Template:9/11 Commission August 2004 Staff report 1.1

Colgan Air Flight 5930
The Flight 11 story begins on the morning of September 11, 2001, in ,

aboard Colgan Air Flight 5930 headed for Logan International Airport.

Two of the Flight 11 hijackers, Mohamed Atta and Abdul Aziz al Omari, were aboard the flight on

their way to Boston.

Hijacker Arrival at the Airport and Check-in
At 5:40 A.M. on September 11, 2001, a car rented by Mohamed Atta in on September 9 entered the Portland International Jetport parking facility.

5:43 A.M. Atta and Omari checked in at the US Airways counter at the Portland Jetport.

Atta checked two bags, Omari none. The agent who checked in the two hijackers

recalled that when he handed Atta his boarding pass, Atta asked why he was not given a

boarding pass for his connecting flight on American Airlines from Boston to Los Angeles. The agent explained to Atta that he would have to check in with American

Airlines in Boston to obtain the boarding pass for the second leg of his itinerary. The

agent remembered that Atta clenched his jaw and looked as though he was about to get

angry. Atta stated that he was assured he would have "one-step check-in." The agent told

them that they had better get going if they were to make their flight He said that Atta

looked as if he were about to say something in anger but turned to leave. Both Atta and

Omari departed for the security checkpoint.

Hijacker Prescreening Selectee Status
When he checked in at the Portland airport, Atta

was randomly selected for additional security scrutiny by the Computer Assisted

Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS). The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),

required air carriers to apply the system to their passengers to identify those who might

be a security risk. FAA rules required that the checked bags of CAPPS selectees be

screened for explosives, or their bags held off the airplane until the passenger boarded.6

Because US Airways at Portland Jetport did not have explosives detection screening

equipment for checked bags at that time, Atta's luggage was subject to the matching

procedure.7 The application of this procedure was designed to stop a nonsuicide

bomber-one who might place a bomb in a bag and then leave the airport. At this time,

the FAA believed that such bombers were among the greatest threats to civil aviation

security.

Checkpoint Security Screening
At 5:45 A.M., Atta and Omari arrived at the sole

security checkpoint at the Portland International Jetport.8 This checkpoint was under the

custodial responsibility of Delta Airlines, which contracted for security screening

services with Globe Aviation Services. The checkpoint had two lanes, each outfitted with

a walk-through metal detector and X-ray equipment to help detect weapons.9

The checkpoint videotape was seized as evidence by the FBI and reviewed by the

Commission. 10 The videotape showed that Atta and Omari entered the walk through

metal detector at 5:45:03 A.M. A screener was stationed at the device to monitor the

screening. Though not conclusive, the video suggests that neither of the subjects set off

the metal detector. Both Atta and Omari proceeded from the magnetometer immediately

to the X-ray belt. Atta picked up a black shoulder bag. Omari claimed a similar bag, and

also a smaller black case that he held in both hands. The item cannot be identified but

resembled a camera or camcorder case. Neither of the bags was physically examined by a

screener, a step that is required if the X-ray monitor displays a suspicious item. Both of

the subjects passed out of view of the video camera at 5:45:15 A.M.

Hijacker Boarding
Seating aboard the Colgan flight was open rather than assigned.1

Eight passengers boarded the flight, including Atta and Omari. 12 The flight crew included

a pilot and a first officer who also served as the flight attendant. Atta and Omari were the

last to board the aircraft and sat in the last row of the plane-row 9.13

The Flight
Colgan Air Flight 5930 was a Beechcraft 1900-a 19-seat regional airliner.

It departed from Gate 11 on time at 6:00 A.M., arriving at Gate B9 (A) at Boston Logan

International Airport at approximately 6:45 A.M., one hour before the scheduled departure

of Flight 11.14

Purpose of the Flight
No physical, documentary, or analytical evidence found either by

the Commission or by law enforcement agencies provides a clear reason why Atta and

Omari drove to Portland from Boston on the morning of September 10 only to return to

Logan International Airport on Flight 5930 on the morning of September 11.15

The most plausible theory is that the hijackers chose to fly into Boston to avoid suspicion

that might have been aroused if they had arrived at Logan at approximately the same time

as eight other young Middle Eastern males to check in for Flight 11 and Flight 175. Such

an intent might also explain why Atta appeared to be so upset that he had to check in

again in Boston to get a boarding pass for Flight 11.

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is also possible that they traveled to Portland to preserve operational security. If the

hijackers' plot had been discovered by U.S. intelligence or law enforcement, or by the

U.S. aviation security system, the two terrorists would be apprehended during their

check-in at the Portland airport. That outcome would have been preferable to being

stopped at Logan Airport, where other members of Atta's hijack team were also checking

in, and where conspirators intending to hijack Flight 175 were assembling at the same

time. 16

Telephone records show that a phone call was placed from a pay phone in the gate area

from which Flight 175 departed to Atta's cell phone at 6:52 A.M. This call strongly

suggests that the two hijacking teams engaged in tactical communications, such as

situational reporting and possible "go" or "no go" determinations, at the last moment.

