Aug 2001

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August 2001: Persian Gulf Informant Gives Ex-CIA Agent Information About ‘Spectacular Terrorist Operation’
Former CIA agent Robert Baer is advising a prince in a Persian Gulf royal family, when a military associate of this prince passes information to him about a “spectacular terrorist operation” that will take place shortly. He is given a computer record of around 600 secret al-Qaeda operatives in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The list includes ten names that will be placed on the FBI’s most wanted terrorists list after 9/11. He is also given evidence that a Saudi merchant family had funded the USS Cole bombing on October 12, 2000, and that the Yemeni government is covering up information related to that bombing. At the military officer’s request, he offers all this information to the Saudi Arabian government. However, an aide to the Saudi defense minister, Prince Sultan, refuses to look at the list or to pass the names on (Sultan is later sued for his complicity in the 9/11 plot in August 2002). Baer also passes the information on to a senior CIA official and the CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center, but there is no response or action. Portions of Baer’s book describing his experience wil be blacked out, having been censored by the CIA. [BAER, 2002, PP. 55-58; FINANCIAL TIMES, 1/12/2002] Entity Tags: Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency, USS Cole, Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Saudi Arabia, Robert Baer, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Al-Qaeda Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Warnings, Warning Signs, 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Foreign Intelligence Warnings, Saudi Arabia, Other Possible Moles or Informants

August 2001: CIA Veteran David Edger Joins University of Oklahoma

The Norman Transcript (Feb 12, 2002). [Source: Norman Transcript] David Edger, a high-ranking CIA officer who was previously station chief in Berlin, Germany (see May 1997), joins the political science department of the University of Oklahoma at Norman as a visiting scholar. Appointment Arranged by CIA Director's Mentor - An announcement says that the appointment was arranged by the university’s president David Boren: “David Edger has joined us as a CIA officer in residence. Mr. Edger most recently was stationed at the US Embassy in Berlin as minister-counselor for coordination, where he directed both military and civilian US intelligence programs in Germany. During the two-year assignment, Mr. Edger will teach courses related to the US intelligence community and foreign policy. President David Boren arranged for his participation at OU.” [NEWSLETTER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA, 9/2001] David Boren is a former Democratic senator who headed the Senate’s intelligence committee for many years. There, Boren acted as mentor to CIA Director George Tenet, who was a Senate staffer before joining the CIA. They have maintained a close relationship: Boren and Tenet were having breakfast together in Washington on the morning of 9/11 (see (Before 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Involved in Surveillance of Hamburg Cell - Edger’s appointment may have been connected to his previous duties in Germany, where, during the years 1997-2001, he directed CIA surveillance and infiltration attempts against the Hamburg cell of 9/11 hijackers. A 2002 article in a local newspaper makes clear that Edger, or possibly other intelligence officers, had some inside but incomplete foreknowledge of al-Qaeda’s plans: “Up until his appointment with OU six months ago, Edger’s work with the CIA focused on terrorist groups in Germany. One of the three cells he was tracking included some of the people responsible for the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center. He said although officers knew members of the cell and some of what they were doing, they had no idea that they would meet in London and go to different parts of the US, where they would learn to fly planes to crash into the World Trade Center. ‘In that case, we failed,’ Edger said.” [NORMAN TRANSCRIPT (OKLAHOMA), 2/12/2002] Several 9/11 Links to Oklahoma - Numerous 9/11 figures have connections to Oklahoma, and specifically to OU’s campus in Norman, including Zacarias Moussaoui (see Between February 23, 2001 and June 2001, February 23-June 2001, and July 29, 2001-August 3, 2001), his associate Hussein al-Attas (see August 10-11, 2001), Nick Berg (see Autumn 1999), and lead hijackers Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi who reportedly sought flight training at the nearby Airman Flight School (see July 2-3, 2000 and August 1, 2001). Post-9/11 Comments - After 9/11, Edger will make numerous public statements supporting the war on terror and the Iraq War. The Tulsa World will report in October, 2001: “‘Americans are looking for simple assurances, hoping human intelligence can warn of the next attack,’ said Dr. David Edger, a specialist in espionage operations, paramilitary activities and counter-terrorism. ‘Getting that human intelligence is not simple. Great patience is required, and classic spy recruitment does not work in such hostile environments,’ said Edger, who served 39 years in the CIA. ‘The war will last many years, and we will never be sure when it ends,’ Edger predicted.” [TULSA WORLD (OKLAHOMA), 10/12/2001; TULSA WORLD (OKLAHOMA), 11/9/2001; TULSA WORLD (OKLAHOMA), 3/25/2002; NORMAN TRANSCRIPT (OKLAHOMA), 10/11/2006] Entity Tags: David Edger, University of Oklahoma, Airman Flight School, David Boren Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Al-Qaeda in Germany

(August 2001): United Airlines Conducting Antiterrorism Training

Kathryn LaBorie. [Source: Family photo] A flight attendant who will be on board one of the hijacked planes on 9/11 reveals that she is undertaking training to deal with terrorists, but will not give any details. [ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, 9/6/2006] Kathryn LaBorie has been working for United Airlines for nearly seven years. [ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, 9/18/2001] While visiting her parents in Colorado Springs, Colorado in the weeks before 9/11, she mentions terrorists and the training she is undergoing at United Airlines to deal with them. Her father, Gene Yancey, later recalls: “She started to say something to me about terrorists, and the fear of, and then she wouldn’t talk to me anymore about it.” He will add, “I don’t know why to this day, but she wouldn’t talk about it any more than that introduction.” [ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, 9/6/2006] LaBorie will be on Flight 175, the second plane to hit the World Trade Center, on 9/11. [ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, 9/18/2001] Entity Tags: United Airlines, Kathryn LaBorie Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11

August 2001: Hijackers Seek Help at Florida Pharmacy; Incident Later Raises Fear of Bioterrorism Pharmacist Gregg Chatterton approaches two men—later identified as Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi—after observing them spending a suspiciously long time in the skin care aisle of his drugstore, Huber Healthmart Drugs in Delray Beach, Florida. “My hands. They’re itching and they’re burning,” says Atta. Chatterton will later recall: “Both [of Atta’s] hands were red from the wrist down. If you filled your sink with bleach and stuck your hands in there for six hours, they would come out red, and that is what they looked like.” Asked the cause of his skin irritation, Atta replies evasively. After recommending a particular lotion, Chatterton is about to turn away when Atta forcefully slaps his hand against the druggist’s chest and says, “My friend, he’s got a cough.” Chatterton gives Alshehhi a bottle of Robitussin. Chatterton will remember the pair when the FBI comes calling a few weeks later. He will say, “When somebody touches you like that, you remember that customer.” According to the St. Petersburg Times, the incident will give rise “to the theory that Atta irritated his hands while handling anthrax” (See also October 14, 2001 and March-April 2002). [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 10/13/2001; US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 10/28/2001; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/1/2002] Entity Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Gregg Chatterton, Mohamed Atta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta

August 2001: Associate of Alleged Hijackers Tells Potential Al-Qaeda Recruit ‘Something Big’ Is about to Happen Mohammed Haydar Zammar, an associate of 9/11 hijackers Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi and Ziad Jarrah, tells an acquaintance that “something big” is about to happen, according to later court testimony by the acquaintance. Zammar advises the acquaintance, a radical Islamist who is thinking about going to train in paramilitary camps in Afghanistan, that he should go as soon as possible because of the forthcoming event. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 1/30/2003] Zammar has been under investigation by numerous intelligence agencies for years (see 1996, Early 1996, March 1997, and Summer 1999). Entity Tags: Mohammed Haydar Zammar Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Germany

August 2001: FAA Told to Warn Airlines of Hijacking or Airliner Bombing in New York, Atlanta, and Other Locations The CIA sends a message to the FAA asking the FAA to advise corporate security directors of US airlines, “A group of six Pakistanis currently based in La Paz, Bolivia may be planning to conduct a hijacking, or possibly a bombing or an act of sabotage against a commercial airliner. While we have no details of the carrier, the date, or the location of this or these possibly planned action(s), we have learned the group has had discussions in which Canada, England, Malaysia, Cuba, South Africa, Mexico, Atlanta, New York, Madrid, Moscow, and Dubai have come up, and India and Islamabad have been described as possible travel destinations.” [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] In late July, the government of Bolivia arrested six Pakistanis, though it is not clear if they are the same six or an additional six. One of them appeared to be related to Mir Aimal Kasi, a militant who killed two CIA employees in front of CIA headquarters in 1993 (see January 25, 1993). [TENET, 2007, PP. 156] The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry will later note, “While this information was not related to an attack planned by al-Qaeda, it did alert the aviation community to the possibility that a hijacking plot might occur in the US shortly before the September 11 attacks occurred.” [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] It has not been reported if the FAA actually passed this message on to the US airlines or not. There have been no reports of any extra security measures taken by the airlines, airports, or the FAA in the month before 9/11 in places such as New York City and Atlanta. Entity Tags: Mir Aimal Kasi, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Aviation Administration Category Tags: Warning Signs, US Air Security

August 2001: Moroccan Informant Warns US of Large Scale, Imminent Attack in New York In 1999, a Moroccan named Hassan Dabou infiltrated al-Qaeda for the Moroccan intelligence agency. He was sent to Afghanistan, posing as an Islamic radical on the run from the Moroccan government. While there, he was able to grow close to bin Laden. He heard bin Laden repeatedly vent his anger at the failure of the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 (see February 26, 1993). Bin Laden was “very disappointed” that the towers did not fall. Dabou heard that bin Laden had planned “something spectacular” involving “large scale operations in New York in the summer or fall of 2001.” Moroccan intelligence passed this information to US. Around this time, US intelligence is so interested that they call Dabou to Washington to report on this information in person. Dabout makes the trip in secret, but apparently his cover is blown and he is unable to go back and gather more intelligence. Dabou is still in Washington cooperating with US intelligence agents when 9/11 occurs. After 9/11 he will remain in Washington, get a new identity, and continue to work with US intelligence. [AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 11/22/2001; INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 5/21/2002; LONDON TIMES, 6/12/2002] Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, Hassan Dabou, World Trade Center, Osama bin Laden Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Foreign Intelligence Warnings, Key Warnings, Other Possible Moles or Informants

August 2001: Six 9/11 Hijackers Live Near Entrance to NSA At least six 9/11 hijackers, including all of those who boarded Flight 77, live in Laurel, Maryland, from about this time. They reportedly include Hani Hanjour, Majed Moqed, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Salem Alhazmi. Laurel, Maryland, is home to a Muslim imam named Moataz Al-Hallak who teaches at a local Islamic school and has been linked to bin Laden. He has testified three times before a grand jury investigating bin Laden. NSA expert James Bamford later states, “The terrorist cell that eventually took over the airliner that crashed into the Pentagon ended up living, working, planning and developing all their activities in Laurel, Maryland, which happens to be the home of the NSA. So they were actually living alongside NSA employees as they were plotting all these things.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/19/2001; RADIO 4 'TODAY', 6/21/2002] Entity Tags: Pentagon, Salem Alhazmi, Nawaf Alhazmi, Osama bin Laden, Moataz Al-Hallak, Hani Hanjour, National Security Agency, Majed Moqed, James Bamford, Khalid Almihdhar Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Remote Surveillance, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Hani Hanjour, Other 9/11 Hijackers

August 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Possibly Seen Near Facility Where ‘Blind Sheikh’ Is Being Held

Mohand Alshehri. [Source: FBI] Hijacker Mohand Alshehri is apparently seen in a bar in Rochester, Minnesota, and is engaged in conversation with a woman there. Rochester is home to the Federal Medical Center prison, where the “Blind Sheikh,” Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman, is held from 1998 to 2002. The hijackers have a number of tangential links to him (see Early 2000-September 10, 2001). The woman, Nancy Hanlon, often runs into Arabs at the bar, which is popular with Saudis receiving medical treatment nearby. Hanlon will later describe Alshehri as “young, dishevelled—and utterly despondent. He was slumped over a glass of beer… It was overwhelming—the despair that a person can give out! Out of every part of him. His face.” During their three-hour conversation Alshehri, who claims to be a pilot and produces a pilot’s ID, insists, “You are talking to a dead man. I don’t exist. I’m a ghost. I’m not even here, I’m dead… I’ve got myself into something there is no way out. There is no way out… It has been decided. He has decided it. It is done. It is finished.” However, he does brighten up a few times and says, “We are really going to show your country something. Something big. It’s going to be really big.” After 9/11, Hanlon apparently remains unaware of pictures showing Alshehri as one of the 9/11 hijackers. She goes to the FBI in 2002 and identifies Alshehri from a series of photographs. However, the FBI will say there is no reason to believe Alshehri ever visited Rochester. [MINNEAPOLIS ST. PAUL CITY PAGES, 6/30/2004] Entity Tags: Nancy Hanlon, Mohand Alshehri, Omar Abdul-Rahman Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman

August 2001: Russia Warns US of Suicide Pilots Russian President Vladimir Putin warns the US that suicide pilots are training for attacks on US targets. [FOX NEWS, 5/17/2002] The head of Russian intelligence Nikolai Patrushev also later states, “We had clearly warned them” on several occasions, but they “did not pay the necessary attention.” [AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 9/16/2001] A Russian newspaper on September 12, 2001, will claim, “Russian Intelligence agents know the organizers and executors of these terrorist attacks. More than that, Moscow warned Washington about preparation to these actions a couple of weeks before they happened.” Interestingly, the article will claim that at least two of the militants were Muslim radicals from Uzbekistan. [IZVESTIA, 9/12/2001] Entity Tags: Vladimir Putin, Nikolai Patrushev Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Warnings, Warning Signs, Foreign Intelligence Warnings

August 2001: US Learns of Plot to Crash Airplane into US Embassy in Nairobi US intelligence learns of a plot to either bomb the US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, from an airplane or crash an airplane into it. Two people who were reportedly acting on instructions from bin Laden met in October 2000 to discuss this plot. [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Warning Signs

August 2001: Crown Prince Abdullah Warns Bush Against Pro-Israeli Stance in Letter Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah writes to President Bush saying that the administration’s increasingly pro-Israel stance with regard to the Palestinians and other issues is putting the Saudis in a very difficult position. The prince warns that Saudi Arabia may need to reassess its relations with the United States. Bush immediately responds by promising a new, more balanced initiative for peace in the Middle East, including support for a Palestinian state. But the new American initiative will be derailed by the events of September 11. [BBC, 11/9/2001; TEL AVIV NOTES, 5/7/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud Category Tags: Saudi Arabia

August 2001: FEMA Warns of Likely Terrorist Attack on New York The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) issues a report warning of the three most likely catastrophes facing America. One of these is a terrorist attack on New York City. (The other two scenarios are a massive San Francisco earthquake and a hurricane hitting New Orleans.) FEMA managers compiled the list of potential disasters at a training session. [HOUSTON CHRONICLE, 12/1/2001; SALON, 8/31/2005; INDEPENDENT, 9/4/2005; NEW REPUBLIC, 9/26/2005] Entity Tags: Federal Emergency Management Agency Category Tags: Warning Signs

(August 2001): NSA Intercepts Another Call to Hijackers in US The NSA has been intercepting calls between at least two hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, in the US and an al-Qaeda communications hub in Sana’a, Yemen, run by al-Qaeda operative Ahmed al-Hada over an approximately 18-month period before 9/11 (see Early 2000-Summer 2001). According to MSNBC, the final intercepted call comes “only weeks” before 9/11. [MSNBC, 7/21/2004] Around the same time there is great alarm in the US intelligence community over a communications intercept in Yemen indicating there was going to be a major al-Qaeda attack against US interests (see June 30-July 1, 2001). Further, the investigation of the USS Cole bombing has reignited interest in Almihdhar and Alhazmi on the part of the US intelligence community since at least June 2001 (see June 11, 2001 and July 13, 2001). The two of them are placed on an international no-fly list in late August (see August 23, 2001). Entity Tags: National Security Agency, Ahmed al-Hada, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Remote Surveillance, Yemen Hub, Hijacker Contact w Government in US

August-October 2001: Britain Seeks Indian Assistance in Catching Saeed Sheikh British intelligence asks India for legal assistance in catching Saeed Sheikh sometime during August 2001. Saeed has been openly living in Pakistan since 1999 and has even traveled to Britain at least twice during that time, despite having kidnapped Britons and Americans in 1993 and 1994. [LONDON TIMES, 4/21/2002; VANITY FAIR, 8/2002] According to the Indian media, informants in Germany tell the internal security service there that Saeed helped fund hijacker Mohamed Atta. [FRONTLINE, 10/13/2001] On September 23, it is revealed, without explanation, that the British have asked India for help in finding Saeed. [LONDON TIMES, 9/23/2001] Saeed Sheikh’s role in training the hijackers and financing the 9/11 attacks soon becomes public knowledge, though some elements are disputed. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 9/30/2001; CNN, 10/6/2001; CNN, 10/8/2001] The Gulf News claims that the US freezes the assets of Pakistani militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed on October 12, 2001, because it has established links between Saeed Sheikh and 9/11. [GULF NEWS, 10/11/2001] However, in October, an Indian magazine notes, “Curiously, there seems to have been little international pressure on Pakistan to hand [Saeed] over” [FRONTLINE, 10/13/2001], and the US does not formally ask Pakistan for help to find Saeed until January 2002. Entity Tags: Jaish-e-Mohammed, United States, India, Pakistan, Mohamed Atta, Saeed Sheikh, United Kingdom Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism

Early August 2001: Government Informant Warns Congressmen of Plan to Attack the WTC

Randy Glass. [Source: Banded Artists Productions] Randy Glass, a former con artist turned government informant, later will claim that he contacts the staff of Senator Bob Graham [D] and Representative Robert Wexler [D] at this time and warns them of a plan to attack the WTC, but his warnings are ignored. [PALM BEACH POST, 10/17/2002] Glass also tells the media at this time that his recently concluded informant work has “far greater ramifications than have so far been revealed,” and, “potentially, thousands of lives [are] at risk.” [SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, 8/7/2001] Glass was a key informant in a sting operation involving ISI agents who were illegally trying to purchase sophisticated US military weaponry in return for cash and heroin. He later claims that in July 1999, one ISI agent named Rajaa Gulum Abbas pointed to the WTC and said, “Those towers are coming down.” [PALM BEACH POST, 10/17/2002] Most details apparently remain sealed. For instance Glass will claim that his sealed sentencing document dated June 15, 2001, lists threats against the WTC and Americans. [WPBF 25 (WEST PALM BEACH), 8/5/2002] Florida State Senator Ron Klein, who had dealings with Glass before 9/11, later will say he is surprised it took so many months for the US to listen to Glass: “Shame on us.” [PALM BEACH POST, 10/17/2002] Klein will recall getting a warning from Glass, though he cannot recall if it mentions the WTC specifically. He will say he was told US intelligence agencies would look into it. [WPTV 5 (WEST PALM BEACH), 10/7/2002] Senator Graham later will acknowledge that his office had contact with Glass before 9/11, and was told about a WTC attack: “I was concerned about that and a dozen other pieces of information which emanated from the summer of 2001.” However, Graham will say that he personally was unaware of Glass’s information until after 9/11. [PALM BEACH POST, 10/17/2002] In October 2002, Glass will testify under oath before a private session of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, stating, “I told [the inquiry] I have specific evidence, and I can document it.” [PALM BEACH POST, 10/17/2002] Entity Tags: Randy Glass, Ron Klein, Bob Graham, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Robert Wexler, Rajaa Gulum Abbas, World Trade Center Category Tags: Warning Signs, Randy Glass/ Diamondback, Key Warnings, Other Possible Moles or Informants

Early August 2001: CIA’s Concern over Planned Bin Laden Strikes Inside US Are Heightened The Associated Press later reports that the “CIA had developed general information a month before the attacks that heightened concerns that bin Laden and his followers were increasingly determined to strike on US soil.” A CIA official will affirm, “[t]here was something specific in early August that said to us that [bin Laden] was determined in striking on US soil.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/3/2001] Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Central Intelligence Agency Category Tags: Warning Signs, Key Warnings

Early August 2001: Saeed Sheikh Receives Ransom Money; Sends $100,000 to Hijacker Atta The ransom for a wealthy Indian shoe manufacturer kidnapped in Calcutta, India, two weeks earlier is paid to an Indian gangster named Aftab Ansari. Ansari is based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and has ties to the ISI and Saeed Sheikh. Ansari gives some of the about $830,000 in ransom money to Saeed, who sends about $100,000 of it to hijacker Mohamed Atta. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 1/23/2002; INDEPENDENT, 1/24/2002] According to some accounts, the money is moved through a charity, the Al Rashid Trust. Some of the money is also channelled to the Taliban, as well as to Pakistani and Kashmiri militant groups. [NEWSINSIGHT, 1/4/2002; PRESS TRUST OF INDIA, 4/3/2002] The money is apparently paid into two of Atta’s accounts in Florida (see Summer 2001 and before). The Al Rashid Trust is one of the first al-Qaeda funding vehicles to have its assets frozen after 9/11 (see September 24, 2001). A series of recovered e-mails shows the money is sent just after August 11. This appears to be one of a series of Indian kidnappings this gang carries out in 2001. [INDIA TODAY, 2/14/2002; TIMES OF INDIA, 2/14/2002] Saeed provides training and weapons to the kidnappers in return for a percentage of the profits. [FRONTLINE (CHENNAI), 2/2/2002; INDIA TODAY, 2/25/2002] This account is frequently mentioned in the Indian press, but appears in the US media as well. For instance, veteran Associated Press reporter Kathy Gannon will write, “Western intelligence sources believe Saeed sent $100,000 to Mohamed Atta, the suspected ringleader of the Sept. 11 terrorist hijackings,” although they apparently think the hawala system was used for this. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2/9/2002] Some evidence suggests Saeed may also have sent Atta a similar amount in 2000 (see (July-August 2000) and Summer 2000). Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Saeed Sheikh, Aftab Ansari, Al Rashid Trust, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh

Early August 2001: Britain Warns US Again; Specifies Multiple Airplane Hijackings Britain gives the US another warning about an al-Qaeda attack. The previous British warning on July 16, 2001 (see July 16, 2001), was vague as to method, but this warning specifies multiple airplane hijackings. This warning is said to reach President Bush. [SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 5/19/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Al-Qaeda Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Foreign Intelligence Warnings, Key Warnings

Early August 2001: Alleged Informant with 9/11 Foreknowledge Arrested in Turkey and Let Go Al-Qaeda operative Luai Sakra is reportedly arrested by Turkish intelligence in Turkey and then let go. It will later appear that Sakra was an informant for the CIA, Turkish intelligence, and Syrian intelligence before 9/11. He appears to have begun working for the CIA and Turkish intelligence in 2000 (see 2000). Sakra will later claim to have been arrested and quickly released twice by Turkish intelligence. It seems the first time was in 2000 and this was the second time. [DER SPIEGEL (HAMBURG), 8/24/2005] It would make sense that he was released at this time if he was a secret informant for Turkey. It will later come to light that Sakra had some foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks and warned Syrian intelligence about them one day before the attacks (see September 10, 2001). But it is not known if he used this arrest to warn Turkish intelligence and/or the CIA as well. Entity Tags: Luai Sakra, Central Intelligence Agency Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11, Luai Sakra, Al-Qaeda in Germany

Early August-August 22, 2001: 9/11 Paymaster Skims Money for Hijackers? An unnamed Sudanese national living in Saudi Arabia makes two wire transfers totaling about $6,500 from the National Commercial Bank in Saudi Arabia to 9/11 plot facilitator Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi’s Standard Chartered Bank account in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The 9/11 Commission will later report that a “foreign security agency” learned from the sender that he had been asked to wire the funds by Uthman Alshehri, a brother of hijackers Waleed and Wail Alshehri. According to the commission, $4,900 of this is deposited in a UAE account of hijacker Fayez Ahmed Banihammad. What happens to the other $1,600 is unclear. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 138, 143 ] After the money is deposited in his UAE account, Banihammad receives a call from an associate in Germany on August 18 and withdraws $3,000 on August 20 and $4,800 on August 22 from the account. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 6/2002 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] Court documents suggest that more money was sent to the hijackers by al-Hawsawi. “[Khalid] Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) explained that Alshehhi was sent $81,000 (US) via al-Baluchi for Alshehhi’s, Atta’s, and Jarrah’s flight training… Most of these types of transfers were made by al-Hawsawi who was located in the UAE.” However, doubts have been expressed about the reliability of this document, which was based on KSM’s testimony, obtained through the use of torture (see June 16, 2004). [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, 7/31/2006 ] For some time after 9/11, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi is described in the media as the hijackers’ paymaster, even though this is the only confirmed transfer associated with him. Moreover, there are questions about his identity and whether or not “Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi” is his real name. [CNN, 3/4/2003] Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, Uthman Alshehri Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, Terrorism Financing

August 1, 2001: Hijacker Hanjour Pulled Over for Speeding; Possibly Using False Driver’s License Hijacker pilot Hani Hanjour is pulled over for speeding on South George Mason Drive in Arlington, Virginia, for going 50-55 miles per hour in a 30 mph zone. He is driving a Chevrolet van rented two days before from Borough Jeep Chrysler in Wayne, New Jersey. He has a Florida driver’s license that gives his address as Miramar, Florida, where he lived in the mid-1990s (see Spring 1996). [CNN, 9/26/2001; CNN, 1/9/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 1/9/2002; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] However, according to the 9/11 Commission, he did not have a Florida driver’s license, although he did have a Florida ID card. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 32 ] Three weeks after the stop, Hanjour sends Arlington General District Court a money order for the $70 and $30 court costs. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/9/2002] Three other plot leaders are also stopped for speeding in the US (see April 1, 2001). Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Hani Hanjour Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Hani Hanjour, Hijacker Contact w Government in US

August 1, 2001: Actor Communicates Concerns to Stewardess That Airplane Will Be Hijacked; Warning Forwarded to the FAA

James Woods. [Source: Disney Enterprises/ Publicity photo] Actor James Woods, flying first class on an airplane, notices four Arabic-looking men, the only other people in the first class section. He concludes they are Islamic militants intent on hijacking the plane, acting very strangely (for instance, only talking in whispers). [BOSTON GLOBE, 11/23/2001] He tells a flight attendant, “I think this plane is going to be hijacked,” adding, “I know how serious it is to say this.” He conveys his worries to the pilots, and they assure him that the cockpit would be locked. [NEW YORKER, 5/27/2002] The flight staff later notifies the FAA about these suspicious individuals. Though the government will not discuss this event, it is highly unlikely that any action is taken regarding the flight staff’s worries [NEW YORKER, 5/27/2002] Woods will not be interviewed by the FBI until after 9/11. Woods will say the FBI believes that all four men took part in the 9/11 attacks, and the flight he was on was a practice flight for them. [O'REILLY FACTOR, 2/14/2002] Woods believes one was Khalid Almihdhar and another was Hamza Alghamdi. [NEW YORKER, 5/27/2002] The FBI later will report that this may have been one of a dozen test run flights starting as early as January (see May 24-August 14, 2001). Flight attendants and passengers on other flights later recall men looking like the hijackers who took pictures of the cockpit aboard flights and/or took notes. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 5/29/2002] The FBI has not been able to find any evidence of hijackers on the flight manifest for Woods’ flight. [NEW YORKER, 5/27/2002] Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Hamza Alghamdi, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal Aviation Administration, James Woods Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Other 9/11 Hijackers, US Air Security

August 1, 2001: FBI Reissues Warning That Overseas Law Enforcement Agencies May Be Targets With the approaching third anniversary of the US embassy bombings in Africa (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998), the FBI reissues a warning that overseas law enforcement agencies may be targets. It notes that although most reporting indicates a potential for attacks on US interests abroad, the possibility of an attack in the US cannot be discounted. [CNN, 3/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 260, 534] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation Category Tags: Warning Signs

Summer 2001: IAEA Scientist: US ‘Wants to Attack’ Iraq After CIA analyst Joe Turner’s presentation to UN atomic energy scientists (see Late July 2001), one of the scientists calls David Albright, a nuclear physicist who runs the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security, and warns him that the “people across the river [i.e., the CIA] are trying to start a war. They are really beating the drum. They want to attack.” [ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 37] Entity Tags: David Albright, Institute for Science and International Security, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

August 1, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Fails in Test to Get in Airplane Cockpit During Flight

Abdulaziz Alomari. [Source: FBI] 9/11 hijacker Abdulaziz Alomari tests airline security while flying across the US. He boards USAir flight 608 from Las Vegas to New York City. Before the flight takes off, he tells a flight attendant that he is a pilot and wants to sit in the jumpseat (a spare seat in the cockpit) to observe the pilots for the whole flight. When asked for his pilot credentials, he says he is just a student pilot. Alomari is allowed in the cockpit, but only for a short while before take-off. The pilots get the impression he doesn’t know much about flying. Half way through the flight, he tries to get back into the cockpit by claiming that he’d lost a valuable pen while in there earlier, but he is not allowed back in. [MILLER, STONE, AND MITCHELL, 2002, PP. 296-297] Although this story is not confirmed by other sources, several of the hijackers do fly to and from Las Vegas at this time (see May 24-August 14, 2001 and August 1, 2001). Apparently the hijackers repeatedly attempt to ride on jumpseats in the summer of 2001 and are sometimes successful, sometimes not (see Summer 2001). Some news stories after 9/11 will allege that the hijackers did use jumpseats on 9/11 (see November 23, 2001). Entity Tags: Abdulaziz Alomari Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training

August 1, 2001: Moussaoui Supposedly Seen with Hijackers Atta and Alshehhi in Oklahoma A hotel owner in Oklahoma City will later say that he saw Zacarias Moussaoui, Mohamed Atta, and Marwan Alshehhi together on or around this day. He will claim they come to his hotel late at night and ask for a room, but end up staying elsewhere. At the time, Moussaoui is living 28 miles away in Norman, Oklahoma (see February 23-June 2001). However, even though the US government will later struggle to find evidence directly connecting Moussaoui to any of the 9/11 hijackers, this account will not be cited by any US government officials or prosecutors. An article later will suggest this may be because of numerous reports and eyewitnesses claiming Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols stayed at the same hotel with a group of Middle Easterners in the weeks before the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing (see April 19, 1995). By highlighting this encounter, it might draw renewed attention to controversial Oklahoma City bombing theories. Atta and Alshehhi briefly visited an Oklahoma flight school in July 2000 (see July 2-3, 2000), before Moussaoui arrived in the US. On April 1, 2001, hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi received a speeding ticket in Oklahoma (see April 1, 2001), but there have been no citings of him with Moussaoui. [LA WEEKLY, 8/2/2002] Former CIA analyst Larry Johnson will say of this meeting: “One of the things that’s evident right now in connection with this investigation, the motel in Oklahoma City where the April bombing against the Murrah building was planned and executed from, that same hotel figures in two of the 9-11 hijackers and Zacarias Moussaoui, who’s currently in jail. Those three guys tried to check into that motel. And there is another fellow in Oklahoma City that links them to the April bombing against the Murrah building.… I have spoken to the owner of the motel. After the 9-11 attack, he called the FBI. The FBI came out and interviewed him, as he identified Mohamed Atta, Marwan Al-Shehi and Zacarias Moussaoui. They came in. They said, we’re looking for a room. He said I don’t have any room. What do you need it for? They said we’re going for flight training.” [O'REILLY FACTOR, 5/7/2002] Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Zacarias Moussaoui, Larry C. Johnson, Marwan Alshehhi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Zacarias Moussaoui

Early August 2001: Mass Casualty Exercise at the Pentagon Includes a Plane Hitting the Building A mass casualty exercise, involving a practice evacuation, is held at the Pentagon. General Lance Lord, the assistant vice chief of staff of the Air Force who is one of the participants in the exercise, will later recall, “[It was] purely a coincidence, the scenario for that exercise included a plane hitting the building.” Lord will also say that on 9/11, “our assembly points were fresh in our minds” thanks to this practice. [AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND NEWS SERVICE, 9/5/2002] Entity Tags: Pentagon, Lance Lord Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Military Exercises

August 1-2, 2001: Hijackers Illegally Purchase Virginia Identity Cards

This Amhed Al-Ghamdi photo comes from his Virginia ID card, the only one publicly released by the 9/11 Commission. [Source: 9/11 Commission] Hijackers Hani Hanjour and Khalid Almihdhar meet Luis Martinez-Flores, an illegal immigrant from El Salvador, in a 7-Eleven parking lot in Falls Church, Virginia. Martinez-Flores is paid $100 cash to accompany the two to a local Department of Motor Vehicles office and sign forms attesting to their permanent residence in Virginia. Given new state identity cards, the cards are used the next day to get Virginia identity cards for several (five to seven) additional hijackers, including Abdulaziz Alomari, Ahmed Alghamdi, Majed Moqed, and Salem Alhazmi. [ARIZONA DAILY STAR, 9/28/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/30/2001; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/16/2001] Entity Tags: Ahmed Alghamdi, Khalid Almihdhar, Abdulaziz Alomari, Luis Martinez-Flores, Majed Moqed, Salem Alhazmi, Hani Hanjour Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, Hani Hanjour, Alhazmi and Almihdhar

