Terry Biggio

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(8:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Realizes with Certainty that Flight 11 Has Been Hijacked According to Terry Biggio, the operations manager at the FAA’s Boston Center, the center initially thought Flight 11 “was a catastrophic electrical failure and… was diverting to New York” (see (8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 10/19/2002] However, at about 8:24 a.m., controllers heard two radio transmissions from it, with the voice of a hijacker declaring, “We have some planes” (see 8:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). Pete Zalewski, who is handling Flight 11, says that after the second of these: “I immediately knew something was very wrong. And I knew it was a hijack.” He alerts his supervisor. Lino Martins, another Boston air traffic controller, says, “the supervisor came over, and that’s when we realized something was serious.” [CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 9/13/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] However, two senior FAA officials—Bill Peacock and David Canoles—later say that the hijacker transmissions were not attributed to a flight, so controllers didn’t know their origin. [WASHINGTON TIMES, 9/11/2002] An early FAA report will similarly refer to them as having come “from an unknown origin.” But right away, the center begins notifying the chain of command that a suspected hijacking is taking place (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ] However, some reports claim that controllers decided Flight 11 was probably hijacked earlier than this, by about 8:20 a.m. (see (8:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Pete Zalewski, Lino Martins Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Tells FAA Regional Office that Hijackers Said ‘We Have Planes’; Office Suggests Notifying Military

Terry Biggio. [Source: Federal Aviation Administration] Over an FAA teleconference, Terry Biggio, the operations manager at the FAA’s Boston Center, reports to the FAA’s New England regional office the “We have some planes” comment apparently made by a Flight 11 hijacker at 8:24 a.m. (see 8:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 23 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 79-80] Because the Boston Center controller monitoring Flight 11 had not understood the communication, the center’s quality assurance specialist had been instructed to “pull the tape” of the transmission, listen to it carefully, and then report back. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 19] Biggio now reports to the New England region representative: “I’m gonna reconfirm with, with downstairs, but the, as far as the tape, Bobby seemed to think the guy said that ‘we have planes.’ Now, I don’t know if it was because it was the accent, or if there’s more than one [hijacked plane], but I’m gonna, I’m gonna reconfirm that for you, and I’ll get back to you real quick. Okay?” Another participant in the teleconference asks, “They have what?” and Biggio clarifies: “Planes, as in plural.… It sounds like, we’re talking to New York, that there’s another one aimed at the World Trade Center.… A second one just hit the Trade Center.” The New England region representative replies: “Okay. Yeah, we gotta get—we gotta alert the military real quick on this.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 23] A manager at the FAA’s Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, is monitoring the teleconference, and so also learns of the “We have some planes” communication at this time (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 79-80] At 9:05 a.m., Biggio will confirm for the New England region representative—with the Command Center listening in—that a hijacker said, “we have planes” (forgetting the “some”). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 24 ] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Terry Biggio Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

9:07 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Manager Wants Cockpit Security Warnings Sent to Aircraft After conferring with the FAA’s New England regional office and contacting representatives of the Air Transport Association, the FAA’s Boston Center decides to issue a Notice to Airmen, warning pilots to heighten cockpit security. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 24-25 ] Following the second attack on the World Trade Center, Terry Biggio, the operations manager at the Boston Center, is concerned that there may be additional attacks. He therefore asks a manager at the FAA’s New England regional office if warnings could be sent to airborne aircraft via “ACARS or something,” advising them to increase their cockpit security. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 24 ] (ACARS is an e-mail system that allows personnel on the ground to rapidly communicate with those in the cockpit of an aircraft. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 9 ] ) Biggio is particularly concerned about the need to warn airborne international flights that are scheduled to arrive at New York’s JFK International Airport. On the advice of a New England Region representative, Boston Center decides to contact Air Transport Association representatives through the FAA’s Herndon Command Center and ask them to formally request that airlines warn their aircraft to heighten cockpit security. According to the 9/11 Commission, though, Biggio is “[n]ot content to rely on the airlines to warn their aircraft,” and so decides that the Boston Center will issue a Notice to Airmen (“NOTAM”) to heighten cockpit security in light of the attacks in New York. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 24-25 ] The NOTAM system is the communication method used to define the rules of the day for air traffic controllers and pilots. With the status of equipment, airports, and rules changing frequently, the NOTAM system is used to distribute any changes to all pilots and controllers. [FRENI, 2003, PP. 86] Two or three minutes later, controllers at the Boston Center will contact all the aircraft in their airspace by radio and advise them to increase cockpit security (see 9:09 a.m.-9:10 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25 ] Entity Tags: Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Federal Aviation Administration, Terry Biggio, Air Transport Association Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

9:09 a.m.-9:10 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Controllers Give Cockpit Security Alert to All Their Aircraft Terry Biggio, the operations manager at the FAA’s Boston Center, instructs the air traffic controllers at his center to contact all aircraft in the center’s airspace by radio and inform them of the events taking place in New York. He tells the controllers to also advise the aircraft to heighten their cockpit security in light of these events. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 23; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25 ] According to author Lynn Spencer, previously “No transmission of that kind has ever been made on air traffic control frequencies.” Controller Jim Ekins is the first to act. He announces over all the radio frequencies in the sector: “All aircraft! Due to recent events that have unfolded in the Boston sector, you are advised to increase cockpit security. Allow no entry to your cockpit!” According to Spencer, other controllers nearby overhear and realize: “Yes! That’s exactly what we need to tell them!” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 98] The Boston Center air traffic controllers then immediately execute Biggio’s order, and give the warning to their aircraft. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25 ] However, Spencer will write: “Communications with controllers are [usually] as dry as they come, and to many pilots this announcement is so out of their realm of understanding, training, and experience that it simply doesn’t make sense. It actually agitates some, who cannot help but view it as some new kind of ‘FAA bureaucratic bullsh_t.’” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 99] Boston Center will subsequently ask the FAA’s Herndon Command Center to issue a similar cockpit security alert nationwide, but the Command Center apparently will not act on this request (see (9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 23] United Airlines will issue a company-wide order at 9:21 for its dispatchers to warn their flights to secure their cockpits (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 455] Entity Tags: Terry Biggio, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Jim Ekins Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

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