The Massport Aviation Director told the Commission that Portland was the nearest

airport to Boston with a flight that would have arrived at Logan in time for the passengers

to transfer to Flight 11.18

We also considered the possibility that Atta, the leader of the 9/11 hijackers, might have

believed that he and Omari were more likely to successfully pass through checkpoint

screening at a smaller airport, carrying items such as Mace or pepper spray, than they

were at Logan Airport.

However, two considerations would have made this a faulty assumption. First, public

sources would not have supported the notion that smaller airports had more porous

checkpoints. For instance, in the winter and spring of 2001, a Fox news special

investigation publicly described serious shortcomings in the detection capabilities at

Logan Airport's security screening checkpoints, including the ease with which knives

could be carried through checkpoints. 19 Second, Atta and Omari were required to go

through another security checkpoint when they arrived at Logan in order to enter the

terminal from which Flight 11 departed.

We believe that Atta's apparent anger about not receiving his boarding pass for Flight 11

when he checked in for Flight 5930 is a strong indication that he hoped to enter the

system and obtain his final boarding pass along with Omari at Portland, separately from

the other hijackers The hijackers checked-in and went through the checkpoints (at least

in the case of the Flight 77 hijackers who were videotaped), in pairs or by themselves.

This provides additional evidence that the hijackers did not want to make themselves

conspicuous by congregating.

American Airlines Flight 11
Hijackers. Mohamed Atta (pilot); Abdul Aziz al Omari; Waleed al Shehri; Wail al

Shehri; Satam al Suqami.

Hijacker Weapon Purchases. Atta purchased two Victorinox Swiss Army knives at the

Zurich Airport on July 8, 2001, and a Leatherman multi-tool in Boynton Beach, Florida,

on August 30, 2001. 2

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Hijacker Arrival at Airport and Check-in. At 6:45 A.M., Atta and Omari arrived at

Boston Logan airport, Terminal B, Gate B9A. Atta and Omari still had their carry-on

shoulder bags. Atta's two checked bags were unloaded from the Colgan Air flight. The

luggage tags indicated that they should be transferred to American Airlines Flight 11

from Boston to Los Angeles International Airport. FAA security rules did not require

additional screening or special security handling of Atta's luggage.

After exiting the aircraft, Atta and Omari crossed a parking lot that separated their arrival

and departure terminals. They were observed asking for directions.21

Also at 6:45 A.M., Wail al Shehri, Waleed al Shehri, and Satam al Suqami arrived at

Logan Airport and parked their rental car at the airport's central parking facility.22

Hijacker Prescreening. According to ticket records, Wail al Shehri, Waleed al Shehri,

and Satam al Suqami were selected by CAPPS. 23 Waleed al Shehri did not check a bag.

The others checked in one each.2 4 Their checked luggage was screened by an explosives

detection system and loaded aboard the aircraft. 25 Under FAA security rules in effect at

the time, the hijackers' designation as "selectees" did not require that they undergo any

screening of their person or carry-on bags beyond what was required of passengers not

selected by CAPPS.2 6

Checkpoint Security Screening. Because the airport's security checkpoints and gate

area were not monitored by video surveillance equipment at that time, no conclusive

evidence exists regarding when and how the Flight 11 hijackers passed through

checkpoint screening. To reach their departure gate after checking in, all five hijackers

would have been required to pass through one of two checkpoints, both of which were

operated by Globe Aviation Services under a contract with American Airlines. 2 7 The

smaller checkpoint opened at 7:15 A.M. and was used mainly for overflow traffic from the

other. We believe it most likely that the hijackers would have chosen to pass through the

busier checkpoint in the hopes of being less conspicuous.

At the checkpoint, each of the individual's carry-on belongings would have been

screened by an X-ray machine. The purpose of this screening was to identify and

confiscate weapons and other items prohibited from being carried onto a commercial

flight.2 8 Also, the passenger would pass through a walk-through metal detector calibrated

at that time to detect items with at least the metal content of a small-caliber handgun. If

any one of the hijackers triggered the walk-through magnetometer, he would have been

screened with a handheld metal detector-a procedure requiring the screener to identify

the item or items that caused the alarm. Any items found that were prohibited or

restricted under the checkpoint operating rules and guidelines would not be allowed past

the checkpoint. The checkpoint supervisors did not recall the hijackers or report anything

suspicious regarding their screening.29

6:52 A.M. Atta received a phone call from a pay phone in Terminal C at Logan

International Airport-the terminal from which Flight 175 was due to depart.3 0

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Hijacker Boarding. At approximately 7:31 A.M., Wail al Shehri and Waleed al Shehri

boarded. Atta and Omari followed at approximately 7:39 A.M. Suqami boarded a minute

later.3 1

Flight Profile. Flight 11 provided daily, nonstop service from Boston's Logan

International Airport (BOS) to Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). On September