August 2, 2001: Federal Reserve Governors Encourage Banks to Review Suspicious Activity Reports, Possibly Due to Heightened Terrorist Threat The Federal Reserve Board of Governors issues a non-routine supervisory letter to Federal Reserve banks, emphasizing the need to continue monitoring suspicious activity reports (SARs). The letter gives no explanation why it has been sent out at this particular time, but states, “Reserve banks must continue to conduct a thorough and timely review of all material SARs filed by supervised financial institutions in their districts.” It adds, “A periodic, comprehensive review of SARs will assist Reserve banks in identifying suspicious or suspected criminal activity occurring at or through supervised financial institutions; provide the information necessary to assess the procedures and controls used by the reporting institutions to identify, monitor, and report violations and suspicious illicit activities; and assist in the assessment of the adequacy of anti-money laundering programs.” [SPILLENKOTHEN, 8/2/2001] While the letter does not say if there are specific reasons why the banks should currently be watching for suspicious activities, William Bergman, an economist who works at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago from 1990 to 2004, will later point out, “Intelligence warnings on terrorism were rising significantly in mid-2001.” He will therefore question whether, “with terrorism and its financing already recognized as an important element of the national money laundering strategy,” this letter is “related to these warnings.” He will also point out, “negotiations between the Taliban and representatives of the United States over energy production issues in Afghanistan ended on August 2, 2001” (see August 2, 2001), and that, “Four days later, President Bush received a ‘PDB’—a presidential daily brief—with a headline warning that bin Laden was ‘determined to strike in US,’ and the body text of the PDB referred to ‘patterns of suspicious activity’” (see August 6, 2001). [SANDERS RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, 1/4/2006] When, in December 2003, Bergman asks the Board of Governors staff why it issued the August 2 letter, and if the letter was related to intelligence about heightened terrorist threats, he will receive no reply and subsequently be told he has “committed an egregious breach of protocol in calling the Board staff and asking the question.” [VETERAN AFFAIRS WHISTLEBLOWERS COALITION, 5/14/2006] Also around this time, between June and August 2001, there is an unexplained surge in the amount of US currency in circulation (see June-August 2001). [SANDERS RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, 9/16/2005] Entity Tags: William Bergman, Federal Reserve Board of Governors Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge

August 2, 2001: Alleged Hijacker Pilot Fails Driving Test After being fined for speeding the day before (see August 1, 2001), Hani Hanjour fails a test to obtain a Virginia driver’s license. Hanjour already has an Arizona driving license and an international driving license. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 32, 44 ] According to the Virginia police, Hanjour also has a Florida driver’s license, although the 9/11 Commission will dispute this (see August 1, 2001). Entity Tags: Hani Hanjour Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Hani Hanjour

August 2, 2001: US Official Secretly Meets Taliban Ambassador in Last Attempt to Secure Pipeline Deal

Christina Rocca. [Source: Sherwin Crasto / Reuters / Corbis] Christina Rocca, Director of Asian Affairs at the State Department, secretly meets the Taliban ambassador in Islamabad, apparently in a last ditch attempt to secure a pipeline deal. Rocca was previously in charge of contacts with Islamic guerrilla groups at the CIA, and oversaw the delivery of Stinger missiles to Afghan mujaheddin in the 1980s. [IRISH TIMES, 11/19/2001; BRISARD AND DASQUIE, 2002, PP. 45; SALON, 2/8/2002] Around the same time, US embassy officials in Islamabad hold secret talks with Taliban security chief Hameed Rasoli. [WASHINGTON POST, 10/29/2001] Entity Tags: Taliban, Hameed Rasoli, Christina Rocca Category Tags: Pipeline Politics

August 2, 2001: Fire at Pentagon Helps Prepare Workers for Crisis Response on 9/11 Almost half of the Pentagon has to be evacuated because of a small but smoky fire there. [CNN, 8/2/2001] The three-alarm fire apparently starts early in the afternoon, in electrical wires near the loading dock behind a food service area, between two main corridors. [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 8/2/2001] It starts on the building’s first floor but extends up to the second floor. [CNN, 8/2/2001] It spreads into the return air duct system, causing smoke to disperse through a fifth of the building. Seventeen vehicles respond to it, and it is put out with extinguishers and a minimal amount of water. About 8,000 Pentagon workers are forced to evacuate from the building, but no one suffers any injury. [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 8/2/2001] Reportedly, the fire provides “the Pentagon’s most relevant experience in dealing with the Flight 77 attack” on 9/11. It is one of the first real tests for the Pentagon’s new Building Operations Command Center (BOCC), which opened two months earlier, on June 4. [MICROSOFT EXECUTIVE CIRCLE, 2006] Steve Carter, the assistant building manager, will later recall that due to this fire, when the Pentagon is hit on 9/11 the emergency drill is “fresh in everybody’s mind.” Consequently his building maintenance and operations workers are able to “immediately [start] those same steps again.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/11/2006] And in response to this fire, Paul Haselbush, the director of real estate and facilities at the Pentagon, will direct his staff to update their emergency plans. As a result, his continuity of operations plan will be fresh in his mind when the attack occurs on 9/11. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 143] Entity Tags: Steve Carter, Pentagon, Building Operations Command Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events

August 2-3, 2001: Taliban Official Predicts US Will Invade Afghanistan by Mid-October, Possibly in Response to Major Attack Inside US A senior official in the Taliban’s defense ministry tells journalist Hamid Mir that the US will soon invade Afghanistan. Mir will later recall that he is told, “[W]e believe Americans are going to invade Afghanistan and they will do this before October 15, 2001, and justification for this would be either one of two options: Taliban got control of Afghanistan or a big major attack against American interests either inside America or elsewhere in the world.” Mir reports this information before 9/11, presumably in the newspaper in Pakistan that he works for. [BERGEN, 2006, PP. 287] Interestingly, Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar made a similar prediction to Mir several months before (see April 2001). Also, several weeks earlier, US officials reportedly passed word to Taliban officials in a back channel meeting that the US may soon attack Afghanistan if the Taliban do not cooperate on building an oil and gas pipeline running through the country. According to one participant in the meeting, the US attack would take place “by the middle of October at the latest” (see July 21, 2001). Entity Tags: Taliban, Hamid Mir Category Tags: Warning Signs, Pipeline Politics

August 3, 2001: Florida Police Fail to Notice Arrest Warrant for Mohamed Atta Mohamed Atta’s rental car is queried by police in Broward County, Florida. This incident is added to the NCIC, a widely used nationwide police database. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 204 ] On June 4, a Florida warrant was issued for Atta’s arrest, as he skipped court following a previous traffic offense (see June 4, 2001). It is not clear why the existing arrest warrant does not raise a red flag, since he rented the car in his own name. Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, National Crime Information Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Hijacker Contact w Government in US

August 4, 2001: Nothing New in Letter from President Bush to Pakistani President Musharraf President Bush sends a letter to Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, warning him about supporting the Taliban. However, the tone is similar to past requests dating to the Clinton administration. There had been some discussion that US policy toward Pakistan should change. For instance, at the end of June, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke “urged that the United States [should] think about what it would do after the next attack, and then take that position with Pakistan now, before the attack.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/24/2004] Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage later acknowledges that a new approach to Pakistan is not yet implemented by 9/11 (see January-September 10, 2001 and Early June 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/24/2004 SOURCES: RICHARD ARMITAGE] Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Clinton administration, Taliban, George W. Bush, Pervez Musharraf Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI

August 4, 2001: Possible 20th Hijacker Denied Entry to US

Customs agent Jose Melendez-Perez. [Source: US Senate] A Saudi named Mohamed al-Khatani is stopped at the Orlando, Florida, airport and denied entry to the US. Jose Melendez-Perez, the customs official who stops him, later says he was suspicious of al-Khatani because he had arrived with no return ticket, no hotel reservations, spoke little English, behaved menacingly, and offered conflicting information on the purpose of his travel. At one point, al-Khatani said that someone was waiting for him elsewhere at the airport. After 9/11, surveillance cameras show that Mohamed Atta was at the Orlando airport that day. 9/11 Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste says: “It is extremely possible and perhaps probable that [al-Khatani] was to be the 20th hijacker.” al-Khatani boards a return flight to Saudi Arabia. He is later captured in Afghanistan and sent to a US military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (see December 2001). Melendez-Perez says that before 9/11, customs officials were discouraged by their superiors from hassling Saudi travelers, who were seen as big spenders. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 1/27/2004; TIME, 6/12/2005] Al-Khatani will later confess to being sent to the US by 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) (see July 2002), and in June 2001 US intelligence was warned that KSM was sending operatives to the US to meet up with those already there (see June 12, 2001). Entity Tags: Mohamed al-Khatani, Richard Ben-Veniste, Mohamed Atta, Jose Melendez-Perez, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta

August 4-30, 2001: Bush Nearly Sets Record for Longest Presidential Vacation President Bush spends most of August 2001 at his Crawford, Texas, ranch, nearly setting a record for the longest presidential vacation. While it is billed a “working vacation,” news organizations report that Bush is doing “nothing much” aside from his regular daily intelligence briefings. [ABC NEWS, 8/3/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 8/7/2001; SALON, 8/29/2001] One such unusually long briefing at the start of his trip is a warning that bin Laden is planning to attack in the US (see August 6, 2001), but Bush spends the rest of that day fishing. By the end of his trip, Bush has spent 42 percent of his presidency at vacation spots or en route. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/7/2001] At the time, a poll shows that 55 percent of Americans say Bush is taking too much time off. [USA TODAY, 8/7/2001] Vice President Cheney also spends the entire month in a remote location in Wyoming. [JACKSON HOLE NEWS AND GUIDE, 8/15/2001] Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, George W. Bush, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB

(August 4-5, 2001): Phoenix Memo Agent Vets Bush PDB, Fails to Add Relevant Information, Does Not Contact Phoenix Office The CIA officers who draft a presidential daily briefing (PDB) item given to George Bush on August 6 (see August 6, 2001) ask an FBI agent for additional information and also to review a draft of the memo, but she does not provide all the additional information she could. The 9/11 Commission will refer to the FBI agent as “Jen M,” so she is presumably Jennifer Maitner, an agent with the Osama bin Laden unit at FBI headquarters. The purpose of the memo is to communicate to the president the intelligence community’s view that the threat of attacks by bin Laden is both current and serious. But Maitner fails to add some important information that she has: around the end of July, she was informed of the Phoenix memo, which suggests that an inordinate number of bin Laden-related Arabs are taking flying lessons in the US (see July 10, 2001). She does not link this to the portion of the memo discussing aircraft hijackings. Responsibility for dealing with the Phoenix memo is formally transferred to her on August 7, when she reads the full text. The finished PDB item discusses the possibility bin Laden operatives may hijack an airliner and says that there are “patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings.” It is unclear whether the draft PDB item Maitner reviews contains this information. However, if it does, it apparently does not inspire her to take any significant action on the memo before 9/11, such as contacting the agents in Phoenix to notify them of the preparations for hijackings (see July 27, 2001 and after). The PDB will contain an error, saying that the FBI was conducting 70 full field investigations of bin Laden-related individuals (see August 6, 2001), but this error is added after Maitner reviews the draft, so she does not have the opportunity to remove it. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 260-2, 535; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 69-77 ] Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, FBI Headquarters, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Usama bin Laden Unit (FBI), Jennifer Maitner Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB, Phoenix Memo

August 6, 2001: Perle’s Concern About Iraq, North Korea, and Iran Before 9/11 Becomes Axis of Evil Afterward Richard Perle, head of the Defense Policy Board and foreign policy adviser to Bush, is asked about new challenges now that the Cold War is over. He cites three: “We’re concerned about Saddam Hussein, We’re concerned about the North Koreans, about some future Iranian government that may have the weapon they’re now trying so hard to acquire…” [AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 8/6/2001] Note that these three nations are the same three named in Bush’s famous January 2002 “axis of evil” speech (see January 29, 2002). [US PRESIDENT, 2/4/2002] Entity Tags: Richard Perle, North Korea, Iran, Saddam Hussein Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links, US Dominance

August 6, 2001: Justice Department Reaffirms Wall Policy

Larry D. Thompson. [Source: National Journal] In later testimony before the 9/11 Commission, Attorney General John Ashcroft will complain, “[T]he single greatest structural cause for September 11 was the wall that segregated criminal investigators and intelligence agents.” However, on this day, Ashcroft’s Assistant Attorney General, Larry Thompson, writes a memo reaffirming the policy that is later criticized as this “wall.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 12/8/2003; WASHINGTON POST, 4/18/2004] Entity Tags: John Ashcroft, Larry D. Thompson Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

August 6, 2001: Suspicious Trading of Companies Affected by 9/11 May Begin by This Date Insider trading based on advanced knowledge of the 9/11 attacks may have begun on this date, if not earlier. Investigators later discover a large number of put option purchases (a speculation that the stock will go down) that expire on September 30 at the Chicago Board Options Exchange are bought on this date. If exercised, these options would have led to large profits. One analyst later says, “From what I’m hearing, it’s more than coincidence.” [REUTERS, 9/20/2001] Entity Tags: Chicago Board Options Exchange Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge

August 6-September 9, 2001: Mohamed Atta Drives Over 3,000 Miles in Rental Cars

Warrick’s Rent-a-Car. [Source: Corbis] On three occasions Mohamed Atta rents cars from Warrick’s Rent-a-Car in Pompano Beach, Florida. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/15/2001] According to the company’s owner Brad Warrick, “a lot of criminals come here because we’re a little guy, out of the way… We don’t have software in our computer system that checks the background of drivers like the major companies do.” Atta, always accompanied by Marwan Alshehhi, appears like a businessman, yet doesn’t “rent the best car we had, he rented the cheapest, a white Escort, then a blue Chevy Corsair, then back to the Escort.” From August 15-29, he travels 1,915 miles in the Corsair. Another time he tells Warrick he is going up to New York State. He always leaves the cars scrupulously clean after using them. [OBSERVER, 9/16/2001; CORBIN, 2003, PP. 212-213] However, Warrick later discovers a small amount of an unidentified white powder in the trunk of the Escort rented by Atta (see October 29, 2001). When, two days before 9/11, Alshehhi returns the car rented by Atta the final time, he asks that the charge be removed from Atta’s credit card and placed on his. Says Warrick, “If you’re going on a suicide mission, who cares who pays for what?” [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/1/2002] Warrick comments, “I mean, if you’re going on a suicide mission, why not leave the car at the airport?” [KANSAS CITY STAR, 9/18/2001] Atta has his own car, a red Pontiac, but sells this about a week before 9/11. [CNN, 10/26/2001] Entity Tags: Warrick’s Rent-a-Car, Mohamed Atta, Brad Warrick, Marwan Alshehhi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta

August 6, 2001: Bush Receives Briefing Titled ‘Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US’

President Bush at his Crawford, Texas, ranch on August 6, 2001. Advisors wait with classified briefings. [Source: White House] President Bush receives a classified presidential daily briefing (PDB) at his Crawford, Texas ranch indicating that Osama bin Laden might be planning to hijack commercial airliners. The PDB provided to him is entitled, “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US.” The entire briefing focuses on the possibility of terrorist attacks inside the US. [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/15/2002; NEWSWEEK, 5/27/2002] The analysts who drafted the briefing will say that they drafted it on the CIA’s initiative (see July 13, 2004), whereas in 2004 Bush will state that he requested a briefing on the topic due to threats relating to a conference in Genoa, Italy, in July 2001, where Western intelligence agencies believed Osama bin Laden was involved in a plot to crash an airplane into a building to kill Bush and other leaders (see April 13, 2004). The analysts will later explain that they saw it as an opportunity to convey that the threat of an al-Qaeda attack in the US was both current and serious. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 260] The existence of this briefing is kept secret, until it is leaked in May 2002, causing a storm of controversy (see May 15, 2002). While National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice will claim the memo is only one and a half pages long, other accounts state it is 11 1/2 pages instead of the usual two or three. [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/15/2002; NEWSWEEK, 5/27/2002; DIE ZEIT (HAMBURG), 10/1/2002] A page and a half of the contents will be released on April 10, 2004; this reportedly is the full content of the briefing. [WASHINGTON POST, 4/10/2004] The briefing, as released, states as follows (note that the spelling of certain words are corrected and links have been added): Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate bin Laden since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US (see December 1, 1998). Bin Laden implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and “bring the fighting to America” (see May 26, 1998). After US missile strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, bin Laden told followers he wanted to retaliate in Washington, according to a -REDACTED-service (see December 21, 1998). An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told -REDACTED- service at the same time that bin Laden was planning to exploit the operative’s access to the US to mount a terrorist strike. The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part of bin Laden’s first serious attempt to implement a terrorist strike in the US. Convicted plotter Ahmed Ressam has told the FBI that he conceived the idea to attack Los Angeles International Airport himself (see December 14, 1999), but that bin Laden lieutenant Abu Zubaida encouraged him and helped facilitate the operation. Ressam also said that in 1998 Abu Zubaida was planning his own US attack (see Late March-Early April 2001 and May 30, 2001). Ressam says bin Laden was aware of the Los Angeles operation. Although bin Laden has not succeeded, his attacks against the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998) demonstrate that he prepares operations years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks. Bin Laden associates surveyed our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993 (see Late 1993-Late 1994), and some members of the Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested and deported in 1997. Al-Qaeda members—including some who are US citizens—have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks (see January 25, 2001). Two al-Qaeda members found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb our embassies in East Africa were US citizens (see September 15, 1998), and a senior EIJ member lived in California in the mid-1990s (see November 1989 and September 10, 1998). A clandestine source said in 1998 that a bin Laden cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks (see October-November 1998). “We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from a [REDACTED] service in 1998 saying that bin Laden wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of ‘Blind Sheikh’ Omar Abdul-Rahman and other US-held extremists” (see 1998, December 4, 1998, and May 23, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 223] According to the Washington Post, this information came from a British service. [WASHINGTON POST, 5/18/2002] Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York (see May 30, 2001). The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full-field investigations throughout the US that it considers bin Laden-related (see August 6, 2001). CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to our embassy in the UAE in May saying that a group or bin Laden supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives (see May 16-17, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 223] In retrospect, the briefing is remarkable for the many warnings that apparently are not included (see for instance, from the summer of 2001 prior to August alone: May 2001, June 2001, June 12, 2001, June 19, 2001, Late Summer 2001, July 2001, July 16, 2001, Late July 2001, Late July 2001, Summer 2001, June 30-July 1, 2001, July 10, 2001, and Early August 2001). According to one account, after the PDB has been given to him, Bush tells the CIA briefer, “You’ve covered your ass now” (see August 6, 2001). Incredibly, the New York Times later reports that after being given the briefing, Bush “[breaks] off from work early and [spends] most of the day fishing.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/25/2002] In 2002 and again in 2004, National Security Adviser Rice will incorrectly claim under oath that the briefing only contained historical information from 1998 and before (see May 16, 2002 and April 8, 2004). Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Islamic Jihad, Omar Abdul-Rahman, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Los Angeles International Airport, Condoleezza Rice, Abu Zubaida, Al-Qaeda, World Trade Center, Central Intelligence Agency, 9/11 Commission, Ahmed Ressam, Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Warnings, Warning Signs, Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB, Presidential Level Warnings

August 6, 2001: Bush Tells CIA Regarding Bin Laden Warning, ‘You’ve Covered Your Ass, Now’ According to journalist and author Ron Suskind, just after a CIA briefer presents President Bush with the later infamous PDB (Presidential Daily Briefing) item entitled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US” (see August 6, 2001), Bush tells the briefer, “You’ve covered your ass, now.” This account is from Suskind’s 2006 book The One Percent Doctrine, which is based largely on anonymous accounts from political insiders. In the book, after describing the presentation of the PDB, Suskind will write: “And, at an eyeball-to-eyeball intelligence briefing during this urgent summer, George W. Bush seems to have made the wrong choice. He looked hard at the panicked CIA briefer. ‘All right,’ he said. ‘You’ve covered your ass, now.’” [SUSKIND, 2006, PP. 2; WASHINGTON POST, 6/20/2006] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB, Presidential Level Warnings

August 6, 2001: Bush Misled on Number and Extent of FBI’s Bin Laden Investigations The CIA’s Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) given to President Bush on this day (see August 6, 2001) contains the important line, “The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout the US that it considers bin Laden-related.” Bush will state in 2004 that, based on this, “I was satisfied that some of the matters were being looked into.” National Security Adviser Rice will explain that since the FBI had 70 “full-field investigations under way of cells” in the US, “there was no recommendation [coming from the White House] that we do something about” the large number of warnings coming in. However, the number and content of the FBI investigations appears grossly exaggerated. The FBI later will reveal that the investigations are not limited to al-Qaeda and do not focus on al-Qaeda cells. Many were criminal investigations, which typically are not likely to help prevent future terrorist acts. An FBI spokesman will say the FBI does not know how that number got into Bush’s PDB. The 9/11 Commission will later conclude, “The 70 full-field investigations number was a generous calculation that included fund-raising investigations. It also counted each individual connected to an investigation as a separate full-field investigation. Many of these investigations should not have been included, such as the one that related to a dead person, four that concerned people who had been in long-term custody, and eight that had been closed well before August 6, 2001.” [NEWSDAY, 4/10/2004; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 4/11/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 262, 535] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, Condoleezza Rice Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB, Presidential Level Warnings, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Warning Signs

August 6, 2001: Bush Later Recalls His Reaction to ‘Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US’ Memo

Bush being briefed at his ranch on August 6, 2001. [Source: Associated Press] On April 29, 2004, President Bush will testify before the 9/11 Commission, but almost no details of what he said will be publicly released. He testifies with Vice President Cheney, in private, not under oath, is not recorded, and the notes that the commissioners take are censored by the White House (see April 29, 2004). However, the 9/11 Commission will release a one paragraph summary of how Bush claims he responded to the Presidential Daily Briefing of August 6, 2001, entitled, “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US” (see August 6, 2001). The Commission recalls, “The President told us the August 6 report was historical in nature. President Bush said the article told him that al-Qaeda was dangerous, which he said he had known since he had become President. The President said bin Laden had long been talking about his desire to attack America. He recalled some operational data on the FBI, and remembered thinking it was heartening that 70 investigations were under way (see August 6, 2001). As best he could recollect, [National Security Adviser] Rice had mentioned that the Yemenis’ surveillance of a federal building in New York had been looked into in May and June, but there was no actionable intelligence (see May 30, 2001). He did not recall discussing the August 6 report with the Attorney General or whether Rice had done so. He said that if his advisers had told him there was a cell in the United States, they would have moved to take care of it. That never happened.” The 9/11 Commission will conclude that they could find no evidence of any further discussions or actions taken by Bush and his top advisers in response to the briefing (see Between August 6 and September 10, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 260] Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, 9/11 Commission, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB

August 7-September 10, 2001: Fire and Evacuation at CIA Headquarters Helps Prepare for Response on 9/11

CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. [Source: GlobeXplorer] A fire lasting several hours leads to the forced evacuation of the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. [REUTERS, 8/8/2001] The fire is discovered on August 7 at around 5:45 p.m., in the northeast section of the agency’s older headquarters building, and more than 60 firefighters are involved in putting it out. It was reportedly caused by a workman at the top of an elevator shaft dropping a welder, which ignited wood at the bottom of the shaft. Both the older headquarters building and the agency’s new headquarters building nearby are evacuated. Following this fire, A. B. “Buzzy” Krongard—the executive director of the CIA since March this year—is dismayed to find that plans for an evacuation of the headquarters are patchy, and that some of the fire alarms do not work. In the ensuing month he therefore initiates regular fire drills and equips key agency officials with tiny walkie-talkies, meaning communication will still be possible should cell phones ever go out. Krongard declares that evacuating safely is to be more important than storing classified material, and has the agency’s computer network reprogrammed so an evacuation warning could be flashed on all computer screens. Journalist and author Ronald Kessler will describe the August 7 fire as being “fortuitous,” as little over a month later, on the morning of September 11, CIA Director George Tenet will order the evacuation of the headquarters building due to fears that it might be targeted (see (9:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). On that day, Tenet and other top officials will reconvene at an alternate location on the CIA campus, “[f]ollowing procedures laid out by Krongard after the fire.” [CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 3/16/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/7/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 8/8/2001; KESSLER, 2003, PP. 222-223] Entity Tags: A.B. (“Buzzy”) Krongard, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events

August 7, 2001: Version of Bush’s Al-Qaeda Briefing Is Incomplete, Poorly Distributed One day after Bush receives a Presidential Daily Briefing entitled, “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US,” a version of the same material is given to other top government officials. However, this Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) does not contain the most important information from Bush’s briefing. It does not mention that there are 70 FBI investigations into possible al-Qaeda activity, does not mention a May 2001 threat of US-based explosives attacks, and does not mention FBI concerns about recent surveillance of buildings in New York City. The Associated Press will report that this type of memo “goes to scores of Cabinet-agency officials from the assistant secretary level up and does not include raw intelligence or sensitive information about ongoing law enforcement matters” due to fear of media leaks. SEIBs were sent to many more officials during the Clinton administration. The Associated Press will also state that “some who saw the memo said they feared it gave policy-makers and members of the congressional intelligence committees a picture of the domestic threat so stale and incomplete that it didn’t provide the necessary sense of urgency one month before the Sept. 11 attacks.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 4/13/2004] Attorney General John Ashcroft will later say he does not recall seeing the SEIB before 9/11 (see Between August 7 and September 10, 2001). Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, George W. Bush, Bush administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Al-Qaeda Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB, Presidential Level Warnings, Warning Signs

Between August 7 and September 10, 2001: Ashcroft Supposedly Does Not See ‘Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US’ Memo before 9/11 On August 7, 2001, a version of the Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) entitled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US” given to President Bush the day before is sent to other top US officials (see August 7, 2001). This version, called an SEIB, has the same title as the PDB but contains less classified information. Attorney General John Ashcroft - the head of law enforcement in the US - will later claim that he does not remember seeing this SEIB before 9/11. He will say he was at a conference in Chicago at the time and he does not remember his staff briefing him about it later. In the Clinton administration, the attorney general was a regular recipient of the same PDB given to the president. [9/11 COMMISSION, 4/13/2004] Entity Tags: John Ashcroft Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB, Presidential Level Warnings, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Warning Signs

Between August 6 and September 11, 2001: No High-Level Meetings to Discuss ‘Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US’ Memo The Bush administration holds no high-level meetings prior to 9/11 to discuss the ‘Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US’ Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) given to President Bush on August 6, 2001 (see August 6, 2001). Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke will later suggest that 9/11 might have been stopped “if [National Security Adviser] Rice and the president had acted personally, gotten involved, shaken the trees, gotten the Cabinet members involved when they had ample warning in June and July and August that something was about to happen.… [Rice] said that the president received 40 warnings face to face from the director of central intelligence that a major al-Qaeda attack was going to take place and she admitted that the president did not have a meeting on the subject, did not convene the Cabinet. She admitted that she didn’t convene the Cabinet. And as some of the [9/11 Commissioners] pointed out, this was in marked contrast to the way the government operated in December of 1999, when it had similar information and it successfully thwarted attacks.” [ABC NEWS, 4/8/2004] Former CIA official Larry Johnson will similarly comment, “At a minimum, the details in the 6 August PDB should have motivated Rice to convene a principals’ meeting. Such a meeting would have ensured that all members of the president’s national security team were aware of the information that had been shared with the president. George Bush should have directed the different department heads to report back within one week on any information relevant to the al-Qaeda threat. Had he done this there is a high probability that the FBI field agents concerns about Arabs taking flight training would have rung some bells. There is also a high probability that the operations folks at CIA would have shared the information they had in hand about the presence of al-Qaeda operators in the United States.” [TOM PAINE (.COM), 4/12/2004] There will be one cabinet-level principals meeting to discuss terrorism on September 4, 2001, but no evidence has been released suggesting the PDB or the possibility of al-Qaeda attacking the US was discussed (see September 4, 2001). Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, Richard A. Clarke, George W. Bush, Larry C. Johnson Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB, Presidential Level Warnings, Warning Signs

Between August 6 and September 10, 2001: ’Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US’ Memo Is Not Acted Upon The 9/11 Commission will later state that after the now famous “bin Laden Determined to Strike in US” memo is given to President Bush on August 6, 2001 (see August 6, 2001), “We have found no indication of any further discussion before September 11 among the president and his top advisers of the possibility of a threat of an al-Qaeda attack in the United States.” [NEWSWEEK, 4/28/2005] 9/11 Commissioner Bob Kerrey will later state to CNN,“[B]y the way, there’s a credible case that the president’s own negligence prior to 9/11 at least in part contributed to the disaster in the first place.… [I]n the summer of 2001, the government ignored repeated warnings by the CIA, ignored, and didn’t do anything to harden our border security, didn’t do anything to harden airport country, didn’t do anything to engage local law enforcement, didn’t do anything to round up INS and consular offices and say we have to shut this down, and didn’t warn the American people. The famous presidential daily briefing on August 6, we say in the report that the briefing officers believed that there was a considerable sense of urgency and it was current. So there was a case to be made that wasn’t made.… The president says, if I had only known that 19 Islamic men would come into the United States of America and on the morning of 11 September hijack four American aircraft, fly two into the World Trade Center, one into the Pentagon, and one into an unknown Pennsylvania that crashed in Shanksville, I would have moved heaven and earth. That’s what he said. Mr. President, you don’t need to know that. This is an Islamic Jihadist movement that has been organized since the early 1990s, declared war on the United States twice, in ‘96 and ‘98. You knew they were in the United States. You were warned by the CIA. You knew in July they were inside the United States. You were told again by briefing officers in August that it was a dire threat. And what did you do? Nothing, so far as we could see on the 9/11 Commission.” [CNN, 11/8/2004] Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Pentagon, Central Intelligence Agency, George W. Bush, Bob Kerrey, Al-Qaeda, 9/11 Commission, Bush administration, Osama bin Laden Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB

August 8-15, 2001: Israel Reportedly Warns of Major Assault on the US

Ephraim Halevy was head of the Israeli Mossad from 1998 to 2002. [Source: Associated Press] At some point between these dates, Israel warns the US that an al-Qaeda attack is imminent. [FOX NEWS, 5/17/2002] Reportedly, two high-ranking agents from the Mossad come to Washington and warn the FBI and CIA that from 50 to 200 terrorists have slipped into the US and are planning “a major assault on the United States.” They say indications point to a “large scale target,” and that Americans would be “very vulnerable.” They add there could be Iraqi connections to the al-Qaeda attack. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 9/16/2001; OTTAWA CITIZEN, 9/17/2001; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/20/2001] The Los Angeles Times later retracts its story after a CIA spokesperson says, “There was no such warning. Allegations that there was are complete and utter nonsense.” [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/21/2001] Other newspapers do not retract it. Entity Tags: Israel Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks (Mossad), Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Israel, Warning Signs, Foreign Intelligence Warnings, Key Warnings

August 10-11, 2001: Moussaoui Moves to Minnesota; Apartment Vandalized

Zacarias Moussaoui. [Source: US Justice Department] Zacarias Moussaoui moves from Oklahoma to Minnesota, in order to attend flight school training there. Moussaoui drives there with Hussein al-Attas, a friend who will stay with him in Minnesota. Curiously, on August 11, someone breaks into the Norman, Oklahoma, apartment that remained unoccupied since Moussaoui moved out of it at the end of May 2001. A neighbor’s bicycle is used to break through the door of the vacant apartment and a bloodstain is left on the wall. A neighbor “[tells] reporters that furniture was overturned as if someone was looking for something.” [MSNBC, 12/11/2001; ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, 9/10/2002; US CONGRESS, 10/17/2002] Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Hussein al-Attas Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 11-15, 2001: Flight School Staff Become Suspicious of Moussaoui, Fear He May Be Hijacker

