plane’s recovered flight data recorder (see September 13-14, 2001) later will indicate the pilot had entered autopilot instructions for a course to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (which is nearby the Pentagon). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

9:29 a.m. September 11, 2001: President Bush Makes a Scheduled Speech; Proclaims Terrorist Attack on Our Country

President Bush begins speaking at 9:29 in the library of Booker Elementary School. [Source: Booker Elementary website] (click image to enlarge) Still inside Booker Elementary School, President Bush gives a brief speech in front of about 200 students, plus many teachers and reporters. [DAILY MAIL, 9/8/2002] He says, “Today we’ve had a national tragedy. Two airplanes have crashed into the World Trade Center in an apparent terrorist attack on our country.” [FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, 9/11/2001] The talk occurs at exactly the time and place stated in his publicly announced advance schedule—making Bush a possible terrorist target. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/12/2001; MSNBC, 9/22/2001] This is the last most Americans will see of Bush until the evening. reporters at Booker Elementary School. Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush, Key Day of 9/11 Events

(9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Clarke Orders US Embassies Closed and Military Bases to Raise Alert Level Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, who is in the White House Situation Room, instructs that US embassies overseas be closed and that US military bases raise their alert level. According to his own recollection, just after he has spoken to the acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers (see 9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001), Clarke is thinking about the simultaneous attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). As he describes, “There was the possibility now of multiple simultaneous attacks in several countries.” He therefore issues instructions to the State Department and the Department of Defense: “We have to assume there will be simultaneous attacks on us overseas. We need to close the embassies. Move [Department of Defense] bases to combat Threatcon.” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 5-6] (“Threatcon” is short for “terrorist threat condition.” [SLATE, 9/12/2001] ) According to CNN, all US military forces will be ordered to the highest alert level at 10:10 a.m. (see (10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/4/2002] But the 9/11 Commission Report will state that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld only orders the US armed forces to Defcon 3, an increased state of readiness, at 10:43 a.m. (see (10:43 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 326 AND 554] The State Department will tell US embassies to make the decision whether to close based on their own local security requirements. Around 50 US embassies or consulates around the world will therefore close, though at what time they do so is unstated. [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 9/12/2001] Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke

(9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Cleveland Air Traffic Controller Thinks Flight 93 Is Hijacked

John Werth. [Source: CBS] Shortly after hearing strange noises from the cockpit of Flight 93, Cleveland air traffic controllers notice the plane has descended about 700 feet. John Werth, the controller who is handling the plane, tells the supervisor nearest to him, “I think we have another one [i.e., another hijacking].” He will repeatedly radio the cockpit over the next four minutes, asking the pilot to confirm the hijacking, but receive no response. At 9:30 a.m., Werth begins asking other nearby flights on his frequency if they’ve heard screaming; several say that they have. [GREGOR, 12/21/2001 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28; CBS NEWS, 9/10/2006] The Cleveland Center immediately notifies United Airlines’ headquarters of the loss of communication with Flight 93 (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, the FAA chain of command is apparently not also immediately informed. And the Cleveland Center will not contact NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) about Flight 93 until 10:07 a.m. (see 10:05 a.m.-10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28 AND 30] Entity Tags: John Werth, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(9:29 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Pentagon Command Center Begins High Level Conference Call

The National Miilitary Command Center, inside the Pentagon. [Source: National Military Command Center] Captain Charles Leidig is temporarily in command of the National Military Command Center (NMCC), “the military’s worldwide nerve center.” In response to the attacks on the World Trade Center, he convenes a conference call. [CNN, 9/4/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 ] Telephone links are established between the NMCC located inside the Pentagon (but on the opposite side of the building from where the explosion will happen), Canada’s equivalent Command Center, Strategic Command, theater commanders, and federal emergency-response agencies. At one time or another, President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, key military officers, leaders of the FAA and NORAD, the White House, and Air Force One are heard on the open line. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] NORAD command director Captain Michael Jellinek claims this call was initiated “at once” after the second WTC tower was hit. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002] However, the 9/11 Commission concludes it starts at 9:29 a.m. According to the commission, it begins as an all-purpose “significant event” conference. But at 9:30, Leidig states that it has just been confirmed that Flight 11 is still airborne and is heading toward Washington, DC. (This incorrect information apparently arose minutes earlier during a conference call between FAA centers (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001).) In response to this erroneous report, the significant event conference is ended at around 9:34. It then resumes at about 9:37 as an air threat conference call, which lasts for more than eight hours. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 37] This is broadcast over a loudspeaker inside the NMCC. [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 8/31/2003] Brigadier General Montague Winfield, who later takes over from Leidig in charge of the NMCC, says, “All of the governmental agencies that were involved in any activity going on in the United States at that point, were in that conference.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] The call continues right through the Pentagon explosion; the impact is not felt within the NMCC. [CNN, 9/4/2002] However, despite being in the Pentagon when it is hit, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld doesn’t enter the NMCC or participate in the call until 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Mike Jellinek, Montague Winfield, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush, National Military Command Center, Federal Aviation Administration, Charles Leidig, Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93, George Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Pentagon