11, it was scheduled for a 7:45 A.M. departure. 32 The aircraft was a Boeing 767, tail

number N334AA. 33

Captain John Ogonowski and First Officer Thomas McGuinness piloted the plane. It

carried its full capacity of nine flight attendants:


 * Karen Martin (Position 1), assigned to the forward left jumpseat (1L), located

between the first-class cabin and the cockpit entrance;


 * Kathleen Nicosia (Position 2), assigned to the left aft jimpseat (3L) at the back of

the aircraft;


 * Betty Ong (Position 3), assigned to the right aft jumpseat (3R) at the back of the

aircraft behind the coach section;


 * Dianne Snyder (Position 4), assigned to the mid-galley jumpseat (2R);


 * Barbara "Bobbi" Arestegui (Position 5), assigned to the forward right jumpseat

(1R Center), which was in the forward galley between the cockpit and the firstclass

cabin;


 * Jeffrey Collman (Position 6), assigned to the middle left jumpseat (2L) located in

the middle galley within the main cabin;


 * Sara Low (Position 7), assigned to the middle right jumpseat (2R) in the middle

galley within the main cabin;


 * Jean Roger (Position 8), assigned to the forward left jumpseat (1L Center) in the

forward galley; and


 * Madeline "Amy" Sweeney (Position 9), assigned to the left aftjumpseat (3L) at

the back of the aircraft behind the coach section.3 4

The aircraft had a capacity of 158 passengers: 9 seats in first class, 30 in business class,

and 119 in coach.35 On September 11, the flight carried 81 passengers (including the 5

terrorists) with 2 pilots and 9 flight attendants, for a total of 92 people on board.

All 9 of the first-class seats were occupied, 2 of them by hijackers Waleed al Shehri (2B)

and Wail al Shehri (2A). Nineteen of the 30 seats in business class were occupied (49

percent), 3 by hijackers Atta (8D), Omari (8G), and Suqami (10B).36 Fifty-three of the

119 coach seats were occupied (44 percent), none of them by hijackers.

The percentage of seats occupied on the aircraft-also known as the "load factor"-on

September 11, 2001, was 51 percent, compared to an average load factor for Flight 11 of

almost 39 percent on Tuesdays over the three months preceding 9/11.37 Thus, the load

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factor on this flight was somewhat above the norm. The Commission found no ticketing,

passenger occupancy, or financial evidence to indicate that the hijackers purchased

additional seats beyond the ones they actually used in order to limit the number of

passengers they would need to control during the operation. 38

As noted above, all of the hijackers were accounted for in checking in and boarding the

flight. American's records do not reflect the use of a cockpit jump seat by anyone other

than the Flight 11 pilot and first officer. 39

Under American Airline's policy in effect on 9/11, every crew member, including each of

the flight attendants, had a key to the cockpit. The airline's Flight Standards Manual

instructed the crews to guard their keys carefully. 40 Rules implemented in the 1960s

required that air crews keep the cockpit door closed and locked during flight, 41 though the

requirement was not always observed by flight crews or enforced by the FAA.

The American Airlines dispatcher in charge of Flight 11 said that all aspects of preflight

preparation were routine. She reported having no preflight communications with the pilot

or aircraft because no problems or issues in need of resolution arose.42

Flight 11 was loaded with 76,400 pounds of fuel, above the average fuel load of 70,000

pounds.4 3

The Flight. At 7:40 A.M., Flight 11 pushed back from Gate 32 and taxied to its departure

runway. It took off at 7:59 A.M. 44

Shortly before 8:14 A.M., Flight 11 reached an altitude of 26,000 feet, just shy of its

initial cruising altitude of 29,000 feet. Up to this point, all communications and the

flight's appearance to air traffic controllers were normal.45 While cabin service generally

did not start until after the cruising altitude was reached, some pilots under the proper

circumstances would turn off the "Fasten Seatbelt" signs earlier, thereby permitting the

flight attendants to begin cabin service. It is not known if such a head start was allowed

on this flight, but it is ver, likely that flight attendants would at least have begun

preparations for service.