Hugh Sims (left) and Tim Nelson (right). [Source: Flysouth and Andy King / Associated Press] Flight engineer Tim Nelson and pilot Hugh Sims, who work at the Pan Am International Flight School where Zacarias Moussaoui trains to fly a Boeing 747-400, are immediately suspicious of Moussaoui, and their suspicions continue to grow after his arrival because: He sends unusual emails that are signed “zuluman tangotango” and laced with grammatical errors, even though he says he is a British businessman; [CNN, 3/2/2006] His e-mails also include abnormal comments such as, “E[mail] is not secure;” [NEWSWEEK, 10/1/2001] He pays most of his $8,300 fee in hundred dollar bills. This makes Nelson suspicious, because he thinks cash is hard to track; [NEW YORK TIMES, 2/8/2002; STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 4/24/2005; CNN, 3/2/2006] He is alone, whereas most trainees arrive in groups; [STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 4/24/2005] He says he wants to fly a 747 not because he plans to be a pilot, but as an “ego boosting thing.” However, within hours of his arrival, it is clear he is “not some affluent joyrider,” as he is shabbily dressed; [NEW YORK TIMES, 2/8/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/18/2002; STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 4/24/2005] In addition, it is unusual that he has no aviation background, very little experience, and no pilot’s license. All other pilots at the center, even “vanity pilots”—wealthy individuals who just want the thrill of flying a large jet—have many times more flying hours than Moussaoui and are all licensed; [US CONGRESS, 10/17/2002; STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 4/24/2005; RAKE, 5/2005] He has flown for 57 hours at flight school in Oklahoma, but not yet flown solo, which is unusual. The school’s manager of pilot training, Alan McHale, will later comment, “My worst student was a grandma, and I got her to solo after 21 hours;” [STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 4/24/2005] He is not just buying a one-period joyride, but a whole course; [STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 4/24/2005] He seems determined to pack a large amount of training in a short period for no apparent reason; [NEW YORK TIMES, 2/8/2002] He is “extremely” interested in the operation of the plane’s doors and control panel. [US CONGRESS, 10/17/2002] He also is very keen to learn the protocol for communicating with the flight tower, despite claiming to have no plans to become an actual pilot; [NEW YORK TIMES, 2/8/2002] He talks to some Syrian airline pilots training at the facility, and the pilots tell Nelson that Moussaoui is fluent in Arabic. Nelson, who is already worried Moussaoui might be up to no good, thinks, “One more red flag;” [STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 4/24/2005; CNN, 3/2/2006] The school’s accountant complains that Moussaoui’s payment is a couple of hundred dollars short, but that he does not have a credit card with him, even though he says he is an international businessman; [STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 4/24/2005] and Nelson thinks back to an incident in Japan when the captain was stabbed to death and the killer then flew the plane for 45 minutes before the co-captain regained control. He is concerned Moussaoui might perform a suicide hijacking, “Here’s the problem: You’ve got an aircraft that weighs upwards of 900,000 pounds fully loaded and carries between 50,000 and 57,000 gallons of jet fuel. If you fly it at 350 knots [about 400 miles per hour] into a heavily populated area, you’re going to kill a boatload of people.” After talking to instructor Clancy Prevost, who is also suspicious of Moussaoui (see August 13-15, 2001), both Sims and Nelson independently decide to call the FBI and Moussaoui is arrested soon after the calls are made (see August 16, 2001). [STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 4/24/2005] Entity Tags: Tim Nelson, Zacarias Moussaoui, Alan McHale, Hugh Sims Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 13-14, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Meet in Las Vegas for Summit

Mohamed Atta stayed at the Las Vegas Econolodge. [Source: Chris Farina/Corbis] The lead hijackers meet in Las Vegas for a summit a few weeks before 9/11. Investigators will believe that this is the “most crucial planning in the United States,” but will not understand why the hijackers choose Vegas, since they are all living on the East Coast at this time (see March 2001-September 1, 2001 and August 6-September 9, 2001). One senior official will speculate, “Perhaps they figured it would be easy to blend in.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/4/2001] At least three of the plot leaders are in Las Vegas at this time. Hani Hanjour and Nawaf Alhazmi fly from Dulles Airport to Los Angeles on an American Airlines Boeing 757, the same sort of plane they hijack on 9/11, and then continue to Las Vegas. Mohamed Atta also flies to Las Vegas from Washington National Airport. This is his second trip to Vegas, which was also previously visited by some of the other hijackers (see May 24-August 14, 2001). A few weeks earlier, Atta had traveled to Spain, possibly with some of the other hijackers, to finalize the plans for the attack with their associate Ramzi bin al-Shibh (see July 8-19, 2001). [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 1, 17, 21 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 57-8 ] Alhazmi will later be recalled by a hotel employee, who will say she ran into him at the Days Inn. According to her later account, he is “cold and abrupt,” in Vegas on “important business,” and will soon be traveling to Los Angeles. He asks for a list of Days Inns in Los Angeles, but does not want a reservation to be made. He also claims to be from Florida, although he is only thought to have spent a week there (see June 19-25, 2001). [LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, 10/26/2001] A close associate of the hijackers, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, will later say in a 2002 interview that Ziad Jarrah, Marwan Alshehhi, and Khalid Almihdhar are also present in Vegas at this time. [FOUDA AND FIELDING, 2003, PP. 137] Newsweek calls Vegas an “odd location” and comments: “They stayed in cheap hotels on a dreary stretch of the Strip frequented by dope dealers and $10 street hookers. Perhaps they wished to be fortified for their mission by visiting a shrine to American decadence. Or maybe they just wanted a city that was easy to reach by air from their various cells in Florida, New Jersey and San Diego.” [NEWSWEEK, 10/15/2001] Entity Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Khalid Almihdhar, Hani Hanjour, Ziad Jarrah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Mohamed Atta, Nawaf Alhazmi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Hani Hanjour, Ziad Jarrah

August 13-15, 2001: Flight Instructor Becomes Suspicious of Moussaoui

Pan Am International Flight School. [Source: FBI] (click image to enlarge) Although some staff at the Pan Am International Flight School became a little suspicious of Zacarias Moussaoui before he arrived (see August 11-15, 2001), within two days of his arrival at the school, Moussaoui’s behaviour makes his assigned instructor Clancy Prevost highly suspicious. This is because: Moussaoui has only flown for under 60 hours, whereas the second least experienced student Prevost ever had had 10 times as many hours. This lack of experience means Moussaoui does not really understand the instruction; [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 3/9/2006] When Moussaoui is asked what his goal is, he tells Prevost he wants to fly a 747 from London to New York, the same goal he gave in his original e-mail to the flight school. [RAKE, 5/2005] This raises fears he has plans to hijack such a flight; [US CONGRESS, 10/17/2002] When Prevost relates a story about a charter flight in the Middle East where getting the doors open was a problem, the story causes Prevost to ask Moussaoui whether he is a Muslim and Moussaoui replies in a strange tone, “I am nothing.” This makes Prevost worry so much that he ends the session, goes back to his motel, and calls the flight school to express his reservations about Moussaoui. He talks to his manager in the morning and says, “We’ll care [about having trained Moussaoui] when there’s a hijacking and he knows how to throw the switches and put them in the right position and all the lawsuits start coming in when they figure out we taught him how to do this”; Prevost then goes into a supervisors’ meeting and recommends calling the FBI, but becomes even more upset when he is told Moussaoui paid for his training in $100 bills. As Moussaoui does not learn much during the day, Prevost invites him to observe a simulator session that evening, which Moussaoui does with interest. The following day Prevost meets the FBI, which has now been alerted by the school, and shares his feeling it would be a good idea to do a background check on Moussaoui. The FBI subsequently arrests Moussaoui (see August 16, 2001). [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 3/9/2006] Some claims later made about Moussaoui in the media may be inaccurate: He is said to mostly practice flying in the air, not taking off or landing. [STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 12/21/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 2/8/2002; SLATE, 5/21/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 5/22/2002] However, he is arrested after ground instruction and never flies the simulator, so it is unclear how this could happen. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 3/9/2006] 9/11 Congressional Inquiry staff director Eleanor Hill will also later say that the reports saying he only wanted to pilot a plane in the air are untrue. [US CONGRESS, 9/24/2002] In addition, the 9/11 Commission will comment, “Contrary to popular belief, Moussaoui did not say he was not interested in learning how to take off or land”; [9/11 COMMISSION, 4/13/2004] It will be reported that he appears not to understand French, despite being from France, and does not specify the Middle Eastern country he says he comes from. [STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 12/21/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 1/2/2002] However, at the trial Prevost will recall that Moussaoui spoke good French and that Moussaoui told him he had both French and Moroccan passports. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 3/9/2006] Prevost will later receive a controversial $5 million reward from the US Department of State’s Reward for Justice program. [NEWSWEEK, 1/30/2008] Entity Tags: Clancy Prevost, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Zacarias Moussaoui, Pan Am International Flight School Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 14, 2001: Atta’s Hamburg Associates Purchase Tickets to Pakistan Two apparent associates of Mohamed Atta’s Hamburg al-Qaeda cell, Ismail Ben Mrabete and Ahmed Taleb, purchase tickets to fly to Pakistan on September 3, 2001. They will be joined on that flight by cell member Said Bahaji. All three will disappear into Afghanistan thereafter. It is later discovered that Taleb had been in e-mail contact with al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida. [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 2/25/2003] Note that these purchases occur one day before Zacarias Moussaoui’s arrest in Minnesota, suggesting the date for the 9/11 attacks was set before his arrest (see August 16, 2001). Entity Tags: Abu Zubaida, Said Bahaji, Ismail Ben Mrabete, Ahmed Taleb Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Germany, Abu Zubaida

Mid-August 2001: Afghan Leader Organizes Taliban Resistance Without US Support Abdul Haq, a famous Afghan leader of the mujaheddin, returns to Peshawar, Pakistan, from the US. Having failed to gain US support, except for that of some private individuals such as former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, Haq begins organizing subversive operations in Afghanistan. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 10/28/2001; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 11/2/2001] He is later killed entering Afghanistan in October 2001, after his position is reportedly betrayed to the Taliban by the ISI. Entity Tags: Taliban, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Abdul Haq, Robert C. McFarlane Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden

August 15, 2001: CIA Told of Moussaoui’s Forthcoming Arrest, Searches for Information The FBI’s Minneapolis field office tells the CIA that Zacarias Moussaoui will be arrested the next day (see August 16, 2001). The information is communicated to a CIA field office, which then informs the Counterterrorist Center (CTC) at CIA headquarters. The CTC searches for information on Moussaoui, but does not find anything. The CIA has information on Moussaoui at this point, but the information is related to one of Moussaoui’s aliases and the CIA apparently does not understand that the alias is used by Moussaoui (see April 2001). [TENET, 2007, PP. 200-201] Entity Tags: FBI Minnesota field office, Charles Frahm, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Harry Samit, Zacarias Moussaoui, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 15, 2001: CIA Counterterrorism Head: We Are Going to Be Struck Soon

Cofer Black. [Source: US State Department] Cofer Black, head of the CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center, says in a speech to the Department of Defense’s annual Convention of Counterterrorism, “We are going to be struck soon, many Americans are going to die, and it could be in the US.” Black later complains that top leaders are unwilling to act at this time unless they are given “such things as the attack is coming within the next few days and here is what they are going to hit.” [US CONGRESS, 9/26/2002] Entity Tags: Cofer Black Category Tags: Key Warnings, Warning Signs, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Before August 16, 2001: Moussaoui Writes Number of Spanish Militant in Address Book Zacarias Moussaoui writes the phone number of Amer el-Azizi in his notebook. El-Azizi is a Spain-based militant who is linked to 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (see (November 2001)) and is thought to have helped set up a meeting between Mohamed Atta and Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Spain in July 2001 (see Before July 8, 2001 and July 8-19, 2001). It is unclear when the number is written in Moussaoui’s notebook or what type of contact there is between Moussaoui and el-Azizi, if any. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 4/7/2004] However, the connection to el-Azizi does not appear to be mentioned at Moussaoui’s trial (see March 6-May 4, 2006), even though it would be one of very few pieces of evidence potentially tying Moussaoui to the 9/11 plot. The reason for this is unclear. El-Azizi’s arrest shortly after 9/11 will be frustrated by Spanish intelligence (see October 2001 and Shortly After November 21, 2001) and he will go on to be involved in the 2004 Madrid bombings (see Before March 11, 2004 and 7:37-7:42 a.m., March 11, 2004). Entity Tags: Amer el-Azizi, Zacarias Moussaoui Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Al-Qaeda in Spain

August 15, 2001: Army to Limit Public Access to Bases Around Washington The US Army is preparing to severely restrict public access to its posts in the Washington, DC area. For decades, visitors have been able to enter these bases freely. But now, as a probably permanent change, barriers will be erected across many roads leading into them, funneling traffic to a few roads staffed by guards. Drivers entering without proper registration will be sent to a visitor’s center to obtain a guest pass. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/15/2001] The new measures will mean commanders know who is entering their installations 24 hours a day, and give them the capability to adjust security measures immediately if required. [MDW NEWS SERVICE, 8/3/2001] The changes will occur at all installations belonging to the Military District of Washington (MDW). [MDW NEWS SERVICE, 7/2001] These include forts Hamilton, Meade, Belvoir, Ritchie, Myer, and McNair. Several of these bases will be reported as having implemented the changes in the following weeks, prior to September 11 (see August 20, 2001)(see September 4, 2001)(see September 5, 2001). Whether the changes take place at the other MDW installations prior to 9/11 is unknown. Part of MDW’s stated mission is to “respond to crisis, disaster or security requirements in the National Capital Region through implementation of various contingency plans.” [MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, 8/2000; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 11/28/2001] It will therefore be much involved with the rescue and recovery efforts following the 9/11 Pentagon attack. [ARMY, 10/2004] The restriction of access to MDW posts stems from guidance from Army leadership and specifically from MDW Commander Maj. Gen. James Jackson. [MDW NEWS SERVICE, 7/2001] It is reportedly part of a nationwide security clampdown due to concerns about terrorism, following such attacks as the Oklahoma City bombing and the attack on the USS Cole. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/15/2001] Entity Tags: Military District of Washington, US Department of the Army Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Military Exercises

August 15-September 10, 2001: Minneapolis Agent Warns Superiors of Moussaoui Seventy Times, Obstructed by Headquarters After Zacarias Moussaoui is arrested (see August 16, 2001), the FBI’s Minneapolis field office becomes very concerned that he may be part of a larger operation involving hijacked aircraft and that he represents a real threat to US national security. One of the agents, Harry Samit, will later say that he and his colleagues are “obsessed” with Moussaoui. Samit sends over 70 communications warning about Moussaoui to the following: The Hezbollah, bin Laden, and Radical Fundamentalist Units at FBI headquarters (see August 20-September 11, 2001); Another FBI field office (see August 23, 2001); The CIA (see August 24, 2001); The FBI’s offices in Paris and London; The FAA; The Secret Service; The Immigration and Naturalization Service; and Another intelligence agency (possibly the National Security Agency). While some of these bodies are responsive (see August 22, 2001 and August 24, 2001), Samit and his colleagues in Minnesota are forced to engage in a running battle with the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters, which obstructs their attempts to obtain a warrant to search Moussaoui’s belongings. Samit will later accuse the RFU of “criminal negligence” because they were trying to “run out the clock” to deport Moussaoui, instead of prosecuting him. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 101-221 ; USA TODAY, 3/9/2006; WASHINGTON POST, 3/21/2006] Entity Tags: FBI Minnesota field office, Radical Fundamentalist Unit, FBI Headquarters, Harry Samit, Zacarias Moussaoui Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 15-20, 2001: Minneapolis FBI Immediately Suspects Wider Airline Hijacking Plot Immediately after learning of Zacarias Moussaoui’s suspicious behavior, Minneapolis FBI agent Harry Samit, one of the agents who arrests Moussaoui (see August 16, 2001), suspects he is preparing to hijack an airliner. He writes to a colleague, “That’s pretty ominous and obviously suggests some sort of hijacking plan.” [ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, 4/4/2006] Interviews with Moussaoui after his arrest will reinforce the Minneapolis FBI’s suspicions that he is involved in a wider terrorist plot against airliners (see August 16-17, 2001). And after interviewing Moussaoui’s associate Hussein al-Attas as well (see August 16, 2001), Samit is unequivocally “convinced… a hundred percent that Moussaoui [is] a bad actor, [is] probably a professional mujaheddin and this [is] not a joyride, that he [is] completely bent on the use of this aircraft for destructive purposes.” [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 114-5, 120-2 ] In the main initial memo from Samit to other FBI units, Samit describes Moussaoui as “extremely evasive” and “extremely agitated.” Samit also writes that Moussaoui appeared to by lying when he denied he had weapons training. Samit says, “Minneapolis believes that Moussaoui is an Islamic extremist preparing for some future act in furtherance of radical fundamentalist goals.” Samit expresses his belief Moussaoui is planning something with a 747-400. He is aware Moussaoui’s plan probably involves co-conspirators and writes “Moussaoui, al-Attas, and others yet unknown are conspiring to commit violations of [Federal anti-terrorism statutes],” and “there is reason to believe that Moussaoui and al-Attas are part of a larger international radical fundamentalist group.” Samit even suspects Moussaoui of two of the offenses he will eventually be charged with and plead guilty to (see April 22, 2005). The e-mail accompanying the main memo concludes, “[p]lease let me know a soon as [the Department] gives the go-ahead. We’re all counting on you!” [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 120-2 ; MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, 6/4/2006] Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, FBI Headquarters, Harry Samit, Hussein al-Attas Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August-Early September 2001: Bin Laden Closes Al-Qaeda’s Afghanistan Training Camps In a 2007 book about the “Lackawanna Six” entitled The Jihad Next Door, author Dina Temple-Raston will write that al-Qaeda “shuttered the training camps in August 2001, leaving little sign of the encampments that once dotted the Pakistan-Afghan border.” After 9/11, the camps are not reopened. [TEMPLE-RASTON, 2007, PP. 130] One article shortly after 9/11 suggests that bin Laden moves his training camps in Afghanistan “in the days before the attacks.” [PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, 9/16/2001] Presumably the CIA notices. CIA Director George Tenet will later claim a group of men from an allied intelligence agency penetrated the camps not long before 9/11 (see Early September 2001), satellites are monitoring Afghanistan from the sky, and the CIA had over 100 assets in Afghanistan before 9/11 (see Before September 11, 2001). FBI agent Jack Cloonan will also later say, “There were agents run into the camps” (see Before September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Warnings, Warning Signs, Remote Surveillance

Mid-August 2001: Hijacker Hanjour Still Not Skilled Enough to Fly Solo

Hani Hanjour. [Source: FBI] 9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour goes to the Freeway Airport in Bowie, Maryland, about 20 miles west of Washington. He wants to rent a single engine Cessna airplane. However, when two instructors take him on three test runs, they find he has trouble controlling and landing the plane. One instructor has to help him land. Due to his poor skills, therefore, he is not allowed to rent one of their planes without more lessons. Further, while Hanjour appears to have logged over 600 hours of flying experience and possesses a valid pilot’s license (though it has in fact expired), he refuses to provide contact information: He gives no phone number and only gives his address as being a hotel in Laurel. In spite of Hanjour’s lack of flying skills, chief instructor Marcel Bernard later claims, “There’s no doubt in my mind that once [Flight 77] got going, he could have pointed that plane at a building and hit it.” [CAPITAL NEWS, 9/19/2001; GAZETTE (GREENBELT), 9/21/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 10/15/2001] However, on 9/11, in piloting Flight 77 into the Pentagon, Hanjour would have needed to do much more than simply point the plane at a target. Because Flight 77 at first seemed to overshoot its target, the Washington Post will note that “the unidentified pilot executed a pivot so tight that it reminded observers of a fighter jet maneuver. The plane circled 270 degrees to the right to approach the Pentagon from the west, whereupon Flight 77 fell below radar level.… Aviation sources said the plane was flown with extraordinary skill, making it highly likely that a trained pilot was at the helm.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001] One Washington air traffic controller will later comment, “The speed, the maneuverability, the way that he turned, we all thought in the radar room, all of us experienced air traffic controllers, that that was a military plane.” [ABC NEWS, 10/24/2001] One law enforcement official who will study Flight 77’s descent after 9/11 will call it the work of “a great talent… virtually a textbook turn and landing.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/10/2002] Remarkably, the 9/11 Commission will overlook the numerous accounts of Hanjour’s terrible piloting skills (see April 15, 1999 and January-February 2001) and state that 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed assigned the Pentagon target specifically to Hanjour because he was “the operation’s most experienced pilot.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 530] Entity Tags: Hani Hanjour, Marcel Bernard, 9/11 Commission, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Hani Hanjour, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training

Mid-August 2001: FBI Fails to Act When Known Al-Qaeda Sniper Moves to Minneapolis Mohamad Kamal Elzahabi moves to Minneapolis, Minnesota. Elzahabi has a long association with al-Qaeda, and has just returned from Chechnya where he fought as a sniper (see April 16, 2004-June 25, 2004). His “name was known to the FBI well before the Sept. 11 attacks, according to law enforcement officials who declined to be identified. He also was on a list of possible or suspected terrorists” circulated to foreign airlines and banks shortly after 9/11. [FOX NEWS, 6/26/2004; STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 6/30/2004] In fact, Canadian intelligence began investigating him for suspected militant ties in 1997, and the Boston FBI began investigating him in 1999, but lost track of him when he left the US later that year (see 1997 and 1999). He was connected to al-Qaeda operatives Raed Hijazi, Nabil al-Marabh, and Bassam Kanj. He worked as a Boston taxi driver with them (see June 1995-Early 1999), and also fought with them in Afghanistan (see Late 1980s). Fox News will later note that Elzahabi has a “potential link to Zacarias Moussaoui” since Moussaoui moved to Minneapolis in early August 2001 and is arrested on August 15, but no firm connection between the two has been shown. It has not been reported exactly when Elzahabi arrives in Minneapolis, but he applies for a commercial driver’s license on August 23, 2001. He is fingerprinted for a criminal background check at that time, which presumably would alert the FBI that he is living in Minneapolis if they do not know already. But it is not known if Minneapolis FBI agents, desperately trying to get a warrant for Moussaoui, are told about Elzahabi before 9/11. In January 2002, the FBI will run his name through a database. Despite the FBI’s knowledge of his al-Qaeda ties, he is cleared to get the license. This allows him to haul hazardous materials. His friend and al-Qaeda operative Nabil al-Marabh received a similar license the year before (see August 2000-January 2001). Elzahabi will apply for a license allowing him to carry general freight in September 2003 and he will get insurance clearance to start work in April 2004. However, he will be arrested by FBI that same month (see April 16, 2004-June 25, 2004). [FOX NEWS, 6/26/2004; STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 6/30/2004] Entity Tags: Mohamad Kamal Elzahabi, Nabil al-Marabh Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Nabil Al-Marabh, Zacarias Moussaoui

Between Mid-August and September 10, 2001: ISI Director Learns Pakistani Nuclear Scientists Are Helping Al-Qaeda, but Fails to Take Action or Warn US Some time before 9/11, ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed learns that two prominent Pakistani nuclear scientists met with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in Afghanistan in mid-August 2001. Bin Laden revealed to the two scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, that he had acquired nuclear material and wanted their help to turn it into a weapon (see Mid-August 2001). ISI Director Mahmood is said to have learned about this through military contacts, as several Pakistani generals sit on the board of directors of a charity run by the two scientists that assists the Taliban. For instance, Hamid Gul, a former director of the ISI, is the charity’s honorary patron and was in Afghanistan at the time of the meeting. However, the ISI does not warn the US or take any action against the scientists or their charity. [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 310-311] Entity Tags: Mahmood Ahmed, Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, Hamid Gul, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Osama bin Laden Timeline Tags: A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Pakistani Nukes & Islamic Militancy, Mahmood Ahmed

Mid-August 2001: Bin Laden Meets with Pakistani Nuclear Scientists and Discusses Building Nuclear Weapon

Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood. [Source: Public domain] Two retired Pakistani nuclear scientists meet with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri at a campfire in a compound near Kandahar, Afghanistan. The more prominent scientist, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, worked with A. Q. Khan for two decades before having a falling out with him in the early 1990s (however, he was seen with Khan earlier in 2001 (see April 2001)). A highly regarded scientist, he also became an advocate of the Taliban and published a pamphlet predicting that “by 2002 millions may die through mass destruction weapons… terrorist attack, and suicide.” He was forced to retire in 1999 after publicly advocating sharing nuclear technology with other Islamic countries. The other scientist, Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, also retired in 1999 after a long career. In 2000, the two men set up a charity, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, purporting to conduct relief work in Afghanistan (see 2000). Bin Laden allegedly tells the scientists that he has made great headway in advancing the apocalypse predicted by Mahmood. He claims that he has acquired highly enriched uranium from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and wants their help to turn it into a bomb. The scientists reply that while they could help with the science of fissile materials, they are not weapons designers. They are also asked with other Pakistani weapons experts could be approached for help. [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 310-311] They spend two or three days at the compound and discuss how the material could be used to create a so-called dirty bomb, in which radioactive material is blown up using conventional explosives to spread radiation. But the discussion apparently ends inconclusively when bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and others depart abruptly for the mountains. Before leaving, bin Laden says that something great is going to happen soon and Muslims around the world will join them in holy war. [FRANTZ AND COLLINS, 2007, PP. 264-265] Both US intelligence and Pakistani ISI learn about this meeting prior to the 9/11 attacks, but neither group will take any effective action as a result (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001 and Between Mid-August and September 10, 2001). Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood Timeline Tags: A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network Category Tags: Warning Signs, Pakistan and the ISI, Pakistani Nukes & Islamic Militancy

Mid-August-September 11, 2001: New York Air National Guard Unit in Saudi Arabia as Part of Operation Southern Watch About 100 members of the 174th Fighter Wing, part of the New York Air National Guard, are deployed to Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, to patrol the no-fly zone over southern Iraq, as part of the ongoing Operation Southern Watch. This is the unit’s second deployment there, its first having been in March 2001. [POST-STANDARD (SYRACUSE), 9/11/2001; POST-STANDARD (SYRACUSE), 9/12/2001; US CONGRESS, 3/1/2005; 174TH FIGHTER WING, 12/9/2005] The 174th FW is located at Hancock Field Air National Guard Base, five miles north of Syracuse, in Central New York State. It is currently equipped with 17 F-16 fighters. These are kept in a six-bay shelter where they are, reportedly, “ready to fly in any weather, at a moment’s notice.” [AIRMAN, 1/2001; POST-STANDARD (SYRACUSE), 9/25/2001; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 4/26/2005] However, Hancock Field is not one of NORAD’s two “alert” sites in the northeast US. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] The unit has 350 full-time staff and 650 part-timers, who work one weekend each month plus two full weeks a year. [POST-STANDARD (SYRACUSE), 9/25/2001; POST-STANDARD (SYRACUSE), 10/24/2001] The 100 members of the unit who go to Saudi Arabia are due to arrive back at Hancock Field at around 3 p.m. on 9/11, but as a consequence of the day’s events are diverted to Canada. [POST-STANDARD (SYRACUSE), 9/14/2001] They will eventually arrive back at the base on September 14. [POST-STANDARD (SYRACUSE), 9/15/2001] In the months after 9/11, 174th FW fighters are involved in flying combat air patrols over New York City. [POST-STANDARD (SYRACUSE), 12/8/2001; NEW YORK STATE, 3/26/2003] Entity Tags: Operation Southern Watch, New York Air National Guard, 174th Fighter Wing Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Military Exercises, US Air Security

August 16, 2001: Zacarias Moussaoui Arrested

Zacarias Moussaoui after his arrest. [Source: FBI] After being warned that Zacarias Moussaoui has raised suspicions at flight school (see August 11-15, 2001 and August 13-15, 2001), the FBI learns they can arrest him because he is in the US illegally. Four agents, Harry Samit, John Weess, Dave Rapp (all FBI) and Steve Nordmann (INS), drive to the Residence Inn, where Moussaoui and his associate Hussein al-Attas are staying. At the hotel Samit speaks on the phone to Joe Manarang from FBI headquarters; Manarang appeals for them to take the “cautious route” and not arrest Moussaoui. However, Samit refuses, as he has already notified the hotel clerk of their interest. Moussaoui is arrested around 4:00 p.m. on an immigration violation. At first Moussaoui shows the agents some documents, but then he becomes upset at missing his flight training. The FBI confiscates his belongings, including a computer laptop, but Moussaoui refuses permission for the belongings to be searched. A search of Moussaoui’s person yields a dagger with a two-inch blade, and another knife with a three-inch blade belonging to Moussoaui is found in the car. He also has boxing gloves and shin guards, and the arresting agents note he has prepared “through physical training for violent confrontation.” Al-Attas allows the agents to search his belongings and they believe al-Attas is in the US legally, so he is not arrested. However, al-Attas tells the FBI that Moussaoui is a radical religious Muslim and later makes several statements indicating Moussaoui may be a terrorist (see August 16, 2001). [MSNBC, 12/11/2001; US CONGRESS, 10/17/2002; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 3/9/2006; MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, 6/4/2006] Al-Attas is arrested the next day (see August 17, 2001). Entity Tags: John Weess, Zacarias Moussaoui, Steve Nordmann, Joe Manarang, Harry Samit, David Rapp, FBI Minnesota field office, Hussein al-Attas Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Key Captures and Deaths

August 16, 2001: Roommate Interview Strengthens Case against Moussaoui

Hussein al-Attas. [Source: Public domain] Hours after Zacarias Moussaoui is taken into custody in Minnesota, his friend and roommate Hussein al-Attas is interviewed by the FBI. The two men had recently driven together to Minnesota from Oklahoma (see August 10-11, 2001). According to a summary of the interview written at the time, “Al-Attas indicated that Moussaoui believes that it is acceptable to kill civilians who harm Muslims and that he approves of martyrs.” Al-Attas says Moussaoui talked about holy war every day when they roomed together. When asked if he had ever heard Moussaoui make a plan to kill those who harm Muslims, “Al-Attas admit[s] that he may have heard him do so, but that because it is not in [al-Attas’] own heart to carry out acts of this nature, he claimed that he kept himself from actually hearing and understanding.” Al-Attas says Moussaoui holds strong anti-American views and might be willing to act on his beliefs. Al-Attas describes Moussaoui as so secretive that he refuses to give his full name, identifying himself only as “Shaqil.” He also says that Moussaoui told him “true” Muslims must prepare themselves to fight and they should understand the suffering of Muslims in places like Palestine and Kosovo. He mentions that he and Moussaoui are carrying fighting gloves and shin guards to practice martial arts as part of Moussaoui’s philosophy that Muslims should be ready to fight nonbelievers. He has not heard Moussaoui mention any specific terrorist plot, but says that Moussaoui “is suspicious to me, too.” FBI agents interview al-Attas again the following day, then charge him with violating the terms of his student visa by working at a mosque in Oklahoma, and arrest him. During the second interview, al-Attas says that Moussaoui follows the teachings of a sheikh whose name he would not disclose to him (see August 17, 2001). The agents contact FBI supervisors in Washington to seek approval to get a warrant to search Moussaoui’s computer. The supervisors are aware of what al-Attas said in the interview, but nevertheless they tell the Minnesota FBI agents that they do not want to attempt to get the warrant because it has not been shown that Moussaoui is an agent of a foreign power. The New York Times will note that the content of al-Attas’ interview “raise[s] new questions about whether top [FBI] officials… were aggressive enough in responding to that information.” [WASHINGTON POST, 1/31/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 5/24/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 3/21/2006] Al-Attas will be arrested shortly after 9/11 and held as a material witness. He will later plead guilty to lying about Moussaoui. He lied in claiming that he did not know Moussaoui’s real name, lied about plans to go with Moussaoui to New York City in late August 2001, lied about Moussaoui’s desire to participate in holy war, and lied about a planned trip to speak to religious scholars who would encourage al-Attas to participate in holy war. He will be sentenced to time served, but will be kept imprisoned until the conclusion of Moussaoui’s trial in 2006 (see March 6-May 4, 2006). [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 7/22/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/22/2002] It is also later revealed that Moussaoui had recently convinced al-Attas to fight in Chechnya in order to prepare for holy war. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 2/4/2002] Furthermore, the person who attempts to post bond for al-Attas had been the subject of a full-field FBI international terrorism investigation in Oklahoma. This unnamed person was a recruiter for a radical Palestinian group and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003] In post-9/11 media accounts, al-Attas is generally portrayed as someone who had been innocently and accidentally caught up with Moussaoui. But it appears that in the weeks before 9/11, US intelligence will consider the possibility that al-Attas may have been plotting with Moussaoui. For instance, a CIA cable that will be sent on August 24 is titled “Subjects Involved in Suspicious 747 Flight Training,” (see August 24, 2001) one that will be sent on August 28 has Moussaoui and al-Attas’ names as the title. [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 7/22/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/22/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 540] Entity Tags: Hussein al-Attas, Zacarias Moussaoui, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 16, 2001: FAA Issues Warning; Airlines Say Warning Not Received The FAA issues a warning to airlines concerning disguised weapons. According to later testimony by National Security Adviser Rice, the FAA is concerned about reports that the terrorists have made breakthroughs in disguising weapons as cell phones, key chains, and pens. [CNN, 3/2002; REUTERS, 5/16/2002 SOURCES: CONDOLEEZZA RICE] However, the major airlines later deny receiving such notification. For instance, a Delta spokesperson states: “We were not aware of any warnings or notifications of any specific threats.” [FOX NEWS, 5/16/2002] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration Category Tags: US Air Security

August 16, 2001: Moussaoui’s Belongings Possess Information Sufficient to Roll Up 9/11 Plot