FAA air traffic controller Peter Zalewski, stationed at the Boston Air Route Traffic

Control Center (Boston Center) radioed directional instructions: "American 11 turn

twenty degrees right." Flight 11 replied: "twenty right American 11." This was the last

routine communication received from the flight. Seconds later, air traffic control radioed

Flight 11 again, this time instructing the aircraft to climb to 35,000 feet. The flight did

not respond. Over the next ten minutes, air traffic control tried nine times to contact the

flight. All attempts were unsuccessful. 47

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According to the flight attendant's assigned seats, Karen Martin was in the first-class

cabin and Bobbi Arestegui in the first-class galley, or kitchen. Sara Low and Jean Roger

would have been serving business-class passengers, with Dianne Snyder in the midgalley.

Betty Ong and Amy Sweeney would have been working in coach, with Karen

Nicosia in the rear galley. Jeffrey Collman would have been assigned to work in coach,

or to assist in first class if needed.48

The Hijacking. At around 8:14 A.M. or shortly thereafter,4 9 the hijackers began their

takeover of the aircraft. Information supplied by eyewitness accounts indicates that the

hijackers initiated and sustained their command of the aircraft using knives (as reported

by two flight attendants); violence, including stabbing and slashing (as reported by two

flight attendants); the threat of violence (as indicated by a hijacker in radio transmissions

received by air traffic control); Mace (reported by one flight attendant); the threat of a

bomb, either fake or real (reported by one flight attendant); and deception about their

intentions (as indicated by a hijacker in a radio transmission received by air traffic

control).

8:19 A.M.50 Flight attendant Betty Ong contacted the American Airlines Southeastern

Reservations Office in Cary, North Carolina, via AT&T air phone to report an emergency

aboard the flight. Flight attendants know the reservations 800 number because they call it

frequently to help passengers with reservations questions. Calls to the number are routed

to the first open line at one of several facilities, including the one in Cary. 51

The emergency call from Betty Ong lasted approximately 25 minutes (8:19 A.M.-8:44

A.M.). Ong relayed vital information about events taking place aboard the airplane to

authorities on the ground. Her call was received initially at the reservations office by an

American Airlines employee. The call was transferred to another employee who,

realizing the urgency of the situation, pushed an emergency button that simultaneously

initiated a tape recording of the call and sent an alarm notifying Nydia Gonzalez, the

reservations office supervisor, to pick up on the line. Gonzalez was paged to respond to

the alarm and joined the call a short time later. Only the first four minutes of the phone

call between Ong and the reservations center was tape-recorded because the recently

installed recording system at that time contained a default time limit. 2

8:19 A.M. Ong reported, "The cockpit is not answering, somebody's stabbed in business

class-and I think there's mace-that we can't breathe-I don't know, I think we're

getting hijacked." 53

While the reported "stabbing" in business class may have been an attack on the flight

attendants, or on an unnamed victim, this may quite possibly have been the initial report

of the attack (recounted with more specificity later) on a passenger in business class,

seated in 9B-directly behind Atta and Omari, and in front of Suqami. The passenger

was a 31-year-old man who had served four years as an officer in the Israeli military.54

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8:20 A.M. Ong reported that two flight attendants had been stabbed.55

As noted above, American Airlines flight attendants all carried cockpit keys on their

person. Although no information was provided from the flight about exactly how the

hijackers gained access to the cockpit, it is possible the stabbings of the flight attendants

could have been for the purpose of acquiring a key, of forcing one of them to open the

cockpit door, or of luring the captain or first officer out of the cockpit.

Also at 8:20 A.M., the American Airlines dispatcher at the airline's operations center in

Texas who was responsible for transatlantic flights received a communication from an

American Airlines flight traveling from Seattle to Boston that air traffic control had asked

the aircraft to try to contact Flight 11. This was the first indication she had of any

problem on the flight.56

8:21 A.M. The transponder on Flight 11 was switched off, making it more difficult for

FAA air traffic control centers to identify the flight and monitor its flight path.57

Also at 8:21 A.M., Gonzalez joined the call from Ong. Realizing the seriousness of the

situation, she used another phone line to contact Craig Marquis, manager on duty, at the

American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) in Fort Worth, Texas, and informed

the airline's headquarters that there was a problem aboard Flight 11. Gonzalez's

emergency call to the SOC was recorded at the airline's headquarters. Gonzalez notified

Marquis that Flight 11 was reporting an emergency, that stabbings had taken place, and

that the flight attendants could not reach the cockpit.

After confirming Gonzalez's identity and position, at 8:22 A.M. Marquis acknowledged

the emergency and indicated to Gonzalez that he would "get ATC [air traffic control] on

here." At this same time, while Marquis was relating this information to Gonzalez, Ong

reported to Gonzalez's colleague: "I think the guys [hijackers] are up there. They might

have gone there, jammed their way up there, or something. Nobody can call the cockpit.