A letter that Zacarias Moussaoui had in his possession when he was arrested. It is signed by Yazid Sufaat, whose apartment was used for a 9/11 planning meeting in January 2000 that was monitored by the authorities. [Source: US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division] (click image to enlarge) After Zacarias Moussaoui is arrested, the FBI wishes to search his possessions (see August 16, 2001 and August 23-27, 2001). According to a presentation made by FBI agent Aaron Zebley at Moussaoui’s trial, the belongings are sufficient to potentially connect Moussaoui to eleven of the 9/11 hijackers: Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, Ziad Jarrah, Hani Hanjour, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, Fayez Banihammad, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Hamza Alghamdi, Satam Al Suqami, and Waleed Alshehri. The connections would be made, for example, through Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who spoke with Moussaoui on the telephone and wired him money (see July 29, 2001-August 3, 2001), and who was linked to three of the hijacker pilots from their time in Germany together (see November 1, 1998-February 2001). Bin al-Shibh also received money from Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, who was connected to hijacker Fayez Ahmed Banihammad (see June 25, 2001). [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] Moussaoui’s notebook contained two recognizable control numbers for the Western Union wire transfers from bin al-Shibh and, according to McClatchy newspapers, a check on these numbers “would probably have uncovered other wires in the preceding days” to bin al-Shibh from al-Hawsawi. [MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, 9/11/2007] The discovery of the eleven hijackers could potentially have led to the discovery of some or all of the remaining eight plot members, as they were brothers (Wail and Waleed Alshehri, Nawaf and Salem Alhazmi), opened bank accounts together (see May 1-July 18, 2001 and June 27-August 23, 2001), lived together (see March 2001-September 1, 2001), obtained identity documents together (see April 12-September 7, 2001 and August 1-2, 2001), arrived in the US together (see April 23-June 29, 2001), and booked tickets on the same four flights on 9/11 (see August 25-September 5, 2001). Entity Tags: Saeed Alghamdi, Salem Alhazmi, Satam Al Suqami, Waleed M. Alshehri, Zacarias Moussaoui, Ziad Jarrah, Wail Alshehri, Mohand Alshehri, Nawaf Alhazmi, Marwan Alshehhi, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Ahmed Alghamdi, Mohamed Atta, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Abdulaziz Alomari, Hani Hanjour, Hamza Alghamdi, Ahmed Alnami, Majed Moqed, Khalid Almihdhar Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Hani Hanjour, Ziad Jarrah, Other 9/11 Hijackers, Zacarias Moussaoui

August 16-19, 2001: Atta Rents Plane at Southeast Florida Airport; Accompanied by Unknown Passengers On August 16, Mohamed Atta arrives at Palm Beach Flight Training, located at an airport in the town of Lantana, southeast Florida. According to Marian Smith, the flight school’s owner, Atta says he wants to get in 100 hours in the air. [MIAMI HERALD, 9/13/2001] He already accumulated about 300 hours of flying time during his earlier training. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/27/2001; TIME, 9/30/2001] Smith describes him as being “well-spoken, well-dressed,” and says, “He seemed normal to me.” [LOCAL 10 NEWS (MIAMI), 9/13/2001; MIAMI HERALD, 9/13/2001] Atta rents a single-engine Piper Archer. He makes his first flight accompanied by an instructor. Having demonstrated his competence, he returns the following day and again two days later. Each time he has a different companion who flies with him. The identities of these men are unknown, but Smith will later recollect that none of them was among the men identified as 9/11 hijackers. [MIAMI HERALD, 9/13/2001; CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 9/14/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/14/2001] On his final day at the school, Atta is heard speaking in Arabic over the plane’s radio. An instructor who speaks Arabic himself hears him happily exclaim, “God is great!” [OBSERVER, 12/23/2001] Workers at the school suspect nothing criminal about Atta, though. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/14/2001] Entity Tags: Marian Smith, Palm Beach Flight Training, Mohamed Atta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training

August 16-September 10, 2001: FBI Fails to Brief NSC on Moussaoui, although this Is Standard Practice Following the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui, the FBI fails to brief the Counterterrorism and Security Group (CSG) chaired by counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke at the National Security Council (NSC) on the case. CIA director George Tenet will later say that briefing the CSG on such an arrest is “standard practice.” [TENET, 2007, PP. 200] In July 2001, Clarke had told the FBI he wanted to be informed of anything unusual, even if a sparrow fell from a tree (see Shortly After July 5, 2001). Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Counterterrorism and Security Group, Federal Bureau of Investigation, George J. Tenet, Zacarias Moussaoui Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

August 16-17, 2001: Moussaoui Interviews Raise Concerns for FBI Agents After Zacarias Moussaoui is arrested, he consents to be interviewed on the day of the arrest and the next day by FBI agent Harry Samit. However, the interviews only alarm the FBI more, as Moussaoui makes a number of suspicious statements and his answers are extremely evasive: [CNN, 9/28/2002; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 3/9/2006] Moussaoui says he does not want the French consul to be informed of his arrest, which makes the FBI think he is a criminal or an Islamic militant; Although Moussaoui says he works for a British company called NOP, he cannot remember what the letters stand for, neither can he recall his salary, job description, or any details of the business; [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 3/9/2006] He says he works as a “marketing consultant” for Infocus Tech, a Southeast Asian technology company, but also fails to provide information about that company; [MSNBC, 12/11/2001; US CONGRESS, 10/17/2002; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 3/9/2006] When asked about his $32,000 bank balance, he initially says it is his savings, but then admits it was given to him by friends and associates, most of whose names he cannot remember (see August 17, 2001); Moussaoui’s passport, which indicates he spent two months in Pakistan shortly before arriving in the US, is new and he tells the FBI his old one was destroyed in the washing machine, which the agents know is a common lie for international criminals. When Samit asks Moussaoui about his trips to Pakistan and tells Moussaoui his story does not add up and they are suspicious, Moussaoui requests an attorney and the interview ends. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 3/9/2006] Moussaoui’s associate Hussein al-Attas is also interviewed around this time and makes several statements indicating Moussaoui may be linked with a militant group (see August 16, 2001). Entity Tags: Harry Samit, Zacarias Moussaoui, FBI Minnesota field office Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 16-September 10, 2001: Hijackers Make Series of Deposits to Bank Accounts Several deposits are made to the hijackers’ accounts. Details are available for some of the deposits for eleven of the nineteen hijackers: Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, Ziad Jarrah, Hani Hanjour, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Ahmed Alhazmawi, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Hamza Alghamdi, Waleed Alshehri, and Satam Al Suqami. Over $40,000 is deposited in their accounts, much in cash. The largest amounts deposited in one day occur on August 24, when $8,000 is split equally between Hamza Alghamdi’s account and a joint account of Atta and Alshehhi, and September 5, when a total of $9,650 is split between Banihammad’s and Hamza Alghamdi’s accounts, and the joint Atta/Alshehhi account. The smallest deposit is $120, paid into Khalid Almihdhar’s First Union National Bank account on September 9. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] Although it is impossible to trace the exact origins of the deposits, possible sources include withdrawals from other hijackers’ bank accounts, cash and traveler’s checks brought in by the hijackers in the spring/early summer (see January 15, 2000-August 2001), car sales, and money distributed by Atta, who reportedly received around $100,000 in early August (see Early August 2001, Summer 2001 and before, and Mid-July - Mid-August 2001). Entity Tags: Hamza Alghamdi, Ziad Jarrah, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Waleed M. Alshehri, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Satam Al Suqami, Mohamed Atta, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, Hani Hanjour Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Hani Hanjour, Ziad Jarrah, Other 9/11 Hijackers

August 16-September 10, 2001: FBI Fails to Inform Own Director of Moussaoui Case The FBI fails to inform its own head of the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui. It is unclear how this failure occurs. The highest FBI official to be informed of Moussaoui’s arrest is apparently Michael Rolince, head of the FBI’s International Terrorism Operations Section (see Late August 2001), but it seems he fails to pass the information on. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 275] Thomas Pickard, who is acting FBI director at this time, will later blame CIA director George Tenet, who was briefed repeatedly on the case (see August 23, 2001), for not informing him of Moussaoui’s arrest, but Tenet will comment: “I was stunned to hear [Pickard’s comments] suggesting that I had somehow failed to notify him about Moussaoui. Failed to tell him? Hell, it was the FBI’s case, their arrest. I had no idea that the Bureau wasn’t aware of what its own people were doing.” [TENET, 2007, PP. 200-201] Entity Tags: Michael Rolince, Federal Bureau of Investigation, George J. Tenet, Zacarias Moussaoui, Thomas Pickard Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

After August 16, 2001: INS Agent Presses for Moussaoui Warrant

INS agent Steve Nordmann. [Source: INS] Immigration and Naturalization Service agent Steve Nordmann, one of the officers who arrested Zacarias Moussaoui (see August 16, 2001), presses for a warrant so that law enforcement bodies can search Moussaoui’s computer files. He will later write of his regret that they were not allowed to access Moussaoui’s laptop. More details are not known as Nordmann will die in a motorcycle accident in 2003 and will not testify at Moussaoui’s trial. [STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 6/28/2003; ST. CLOUD TIMES, 9/7/2003] FBI agents also press for a warrant to search Moussaoui’s belongings (see August 21, 2001 and August 23-27, 2001), which contain potentially enough information to prevent 9/11 (see August 16, 2001). However, the warrant is blocked by the Radical Fundamentalist Unit at FBI headquarters (see August 20-September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Steve Nordmann Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 17, 2001: Moussaoui Gives FBI Name of Alleged Accomplice Towards the end of an interview with the FBI (see August 16-17, 2001), Zacarias Moussaoui discloses the name of one of his associates, Atif Ahmed. Moussaoui tells the FBI that Ahmed provided him with some money and that he associated with Ahmed’s brother in Pakistan. However, he cannot remember any details, such as Ahmed’s address or employment. The FBI’s Minneapolis field office immediately sends a lead to its legal attaché in London, asking him to follow up. However, information about Ahmed does not arrive in the US until “months later,” possibly November 2001, when Ahmed is arrested in Britain (see Mid-November 2001). [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 3/9/2006] Moussaoui will later say that Ahmed is a spy working for the British, but the FBI and British authorities will deny this (see July 25, 2002). Entity Tags: FBI Minnesota field office, Atif Ahmed, Zacarias Moussaoui, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism

August 17 and 31, 2001: CIA Director Tenet Briefs President Bush; Fails to Mention Moussaoui CIA records show that CIA Director George Tenet briefed President Bush twice in August—once in Crawford, Texas, on August 17, and once in Washington, on August 31. [WASHINGTON POST, 4/15/2004] In Tenet’s 2007 book, he will briefly mention that “A few weeks after the August 6 PDB [titled ‘Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US’ (see August 6, 2001)] was delivered, I followed it to Crawford to make sure the president stayed current on events. That was my first visit to the ranch.” [TENET, 2007, PP. 145] Later asked about what he told Bush at this meeting, Tenet will only say, “I held nothing back from the president. He understood our concerns about threats. He understood what we were doing around the world at the time.” [MSNBC, 5/7/2007] By the time of the second briefing, Tenet has been briefed about Zacarias Moussaoui’s arrest (see August 23, 2001), but, apparently, he fails to tell Bush about it. [WASHINGTON POST, 4/15/2004] In April 2004, Tenet will testify under oath before the 9/11 Commission that he had no direct communication with President Bush during the month of August. [NEW YORK TIMES, 4/15/2004] This is quickly discovered to be untrue. A CIA spokesperson will then claim, “He momentarily forgot [about the briefings]” (see April 14, 2004). [WASHINGTON POST, 4/15/2004] Tenet will personally brief Bush six more times before 9/11 and will still apparently fail to mention Moussaoui to him (see September 1-8, 2001). Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, George J. Tenet, George W. Bush, 9/11 Commission Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Presidential Level Warnings, Zacarias Moussaoui, Warning Signs

August 17, 2001: Moussaoui’s Roommate Arrested Zacarias Moussaoui’s roommate, Hussein Al-Attas, reports to the Immigration and Naturalization Service and is arrested when he admits he has worked despite only having a student visa. Al-Attas was with Moussaoui when he was arrested and was questioned the previous day (see August 10-11, 2001, August 16, 2001, and August 16, 2001). Al-Attas also says that Moussaoui follows the teachings of a sheikh, but that Moussaoui has not told him which sheikh because he does not think al-Attas would approve. When asked if the sheikh is Osama bin Laden, al-Attas says he does not think so and only remembers Moussaoui making one reference to bin Laden, when he appeared on television. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 77-9 ] Entity Tags: Hussein al-Attas, Immigration and Naturalization Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

Summer 2001 and before: Hijacker Atta Receives $100,000 from Pakistan Mohamed Atta receives $100,000 from accounts in Pakistan. The money is transferred to two of his accounts in Florida. [FOX NEWS, 10/2/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/2/2001; US CONGRESS, 10/3/2001; CNN, 10/6/2001; CNN, 10/8/2001] This will later be reported in various media, for example, ABC News will say that federal authorities track “more than $100,000 from banks in Pakistan to two banks in Florida to accounts held by suspected hijack ringleader Mohamed Atta.” [ABC NEWS, 9/30/2001] Law enforcement sources will tell CNN, “[T]he wire transfers from Pakistan were sent to Atta through two banks in Florida.” [CNN, 10/1/2001] One of the hijackers’ financiers, the Pakistan-based Omar Saeed Sheikh, is said to wire Atta around $100,000 in August (see Early August 2001). The transfers from Pakistan will be disclosed a few weeks after 9/11 but will then fade from view (see September 30-October 7, 2001), until 2003 when John S. Pistole, deputy assistant director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, tells the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs that the FBI has traced the origin of funding for 9/11 back to accounts in Pakistan (see July 31, 2003). However, in 2004 the 9/11 Commission will fail to mention any funding coming directly from Pakistan (see Late-September 2001-August 2004). Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, John S. Pistole, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Saeed Sheikh Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Saeed Sheikh, Key Hijacker Events

August 17, 2001: US Plan to Snatch Bin Laden Foiled After It Is Leaked to Media A US plan to snatch Osama bin Laden inside Afghanistan (see January 19, 2001) is revealed in the Pakistan press, after the US asks Pakistan for assistance with the plot. An article that runs in the Pakistan newspaper The News also says that the US and Pakistan have discussed a sting operation in Afghanistan using US special forces, but that Pakistan has advised Washington against it. After a UN resolution tightening sanctions against the Taliban, General Tommy Franks, commander-in-chief of US Central Command, discussed the plan with his Pakistani counterparts and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf during a visit to Islamabad in January 2001 (see January 19, 2001). [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 8/17/2001] There is some suggestion that the operation is attempted, but only partially successful, after 9/11 (see (September 26, 2001)). Entity Tags: US Central Command, Osama bin Laden, Thomas Franks, Pervez Musharraf Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Pakistan and the ISI

August 17, 2001: In Phone Call Recorded by FBI, Imam Says Moussaoui Wants to ‘Go on Jihad’ Zacarias Moussaoui’s roommate, Hussein al-Attas, makes thirteen phone calls from jail to El Hadj Ndiaye, the imam of his local mosque in Norman, Oklahoma looking for assistance in raising money for his bond. Al-Attas was arrested and jailed shortly after Moussaoui was detained (see August 16, 2001 and August 16, 2001). Ndiaye reportedly becomes “very upset” when he hears that Moussoaui is going to be deported. According to an FBI translation of one of these conversations, Ndiaye says, “I heard you guys wanted to go on jihad.” Al-Attas responds, “Don’t talk about that now.” [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 134, 167-8, 201 ; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 3/1/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] The Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters learns of the translated conversation on August 29 (see August 29, 2001), but the RFU chief downplays the significance of the reference to jihad. Two other people involved in posting the bond for al-Attas were the subject of counterterrorism investigations (see August 20, 2001 and August 23, 2001). Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Hussein al-Attas, El Hadj Ndiaye Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 17-November 11, 2001 and After: FBI Fails to Check Moussaoui Computer Lead When Zacarias Moussaoui is arrested (see August 16, 2001), he has a receipt on him for a Kinko’s store where he used a computer on August 12. The FBI does not go to this Kinko’s store to collect information about Moussaoui immediately after the arrest, but only on September 19, after the rest of Moussaoui’s belongings have been searched (see September 11, 2001). The FBI is told that the computers have been wiped and no information about Moussaoui’s use can be obtained. Due to the frequency with which Kinko’s computers are wiped, if the FBI visited the Kinko’s store immediately after the arrest, it is possible information about Moussaoui could have been recovered. Although the FBI is initially aware of some of Moussaoui’s e-mail addresses, in summer 2002 Moussaoui will reveal additional addresses he used and say he used them from this Kinko’s outlet. Although the Kinko’s computers have been wiped by 9/11, Microsoft, which operates the Hotmail service Moussaoui uses, can recover information up to 90 days after an account is last used, so the FBI could get the information it seeks from Microsoft until Mid-November 2001 (see (Late July-Early August, 2002)). However, the FBI does not know about the additional accounts at this point, partly because it was prevented from interviewing Moussaoui after 9/11 (see September 11-12, 2001). [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 1/1/2003] Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Minnesota field office Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 18, 2001 or Shortly Before: Minneapolis FBI Contacts CIA Headquarters for Help with Moussaoui Case Minneapolis FBI agent Harry Samit contacts Charles Frahm, an FBI agent who is working with the CIA’s bin Laden unit as a deputy chief, to discuss the Moussaoui case. Frahm passes on information to other CIA officers. Frahm will also be contacted by FBI headquarters about the case (see (August 20, 2001)) and will provide information linking the Chechen rebels, to which Moussaoui is connected, to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda (see August 24, 2001). [TENET, 2007, PP. 201] Entity Tags: Charles Frahm, Central Intelligence Agency, FBI Minnesota field office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Zacarias Moussaoui, Harry Samit Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 19, 2001: FBI’s Best Al-Qaeda Expert Under Investigation for Trivial Issue, His Retirement Soon Follows

John O’Neill. [Source: FBI] The New York Times reports that counterterrorism expert John O’Neill is under investigation for an incident involving a missing briefcase. [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/19/2001] In July 2000, he misplaced a briefcase containing important classified information, but it was found a couple of hours later still locked and untouched. Why such a trivial issue would come up over a year later and be published in the New York Times seems entirely due to politics. Says the New Yorker, “The leak seemed to be timed to destroy O’Neill’s chance of being confirmed for [a National Security Council] job,” and force him into retirement. A high-ranking colleague says the leak was “somebody being pretty vicious to John.” [NEW YORKER, 1/14/2002] John O’Neill suspects his enemy Tom Pickard, then interim director of the FBI, orchestrated the article. [PBS FRONTLINE, 10/3/2002] The New Yorker later speculates that with the retirement of FBI Director Freeh in June, it appears O’Neill lost his friends in high places, and the new FBI director wanted him replaced with a Bush ally. [NEW YORKER, 1/14/2002] O’Neill retires a few days later. Entity Tags: Louis J. Freeh, Thomas Pickard, John O’Neill Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

August 20, 2001: Hanjour Passes Check Ride, but Apparently Does Not Obtain Certification Alleged Flight 77 pilot Hani Hanjour successfully conducts “a challenging certification flight supervised by an instructor at Congressional Air Charters of Gaithersburg, Maryland, landing at a small airport with a difficult approach,” according to the 9/11 Commission Report. The instructor, Eddie Shalev, thinks that “Hanjour may have had training from a military pilot because he used a terrain recognition system for navigation.” However, it is unclear what certification the 9/11 Commission thinks Hanjour receives. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 248, 531] Shalev is an Israeli national and has a military background. He began working at Congressional Air Charters in April 2001. [9/11 COMMISSION, 4/9/2004] A stipulation used as evidence at the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui will mention the flight, but fail to mention any certification Hanjour allegedly receives based on it, merely saying it is a “check ride with a flight instructor.” Hanjour will subsequently rent aircraft from the company on August 26 and 28. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 68 ] Entity Tags: Congressional Air Charters, Eddie Shalev, Hani Hanjour Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Hani Hanjour, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training

August 20, 2001: Fort Meade Increases Base Security Fort Meade, a US Army installation located between Baltimore and Washington, DC, begins strict new entrance restrictions. For decades, visitors such as churchgoers and parents taking their children to schools on the base have been able to enter the post freely. But the Army is now closing seven access points, with only four points remaining open full time and four others part time. The restrictions, part of a security crackdown ordered by Army leaders concerned about terrorism, will require visitors to stop at a visitor’s center and obtain a day pass allowing them to enter and travel on the base. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/15/2001; LAUREL LEADER, 8/23/2001; LAUREL LEADER, 8/23/2001] Fort Meade is home to about 10,000 military personnel and 25,000 civilian employees. Its major tenant units include the National Security Agency (NSA), the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), and the US Air Force’s 694th Intelligence Group. [MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, 8/2000; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 4/9/2002] All other installations in the Military District of Washington are currently implementing similar access restrictions (see August 15, 2001). [MDW NEWS SERVICE, 7/2001] Entity Tags: Fort Meade, Military District of Washington Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Military Exercises

August 20, 2001: Atta Announces Approximate Date of Attack in E-mail to Bin Al-Shibh In a later interview, would-be hijacker Ramzi bin al-Shibh claims that roughly around this day, he receives a coded e-mail about the 9/11 plot from Mohamed Atta. It reads, “The first term starts in three weeks.… There are 19 certificates for private studies and four exams.” Bin al-Shibh learns the exact day of the attack on August 29. [GUARDIAN, 9/9/2002] Hijacker Hani Hanjour also makes surveillance test flights near the Pentagon and WTC around this time, showing the targets have been confirmed as well. [CBS NEWS, 10/9/2002] Information in a notebook later found in Afghanistan suggests the 9/11 attack was planned for later, but was moved up at the last minute. [MSNBC, 1/30/2002] The FBI later notices spikes in cell phone use between the hijackers just after the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui and just before the hijackers begin to buy tickets for the flights they would hijack. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/10/2002] CIA Director Tenet has hinted that Zacarias Moussaoui’s arrest a few days earlier (on August 15 (see August 16, 2001)) may be connected to when the date of the attack was picked. [US CONGRESS, 6/18/2002] On the other hand, some terrorists appear to have made plans to flee Germany in advance of the 9/11 attacks one day before Moussaoui’s arrest (see August 14, 2001). Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, George J. Tenet, Hani Hanjour, Mohamed Atta, Ramzi bin al-Shibh Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta

August 20, 2001: Moussaoui Associate Bailed out of Custody by Subject of Counterterrorism Investigation

M. A. Menepta (Melvin Lattimore). [Source: Public domain] Hussein al-Attas, an associate of Zacarias Moussaoui, is released from an immigration detention center on bail. Al-Attas was questioned and detained shortly after Moussaoui’s arrest (see August 16, 2001 and August 16, 2001). His bail is paid by Mujahid Abdulqadir Menepta, who was investigated by the FBI over terrorism suspicions. When agents from the Minneapolis field office investigate Menepta, they find that he knows Moussaoui and attended the same mosque as him in Norman, Oklahoma. They also discover that he has an extensive criminal history and was the subject of a New York criminal-terrorism related investigation. Minneapolis agent Harry Samit writes in a memo to FBI headquarters that he thinks Menepta may be involved in whatever Moussaoui is plotting. Samit explains that he told immigration officers that he traveled to Pakistan in 1989 as part of a missionary effort. Samit says the international Islamic organization that sponsored the trip has been linked by the FBI to the recruitment of militants. Samit also reports that Menepta wasn’t entirely truthful with the INS. Samit says Pakistan apparently issued him a visa in April 1990, something he failed to disclose to the INS. Additionally, Menepta told immigration officers that he is al-Attas’ roommate, but al-Attas has been living with Moussaoui and another man for one month at an address different than the one indicated by Menepta. Samit says that the the explanation that he flew to Minneapolis to post al-Attas’ bond so that al-Attas can return to teach children at the Oklahoma mosque seems “farfetched.” [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 135-6 ; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 3/1/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] Entity Tags: Hussein al-Attas, Zacarias Moussaoui, Mujahid Abdulqadir Menepta, Harry Samit, FBI Minnesota field office Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 20, 2001: Pakistani President Musharraf Denounces UN Sanctions against Taliban Both Russia and France have recently presented intelligence to the United Nations Security Council documenting that Pakistan is continuing to heavily support the Taliban (see March 7, 2001), in direct violation of UN sanctions (see January 19, 2001). Up to 30 ISI trucks a day are crossing into Afghanistan (see June 13, 2001 and Summer 2001). But on August 20, 2001, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf openly condemns the UN sanctions, saying: “The Taliban are the dominant reality in Afghanistan.… The unilateral arms embargo on the Taliban is unjustified, discriminatory, and will further escalate the war [between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance].” [RASHID, 2008, PP. 60, 416] Entity Tags: Taliban, United Nations, Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI

Before August 22, 2001: Threat Information about ‘Khalid’ Increases Interest in Hijacker Almihdhar The CIA receives some threat information about a man named “Khalid” and begins to examine data on everybody it knows whose first name is “Khalid”. In an August 22 e-mail FBI agent Dina Corsi writes that this is one of the reasons for the interest in hijacker Khalid Almihdhar at this time: “the reason [the intelligence community] were looking at [Almihdhar] is relatively general—basically they were looking at all individuals using the name Khalid because of some threat information.” [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 285 ] The identity of the man named Khalid they are looking for is not revealed, however, the there is threat reporting starting in June 2001 concerning someone an informant called Khalid, who is later revealed to be Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (see June 12, 2001). Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khalid Almihdhar, Dina Corsi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

(August 20, 2001): FBI Headquarters Opens Informal Communication Channel with CIA over Moussaoui After the Zacarias Moussaoui case (see August 16, 2001) is transferred from the Iran unit to the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters (see August 20-September 11, 2001), RFU chief Dave Frasca contacts Charles Frahm, an FBI manager detailed to the CIA with responsibility for Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit. According to Frahm, who has already been contacted by the FBI Minneapolis field office (see August 18, 2001 or Shortly Before), Frasca asks CIA headquarters to quickly share any information it has on Moussaoui with the FBI, but does not send the agency a formal request, even though FBI headquarters continues to coordinate the case with the CIA. In an e-mail sent around August 28, Frahm will indicate that the CIA has still not received a formal request from the bureau. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 123, 154-5, 231-2 ; WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 313] The CIA will tell FBI agent Harry Samit that it thinks there is enough information to firmly link Moussaoui to a terrorist group (see August 24, 2001). Entity Tags: Radical Fundamentalist Unit, David Frasca, Charles Frahm, Central Intelligence Agency, Alec Station, FBI Headquarters Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 20-September 11, 2001: FBI’s Radical Fundamentalist Unit Unhelpful with Moussaoui Search Warrant The FBI Minneapolis field office wishes to search Zacarias Moussaoui’s belongings, which will later be found to contain enough information to potentially stop 9/11 (see August 16, 2001). To do so it must get the approval of the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters. However, the RFU throws obstacles in the warrant request’s path: RFU chief Dave Frasca stops the Minneapolis office from pursuing a criminal warrant (see August 21, 2001); When French authorities say that Moussaoui is connected to the Chechen rebels, RFU agent Mike Maltbie insists that the FBI representative in Paris go through all telephone directories in France to see how many Zacarias Moussaouis live there (see August 22, 2001); Maltbie stops Minneapolis from informing the Justice Department’s Criminal Division about the case (see August 22, 2001); When RFU agent Rita Flack, who is working on the Moussaoui case, reads the Phoenix memo suggesting that bin Laden is sending pilots to the US for training, she apparently does not tell her colleagues about it, even though it was addressed to several of them, including Frasca (see July 10, 2001 and August 22, 2001); The RFU does not provide the relevant documentation to attorneys consulted about the request. In particular, Flack does not tell them about the Phoenix Memo, even though one of the attorneys will later say she asked Flack if anyone is sending radical Islamists to the US to learn to fly (see August 22-28, 2001); When Minneapolis learns Moussaoui apparently wants to go on jihad, Frasca is not concerned and says jihad does not necessarily mean holy war. However, a top Justice Department attorney will later say “he would have tied bells and whistles” to this comment in a request for a search warrant had he known this (see August 17, 2001 and August 29, 2001); Maltbie tells the Minneapolis office that getting a warrant will “take a few months” (see August 24, 2001). He also tells Minneapolis, “We know what’s going on. You will not question us.” (see August 27, 2001); Maltbie weakens the warrant request by editing it and removing a statement by a CIA officer that Chechen rebel leader Ibn Khattab was closely connected to Osama bin Laden, despite their being intelligence linking that leader to bin Laden (see August 28, 2001); In a key meeting with an attorney about the request, Maltbie and Flack, who are submitting the warrant, are adamant that it is not sufficiently supported (see August 28, 2001); Frasca opposes a plan to put an undercover officer in the jail cell with Moussaoui to find out more information about his connections to Islamic militants (August 29, 2001 and Shortly After); The RFU does not want a Minneapolis agent to accompany Moussaoui when he is deported (see (August 30-September 10, 2001)); The RFU does not re-consider getting a criminal search warrant after a decision is taken not to seek a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (see After August 28, 2001); Frasca and Maltbie are said to oppose a search warrant after 9/11 (see September 11, 2001). It is unclear why the RFU opposes the warrant so strongly. The Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General will later criticize the RFU staff, but will conclude that they did not intentionally sabotage the warrant application. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 101-222 ] A 2004 book by independent researcher Mike Ruppert will speculate that Frasca is actually a CIA agent. Ruppert suggests that the CIA placed Frasca in the FBI to prevent CIA operations from being compromised by FBI investigations. But he does not provide any direct evidence of ties between Frasca and the CIA (see October 1, 2004). The Minneapolis agents will offer a different interpretation of RFU actions. Coleen Rowley will say, “I feel that certain facts… have, up to now, been omitted, downplayed, glossed over and/or mischaracterized in an effort to avoid or minimize personal and/or institutional embarrassment on the part of the FBI and/or perhaps even for improper political reasons.” She asks, “Why would an FBI agent deliberately sabotage a case? The superiors acted so strangely that some agents in the Minneapolis office openly joked that these higher-ups ‘had to be spies or moles… working for Osama bin Laden.’… Our best real guess, however, is that, in most cases avoidance of all ‘unnecessary’ actions/decisions by FBI [headquarters] managers… has, in recent years, been seen as the safest FBI career course. Numerous high-ranking FBI officials who have made decisions or have taken actions which, in hindsight, turned out to be mistaken or just turned out badly… have seen their careers plummet and end. This has in turn resulted in a climate of fear which has chilled aggressive FBI law enforcement action/decisions.” [TIME, 5/21/2002] Minneapolis FBI agent Harry Samit will agree with explanation, telling the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General that the RFU is guilty of “obstructionism, criminal negligence, and careerism.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 3/20/2006] Samit will also say that Maltbie even told him he was acting this way to “preserve the existence of his advancement potential” in the FBI. [NEWSDAY, 3/21/2006] Entity Tags: David Frasca, Rita Flack, Coleen Rowley, Radical Fundamentalist Unit, Harry Samit, Michael Maltbie, FBI Headquarters Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

Between August 20-September 10, 2001: FBI Headquarters Agent Apparently Worried Moussaoui Case Will Damage His Career Mike Maltbie, a supervisory agent with the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters, tells Minneapolis agent Harry Samit, who has arrested Zacarias Moussaoui and wants to search his belongings, that getting an intelligence warrant can be bad for an agent’s career if it gets fouled up. Maltbie comments that he wants to “preserve the existence of his advancement potential.” The Minneapolis field office is in dispute with the RFU over whether a warrant should be granted to search Moussaoui’s belongings, which contain enough information to potentially prevent 9/11 (see August 16, 2001 and August 20-September 11, 2001). At a key meeting with an attorney about whether to go forward with the warrant request, Maltbie is adamant that the warrant should not be granted (see August 28, 2001). [NEWSDAY, 3/21/2006] Entity Tags: Harry Samit, FBI Headquarters, Michael Maltbie, FBI Minnesota field office, Zacarias Moussaoui, Radical Fundamentalist Unit Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 20, 2001 and After: Key Justice Department Unit Not Consulted about Moussaoui Warrant Request

A memo from Attorney General John Ashcroft about the FISA process, obtained by the Center for Grassroots Oversight by FOIA request. [Source: Office of the Attorney General] (click image to enlarge) A key Justice Department unit, the Office of Intelligence and Policy Review (OIPR), is not consulted about a request to search Zacarias Moussaoui’s belongings. Although it is this office that would submit an application for a search warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the legal aspects of the application are discussed only with the National Security Law Unit, which is beneath the OIPR (see August 22-28, 2001). FBI officials discuss what they think the OIPR will want in a warrant application, but do not ask it directly. Sherry Sabol, an attorney in the lower National Security Law Unit, will later say that she would have contacted the OIPR to discuss a possible warrant application, if FBI headquarters agents had not withheld information from her (see August 22-28, 2001). When shown the relevant documentation for the Moussaoui case after 9/11, the OIPR’s general counsel will say he would have considered the application and, if submitted, he “would have tied bells and whistles” to a comment by Moussaoui’s imam that Moussaoui and an associate wanted to “go on jihad” (see August 17, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 132-166, 182-4, 201 ] However, a memo from Attorney General John Ashcroft issued in May to improve the efficiency of the FISA process recommended communications between field offices, FBI headquarters, and the OIPR. In addition, the OIPR and the FBI should hold regular monthly meetings to discuss FISA warrants. It is unclear if such a meeting is held in the three weeks between Moussaoui’s arrest and 9/11. However, one of the people supposed to attend such meetings is Spike Bowman, chief of the National Security Law Unit, who is involved in the Moussaoui case (see August 28, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 5/18/2001 ] Entity Tags: Marion (“Spike”) Bowman, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Zacarias Moussaoui, Radical Fundamentalist Unit, FBI Headquarters, Sherry Sabol, National Security Law Unit, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