We can't even get inside." Thirty seconds after contacting American Airlines'

headquarters, Gonzalez rejoined the call from Ong. 58

Also at 8:22 A.M., flight attendant Madeline "Amy" Sweeney tried to contact the

American Airlines flight services office at Logan International Airport by air phone. The

office she was attempting to call managed the scheduling and operation of flight

attendants, and its phone number was well known to the American flight attendants

operating out of Boston.59 Sweeney's initial attempt to get through to the office failed.6

8:23 A.M. The American Airlines flight dispatcher sent an Aircraft Communications and

Reporting System (ACARS) text message to Flight 11: "Good Morning. . .ATC looking

for you on [radio frequency] 135.32."61 ACARS is an email system that enables those in

the cockpit of an in-flight aircraft and company personnel on the ground to rapidly

communicate with one another. The dispatcher received no response to his message.

Also at 8:23 A.M., the tape recording of the call between Ong and the reservations center

ceased because of the default time limit on the system. However, Gonzalez remained on

the line with Ong for the next 21 minutes. Gonzalez continued to report the information

she received from the flight attendant to the American Airlines SOC. The call between

American's reservations facility and the SOC continued to be taped by the SOC until its

conclusion. 6 2

8:24 A.M. Ong told Gonzalez that the hijackers were in the cockpit.63 Sweeney attempted

another call to the flight services office. It also failed. 64

Shortly before 8:25 A.M., air traffic controller Zalewski heard two clicks over the

frequency assigned to the flight, and radioed in response, "Is that American eleven trying

to call?" Five seconds later, a voice with a foreign accent addressed the passengers. "We

have some planes. Just stay quiet and you'll be okay. We're returning to the airport." 65

Because the wrong button was pushed, this message was heard not by the passengers but

by air traffic control. The controller did not comprehend the first sentence ("planes"); it

was understood 30 minutes later after a facility manager was able to locate and replay the

tape. (See 9:03 A.M. entry below.)

Seconds later, Boston Center heard the following transmission from the same foreign

voice: "Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you'll

endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet." 66 According to Ong's simultaneous

reporting, no announcements had been made from the cockpit to the passengers. This

suggests that the hijackers' announcements were not heard in the cabin, and that they did

not know how to operate the radio properly.

8:25 A.M. After hearing the second transmission from the aircraft, controllers at Boston

Center believed that Flight 11 had been hijacked.67

Also at 8:25 A.M., an American Airlines air traffic control (ATC) specialist at the SOC

sent another ACARS message to Flight 11: "Plz contact Boston Center ASAP.. .They

have lost radio contact and your transponder signal." Again, the aircraft did not respond

to this or subsequent ACARS messages attempting to reestablish contact with the

cockpit.68

At the same time, Sweeney's third call to the American Airlines Flight Services Office at

Boston finally was connected to an American Airlines' employee. Sweeney told her that

someone was hurt aboard Flight 12, and then the phone call was cut off. The recipient of

the call passed the information to Michael Woodward, the flight service manager.

Woodward went to American's gate area at Logan with a colleague. The supervisor noted

that the morning flights had all departed Boston and the gate area was quiet. He further

realized that Flight 12 was a flight to Boston from the West Coast that had not even left

yet, so he and his colleague returned to the office to try to clarify the nature of the

emergency call. 69

Between 8:25 A.M. and 8:32 A.M., in accordance with the FAA managers protocol, Boston Center started notifying their chain of command that Flight 11 had been hijacked.7

8:26 A.M. Ong reported to Gonzalez that the plane was "flying erratically." Gonzalez passed this information to the SOC.7 '

8:28 A.M., Boston Center called the FAA Air Traffic Control Svstem CnmmrnA ro,ntd TT - ' AA '..-...LL r, L f. nerndon, Virginia (Herdon Command Center) to advise management that it believed Flight 11 had been hijacked and was heading toward New York Center's airspace. By this point in time, Flight 11 had taken a dramatic turn to the south. Command Center immediately established a teleconference between Boston, New York and Cleveland Centers to allow Boston Center to provide situational awareness to the centers that adjoined Boston in the event the rogue aircraft entered their airspace. 2

8:29 A.M. An air traffic control specialist at the American Airlines' SOC contacted Boston Center to ask about the status of Flight 11.

8:31 A.M. A controller at Boston Center told the American Airlines air traffic control specialist that the last known altitude of the aircraft was below 29,000 feet and that "He [Flight 1 1] was heading west. But right now he's pointed southwest of Albany." The controller also said the transponder had been lost and that "the controller heard a threat in the background, but that's unconfirmed and we're trying to pull the tape at this time." 73

8:32 A.M. The Hemdon Command Center notified the Operations Center at FAA headquarters in Washington, D.C., of the possible hijacking of Flight 11, and was told that FAA security personnel at headquarters had just begun discussing the hijacking on a conference call with the agency's New England regional office.74

Also at 8:32 A.M., 75 the American Airlines flight service manager at Logan, Michael Woodward, returned to his office and discovered that Sweeney had called again and was speaking with an employee in the office. Woodward, who was a friend of Sweeney's, took over the call. Sweeney said that she was sitting in the back of the plane next to Ong, who was still on the phone with Gonzalez.

The phone call between Sweeney and Woodward lasted approximately 12 minutes. It was not taped. According to Woodward, Sweeney was calm and collected. She provided the following information: she was sitting in the back of the aircraft next to Betty Ong; the plane had been hijacked; a man in first class had had his throat slashed; two flight attendants had been stabbed-one flight attendant had been stabbed seriously and was on oxygen while another flight attendant's wounds were not as serious and seemed to be okay; a doctor had been paged; the flight attendants were unable to contact the cockpit; and there was a bomb in the cockpit.

Sweeney told Woodward that she and Ong were trying to relay as much information as

they could to people on the ground.

Sometime after 8:30 A.M. but before 8:45 A.M., American Airlines Executive Vice

President Gerard Arpey made a routine call to the airline's SOC and was informed that

personnel there were on the phone with a flight attendant who was reporting violence and

a cockpit intrusion on one of the company's flights. He tried unsuccessfully to contact

American Airlines' Chairman Don Carty to apprise him of the situation. He immediately

went to the SOC and learned that colleagues were setting up the company's [[System

Operations Command Center]] (SOCC) in order to manage the emergency.

8:33 A.M. The SOC manager on duty, Craig Marquis, received a report from the SOC air

traffic control specialist about the specialist's just-completed call to Boston Center. The

specialist told him that the aircraft was at "29,000 feet. They've lost Comm

[communications] with 'em. Turned off his transponder. Tracking his primary only. Was

westbound. Turned southbound. Said the controller heard on the frequency the pilot

apparently adjust his mike-lot of loud voices-that sounded threatening-something

about return or I'll kill ya or something to that effect-or threatening dialogue."

American headquarters now suspected that Flight 11 had been hijacked.

Also at 8:33 A.M., Gonzalez received a report from Ong providing the first indication of a

fatality on board. Gonzalez passed the information on to Marquis at 8:34 A.M. as follows:

"They think they might have a fatality on the flight. One of our passengers, possibly on

9B, Levin or Lewis, might have been fatally stabbed."8 1

8:34 A.M., While FAA headquarters received its initial notification that Flight 11 had

been hijacked, the Boston controller received a third transmission from Flightl 1:

"Nobody move please. We are going back to the airport. Don't try to make any stupid

moves.",,822

Also at 8:34 A.M., in an attempt to get fighter aircraft airborne to track Flight 11, Boston

Center's managers decided not to wait for the request for military assistance to be passed

up the FAA chain of command, and took the initiative by calling a manager at the FAA

Cape Cod facility. They asked the Cape Cod manager to contact Otis Air Force Base in

Cape Cod, Massachusetts to get fighters airborne to "tail" the hijacked aircraft. 83

8:35 A.M. Gonzalez confirmed the details of a report by Ong regarding the identity of one

of the hijackers: "He's the one that's in the-he's in the cockpit. Okay you said Tom

Sukani? Okay-Okay and he was in 10B. Okay, okay, so he's one of the persons that are

in the cockpit. And as far as weapons, all they have are just knives?"8

8:36 A.M. Marquis received Gonzalez's report about the hijacker she referred to as "Tom

al Sukani" (i.e., Satam al Suqami), who had been seated in 10B.85 He then initiated action

to "lockout" American Airlines Flight 11. This procedure is standard for airlines in safety

and security incidents. It acknowledges an emergency on the flight and isolates

information so that the case can be managed by top leadership at the airlines in a way that

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information from being altered or released, and also protects the identities of the

passengers and crew.

8:3 7A.M.- 8:38 A.M., Gonzalez reported to Marquis that the passengers had been moved

out of first class and back to coach and that the plane was flying erratically again.

American completed its lockout of Flight 11. 86 Also at 8:38 A.M., Gonzalez reported that

the plane was in a rapid descent. Marquis asked a fellow employee in the SOC if Flight

11 was descending. The employee replied, "We don't know. The transponder is off so

we have no active read on him." 87

8:37:52 A.M. Boston Center called

the North American Aerospace

Defense Command's (NORAD)

Northeast Air Defense Sector

(NEADS) and notified NEADS

about the suspected hijacking of

Flightl 1.88 The United States'

military defense of its homeland on

9/11 began with this call. Indeed,

this was the first notification

received by the military - at any

level - that Flight 11 had been

hijacked.