(August 20, 2001 or after): Radical Fundamentalist Unit Delays Advising FAA of Moussaoui Case At a meeting attended by Mike Maltbie of the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU), RFU chief Dave Frasca, FBI agent Rita Flack, and an FAA representative who is familiar with the Moussaoui case, a decision is made not to advise the FAA about the Moussaoui investigation at this point because Moussaoui and Al-Attas are presumably in custody. (Al-Attas is bailed out of custody on August 20) [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 134, 149-150 ; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 3/1/2006 ] Al-Attas is suspected of involvement in terrorism at this point and investigators believe he and Moussaoui may be involved in a plot against the US that involves the hijacking of an airplane (see August 17, 2001 and August 24, 2001). The FBI will eventually warn the FAA, but it will fail to mention that its Minneapolis office believes Moussaoui intends to hijack an airliner (see September 4, 2001). Entity Tags: Michael Maltbie, David Frasca, Federal Aviation Administration, Rita Flack, FBI Headquarters, Radical Fundamentalist Unit Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 21, 2001: Local FBI Pleads with Headquarters to Warn Secret Service About Moussaoui The Minnesota FBI office e-mails FBI headquarters on this day, saying it is “imperative” that the Secret Service be warned of the danger that a plot involving Zacarias Moussaoui might pose to the president’s safety. However, no such warning is ever sent. [US CONGRESS, 10/17/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/18/2002] Entity Tags: FBI Minnesota field office, George W. Bush, FBI Headquarters, Secret Service, Zacarias Moussaoui Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 21, 2001: Inmate Warns of Impending Attack in New York

Khalid al-Fawwaz, Adel Abdel Bary and Ibrahim Ediarous. [Source: Orlando Sentinel/ Bureau of Prisons] Walid Arkeh, a Jordanian serving time in a Florida prison, is interviewed by FBI agents after warning the government of an impending al-Qaeda attack. He had been in a British jail from September 2000 to July 2001, and while there had befriended three inmates, Khalid al-Fawwaz, Adel Abdel Bary, and Ibrahim Eidarous. US prosecutors charge, “The three men ran a London storefront that served as a cover for al-Qaeda operations and acted as a conduit for communications between bin Laden and his network.” [ORLANDO SENTINEL, 10/30/2002] Al-Fawwaz was bin Laden’s press agent in London, and bin Laden had called him over 200 times before al-Fawwaz was arrested in 1998. [FINANCIAL TIMES, 11/29/2001; SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), 3/24/2002] The other two had worked in the same office as al-Fawwaz (see Early 1994-September 23, 1998). All three had been indicted as co-conspirators with bin Laden in the August 1998 US embassy bombings. Arkeh tells the FBI that he had learned from these three that “something big [is] going to happen in New York City,” and that they call the 1993 attack on the WTC “unfinished business.” Tampa FBI agents determine that he had associated with these al-Qaeda agents, but nonetheless they do not believe him. According to Arkeh, one agent responds to his “something big” warning by saying: “Is that all you have? That’s old news.” The agents fail to learn more from him. On September 9, concerned that time is running out, a fellow prisoner will try to arrange a meeting, but nothing will happen before 9/11. The Tampa FBI agents will have a second interview with him hours after the 9/11 attacks, but even long after 9/11 they will claim that he cannot be believed. On January 6, 2002, the Tampa FBI will issue a statement: “The information [was] vetted to FBI New York, the Acting Special Agent in Charge of the Tampa Division and the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Florida. All agreed the information provided by this individual was vague and unsubstantiated… Mr. Arkeh did not provide information that had any bearing on the FBI preventing September 11.” [ORLANDO SENTINEL, 1/6/2002; ORLANDO SENTINEL, 10/30/2002] However, a different group of FBI agents will interview him in May 2002 and find his information credible (see May 21-22, 2002). Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, World Trade Center, Khalid al-Fawwaz, Walid Arkeh, Ibrahim Eidarous, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Adel Abdel Bary Category Tags: Warning Signs, Key Warnings, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism

August 21, 2001: FBI Headquarters Blocks Criminal Investigation into Moussaoui Dave Frasca of the FBI’s Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) denies a request from the Minneapolis FBI field office to seek a criminal warrant to search the belongings of Zacarias Moussaoui, who was arrested on August 15 as part of an intelligence investigation (see August 16, 2001 and August 16, 2001). Minneapolis agents believe they had uncovered sufficient evidence that Moussaoui is involved in a criminal conspiracy, and want to obtain a criminal search warrant instead of a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). But because they originally opened an intelligence investigation, they cannot go directly to the local US attorney’s office for the warrant. In order to begin a parallel criminal investigation, they must first obtain permission from the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) so they can pass the information over the “wall.” [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 3/9/2006] Harry Samit, a Minneapolis FBI agent on the Moussaoui case, calls Dave Frasca, the head of the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters, to discuss the request. Samit tells Frasca that they have already completed the paperwork for a criminal investigation, but, according to Samit, Frasca says, “You will not open it, you will not open a criminal case.” Frasca says that argument for probable cause in seeking a criminal warrant is “shaky” and notes that if they fail to obtain a criminal warrant, they will be unable to obtain a warrant under FISA. Samit, who has only been with the FBI since 1999, defers to his superior, and writes on the paperwork, “Not opened per instructions of Dave Frasca.” Samit then tells his Chief Division Counsel, Coleen Rowley, about the conversation, and she also advises him that it would be better to apply for a warrant under FISA. When the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) interviews Frasca after 9/11, he will claim he never spoke to Samit about this matter, and that the conversation was with Chris Briese, one of Samit’s superiors. However, Briese will deny this and the OIG will conclude that the conversation was between Samit and Frasca. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 128-132 ; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 3/1/2006 ] To get a FISA search warrant for Moussaoui’s belongings the FBI must now show there is probable cause to believe Moussaoui is an agent of a foreign power. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 3/9/2006] A criminal warrant to search Moussaoui’s belongings will be granted only after the 9/11 attacks (see September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: David Frasca, Coleen Rowley, Harry Samit, FBI Headquarters, Zacarias Moussaoui, Radical Fundamentalist Unit, FBI Minnesota field office Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 21, 2001: PNAC Think Tank Leader States US Should Embrace Imperialist Hegemon Role Thomas Donnelly, deputy executive director of the PNAC, explains to the Washington Post that the US should embrace its role as imperialist hegemon over the world. He says many important politicians privately agree with him. “There’s not all that many people who will talk about it openly,” he says. “It’s discomforting to a lot of Americans. So they use code phrases like ‘America is the sole superpower.’” He also says, “I think Americans have become used to running the world and would be very reluctant to give it up, if they realized there were a serious challenge to it.” [WASHINGTON POST, 8/21/2001] Such statements of policy had been publicly denounced by Bush prior to his election, and some claim that the Bush administration only changes its mind toward a more aggressive policy after 9/11. However, this claim is inconsistent with the roles of senior Bush officials such as Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz in formulating the preemptive doctrine in 1992 then pushing for it in PNAC during the Clinton administration. In the summer of 2001, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s office “sponsored a study of ancient empires—Macedonia, Rome, the Mongols—to figure out how they maintained dominance.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 3/5/2003] Entity Tags: Thomas Donnelly Category Tags: US Dominance

August 21, 2001-September 13, 2001: FBI and CIA Ask British about Moussaoui But Get No Answer until After 9/11 On August 21, the FBI’s legal attache in London hand-delivers a request for information about Zacarias Moussaoui to British officials. On August 24, the CIA tells the British that Moussaoui is a possible “suicide hijacker” who is involved in “suspicious 747 flight training.” The CIA asks for information on him on August 28. The FBI raises the matter with the British again on September 3 and again on September 5. Although the British do not respond to these requests until just after 9/11, French intelligence, which has been sharing information about Moussaoui with the British (see 1999), sends the FBI some information about Moussaoui’s activities and history in England (see August 22, 2001). Then, on September 13, 2001, the British supposedly learn new information that Moussaoui attended an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan (see 1995-1998). The 9/11 Commission will conclude, “Had this information been available in late August 2001, the Moussaoui case would almost certainly have received intense and much higher-level attention.” A British official will complain, “We passed on all the relevant information [about Moussaoui] as soon as we obtained it.” [GUARDIAN, 4/14/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 274-75] However, the British had Moussaoui under surveillance in 2000 (see Mid-2000-December 9, 2000), and appear to have failed to pass on any information about this surveillance or what it uncovered. Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/11 Commission, United Kingdom, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism

August 21-22, 2001: FBI Agents Finally Realize Hijacker Almihdhar Is in US An FBI agent detailed to the CIA’s bin Laden unit locates CIA cables saying that future 9/11 hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi entered the US in early 2000. The agent, Margaret Gillespie, then checks with the US Customs Service and discovers that another future 9/11 hijacker, Khalid Almihdhar, entered the US on July 4, 2001, and there is no record he has left the country. As there is “an imperative to find anyone affiliated with al-Qaeda if they [are] believed to be in the US,” Gillespie immediately contacts Dina Corsi, an FBI agent in its bin Laden unit. Gillespie, who has been examining the USS Cole bombing and al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit for some time, will later say that when she learns of their arrival in the US, “it all clicks for me.” The Justice Department’s office of inspector general will find that Gillespie’s “actions on receipt of the information clearly indicate that she understood the significance of this information when she received it. She took immediate steps to open an intelligence investigation.” Gillespie and Corsi meet with Tom Wilshire, a CIA officer involved in the investigation (see August 22, 2001), and Almihdhar and Alhazmi are soon watchlisted (see August 23, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 300-301, 313 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, Margaret Gillespie, Dina Corsi, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Alec Station Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

August 21, 2001: FBI Fails to Ask Al-Qaeda Operative in Custody about Almihdhar Margaret Gillespie, an FBI agent detailed to the CIA who has just found out that future 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar is in the US (see August 21-22, 2001), suggests asking failed Millennium bomber Ahmed Ressam whether he recognizes Almihdhar, but the proposal is not acted on. Ressam was arrested on his way to bomb Los Angeles airport (see December 14, 1999), but has been co-operating with the US government against al-Qaeda (see May 30, 2001). Gillespie makes the suggestion in an e-mail to Tom Wilshire, a CIA representative to the FBI. It is unclear what Wilshire does with the suggestion, but Ressam is not interviewed. When shown photos of Almihdhar after 9/11, Ressam will not recognize him. The FBI also fails to ask Ressam about Zacarias Moussaoui before 9/11, but shortly after 9/11 Ressam will identity Moussaoui as a person that attended al-Qaeda’s camps in Afghanistan (see Late August-Early September 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 275-6, 541] Entity Tags: Tom Wilshire, Zacarias Moussaoui, Margaret Gillespie, Ahmed Ressam, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Almihdhar Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

Before August 22, 2001: FBI Headquarters Agent Learns Al-Qaeda Leader Attended Malaysia Summit with 9/11 Hijackers, Investigation Fails to Discover How FBI headquarters agent Dina Corsi learns that al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash attended a summit in Malaysia that was also attended by 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi (see January 5-8, 2000); an e-mail sent by Corsi on this date contains the first reference in FBI documents to bin Attash’s presence at the Malaysia summit. Although it is her job to support the investigation into the attack on the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000), which bin Attash commanded, and she is aware that bin Attash is important to the Cole investigation, even saying that she is focused on his identity and whereabouts, she fails to communicate this information to the agents investigating the bombing, who do not receive it before 9/11 (see August 30, 2001). After 9/11, she will say she cannot recall how she learned this information and an investigation by the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General will fail to find any documents that cast light on the matter. Although she does not do anything with this information before another FBI agent tells her Khalid Almihdhar is in the US (see August 21-22, 2001), she will later say that the information bin Attash was at the Malaysia summit was important, as it connected Almihdhar and Alhazmi to the Cole bombing. She will also say that CIA officers Tom Wilshire and Clark Shannon, who she discussed al-Qaeda’s Malaysia meeting with and who knew that bin Attash was in Malaysia with Alhazmi and Almihdhar (see Late May, 2001, Mid-May 2001 and June 11, 2001), did not give her this information. Although Corsi and others know that bin Attash is an important al-Qaeda leader, he is not watchlisted at this point, although one of his aliases is watchlisted in August (see August 23, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 280, 284, 286, 293, 296, 302 ] Entity Tags: Dina Corsi, Clark Shannon, Tawfiq bin Attash, Tom Wilshire, Khalid Almihdhar, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Nawaf Alhazmi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

August 22, 2001: FBI Team Returns to Yemen to Investigate Cole Bombing An FBI team returns to Yemen to re-commence its investigation of the bombing of the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000). The team, headed by FBI agent Ali Soufan and sent by retiring FBI manager John O’Neill on his last day with the FBI (see August 22, 2001), had been pulled out of Yemen in June, due to possible threats against it (see June 17, 2001). On the same day as Soufan leaves, the CIA finally tells the FBI some of what it knows about 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, and their attendance at an al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit (see August 21-22, 2001 and August 23, 2001). Soufan had requested information about the Malaysia meeting from the CIA three times (see Late November 2000, April 2001 and July 2001), but the CIA had repeatedly failed to respond to his requests. While in Yemen, Soufan appears not to be aware of the new information provided to the FBI, and learns about the Malaysia summit shortly after the 9/11 attacks (see January 5-8, 2000 and September 12-Late September, 2001). [NEW YORKER, 7/10/2006 ] Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Ali Soufan, John O’Neill, Nawaf Alhazmi, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

August 22, 2001: FBI Headquarters Blocks Notification to Justice Department about Moussaoui Staff at the FBI’s Minneapolis field office form the opinion that there is a “reasonable indication” Zacarias Moussaoui wants to commit a “significant federal crime,” meaning that, under the amended 1995 “wall” procedures (see July 19, 1995 and August 6, 2001), they must inform an attorney at the Justice Department’s Criminal Division about the case. However, Mike Maltbie, an agent with the FBI’s Radical Fundamentalist Unit, blocks the notification. Minneapolis agents Chris Briese and Greg Jones believe that if the Criminal Division were notified, it would then order Minneapolis to seek a criminal warrant to search Moussaoui’s belongings, overcoming opposition to the search being put up by Maltbie and his colleagues (see August 20-September 11, 2001 and August 21, 2001). However, Maltbie prevents the notification from being sent, saying that he does not see any evidence of a federal crime, and that asking for a criminal warrant could unfavorably affect the chances of getting a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), if the criminal application were unsuccessful. He also says that getting a FISA warrant is easier, although two days later he says obtaining a FISA warrant will “take a few months” (see August 24, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 127-8, 143-4 ] Entity Tags: FBI Headquarters, Criminal Division (DoJ), US Department of Justice, Zacarias Moussaoui, Chris Briese, Greg Jones, Michael Maltbie, Radical Fundamentalist Unit Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 22, 2001: FBI Agent on Moussaoui Case Reads Phoenix Memo, Does Nothing with It Rita Flack, an intelligence operations specialist with the FBI’s Radical Fundamentalist Unit, is looking for evidence of ties between Zacarias Moussaoui and a foreign power so the agency can obtain a warrant to search Moussaoui’s belongings (see August 21, 2001). On this day, she comes across the Phoenix memo written by FBI agent Ken Williams (see July 10, 2001) which observed that an unusual number of Islamic radicals are taking aviation training in the US. In the memo, Williams suggested that bin Laden may be coordinating the flight training as part of preparations for a terrorist attack. Flack prints the Phoenix memo. She will later tell the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General that it is her usual practice to read the documents she prints, but she will not recall actually reading the Phoenix memo. She will also say she did not give the memo to anyone else, including colleague Mike Maltbie or the Minneapolis FBI field office. Nor did she discuss it with anyone, she says. After 9/11, she will say that there was nothing in the memo that would have bolstered Moussaoui’s connection to a foreign power, although this will be disputed by three National Security Law Unit attorneys (see August 22-28, 2001). The Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General will state: “We believe she should have at least recognized the relevance of the [memo] and the potential relationship of its theories to the Moussaoui case… We think [Flack] should have brought the Phoenix [memo] to someone’s attention.” [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 145-6, 217-8 ; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 3/1/2006 ] The Senate Judiciary Committee will also later say, “The [Phoenix memo] contained information that was material to the decision whether or not to seek a FISA warrant in the Moussaoui case.” [US CONGRESS, 2/2003] Entity Tags: Ken Williams, FBI Headquarters, Rita Flack, Radical Fundamentalist Unit Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Phoenix Memo

August 22, 2001: US and Pakistan Negotiate to Capture or Kill Bin Laden The Asia Times reports that the US is engaged in “intense negotiations” with Pakistan for assistance in an operation to capture or kill bin Laden. However, despite promised rewards, there is a “very strong lobby within the [Pakistani] army not to assist in any US moves to apprehend bin Laden.” [ASIA TIMES, 8/22/2001] Entity Tags: Pakistan, United States, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI

August 22, 2001: Top FBI Al-Qaeda Expert Leaves FBI in Frustration; Misses Important Warnings

John O’Neill (left) with Dan Coleman at O’Neill’s retirement party on August 22, 2001. [Source: Dan Coleman] Counterterrorism expert John O’Neill retires from the FBI. He says it is partly because of the recent power play against him, but also because of repeated obstruction of his investigations into al-Qaeda. [NEW YORKER, 1/14/2002] In his last act, he signs papers ordering FBI investigators back to Yemen to resume the USS Cole investigation, now that Barbara Bodine is leaving as ambassador (they arrive a couple days before 9/11). He never hears the CIA warning about hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar sent out just one day later. He also apparently is not told about the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui on August 15, 2001 [PBS, 10/3/2002] ; nor does he attend a June meeting when the CIA reveals some of what it knows about Alhazmi and Almihdhar. [PBS FRONTLINE, 10/3/2002] ABC News reporter Chris Isham will later say, “John had heard the alarm bells, too, and we used to talk about it. And he knew that there was a lot of noise out there and that there were a lot of warnings, a lot of red flags, and that it was at a similar level that they were hearing before the millennium, which was an indication that there was something going on. And yet he felt that he was frozen out, that he was not in a capacity to really do anything about it anymore because of his relationship with the FBI. So it was a source of real anguish for him.” [PBS, 10/3/2002] Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi, USS Cole, Zacarias Moussaoui, Walid Arkeh, Ken Williams, Khalid Almihdhar, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Barbara Bodine, Al-Qaeda, Central Intelligence Agency, Chris Isham, John O’Neill Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Late August-September 10, 2001: Hijackers’ San Diego Associates Appear to Have Foreknowledge of Attacks
Osama Awadallah. [Source: Chris Park / Associated Press] Associates of hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar in San Diego reportedly change their behavior and seem to be aware that “something big” is about to happen. But it is not clear how they would have obtained this information. The 9/11 Commission will suggest that there is evidence Alhazmi calls Mohdar Abdullah in late August. Abdullah, a friend of these two hijackers in San Diego, may have been told some about the 9/11 plot back in 2000 and even invited to join in (see Early 2000 and June 10, 2000). He will later brag to someone in prison that he was told of the attack date three weeks in advance (see Early 2000). Both Abdullah and another former associate of the hijackers, Yazeed al-Salmi, suddenly become intent on marrying before 9/11. The 9/11 Commission will quote a witness saying al-Salmi told him, “I knew they were going to do something, that is why I got married.” In addition, employees at the Texaco station where Alhazmi worked (see Autumn 2000) apparently expect that law enforcement authorities will visit them in the near future. Further, according to one witness, early on the morning of September 10, Abdullah, Osama Awadallah, Omar Bakarbashat, and others behave suspiciously at the gas station. The witness will say that after the group meets, Awadallah tells the others, “[I]t is finally going to happen” and they celebrate with high fives. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 219-220, 249-50, 532] Entity Tags: Yazeed al-Salmi, Omar Bakarbashat, Mohdar Abdullah, Osama Awadallah, Nawaf Alhazmi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge, Alhazmi and Almihdhar

August 22, 2001: French Connect Moussaoui to Chechen Rebels, FBI Headquarters Still Refuses Search Warrant

Jean-Louis Bruguiere, who assisted the FBI with the Moussaoui case. [Source: Michel Lipchitz / Associated Press] After arresting Zacarias Moussaoui, the FBI’s Minneapolis field office asks French authorities if they have any information on him. The French then provide the US with intelligence indicating that Moussaoui is associated with a radical militant who died fighting for the Chechen rebels in 2000 (see Late 1999-Late 2000). The French interviewed one of this militant’s associates who said he had been recruited by Moussaoui to fight in Chechnya and described Moussaoui as “the dangerous one.” [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 140-1 ] French authorities attempt to gather additional information by talking to Moussaoui’s mother. Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere, France’s lead investigating magistrate in charge of counterterrorism affairs, also provides information. “Let’s just say that Zacarias Moussaoui was well-known by the French security service…,” Bruguiere later recalls in a 2004 interview with CBC. “When the names come from abroad, we usually have a file, and it was the same with him. He was a well-known personality. He lived in France and then left here to go to England.” Bruguiere will also say that the French provided US authorities with information on Moussaoui’s activities in both France and England (see 1999 and August 21, 2001-September 13, 2001). [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 3/16/2004] Upon reviewing this information, Mike Maltbie of the Radical Fundamentalist Unit at FBI headquarters will inform Minneapolis that it is not enough for a search warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, because, even though the French sent information about Moussaoui, Maltbie objects that the Moussaoui the French are talking about may not be the same one Minneapolis has in custody. The result of this is that FBI staff are sent on what Minneapolis agent Harry Samit will later call a “wild goose chase”—they are asked to spend days poring through French phone books to make sure they have the right Moussaoui. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 8/27/2001 ; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 8/28/2001 ; NEWSDAY, 3/21/2006; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 3/21/2006] For a search warrant to be granted there must be probable cause to believe Moussaoui is an agent of a foreign power. Maltbie claims that the Chechen rebels, who have never been treated as a foreign power before for a FISA warrant, cannot be treated as such, because they are not a “recognized” foreign power, only dissidents engaged in a civil war, and are not hostile to the US. In fact, the FBI has already received information indicating a close relationships between Chechen rebels and bin Laden (see, e.g., 1986-March 19, 2002, August 24, 2001, and (October 1993-November 2001)) and that the two groups are working together on a strike against US interests (see Before April 13, 2001). Maltbie says that even if the Chechen rebels are a foreign power, then it will take some time to develop this information to the point where a FISA application can be submitted. Previous to this, Maltbie had only once advised a field office it was not going to get a FISA warrant. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 141-4 ] The French provide more information on Moussaoui a few days later (see August 30, 2001). Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Michael Maltbie, Harry Samit, France, Jean-Louis Bruguiere, FBI Headquarters, FBI Minnesota field office Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Zacarias Moussaoui, Islamist Militancy in Chechnya

August 22, 2001: CIA Officer Who Already Knows of Almihdhar and Alhazmi’s US Travel Is Informed of it by FBI, Agrees Investigation Should Start After two FBI agents learn that hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi may be in the US (see August 21-22, 2001), they call a meeting with Tom Wilshire, a CIA officer interested in the investigation who is on loan to the FBI. Although all three will later be unable to recall the specifics of the conversation, they agree that it is important to initiate an investigation to locate Almihdhar. However, Wilshire has been aware that Almihdhar has a US visa since January 2000, when he frustrated the passage of such information to the FBI (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000). He is also already aware that Alhazmi entered the US in January 2000 (see May 15, 2001) but again does not share this with the FBI. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 301-2 ] Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Dina Corsi, Tom Wilshire, Khalid Almihdhar, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Margaret Gillespie, Nawaf Alhazmi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

August 22-September 10, 2001: Unclear If Bin Laden Unit Briefs Top CIA Management about Almihdhar’s Presence in US; Unit Chief Knows He Is Likely Attacker

Khalid Almihdhar. [Source: US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division] It is unclear if Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, briefs CIA leaders on information that 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar is in the US. Margaret Gillespie, an FBI analyst detailed to the station, discovers that Almihdhar is in the US on August 21, immediately informs the FBI (see August 21-22, 2001), and places Almihdhar, hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi, and two more associates on the TIPOFF watch list the next day (see August 23, 2001). The CIA also forwards information about al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash to the FBI on August 30 (see August 30, 2001). No Information on Briefings - There is no indication that Richard Blee, the CIA manager responsible for Alec Station, or anyone at Alec Station informs the CIA’s leadership, the White House, or Richard Clarke’s Counterterrorism Security Group (see August 23, 2001) of Almihdhar’s presence in the US and the clear implications of this presence. For example, no such briefing will be mentioned in the 9/11 Commission Report, although the report will mention that CIA Director George Tenet is briefed about Zacarias Moussaoui around the same time, and it does discuss the circulation of the information about Almihdhar at the FBI in detail. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 268-277] The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry will not mention any such briefing, although it will discuss how the FBI handles the information. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 151-4 ] No such briefing will be mentioned in a 2007 book by Tenet, although the book will mention a briefing Tenet receives about Moussaoui. [TENET, 2007, PP. 158-160, 200] The Justice Department inspector general’s report will discuss the FBI’s handling of the information in detail. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 297-313 ] However, the full CIA inspector general’s report about 9/11 will not be made public, and its executive summary will not mention any such briefing. [CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 6/2005, PP. 15-16 ] Alec Station Aware of Threat and Almihdhar - Alec Station, the CIA, and the US intelligence community in general are highly aware that preparations for a large al-Qaeda attack are in the final stages (see Shortly After July 5, 2001, June 28, 2001, and June 28, 2001). Blee is, in fact, the lead briefer within the government about the threats, and has briefed not only his superiors at the CIA, but also National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (see May 30, 2001 and June 28, 2001). He has also recently expressed the belief that the attack will be in the US (see Late July 2001) and has apparently received a series of e-mails in which his former deputy told him Almihdhar may well be involved in the forthcoming attack (see July 5, 2001, July 13, 2001, and July 23, 2001). The information that Almihdhar is in the US therefore confirms Blee’s belief that the attack will be in the US, but it appears Alec Station fails to pass this information on. Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, George J. Tenet, Nawaf Alhazmi, Rich B., Alec Station, Khalid Almihdhar Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

August 22-28, 2001: Phoenix Memo Withheld from FISA Attorneys in Moussaoui Case The FBI’s Minneapolis field office drafts an application for a FISA warrant to search Zacarias Moussaoui’s belongings and sends it to the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters. From there, the application is sent to four attorneys at the FBI’s national security law unit (NSLU), as it needs to be legally cleared by them before being submitted to the FISA court. All four attorneys are doubtful that the application contains enough evidence to secure a warrant. Although they are aware that Moussaoui is connected to Chechen rebels, they do not believe the FISA court will consider the Chechen rebels to be a foreign power. Moreover, they do not think the connection between the Chechens and Osama bin Laden is strong enough to make Moussaoui an agent of al-Qaeda. However, the attorneys are not given the relevant documentation. For example, they are not informed that the FBI was warned in April that the Chechen rebel leader and bin Laden were planning an attack against the US (see Before April 13, 2001). Nor are they provided with a copy of the Phoenix memo, in which Arizona FBI agent Ken Williams correctly theorized that bin Laden was sending agents to the US to train in flight schools (see July 10, 2001). Attorney Sherry Sabol will later say that she asked RFU agents Mike Maltbie and Rita Flack whether there was any evidence of people being sent to the US for flight training. Flack, who read the Phoenix memo five days before (see August 22, 2001), said no. Maltbie will later say he does not recall this, and Flack will deny it. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 139-160 ; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 3/1/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] The Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General will later criticize Flack for failing to inform the attorneys of the memo. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 208 ] Sabol, fellow NSLU attorney Tom Ainora, and another attorney whose name is unknown will say that they would have taken actions to support the application if they had known about the Phoenix memo. However, they do not believe that material from the Phoenix memo would have been enough to secure the FISA warrant. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 146-8, 158-160, 208 ] Entity Tags: Tom Ainora, Sherry Sabol, Office of the Inspector General (DOJ), National Security Law Unit, Michael Maltbie, Radical Fundamentalist Unit, Rita Flack Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Phoenix Memo, Zacarias Moussaoui

August 23, 2001: FBI Headquarters Gives New York Field Office Heads Up Over Hijacker Almihdhar, but Investigation Is Not Considered Urgent FBI headquarters agent Dina Corsi, who has discovered hijacker Khalid Almihdhar is in the country (see August 21-22, 2001), contacts the FBI’s New York field office to give it a heads up that information about Almihdhar will soon be passed to it, and it will be asked to search for him. Corsi does not usually call in advance of sending notification, but she thinks that the situation is urgent in this case, as they need to locate Almihdhar, who is watchlisted at this time (see August 23, 2001), before he leaves the US. However, when she sends written notification (see August 28, 2001), it only has “routine” precedence, the lowest level. When asked about the discrepancy after 9/11, Corsi will say that this case was “no bigger” than any other case. I-49 squad supervisor Jack Cloonan and another FBI supervisor will later also say they recognized there was some urgency to the Almihdhar investigation, but the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General will comment: “Yet, the FBI in New York did not treat it like an urgent matter.” [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 303-5, 354 ] Entity Tags: I-49, Dina Corsi, FBI New York Field Office, Jack Cloonan, FBI Headquarters, Khalid Almihdhar, Usama bin Laden Unit (FBI) Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

August 23, 2001: FBI Manager Informed of Hunt for Almihdhar, Realizes Seriousness of Situation Dina Corsi, an FBI agent in the bureau’s bin Laden unit, informs her boss, bin Laden unit supervisor Rodney Middleton, that 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar is in the US. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 303 ] Middleton will later recall his reaction to the news as an “‘Oh sh_t’ moment.” [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 52 ] He reviews the information Corsi presents to him and agrees with her that an intelligence investigation should be opened in New York to find Almihdhar. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 303 ] Entity Tags: Dina Corsi, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Rod Middleton, Usama bin Laden Unit (FBI), FBI Headquarters Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

August 23, 2001: Mossad Reportedly Gives CIA List of Terrorists Living in US; at Least Four 9/11 Hijackers Named According to German newspapers, the Mossad gives the CIA a list of 19 terrorists living in the US and say that they appear to be planning to carry out an attack in the near future. It is unknown if these are the 19 9/11 hijackers or if the number is a coincidence. However, four names on the list are known, and these four will be 9/11 hijackers: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, and Mohamed Atta. [DIE ZEIT (HAMBURG), 10/1/2002; DER SPIEGEL (HAMBURG), 10/1/2002; BBC, 10/2/2002; HA'ARETZ, 10/3/2002] The Mossad appears to have learned about this through its “art student spy ring.” Yet apparently, this warning and list are not treated as particularly urgent by the CIA and the information is not passed on to the FBI. It is unclear whether this warning influenced the decision to add Alhazmi and Almihdhar to a terrorism watch list on this same day, and if so, why only those two. [DER SPIEGEL (HAMBURG), 10/1/2002] Israel has denied that there were any Mossad agents in the US. [HA'ARETZ, 10/3/2002] Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi, Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, “Israeli art students”, Khalid Almihdhar, Israel Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks (Mossad) Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Israel, Warning Signs, Foreign Intelligence Warnings, Key Warnings, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

August 23, 2001: FBI Field Agent Tells FBI Headquarters Search for Almihdhar Should Be Criminal, Not Intelligence Investigation After being alerted to the fact hijacker Khalid Almihdhar is in the US, FBI agent Craig Donnachie says that the FBI should look for him under a criminal investigation, not an intelligence investigation. Donnachie, an intelligence agent at the FBI’s New York field office, is contacted by headquarters agent Dina Corsi, who says that the search for Almihdhar should be an intelligence investigation because the case is partially based on information from the NSA. Donnachie, however, tells her that the attempt to locate Almihdhar is related to the criminal investigation into the bombing of the USS Cole and would normally be handled as a sub-file of the main investigation, not a separate investigation. The case will later be opened as an intelligence investigation, meaning fewer resources can be devoted to it (see August 29, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 304 ] Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Usama bin Laden Unit (FBI), I-49, FBI Headquarters, FBI New York Field Office, Dina Corsi, Craig Donnachie Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

August 23, 2001: Former FBI Al-Qaeda Expert Begins Job as Head of Security at the WTC John O’Neill begins his new job as head of security at the WTC. O’Neill had been the special agent in charge of the FBI’s National Security Division in New York, and was the bureau’s top expert on al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. [NEW YORK MAGAZINE, 12/17/2001; NEW YORKER, 1/14/2002] He’d left his job with the FBI just the day before (see August 22, 2001). His friend Jerome Hauer, who is the former head of New York’s Office of Emergency Management, had found him the job at the World Trade Center. Developer Larry Silverstein, who recently took over the lease of the WTC (see July 24, 2001), had been highly impressed with O’Neill but insisted he start in the post no later than the first week of September, when his firm Silverstein Properties is set to assume control of the buildings. O’Neill had agreed to this. [WEISS, 2003, PP. 336-338, 345-346 AND 349-351] After hearing that O’Neill has got this job, Chris Isham, a senior producer at ABC News who is a close friend, says to him, “Well, that will be an easy job. They’re not going to bomb that place again.” O’Neill replies, “Well actually they’ve always wanted to finish that job. I think they’re going to try again.” [PBS FRONTLINE, 5/31/2002] After a few days as the WTC security director, O’Neill will move into his new office on the 34th floor of the South Tower. [WEISS, 2003, PP. 353-354 AND 366] Entity Tags: John O’Neill, Jerry Hauer, Larry Silverstein, Chris Isham, World Trade Center Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