The report of the hijack was relayed immediately to Battle Commander Colonel Robert

Marr at NEADS, who was stationed in the Battle Cab in preparation for a scheduled

NORAD exercise. Col. Marr confirmed that the hijacking was "real-world" then ordered

fighter pilots at Otis Air Force Base in Massachusetts to battle-stations.89

Col. Marr then phoned Maj. General Larry Arnold, commanding General of the First Air

Force and the Continental U.S. NORAD Region (CONR) commander. Col. Marr advised

him of the situation, and sought authorization to scramble the Otis fighters in response to

the reported hijacking. General Arnold instructed Col. Marr "to go ahead and scramble

the airplanes and we'd get permission later. And the reason for that is that the

procedure... if you follow the book, is they [law enforcement officials] go to the duty

officer of the national military center, who in turn makes an inquiry to NORAD for the

availability of fighters, who then gets permission from someone representing the

Secretary of Defense. Once that is approved then we scramble an aircraft. We didn't

wait for that." 90 General Arnold then picked up the phone and talked to the operations

deputy at NORAD, who told him 'Yeah, we'll work with the National Military

Command Center (NMCC). Go ahead and scramble the aircraft."' 9 1

At 8:40 A.M., NEADS placed two F-15 alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base in

Massachusetts, located about 153 miles away from New York City, on battle stations. 92

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Also at 8:40 AM., information about Flight 11 started to be conveyed within the Air

Traffic Control system. Boston Center, through the Herdon Command Center, provided

a report to New York TRACON on Flight 11.

Also at 8:40 A.M., an American Airlines employee in Boston who was standing next to

Michael Woodward as he talked to Sweeney contacted an employee in American

Airlines' SOC. She reported the content of the ongoing call between Woodward and

Sweeney, including that Sweeney said the hijackers were Middle Eastern men seated in

10B, 9D, and 9G; one spoke very little English and one spoke excellent English; she did

not know how they had gained entry to the cockpit; and the aircraft was in a rapid

descent.9 3

8:41 A.M. Sweeney told Woodward that passengers in coach were under the impression

that there was a routine medical emergency in first class. She said that the other flight

attendants were attending to duties, including getting medical supplies, while she and

Ong reported the events.

Also at 8:41 A.M., Marquis instructed an unidentified colleague in the SOC: "Tell ATC to

handle this as an emergency." The colleague replied, "They have in there it's been

hijacked." The manager responded: "It is. Okay." 95

The colleague then informed Marquis, "They think he's [Flight 11] headed toward

Kennedy. They're moving everybody out of the way. They seem to have him on a

primary radar. They seem to think that he is descending."

8:43 A.M. A Hemdon Command Center air traffic specialist warned Washington en route

center that Flightl1 was a "possible hijack" and would be headed towards Washington

Center's airspace if it continued on a southbound track.

8:44 A.M., Gonzalez reported to Marquis that phone contact with Ong had been

terminated: "We, I think we might have lost her." 97 About this same time, Sweeney

reported to Woodward in Boston, "Something is wrong. We are in a rapid descent... we

are all over the place." Woodward asked Sweeney to look out the window to see if she

could determine where they were. Sweeney told him, "We are flying low. We are flying

very, very low. We are flying way too low." Seconds later she said, "Oh my God we are

way too low" and then the phone call ended.9 8

8:45 A.M. The American Airlines employee listening to the call between Woodward and

Sweeney reported to the SOC:, "She [Sweeney] started screaming and saying

something's wrong and now he's [Woodward] having trouble-now he thinks he might

be disconnected. Okay, we just lost connection." 99

Also at 8:45 A.M., the American Airlines director of security learned of the hijacking. He

contacted the special agent in charge of the FBI's Dallas Field Office to tell him that a

hijacking was taking place. l°°

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8:46 AM. The order to scramble the Otis fighters was passed from the NEADS Battle

Commander (BC) to his Mission Crew Commander (MCC), who passed it to the

Weapons Director (WD).1 0 ' Almost immediately, however, a problem arose. The

Weapons Director asked: "MCC. I don't know where I'm scrambling these guys to. I

need a direction, a destination." 10 2 Because the hijackers had turned off the plane's

transponder, the plane appeared only as a primary track on radar. The fighters were

vectored to military air space near Long Island while NEADS personnel searched

frantically for the missing flight. 103

8:46:40 A.M. American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World

Trade Center in New York City.1 4 All on board and an unknown number in the building

were killed on impact.

By 8:50 A.M., American Airlines headquarters learned that an aircraft had struck the

World Trade Center via a telephone call from an American employee at LaGuardia

Airport. The airline did not know the plane was Flight 11.105

8:53 A.M. Although the Otis fighters were airborne, neither the fighter pilots nor the

NEADS officers were aware that Flight 11 had crashed into the World Trade Center's

North Tower. When NEADS learned of the crash, the fighters were placed in a holding

pattern in military airspace to await further instruction. NEADS had no knowledge that a

second hijacked aircraft, United 175, was bearing down on the South Tower. The Otis

fighters remained in a holding pattern until word reached NEADS that the second aircraft

had crashed into the World Trade Center.

At about 9:03 A.M., Boston Center reported to the FAA's New England regional office

that the hijackers stated, "We have some planes" during the 8:25 A.M. transmission from

Flight 11 06

9:16 A.M. The American Airlines SOC air traffic control specialist called an official at the

FAA's Hemdon Command Center and informed her that American "thought" Flight 11

had been the first aircraft to crash into the World Trade Center.10 7

9:21 A.M. NEADS received a report from Boston Center that "it was evidently another

aircraft that hit the tower" and that Flight 11 was still airborne and "heading towards

Washington."' 0 8 NEADS personnel immediately began an active search for the aircraft.

9:23 A.M. After consulting with the NEADS Battle Commander, the NEADS Mission

Crew Commander issued an order to scramble alert fighters from Langley Air Force Base

in Virginia in response to the report that Flight 11 was headed towards Washington

DC.1' 9 The initial strategy of NEADS personnel was to use the alert fighters scrambled

from Otis Air Force Base at 8:46 A.M. to chase down Flight 11 if they could find the

aircraft, and to vector the Langley fighters on a northerly heading to an area between the

(reported) southbound Flight 11 and the nation's capital.'" 0

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9:24 A.M. The order to scramble the Langley fighters was processed and transmitted by

NEADS to Langley Air Force Base. l'

Shortly after 9:24 A.M., out of concern over leaving New York's airspace unprotected,

NEADS commanders decided to cancel the plan to pursue Flight 11 with the Otis

fighters. 12

9:27A.M. The military's situational awareness was summarized on the NEADS watch

floor as follows: "Three planes unaccounted for. American Airlines 11 may still be

airborne but the flight that - United 175 to the World Trade Center. We're not sure who

the other one is."1'

9:30 A.M. Radar data showed the Langley fighters airbore. On the floor at NEADS,

the ID Technicians continued to attempt to locate American 11 after the Langley fighters

were airborne.114

By 9:30 A.M., American Airlines confirmed that Flight 11 had crashed into the World

Trade Center.l 15

Alleged Gun Use on Flight 11. The Commission investigated an allegation that a gun

was used aboard American Airlines Flight 11. The allegation arose from a notation in an

initial executive summary produced on September 11, 2001, by FAA staff indicating that

FAA headquarters had received a report of a shooting on the plane from an American

Airlines employee at the company's operations center. 116 The report did not mention a

stabbing. In interviews with the Commission, the individual alleged to have made the

report to the FAA denied having done so." 7

Regardless of what reports were received in the chaotic environment of the various

operations centers at the FAA, the airports, and the airlines, authoritative information

about whether a shooting occurred on Flight 11 could have come only from individuals

on the aircraft who were reporting events to contacts on the ground.

As noted above, two flight attendants aboard American Airlines Flight 11 placed calls to

ground contacts to report what was happening on the aircraft. Neither in the tape

recordings of the calls nor in the accounts of the witnesses to the calls is the presence of a

gun or the occurrence of a shooting reported. l18 These witnesses' accounts of the phone

calls are consistent and are quite specific about the presence of knives and the stabbing or

slashing of two crew members and a passenger.

In order to accept the accuracy of the initial FAA executive summary concerning a

shooting (disregarding the evidence by eyewitnesses to the contrary), one would have to

believe that the American Airlines operations center relayed to the FAA the account of a

shooting that no witness recalls while neglecting to include the account of a stabbing that

was widely reported, including to personnel in the operations center. This seems highly

implausible.

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In fact, the victim of the alleged shooting that was noted in the FAA executive summary

was seated in 9B. That seat, according to several of the witness accounts from the

aircraft, was assigned to the passenger who was stabbed.' 19

Both the FBI and the General Accounting Office investigated the story of a gun aboard

Flight 11 and could find nothing to substantiate the version in the executive summary. In

addition, while investigators have uncovered evidence of numerous knife purchases by

the 19 hijackers leading up to September 11, 2001, there was no evidence that they

purchased or possessed firearms. 120

Furthermore, the tactics of all four hijacking teams involved in the plot were similar. No

evidence has been uncovered to suggest that the hijackers on any of the other flights used

firearms. Evidence shows that common tactics were used among the flights including the

use of knives, the threat of a bomb (either real or simulated) reported on three flights, and

the presence of Mace reported on two flights. It seems unlikely that one of the teams

would depart from the tactical discipline of the plotters' mutual strategy.

Evidently, the account of the attack on the business-class passenger-the only attack on a

passenger reported by eyewitnesses-became garbled as it was relayed between airline

and FAA authorities in the confusion of the rapidly unfolding events of the day.