August 23, 2001: Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Are Finally Added to Terrorist Watch List

The CIA cable watchlisting Alhazmi, Almihdhar, and two others (the sections mentioning Shakir and bin Attash are blacked out). [Source: FBI] (click image to enlarge) Thanks to the request of Margaret Gillespie, an FBI analyst assigned to the CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center, the CIA sends a cable to the State Department, INS, Customs Service, and FBI requesting that “bin Laden-related individuals” Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, and Salah Saeed Mohammed bin Yousaf (an alias for Khallad bin Attash) be put on the terrorism watch list. All four individuals had attended the January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia. The cable mostly focuses on Almihdhar, briefly outlining his attendance at the Malaysia summit (see January 5-8, 2000) and his subsequent travel to the US in January 2000 and July 2001. Since March 2000, if not earlier, the CIA has had good reason to believe Alhazmi and Almihdhar were al-Qaeda operatives living in the US, but apparently did nothing and told no other agency about it until now. The hijackers are not located in time, and both die in the 9/11 attacks. FBI agents later state that if they been told about Alhazmi and Almihdhar sooner, “There’s no question we could have tied all 19 hijackers together” given the frequent contact between these two and the other hijackers. [NEWSWEEK, 6/2/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 538; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 32-36, 302] However, in what the Washington Post calls a “critical omission,” the FAA, the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and the FBI’s Financial Review Group are not notified. The two latter organizations have the power to tap into private credit card and bank data, and claim they could have readily found Alhazmi and Almihdhar, given the frequency the two used credit cards. [WASHINGTON POST, 7/25/2003] Furthermore, counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke and his Counterterrorism Security Group are not told about these two operatives before 9/11 either. [NEWSWEEK, 3/24/2004] The CIA later claims the request was labeled “immediate,” the second most urgent category (the highest is reserved for things like declarations of war). [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 10/28/2001] The FBI denies that it was marked “immediate” and other agencies treated the request as a routine matter. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 10/18/2001; US CONGRESS, 9/20/2002] The State Department places all four men on the watch list the next day. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 ] However, this watch list, named TIPOFF, checks their names only if they use international flights. There is another watch list barring suspected terrorists from flying domestically. On 9/11, it contains only 12 names, including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and other al-Qaeda figures, and some names are added as late as August 28, 2001. But none of these four men are added to this domestic list before 9/11.(see April 24, 2000). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004] Entity Tags: TIPOFF, Khalid Almihdhar, Margaret Gillespie, Richard A. Clarke, Immigration and Naturalization Service, US Department of State, US Customs Service, Tawfiq bin Attash, Nawaf Alhazmi, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Federal Aviation Administration, Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, Central Intelligence Agency, Counterterrorism and Security Group, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, US Air Security, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

August 23, 2001: FBI Agents Visit Moussaoui’s Former Flight School; Fail to Make Connections Two agents from the Oklahoma City FBI office visit Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma, to learn about Zacarias Moussaoui’s training there earlier in the year. One of these agents had visited the same school in September 1999 to learn more about Ihab Ali, an al-Qaeda agent who trained there in 1993. Apparently, this agent forgets the connection when he visits the school to look into Moussaoui. He later admits he should have connected the two cases. [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/18/2001; US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 322] The staff director of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry later states, “No one will ever know whether a greater focus on the connection between these events would have led to the unraveling of the September 11 plot.” [NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, 9/25/2002] The Oklahoma City office also does not connect Moussaoui to a memo that had come from its office in May 1998 warning that “large numbers of Middle Eastern males” were receiving flight training in Oklahoma and could be planning terrorist attacks (see May 15, 1998). Furthermore, Moussaoui’s Oklahoma roommate Hussein al-Attas is also under suspicion at this time (see August 16, 2001). One of the people who attempted to post bond for al-Attas, William Webb, had previously been the subject of an extensive investigation by the same Oklahoma City FBI office. Webb is a member of the extremist group the Muslim Brotherhood and is also Vice President of Overseas Operations and Recruiting for the Palestinian group Fatah. Further, Webb is connected to Anwar Al Aulaqi, an imam who has frequent ties with some of the 9/11 hijackers and is suspected of involvement in the 9/11 plot (see March 2001 and After). Al Aulaqi was the subject of an FBI counterterrorism inquiry the year before (see June 1999-March 2000). These connections are also not noticed. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 322; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 134-5 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] Entity Tags: William Webb, Ihab Ali, FBI Minnesota field office, FBI Oklahoma City field office, Airman Flight School, Hussein al-Attas, Zacarias Moussaoui Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 23, 2001: CIA Director Tenet Told of Moussaoui, but Does Not Inform White House and Takes No Action CIA Director George Tenet and senior CIA senior staff are briefed repeatedly about the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui. When news of the case first reaches the CIA, Tenet is absent and his deputy John McLaughlin is briefed, probably around August 20, 2001. [9/11 COMMISSION, 4/13/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 541] Series of Briefings - Tenet is informed of Moussaoui on August 23 in a briefing entitled “Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly.” The briefing states that Moussaoui paid for his training in cash, was interested to learn a plane’s doors do not open in flight, and wanted training on London to New York City flights. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DISTRICT, 7/31/2006 ] At the same time Tenet is briefed on a number of other items, including the arrest of one of Moussaoui’s associates, Djamel Beghal (see July 24 or 28, 2001), and a group of Pakistanis arrested in Bolivia during preparations for a hijacking. [TENET, 2007, PP. 200] Tenet and other CIA officials are then kept up to date with developments in the case in a series of at least five briefings. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] No Discussion with Other Agencies - However, others such as President Bush and the White House Counterterrorism Support Group (CSG) are not told about Moussaoui until after the 9/11 attacks begin (see August 16-September 10, 2001). Even the acting director of the FBI is not told (see August 16-September 10, 2001), despite the fact that lower level FBI officials who made the arrest tried to pass on the information. Tenet later maintains that there was no reason to alert President Bush or to share information about Moussaoui during an early September 2001 Cabinet-level meeting on terrorism, saying, “All I can tell you is, it wasn’t the appropriate place. I just can’t take you any farther than that.” [WASHINGTON POST, 4/17/2004; US DISTRICT COURT OF EASTERN VIRGINIA, 5/4/2006, PP. 6 ] 'Lousy Explanation' - 9/11 Commissioner Tim Roemer will later come to the conclusion that this is, in author Philip Shenon’s words, a “lousy explanation,” and that Tenet should have called Acting FBI Director Thomas Pickard to talk about the case, because Tenet was well aware that the FBI was “dysfunctional” at terrorism investigations and that it did not have a permanent director at that time. Roemer will ask, “The report about Moussaoui shoots up the chain of command at the CIA like the lit fuse on a bomb, but Director Tenet never picks up the phone to call the FBI about it?” Roemer will conclude that a call from Tenet to Pickard might have prevented 9/11, and will be amazed Tenet does not mention it at the September terrorism meeting, “If the system is blinking red, why don’t you bring it up?” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 361] Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, John E. McLaughlin, Central Intelligence Agency, Zacarias Moussaoui, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 23, 2001: FBI Agent Discusses Opening of Intelligence Investigation with CIA Officer, Notes Almihdhar Has Stronger Link to USS Cole Bombing FBI headquarters agent Dina Corsi writes to Tom Wilshire, a CIA manager detailed to the FBI, and tells him that the search for hijacker Khalid Almihdhar will be conducted as an intelligence investigation (see August 23, 2001 and August 29, 2001). She also says that she is surer now that Almihdhar is connected to the bombing of the USS Cole, writing, “I am still looking at intel, but I think we have more of a definitive connection to the Cole here than we thought.” Even though Corsi thinks Almihdhar is tied to the Cole bombing, she will oppose the search for him being conducted as part of the criminal investigation and insist that it be part of an intelligence investigation (see August 28, 2001 and August 28, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 304 ] Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, FBI Headquarters, Tom Wilshire, Dina Corsi, Usama bin Laden Unit (FBI) Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

August 23, 2001-April 2004: Owner of Flight School Attended by Two 9/11 Hijackers Faces Numerous Legal Suits Rudi Dekkers, owner of Huffman Aviation—the Venice, Florida flight school attended by Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi—faces a series of legal suits. On August 23, 2001, a former female employee initiates a suit to enforce the settlement of a charge of “severe” sexual harassment by Dekkers. Huffman Aviation earlier agreed to pay her $15,000 in return for her not suing them. [CHARLOTTE SUN, 10/3/2001; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/25/2004] In August 2002, Dekkers’ former business partner Wally Hilliard files a suit, claiming Dekkers has failed to repay several loans, including one for $1.7 million, and also owes money for Huffman stock he sold him. [VENICE GONDOLIER SUN, 8/24/2002] In January 2003, the state attorney’s office files criminal fraud charges against Dekkers for securing a loan of $200,000 with a mortgage on property his company had no legal interest in. The suit could result in a five-year prison sentence, but is later dismissed. [VENICE GONDOLIER SUN, 1/18/2003; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1/22/2003; VENICE GONDOLIER SUN, 1/25/2003; VENICE GONDOLIER SUN, 12/6/2003] And in April 2004, along with Hilliard, he is accused of making as many as 26 unauthorized passenger flights during 1999, and faces a fine of up to $286,000. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 4/14/2004] In July 2004, the St. Petersburg Times will comment that Dekkers “continues to drive expensive vehicles and live in a million-dollar waterfront home, even though a Naples lawyer had ‘to chase him around’ to get him to pay a $359 judgment.” Even before 2001, Dekkers had a history of troubled businesses and being the subject of legal suits. In spite of this, following 9/11 he becomes a much sought-after figure by the media, later remarking, “I’m always on television somewhere.” He is even invited to testify before Congress regarding the two hijackers’ attendance at his flight school. [US CONGRESS, 3/19/2002; VENICE GONDOLIER SUN, 8/24/2002; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/25/2004] Entity Tags: Wally Hilliard, Rudi Dekkers Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training

August 23-27, 2001: Minnesota FBI Agents ‘Absolutely Convinced’ Moussaoui Plans to Hijack Plane; They Are Undermined by FBI Headquarters

Zacarias Moussaoui’s laptop, not opened until after 9/11. [Source: FBI] In the wake of the French intelligence report (see August 22, 2001) on Zacarias Moussaoui, FBI agents in Minneapolis, Minnesota, are “in a frenzy” and “absolutely convinced he [is] planning to do something with a plane.” Agent Greg Jones tells FBI headquarters that Moussaoui might “fly something into the World Trade Center.” [NEWSWEEK, 5/20/2002; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 153 ] Minneapolis FBI agents become “desperate to search the computer lap top” and “conduct a more thorough search of his personal effects,” especially since Moussaoui acted as if he was hiding something important in the laptop when arrested. [TIME, 5/21/2002; TIME, 5/27/2002] As the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters has already blocked an application for a criminal warrant (see August 21, 2001), the FBI’s Minneapolis field office must apply for one under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Minneapolis agent Harry Samit completes an application for a warrant to search Moussaoui’s belongings on August 25. To obtain the warrant, he has to show there is probable cause to believe Moussaoui is an agent of a foreign power. The memo states that Moussaoui recruited a fighter for a particular Chechen rebel group connected to al-Qaeda, so he is connected to al-Qaeda through the Chechens. However, the RFU at FBI headquarters believes that the Chechen rebels should not be described as a foreign power and that the link between the Chechens and bin Laden is not strong enough. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 128-132 ; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 3/1/2006 ] However, earlier in 2001 the FBI had received information indicating that this Chechen group and bin Laden were planning to attack US interests (see Before April 13, 2001). Minneapolis FBI agent Coleen Rowley later sums up how the Minneapolis agents feel at this point, when she says FBI headquarters “almost inexplicably, throw up roadblocks” and undermine their efforts. Headquarters personnel bring up “almost ridiculous questions in their apparent efforts to undermine the probable cause.” One of Jones’ e-mails to FBI headquarters says they are “setting this up for failure.” That turns out to be correct. [TIME, 5/21/2002; TIME, 5/27/2002; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 161 ] Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Zacarias Moussaoui, Harry Samit, Radical Fundamentalist Unit, FBI Headquarters, FBI Minnesota field office, Greg Jones, Coleen Rowley, Clinton administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Zacarias Moussaoui, Key Warnings

(August 23-September 10, 2001): Flight 77 Hijackers Stay at Valencia Motel

The Valencia Motel. [Source: PBS NOVA] From September 2 (or August 23, according to some reports) until the day before the attacks, five of the hijackers stay in Room 343 at the rundown Valencia Motel in Laurel, Maryland. The five men—Khalid Almihdhar, Majed Moqed, Nawaf Alhazmi, Salem Alhazmi, and Hani Hanjour—are later identified as the hijackers of Flight 77. Their suite has only one bedroom, with two double beds. Reportedly, they all leave it at 10 each morning and go out for the day in an old Toyota Corolla with California license plates. The motel’s manager later will state that only two men rented the room for one week, paying $308 for it with a credit card, though several long-term motel residents will remember a larger group. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/19/2001; BALTIMORE SUN, 9/20/2001; CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 9/23/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001; WASHINGTON CITY PAPER, 9/28/2001; COX NEWS SERVICE, 10/15/2001] During their time at the motel the five men show up several times at a nearby gym (see May 6-September 6, 2001). However, there are conflicting accounts that Almihdhar, Hanjour, and Nawaf Alhazmi stayed in San Diego until about September 9 (see Early September 2001). Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi, Majed Moqed, Salem Alhazmi, Hani Hanjour, Khalid Almihdhar Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Hani Hanjour, Other 9/11 Hijackers

August 24, 2001: CIA Manager Requests Information about Moussaoui Case, Makes Disparaging Reference to Minneapolis Field Office Tom Wilshire, a CIA manager detailed to the FBI (see May 2001), writes to Dave Frasca, head of the FBI’s radical fundamentalist unit, to obtain information about the progress of the case of Zacarias Moussaoui. Moussaoui was arrested by the FBI’s Minneapolis field office, which Wilshire refers to as the “Minneapolis Airplane IV crowd.” Presumably, this is a reference to the films Airplane and Airplane II, which were parodies of disaster and sci-fi movies. He asks whether leads have been sent out to obtain additional biographical information and whether the FBI has photographs it can provide the CIA. He receives a reply from one of Frasca’s subordinates telling him there are no indications Moussaoui has plans for nefarious activity (see August 24, 2001). [BBC, 3/13/2001; BBC, 3/13/2001; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 151 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, David Frasca, Zacarias Moussaoui, Central Intelligence Agency, Tom Wilshire Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 24, 2001: Foreign Intelligence Warns US of Al-Qaeda Plot to Attack within US The 9/11 Commission later will note that at this time, an unnamed foreign intelligence “service report[s] that [al-Qaeda deputy leader] Abu Zubaida [is] considering mounting terrorist attacks in the United States, after postponing possible operations in Europe. No targets, timing or method of attack [are] provided.” Newsweek will suggest that most or all of this information may have come from a US debriefing of al-Qaeda bomber Ahmed Ressam in May 2001 (see May 30, 2001). Newsweek will note that it is a common occurrence for foreign intelligence agencies to “simply rereport to the CIA what it had originally learned from the FBI through separate channels.” Still, even “the multiple channels for Ressam’s warnings [do] little to change thinking within the FBI or CIA…” [NEWSWEEK, 4/28/2005; US DISTRICT COURT OF EASTERN VIRGINIA, 5/4/2006, PP. 6 ] However, it is possible the information could be more than a mirror of what Ressam said, since a number of Western intelligence agencies are monitoring Zubaida’s phone calls before 9/11 (see October 1998 and After). Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Al-Qaeda, Abu Zubaida, 9/11 Commission, Ahmed Ressam, Central Intelligence Agency Category Tags: Warning Signs, Millennium Bomb Plots, Abu Zubaida

August 24, 2001: CIA Officer Detailed to FBI Asked to Help with Moussaoui Warrant After the CIA sends the FBI information it thinks is sufficient for a warrant to search Zacarias Moussaoui’s belongings (see August 24, 2001), the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC) sends the same information to a CIA representative to the FBI and asks him to help arrange a search warrant. The representative is not named, but it may be Tom Wilshire (see May 2001), a CIA officer assigned to the FBI who requests information about Moussaoui on this day (see August 24, 2001). The CTC officer writes: “No one in the FBI seems to have latched on to this. Perhaps you can educate them on Moussaoui. This may be all they need to open a FISA on Moussaoui.” [TENET, 2007, PP. 202] Entity Tags: Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency, Tom Wilshire, Zacarias Moussaoui, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 24, 2001: CIA Backs Minneapolis’ Request for Search Warrant After being contacted by FBI headquarters (see (August 20, 2001)) and the local Minneapolis field office (see August 24, 2001), the CIA offers an opinion on the Moussaoui case. In response to French information linking Moussaoui to the Chechen rebels (see August 22, 2001), a CIA officer tells Minneapolis agent Harry Samit that this is “highly interesting,” adding, “[I] am not sure why this is not enough to firmly link Moussaoui to a terrorist group—Ibn Al-Khattab is well known to be the leader of the Chechen mujaheddin movement and to be a close buddy with bin Laden from their earlier fighting days. From a read of the [French] info, Moussaoui is a recruiter for Khattab. I can confirm from our own info that in fact the dead guy [Masooud Al-Benin] in fact was a fighter for Khattab who perished in Chechnya in April 2000” (see Late 1999-Late 2000). In a document submitted to court, the CIA officer will state “[T]he connection between Ibn Khattab and Osama bin Laden had been known for years at the CIA… it was crystal clear that Khattab and [bin Laden] were intricately tied together and they had clearly shared funding operations and training… it was no leap of faith to connect Khattab to [bin Laden] and there was lots of information connecting the two groups… the FBI informed [me] that French information discerned that Moussaoui had recruited for Khattab, clearly establishing his connection to Khattab, and thereby his connection to [bin Laden].” However, FBI headquarters, which is aware that bin Laden and the Chechen rebel leader are plotting together against the US (see, e.g., Before April 13, 2001), will refuse to apply for a search warrant for Moussaoui’s belongings, saying that the connections between Moussaoui and the Chechen rebels, and the Chechen rebels and bin Laden are not strong enough to justify one (see August 20-September 11, 2001 and August 28, 2001). [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] Entity Tags: Harry Samit, Central Intelligence Agency, FBI Minnesota field office, Ibn Khattab Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

After August 23, 2001: US Intelligence Again Fails to Connect Al-Qaeda Leader to Alias When the US intelligence community watchlists the alias Salah Saeed Mohammed bin Yousaf, which is used by al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash (see August 23, 2001), it fails to realize that “bin Yousaf” is really bin Attash, who is known to be one of the masterminds of the USS Cole bombing (see Late October-Late November 2000 and November 22-December 16, 2000). The CIA knows that both bin Attash and “Salah Saeed Mohammed bin Yousaf” were in Malaysia with 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi in January 2000 (see January 5-8, 2000, January 8, 2000, and January 4, 2001). Furthermore, the CIA has a photo of bin Attash provided by the Yemeni government, and surveillance photos and video of bin Attash with Alhazmi and Almihdhar at an al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000 and Shortly After and January 5, 2000). And when bin Attash applied for a US visa, he used the “bin Yousaf” alias (see April 3, 1999), so presumably a comparison of his photo from that application with other photos would reveal that “bin Yousaf” and bin Attash are one and the same person. However, apparently no check is made for any US visa of “bin Yousaf,” even after he is watchlisted to prevent him from coming into the US, which would require a visa. Had a check been made, it would have been discovered that he applied for a visa at the same time as both Almihdhar and Alhazmi (see April 3-7, 1999), the very people who have been watchlisted together with him. Presumably, discovering that Alhazmi and Almihdhar had applied for US visas with one of the Cole masterminds would have greatly increased the urgency of finding them. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 538; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 248, 300-3 ] The US missed other opportunities to learn more about this alias (see After January 8, 2000 and After December 16, 2000). Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Tawfiq bin Attash Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

August 24, 2001: FBI Agent Tells CIA ‘No Indication’ Moussaoui Is Planning Nefarious Activity, Despite Knowing Evidence Otherwise Mike Maltbie, a supervisory special agent with the Radical Fundamentalist Unit at FBI headquarters, writes to a CIA manager stationed with the FBI as a consultant about the case of Zacarias Moussaoui and Hussein al-Attas. He tells the manager what actions the FBI has taken on the case and concludes by saying, “Please bear in mind that there is no indication that either of these two had plans for nefarious activity as was apparently indicated in an earlier communication.” The word “no” is underlined. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 151 ] However, the FBI’s field office in Minneapolis suspects Moussaoui is part of a wider plot to hijack airliners and Maltbie is aware of their concerns (see August 15-20, 2001). Entity Tags: Radical Fundamentalist Unit, Central Intelligence Agency, FBI Headquarters, Zacarias Moussaoui, Hussein al-Attas, Michael Maltbie Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 24, 2001: FBI Headquarters Tells Minneapolis Moussaoui Warrant Will ‘Take a Few Months’ Mike Maltbie of the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters tells Greg Jones of the FBI’s Minneapolis field office that obtaining a search warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Act (FISA) for Zacarias Moussaoui’s belongings could “take a few months” because there are “hundreds of these FISA requests.” (FISA warrants can actually be obtained in a matter of hours if needed, and can even be approved retroactively) Maltbie tells Jones that the situation is not an emergency, as he believes an act of terrorism is not imminent in this case, but that Minneapolis can write a letterhead memorandum for FBI headquarters about the case. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 48, 53, 148-9 ; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 3/1/2006 ] Entity Tags: Greg Jones, FBI Headquarters, Michael Maltbie, FBI Minnesota field office, Radical Fundamentalist Unit Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 24, 2001: Frustrated Minnesota FBI Asks CIA for Help with Moussaoui Case Frustrated with the lack of response from FBI headquarters about Zacarias Moussaoui, the Minnesota FBI contacts an FBI agent working with the CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center, and asks for help. [US CONGRESS, 10/17/2002] On this day, the CIA sends a cable to stations and bases overseas requesting information about Moussaoui. The cable is titled, “Subjects Involved in Suspicious 747 Flight Training.” The cable says that the FBI is investigating Moussaoui for possible involvement in the planning of a terrorist attack and mentions his efforts to obtain flight training. It also suggests he might be “involved in a larger plot to target airlines traveling from Europe to the US” [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 540] It calls him a “suspect 747 airline attacker” and a “suspect airline suicide hijacker” —showing that the form of the 9/11 attack is not a surprise, at least to the CIA. [US CONGRESS, 10/17/2002] FBI headquarters responds by chastising the Minnesota FBI for notifying the CIA without approval. [TIME, 5/21/2002] Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Central Intelligence Agency, FBI Minnesota field office, FBI Headquarters, Counterterrorist Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

(Shortly After August 23, 2001): Top FBI Official Possibly Notified of Search for Hijacker Almihdhar After 9/11, no clear evidence that any of the FBI’s top managers are informed of the search for hijacker Khalid Almihdhar will be uncovered and the 9/11 Commission will comment, “It appears that no one informed higher levels of management in either the FBI or CIA about the case.” However, the Commission will also note that “one witness recalls a discussion with a senior FBI official, that official denies that a discussion took place. The other alleged participant does not recall such a meeting.” The list of sources that follows this passage indicates that the senior official is International Terrorism Operations Section chief Michael Rolince, who is also informed of the Moussaoui case around this time, but will attempt to play down his knowledge of it (see Late August 2001 and March 21, 2006), and the other participants are two of the following: FBI headquarters agent Dina Corsi, CIA officer Tom Wilshire, and acting head of the FBI’s bin Laden unit Rod Middleton. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 270, 538] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Dina Corsi, Michael Rolince, Rod Middleton, Tom Wilshire, 9/11 Commission Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

Late August-Early September 2001: Hijacker Atta Receives Money from Egypt Mohamed Atta receives two wire transfers from Egypt through a small Florida money-wiring business. [TIME, 10/1/2001] These transfers are not mentioned by the 9/11 Commission. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004 ] Atta, an Egyptian, was in contact with his family in Cairo, Egypt, about once a month while he was in the US, although his father subsequently claimed not to know he was there (see September 19, 2001). Atta celebrates his birthday roughly around this time, on August 27 (8 Jumada al-Thani 1388 A.H.) or September 1, depending on whether he was going be the Muslim or Western calendar. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DISTRICT, 7/31/2006 ; RABIAH (.COM), 12/3/2006] Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta

Late August-Early September 2001: FBI Fails to Ask Failed Millennium Bomber to Identify Moussaoui The FBI fails to ask Ahmed Ressam, an al-Qaeda operative arrested during the Millennium alert (see December 14, 1999), whether he can identify Zacarias Moussaoui. Agents in Seattle holding Ressam receive a general notification about the Moussaoui case, but it lacks urgency and they do not follow up on it with Ressam (see September 4, 2001). When asked shortly after 9/11, Ressam will say he recognizes Moussaoui from al-Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan. The 9/11 Commission will conclude that had Ressam been shown photos of Moussaoui and identified him before 9/11, the FBI would have been able to search his belongings. The belongings contain enough information to potentially prevent 9/11 (see August 16, 2001). The FBI also fails to ask Ressam whether he recognizes Khalid Almihdhar at this time, although Ressam has never met Almihdhar and will not identify him after 9/11 (see August 21, 2001). [SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), 2/3/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 275-6, 541] Entity Tags: Ahmed Ressam, FBI Headquarters, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Zacarias Moussaoui Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 25, 2001: 9/11 Facilitator Obtains Credit Card for KSM A supplemental Visa credit card on a “Mustafa al-Hawsawi” bank account is issued in the name of Abdulrahman A. A. al-Ghamdi, which the FBI says is an alias for Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM). The FBI believes this helps prove KSM is a superior to 9/11 facilitator al-Hawsawi (see July 23, 2001). [HOUSTON CHRONICLE, 6/5/2002; US CONGRESS, 9/26/2002] Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Mustafa al-Hawsawi, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Abdulrahman A. A. al-Ghamdi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

August 25, 2001: Bin Laden Publicly Hints at Attack on US Bin Laden gives an interview to Middle Eastern television. According to ABC News, “When asked about his supporters, he says with a significant and knowing smile there is going to be a surprise to the United States.” [ABC NEWS, 9/14/2001] Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Warning Signs, Key Warnings

August 25-September 5, 2001: Hijackers Spend Over $30,000 on 9/11 Tickets All the hijackers book their flights for 9/11, using their apparent real names. The total cost of the tickets is in excess of $30,000: August 25: Khalid Almihdhar, who was watchlisted two days previously (see August 23, 2001), and Majed Moqed book tickets for American Airlines flight 77 using the AA.com website. They are collected from the American Airlines ticket counter at Baltimore Washington International Airport on September 5. The tickets were not mailed, because the shipping address did not match the credit card address. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 72, 74 ] August 26: Wail Alshehri buys a ticket for American Airlines flight 11 over the phone with his debit card. His brother Waleed buys a ticket for the same flight at the AA.com website using his debit card. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 72 ] August 27: Nawaf Alhazmi, who was watchlisted four days before (see August 23, 2001), buys tickets for himself and his brother Salem for American Airlines flight 77 through Travelocity from a Kinkos computer in Laurel, Maryland, using his debit card (see August 25-27, 2001). [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 72 ] August 27: Saeed Alghamdi uses his debit card to purchase tickets for United Airlines flight 93 for himself and Ahmed Alnami from the UA.com website. The tickets are not paid for until September 5, 2001, due to a problem with the debit card. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 72 ] August 27: Fayez Ahmed Banihammad uses his visa card to purchase tickets for himself and Mohamed Alshehri for United Airlines flight 175 over the telephone. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 72-73 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] August 28: Mohamed Atta uses his debit card to buy tickets for American Airlines flight 11 for himself and Abdulaziz Alomari from the AA.com website. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] August 28: Waleed Alshehri purchases a ticket for Satam Al Suqami for American Airlines flight 11 in person from the company’s counter at Fort Lauderdale Airport. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 73 ] August 28: Marwan Alshehhi purchases a ticket for United Airlines flight 175 from the company’s counter at Miami International Airport. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 73 ] August 29: Hamza Alghamdi books tickets for himself and Ahmed Alghamdi for United Airlines flight 175 from the UA.com website. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] August 29: Ahmed Alhaznawi creates a new e-mail account and Travelocity.com account and uses them to book a ticket for himself on United Airlines flight 93. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 74 ] August 30: Ziad Jarrah purchases a ticket for himself for United Airlines flight 93 from the UA website. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] August 31: Hani Hanjour purchases a ticket for American Airlines flight 77 from ATS Advanced Travel Services in Totowa, New Jersey, paying in cash. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] At least five tickets are one way only. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/18/2001] There are numerous connections between the hijackers booked on the four flights by this point: Hijackers on different 9/11 flights arrived in the US on the same plane. For example, Salem Alhazmi (Flight 77) arrived with Abdulaziz Alomari (Flight 11), and Fayez Ahmed Banihammad (Flight 175) arrived with Saeed Alghamdi (Flight 93) (see April 23-June 29, 2001); Two of the pilots, Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi, train and live together, and have a joint bank account (see (Mid-July 2000 - Early January 2001), July 6-December 19, 2000, and June 28-July 7, 2000); Hijackers from different planes open bank accounts together (see May 1-July 18, 2001 and June 27-August 23, 2001); and The hijackers obtain identity documents together (see April 12-September 7, 2001 and August 1-2, 2001). Six hijackers also provide the same phone number and three use the same address. [MIAMI HERALD, 9/22/2001] Entity Tags: Ahmed Alnami, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Hamza Alghamdi, Khalid Almihdhar, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Hani Hanjour, Marwan Alshehhi, Majed Moqed, Ahmed Alghamdi, Wail Alshehri, Mohamed Atta, Ziad Jarrah, Waleed M. Alshehri, Abdulaziz Alomari, Satam Al Suqami, Nawaf Alhazmi, Salem Alhazmi, Mohand Alshehri, Saeed Alghamdi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Hani Hanjour, Ziad Jarrah, Other 9/11 Hijackers

August 25-27, 2001: Alhazmi and Almihdhar Buy 9/11 Plane Tickets Despite Presence on Watch List Hijacker Khalid Almihdhar buys his 9/11 plane ticket on-line using a credit card; hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi does the same two days later, and also buys a ticket for his brother Salem (see August 25-September 5, 2001). Both men were put on a terrorist watch list on August 23 (see August 23, 2001), but the watch list only means they will be stopped if trying to enter or leave the US. There is another watch list that applies to domestic flights that some of their associates are on, but they are only placed on the international watch list (see April 24, 2000). Procedures are in place for law enforcement agencies to share watch list information with airlines and airports and such sharing is common, but the FAA and the airlines are not notified about this case, so the purchases raise no red flags. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/20/2001; US CONGRESS, 9/26/2002] An official later states that had the FAA been properly warned, “they should have been picked up in the reservation process.” [WASHINGTON POST, 10/2/2002] On September 4 and 5, 2001, an FBI agent will attempt to find Alhazmi and Almihdhar in the US, but will fail to conduct a simple credit card check that should have revealed these purchases (see September 4-5, 2001). Entity Tags: Salem Alhazmi, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

Late August 2001: Future Alleged Ricin Plotter Arrested in Netherlands, but Released Mohammed Meguerba, a radical Islamist who will later confess to being part of a ricin plot under torture in Algeria (see September 18, 2002-January 3, 2003), is arrested at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. He is stopped because police realize he is using a false passport, and is held for six months. He will make five asylum appeals, but they are all rejected. According to authors Sean O’Neill and Daniel McGrory, he is then “suddenly released” in February 2002, and travels to Paris, continuing to Italy and then Britain. [O'NEILL AND MCGRORY, 2006, PP. 243] Entity Tags: Mohammed Meguerba Category Tags: Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism

Between August 26 and September 9, 2001: Hijacker Leaves Clues behind at Florida Motel

The Panther Motel. [Source: Chris Zuppa / St. Petersburg Times] Marwan Alshehhi and another unidentified man stay at the Panther Motel in Deerfield Beach, Florida. During their stay, the manager, Richard Surma, observes that they have covered two paintings with towels, apparently for religious reasons, and that they are frequently visited by a third individual. When they leave on September 9, Surma finds several items left behind in a dumpster: a box cutter, aeronautical maps of the East Coast, martial arts books, and a tote bag from a flying school. [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/15/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/16/2001 ; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/30/2001; U.S.D.C EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, 7/31/2006, PP. 3 ] Entity Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Richard Surma Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi

August 27, 2001: Saudis Threaten to End Their Alliance with US Crown Prince Abdullah, the effective leader of Saudi Arabia, is upset with US policy over Israel and Palestine and threatens to break the Saudi alliance with the US. He has Prince Bandar, Saudi ambassador to the US, personally deliver a message to President Bush on August 27. Bandar says, “This is the most difficult message I have had to convey to you that I have ever conveyed between the two governments since I started working here in Washington in 1982.” He brings up a number of issues, including the complaint that since Bush became president US policy has tilted towards Israel so much that the US has allowed Israeli Prime Minister Sharon to “determine everything in the Middle East.” The message concludes, “Therefore the Crown Prince will not communicate in any form, type or shape with you, and Saudi Arabia will take all its political, economic and security decisions based on how it sees its own interest in the region without taking into account American interests anymore because it is obvious that the United States has taken a strategic decision adopting Sharon’s policy.” Bush seems shocked and replies, “I want to assure you that the United States did not make any strategic decision.” Secretary of State Powell later confronts Bandar and says, “What the fuck are you doing? You’re putting the fear of God in everybody here. You scared the shit out of everybody.” Bandar reportedly replies, “I don’t give a damn what you feel. We are scared ourselves.” Two days later, Bush replies with a message designed to appease the Saudi concerns (see August 29-September 6, 2001). [WOODWARD, 2006, PP. 77-79] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Bandar bin Sultan, Colin Powell, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud Category Tags: Saudi Arabia

August 27, 2001: Conflict between Minneapolis and FBI Headquarters Comes into the Open FBI agents at the bureau’s Minneapolis field office have been arguing with the FBI’s Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) over whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a warrant to search Zacarias Moussaoui’s belongings (see August 20-September 11, 2001). The tensions surface in a call between Minneapolis agent Greg Jones and Supervisory Special Agent Mike Maltbie. This is a partial reconstruction of the conversation based on Jones’ notes: Maltbie: “What you have done is couched [the request] in such a way that people get spun up.” Jones: “Good. We want to make sure he doesn’t get control of an airplane and crash it into the [World Trade Center] or something like that.” Maltbie: “[T]hat’ not going to happen. We don’t know he’s a terrorist. You don’t have enough to show he is a terrorist. You have a guy interested in this type of aircraft—that is it.” Jones also asks whether the warrant request has been shown to Section Chief Michael Rolince yet, and Maltbie replies it has not. [US CONGRESS, 10/17/2002; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 153-5 ; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 3/1/2006 ] Another Minneapolis agent, Harry Samit, also contacts Maltbie and expresses his frustration with RFU’s position that they do not have enough evidence. In an interview with the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General he recalls telling Maltbie: “… if you’re not going to advance this the FISA route, or if you don’t believe we have enough for a FISA, I shudder to think—and that’s all I got out. And [Maltbie] cut me off and said, ‘You will not question the unit chief and you will not question me. We’ve been through a lot. We know what’s going on. You will not question us.’ And that could be the mantra for FBI supervisors.” [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 155 ] Entity Tags: Radical Fundamentalist Unit, Greg Jones, FBI Minnesota field office, FBI Headquarters, Harry Samit, Michael Maltbie Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 27, 2001: Minneapolis Chief Calls FBI Headquarters to Discuss Moussaoui Harry Samit and Greg Jones, agents at the FBI’s Minneapolis field office investigating Zacarias Moussaoui, are having some problems with Mike Maltbie, a supervisory special agent at FBI headquarters’ Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) (see August 20-September 11, 2001). They ask their boss to call RFU head Dave Frasca to “find out what [Maltbie]‘s problem [is].” Jones and his boss place the call. According to Jones, when the call starts, Frasca is “immediately defensive” and asks Maltbie to join the call. Jones’ notes indicate that he asks what is going to happen if “they won’t let us go criminal” and there is not enough information for a warrant under FISA. Jones asks what will happen if Moussaoui cannot be connected to a known group. The answer recorded in his notes is “That isn’t something for you to worry about.” However, Frasca will state he never said this. Maltbie’s performance—the original reason for the call—is apparently not discussed. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 155-8 ; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 3/1/2006 ] Entity Tags: Harry Samit, David Frasca, FBI Headquarters, Greg Jones, Michael Maltbie, FBI Minnesota field office, Radical Fundamentalist Unit Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 27, 2001: Spanish Police Tape Phone Calls Indicating Aviation-Based Plans to Attack US

Farid Hilali, a.k.a. Shakur. [Source: Reuters] Spanish police tape a series of cryptic, coded phone calls from a caller in Britain using the codename “Shakur” to Barakat Yarkas (also known as Abu Dahdah), the leader of a Spanish al-Qaeda cell presumably visited by Mohamed Atta in July. A Spanish judge will claim that a call by a man using the alias “Shakur” on this day shows foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks. “Shakur” says that he is “giving classes” and that “in our classes, we have entered the field of aviation, and we have even cut the bird’s throat.” Another possible translation is, “We are even going to cut the eagle’s throat,” which would be a clearer metaphor for the US. [OBSERVER, 11/25/2001; GUARDIAN, 2/14/2002] Spanish authorities later claim that detective work and voice analysis shows “Shakur” is Farid Hilali, a young Moroccan who had lived mostly in Britain since 1987. The Spanish later will charge him for involvement in the 9/11 plot, claiming that, in the 45 days preceding 9/11, he travels constantly in airplanes “to analyse them and to be prepared for action.” It will be claimed that he is training on aircraft in the days leading up to 9/11. It will further be said that he is connected to the Madrid train bombing in 2003. [LONDON TIMES, 6/30/2004; SCOTSMAN, 7/15/2004; LONDON TIMES, 7/16/2004] The Spanish Islamic militant cell led by Yarkas is allegedly a hub of financing, recruitment, and support services for al-Qaeda in Europe. Yarkas’s phone number will later also be found in the address book of Said Bahaji, and he had ties with Mohammed Haydar Zammar and Mamoun Darkazanli. All three are associates of Atta in Hamburg. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 11/23/2001] Yarkas also “reportedly met with bin Laden twice and was in close contact with” top deputy Muhammad Atef. [WASHINGTON POST, 11/19/2001] On November 11, 2001, Yarkas and ten other Spaniards will be arrested and charged with al-Qaeda activity. [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/20/2001] Entity Tags: Mohammed Haydar Zammar, Mohamed Atta, Farid Hilali, Said Bahaji, Al-Qaeda, Mamoun Darkazanli, Barakat Yarkas Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Remote Surveillance, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism

August 27, 2001: INS Given Non-Urgent Request to Determine Visa Status of Alhazmi and Almihdhar The FBI contacts the State Department and the INS to determine the visa status of recently watch listed hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar. Almihdhar’s visa obtained in June is revoked the same day; Alhazmi’s visa has already expired and he is in the country illegally. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 ] However neither agency is asked “to assist in locating the individuals, nor was any other information provided [that] would have indicated either a high priority or imminent danger.” An INS official later states, “if [the INS] had been asked to locate the two suspected terrorists… in late August on an urgent, emergency basis, it would have been able to run those names through its extensive database system and might have been able to locate them.” The State Department says that “it might have been able to locate the two suspected terrorists if it had been asked to do so.” [US CONGRESS, 9/20/2002] Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, US Department of State, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

August 27-31, 2001: Power Failure at Washington Medical Center Helps Prepare 9/11 Response

Walter Reed Army Medical Center. [Source: US Army] The Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in Washington, DC suffers a four-day power loss following an electrical transformer fire on August 27. Backup generators ensure patient care is minimally affected, but as a precaution 77 of the hospital’s roughly 100 patients are moved to other facilities until it regains full power. Most go to the National Naval Medical Center (NNMC) in Bethesda. According to Capt. Tom Sizemore, the acting commander of the NNMC, precautionary measures are necessary due to the size of the patient transfer. So on August 28 he sets the hospital into a mass casualty condition. Usually such a condition is only set in response to a major incident with many seriously injured people. Sizemore says, “This most unfortunate opportunity has provided NNMC with a very special opportunity. We were able to exercise our response system, with real patients, but (thank God) not with patients involved in some mass disaster.” [STRIPE, 8/31/2001; BETHESDA JOURNAL, 9/6/2001; STRIPE, 9/6/2001; OFFICE OF MEDICAL HISTORY, 9/2004, PP. 146] Walter Reed is about six miles from the Pentagon, and its ambulance teams will respond to the attack there on September 11. Many believe that coping with the power failure helps prepare them for this. One member of staff later says, “A lot of the procedures that we used in the September 11 tragedy, we had just come out of this power loss where we had implemented a lot of what we did. We had good procedures in place that we had already just executed. It was really eerie.” [NURSEWEEK, 9/17/2001; OFFICE OF MEDICAL HISTORY, 9/2004, PP. 145-146] A similar incident also occurs around this time at DeWitt Army Community Hospital at Fort Belvoir, an army base roughly 12 miles south of the Pentagon. The details of this are unspecified. [STRIPE, 9/20/2001] Ambulance teams from DeWitt will also be involved in the emergency response to the Pentagon attack. [OFFICE OF MEDICAL HISTORY, 9/2004, PP. I] Entity Tags: Tom Sizemore, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Fort Belvoir, National Naval Medical Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Military Exercises

August 27-September 1, 2001: Hijackers Stay at Maryland Motel at Different Times

The Pin-Del Motel. [Source: Michael Springer / Zuma Press] On August 27, Flight 93 hijacker Ziad Jarrah checks into the Pin-Del, a budget motel in Laurel, Maryland. Giving a Florida address and driver’s license number, he pays for three nights with a Visa card, but leaves the following evening. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/19/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/19/2001] Days later, Nawaf Alhazmi spends the night of September 1 at the same motel. He uses a New York driver’s license as identification, which gives his address as a Manhattan hotel. But the records of this hotel later will show he never stayed there, and his driver’s license will also be found to be a fake. On September 2, he joins the other Flight 77 hijackers at another motel, about a mile from the Pin-Del (See (August 23-September 10, 2001)). Jarrah is apparently never seen with any of the other hijackers while in the US. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/19/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/21/2001] Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi, Ziad Jarrah Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Ziad Jarrah

August 27-28, 2001: NSA Approves Passage of Key Information about Almihdhar to Cole Investigators, but FBI Headquarters Continues to Withhold It The NSA’s representative to the FBI asks the NSA for permission to pass intelligence information about hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi to FBI criminal agents investigating the bombing of the USS Cole and permission is granted the same day, but FBI headquarters does not forward this information to the Cole investigators. The request is made on behalf of FBI headquarters agent Dina Corsi, but Corsi does not want the agents to launch a criminal investigation to find Almihdhar in the US—she believes the information will be useful to them because of Almihdhar’s connection to the Cole bombing. The information identifies Almihdhar as an “Islamic extremist” and says that he traveled to Kuala Lumpur, where he met an associate named Nawaf (see January 5-8, 2000). This links Almihdhar to the Cole bombing because the FBI thinks one of the bombers, Fahad al-Quso, may have traveled to Kuala Lumpur at the same time as Almihdhar. Although the 9/11 Commission will say that Corsi “had permission to share the information” with the Cole investigators, she apparently does not do so, even though it is clear from conversations they have around this time that they want it (see August 28, 2001, and August 28, 2001, August 28-29, 2001, and August 29, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 271, 539; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 276-7, 283, 286, 294, 304 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] Entity Tags: Usama bin Laden Unit (FBI), Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, National Security Agency, FBI Headquarters, Fahad al-Quso, FBI New York Field Office, Dina Corsi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US, Key Hijacker Events

Late August 2001: Moussaoui Case Mentioned to Head of FBI’s International Terrorism Operations Section Dave Frasca, head of the FBI’s Radical Fundamentalism Unit (RFU), and Michael Rolince, the assistant director in charge of the FBI’s International Terrorism Operations Section (ITOS), have at least two brief conversations about the Zacarias Moussaoui case. Moussaoui, suspected of having ties to Islamic militants, was arrested in mid-August (see August 16, 2001). Though it is not known what Frasca and Rolince talk about, it is possible their discussions concern complaints from the Minneapolis field office about how RFU is handling the case (see August 27, 2001). According to the 9/11 Commission, there is no evidence that this discussion ever reaches Assistant Director for Counterterrorism Dale Watson or Acting FBI Director Thomas Pickard. If this is true, the FBI’s handling of the case is remarkably different than the approach taken in the CIA, where Director George Tenet is briefed repeatedly on the matter (see August 23, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 275; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 3/21/2006] A warning that Osama bin Laden and Chechen rebel leader Ibn Khattab were planning a joint operation against the US was sent to Rolince earlier in the year (see Before April 13, 2001) and the FBI is aware that Moussaoui had recruited for the Chechen rebels (see August 22, 2001). Rolince will be involved in preparations for Moussaoui’s deportation to France shortly before 9/11 (see (August 30-September 10, 2001)). Entity Tags: FBI Minnesota field office, Michael Rolince, David Frasca, FBI Headquarters, Radical Fundamentalist Unit Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 28, 2001: Edits to Moussaoui Warrant Request ‘Set It Up for Failure’ The FBI’s Minneapolis field office has submitted a memorandum to the Radical Fundamental Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters for a search warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) for Zacarias Moussaoui’s belongings (see August 23-27, 2001). Before it is submitted, RFU agent Mike Maltbie makes several alterations to the memo. In particular, he deletes a key section saying that a CIA officer had described Chechen rebel leader Ibn Khattab, to whom Moussaoui was connected, as an associate of bin Laden. He deletes this even though the FBI was recently warned that bin Laden and Ibn Khattab may be working together on attacks against US interests (see Before April 13, 2001). However, Minneapolis FBI agent Greg Jones objects in a lengthy e-mail that “we are setting this up for failure if we don’t have the foreign power connection firmly established for the initial review.” Jones also complains about other changes made by Maltbie, including: Maltbie changes a statement about Moussaoui “preparing himself to fight” to one saying he and an associate “train together in defensive tactics.” Maltbie changes the sentence, “Moussaoui was unable to give a convincing explanation for his paying $8300 for 747-400 training,” to “Moussaoui would give an explanation for his paying $8300 in cash for 747-700 flight simulation training.” Maltbie changes a statement that Moussaoui has no convincing explanation for the large sums of money he had to “Moussaoui would not explain the large sums of money known to have been in his possession.” Maltbie responds by saying that they will attempt to put something together for the foreign power requirement and by changing some, but not all of the sections Jones complains about. However, Minneapolis is still unhappy and the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General will state that after Jones’ complaints are taken into consideration the memo is only “slightly less persuasive.” The key section about Chechnya is not reinstated, but Moussaoui’s links to Chechnya are discussed at the relevant meeting with an attorney about the request (see August 28, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 161-4, 209-211 ] Entity Tags: FBI Minnesota field office, FBI Headquarters, Radical Fundamentalist Unit, Greg Jones, Michael Maltbie Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 28, 2001: Atta Buys Flight Ticket Despite Being Wanted by Police Mohamed Atta is able to buy his flight ticket, despite having an arrest warrant for driving without a license and also having violated visa regulations (see April 26, 2001). He should have been wanted for abandoning a stalled aircraft in December 2000 as well (see December 26, 2000). [AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 11/12/2001] Entity Tags: Australia, Mohamed Atta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta

August 28, 2001: Hijacker Alhazmi’s Rental Car Is Checked by Police in New Jersey A car rented by Nawaf Alhazmi is queried by police in Totowa, New Jersey. This incident is inputted into the NCIC, a widely used nationwide police database. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 236 ] Alhazmi rented the car, a Chrysler Concorde, on August 20 in nearby Wayne, New Jersey. He used his Florida driver’s license for ID. He stays in the area until September 1, when he returns the car and goes to Maryland. [CNN, 9/26/2001; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 229, 247 ] Alhazmi had been put on a terrorist watch list several days earlier along with his companion Khalid Almihdhar (see August 23, 2001), and the FBI has been tasked to search for them in the US. On September 5, 2001, FBI agent Robert Fuller will allegedly search the NCIC database, although evidence suggests he does not actually do so (see September 5, 2001). It is unknown how quickly this incident is added to the database and if it would be there in time for Fuller to discover. Entity Tags: National Crime Information Center, Robert Fuller, Nawaf Alhazmi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Hijacker Contact w Government in US, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

August 28, 2001: Two Future Hijackers Confront Neighbor at Florida Condominium

Maria Siscar-Simpson’s apartment at the Delray Beach Racquet Club. [Source: Chris Zuppa/St. Petersburg Times] Two future Flight 93 hijackers, Ahmed Alhaznawi and Ahmed Alnami, who are living in a Delray Beach, Florida, condominium, forcefully try to enter the apartment of a neighbor living below them. They say a towel has dropped from their balcony to hers and insist on entering to retrieve it. The apartment’s tenant, Maria Siscar-Simpson, is frightened and refuses to let them in. According to her account, a handyman shouts the men away, but they come back three more times. After Siscar-Simpson later tells her story to the FBI, agents will suggest the towel, which appears to have fallen on her roof, not her balcony, may have contained clothing with something important to the two future hijackers’ mission, perhaps a confirmation number for their 9/11 flights (Alnami’s flight was booked the previous day—see August 25-September 5, 2001). The bureau will later find evidence that the men lower themselves on guy wires to retrieve the towel this evening. [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/1/2002] Entity Tags: Ahmed Alhaznawi, Maria Siscar-Simpson, Ahmed Alnami Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers

August 28, 2001: CIA Fails to Connect KSM, Bin Al-Shibh, and Moussaoui In April 2001, the CIA analyzed some “intriguing information associated with a person known as ‘Mukhtar.’” The CIA didn’t know who this was at the time, only that he was associated with top al-Qaeda deputy Abu Zubaida and that he seemed to be involved in planning al-Qaeda activities. On August 28, 2001, the CIA receives a cable reporting that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) has the nickname of Mukhtar (which means “brain” in Arabic). However, apparently no one at the CIA’s bin Laden unit makes the connection between this new information and the April 2001 information. The 9/11 Commission writes, “Only after 9/11 would it be discovered that Muhktar/KSM had communicated with a phone that was used by [Ramzi] bin al-Shibh, and that bin al-Shibh had used the same phone to communicate with [Zacarias] Moussaoui [who is in US custody by this time.]” [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 322; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 277] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Ramzi Yousef, Alec Station, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Central Intelligence Agency, Zacarias Moussaoui Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Zacarias Moussaoui, Warning Signs, Abu Zubaida

(August 28, 2001): FBI Supervisor Says Search for Almihdhar Should Be Criminal, Not Intelligence Investigation After learning that FBI headquarters wants the search for hijacker Khalid Almihdhar to be an intelligence investigation, FBI supervisor Jack Cloonan protests, saying a criminal investigation would be more appropriate. Cloonan, an agent on the I-49 al-Qaeda squad at the FBI’s New York office, says that the search should be conducted by criminal agents, as they would have more freedom and resources, due to an existing indictment of Osama bin Laden. Other agents on the squad make the same argument (see August 23, 2001 and August 28, 2001). However, in the end the search will be conducted as an intelligence investigation, but will not find Almihdhar before 9/11 as only one inexperienced agent will be assigned to it (see August 29, 2001). [WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 353] Entity Tags: FBI New York Field Office, FBI Headquarters, Usama bin Laden Unit (FBI), Jack Cloonan, Dina Corsi, I-49, Khalid Almihdhar Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

August 28-30, 2001: US Politicians Visit Pakistan and Discuss Bin Laden Senator Bob Graham (D-FL), Representative Porter Goss (R-FL), and Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) travel to Pakistan and meet with President Pervez Musharraf. They reportedly discuss various security issues, including the possible extradition of bin Laden. They also meet with Abdul Salam Zaeef, the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan. Zaeef apparently tells them that the Taliban wants to solve the issue of bin Laden through negotiations with the US. Pakistan says it wants to stay out of the bin Laden issue. [AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 8/28/2001; SALON, 9/14/2001] Entity Tags: Taliban, Porter J. Goss, Pervez Musharraf, Osama bin Laden, Abdul Salam Zaeef, Bob Graham, Jon Kyl Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI

August 28, 2001: FBI Headquarters Asks New York Office to Open Intelligence Investigation into Hijacker Almihdhar FBI headquarters agent Dina Corsi asks the FBI’s New York field office to open an intelligence investigation into future 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar and locate him in the US. Corsi’s written request mentions Almihdhar’s arrival in the US in July 2001 (see July 4, 2001), his previous travel to the US in January 2000 with Nawaf Alhazmi (see January 15, 2000), his attendance at al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit (see January 5-8, 2000), his association with an al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen (see Early 2000-Summer 2001), and similarities between his travel and that of Fahad al-Quso, Ibrahim al-Thawar (a.k.a. Nibras), and Khallad bin Attash (see January 13, 2000), operatives involved in the bombing of the USS Cole. Corsi does not mention that the CIA knows bin Attash also attended the Malaysia summit, as this information has not officially been passed to the FBI yet. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 304 ] Entity Tags: Tawfiq bin Attash, Usama bin Laden Unit (FBI), Khalid Almihdhar, Dina Corsi, Fahad al-Quso, FBI Headquarters, Ibrahim al-Thawar Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, 2000 USS Cole Bombing

August 28, 2001: Attorney Kills Moussaoui Warrant Request Mike Maltbie and Rita Flack of the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) forward a request for a warrant to search Zacarias Moussaoui’s belongings (see August 21, 2001) to National Security Law Unit chief Spike Bowman. The request was submitted by the Minneapolis field office (see August 22-28, 2001), which has been trying to obtain a warrant for some time. Earlier in the day, Maltbie edited the request, removing information connecting Moussaoui to al-Qaeda through a rebel group in Chechnya (see August 28, 2001). RFU chief Dave Frasca was to attend the meeting, but is called away at the last minute. According to Bowman, who is already very familiar with the facts in this case, Maltbie is adamant that there is not enough evidence to issue the warrant. Bowman agrees, saying that the evidence fails to implicate Moussaoui as an agent of a foreign power. The FBI thus abandons the effort to obtain a FISA warrant and begins planning his deportation (see (August 30-September 10, 2001)). [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 164-6, 168 ; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 3/1/2006 ] Entity Tags: Rita Flack, Marion (“Spike”) Bowman, FBI Headquarters, FBI Minnesota field office, Radical Fundamentalist Unit, Michael Maltbie, National Security Law Unit Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 28, 2001: USS Cole Investigator Receives Almihdhar Memo, FBI Headquarters Forces Him to Delete It Steve Bongardt, an FBI criminal agent investigating the bombing of the USS Cole, receives an e-mail from FBI headquarters asking the FBI’s New York office to start looking for future 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar under an intelligence investigation, but is forced to delete it following an argument with headquarters. The e-mail was not addressed to Bongardt, but forwarded to him by a supervisor, possibly in error. However, Bongardt calls Dina Corsi, the headquarters agent who wrote the e-mail, and expresses his surprise at the information contained in it, saying: “Dina, you got to be kidding me! Almihdhar is in the country?” He tells her the search should be conducted as a criminal investigation, not an intelligence investigation. Corsi incorrectly replies that the “wall” prevents the search from being carried out by criminal agents (see Early 1980s and July 19, 1995), as the investigation requires intelligence from the NSA that criminal agents cannot have, and she forces Bongardt to delete the e-mail from his computer (see August 29, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 271; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 304 ; WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 353] Entity Tags: Usama bin Laden Unit (FBI), Steve Bongardt, Dina Corsi, FBI New York Field Office, FBI Headquarters, Khalid Almihdhar Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US, 2000 USS Cole Bombing

August 28, 2001: Cole Agent Argues with FBI Headquarters over Search for Hijacker Almihdhar FBI New York agent Steve Bongardt, FBI headquarters agent Dina Corsi, and acting FBI Osama bin Laden unit head Rod Middleton, who is Corsi’s supervisor, discuss whether the search for future 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar should be an intelligence or criminal investigation. Bongardt argues that the search should be a criminal investigation because of Almihdhar’s connection to the bombing of the USS Cole and because more agents could be assigned to a criminal investigation. (Note: the office only has one rookie intelligence agent available.) He also says a criminal investigation would have better tools, such as grand jury subpoenas, which are faster and easier to obtain than the tools in an intelligence investigation. Corsi and Middleton say that the “wall” prevents the intelligence information necessary for the case being shared with criminal investigators, so the search must be an intelligence investigation. (Note: Corsi and Middleton are wrong (see August 29, 2001).) Bongardt is unhappy with this and requests an opinion from the Justice Department’s national security law unit (see August 28-29, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 307 ] Entity Tags: Usama bin Laden Unit (FBI), Steve Bongardt, FBI Headquarters, FBI New York Field Office, Dina Corsi, Khalid Almihdhar, Rod Middleton Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US, 2000 USS Cole Bombing

August 28-29, 2001: FBI Headquarters Allegedly Misrepresents Attorney’s Advice, Ensuring Search for Hijacker Almihdhar Is Intelligence Investigation FBI headquarters agents Dina Corsi and Rod Middleton contact Justice Department lawyer Sherry Sabol to ask her opinion on the search for future 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar, but Sabol will later say that Corsi misrepresents her advice to other agents. Corsi contacts Sabol, an attorney at the national security law unit, to ask her about legal restrictions on the search for Almihdhar, because of an argument she has had with New York agent Steve Bongardt about whether the search should be an intelligence or criminal investigation (see August 28, 2001 and August 28, 2001). Corsi will later tell Bongardt that Sabol told her that the information needed for the investigation cannot be passed on to criminal agents at the FBI, only intelligence agents, and that if Almihdhar is located, a criminal agent cannot be present at an interview. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 307-8 ] Corsi’s understanding of the issue is wrong, and the “wall,” which restricted the passage of some intelligence information to criminal agents at the FBI, does not prevent the information in question being shared with criminal agents (see August 29, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will comment that Corsi “appears to have misunderstood the complex rules that could apply to the situation.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 271] In addition, Sabol will later insist that her advice was very different than what Corsi claims it is. She will deny saying a criminal agent could not interview Almihdhar, arguing that she would not have given such inaccurate advice. She will also say the caveat on the intelligence information from the NSA would not have stopped criminal agents getting involved and, in any case, the NSA would have waived the caveat if asked. (Note: the NSA did so at Corsi’s request just one day earlier (see August 27-28, 2001), but presumably Corsi does not tell Sabol this.) [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 271] Larry Parkinson, the FBI’s general counsel at this time, will later say there was no legal bar to a criminal agent being present at an interview and that he would be shocked if Sabol had actually told Corsi this. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2/24/2004] Furthermore, Corsi apparently does not tell Sabol that Almihdhar is in the US illegally. The illegal entry is a crime and means criminal FBI agents can search for him (see August 29, 2001). Entity Tags: Sherry Sabol, Steve Bongardt, Rod Middleton, Usama bin Laden Unit (FBI), National Security Law Unit, Khalid Almihdhar, Dina Corsi, Larry Parkinson, FBI New York Field Office, FBI Headquarters Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

After August 28, 2001: FBI Fails to Reconsider Seeking Criminal Warrant for Moussaoui After the FBI decides not to seek a warrant to search Zacarias Moussaoui’s belongings under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (see August 28, 2001), it fails to reconsider the possibility of applying for a criminal warrant. A criminal warrant was not sought initially, partially because if the warrant application were unsuccessful, it would adversely affect the chances of getting a FISA warrant (see August 21, 2001). Now that a FISA warrant is not to be sought, this potential consequence is irrelevant. Dave Frasca, head of the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters, will later say that he does not know why he, his subordinate Mike Maltbie, and the FBI’s Minneapolis field office do not bring this possibility up at this time, but will suggest that everybody probably forgot to raise the matter. Maltbie will say he does not think there is enough evidence for a warrant. Minneapolis personnel will say they do not bring the issue up because they do not think of it, are not in charge of the case, and the RFU has previously blocked this route. The Justice Department’s inspector general will say that the failure to reconsider obtaining a criminal search warrant is “puzzling” and “even more troubling” than the previous errors in the case’s handling, adding that it “also shows a troubling lack of initiative and acceptance of responsibility by FBI headquarters.” [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 168-9, 191-2 ] Entity Tags: FBI Minnesota field office, FBI Headquarters, Zacarias Moussaoui, David Frasca, Michael Maltbie, Office of the Inspector General (DOJ), Radical Fundamentalist Unit Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 29, 2001: FBI Does Not Fully Realize Hijacker Almihdhar Entered US Illegally Although the FBI is aware that hijacker Khalid Almihdhar lied in an application for a visa on which he entered the US the previous month (see July 4, 2001), it does not fully realize that this means his entry into the US was illegal. If the FBI realized this, it would be able to open a criminal investigation to locate Almihdhar, instead of an intelligence investigation. The New York office, which conducts the search for him, would have preferred a criminal investigation, as more agents could have worked on it, possibly allowing the office to locate Almihdhar before and stop 9/11. The Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General will remark after 9/11: “Thus, there was a clear basis to charge Almihdhar criminally with false statements or visa fraud. Significantly, this information had been provided to the FBI without the restrictive caveats placed on NSA reports and other intelligence information. As a result, if Almihdhar had been found, he could have been arrested and charged with a criminal violation based on the false statements on his visa application. However, the FBI did not seem to notice this when deciding whether to use criminal or intelligence resources to locate Almihdhar.” Almihdhar’s passport also lacks an expiry date and he is a terrorist posing as a tourist (see July 4, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 351 ] Entity Tags: FBI Headquarters, Dina Corsi, FBI New York Field Office, Khalid Almihdhar, Usama bin Laden Unit (FBI), Steve Bongardt Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

August 29, 2001: Atta Tells Bin Al-Shibh Exact Date of Attack In a later interview, would-be hijacker Ramzi bin al-Shibh claims that on this day Mohamed Atta calls him (he is in Germany at the time) from the US. Atta asks him what is “two sticks, a dash and a cake with a stick down?” The answer, which bin al-Shibh figures out, is “11-9” —the European and Arabic way of writing 9/11. [KNIGHT RIDDER, 9/9/2002; CBS NEWS, 10/9/2002] Now knowing the date of the attack, bin al-Shibh later claims that he orders active cells in Europe, the US, and elsewhere to evacuate. Entity Tags: Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Mohamed Atta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge

August 29, 2001: Bush Vows Security Is His First Responsibility President Bush says, “We recognize it’s a dangerous world. I know this nation still has enemies, and we cannot expect them to be idle. And that’s why security is my first responsibility. And I will not permit any course that leaves America undefended.” [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

August 29, 2001: FBI Headquarters Not Concerned about Imam’s Reference to Moussaoui and Jihad The Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters learns of a translated conversation (see August 17, 2001) between Zacarias Moussaoui’s roommate, Hussein al-Attas, and an imam from a mosque in Norman, Oklahoma, in which the imam had said, “I heard you guys wanted to go on jihad.” On this day, the FBI also learns about al-Attas’s will, which states that “death is near” and that “those who participate in jihad can expect to see God.” After receiving the information, RFU chief Dave Frasca replies in an e-mail, “The will is interesting. The jihad comment doesn’t concern me by itself in that this word can mean many things in various [M]uslim cultures and is frequently taken out of context.” However, a top Justice Department attorney who submits applications for warrants under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), will later say that “he would have tied bells and whistles” to the jihad comment in a FISA application. A later investigation by the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General will conclude that the comment was “significant” and “should have been given greater weight in considering whether there was probable cause to believe Moussaoui was connected to a terrorist group.” [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 134, 167-8, 201 ; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 3/1/2006 ] Entity Tags: Office of the Inspector General (DOJ), David Frasca, Radical Fundamentalist Unit, FBI Headquarters, Zacarias Moussaoui Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 29, 2001: Cayman Islands Letter Warns of ‘Major Terrorist Act Against US via an Airline or Airlines’ Three men from either Pakistan or Afghanistan living in the Cayman Islands are briefly arrested in June 2001 for discussing hijacking attacks in New York City (see June 4, 2001). On this day, a Cayman Islands radio station receives an unsigned letter claiming these same three men are agents of bin Laden. The anonymous author warns that they “are organizing a major terrorist act against the US via an airline or airlines.” The letter is forwarded to a Cayman government official but no action is taken until after 9/11. When the Cayman government notifies the US is unknown. Many criminals and/or businesses use the Cayman Islands as a safe, no tax, no-questions-asked haven to keep their money. The author of the letter will meet with the FBI shortly after 9/11, and will claim his information was a “premonition of sorts.” The three men will later be arrested. What has happened to them since their arrest is unclear. [MIAMI HERALD, 9/20/2001; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/20/2001; MSNBC, 9/23/2001] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Al-Qaeda Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Foreign Intelligence Warnings

August 29-September 6, 2001: Bush Tries to Repair Relations with Saudis, But Policy Change Halted by 9/11 Attacks The Bush administration attempts to repair its relation with Saudi Arabia after a dramatic letter from Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah. On August 27, 2001, Abdullah, the de facto leader of Saudi Arabia, sent a message to President Bush threatening to end the Saudi alliance with the US because of what they see as US favoritism towards Israel (see August 27, 2001). Two days later, Bush sends a two-page letter to Abdullah: “Let me make one thing clear up front: nothing should ever break the relationship between us. There has been no change in the strategic equation. I firmly believe the Palestinian people have a right to self-determination and to live peacefully and securely in their own state, in their own homeland, just as the Israelis have the right to live peacefully and safely in their own state.” Journalist Bob Woodward will later note that this “was a much bigger step than President Clinton had taken. Even as Clinton had tried to fashion a Middle East peace agreement as his legacy, he had never directly supported a separate Palestinian state.” On September 6, Abdullah replies, “Mr. President, it was a great relief to me to find in your letter a clear commitment confirming the principle in which the peace process was established. I was particularly pleased with your commitment to the right of the Palestinians to self-determination as well as the right to peace without humiliation, within their independent state.” The Saudis appear appeased. [WOODWARD, 2006, PP. 77-79] Also on September 6, Bush holds a meeting with his top advisers and suggests a change of policy towards Palestine, including public support for a separate Palestinian state. However, days before Bush is to announce these new policies, the 9/11 attacks take place. None of the planned US policy changes materialize (see September 6, 2001). Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud Category Tags: Israel, Saudi Arabia

August 29-September 4, 2001: Minneapolis Memo to FAA Warning of Moussaoui Is Blocked by FBI Headquarters Harry Samit, an agent at the FBI’s Minneapolis field office, drafts a memo to the FAA summarizing the facts of the Zacarias Moussaoui case. In it, he writes, “Minneapolis believes that Moussaoui, [his roommate Hussein] al-Attas, and others not yet known were engaged in preparing to seize a Boeing 747-400 in commission of a terrorist act. As Moussaoui denied requests for consent to search his belongings and was arrested before sufficient evidence of criminal activity was revealed, it is not known how far advanced were his plans to do so.” He also mentions Moussaoui’s physical and marital arts training and expresses concern that France, where Moussaoui will soon be deported, may not be able to hold him or his property for long. But Mike Maltbie of the FBI’s Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) instructs the Minneapolis field office not to send the memo because he is also drafting a memo on the Moussaoui case that will be sent to the FAA and other agencies. However Maltbie’s memo lacks a threat assessment and does not mention Minneapolis’ suspicions that Moussaoui might be planning a terrorist act involving a hijacked airplane. The memo does not result in any FAA action. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 174-7 ; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 3/20/2006] A meeting between Samit and a Minneapolis FAA officer will also fail to produce any FAA action (see September 4, 2001). Entity Tags: Michael Maltbie, FBI Headquarters, Harry Samit, Zacarias Moussaoui, FBI Minnesota field office, Radical Fundamentalist Unit Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, US Air Security

August 29, 2001: Inexperienced FBI Agent Is Assigned to Search for Almihdhar The FBI’s New York office opens a full field intelligence investigation to locate Khalid Almihdhar. New York FBI agent Robert Fuller, new to the international terrorism squad, is the only person assigned to the task. The New York office had been given a “heads up alert” about Almihdhar on August 23, but the search only begins after the FBI decides on August 28 to conduct an intelligence investigation instead of a criminal investigation (see August 29, 2001). Another agent had labeled the search request “routine,” meaning that Fuller has 30 days to find his target. However, Fuller will be busy with another matter and won’t begin work on finding Almihdhar until September 4 (see September 4-5, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004] Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Nawaf Alhazmi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

August 29, 2001: CIA Officer Possibly Tells FBI Agent Search for Hijacker Almihdhar Must Be Intelligence Investigation According to author Lawrence Wright, on this day there is a conference call between FBI field agent Steve Bongardt, FBI headquarters agent Dina Corsi, and a CIA supervisor at Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, who tells Bongardt to stand down in the search for future 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar. Corsi and Bongardt have been arguing over whether the search for Almihdhar in the US should be a criminal or intelligence investigation (see August 28, 2001 and August 28, 2001), and the CIA supervisor apparently sides with Corsi, saying the search should be an intelligence investigation, and so Bongardt, a criminal agent, cannot be involved in it. Bongardt is angry with this and remarks, “If this guy [Almihdhar] is in the country, it’s not because he’s going to f___ing Disneyland!” [WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 353-4] However, there will be no mention of this conversation in the 9/11 Commission Report or the Justice Department’s report into the FBI’s performance before 9/11. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 271; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 306-7 ] According to the Justice Department report, there is a similar conference call between Bongardt, Corsi, and her supervisor at the FBI around this time (see August 28, 2001). It is possible Wright is confusing the supervisor of the CIA’s bin Laden unit with the supervisor of the FBI’s bin Laden unit, meaning that the CIA supervisor is not involved in this argument. Entity Tags: Steve Bongardt, Khalid Almihdhar, Central Intelligence Agency, Alec Station, FBI New York Field Office, Dina Corsi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

August 29, 2001: FBI Wrongly Opens Intelligence Investigation to Find Almihdhar, despite Protests that ‘Someday Somebody Will Die’ as a Result The FBI opens an intelligence investigation to find future 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar, despite protests from the FBI New York field office that FBI headquarters has wrongly insisted on an intelligence investigation, when a criminal investigation would be more appropriate and have a better chance of finding him. The Justice Department’s office of inspector general will later conclude that “the designation of the Almihdhar matter as an intelligence investigation, as opposed to a criminal investigation, undermined the priority of any effort to locate Almihdhar.” Upon learning of the decision, Steve Bongardt, an investigator working on the USS Cole bombing investigation, writes to headquarters agent Dina Corsi to express his frustration. He points out that she is unable to produce any solid documentary evidence to support her view of the “wall,” a mechanism that restricts the passage of some intelligence information to criminal agents at the FBI (see Early 1980s and July 19, 1995), and that her interpretation of the “wall” is at odds with the purpose for which it was established. He adds: “Whatever has happened to this—someday someone will die—and wall or not—the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain ‘problems.’ Let’s hope the [Justice Department’s] National Security Law Unit will stand behind their decisions then, especially since the biggest threat to us now, UBL [Osama bin Laden], is getting the most ‘protection.’” [US CONGRESS, 9/20/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/21/2002; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 307-9 ; NEW YORKER, 7/10/2006 ] Both the Justice Department’s office of inspector general and the 9/11 Commission will later back Bongardt and say the investigation should have been a criminal investigation, as the “wall” procedures did not apply. The inspector general will comment that Bongardt “was correct that the wall had been created to deal with the handling of only [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] information and that there was no legal barrier to a criminal agent being present for an interview with Almihdhar if it occurred in the intelligence investigation.” [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 351 ] The 9/11 Commission will remark that Corsi “misunderstood” the wall and that, “Simply put, there was no legal reason why the information [Corsi] possessed could not have been shared with [Bongardt].” It will conclude: “It is now clear that everyone involved was confused about the rules governing the sharing and use of information gathered in intelligence channels. Because Almihdhar was being sought for his possible connection to or knowledge of the Cole bombing, he could be investigated or tracked under the existing Cole criminal case. No new criminal case was needed for the criminal agent to begin searching for [him]. And as the NSA had approved the passage of its information to the criminal agent, he could have conducted a search using all available information. As a result of this confusion, the criminal agents who were knowledgeable about al-Qaeda and experienced with criminal investigative techniques, including finding suspects and possible criminal charges, were thus excluded from the search.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 271, 539] Entity Tags: Office of the Inspector General (DOJ), National Commision on Terrorist Attacks, Osama bin Laden, Usama bin Laden Unit (FBI), Steve Bongardt, Khalid Almihdhar, FBI New York Field Office, FBI Headquarters, Dina Corsi, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

August 30, 2001: Transportation Department Holds Plane Hijacking Exercise A tabletop exercise is held at the Department of Transportation (DOT) in Washington, DC, as part of its preparations for the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City. According to Ellen Engleman, the administrator of the DOT’s Research and Special Programs Administration, this is “actually much more than a tabletop” exercise, though she does not explain how. She will later recount, “During that exercise, part of the scenario, interestingly enough, involved a potentially hijacked plane and someone calling on a cell phone, among other aspects of the scenario that were very strange when 12 days later, as you know, we had the actual event [of 9/11].” [MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE, 10/30/2001, PP. 108] Further details of this exercise are unknown. The DOT’s Crisis Management Center will be heavily involved in the 9/11 crisis response, acting as a focal point for the transportation response to the attacks (see 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: US Department of Transportation, Ellen Engleman Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Military Exercises

August 30, 2001: CIA Officer Expresses Frustration at FBI’s Inaction on Moussaoui, Predicts Suicide Hijacking in US A CIA officer involved in the Moussaoui case contacts a fellow CIA officer assigned to the FBI and complains about the FBI’s inability to obtain a warrant to search Zacarias Moussaoui’s belongings, which contain enough information to potentially prevent 9/11 (see August 16, 2001). The officer writes: “Please excuse my obvious frustration in this case. I am highly concerned that this is not paid the amount of attention it deserves. I do not want to be responsible when [Moussaoui and his associate Hussein al-Attas] surface again as members of a suicide terrorist op… I want an answer from a named FBI group chief [note: presumably Dave Frasca, head of the FBI’s Radical Fundamentalist Unit] for the record on these questions… several of which I have been asking since a week and a half ago. It is critical that the paper trail is established and clear. If this guy is let go, two years from now he will be talking to a control tower while aiming a 747 at the White House.” One of these two CIA officers may be Tom Wilshire, who is involved in the Moussaoui case (see August 24, 2001). CIA director George Tenet will write, “This comment was particularly prescient because we later learned after 9/11 that Moussaoui had in fact asked Osama bin Laden for permission to be able to attack the White House.” [TENET, 2007, PP. 203] Greg Jones, an FBI agent involved in the case, makes a similar prediction, but guesses that the target will be the World Trade Center, not the White House (see August 27, 2001). Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, George J. Tenet, Tom Wilshire, Zacarias Moussaoui Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 30, 2001: CIA Finally Tells FBI Al-Qaeda Leader Met 9/11 Hijackers in Malaysia, but Information Is Withheld from Investigators The CIA finally tells the FBI that al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash attended an al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia in January 2000 with 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi (see January 5-8, 2000). The CIA monitored the meeting and has known that bin Attash attended for at least eight months (see January 4, 2001), but repeatedly failed to tell the FBI of this (see Shortly Before February 1, 2001, February 1, 2001, Mid-May 2001, and June 11, 2001). The CIA will later say that it thought the FBI knew of the identification in January 2001 (see January 5, 2001 and After), but a CIA manager asked for permission to pass the information to the FBI in July 2001, implying he knew the FBI did not have the information (see July 13, 2001). The cable containing the information is for Rodney Middleton, acting head of the FBI’s bin Laden unit, and also says that, if the FBI thinks it does not have all the photographs it needs of the Malaysia summit, it should ask the CIA for them. Middleton is aware that the FBI is investigating Almihdhar (see August 29, 2001), but there is no record of him or anyone else providing this information to either the agent investigating Almihdhar or the main investigation of the USS Cole bombing, which bin Attash commanded. The information was requested by FBI agent Dina Corsi and was passed through a CIA Counterterrorist Center representative to the FBI, presumably Tom Wilshire. Although one of bin Attash’s aliases was watchlisted one week before (see August 23, 2001), he is not watchlisted under his real name even at this point, meaning the commander of the USS Cole attack can enter the US under his own name as he pleases. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 298, 305, 310 ] Entity Tags: Tom Wilshire, Usama bin Laden Unit (FBI), Tawfiq bin Attash, Nawaf Alhazmi, Central Intelligence Agency, Dina Corsi, Rod Middleton, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khalid Almihdhar Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US, Key Hijacker Events

August 30, 2001: French Provide More Information about Moussaoui

The information sent by the French included a photocopy of this page of Moussaoui’s French passport. [Source: FBI] French authorities provide the FBI’s representative in Paris with additional information about Zacarias Moussaoui, and he forwards this information to the FBI’s Minneapolis field office and headquarters (see August 22, 2001 and Late 1999-Late 2000). The French say that according to an acquaintance of the suspected militant, Moussaoui is a radical Islamic fundamentalist who is potentially very dangerous. They warn that Moussaoui, who was radicalized at London’s Finsbury Park mosque, is devoted to Wahabbism, the Saudi Arabian sect of Islam that is adhered to by bin Laden (see 1994), and has traveled to Kuwait, Turkey, and Afghanistan (see 1995-1998). According to the French, the acquaintance also revealed that Moussaoui is a “strategist” and described him as “a cold stubborn man, capable of nurturing a plan over several months, or even years and of committing himself to this task in all elements of his life.” The French also tell the FBI that they would be willing to have Moussaoui deported back to France. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 169-170 ; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 3/20/2006] Describing the French report to the FBI, a French justice official later says that France “gave the FBI ‘everything we had’” on Moussaoui, “enough to make you want to check this guy out every way you can. Anyone paying attention would have seen he was not only operational in the militant Islamist world but had some autonomy and authority as well.” [TIME, 5/27/2002] And the French interior minister will similarly state, “We did not hold back any information.” [ABC NEWS, 9/5/2002] “Even a neophyte working in some remote corner of Florida, would have understood the threat based on what was sent,” one senior French investigator later explains. [TIME, 8/4/2002] The FBI decides (see (August 30-September 10, 2001)) to deport Moussaoui back to France. At a meeting in Paris several days later (see September 5-6, 2001), French authorities will again warn their US counterparts about Moussaoui and his connections. Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Zacarias Moussaoui Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 30, 2001: Bin Laden Reportedly Named Commander of Afghanistan Army It is reported in Russia and Pakistan that the Taliban has named bin Laden commander of the Afghanistan army. [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 8/30/2001] Entity Tags: Taliban, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Osama Bin Laden

August 30, 2001-September 4, 2001: Egypt Warns Al-Qaeda Is in Advanced Stages of Planning Significant Attack on US According to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian intelligence warns American officials that bin Laden’s network is in the advanced stages of executing a significant operation against an American target, probably within the US. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/7/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 6/4/2002] He says he learned this information from an agent working inside al-Qaeda. US officials will deny receiving any such warning from Egypt. [ABC NEWS, 6/4/2002] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Hosni Mubarak Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Foreign Intelligence Warnings, Key Warnings

August 30-September 6, 2001: Oklahoma FBI Blows Second Moussaoui Lead The FBI’s Oklahoma City field office again fails to provide help with the Moussaoui investigation. They had been asked by colleagues in Minneapolis to investigate El Hadj Ndiaye, an associate of Moussaoui who knew Moussaoui wanted to go on jihad (see August 17, 2001). However, instead of interviewing the list of people Minneapolis wanted them to talk to, they just speak to one person. On September 6, Minneapolis agent Harry Samit notes that the interviewee seems to be close to Ndaiye and that he would “be willing to throw the Bureau off the trail” because of this closeness. The same field office had previously failed to make connections related to another lead in the investigation (see August 23, 2001). Samit also expresses his disappointment at their performance: “Oklahoma City continues to fall short of expectations… Anyway, we know for future reference how weak they are.” [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, El Hadj Ndiaye, FBI Oklahoma City field office, Harry Samit, FBI Minnesota field office Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

(August 30-September 10, 2001): FBI Plans to Deport Moussaoui So Belongings Can Be Searched in France Following the collapse of the FBI’s attempts to search Zacarias Moussaoui’s belongings (see August 28, 2001), the FBI begins working on a plan to deport him to France so his belongings can be searched there. The French ask that a law enforcement officer from the US accompany Moussaoui. The FBI’s Minneapolis field office and the FBI’s assistant legal attache in Paris ask that Minneapolis agent Harry Samit and an INS agent go to France with Moussaoui to brief the French and await the results of the search of his belongings. Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) chief Dave Frasca opposes this plan. Michael Rolince, head of the bureau’s International Terrorism Operations Section, opposes it as well, later claiming that he thought Samit might try to obtain information from Moussaoui on the journey. For several days, Frasca and one of his subordinates, Mike Maltbie, continue to haggle with Minneapolis over whether Samit can accompany Moussaoui. But when the French and the assistant legal attache insist, they drop their objections. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 171-3 ] Minneapolis is highly unsatisfied with this solution and would have preferred to obtain a warrant to search his belongings. Samit writes before 9/11 that deporting Moussaoui “was a distant third in my list of desired outcomes, but at this point I am so desperate to get into his computer I’ll take anything.” [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/10/2001 ] Samit will later accuse the RFU of “criminal negligence” because they were trying to “run out the clock” and deport Moussaoui, instead of prosecuting him. [WASHINGTON POST, 3/21/2006] The 9/11 attacks occur before the deportation can take place (see September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Michael Rolince, Michael Maltbie, Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Headquarters, Harry Samit, Radical Fundamentalist Unit, David Frasca Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

August 29, 2001 and Shortly After: FBI Headquarters Rejects Plan to Place Undercover Officer in Moussaoui’s Cell After failing to obtain a warrant to search Zacarias Moussaoui’s belongings (see August 28, 2001), the FBI’s Minneapolis field office considers inserting an Arabic speaking undercover officer into Moussaoui’s cell “in an attempt to learn the name or description of the recognized foreign power with whom Moussaoui is aligned.” Minneapolis sees no problem with the idea and contacts the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters about it. RFU chief Dave Frasca replies, “Let us look into this asap. Do NOT go forward with the [undercover officer] until we weigh in…” Frasca then discusses the idea with an expert at the FBI’s International Terrorism Operations Section, who says the proposal is “ridiculous” and should not be implemented. Frasca also tells Minneapolis the idea is problematic because in the event of criminal proceedings the undercover officer will not be in a position to testify. The plan is abandoned and the FBI continues with preparations to deport Moussaoui (see (August 30-September 10, 2001)). [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 166-7 ] Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Radical Fundamentalist Unit, FBI Headquarters, Coleen Rowley, David Frasca, Harry Samit, Greg Jones, FBI Minnesota field office Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

Late August 2001: Bin Laden Boasts in Interview of ‘Very, Very Big Attacks’ Against US In an interview with the London-based newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi, bin Laden boasts that he is planning an “unprecedented” strike against the US. Abdel-Bari Atwan, editor of the newspaper, will say, “Personally, we received information that he planned very, very big attacks against American interests. We received several warnings like this. We did not take it so seriously, preferring to see what would happen before reporting it.” [ABC NEWS, 9/12/2001; INDEPENDENT, 9/17/2001] The Washington Post will similarly report just after 9/11, “Interviewed last month in the mountains of southern Afghanistan by a London-based Arab journalist, he boasted—without going into detail—that he and his followers were planning ‘a very big one.’” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/13/2001] Atwan’s comment implies the warning is not published before 9/11. But Senator Diane Feinstein (D) will say shortly after 9/11, “Bin Laden’s people had made statements three weeks ago carried in the Arab press in [Britain] that they were preparing to carry out unprecedented attacks in the US.” [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 9/14/2001] Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Dianne Feinstein, Abdel-Bari Atwan Category Tags: Key Warnings, Warning Signs

Late August 2001: Hussein Puts His Troops on Highest Military Alert Since Gulf War A Daily Telegraph article later claims that Iraq leader Saddam Hussein puts his troops on their highest military alert since the Gulf War. A CIA official states that there was nothing obvious to warrant this move: “He was clearly expecting a massive attack and it leads you to wonder why.” Hussein apparently makes a number of other moves suggesting foreknowledge, and the article strongly suggests Iraqi complicity in the 9/11 attacks. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 9/23/2001] Iraq will later be sued by 9/11 victims’ relatives on the grounds that they had 9/11 foreknowledge but did not warn the US. Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein Category Tags: Warning Signs

Late August 2001: French Warning to US Echoes Earlier Israeli Warning French intelligence gives a general terrorist warning to the US; apparently, its contents echo an Israeli warning from earlier in the month (see August 8-15, 2001). [FOX NEWS, 5/17/2002] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Foreign Intelligence Warnings

Late August 2001: Mystery Arab Rap Group Records CD about Terrorism A mysterious Arab rap band records a CD, which includes songs apparently about upcoming terrorist attacks. The group, called the Arab Assassins, records its songs at the GHC Recording Studio in Sarasota, Florida. According to the Sarasota Herald-Tribune, their lyrics “range from generic references to Palestinian beliefs to verses that could be considered by some as a warning of what unfolded in New York City and Washington, DC” on 9/11. These refer to subjects such as bombings, New York, and fundamentalist Islamic martyrs. Lyrics include, “I know I’m going to die,” “I’m next on God’s list,” “Partners torn, transformed to martyrs,” “to turn wives into widows,” and “the US will remember this.” After 9/11, the recording studio’s owner Chris Musgrave will comment, “There are some weird coincidences here.” The rap group is made up of three brothers who claim to be from Brooklyn. Yet officials with the Recording Industry Association of America later say they have never heard of the Arab Assassins, and none of the large Internet music sites offer any recordings by them. After recording several songs at the studio, the Arab Assassins take six copies of their CD, and then leave a telephone number that is listed as disconnected. The day after 9/11, the local FBI will seize a copy of the CD from the studio, but offer no comments to the press on the band. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/13/2001; SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, 9/13/2001] Some Middle Eastern men will be witnessed in Sarasota early in the morning of 9/11 acting suspiciously, though details of their identities are unknown (see (6:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001) (see (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [LONGBOAT OBSERVER, 9/26/2001] Entity Tags: Arab Assassins Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events

Late August-September 10, 2001: WTC Security Raised, Then Scaled Back, in Weeks Before 9/11 Attack The Independent reports that in late August, “security [is] abruptly heightened at the World Trade Center with the introduction of sniffer dogs and systematic checks on trucks bringing in deliveries. No explanation has been given for this measure.” [INDEPENDENT, 9/17/2001] Newsday claims that around the same time, security personnel at the WTC begin working extra-long shifts because of numerous phone threats. However, on September 6, bomb-sniffing dogs are abruptly removed. Security further drops right before 9/11. WTC guard Daria Coard says in an interview later on the day of 9/11: “Today was the first day there was not the extra security.” [NEWSDAY, 9/12/2001] Entity Tags: Daria Coard, World Trade Center Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Late Summer 2001: American Airlines Develops New Crisis Plan, But Unable to Use it on 9/11 Some time shortly before 9/11, American Airlines revises its crisis communications plan. According to a PR Week magazine article shortly after 9/11, “Those charged with imagining worst-case scenarios laid out contingencies for plane crashes and 1978-style hijackings.” However, “They never dreamed of terrorists turning two aircrafts into weapons of mass destruction, of coordinating disaster communication with another airline in the same predicament, or of working in the shadows of the FBI.” Tim Doke, an American Airlines spokesman, later says, “We realized that nowhere in our plan did we contemplate such a circumstance” as what happened on 9/11. When the 9/11 attacks occur, American Airlines will have to abandon “its freshly minted crisis communications plan almost immediately… because the FBI rushed to American’s Command Center and made it clear who was in charge.” [PR WEEK, 11/5/2001; O'DWYER'S PR SERVICES REPORT, 1/2003] Entity Tags: American Airlines Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

August 31, 2001: US Watch List Calls Almihdhar ‘Armed and Dangerous’ According to the 9/11 Commission, on this day “A new listing for [Khalid] Almihdhar was placed in an INS and Customs lookout database, describing him as ‘armed and dangerous’ and someone who must be referred to secondary inspection.” However, this information will only first appear in a little-noticed Commission staff report released one month after the 9/11 Commission Final Report. It will not be explained who determined Almihdhar to be armed and dangerous or what information this was based on. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 31 ] By September 5, 2001, the lookout database will be inexplicably changed and inspectors will be told not to detain Almihdhar after all (see September 4-5, 2001). Entity Tags: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Khalid Almihdhar, US Customs Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

(Late August-September 17, 2001): Members of Langley, Virginia Fighter Squadron Away for Training Exercise in Nevada

Thomas Bergeson. [Source: Samuel Rogers / United States Air Force] Fighter jets and personnel from the 71st Fighter Squadron, which is stationed at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, are away in Nevada at the time of the 9/11 attacks, participating in the “Red Flag” training exercise, and only return to base about a week later. [VIRGINIAN-PILOT, 9/24/2001; 1ST FIGHTER ASSOCIATION, 2003; LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, 9/15/2006] Langley AFB is located 130 miles south of the Pentagon, and fighters from there are launched on 9/11 to protect Washington, DC (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 9/16/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27] The “host unit” at the base is the 1st Fighter Wing, which includes the 71st Fighter Squadron and two other fighter squadrons: the 27th FS and the 94th FS. [GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 10/21/2001; LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, 11/2003] The 71st FS includes about 25 pilots. Its members are participating in Red Flag in preparation for an expected deployment to Iraq this coming December. [MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, 10/19/2001] Col. Thomas Bergeson, the commander of the 71st FS, will later recall, “We had most of our F-15s at Nellis” Air Force Base in Nevada, for the exercise. [LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, 9/15/2006] Red Flag - Red Flag is a realistic combat training exercise, held four times a year at Nellis Air Force Base, involving the air forces of the US and its allies. [GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 10/19/2002; ARKIN, 2005, PP. 476] Various aircraft are involved, and more than 100 pilots are participating in the current exercise. [AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, 11/2000; LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, 8/22/2001] The exercise began on August 11 and ends on September 7. [LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, 7/28/2001; LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, 8/22/2001] But the 71st FS pilots only fly their F-15s back to Langley AFB around September 17. [VIRGINIAN-PILOT, 9/24/2001] The 71st Fighter Squadron - The mission of the 71st Fighter Squadron is “to maintain a combat-ready force able to conduct air-superiority operations anywhere in the world for the United States and its allies.” [LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, 1/2005] Although Langley Air Force Base, where it is stationed, is one of the two “alert sites” upon which NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) can call to get jets quickly launched, NEADS’s alert fighters at the base do not belong to the 71st FS or either of the other two fighter squadrons of the 1st Fighter Wing. Instead, the two alert jets are part of a small detachment from Fargo, North Dakota’s 119th Fighter Wing, which is located on the opposite side of the runway to the central facilities of Langley AFB. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 17; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 114] However, some F-15s belonging to the 71st FS are launched from Langley AFB on 9/11, following the attacks, to patrol the skies of the East Coast. Some of the 71st FS jets that are deployed to Nevada are the first fighters to get airborne to patrol Las Vegas and southern California in response to the attacks. [LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, 1/2005; 1ST FIGHTER ASSOCIATION, 3/14/2006] Other Units Away on 9/11 - The 94th Fighter Squadron, which is also based at Langley AFB, is away on September 11 as well, for a 90-day combat deployment to Saudi Arabia to enforce the no-fly zone over southern Iraq (see September 2001). [BBC, 12/29/1998; 1ST FIGHTER ASSOCIATION, 2003] Around this same time, members of the 121st Fighter Squadron of the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) also participate in Red Flag, and only return to their base three days before 9/11 (see Late August-September 8, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 156] Entity Tags: Thomas Bergeson, 71st Fighter Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Red Flag Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Military Exercises

Late August-September 8, 2001: Most Washington National Guard Pilots Are Away at Nevada Exercise

An F-16 heading to the combat ranges of Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, for the Red Flag training exercise in January 2006. [Source: US Department of Defense] In late August and early September 2001, members of the 121st Fighter Squadron of the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) participate in the “Red Flag” training exercise in Nevada. They do not return from it until September 8. [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 156] Red Flag - Red Flag is a realistic combat training exercise that involves the air forces of the US and its allies. [GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 10/19/2002] It is managed by the Air Warfare Center through the 414th Combat Training Squadron. Most of the aircraft and personnel that are deployed for Red Flag are part of the exercise’s “Blue Forces,” which use various tactics to attack targets that are defended by an enemy “Red Force,” which electronically simulates anti-aircraft artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and electronic jamming equipment. A variety of aircraft are involved in the exercise. [AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, 11/2000] Red Flag is held four times a year at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. It is usually composed of two or three two-week periods. [ARKIN, 2005, PP. 476] The current exercise began on August 11, and involves more than 100 pilots in total. [LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, 7/28/2001; LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, 8/22/2001] Exercise May Hinder Defense of Washington on 9/11 - The timing of the Red Flag exercise may reduce the ability of the DCANG to respond to the 9/11 attacks. The 121st Fighter Squadron is stationed at Andrews Air Force Base, which is located 10 miles southeast of Washington, DC. [GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 10/21/2001; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 11/15/2001] Most of its pilots are involved with the unit on only a part-time basis, while flying commercial jet planes in their civilian lives. [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002] Therefore, according to author Lynn Spencer, on 9/11 most of the 121st Fighter Squadron’s pilots will be “back at their airline jobs, having just returned three days before from two weeks of the large-scale training exercise ‘Red Flag’ at Nellis Air Force Base in Las Vegas. [The squadron has] only seven pilots available.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 156] In addition, some of the pilots will need to have their flight data disks reprogrammed before they can launch. Pilot Heather Penney Garcia will reportedly be “busy reprogramming flight data disks, which still contain all the Nellis data from the Red Flag training exercise they just returned from” (see (Between 9:05 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 236-237] A significant number of fighter jets from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia also participate in Red Flag around this time (see (Late August-September 17, 2001)). [VIRGINIAN-PILOT, 9/24/2001; LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, 9/15/2006] Entity Tags: 121st Fighter Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Red Flag, District of Columbia Air National Guard Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Military Exercises

Around August 31, 2001: Saudi Intelligence Chief’s Replacement Reportedly Makes CIA Nervous about Almihdhar and Alhazmi Following the resignation of Prince Turki as head of the Saudi General Intelligence Directorate (GID) (see August 31, 2001), the CIA becomes nervous about its protection of hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, according to investigative reporters Joe and Susan Trento. A CIA officer will tell the two reporters that the CIA protected the two hijackers in the US because they were working for the GID, and the CIA did not realize they were loyal to Osama bin Laden, not the regime in Riyadh (see August 6, 2003). After Turki is replaced, the CIA apparently thinks: “Had Turki been forced out by more radical elements in the Saudi royal family? Had he quietly warned the CIA that he suspected the GID’s assurances about the penetration of al-Qaeda were not as reliable as thought previously? Had al-Qaeda penetrated GID?” This is said to be the reason the CIA allows the passage of more intelligence related to the two men to the FBI around this time (see August 30, 2001). [TRENTO AND TRENTO, 2006, PP. 193] However, the 9/11 Commission will not say Almihdhar and Alhazmi were assets of Saudi Arabia’s General Intelligence Directorate or that they were protected by the CIA. The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry will not say they were protected by the CIA. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004] Entity Tags: Saudi General Intelligence Directorate, Central Intelligence Agency, Joseph Trento, Nawaf Alhazmi, Susan Trento, Turki al-Faisal, Khalid Almihdhar Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

Late August 2001: Hijackers Reportedly Tell Motel Manager, ‘We Are on a Mission’ According to Paul Dragomir, the manager of the Longshore Motel in Hollywood, Florida, two individuals who may be Mohamed Atta and Ziad Jarrah rent a room in his motel. They sign in using apparent aliases, claiming to be computer engineers from Iran, and say they are down from Canada to find jobs. However, they leave the motel after a few hours because of a dispute over Internet access, which the motel cannot provide on a 24-hour basis. The Washington Post will write: “The need to be online at any moment suggests they were looking for Web pages or messages that would signal phases of the operation, experts say. Dragomir said he refunded their $175 in cash and they left. ‘They got very angry. One of the guys said, You don’t understand. We are here on a mission.’” [WASHINGTON POST, 10/5/2001] While the Post’s account will say that the motel manager recognizes Atta and Jarrah, other press accounts differ. According to the Chicago Tribune, Dragomir “said he was uncertain whether the pair had any connection to the Sept. 11 events, except for general physical descriptions.” [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 9/18/2001] And according to Wired Magazine, Dragomir “suggested that they were closely linked to the 19 hijackers, but that they were not among those men.” [WIRED, 9/20/2001] Entity Tags: Ziad Jarrah, Mohamed Atta, Paul Dragomir Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Ziad Jarrah

August 31, 2001: Head of Saudi Arabia’s Intelligence Service Is Replaced Prince Turki al-Faisal, head of Saudi Arabia’s intelligence service for 24 years, is replaced. No explanation is given. He is replaced by Nawaf bin Abdul Aziz, his nephew and the king’s brother, who has “no background in intelligence whatsoever.” [AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 8/31/2001; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/22/2001; SEATTLE TIMES, 10/29/2001] The Wall Street Journal later reports: “The timing of Turki’s removal—August 31—and his Taliban connection raise the question: Did the Saudi regime know that bin Laden was planning his attack against the US? The current view among Saudi-watchers is probably not, but that the House of Saud might have heard rumors that something was planned, although they did not know what or when. (An interesting and possibly significant detail: Prince Sultan, the defense minister, had been due to visit Japan in early September, but canceled his trip for no apparent reason less than two days before an alleged planned departure.)” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/22/2001] It will later come out that Turki’s removal takes place during a time of great turmoil in the relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia, though it is not known if there is a connection (see August 27, 2001, August 29-September 6, 2001, and September 6, 2001). Turki is later sued in August 2002 for his role in 9/11 (see August 15, 2002), and is later appointed ambassador to Britain (see October 18, 2002) and then ambassador to the US (see August 21, 2005). Entity Tags: Turki al-Faisal, Taliban, Osama bin Laden, Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Nawaf bin Abdul Aziz Category Tags: Saudi Arabia

Before September 11, 2001: FBI Squad Builds Antenna to Listen in on KSM’s Phone Calls I-49, a squad of FBI agents and Justice Department prosecutors that began focusing on bin Laden in 1996 (see January 1996), is upset that the NSA is not sharing its monitoring of the phone calls of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM). The squad builds their own antenna in Madagascar specifically to intercept KSM’s calls. [WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 344] It has not been revealed when this antenna was built or what was learned from this surveillance. However, there have been media reports that the NSA monitored some phone calls between KSM and Mohamed Atta in the summer of 2001 (see Summer 2001). Further, US intelligence monitored a call between KSM and Atta a day before 9/11 that was the final go-ahead for the attacks (see September 10, 2001). So presumably the I-49 squad should have known about these calls as well if this antenna did what it was designed to do. Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, National Security Agency, I-49, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Remote Surveillance, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed