Q2 2001

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April 2001: Hekmatyar Predicts US Will Soon Attack Afghanistan and Overthrow Taliban
Journalist Hamid Mir talks to Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who is living in exile in Iran at the time. Hekmatyar predicts that the Taliban will fall by the end of the year. Mir will later recall, “he was telling me that the Americans will attack Afghanistan, Taliban government will fall, and then we’ll continue our jihad against the Americans.” Hekmatyar is opposed to the Taliban but openly supports bin Laden. He tells Mir, “Osama bin Laden is a great man and I support his ideology and I support his objectives.… He is a good friend of mine and he is a real muhjahid.” [BERGEN, 2006, PP. 287] A senior Taliban official will make a similar prediction to Mir before 9/11 and hint the justification for the US attack would be a major attack against US interests (see August 2-3, 2001). Entity Tags: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Hamid Mir, Taliban Category Tags: Warning Signs

April 2001: Cole Investigator Again Asks for Malaysia Information, CIA Again Reveals Nothing

Ali Soufan in Afghanistan after 9/11. [Source: FBI] Ali Soufan, a lead investigator into the bombing of the USS Cole, again requests information from the CIA about leads turned up by the investigation. He made a similar request in late 2000, but got no reply (see Late November 2000). After learning that some of the bombers made calls between one of their houses in Yemen, the Washington Hotel in Bangkok, Thailand, where some of them stayed, and a payphone in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (see (January 5-8, 2000) and Early December 2000), Soufan sends an official teletype with the request for information and also a photo of al-Qaeda manager Khallad bin Attash. The CIA is well aware that there was an al-Qaeda summit at an apartment near the payphone in Kuala Lumpur (see January 5-8, 2000), and in fact considered it so important that CIA Director George Tenet and other CIA leaders were repeatedly briefed about it (see January 6-9, 2000). [NEW YORK TIMES, 4/11/2004; WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 330-331; NEW YORKER, 7/10/2006 ] The CIA even has photos from the Malaysia summit of al-Quso standing next to hijacker Khalid Almihdhar, and other photos of bin Attash standing next to Almihdhar. [NEWSWEEK, 9/20/2001] However, the CIA does not share any of what they know with Soufan, and Soufan continues to remain unaware the Malaysia summit even took place. Author Lawrence Wright will later comment, “If the CIA had responded to Soufan by supplying him with the intelligence he requested, the FBI would have learned of the Malaysia summit and of the connection to Almihdhar and Alhazmi. The bureau would have learned—as the [CIA] already knew—that the al-Qaeda operatives were in America and had been there for more than a year. Because there was a preexisting indictment for bin Laden in New York, and Almihdhar and Alhazmi were his associates, the bureau already had the authority to follow the suspects, wiretap their apartment, intercept their communications, clone their computer, investigate their contacts—all the essential steps that might have prevented 9/11.” [WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 330-331] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Lawrence Wright, Ali Soufan, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Key Hijacker Events

April 2001: A. Q. Khan Linked to Pakistani Militant Group

Hafiz Mohammed Saeed. [Source: BBC] In April 2001, the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) holds its annual public meeting in Pakistan. Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan attends the meeting as an honored guest. Accompanying Khan at the podium is Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, another Pakistani nuclear scientist who had met with Osama bin Laden the year before (see 2000). He will meet with bin Laden again shortly before 9/11 and advise him on how to build a “dirty bomb” (see Mid-August 2001). [ASIA TIMES, 6/4/2004] French journalist Bernard Henri-Levy, the author of a book about Pakistani militant Saeed Sheikh, will later claim in the Wall Street Journal that Khan was a secret member of LeT. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 2/17/2004] The US will ban LeT after 9/11 because of its involvement in a string of attacks against India (see December 20, 2001). LeT is considered linked to al-Qaeda, and bin Laden addressed the annual LeT meeting by phone in some past years. Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, the founder and leader of LeT, has publicly declared that Pakistan should share its nuclear technology with other Islamic nations, a position also advocated by Khan. In 2002, he will claim that people loyal to his organization “control two nuclear missiles.” [ASIA TIMES, 6/4/2004] Entity Tags: Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, Osama bin Laden Timeline Tags: A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Pakistani Nukes & Islamic Militancy

April 2001: Courier Working for Bin Laden and CIA Flees Afghanistan, Warns Al-Qaeda Planning to Hijack Airplane in US

Peter Jouvenal. [Source: Dominc Medley] British cameraman Peter Jouvenal is reporting on Afghanistan at this time and using a young Afghan known only as “Ahmed” to run errands. Ahmed also has a job running errands for Osama bin Laden at the same time. Jouvenal will later recount that Ahmed was helping bin Laden by “meeting people in Pakistan and taking them across the border, taking messages around for Osama, buying his food, taking messages to the Internet and logging on and receiving, printing, sending.” Ahmed buys bin Laden’s meals most every day. But Jouvenal says that “somewhere on the line Ahmed tied up with the CIA” and decided that working for bin Laden was too dangerous. Ahmed asks Jouvenal for help to get a visa for himself and his family to defect to the US, which Ahmed eventually gets. He also tells Jouvenal that al-Qaeda is planning to hijack an airplane in the US in an attempt to get Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman released from prison. [BERGEN, 2006, PP. 287-289] There are some similarities between Ahmed’s case and the case of “Max” who leaves Afghanistan around the same time and warns of a hijacking, but there are differences as well (see March-April 2001). It is not known if they are the same person. Regardless, Ahmed’s case contradicts CIA assertions that they never had any asserts close to bin Laden. It is not known why the CIA did not use Ahmed to track bin Laden’s location or poison his food. One month later the White House will be warned of the hijacking plot, but it is unknown if this came from Ahmed or other sources (see May 23, 2001). Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Ahmed (Afghan courier), Osama bin Laden, Peter Jouvenal, Omar Abdul-Rahman Category Tags: Warning Signs, Hunt for Bin Laden, Other Possible Moles or Informants

April 2001: Speculation That Commercial Pilots Could Be Al-Qaeda Operatives A source with al-Qaeda connections speculates to US intelligence that “bin Laden would be interested in commercial pilots as potential terrorists.” The source warns that the US should not focus only on embassy bombings, because al-Qaeda is seeking “spectacular and traumatic” attacks along the lines of the WTC bombing in 1993. Because the source is offering personal speculation and not hard information, the information is not disseminated widely. [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/18/2002] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, World Trade Center Category Tags: Warning Signs

April 2001: Surveillance of Al-Qaeda and Hamas in US Curtailed A surveillance program known as Catcher’s Mitt is curtailed, and ten to twenty al-Qaeda wiretaps, as well as some Hamas wiretaps, are not renewed. This follows the discovery of errors in applications for warrants under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) related to both al-Qaeda and Hamas and the introduction of new procedures (see Summer 2000-September 11, 2001, Summer-October 2000, October 2000, and March 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/19/2001; NEWSWEEK, 5/27/2002; NEWSWEEK, 3/29/2004] In addition, other similar programs such as Able Danger and Monarch Passage are shut down at the same time (see (February-March 2001) and January-March 2001). Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Catcher’s Mitt, Hamas Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11, Robert Wright and Vulgar Betrayal, Remote Surveillance

April 2001: Al-Qaeda Intelligence Intercepts Lead to Closure of Al Taqwa’s Bahamas Branch The charters of the Bahamas branch of the Al Taqwa Bank and the related Akida Bank are revoked. Al Taqwa’s headquarters in Switzerland will be shut down after 9/11 following accusations that it helped fund al-Qaeda and other Islamist militant groups (see November 7, 2001). [RANDAL, 2005, PP. 225] The US Treasury Department will later state that the Bahamas branch of “Al Taqwa and Akida Bank are not functional banking institutions in the conventional sense. They are shell companies lacking a physical presence and sharing the same address in the Bahamas where they were licensed.” [US DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 8/29/2002] Press reports at the time say the closure is the result of Jordanian, French, and US intelligence reports indicating al-Qaeda money coming from Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates had been channeled through Al Taqwa. [FORWARD, 10/17/2003] Journalist Jonathan Randal will later note that US intelligence on Al Taqwa was solid enough before 9/11 to lead to this closure. “Egyptian, US, and other Western specialists had long suspected this well-known Muslim Brotherhood bank had ties to al-Qaeda as well as to radical Algerian, Egyptian, and Palestinian Islamist groups. One persistent rumor suggested Osama had been bugged telephoning the bank in Nassau, [Bahamas,] in 1996 to discuss rearranging his finances at the time of his departure from Khartoum, [Sudan.]” [RANDAL, 2005, PP. 225] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Akida Bank, Al Taqwa Bank Category Tags: Terrorism Financing, Al Taqwa Bank

April 2001: FBI Translators Learn Al-Qaeda Suicide Pilots Plan to Hit Skyscrapers in US and Europe FBI translators Sibel Edmonds and Behrooz Sarshar will later claim to know of an important warning given to the FBI at this time. In their accounts, a reliable informant on the FBI’s payroll for at least ten years tells two FBI agents that sources in Afghanistan have heard of an al-Qaeda plot to attack the US and Europe in a suicide mission involving airplanes. Al-Qaeda agents, already in place inside the US, are being trained as pilots. By some accounts, the names of prominent US cities are mentioned. A report on the matter is filed with squad supervisor Thomas Frields, but it’s unclear if this warning reaches FBI headquarters or beyond. The two translators will later privately testify to the 9/11 Commission. [WORLDNETDAILY, 3/24/2004; SALON, 3/26/2004; WORLDNETDAILY, 4/6/2004; VILLAGE VOICE, 4/14/2004] Sarshar’s notes of the interview indicate that the informant claimed his information came from Iran, Afghanistan, and Hamburg, Germany (the location of the primary 9/11 al-Qaeda cell). However, anonymous FBI officials will claim the warning was very vague and doubtful. [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 7/21/2004] In reference to this warning and apparently others, Edmonds will say, “President Bush said they had no specific information about September 11, and that’s accurate. However, there was specific information about use of airplanes, that an attack was on the way two or three months beforehand, and that several people were already in the country by May of 2001. They should’ve alerted the people to the threat we were facing.” [SALON, 3/26/2004] She will add, “There was general information about the time-frame, about methods to be used but not specifically about how they would be used and about people being in place and who was ordering these sorts of terror attacks. There were other cities that were mentioned. Major cities with skyscrapers.” [INDEPENDENT, 4/2/2004] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Behrooz Sarshar, Thomas Frields, Sibel Edmonds, Al-Qaeda, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry Category Tags: Warning Signs, Sibel Edmonds, Key Warnings, Other Possible Moles or Informants

April 2001: Informer Shares Some Information on Moussaoui with CIA A CIA informer who is aware of Zacarias Moussaoui’s connection to terrorism and met him in Azerbaijan in 1997 (see 1997) shares some information on him with the CIA. However, the informer is not aware of Moussaoui’s real name and knows him under an alias, “Abu Khalid al-Francia.” An intelligence official will indicate in 2002 that the source reports on Moussaoui under this name. However, CIA director George Tenet, writing in 2007, will say that the informer only reports on Moussaoui as “al Francia.” One of Moussaoui’s known aliases in 2001 is Abu Khalid al-Sahrawi, similar to the name the source knows him under, but when Moussaoui is arrested in the US (see August 16, 2001) the CIA apparently does not realize that Abu Khalid al-Francia is Moussaoui. [MSNBC, 12/11/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6/4/2002; TENET, 2007, PP. 201] Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Zacarias Moussaoui Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Other Possible Moles or Informants

April-May 2001: Florida FBI Investigates Atta Associate While monitoring a plot to blow up Mount Rushmore and carry out other attacks (see November 2000-Spring 2002), the Florida FBI investigates Adnan Shukrijumah, an apparent associate of Mohamed Atta (see May 2, 2001). Imran Mandhai is a leader of the Mount Rushmore plot, and he attends the same mosque in the greater Miami area that Shukrijamah does. Mandhai tries to recruit him for the plot. However, Shukrijumah declines and never says anything incriminating within earshot of undercover surveillance teams or an FBI informer using the alias Mohamed who has gotten close to Mandhai. The FBI investigates Shukrijumah anyway, but only finds that he lied on his green card application regarding a prior arrest. The Florida FBI is apparently unaware of his connection to the 9/11 hijackers. An investigator on the case will tell USA Today, “Shukrijumah sensed what Mandhai did not: that ‘Mohamed’ was an FBI informant.” After 9/11 the FBI will give Mandhai a lie detector test and ask him if he knew any of the terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks. He says he did not, but his answer is judged to be false, and he confesses he was thinking of Shukrijumah. The FBI is also investigating Shukrijumah over another plot at this time (see (Spring 2001)). Shukrijumah apparently disappears from the Miami area around the time Mandhai and Jokhan are first interviewed by the FBI. He then travels around North America (see July-September 2001). [MIAMI HERALD, 3/31/2003; US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 4/7/2003; USA TODAY, 6/15/2003; ABC NEWS, 9/10/2009] The FBI will later find that Shukrijumah is a top al-Qaeda operative and offer a reward of $5 million for information leading to his capture (see Late March 2003 and After). [REWARDS FOR JUSTICE, 3/2003] Entity Tags: Adnan Shukrijumah, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Imran Mandhai Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11, Other Possible Moles or Informants

April-August 2001: Would-Be Buffalo Sleeper Cell Attends Training Camps, Meets Bin Laden

The Lackawanna Six. Top row, from left: Faysal Galab, Mukhtar al-Bakri, and Sahim Alwan. Bottom row, from left: Yahya Goba, Shafel Mosed, and Yaseinn Taher. [Source: Associated Press] A group of seven men in Lackawanna, near Buffalo, New York, are influenced by religious discussions with two al-Qaeda operatives, Kamal Derwish and Juma al-Dosari. The seven US citizens—Yaseinn Taher, Yahya Goba, Shafel Mosed, Mukhtar al-Bakri, Sahim Alwan, Faysal Galab, and Jaber Elbaneh—leave for jihad training in Afghanistan. They tell friends they are merely going to Pakistan for religious instruction. Escorted by Derwish, the men travel separately and attend a six-week long weapons course at the Al Farooq camp. Some of them meet Osama bin Laden in Kandahar and they all hear him give a speech (see (June 2001)). However, most of them apparently think they are in over their heads and find excuses to cut their basic training course short and return home. The six who return show little to no evidence of any al-Qaeda plotting in the following months. Jaber Elbaneh, however, becomes committed and stays overseas with al-Qaeda. The six who return will later be arrested and dubbed an al-Qaeda cell known as the “Lackawanna Six” (see September 13, 2002). [PBS FRONTLINE, 10/16/2003] Entity Tags: Yaseinn Taher, Al Farooq training camp, Shafel Mosed, Yahya Goba, Osama bin Laden, Faysal Galab, Jaber Elbaneh, Juma al-Dosari, Sahim Alwan, Mukhtar al-Bakri, Kamal Derwish Category Tags: "Lackawanna Six"

April-May 2001: Hambali Identified as Top Al-Qaeda Planner, But His Connection to Malaysia Summit Apparently Not Made

Al- Qaeda leader Hambali. [Source: Virtual Information Center] In April 2001, the Malaysian government connects al-Qaeda leader Hambali with a gun-smuggling syndicate, and as a result police place an all points bulletin for him. A month later, Hambali is connected to a botched bank robbery also in Malaysia. Twenty-six members of the Malaysian militant group Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) are arrested and questioned about the robbery. Authorities discover the group has been responsible for a number of attacks, including the bombing of a Hindu temple, and that Hambali is a top leader. [NEW STRAITS TIMES, 2/10/2002; NEW STRAITS TIMES, 8/16/2003] A photograph of Hambali is found in a raid at this time, and is matched with a photo of him discovered in 1995 on Ramzi Yousef’s computer that contained files detailing the Bojinka plot (see January 6, 1995). [NEW STRAITS TIMES, 2/2/2002] His picture appears in the media no later than mid-August. [NEW STRAITS TIMES, 8/18/2001; NEW STRAITS TIMES, 9/9/2001] The US is already aware of Hambali’s involvement in the Bojinka plot (see May 23, 1999). However, this new evidence of Hambali’s importance does not lead to any renewed focus on the January 2000 al-Qaeda summit attended by Hambali and two of the 9/11 hijackers that was monitored by Malaysian intelligence (see January 5-8, 2000). Entity Tags: Kumpulan Militan Malaysia, Hambali, Malaysian Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Hambali, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia

(April-July 2001): Hani Hanjour Receives More Flight Training; Rents Small Aircraft According to the 9/11 Commission, soon after settling in the area (see March 2001-September 1, 2001) hijacker Hani Hanjour starts receiving “ground instruction” at Air Fleet Training Systems, a flight school in Teterboro, New Jersey. While there, he flies the Hudson Corridor: “a low-altitude ‘hallway’ along the Hudson River that passes New York landmarks like the World Trade Center.” His instructor refuses a second request to fly the Corridor, “because of what he considered Hanjour’s poor piloting skills.” Soon after, Hanjour switches to Caldwell Flight Academy in Fairfield, New Jersey, about 25 miles from lower Manhattan, from where he rents small aircraft several times during June and July. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 242] In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Caldwell’s owner will confirm that several suspects sought by the FBI, reportedly including Mohamed Atta, had rented planes from him, though when they did so is unstated. A search of the Lexis Nexus database indicates there are no media accounts of any witnesses recalling Hanjour or any of the other hijackers attending these schools. [NEW JERSEY STAR-LEDGER, 9/24/2001; EVENING STANDARD, 9/25/2001] Entity Tags: Hani Hanjour, Air Fleet Training Systems, Mohamed Atta, Caldwell Flight Academy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Hani Hanjour, Mohamed Atta, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training

Early April 2001: CIA Meets Northern Alliance Leader in Paris, Receives Warning of Major Al-Qaeda Attack CIA managers Gary Schroen, of the Near East division, and Richard Blee, responsible for Alec Station, the agency’s bin Laden unit, meet Northern Alliance commander Ahmed Shah Massoud in Paris, France. [COLL, 2004, PP. 560] Massoud, who is in Europe to address the European Parliament (see April 6, 2001), tells Schroen and Blee “that his own intelligence had learned of al-Qaeda’s intention to perform a terrorist act against the United States that would be vastly greater than the bombings of the American embassies in East Africa.” [WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 337] Declassified Defense Intelligence Agency documents from November 2001 will say that Massoud has gained “limited knowledge… regarding the intentions of [al-Qaeda] to perform a terrorist act against the US on a scale larger than the 1998 bombing of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.” They will further point out he may have been assassinated two days before 9/11 (see September 9, 2001) because he “began to warn the West.” [PAKTRIBUNE (ISLAMABAD), 9/13/2003; AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 9/14/2003] Schroen and Blee assure Massoud that, although he has been visited less by the CIA recently, they are still interested in working with him, and they will continue to make regular payments of several hundred thousand dollars each month. Commenting on the military situation in Afghanistan, Massoud says his defenses will hold for now, but the Northern Alliance is doing badly and no longer has the strength to counterattack. [COLL, 2004, PP. 561-2] Entity Tags: Rich B., Gary C. Schroen, Defense Intelligence Agency, Lawrence Wright, Alec Station, Ahmed Shah Massoud, Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda Category Tags: Warning Signs

Early April-Early May, 2001: Associate of Suspicious Imam Helps 9/11 Hijackers Rent Flat Nawaf Alhazmi and Hani Hanjour rent an apartment in Alexandria, Virginia, for about a month, with the help of Eyad Alrababah, a man whom they met at a local mosque. The mosque is run by Anwar Aulaqi, an associate of Alhazmi’s from San Diego who was investigated by the FBI over terrorism suspicions (see March 2001 and After). Alhazmi and Hanjour had previously lived in Phoenix, Arizona (see December 12, 2000-March 2001) and will later move to Paterson, New Jersey (see March 2001-September 1, 2001). Alrababah will later say that he just happened to meet them after a service in the mosque, when they mentioned they were looking for an apartment and he had a friend who had one to rent. However, given Al Aulaqi’s previous association with Alhazmi, some FBI agents will later doubt this and suspect that Aulaqi told Alrababah to help the hijackers. The 9/11 Commission will comment, “We share that suspicion, given the remarkable coincidence of Aulaqi’s prior relationship with Alhazmi.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 230] Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi, Anwar Al Aulaqi, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/11 Commission, Hani Hanjour, Eyad M. Alrababah Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Hani Hanjour

April 1, 2001: Hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi Gets Speeding Ticket, but His Illegal Status Is Not Noticed

A poor photocopy of Nawaf Alhazmi’s US driver’s license. [Source: FBI] Hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi is stopped by an Oklahoma police officer for speeding. He is stopped while traveling east on interstate highway 40, near Clinton, Oklahoma. It is likely he is with Hani Hanjour and the two are driving across the US, because they moved out of an apartment in Arizona the day before and will be seen in Virginia several days later. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 131-132 ; DAILY OKLAHOMAN, 1/20/2002] Alhazmi’s license information is run through a computer to determine whether there are any warrants for his arrest. There are none, so he is issued a ticket and sent on his way. He is driving the Toyota Corolla that he bought in San Diego the year before (see March 25, 2000). The CIA has known that Alhazmi is an al-Qaeda operative possibly living in the US since March 2000, but has failed to share this knowledge with other agencies. [DAILY OKLAHOMAN, 1/20/2002; NEWSWEEK, 6/2/2002] Police do not check his immigration status, which would require a call to an Law Enforcement Support Center hotline. Had such a call been made, it would have revealed he had been in the US illegally since January 2001. [US CONGRESS, 9/20/2002; GOVEXEC, 3/16/2004] This incident is added to the NCIC, a widely used nationwide police database (see September 5, 2001). [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 131 ] Entity Tags: Hani Hanjour, National Crime Information Center, Nawaf Alhazmi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Hani Hanjour, Hijacker Contact w Government in US

(Spring 2001): FBI Investigates Atta Associate over Second Plot
The FBI investigates Adnan Shukrijumah, an apparent associate of Mohamed Atta (see 2000-2001 and May 2, 2001), in connection with a South Florida -based Islamic militant group that is plotting to recruit operatives and finance attacks and assassinations in the Middle East (see (October 1993-November 2001)). The group includes Jose Padilla associates Adham Amin Hassoun and Mohammed Hesham Youssef, and is connected to Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman and the suspect charity Benevolence International Foundation (see 1988-1989). Shukrijumah keeps his distance from the core plotters and despite FBI wiretaps on the group’s phones, the FBI is unable to establish a firm connection between him and the plans. Shukrijumah is also being investigated over a plot to attack various businesses in Florida and blow up Mount Rushmore around this time (see April-May 2001). The FBI later determines that Shukrijumah is a top al-Qaeda operative and will issue a $5 million reward for his capture (see Late March 2003 and After). [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 4/7/2003; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 11/23/2003; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/3/2006] Entity Tags: Adnan Shukrijumah, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Benevolence International Foundation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11, Mohamed Atta

April 1, 2001-September 10, 2001: Nearly Half of FAA’s Daily Intelligence Summaries Mention Bin Laden or Al-Qaeda; No Action is Taken In 2005 (see February 10, 2005), it will be revealed that of the FAA’s 105 daily intelligence summaries between these dates, 52 mention bin Laden, al-Qaeda, or both. Most of the mentions are “in regard to overseas threats.” None of the warnings specifically predict something similar to the 9/11 attacks, but five of them mention al-Qaeda’s training for hijackings and two reports concern suicide operations unconnected to aviation. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2/11/2005] One of the warnings mentions air defense measures being taken in Genoa, Italy, for the July 2001 G-8 summit to protect from a possible air attack by terrorists (see July 20-22, 2001). However, the New Jersey Star-Ledger is virtually the only newspaper in the US to report this fact. [NEW JERSEY STAR-LEDGER, 2/11/2005] Despite all these warnings, the FAA fails to take any extra security measures. They do not expand the use of in-flight air marshals or tighten airport screening for weapons. A proposed rule to improve passenger screening and other security measures ordered by Congress in 1996 has held up and is still not in effect by 9/11. The 9/11 Commission’s report on these FAA warnings released in 2005 (see February 10, 2005) will conclude that FAA officials were more concerned with reducing airline congestion, lessening delays, and easing air carriers’ financial problems than preventing a hijacking. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2/11/2005] The FAA also makes no effort to expand its list of terror suspects, which includes only a dozen names by 9/11 (see April 24, 2000). The former head of the FAA’s civil aviation security branch later says he wasn’t even aware of TIPOFF, the government’s main watch list, which included the names of two 9/11 hijackers before 9/11. Nor is there any evidence that a senior FAA working group responsible for security ever meets in 2001 to discuss “the high threat period that summer.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 2/10/2005] Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11 Commission, US Congress, Al-Qaeda Category Tags: Warning Signs, Key Warnings, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, US Air Security

April 1-May 27, 2001: Additional 9/11 Hijackers Spend Time in Malaysia

Satam al Suqami. [Source: FBI] Two of the 9/11 hijackers travel to Malaysia and spend some time there. Satam al Suqami arrives on April 1 and stays there for just under two weeks, before traveling to the United Arab Emirates. Abdulaziz Alomari arrives on May 7 and spends three weeks there, before departing for the same destination. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 42, 50 ] There are no reports about what Alomari and al Suqami do in Malaysia or who they meet. Lead hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar visit Malaysia before 9/11 and meet other extremists there (see January 5-8, 2000), as does Zacarias Moussaoui (see September-October 2000). Almihdhar again visits Malaysia in the summer of 2001 (see June 2001), and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, an associate of the plot leaders, travels there in June 2001. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 243-4] Entity Tags: Satam Al Suqami, Abdulaziz Alomari Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia

April 3-4, 2001 and around: Hijackers Atta and Alshehhi Make Second Unexplained Trip to Virginia Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi make a second visit to Virginia Beach (see February 19-February 20, 2001). They close their recently rented mailbox there and, after checking out of the Diplomat Inn, cash a check for $8,000 at a nearby SunTrust Bank branch. [NATIONAL REVIEW, 9/27/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/16/2004, PP. 8; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 228, 523; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 11/22/2005] They also cash another check for $10,000 in the same place at around the same time. [VIRGINIAN PILOT, 9/27/2001; RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, 12/10/2005] Bank surveillance footage of Atta on April 4 will be found after 9/11. [KEAN AND HAMILTON, 2006, PP. 238] Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta

April 4, 2001: Bugging Techniques Reach New Heights

One of the approximately 30 radomes at the Echelon station in Menwith Hill, England. A radome covers an antenna to protect it from the weather and disguise the direction it is pointing. [Source: Matt Crypto / Public domain] The BBC reports on advances in electronic surveillance. The US’s global surveillance program, Echelon, has become particularly effective in monitoring mobile phones, recording millions of calls simultaneously and checking them against a powerful search engine designed to pick out key words that might represent a security threat. Laser microphones can pick up conversations from up to a kilometer away by monitoring window vibrations. If a bug is attached to a computer keyboard, it is possible to monitor exactly what is being keyed in, because every key on a computer has a unique sound when depressed. [BBC, 4/4/2001] Furthermore, a BBC report on a European Union committee investigation into Echelon one month later notes that the surveillance network can sift through up to 90 percent of all Internet traffic, as well as monitor phone conversations, mobile phone calls, fax transmissions, net browsing history, satellite transmissions and so on. Even encryption may not help much. The BBC suggests that “it is likely that the intelligence agencies can crack open most commercially available encryption software.” [BBC, 5/29/2001] Entity Tags: Echelon Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, Civil Liberties Category Tags: Remote Surveillance

April 6, 2001: Rebel Leader Warns Europe and US About Large-Scale Imminent Al-Qaeda Attacks

Ahmed Shah Massoud speaking before European Parliament. [Source: Robert Sanchez/ Black Star] Ahmed Shah Massoud, leader of the Northern Alliance fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan, has been trying to get aid from the US but his people are only allowed to meet with low level US officials. In an attempt to get his message across, he addresses the European Parliament: “If President Bush doesn’t help us, these terrorists will damage the US and Europe very soon.” [DAWN (KARACHI), 4/7/2001; TIME, 8/4/2002] A classified US intelligence document states, “Massoud’s intelligence staff is aware that the attack against the US will be on a scale larger than the 1998 embassy bombings, which killed over two hundred people and injured thousands (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998).” [DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 11/21/2001 ] Massoud also meets privately with some CIA officials while in Europe. He tells them that his guerrilla war against the Taliban is faltering and unless the US gives a significant amount of aid, the Taliban will conquer all of Afghanistan. No more aid is forthcoming. [WASHINGTON POST, 2/23/2004] Entity Tags: Northern Alliance, Taliban, George W. Bush, Ahmed Shah Massoud, Central Intelligence Agency Category Tags: Warning Signs, Hunt for Bin Laden

April 8, 2001: Czech Intelligence Informant Claims Iraqi Agent Met Arab Man in Prague; He Later Claims Man was Mohamed Atta An informant for the BIS, the Czech intelligence agency, reportedly sees Iraqi diplomat Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani meeting in a restaurant outside Prague with an Arab man in his 20s. This draws concern from the intelligence community because the informant suggests the person is “a visiting ‘student’ from Hamburg—and… potentially dangerous.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/19/2003 SOURCES: JAN KAVAN] The young man is never positively identified or seen again. Fearing that al-Ani may have been attempting to recruit the young man for a mission to blow-up Radio Free Europe headquarters, the diplomat is told to leave the country on April 18. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/27/2001; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 10/20/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 11/19/2003 SOURCES: UNNAMED US OFFICIALS, JAN KAVAN] Information about the incident is passed on to US intelligence. After the 9/11 attacks and after it is reported on the news that Atta had likely visited Prague, the BIS informant will say the young man at the restaurant was Atta. (see September 14, 2001) This information leads hawks to come up with the so-called “Prague Connection” theory, which will hold that 9/11 plotter Mohomed Atta flew to Prague on April 8, met with al-Ani to discuss the planning and financing of the 9/11 attacks, and returned to the US on either April 9 or 10. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/27/2001; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 10/20/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 11/19/2003 SOURCES: UNNAMED US OFFICIALS, UNNAMED BIS INFORMANT, JAN KAVAN] The theory will be widely discounted by October 2002. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/21/2002 SOURCES: UNNAMED US OFFICIALS, UNNAMED BIS INFORMANT] Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Radio Free Europe, Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, Jabir Salim Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

April 11, 2001: Hijacker Atta and Alshehhi Move to Coral Springs

The Tara Gardens Condominiums complex. [Source: Coralsprings.com] Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi move into Apartment 122 in the Tara Gardens Condominiums complex in Coral Springs, a suburb of Fort Lauderdale in southeast Florida. Atta rents the apartment using his own name and they pay $840 per month in rent. Atta will list the apartment as his address when he applies for a driver’s license in May. According to the London Times, while in Coral Springs, Alshehhi spends his days “washing piles of laundry for the gang in the development’s washing machines,” and Atta is “often in the parking lot, chain smoking.” [SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, 9/13/2001; CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 9/16/2001; BOSTON GLOBE, 9/23/2001; SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), 2/3/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 228, 230] Diana Padilla, who lives upstairs from them, later recalls, “You would say hello to [Atta] and nothing—no reaction.” [DETROIT FREE PRESS, 9/22/2001] Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta

April 11-June 28, 2001: 9/11 ‘Muscle’ Hijackers Arrive in Dubai on Way to US The muscle hijackers arrive in Dubai on their way to the US (see April 23-June 29, 2001): April 11: It is not known when Ahmed Alghamdi first arrives in Dubai, but he leaves on April 8, traveling to an unknown destination, and returns on April 11; April 12: Satam al Suqami arrives in the United Arab Emirates from Malaysia (see April 1-May 27, 2001); May 7, 2001: Ahmed Alhaznawi arrives in Abu Dhabi from Karachi by plane; May 13: Ahmed Alnami arrives in the United Arab Emirates by plane from Saudi Arabia; May 26: Hamza Alghamdi enters the United Arab Emirates; May 27: Abdulaziz Alomari arrives in Dubai from Malaysia (see April 1-May 27, 2001); June 1: It is not known when Wail Alshehri first arrives in Dubai, but he leaves on May 29, traveling to an unknown destination, and returns on June 1 with Ahmed Alhaznawi, who previously arrived on May 7, but must have left in the meantime; June 12: Saeed Alghamdi arrives in the United Arab Emirates from Saudi Arabia; June 28: Salem Alhazmi arrives in the United Arab Emirates from Saudi Arabia. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 42-50 ] The hijackers typically remain in Dubai for a few weeks before moving on to the US (see April 23-June 29, 2001). While in Dubai the hijackers purchase traveler’s checks: April 28: Majed Moqed purchases $2,980 in MasterCard travelers’ checks from the Thomas Cook Exchange in the nearby emirate of Sharjah; May 27, 2001: Ahmed Alnami purchases $10,000 of American Express travelers’ checks and Hamza Alghamdi purchases the same amount of Visa travelers’ checks in Dubai; June 6, 2001: Ahmed Alhaznawi purchases $3,000 of American Express travelers’ checks in Dubai; June 7, 2001: Wail Alshehri purchases $14,000 of American Express travelers’ checks in Sharjah; June 24: Fayez Ahmed Banihammad purchases $4,000 of Thomas Cook travelers’ checks in Sharjah. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 44-48 ] In addition, Wail Alshehri obtains an international driving permit in Sharjah on June 5. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 47 ] Some of these hijackers are assisted by plot facilitator Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi (see Early-Late June, 2001). It is not clear who helps the others, although Dubai-based Ali Abdul Aziz Ali previously assisted some of the hijackers (see June 29, 2000-September 18, 2000), and Saeed Sheikh, who has Dubai connections, may also assist some of them (see Early August 2001). In addition, Victor Bout, an arms dealer who flies shipments for al-Qaeda and the Taliban through the UAE, is based in Sharjah (see Mid-1996-October 2001). Entity Tags: Satam Al Suqami, Wail Alshehri, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Abdulaziz Alomari, Ahmed Alghamdi, Salem Alhazmi, Saeed Sheikh, Victor Bout, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, Saeed Alghamdi, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Ahmed Alnami, Majed Moqed, Hamza Alghamdi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers

Before April 13, 2001: FBI Reports Extremists Linked to Chechnya Leader and Bin Laden Are Planning Attack Dale Watson, head of the FBI’s counterterrorism program, sends a memo to FBI Director Louis Freeh warning that Islamic radicals are planning a “terrorist operation.” The memo states that “Sunni extremists with links to Ibn al Kahhatb, an extremist leader in Chechnya, and to Osama bin Laden [have been involved in] serious operational planning… since late 2000, with an intended culmination in late spring 2001.” Watson says the planning was sparked by the renewal of the Palestinian Intifada in September 2000. “[A]ll the players are heavily intertwined,” the memo notes. Additionally, the memo says that “[m]ultiple sources also suggest that [bin Laden’s] organization is planning a terrorist attack against US interests.” The memo is also sent to other FBI officials, such as International Terrorism Operations Section (ITOS) chief Michael Rolince, who will later be involved in the case of Zacarias Moussaoui (see Late August 2001 and (August 30-September 10, 2001)) [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 4/2001 ] Based on this report, ITOS sends an e-mail (see April 13, 2001) to all field offices, asking agents to help identify information pertaining to the “current operational activities relating to Sunni extremism.” The e-mail does not mention Ibn Khattab. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 3/21/2006] These plans may be for the 9/11 attacks—at least some of the alleged hijackers are linked to bin Laden (see January 5-8, 2000), and Zacarias Moussaoui is linked to Ibn Khattab (see Late 1999-Late 2000). Some of the hijackers fought in Chechnya and therefore might also be linked to Ibn Khattab (see 1996-December 2000). Officials at FBI headquarters will later refuse a search warrant for Zacarias Moussaoui’s belongings saying they believe Ibn Khattab is not closely connected to Osama bin Laden and is not hostile to the US (see August 22, 2001 and August 23-27, 2001). Entity Tags: Louis J. Freeh, Michael Rolince, Dale Watson, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Ibn Khattab Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Warning Signs, Islamist Militancy in Chechnya

April 12, 2001: Report on Energy Security Argues US Needs to Review Policy on Iraq A report commissioned by former US Secretary of State James Baker and the Council on Foreign Relations, titled “Strategic Energy Policy Challenges For The 21st Century,” is completed and submitted to Vice President Dick Cheney. The report was drafted by the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy. Edward L. Morse, an energy industry analyst, chaired the project, and Amy Myers Jaffe was the project’s director. The paper urges the US to formulate a comprehensive, integrated strategic energy policy to address the current energy crisis, which it attributes to infrastructural restraints, rapid global economic expansion, and the presence of obstacles to foreign investment in the oil-rich Middle East. The report says the world’s supply of oil is not a factor in the crisis. “The reasons for the energy challenge have nothing to do with the global hydrocarbon resource base…. The world will not run short of hydrocarbons in the foreseeable future,” the paper says. One of the report’s recommendations is to “[r]eview policies toward Iraq” with the ultimate goal of stemming the tide of anti-Americanism in the Middle-East and “eas[ing] Iraqi oil-field investment restrictions.” Iraq, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, remains a “destabilizing influence… to the flow of oil to international markets from the Middle East.” It also notes, “Saddam Hussein has also demonstrated a willingness to threaten to use the oil weapon and to use his own export program to manipulate oil markets.” Therefore, the report says, the “United States should conduct an immediate policy review toward Iraq, including military, energy, economic, and political/diplomatic assessments” and work with key allies to develop a new integrated strategy toward Iraq. Key elements of the new policy should include narrowing the focus of sanctions and using diplomatic means to enforce existing UN resolutions. [UNIVERSITY, 4/2/2001 ; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 10/5/2002; SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 12/26/2002] Entity Tags: Council on Foreign Relations, James A. Baker, Edward L. Morse, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Amy Myers Jaffe, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

(Show related quotes) April 12-September 7, 2001: Hijackers Collect Multiple Drivers’ License Copies

The most famous image of Mohamed Atta came from his Florida driver’s license. [Source: 9/11 Commission] At least six hijackers get more than one Florida driver’s license. They get the second license simply by filling out change of address forms: Waleed Alshehri—first license May 4, duplicate May 5; Marwan Alshehhi—first license, April 12, duplicate in June; Ziad Jarrah—first license May 2, duplicate July 10; Ahmed Alhaznawi—first license July 10, duplicate September 7 (see September 7, 2001); Hamza Alghamdi—first license June 27, two duplicates, the second in August; and “A sixth man” with a Florida duplicate is not named. [SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, 9/28/2001] Additionally, some hijackers obtained licenses from multiple states. For instance, Nawaf Alhazmi had licenses from California, New York, and Florida at the same time, apparently all in the same name. [NEWSDAY, 9/21/2001; SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, 9/28/2001; SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, 9/28/2001; DAILY OKLAHOMAN, 1/20/2002] Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi, Hamza Alghamdi, Ziad Jarrah, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Marwan Alshehhi, Waleed M. Alshehri Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Ziad Jarrah, Other 9/11 Hijackers

April 13, 2001: FBI Warned to Search for Information on Muslim Extremist Threat Shortly after discovering that Osama bin Laden and Chechen rebel leader Ibn Khattab may be planning an attack against the US (see Before April 13, 2001), the FBI sends a message to all its field offices summarizing intelligence reporting to date on the Sunni extremist threat (see February 6, 2001). (Bin Laden is the most wanted Sunni extremist by this time.) The offices are told to task all resources, including human sources and electronic databases, for any information pertaining to “current operational activities relating to Sunni extremism.” No domestic threat is mentioned. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 255; US DISTRICT COURT OF EASTERN VIRGINIA, 5/4/2006, PP. 1 ] There is no mention about what is done, if anything, in response to this message. This also appears to be the last time before 9/11 that FBI field offices are tasked to work on any Muslim extremist threat in the US. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 264] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Ibn Khattab, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Warning Signs

(Mid April 2001): Hijackers Alhazmi and Hanjour Mention Jihad to Roommates While staying in a flat in Alexandria, Virginia (see Early April-Early May, 2001), Nawaf Alhazmi and Hani Hanjour tell two roommates that they had thought of going to Afghanistan for jihad. According to the 9/11 Commission, “The al-Qaeda operatives spent little time with their roommates, but did mention at one point that they had considered going to Afghanistan for jihad.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 523] In fact, Alhazmi, an al-Qaeda veteran, has already spent time in Afghanistan (see 1993-1999). Hanjour may also have traveled to Afghanistan already (see (Early 2000-November 2000)). Alhazmi made similar comments when he lived in San Diego (see (Spring 2000)). Entity Tags: Hani Hanjour, Nawaf Alhazmi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Hani Hanjour

April 17-26, 2001: Joint Chiefs of Staff Holds Exercise for Continuity of Government if US is Attacked; Proposal to Simulate Airliner Crash into Pentagon Rejected The Joint Chiefs of Staff holds a large, worldwide exercise called Positive Force, which focuses on the Defense Department’s ability to conduct large-scale military operations and coordinate these operations. [CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 8/14/2000 ] The 2001 Positive Force exercise is a “continuity of operations exercise,” meaning it deals with government contingency plans to keep working in the event of an attack on the US. [GUARDIAN, 4/15/2004] Over a dozen government agencies, including NORAD, are invited to participate. The exercise prepares them for various scenarios, including non-combatant evacuation operations, cyber attacks, rail disruption, and power outages. It includes “a series of simulated attacks against the maritime, surface and aviation sectors” of America’s national security transportation infrastructure. [US CONGRESS, 5/8/2001; PROVIDER UPDATE, 10/2001; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 6/9/2002] Apparently, one of the scenarios that was considered for this exercise involved “a terrorist group hijack[ing] a commercial airliner and fly[ing] it into the Pentagon.” But the proposed scenario, thought up by a group of Special Operations personnel trained to think like terrorists, was rejected. Joint Staff action officers and White House officials said the additional scenario is either “too unrealistic” or too disconnected to the original intent of the exercise. [AIR FORCE TIMES, 4/13/2004; BOSTON HERALD, 4/14/2004; WASHINGTON POST, 4/14/2004; NEW YORK TIMES, 4/14/2004; GUARDIAN, 4/15/2004] Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Pentagon, Bush administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Military Exercises, US Air Security

April 18, 2001: Hijacker Alshehhi Flies Between Miami and Amsterdam Hijacker Marwan Alshehhi flies from Miami, Florida, to Amsterdam, Netherlands. He returns on May 2. Investigators have not divulged where he went or what he did while in Europe. Hamburg, Germany, is less than 250 miles from Amsterdam. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 5/20/2002] Entity Tags: Marwan Alshehhi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi

April 18, 2001: FAA Warns Airlines About Middle Eastern Hijackers The FAA sends a warning to US airlines that Middle Eastern militants could try to hijack or blow up a US plane and that carriers should “demonstrate a high degree of alertness.” The warning stems from the April 6, 2001, conviction of Ahmed Ressam over a failed plot to blow up Los Angeles International Airport during the millennium celebrations. This warning expires on July 31, 2001. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 5/18/2002] This is one of 15 general warnings issued to airlines in 2001 before 9/11 (see January-August 2001), but it is more specific than usual. [CNN, 3/2002; CNN, 5/17/2002] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Los Angeles International Airport, Ahmed Ressam Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Warning Signs, US Air Security

April 19-20, 2001: Bush Warned ‘Bin Laden Planning Multiple Operations’ On April 19, 2001, the interagency Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) chaired by counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke discusses recent reports that al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida is planning an attack. The next day, a Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) with the title “Bin Laden Planning Multiple Operations” is sent to top White House officials. The New York Times will later report that President Bush and Vice President Cheney were among those who received this warning. Since SEIBs are usually based on previous days’ President Daily Briefings, President Bush probably learned about this report on April 19 (see January 20-September 10, 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 4/18/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 255; US DISTRICT COURT OF EASTERN VIRGINIA, 5/4/2006, PP. 2 ] Entity Tags: White House, Richard A. Clarke, George W. Bush, Abu Zubaida, Counterterrorism and Security Group, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Key Warnings, Abu Zubaida, Presidential Level Warnings

April 21, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Alnami Receives Passport Possibly Containing Suspicious Indicator of Islamist Extremism, May Be Tracked by Saudi Authorities Ahmed Alnami receives a new passport from Saudi Arabia. According to the 9/11 Commission, the passport may contain an “indicator of extremism” that is “associated with al-Qaeda.” However, although it is certain some of the other hijackers have such indicator in their passports, it is not certain that Alnami does. The commission will merely say that there “is reason to believe” his passport may contain such indicator and note that it was “issued in the same Saudi passport office” that issued passports with the indicator to some of the other hijackers. In addition, Alnami obtains two passports before 9/11 (see also November 6, 1999), and it is not clear whether the commission thinks both of the passports have the indicator, or just one of them. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 564; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 9, 21, 33 ] According to author James Bamford, the indicator is a “secret coded indicator, placed there by the Saudi government, warning of a possible terrorist affiliation.” [BAMFORD, 2008, PP. 58-59] The Saudi government reportedly uses this indicator to track some of the Saudi hijackers before 9/11 “with precision” (see November 2, 2007). Entity Tags: Ahmed Alnami Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers

April 22-June 27, 2001: Some Hijackers Transit London on Way to US, One or More Apparently on British Watch List

Mohand Alshehri, apparently in Afghanistan. [Source: As Sahab] Some of the “muscle hijackers” transit London when traveling between Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and the US (see April 11-June 28, 2001 and April 23-June 29, 2001): Satam al Suqami and Waleed Alshehri leave Dubai on April 22, change planes in London, and arrive in Orlando the next day. Majed Moqed and Ahmed Alghamdi fly from Dubai via London to Washington on May 2. Hamza Alghamdi, Ahmed Alnami, and Mohand Alshehri pass through London on their way from Dubai to Miami on May 28. Ahmed Alhaznawi and Wail Alshehri travel from Dubai to Miami via London on June 8. Fayez Ahmed Banihammad and Saeed Alghamdi transit London en route from Dubai to Orlando on June 27. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 42-50 ] There are also some reports that some of the hijackers spend more time in Britain (see January-June 2001 and June 2001). Ahmed Alghamdi is later said to have been on a British watch list and the Sunday Herald will say that he should have been “instantly ‘red-flagged’ by British intelligence” as he passed through Britain. Alghamdi was linked by the FBI to Raed Hijazi, an associate of Osama bin Laden in prison in Jordan for plotting a bombing campaign there, so the British may have watchlisted him based on information from the US. Two other hijackers that may have been on the British watch list are Satam al Suqami and Hamza Alghamdi, who were investigated by US customs together with Ahmed Alghamdi. If Ahmed Alghamdi was watchlisted based on US information, the names of the other two hijackers may have been passed to the British along with his name. Al Suqami and Ahmed Alghamdi are connected to both Hijazi and one of his associates, Nabil al-Marabh, and are reported to be under investigation, starting between autumn 2000 and spring 2001, by US customs and the FBI (see September 2000, Spring 2001 and September 11, 2001). A British intelligence source will say: “There is no way that MI5 and MI6 should have missed these guys. Britain has a history of having Islamic extremists in the country. We should have been watching them.” [SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/30/2001] Alghamdi appears to have been questioned about bin Laden after arriving in the US from London, but he is not stopped from entering the country (see May 2, 2001). According to The Times, the identities of some of the men are in question: “Officials hope that the inquiries in Britain will disclose the true identities of the suicide team. Some are known to have arrived in Britain using false passports and fake identities that they kept for the hijack. There are serious question marks over the identities of at least four of the visitors to Britain.” [LONDON TIMES, 9/26/2001] Entity Tags: Saeed Alghamdi, Wail Alshehri, Mohand Alshehri, Majed Moqed, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Waleed M. Alshehri, Ahmed Alghamdi, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Ahmed Alnami, Hamza Alghamdi, Satam Al Suqami Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism

April 23, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Alnami Obtains Another US Visa, despite Incomplete Application After acquiring a new Saudi passport (see April 21, 2001), future 9/11 hijacker Ahmed Alnami obtains a new US visa at the US consulate in Jeddah, even though he already has a valid US visa in his old passport (see October 28, 2000). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 21 ] The visa is issued by Shayna Steinger, a consular official who apparently issues the 9/11 hijackers with 12 visas (see July 1, 2000) and had issued Alnami’s previous visa. [9/11 COMMISSION, 12/30/2002, PP. 2; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (US DEPARTMENT OF STATE), 1/30/2003] A handwritten note on Alnami’s application indicates that he is interviewed briefly, either by Steinger or another staff member. Previous Visa - Alnami marks the “no” box in response to a question asking if he has ever applied for a US visa previously, but changes his answer to “yes,” possibly due to the brief interaction with Steinger or another consular official. However, he fails to specify when he applied for the visa. Had he done so, it would have been clear that he was applying for another visa long before his previous visa had expired, which would have raised questions. The information about his previous visa is available at the consulate, but is not accessed, as consular workers do not usually examine previous visa issuances, only refusals. Not Interviewed - The 9/11 Commission will later say that Saudis were rarely interviewed at this time. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 21, 184-5 ] However, according to a consular officer serving in Jeddah at the time, while most Saudis may not have been interviewed, “the majority” of males traveling alone aged between 16 and 40 are interviewed and officers are “not shy” of turning them down on security grounds. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 36 ] Suspicious Indicator in Passport - The 9/11 Commission will also suggest that one or more of Alnami’s passports may contain a suspicious indicator of Islamic extremism, but this is not certain (see April 21, 2001 and November 2, 2007). Some of the radicals who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 also had Saudi passports with the same indicator (see Around February 1993). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 563-4; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 14-15 ] Entity Tags: Ahmed Alnami, Shayna Steinger, US Consulate, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Office Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers

April 23-June 29, 2001: 9/11 ‘Muscle’ Hijackers Arrive in US at This Time or Earlier

This Ahmed Al-Haznawi picture is a photocopy of his 2001 US visa application. [Source: 9/11 Commission] The 13 hijackers commonly known as the “muscle” allegedly first arrive in the US. The muscle provides the brute force meant to control the hijacked passengers and protect the pilots. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/30/2001] Yet, according to the 9/11 Commission, these men “were not physically imposing,” with the majority of them between 5 feet 5 and 5 feet 7 tall, “and slender in build.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/16/2004, PP. 8] According to FBI Director Mueller, they all pass through Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and their travel was probably coordinated from abroad by Khalid Almihdhar. [US CONGRESS, 9/26/2002] However, some information contradicts their official arrival dates: April 23: Waleed Alshehri and Satam Al Suqami arrive in Orlando, Florida. Suqami in fact arrived before February 2001. A man named Waleed Alshehri lived with a man named Ahmed Alghamdi in Virginia and Florida between 1997 and 2000. However, it is not clear whether they were the hijackers or just people with the same name (see 1999). [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 9/20/2001] Alshehri appears quite Americanized in the summer of 2001, frequently talking with an apartment mate about football and baseball, even identifying himself a fan of the Florida Marlins baseball team. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/21/2001] May 2: Majed Moqed and Ahmed Alghamdi arrive in Washington. Both actually arrived by mid-March 2001. A man named Ahmed Alghamdi lived with a man named Waleed Alshehri in Florida and Virginia between 1997 and 2000. However, it is not clear whether they were the hijackers or just people with the same name (see 1999). [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 9/20/2001] Alghamdi apparently praises Osama bin Laden to Customs officials while entering the country and Moqed uses an alias (see May 2, 2001). May 28: Mohand Alshehri, Hamza Alghamdi, and Ahmed Alnami allegedly arrive in Miami, Florida. Alnami may have a suspicious indicator of terrorist affiliation in his passport (see April 21, 2001), but this is apparently not noticed by US authorities. The precise state of US knowledge about the indicator at this time is not known (see Around February 1993). The CIA will learn of it no later than 2003, but will still not inform immigration officials then (see February 14, 2003). According to other reports, however, both Mohand Alshehri and Hamza Alghamdi may have arrived by January 2001 (see January or July 28, 2001). June 8: Ahmed Alhaznawi and Wail Alshehri arrive in Miami, Florida. Alhaznawi may have a suspicious indicator of terrorist affiliation in his passport (see Before November 12, 2000), but this is apparently not noticed by US authorities. June 27: Fayez Banihammad and Saeed Alghamdi arrive in Orlando, Florida. June 29: Salem Alhazmi and Abdulaziz Alomari allegedly arrive in New York. According to other reports, however, Alhazmi arrived before February 2001. Alhazmi has a suspicious indicator of terrorist affiliation in his passport (see June 16, 2001), but this is apparently not noticed by US authorities. After entering the US (or, perhaps, reentering), the hijackers arriving at Miami and Orlando airports settle in the Fort Lauderdale, Florida, area along with Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, and Ziad Jarrah. The hijackers, arriving in New York and Virginia, settle in the Paterson, New Jersey, area along with Nawaf Alhazmi and Hani Hanjour. [US CONGRESS, 9/26/2002] Note the FBI’s early conclusion that 11 of these muscle men “did not know they were on a suicide mission.” [OBSERVER, 10/14/2001] CIA Director Tenet’s later claim that they “probably were told little more than that they were headed for a suicide mission inside the United States” [US CONGRESS, 6/18/2002] and reports that they did not know the exact details of the 9/11 plot until shortly before the attack [CBS NEWS, 10/9/2002] are contradicted by video confessions made by all of them in March 2001 (see March 2001). Entity Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohand Alshehri, Majed Moqed, Mohamed Atta, Ziad Jarrah, Saeed Alghamdi, Khalid Almihdhar, Waleed M. Alshehri, Wail Alshehri, Satam Al Suqami, Nawaf Alhazmi, Hani Hanjour, Salem Alhazmi, George J. Tenet, Hamza Alghamdi, Abdulaziz Alomari, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Ahmed Alghamdi, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Ahmed Alnami Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Other 9/11 Hijackers

April 24, 2001: Declassified Documents Reveal US Military Planned for Attacks Against Americans in 1960s to Justify Attacking Cuba

The first lines of the declassified Northwoods document. [Source: Public domain] (click image to enlarge) James Bamford’s book, Body of Secrets, reveals a secret US government plan named Operation Northwoods. All details of the plan come from declassified military documents. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 4/24/2001; BALTIMORE SUN, 4/24/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 4/26/2001; ABC NEWS, 5/1/2001] The heads of the US military, all five Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposed in a 1962 memo to stage attacks against Americans and blame Cuba to create a pretext for invasion. Says one document, “We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.… We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of indignation.” In March 1962, Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented the Operation Northwoods plan to President John Kennedy and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. The plan was rejected. Lemnitzer then sought to destroy all evidence of the plan. [BALTIMORE SUN, 4/24/2001; ABC NEWS, 5/1/2001] Lemnitzer was replaced a few months later, but the Joint Chiefs continued to plan “pretext” operations at least through 1963. [ABC NEWS, 5/1/2001] One suggestion in the plan was to create a remote-controlled drone duplicate of a real civilian aircraft. The real aircraft would be loaded with “selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases,” and then take off with the drone duplicate simultaneously taking off near by. The aircraft with passengers would secretly land at a US military base while the drone continues along the other plane’s flight path. The drone would then be destroyed over Cuba in a way that places the blame on Cuban fighter aircraft. [HARPER'S, 7/1/2001] Bamford says, “Here we are, 40 years afterward, and it’s only now coming out. You just wonder what is going to be exposed 40 years from now.” [INSIGHT, 7/30/2001] Some 9/11 skeptics will claim that the 9/11 attacks could have been orchestrated by elements of the US government, and see Northwoods as an example of how top US officials could hatch such a plot. [OAKLAND TRIBUNE, 3/27/2004] Entity Tags: John F. Kennedy, James Bamford, Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Robert McNamara Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks Category Tags: Warning Signs

April 26, 2001: Hijacker Mohamed Atta Given Ticket for Having No Driver’s License Mohamed Atta is stopped at a random inspection near Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and given a citation for having no driver’s license. He will get a new Florida driver’s license on May 5. However, he will fail to show up for his May 28 court hearing, and a warrant will be issued for his arrest on June 4. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/16/2001; AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 11/12/2001; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 12/14/2001] Police do not check his immigration status, which would require a call to a Law Enforcement Support Center hotline. Had such a call been made, it would have revealed Atta had overstayed his visa. [GOVEXEC, 3/16/2004] An FBI timeline compiled after 9/11 does not mention whether this incident is entered into the NCIC, a nationwide police database. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 138 ] Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Hijacker Contact w Government in US

April 30, 2001: Annual Terrorism Report Says Focusing on Bin Laden Is Mistake; Pakistan and Taliban Are Criticized But Not Punished The US State Department issues its annual report on terrorism. The report cites the role of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and notes the Taliban “continued to provide safe haven for international terrorists, particularly Saudi exile Osama bin Laden and his network.” However, as CNN describes it, “Unlike last year’s report, bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization is mentioned, but the 2001 report does not contain a photograph of bin Laden or a lengthy description of him and the group. A senior State Department official told CNN that the US government made a mistake last year by focusing too tightly on bin Laden and ‘personalizing terrorism… describing parts of the elephant and not the whole beast.’” [CNN, 4/30/2001] The report is unusually critical of Pakistan, noting, “Pakistan increased its support to the Taliban and continued its support to militant groups active in Indian-held Kashmir, such as the Harkat ul-Mujahedeen (HUM), some of which engaged in terrorism.… Credible reporting indicates that Pakistan is providing the Taliban with materiel, fuel, funding, technical assistance, and military advisers. Pakistan has not prevented large numbers of Pakistani nationals from moving into Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban. [Pakistan] also failed to take effective steps to curb the activities of certain madrassas, or religious schools, that serve as recruiting grounds for terrorism.” However, despite this criticism and a further critique that Afghanistan has been the “primary hub” for militants “involved in most major terrorist plots or attacks against the United States in the past 15 years and now engaged in international militant and terrorist acts around the world,” neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan is placed on the official list of countries sponsoring terrorism. The report merely hints that both of them could be added to the list in the next year unless their behavior improves. [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 4/30/2001; CNN, 4/30/2001] In 1999, an unnamed Western diplomat explained to Human Rights Watch that if Pakistan were designated a terrorist state, it would mean the termination of international financial assistance. This would result in the near-collapse of the Pakistani economy, since two-thirds of Pakistan’s budget is funded by international loans and credits. [HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 7/1/2001] Entity Tags: Pakistan, Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, Harkat ul-Mujahedeen, Human Rights Watch, Taliban, US Department of State Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

April 30, 2001: State Department Finds No External Terror Support from Iraqi Government The US State Department’s 2000 annual report states in its section on state-sponsored terrorism that the Iraqi government’s “terrorist” activities consist primarily of its use of violence to silence dissident exiles. The report also notes that Iraq has not supported any militant operations against the West “since its failed plot to assassinate former President Bush in 1993 in Kuwait.” Significantly the report does not tie Iraq to international Islamic militant groups like al-Qaeda. [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 4/30/2001; US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 4/30/2001; NEWSDAY, 12/24/2001] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

April 30, 2001: Wolfowitz Claims that Iraq is Involved in Terrorism and Was Behind 1993 WTC Bombing During a National Security Council deputy principals meeting on April 30, 2001, Paul Wolfowitz is challenged by White House counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke after asserting that Iraq is involved in terrorism. Recalling the meeting, Clarke tells The Guardian in a March 2004 interview: “April was an initial discussion of terrorism policy writ large and at that meeting I said we had to talk about al-Qaeda. And because it was terrorism policy writ large [Paul] Wolfowitz said we have to talk about Iraqi terrorism and I said that’s interesting because there hasn’t been any Iraqi terrorism against the United States. There hasn’t been any for 8 years. And he said something derisive about how I shouldn’t believe the CIA and FBI, that they’ve been wrong. And I said if you know more than I know tell me what it is, because I’ve been doing this for 8 years and I don’t know about any Iraqi-sponsored terrorism against the US since 1993. When I said let’s start talking about bin Laden, he said bin Laden couldn’t possibly have attacked the World Trade Center in ‘93. One little terrorist group like that couldn’t possibly have staged that operation. It must have been Iraq.” [GUARDIAN, 3/23/2004] During the same meeting, Wolfowitz also allegedly dismisses bin Laden and al-Qaeda as a serious threat (see April 30, 2001). Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Paul Wolfowitz Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: 1993 WTC Bombing, Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

April 30, 2001: Wolfowitz in Deputy Secretary Meeting: Who Cares About [Bin Laden]? The Bush administration finally has its first Deputy Secretary-level meeting on terrorism. [TIME, 8/4/2002] According to counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, he advocates that the Northern Alliance needs to be supported in the war against the Taliban, and the Predator drone flights need to resume over Afghanistan so bin Laden can be targeted. [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 231] Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz says the focus on al-Qaeda is wrong. He states, “I just don’t understand why we are beginning by talking about this one man bin Laden,” and “Who cares about a little terrorist in Afghanistan?” Wolfowitz insists the focus should be Iraqi-sponsored terrorism instead. He claims the 1993 attack on the WTC must have been done with help from Iraq, and rejects the CIA’s assertion that there has been no Iraqi-sponsored terrorism against the US since 1993 (see April 30, 2001). (A spokesperson for Wolfowitz later calls Clarke’s account a “fabrication.”) [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 30, 231; NEWSWEEK, 3/22/2004] Wolfowitz repeats these sentiments immediately after 9/11 and tries to argue that the US should attack Iraq. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage agrees with Clarke that al-Qaeda is an important threat. Deputy National Security Adviser Steve Hadley, chairing the meeting, brokers a compromise between Wolfowitz and the others. The group agrees to hold additional meetings focusing on al-Qaeda first (in June and July), but then later look at other terrorism, including any Iraqi terrorism. [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 30, 231-32] Vice President Cheney’s Chief of Staff I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby and Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin also attend the hour-long meeting. [TIME, 8/4/2002] Entity Tags: Stephen J. Hadley, Richard Armitage, Richard A. Clarke, Taliban, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Central Intelligence Agency, John E. McLaughlin, Northern Alliance, Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, Bush administration Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

May 2001: CIA Learns Bin Laden Associates Are Heading to US, Preparing for Martyrdom The Washington Post will later report, “In May 2001, the CIA learned supporters of bin Laden were planning to infiltrate the United States; that seven were on their way to the United States, Canada and Britain; that his key operatives ‘were disappearing while others were preparing for martyrdom,’ and that bin Laden associates ‘were planning attacks in the United States with explosives.’” [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 9/19/2002] This information may be related to a warning given by captured al-Qaeda operative Ahmed Ressam this month that al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida is seeking Canadian passports for himself and five other top militants in order to plant explosives in US cities (see May 30, 2001 and May 2001). [CALGARY HERALD, 4/3/2002] It is not known if the seven traveling to the US, Canada, and Britain refer to any of the 9/11 hijackers, but 11 of the hijackers travel to the US in May and June (see April 23-June 29, 2001), stopping in Britain along the way (see January-June 2001). Investigators will later say that they are not sure if the aliases Zubaida wanted on the Canadian passports could have been used by some of the 9/11 hijackers. [CALGARY HERALD, 4/3/2002] Entity Tags: Abu Zubaida, Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, Central Intelligence Agency, Ahmed Ressam Category Tags: Warning Signs, Abu Zubaida

May 2001: US Military Drafts Scenario for Afghan Operation

Gen. William F. Kernan (2002) [Source: Wikipedia] General William Kernan, commander in chief of the Joint Forces Command, later mentions: “The details of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan which fought the Taliban and al-Qaeda after the September 11 attacks, were largely taken from a scenario examined by Central Command in May 2001.” [AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 7/23/2002] This seems to contradict other accounts suggesting the military made no Afghanistan invasion plans or preparations after Bush took office (see December 2000). Entity Tags: William Kernan, Al-Qaeda, Taliban, George W. Bush Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden

May 2001: US Army Sees ‘Military Implications’ for Caspian Sea Oil Pipelines An article published in Military Review, which bills itself as “the professional journal for the US Army,” states, “the Caspian Sea appears to be sitting on yet another sea—a sea of hydrocarbons.… The presence of these oil reserves and the possibility of their export raises new strategic concerns for the United States and other Western industrial powers. As oil companies build oil pipelines from the Caucasus and Central Asia to supply Japan and the West, these strategic concerns gain military implications.” [SCOTT, 2007, PP. 20, 281] Entity Tags: US Department of the Army Category Tags: Pipeline Politics, US Dominance

May 2001: Iranian Tells of Plot to Attack WTC An Iranian in custody in New York City tells local police of a plot to attack the WTC. No more details are known. [FOX NEWS, 5/17/2002] Interestingly, an Iranian in prison in Germany will also warn of an attack on the WTC (see Early September 2001), but it is not known if the two cases are related. Entity Tags: World Trade Center Category Tags: Warning Signs

May 2001: Feith, Perle, and Wolfowitz Discuss Iraq Invasion; Scowcroft Initially Favorable According to FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds, “Four months before 9/11”, FBI monitoring overhears Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, Pentagon adviser Richard Perle, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz “discussing with the Turkish ambassador in Washington an arrangement whereby the US would invade Iraq and divide the country.… They were negotiating what Turkey required in exchange for allowing an attack from Turkish soil.” National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, later a critic of the Iraq War, is initially in favor of the plan, but will later drop his support when it becomes clear Turkish demands for control of the Kurdish region in northern Iraq will not be granted. [THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, 11/1/2009] Entity Tags: Sibel Edmonds, Brent Scowcroft, Douglas Feith, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Paul Wolfowitz Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Sibel Edmonds, Pipeline Politics, US Dominance

May 2001: Effort to Keep Able Danger Alive Is Unsuccessful According to a later account by Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, Capt. Scott Phillpott calls him “in desperation” around this time. Able Danger has been effectively shut down, but Phillpott wants to know if he can bring the Able Danger options that had been presented to higher officials in early 2001 (see Early 2001, January-March 2001 and March 2001) and use one of Shaffer’s Stratus Ivy facilities to continue to work. Shaffer claims that he replies, “I tell him with all candor that I would love nothing better than to loan him my facility and work the options with him (to exploit them for both [intelligence] potential and for actual offensive operations) but tell him that my DIA chain of command has directed me to stop all support to him and the project. In good faith, I ask my boss, Col. Mary Moffitt if I can help Scott and exploit the options—and that there would be a DIA quid pro quo of obtaining new ‘lead’ information from the project. She takes offense at me even mentioning Able Danger in this conversation, tells me that I am being insubordinate, and begins the process of removing me from my position as chief of Stratus Ivy. As a direct result of this conversation, she directs that I be ‘moved’ to a desk officer position to oversee Defense [human intelligence] operations in Latin America.” [US CONGRESS, 2/15/2006] Entity Tags: Scott Phillpott, Mary Moffitt, Able Danger, Anthony Shaffer Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Able Danger

May 2001: Bush, Who Has Yet to Take Any Action Against Al-Qaeda, Is Tired of ‘Swatting at Flies’ It is claimed that after a routine briefing by CIA Director Tenet to President Bush regarding the hunt for al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida, Bush complains to National Security Adviser Rice that he is tired of “swatting at flies” and wants a comprehensive plan for attacking terrorism. Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke already has such a plan, but it has been mired in bureaucratic deadlock since January. After this, progress remains slow. [TIME, 8/4/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/24/2004] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, George J. Tenet, Abu Zubaida, Richard A. Clarke, Condoleezza Rice Category Tags: Abu Zubaida, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

May 2001: Medics Train for Airplane Hitting Pentagon The Army’s DiLorenzo Tricare Health Clinic (DTHC) and the Air Force Flight Medicine Clinic, both housed within the Pentagon, hold a tabletop exercise along with Arlington County Emergency Medical Services. The scenario practiced for is of an airplane crashing into the Pentagon’s west side—the same side as is impacted in the attack on 9/11. [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. B17; GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 23 AND 107] Reportedly, the purpose of the exercise is “to fine-tune their emergency preparedness.” [US MEDICINE, 10/2001] According to US Medicine newspaper, the plane in the scenario is a hijacked Boeing 757. [US MEDICINE, 1/2002] (Flight 77, that targets the Pentagon on 9/11, is a 757. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2001] ) But a federally funded report on the response to the Pentagon attack says it is a commuter airplane. [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. B17] The Defense Department’s own book about the Pentagon attack says the plane in this exercise is a twin-engine aircraft (757s, like Flight 77, are twin-engine aircraft), but that it crashes into the Pentagon by accident in the scenario. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2001; GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 107] The idea of a plane hitting the Pentagon was suggested by Colonel John Baxter, the commander of the Air Force Flight Medicine Clinic, who has often been reminded that the Pentagon is on the flight path of nearby Reagan National Airport. The scenario was approved by Air Force Surgeon General Paul Carlton Jr. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 107 AND 109] Baxter and Col. James Geiling, the commander of the DTHC, later say this exercise prepares them well to respond to the Pentagon attack on 9/11. For example, the Air Force Flight Medicine Clinic retools its trauma packs as a result. [US MEDICINE, 10/2001] And, due to the exercise, staffers of both clinics will wear special blue vests on 9/11 labeled “physician,” “nurse,” or “EMT,” to allow for easy identification. [UNIFORMED SERVICES UNIVERSITY, 1/2002 ] Paul Carlton will say, “We learned a lot from that exercise and applied those lessons to September 11.” [MURPHY, 2002, PP. 222] And Major Lorie Brown, the chief nurse of the DTHC, who leads the exercise, will later recall, “The training made a huge difference” on 9/11. [NURSING SPECTRUM, 9/24/2001] The two Pentagon clinics routinely hold mass casualty tabletop exercises. The scenario changes for each drill. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 107] Entity Tags: Air Force Flight Medicine Clinic, Arlington County Emergency Medical Services, John Baxter, Lorie Brown, Paul Carlton, DiLorenzo Tricare Health Clinic, James Geiling, Pentagon Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Military Exercises

May 2001: US and Jordan Let Suspected Al-Qaeda Figure Go Free Khalil Deek, member of an al-Qaeda cell in Anaheim, California, is mysteriously released in Jordan and allowed to go free. Deek had been arrested on suspicions that he masterminded a series of planned millennium attacks in Jordan (see December 11, 1999). Investigators believe he may have masterminded an attempted bombing of the Los Angeles airport as well (see December 15-31, 1999), and in fact US intelligence had been interested in him since the late 1980s (see Late 1980s, December 14-25, 1999, and May 2000). But despite is the seemingly strong evidence against him, he is released this month after mounting a hunger strike. Relatives tell a US newspaper that US government officials pressured Jordan to let him go. [ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, 9/12/2005] Despite the fact that US officials had previously labeled him a terrorist mastermind, they do not protest his release. [ORANGE COUNTY WEEKLY, 6/15/2006] The Jordanian government claims they lacked evidence Deek was aware of terrorist activities. [ORANGE COUNTY WEEKLY, 6/17/2004] The Los Angeles Times reports that he had cooperated with US investigators in deciphering al-Qaeda computer documents. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 3/29/2000] He is deported to the United Arab Emirates. He is rearrested there and held for several days, and then let go again. [ORANGE COUNTY WEEKLY, 5/31/2001] A few days later, Deek emerges at the US embassy in Pakistan with his wife and family. He approaches the embassy gates, asking staffers there help to bring his family back to the US. However, he is only able to speak to someone through an intercom and is not allowed in the building. He is told to come back in two weeks. A newspaper will later comment, “Given that the US government already considered him a dangerous man, it’s not surprising that embassy officials weren’t eager to provide him with travel visas. But it is weird that they didn’t let him inside the building and simply arrest him.” [ORANGE COUNTY WEEKLY, 6/15/2006] It will later be alleged that Deek was actually a mole for the Jordanian government (see Shortly After December 11, 1999). Entity Tags: US intelligence, Jordan, Khalil Deek Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11, Millennium Bomb Plots, Khalil Deek

May 2001: Clinton Impeachment Lawyer Learns About Al-Qaeda Manhattan Attack Warning David Schippers, the House Judiciary Committee’s chief investigator in the Clinton impeachment trial, was hired to represent FBI agent Robert Wright in September 1999 (see August 3, 1999). After 9/11, Schippers will claim that he began privately informing congresspeople about Wright’s investigation into terrorism financing in the US in early 2001, but found little interest (see February-March 2001). Schippers appears to have had different sources than Wright who began telling him about attack warnings. Supposedly, the first warning was based on a secret February 1995 report which stated that bin Laden was planning three attacks on the US: the bombing of a federal building in the heartland of the US, shooting down or blowing up an airplane, and a massive attack in lower Manhattan. Schippers believes the first warning was a prediction of the April 1995 Oklahoma City bombing (see April 19, 1995) and the second was a prediction of the 1996 explosion of TWA Flight 800 (see July 17, 1996-September 1996). In some versions of this warning, the Manhattan attack was meant to be caused by a “dirty bomb” - explosives mixed with radioactive materials - but other accounts described the use of planes as weapons instead. He says one of his sources for this early warning was Yossef Bodansky, director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare. Schippers will claim that his sources continued to uncover further information. The Manhattan warning “had started out just a general threat, but they narrowed it and narrowed it, more and more with time,” until the “same people who came out with the first warning” tell him in May 2001 that “an attack on lower Manhattan is imminent.” Schippers speaks to several FBI agents directly, and hears that “there are [other agents] all over the country who are frustrated and just waiting to come out.” They are frustrated by “a bureaucratic elite in Washington short-stopping information,” which gives “terrorism a free reign in the United States.” Schippers later claims that some FBI agents later told him that before 9/11, “they had [Mohamed] Atta in their sights.” They also had attempted to “check out” the names and activities of “very strange characters training at flight schools.” He will claim that “FBI agents in Chicago and Minnesota” tell him “there [is] going to be an attack on lower Manhattan.” Schippers will later claim that he will attempt to contact Attorney General John Ashcroft and other politicians about this warning in coming months, but that they will show little interest (see July-Late August 2001). [WORLDNETDAILY, 10/21/2001; INDIANAPOLIS STAR, 5/18/2002; AHMED, 2004, PP. 258-260] Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Yossef Bodansky, Al-Qaeda, David Schippers, William Jefferson (“Bill”) Clinton, John Ashcroft, Robert Wright, Federal Bureau of Investigation Category Tags: Warning Signs, Terrorism Financing, Robert Wright and Vulgar Betrayal

May 2001: NSA Analyst Warns of Terrorist Planes into Buildings Plot; But Described as ‘Obsessed’ By Superiors A National Security (NSA) linguist who only allows himself to be identified to the media as “J” warns his superiors at the agency that terrorists may be planning to hijack passenger planes to ram into buildings, and that security measures need to be implemented to prevent this. Instead, J is ordered to undergo psychiatric evaluation. (J was given similar treatment in another instance eight years before; see September 11, 1993). J will later claim that NSA officials dismissed his warnings, and instead labeled him as “obsessed” with the idea of a “kamikaze” threat because of time he had spent in Japan. In 2006, J will say that any time his analysis countered conventional wisdom, he was ordered to undergo psychiatric evaluations. He will eventually develop an irregular heartbeat due to the stress of anticipating further retaliatory, potentially career-damaging psychological evaluations. “I believe it was retaliation, but how do you prove that?” he will ask. J will spend his last decade at NSA with no promotion or raise, and will say that another linguist left the agency during that time out of disgust with what was happening. “Who was going to listen to us? Who could do anything anyway?” he asks in 2006. In 2006, other current and former NSA officials will claim that the NSA routinely uses unfavorable psychological evaluations to retaliate against whistleblowers and those employees who come into conflict with superiors (see January 25-26, 2006). [CYBERCAST NEWS SERVICE, 1/26/2006] It is not clear whether J’s warnings are related to the 33 other warnings picked up by NSA analysts during this same time period (see May-July 2001.) Entity Tags: National Security Agency, “J” Category Tags: Warning Signs, Remote Surveillance

May 2001: Tenet Secretly Visits Pakistan, but ISI Director Refuses to Share Information about Bin Laden

Richard Armitage. [Source: NATO] Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, a former covert operative and Navy Seal, travels to India on a publicized tour while CIA Director Tenet makes a quiet visit to Pakistan to meet with President Pervez Musharraf. Armitage has long and deep Pakistani intelligence connections (as well as a role in the Iran-Contra affair). While in Pakistan, Tenet, in what was described as “an unusually long meeting,” also secretly meets with his Pakistani counterpart, ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed. [SAPRA (NEW DELHI), 5/22/2001] According to a senior ISI officer in 2006, Tenet urges Mahmood to trade information on Osama bin Laden. However, Mahmood does not cooperate. [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 309, 520] Entity Tags: Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Armitage, George J. Tenet, Mahmood Ahmed, Pervez Musharraf Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Mahmood Ahmed

May 2001: Report Warns of Al-Qaeda Infiltration from Canada US intelligence obtains information that al-Qaeda is planning to infiltrate the US from Canada and carry out an operation using high explosives. The report does not say exactly where, when, or how an attack might occur. Two months later, the information is shared with the FBI, the INS, the US Customs Service, and the State Department, and it will be shared with President Bush in August. [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 9/19/2002] This information could come from captured al-Qaeda operative Ahmed Ressam, who warns around this month that al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida has been seeking Canadian passports as part of a plot to attack the US, possibly by planting explosives in several US cities (see May 30, 2001 and May 2001). [CALGARY HERALD, 4/3/2002] Entity Tags: US Customs Service, George W. Bush, US Department of State, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Ahmed Ressam, Al-Qaeda, Abu Zubaida, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation Category Tags: Warning Signs, Abu Zubaida

May 2001: CIA Official Connected to Cases of Moussaoui and 9/11 Hijackers Starts Helping FBI Tom Wilshire, a former deputy chief of Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, is detailed to the FBI to help with its counterterrorism work. Wilshire was involved in the failure to watchlist Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar during the al-Qaeda Malaysia summit (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000), and will also be involved in the failed search for them in the summer of 2001 (see May 15, 2001, Late May, 2001, and July 13, 2001), as well as the failure to obtain a search warrant for Zacarias Moussaoui’s belongings (see August 24, 2001). He acts as the CIA’s chief intelligence representative to Michael Rolince, head of the Bureau’s International Terrorism Operations Section. His primary role is apparently to help the FBI exploit information for intelligence purposes. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 282-348 ] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Alec Station, Michael Rolince, Tom Wilshire, International Terrorism Operations Section Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Zacarias Moussaoui, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

May 2001: Hijackers Take Advantage of New, Anonymous Visa Express Procedure

A portion of Salem Alhazmi’s New Jersey identification card. [Source: 9/11 Commission] (click image to enlarge) The US introduces the “Visa Express” program in Saudi Arabia, which allows any Saudi Arabian to obtain a visa through his or her travel agent instead of appearing at a consulate in person. An official later states, “The issuing officer has no idea whether the person applying for the visa is actually the person in the documents and application.” [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 12/12/2001; US CONGRESS, 9/20/2002] At the time, warnings of an attack against the US led by the Saudi Osama bin Laden are higher than they had ever been before— “off the charts” as one senator later puts it. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 5/18/2002; US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] A terrorism conference had recently concluded that Saudi Arabia was one of four top nationalities in al-Qaeda. [STAR-TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS), 5/19/2002] Suspect Travel Agency - Ten Saudi travel agency companies are allowed to issue US visas as part of the program. One company, Fursan Travel and Tourism, is a subsidiary of Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp., a multibillion Saudi banking conglomerate. Fursan is also the only one out of the ten deputized to handle the collection and initial processing of US visas. After 9/11, the CIA will suggest taking action against Al Rajhi for its suspected support of Islamist militancy, but the Bush Administration will decide not to do anything (see Mid-2003 and Mid-2003). It is believed that al-Qaeda and other militant groups advised their operatives to use Al Rajhi for their banking needs (see Before September 11, 2001). [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/13/2003] Used by 9/11 Plotters - Five hijackers—Khalid Almihdhar, Abdulaziz Alomari, Salem Alhazmi, Saeed Alghamdi, and Fayez Ahmed Banihammad—use Visa Express over the next month to enter the US. [US CONGRESS, 9/20/2002] Alomari has a bank account with Al Rajhi, but it is unknown if he or any of the other hijackers use Fursan, the Al Rajhi subsidiary, since the names of travel agencies do not appear on copies of the hijackers’ visa applications that are later made public. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/13/2003] Even 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed will successfully get a US Visa through the “Visa Express” program in July (using a false name but real photograph), despite a posted $2 million reward for his capture. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 1/27/2004] Saudi Visas Almost Never Rejected - Only three percent of Saudi visa applicants are turned down by US consular officers in fiscal 2000 and 2001. In contrast, about 25 percent of US visa seekers worldwide are rejected. Acceptance is even more difficult for applicants from countries alleged to have ties to terrorism such as Iraq or Iran. [WASHINGTON POST, 10/31/2001] The widely criticized program is finally canceled in July 2002, after a public outcry. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/13/2003] Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Khalid Almihdhar, Fursan Travel and Tourism, Salem Alhazmi, Abdulaziz Alomari, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Saudi Arabia, Osama bin Laden, Saeed Alghamdi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Other 9/11 Hijackers, Saudi Arabia

May 2001: Associate Sends Atta $1,000 from Germany

Kay Nehm [Source: Generalbundesanwalt] An associate of the hijackers named Mounir El Motassadeq sends $1,000 to an account of Mohamed Atta in Florida. The money is sent from an account of Marwan Alshehhi in Germany for which El Motassadeq has a power of attorney. This transaction is not mentioned by US authorities, but is disclosed by Kay Nehm, a prosecutor in the case against Motassadeq in Germany. Motassadeq will later be convicted for membership of al-Qaeda (see August 19, 2005). [DAWN (KARACHI), 9/1/2002; CNN, 2/19/2003 SOURCES: KAY NEHM] Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Mounir El Motassadeq, Kay Nehm, Marwan Alshehhi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Al-Qaeda in Germany

May-June 2001: Muslim Convert Inadvertently Learns of 9/11 Plot

John Walker Lindh. [Source: Alexandria, Virginia, Sheriff's Department] John Walker Lindh, a young Caucasian man from California who has converted to Islam, travels to Peshawar, Pakistan, in an attempt to fight for Islamic causes. He had been studying the Koran for about six months elsewhere in Pakistan, but otherwise had no particularly special training, qualifications, or connections. Within days, he is accepted into al-Qaeda and sent to the Al Farooq training camp in Afghanistan. Seven other US citizens are already training there (see April-August 2001). He inadvertently learns details of the 9/11 attacks. In June, he is told by an instructor that “bin Laden had sent forth some fifty people to carry out twenty suicide terrorist operations against the United States and Israel.” He learns that the 9/11 plot is to consist of five attacks, not the four that actually occur. The other fifteen operations are to take place later. He is asked if he wants to participate in a suicide mission, but declines. [MAHONEY, 2003, PP. 162, 216; BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 234-36] Author James Bamford comments, “The decision to keep CIA employees at arm’s length from [al-Qaeda] was a serious mistake. At the same moment the CIA was convinced al-Qaeda was impenetrable, a number of American citizens were secretly joining al-Qaeda in Afghanistan—and being welcomed with open arms.” [BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 161] Entity Tags: Al Farooq training camp, John Walker Lindh, Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, James Bamford, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden

May-July 2001: No Cabinet Level Meetings on Terrorism Despite New Warnings Around this time, intercepts from Afghanistan warn that al-Qaeda could attack an American target in late June or on the July 4 holiday. However, the White House’s Cabinet-level principals group does not meet to discuss this prospect. This group also fails to meet after intelligence analysts overhear conversations from an al-Qaeda cell in Milan suggesting that bin Laden’s agents might be plotting to kill Bush at the European summit in Genoa, Italy, in late July (see July 20-22, 2001). In fact, the group will only hold one meeting on terrorism before 9/11 (see September 4, 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 12/30/2001] According to 9/11 Commissioner Tim Roemer, before 9/11 the principals group met 32 times on other issues, such as Iraq, Russia, China, the Middle East, and missile defense. [EDITOR & PUBLISHER, 10/1/2006] By comparison, the principals group met to discuss terrorism around once a week between 1998 and 2000 under Clinton (see Late August 1998-November 2000). [NEW YORK TIMES, 12/30/2001] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

May-July 2001: NSA Picks Up Word of ‘Imminent Terrorist Attacks’ Over a two-month period, the NSA reports that “at least 33 communications indicating a possible, imminent terrorist attack.” None of these reports provide any specific information on where, when, or how an attack might occur. These reports are widely disseminated to other intelligence agencies. [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002; MSNBC, 9/18/2002] National Security Adviser Rice later will read what she calls “chatter that was picked up in [2001s] spring and summer. ‘Unbelievable news coming in weeks,’ said one. ‘A big event… there will be a very, very, very, very big uproar.’ ‘There will be attacks in the near future.’” [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2004] The NSA director will claim in 2002 that all of the warnings were red herrings not related to the 9/11 attacks. [US CONGRESS, 10/17/2002] However, in 2004 it will be revealed that the 9/11 attacks were originally planned to take place between May and July, but were delayed to September (see May-July 2001). Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, National Security Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Remote Surveillance, Key Warnings

May-July 2001: 9/11 Attacks Originally Planned for Early Date In 2001, bin Laden apparently pressures Khalid Shaikh Mohammed for an attack date earlier than 9/11. According to information obtained from the 9/11 Commission (apparently based on a prison interrogation of Mohammed), bin Laden first requests an attack date of May 12, 2001, the seven-month anniversary of the USS Cole bombing. Then, when bin Laden learns from the media that Israel’s Prime Minister Ariel Sharon would be visiting the White House in June or July 2001, he attempts once more to accelerate the operation to coincide with his visit. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/16/2004] The surge of warnings around this time could be related to these original preparations. By mid-July, US intelligence will learn of this delay (see July 13, 2001). Entity Tags: USS Cole, Ariel Sharon, Osama bin Laden, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Osama Bin Laden

May-August 2001: Nurse Witnesses Hijackers at Rehab Clinic Owned by Convicted Felon; Fired After 9/11 for Speaking to FBI

Eileen Luongo. [Source: CNN] A nurse at a drug rehabilitation clinic in a suburb of Miami allegedly witnesses several 9/11 hijackers using one of the clinic’s computers. Eileen Luongo, the director of nursing at the Seawinds Healthcare Services in Miami Shores, sees Mohamed Atta at the center in May. She says, “His features were so striking I stared at him for like two minutes and he stared back at me.” In August, she claims, she sees three other alleged 9/11 hijackers there: Marwan Alshehhi, Satam Al Suqami, and Waleed Alshehri. She spends 45 minutes with them after they come into her office to write a letter on a computer. She says, “They just came in like they knew where they were going and they had been there before.” Luongo later says she wondered if the men were acquaintances of the center’s Egyptian owner, Mohammed Ibrahim, or his relatives. [MIAMI HERALD, 11/29/2001; CNN, 11/30/2001; FOX NEWS, 12/7/2001] Ibrahim, according to the Miami New Times, is a “convicted felon and charming con man,” who, despite a dubious past, “remains remarkably unhindered by legal considerations and is constantly acquiring properties and embarking on new business ventures.” Since autumn 2000, unknown armed men have occasionally been witnessed showing up at Seawinds, such as a Cuban man who drove up and said to a member of staff, “Tell your boss I’m gonna kill him if he doesn’t pay me.” Furthermore, according to its former medical director Dr. Evan Zimmer, the clinic does not have the necessary licenses for the treatments it administers. [MIAMI NEW TIMES, 2/22/2001] Ibrahim is deported from the US in June 2001 and Seawinds will close three months later. After seeing photos of the suspected hijackers in a newspaper in late September 2001, Eileen Luongo will contact the FBI and report her encounters with four of them. Agents will meet her at Fort Lauderdale Hospital, where she works part-time. FBI spokeswoman Judy Orihuela says Luongo’s information provides “credible leads we needed to follow up on.” Yet immediately after she meets the agents, Luongo will be fired for doing so. At the time, the hospital will be under investigation by the FBI itself for possible health care fraud. [MIAMI HERALD, 11/29/2001; CNN, 11/30/2001; CNN, 11/30/2001] Entity Tags: Seawinds Healthcare Services, Waleed M. Alshehri, Satam Al Suqami, Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohammed Ibrahim, Eileen Luongo Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Other 9/11 Hijackers

After April 2001: Italian Authorities Uncover Extremists’ Route to Afghanistan Following the arrest of extremists based around Milan, Italy, in April 2001 (see 2000-April 2001 and Early 2000-2001), local authorities begin to investigate associates of the arrested men. They find that when the group wants to send people to training camps in Afghanistan, this is arranged through two people based at the Islamic Cultural Institute, a well-known radical mosque in Milan. The two men who take care of the arrangements are Abdelhalim Remadna, an Algerian secretary of the mosque’s imam, and a Moroccan named Yassin Chekkouri, both of whom live inside the mosque and almost never leave. After several months of investigation, the authorities find them to be key players in a sophisticated network that is recruiting hundreds of European Muslims for al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. They also find that Remadna communicates frequently with a man named Abu Jaffa (a.k.a. Abu Jafar al-Jaziri), who runs a guesthouse for Algerian militants in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, and that the two of them coordinate the trainees’ movements. The group does not use the usual route for trainees through Pakistan, as it is aware Pakistani stamps in a passport indicate an affiliation with al-Qaeda. Instead, volunteers travel through Turkey and Iran. Members of Remadna’s network say that Iran provides “complete cooperation” with this. Remadna provides the volunteers with addresses of hotels and safe houses, where members of the network meet them and help them cross from Iran into Afghanistan. By analyzing phone traffic, the authorities find that militants from at least six European countries rely on Remadna to reach the Afghan camps. [VIDINO, 2006, PP. 219-221] Entity Tags: Yassin Chekkouri, Abu Jaffa, Abdelhalim Remadna, Islamic Cultural Institute Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Italy, Remote Surveillance

May 1, 2001: Hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi Tells Virginia Police He Was Mugged Hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi is mugged outside of his apartment in Alexandria, Virginia, by an “unknown black male.” He files a police report about this and gives his correct name and local address. He reports that he had seen his alleged assailant outside of his apartment almost every day for the previous two weeks. This information in inputted into the NCIC, a widely used nationwide police database. In August 2001, Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar will be watchlisted and an FBI agent will begin looking for them in the US (see September 4-5, 2001). But, as one news report will later note, the agent “never perform[s] one of the most basic tasks of a police manhunt. He never [runs] Almihdhar or Alhazmi through the NCIC computer” (see September 5, 2001). [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 139 ] A police officer takes a statement from Alhazmi in his apartment, but Alhazmi signs a release indicating he does not want the incident investigated. [US CONGRESS, 9/26/2002; SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, 9/27/2002] He has been in the country illegally since January 2001. [US CONGRESS, 9/20/2002] Entity Tags: National Crime Information Center, Nawaf Alhazmi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Hijacker Contact w Government in US

May 1, 2001: FBI Director Louis Freeh Announces Resignation Louis Freeh, FBI Director since September 1993 (see September 1993), unexpectedly announces his resignation. He will continue to serve until June 25. Assistant Director Thomas Pickard will serve as acting director until Robert Mueller will take over in early September 2001 (see September 4, 2001). [BBC, 5/1/2001] The BBC reports, “Mr. Freeh did not give specific reasons for his decision to leave, but he had been the target of criticism following the arrest in February [2001] of Robert Hanssen, an FBI agent accused of working for Moscow for more than 15 years.” [BBC, 7/5/2001] Entity Tags: Louis J. Freeh, Thomas Pickard Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

May 1, 2001-September 11, 2001: FAA Briefs Airlines on Security, But Only About Overseas Threats The FAA conducts 27 briefings for airline companies in this time period. However, each briefing only addresses hijacking threats overseas. This is despite the fact that from March to May, the FAA conducted briefings for US airports that raised concerns about hijackings in the domestic US, and even told airports that if hijackers wanted to end a hijacking with a suicidal “spectacular explosion” it would make more sense to do it in the domestic US (see March-May 2001). Also during roughly the same May to September time period, about half of the FAA’s daily intelligence briefings mention bin Laden or al-Qaeda, and one of those specifically referred to an al-Qaeda plot using planes as weapons. Even though some of these mentions are connected to domestic threats, airlines are only briefed about the overseas threats (see April 1, 2001-September 10, 2001). [NEW JERSEY STAR-LEDGER, 2/11/2005; NEWSDAY, 2/11/2005] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, US Air Security

May 1-July 18, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Open More Florida Bank Accounts

Waleed Alshehri. [Source: FBI] The 9/11 hijackers open nine new SunTrust bank accounts in Florida. One is opened by hijacker pilot Ziad Jarrah, the others by the newly arrived hijackers: Satam Al Suqami and Waleed Alshehri open a joint account on May 1 with a $9,000 deposit; [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 136 ] Ziad Jarrah opens an account on May 15; Ahmed Alnami, Hamza Alghamdi, and Mohand Alshehri open accounts on June 1; Wail Alshehri opens an account on June 18; Saeed Alghamdi and Ahmed Alhaznawi open accounts on July 12; Fayez Ahmed Banihammad opens an account on July 18. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 3, 19 ] Many of the hijackers also obtain Florida driver’s licenses and ID cards at the same time (see April 12-September 7, 2001). Entity Tags: Wail Alshehri, Ziad Jarrah, Waleed M. Alshehri, Satam Al Suqami, SunTrust Bank, Mohand Alshehri, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Ahmed Alnami, Hamza Alghamdi, Saeed Alghamdi, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Ziad Jarrah, Other 9/11 Hijackers

May 2, 2001: Hijacker Atta Seen with Al-Qaeda Operative in Miami

Adnan Shukrijumah. [Source: FBI] Mohamed Atta, Adnan Shukrijumah, and another man go to the Miami District Immigration Office to request a visa extension for the third man, whose identity is not known but who is believed to be Ziad Jarrah. The man received only a six-month visa, while Atta received one for eight months after returning from Europe in January 2001 (see January 10, 2001). The inspector rejects the request, and instead decides that Atta was given an incorrect length of stay and rolls back his visa’s expiry date to July 9, 2001. Atta is quiet and polite throughout and even thanks her at the end, despite his visa having been shortened by two months. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 22-3 ] After 9/11, both Mohamed Atta and Adnan Shukrijumah are identified by the immigration officer as two of the men who visited her office. Upon seeing Shukrijumah’s photo, she will say that she is “75 percent sure” it is him, and will provide a description that matches his profile. At this time, Shukrijumah is being investigated by the FBI and is thought to be a well-connected al-Qaeda operative (see November 2000-Spring 2002, (Spring 2001), April-May 2001, and Late March 2003 and After). Atta and Marwan Alshehhi may also attend a Florida mosque run by Shukrijumah’s father (see 2000-2001). But the immigration officer will not be able to identify the third man. The 9/11 Commission will believe that he was Ziad Jarrah. Jarrah entered the US in January 2001 with a six-month tourist visa, left the States in February, and then returned as a business visitor with a visa for three and a half months (see March 30-April 13, 2001). Another reason to believe that this third man may have been Jarrah is that Atta and Jarrah are known to have been together on this date, for DMV records show that the two obtained drivers’ licenses later in the day. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 40-1 ] Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Adnan Shukrijumah, Ziad Jarrah Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Key Hijacker Events, Hijacker Contact w Government in US

May 2, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Ahmed Alghamdi Is Not Stopped from Entering US Despite Praising Bin Laden to Customs Officials and Customs Investigation

Ahmed Alghamdi praised Osama bin Laden to a US immigration official. [Source: US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division] 9/11 Hijackers Majed Moqed and Ahmed Alghamdi arrive in Washington, DC, on the same flight from London. Alghamdi tells the immigration inspector that Osama bin Laden is a good Muslim and that the media distorts facts about him, but is nevertheless allowed into the country. This incident will not be mentioned in the main 9/11 Commission Report or the Commission’s Terrorist Travel Monograph, but is mentioned in an FBI timeline of hijacker movements that the 9/11 Commission will frequently use as a source. Both Alghamdi and Moqed declare over $10,000 in cash, but the customs inspector who processes Alghamdi does not fill out the documentation required when a person brings in more than $10,000. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 139 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 528; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 22 ] Shortly after 9/11, the New York Times, Washington Post, and other newspapers will report that by the spring of 2001, US customs was investigating Alghamdi and two other future 9/11 hijackers for their connections to known al-Qaeda operatives (see Spring 2001). One British newspaper will note that Alghamdi should have been “instantly ‘red-flagged’ by British intelligence” as he passed through London on his way to the US because of a warning about his links to al-Qaeda (see April 22-June 27, 2001). It will not be explained how Alghamdi is able to pass through Britain and US customs, even as he is openly praising bin Laden. Majed Moqed apparently is not stopped while passing through customs. However the FBI will later note that he uses the alias Mashaanmoged Mayed on the flight manifest before returning to the Moqed name when passing through customs. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 139 ] Entity Tags: Majed Moqed, US Customs Service, Ahmed Alghamdi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Other 9/11 Hijackers, Hijacker Contact w Government in US

May 2-3, 2001: Bush Told Bin Laden’s Public Comments Suggest New Attack A Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) about bin Laden sent to top White House officials on May 3, 2001, is entitled, “Bin Laden Public Profile May Presage Attack.” Apparently it suggests that recent public comments by bin Laden could be hinting at future attacks, but details of what exactly he said or did to cause this warning have not be made public. The New York Times will later report that President Bush and Vice President Cheney were among those who received this warning. Since SEIBs are typically based on the previous day’s President Daily Briefings (see January 20-September 10, 2001), President Bush was probably informed about this warning on May 2. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 255; US DISTRICT COURT OF EASTERN VIRGINIA, 5/4/2006, PP. 2 ] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, White House Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Key Warnings, Presidential Level Warnings

May 6-September 6, 2001: Some Hijackers Work Out at Gyms, Some Merely Hang Out

Ziad Jarrah’s computer record at the US1 Fitness gym. [Source: Patrick Durand/ Corbis] The hijackers work out at various gyms, presumably getting in shape for the hijacking. Ziad Jarrah appears to train intensively from May to August, and Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi also take exercising very seriously. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/20/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/23/2001] However, these three are presumably pilots who would need the training the least. For instance, Jarrah’s trainer says, “If he wasn’t one of the pilots, he would have done quite well in thwarting the passengers from attacking.” [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/20/2001] From September 2-6, Flight 77 hijackers Hani Hanjour, Majed Moqed, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Salem Alhazmi show up several times at a Gold’s Gym in Greenbelt, Maryland, signing the register with their real names and paying in cash. According to a Gold’s regional manager, they “seemed not to really know what they were doing” when using the weight machines. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/19/2001; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/20/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/21/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001] Three others—Waleed Alshehri, Wail Alshehri and Satam Al Suqami— “simply clustered around a small circuit of machines, never asking for help and, according to a trainer, never pushing any weights. ‘You know, I don’t actually remember them ever doing anything… They would just stand around and watch people.’” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/23/2001] Those three also had a one month membership in Florida—whether they ever actually worked out there is unknown. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/20/2001] Entity Tags: Satam Al Suqami, Ziad Jarrah, Waleed M. Alshehri, Salem Alhazmi, Wail Alshehri, Mohamed Atta, Nawaf Alhazmi, Majed Moqed, Central Intelligence Agency, Hani Hanjour, Marwan Alshehhi, Khalid Almihdhar Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Ziad Jarrah, Other 9/11 Hijackers

May 7-July 24, 2001: Risk Management Specialist Warns Senator John Kerry of Possible ‘Coordinated Attack’

Brian Sullivan. [Source: PBS] Brian Sullivan, a retired Federal Aviation Administration risk management specialist, writes a letter to Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.), concerned about an alarming lack of security at Boston’s Logan Airport. Flights 11 and 175 take off from Logan on 9/11. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/14/2001; VILLAGE VOICE, 9/15/2004] The previous night a local TV station aired a report of an undercover investigation, which found that, nine times out of 10, a crew was able to get knives and other weapons through Logan’s security checkpoints, including the ones later used by the 9/11 hijackers. Sullivan writes: “With the concept of jihad, do you think it would be difficult for a determined terrorist to get on a plane and destroy himself and all other passengers? Think what the result would be of a coordinated attack which took down several domestic flights on the same day. With our current screening, this is more than possible. It is almost likely.” Following his letter, Sullivan has a videotape of the TV investigation hand-delivered to Kerry’s office. [INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, 6/17/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/11/2004, PP. 4; NEW YORK POST, 3/15/2004] After 9/11, Kerry will say that his response was to pass the letter and videotape to the General Accounting Office, and consequently it began an undercover investigation into the matter. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/14/2001; BOSTON GLOBE, 9/15/2001] Sullivan will confirm Kerry having responded to his letter, and having asked the Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General to look into the matter. He comments, “I think Sen. Kerry did get it to the right people and they were about to take action.” [MSNBC, 9/16/2001] However, in the run-up to the 2004 presidential election where Kerry is the Democratic candidate, Sullivan will accuse him of having done “the Pontius Pilate thing and passed the buck.” An article in the right-wing New York Post will claim that Kerry’s only response to Sullivan was a brief letter towards the end of July 2001, and says Sullivan’s letter to him had made clear that the Department of Transportation was ineffective in responding to complaints about security problems. [NEW YORK POST, 3/15/2004] Entity Tags: Logan Airport, Brian Sullivan, John Kerry Category Tags: Warning Signs, US Air Security

May 7, 2001: FBI Told of Plan to Attack Boston, New York, and London A walk-in to an FBI office claims that there is a radical fundamentalist plot to launch attacks on Boston, New York, and London. The 9/11 Commission will later claim that the walk-in’s report was discredited, but it is unknown if this happened before or after 9/11. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 255, 533] A declassified copy of the FBI warning obtained by the Intelwire website in 2008 will shed further light on the warning. Although parts of the warning are redacted, it appears the walk-in claims that three high-ranking al-Qaeda prisoners held in prison in Britain, Khalid al-Fawwaz, Adel Abdel Bary, and Ibrahim Eidarous, would launch the attack if they are extradited to the US. The warning claims that the attack has been planned for several years and operatives are already in the US to carry it out. The plan may involve a boat loaded with explosives or an attack on a large building. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 5/7/2001 ] In August 2001, a different source will also claim to have learned of an attack on New York, possibly the World Trade Center, from the same three prisoners (see August 21, 2001). Entity Tags: Khalid al-Fawwaz, Ibrahim Eidarous, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Adel Abdel Bary Category Tags: Warning Signs

(Between May 7 and June 1, 2001): 9/11 Hijacker Alhaznawi Enters Saudi Arabia, Possibly Tracked by Saudi Authorities 9/11 hijacker Ahmed Alhaznawi enters Saudi Arabia. The exact date on which he does so is unknown, but it must be between May 7, when he arrives in the United Arab Emirates from Pakistan (see April 11-June 28, 2001) and June 1, when he leaves Saudi Arabia (see June 1, 2001). [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 151 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 42-50 ] According to the 9/11 Commission, Alhaznawi may have had a passport with an indicator of Islamic extremism (see Before November 12, 2000). Such indicators were used by the Saudi authorities to track some of the hijackers before 9/11 (see November 2, 2007). Entity Tags: Ahmed Alhaznawi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers

May 7-24, 2001: Military Exercise Predicts War on Terror The Joint Experimentation Directorate of the US Joint Forces Command, in partnership with US Central Command and US Special Operations Command, conducts a three-week exercise called Unified Vision 2001 (UV 01). Over 40 organizations and 350 personnel from all branches of the armed services and other federal agencies participate. [US JOINT FORCES COMMAND, 6/25/2001; AEROSPACE AMERICA, 12/2001; US CONGRESS, 4/9/2002; ARKIN, 2005, PP. 540] UV 01 tests the ability of the military’s provisional Homeland Security Joint Force to respond, following “chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives for the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia.” It is based around the scenario of a major regional threat coming from the Middle East, requiring a “global deployment into a landlocked country with hostile terrain and a lack of basing and agreements with neighboring countries for US access.” Dave Ozolek, assistant director of the exercise, says, “The threat we portrayed was an unstable and hostile state, but the primary enemy was not the state itself but a transnational actor based out of that area, globally connected, capable and willing to conduct terrorist attacks in the US as part of that campaign.” As the American Forces Press Service will later report, “real events similar to the Unified Vision scenario unfolded in the attacks of Sept. 11. The al-Qaeda is a global terrorist network hosted by an unstable, landlocked Central Asian regime.” Many of the participants in UV 01 will, following 9/11, become war planners and utilize their experiences from the exercise in the resulting military operations. Ozolek will later remark, “Nostradamus couldn’t have nailed the first battle of the next war any closer than we did.… [T]his time we got it right.” He will say, however, that UV 01 did not foresee the severity of terrorist attacks that occurred on 9/11, and involved terrorists attacking US military targets, rather than civilian ones. The Joint Forces Command will refuse to say whether the Pentagon was among these imagined targets. [AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 7/30/2002; WASHINGTON TIMES, 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: Dave Ozolek, Unified Vision, Special Operations Command, US Central Command, US Joint Forces Command Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Military Exercises

May 8, 2001: Cheney to Oversee National Effort for Responding to Domestic Attacks, but No Action Is Taken before 9/11

Vice President Dick Cheney on television, May 8, 2001. [Source: CNN] In a brief statement, President Bush announces that Vice President Dick Cheney will oversee a “coordinated national effort” aimed at integrating the government’s plans for responding to the use of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon within the United States. Bush declares, “Should our efforts to reduce the threat to our country from weapons of mass destruction be less than fully successful, prudence dictates that the United States be fully prepared to deal effectively with the consequences of such a weapon being used here on our soil.” Bush says a new agency within the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), known as the Office of National Preparedness, will be “responsible for implementing the results of those parts of the national effort overseen by Vice President Cheney that deal with consequence management.” The Office of National Preparedness appears to be a reincarnation of FEMA’s old National Preparedness Directorate (NPD), which was disbanded by the Clinton administration in 1993 (see January 1993-October 1994). During the 1980s and early 1990s, the NPD secretly spent billions of dollars preparing for nuclear war and other national emergencies as part of the highly classified Continuity of Government (COG) program (see February 1993, 1982-1991, and April 1, 1979-Present). [COX NEWS SERVICE, 2/22/1993] Under the Bush administration, the Office of National Preparedness (ONP) will apparently take over where the National Preparedness Directorate left off. According to Bush, the ONP “will coordinate all Federal programs dealing with weapons of mass destruction consequence management within the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Justice, and Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other federal agencies.” Cheney, who played a central role in the COG program during the Reagan administration (see 1981-1992 and 1980s), informs CNN, “[O]ne of our biggest threats as a nation” could be “domestic terrorism, but it may also be a terrorist organization overseas or even another state using weapons of mass destruction against the US.… [W]e need to look at this whole area, oftentimes referred to as homeland defense.” According to FEMA, the ONP will be up and running as early as the summer of 2001. President Bush says he “will periodically chair a meeting of the National Security Council to review these efforts.” [CNN, 5/8/2001; WHITE HOUSE, 5/8/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 7/8/2002] Cheney is meant to head a group that will draft a national terrorism response plan by October 1. [CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, 5/5/2001; INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, 6/18/2001] But, according to Barton Gellman of the Washington Post, “Neither Cheney’s review nor Bush’s took place.” [WASHINGTON POST, 1/20/2002] Former Senator Gary Hart (D) later implies that the president assigned this specific role to Cheney in order to prevent Congress from enacting counterterrorism legislation proposed by a bipartisan commission he had co-chaired in January (see January 31, 2001). [SALON, 4/2/2004; SALON, 4/6/2004] In July, two senators will send draft counterterrorism legislation to Cheney’s office, but a day before 9/11, they are told it might be another six months before he gets to it (see September 10, 2001). [NEWSWEEK, 5/27/2002] Cheney’s “National Preparedness Review” is just beginning to hire staff a few days before 9/11 (see September 10, 2001). [CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, 4/15/2004] Entity Tags: National Security Council, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Directorate, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Gary Hart, George W. Bush, Office of National Preparedness Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

May 8-10, 2001: Senate Hearings Discuss Possibility of Terrorist Attack in the US

Senator Pat Roberts. [Source: Publicity photo] Based on concerns that the US is unprepared for a terrorist attack on its soil, the Republican chairmen of three Senate committees—appropriations, armed services and intelligence—arrange three days of hearings to explore how to better coordinate efforts at preventing and responding to terrorist attacks within the United States. Eighteen government officials testify, including CIA Director George Tenet, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill, Attorney General John Ashcroft, and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. Before the hearings commence, Senator Pat Roberts (R-Kan) tells reporters, “The United States is very likely to suffer, on our soil, an attack by a weapon of mass destruction, by a terrorist group or cell. It should come as no surprise this nation is not prepared for such an attack.” [WASHINGTON POST, 5/9/2001; RED CROSS, 5/10/2001] In his testimony at the hearings, John Ashcroft warns, “It is clear that American citizens are the target of choice of international terrorists. Americans comprise only about 5 percent of the world’s population. However, according to State Department statistics, during the decade of the 1990s, 36 percent of all worldwide terrorist acts were directed against US interests. Although most of these attacks occurred overseas, international terrorists have shown themselves willing to reach within our borders to carry out their cowardly acts.” [US CONGRESS. SENATE. APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, 5/9/2001] Yet in a letter describing the agenda of the new administration that he sends to department heads the day after giving this testimony, Ashcroft does not mention terrorism (see May 10, 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 2/28/2002] Also testifying at the hearings, FEMA Director Joe Allbaugh announces he will soon be establishing an Office of National Preparedness to coordinate efforts at responding to terrorist attacks. [WASHINGTON POST, 5/9/2001] On the day the hearings start, President Bush announces that he is putting Vice President Dick Cheney in charge of overseeing a coordinated effort to address the threat posed to the United States by chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons (see May 8, 2001). [WHITE HOUSE, 5/8/2001] Entity Tags: Paul Wolfowitz, Paul O’Neill, John Ashcroft, Joseph M. Allbaugh, Pat Roberts, Colin Powell, George J. Tenet Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Mid-May 2001: CIA Officer Obtains More Information about USS Cole Bombing CIA officer Tom Wilshire, currently assigned to the FBI, discusses al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit with another CIA officer called Clark Shannon, who is assigned to the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center and wrote a report on the USS Cole bombing (see January 2001). Shannon gives Wilshire a timeline of events related to the Cole attack and they discuss Fahad al-Quso, a member of the bombing team in custody at this point (see Early December 2000), and Khallad bin Attash. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 282 ] Around this time, Wilshire also accesses a March 2000 cable about travel to the US by 9/11 hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi and a companion following the summit (see May 15, 2001). According to Margaret Gillespie, an FBI agent on loan to the CIA, Wilshire “had always been interested in the Malaysia summit and he was especially concerned about any potential ties between the USS Cole investigation and the Malaysia summit.” [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] Entity Tags: Tom Wilshire, Nawaf Alhazmi, Clark Shannon, Khalid Almihdhar, Fahad al-Quso, Margaret Gillespie Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, 2000 USS Cole Bombing

May 10, 2001: Attorney General Ashcroft Omits Counterterrorism from List of Goals Attorney General John Ashcroft sends a letter to department heads telling them the Justice Department’s new agenda. He cites seven goals, but counterterrorism is not one of them. Yet just one day earlier, he testified before Congress and said of counterterrorism, “The Department of Justice has no higher priority.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 2/28/2002] Dale Watson, head of the FBI’s counterterrorism division, will later recall nearly falling out of his chair when he sees counterterrorism not mentioned as a goal. [9/11 COMMISSION, 4/13/2004] Watson goes to see FBI Deputy Director Thomas Pickard and asks him, “Did you see this?” in what author Philip Shenon will describe as a “disgusted tone.” Pickard finds it hard to believe that Ashcroft’s office had accidentally left terrorism off the list, due to the focus on it elsewhere in the government. “If he didn’t think about it, his staff should have,” Pickard will recall thinking. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 246] In August, a strategic plan will be distributed, listing the same seven goals and 36 objectives. Thirteen objectives are highlighted, but the single objective relating to counterterrorism is not highlighted. [NEW YORK TIMES, 2/28/2002] Entity Tags: Thomas Pickard, Counterterrorism Division, Dale Watson, John Ashcroft, US Department of Justice Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

May 11, 2001: New York City Practices for Biological Terrorist Attack New York City’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM), which is located in World Trade Center Building 7, organizes a bio-terrorism drill where militant extremists attack the city with bubonic plague and Manhattan is quarantined. The “tabletop exercise” is called RED Ex—meaning “Recognition, Evaluation, and Decision-Making Exercise” —and involves about seventy different entities, agencies, and locales from the New York area. Federal legislation adopted in 1997 requires federal, state, and local authorities to conduct regular exercises as part of the Domestic Preparedness Program (DPP). The US Defense Department chose New York City as the venue for RED Ex due to its size, prominence, and level of emergency preparedness. Various high-level officials take part, including Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, OEM Director Richard Sheirer, Fire Commissioner Thomas Von Essen, and Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik. Agencies and organizations that participate include New York City Fire Department, New York City Police Department, the FBI, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The exercise is supposedly so intense that, according to one participant, “five minutes into that drill, everybody forgot it was a drill.” [NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT, 5/11/2001; NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT, 9/5/2001, PP. 74 ; NEW YORK SUN, 12/20/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/18/2004] According to OEM Director Richard Sheirer, “Operation RED Ex provided a proving ground and a great readiness training exercise for the many challenges the city routinely faces, such as weather events, heat emergencies, building collapses, fires, and public safety and health issues.” [NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT, 5/11/2001] In his prepared testimony before the 9/11 Commission, Bernard Kerik later states: “The City, through its OEM, had coordinated plans for many types of emergencies; and those plans were tested frequently.” The types of emergencies they prepared for, he states, included “building collapses” and “plane crashes.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/18/2004 ] Considering Richard Sheirer’s comments, RED Ex appears to be one example where the city tests for building collapses. Details about training for airplanes crashing into New York City remain unknown. The second part of this exercise, called Tripod, is scheduled to take place in New York on September 12, 2001, but is cancelled due to the 9/11 attacks. Entity Tags: New York City Fire Department, US Department of Defense, World Trade Center, Bernard Kerik, Rudolph (“Rudy”) Giuliani, National Air College, New York City Police Department, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Military Exercises

May 11-June 1, 2001: Deposits Made on Hijackers’ Accounts, Source of Money Unknown

An apartment in Hollywood, Florida, where Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi lived for a month from May 13. [Source: Patrick Durand / Corbis] Several large deposits are made on the hijacker pilots’ accounts. The joint SunTrust account of Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi receives $8,600 on May 11, $3,400 on May 22, and $8,000 on June 1, when $3,000 is also deposited in Ziad Jarrah’s SunTrust account. The 9/11 Commission will not identify the source of these funds, but will speculate that they may be from physically imported cash or traveler’s checks the investigation did not identify, or funds that were previously withdrawn, but not spent. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 136-7 ] Alternatively, they may be related to the way in which Mohamed Atta distributes cash transferred to his US bank accounts (see Mid-July - Mid-August 2001). Entity Tags: Ziad Jarrah, 9/11 Commission, Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, SunTrust Bank Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Ziad Jarrah

May 13, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Alnami Leaves Saudi Arabia, Possibly Tracked by Saudi Authorities 9/11 hijacker Ahmed Alnami departs Saudi Arabia, traveling to the United Arab Emirates. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 142 ] According to the 9/11 Commission, Alnami may have had a passport with an indicator of Islamic extremism (see April 21, 2001). Such indicators were used by the Saudi authorities to track some of the hijackers before 9/11 (see November 2, 2007). Entity Tags: Ahmed Alnami Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers

May 15, 2001: CIA Officer Again Accesses Cables about Hijackers’ Travel in Asia and to US, Fails to Alert FBI or Check If They Are Still in US Tom Wilshire, a former deputy chief of the CIA’s bin Laden unit currently detailed to the FBI, accesses a number of cables about travel by 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi in 2000 (see March 5, 2000), but fails to draw the FBI’s attention to this or ask the INS whether they are still in the US. The cables report on Khalid Almihdhar’s travel to Malaysia in January 2000, his US visa, al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit, and Alhazmi’s travel from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to Bangkok, Thailand, with another person, and then to Los Angeles. Wilshire had previously blocked a notification to the FBI that Almihdhar had a US visa (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000). He writes to another CIA analyst about the travel (see May 15, 2001), but does not alert the FBI to the fact Alhazmi came to the US. Neither does he check with the INS to see whether Alhazmi and Almihdhar are in the country. When one of his colleagues finds these cables in late August, she will immediately check with the INS and become alarmed when she is told they are in the US (see August 21-22, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 266-8, 537; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 283 ] The 9/11 Commission will explain his failure to alert the FBI by saying he was focused on a possible terrorist attack in Malaysia: “Despite the US links evident in this traffic, [Wilshire] made no effort to determine whether any of these individuals was in the United States. He did not raise the possibility with his FBI counterpart. He was focused on Malaysia.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 268] Entity Tags: International Terrorism Operations Section, Tom Wilshire, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/11 Commission Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Key Hijacker Events

May 15, 2001: CIA Hides Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit Information from FBI Tom Wilshire, a former deputy chief of the CIA’s bin Laden unit on attachment to the FBI, sends a request to CIA headquarters for the surveillance photos of the January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000). Three days later, Wilshire explains the reason for his interest in an e-mail to a CIA analyst: “I’m interested because Khalid Almihdhar’s two companions also were couriers of a sort, who traveled between [the Far East] and Los Angeles at the same time ([H]azmi and [S]alah).” Hazmi refers to hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi, and Salah Said is the alias al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash traveled under during the summit. Apparently, Wilshire receives the photos. Toward the end of May, a CIA analyst contacts a specialist working at FBI headquarters about the photographs. The CIA wants the FBI analyst to review the photographs and determine if a person who had carried money to Southeast Asia for bin Attash in January 2000 could be identified. The CIA fails to tell the FBI analyst anything about Almihdhar or Alhazmi. Around the same time, the CIA analyst receives an e-mail mentioning Alhazmi’s travel to the US. These two analysts travel to New York the next month and again the CIA analyst fails to divulge what he knows. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 ; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 283 ] Entity Tags: Tom Wilshire, Tawfiq bin Attash, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khalid Almihdhar, Central Intelligence Agency, Counterterrorist Center, Nawaf Alhazmi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar

Mid-May 2001: CIA Manager Says Photo Identification Is Incorrect, Hinting He Has Greater Knowledge of Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit Figures Tom Wilshire, a CIA officer detailed to the FBI, discusses three photographs of al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit (see January 5-8, 2000) with CIA analyst Clark Shannon. Based on an identification by a source inside al-Qaeda, one of the photos is thought to show al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash, who was involved in the bombing of the USS Cole (see January 4, 2001). However, Wilshire tells Shannon that he does not see bin Attash in any of the photos and that he is “missing something” or “someone saw something that wasn’t there.” Wilshire is correct—the photo actually shows 9/11 hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi not bin Attash, but it is unclear why Wilshire would think this; he has apparently not read the cable stating the source identified the man in the photo as bin Attash, but he is aware that bin Attash has been identified in the photo. The three photos will later be passed to the FBI and shown to investigators working on the bombing of the USS Cole (see Mid-May 2001, Late May, 2001, and June 11, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 284-5 ] Entity Tags: Tawfiq bin Attash, Central Intelligence Agency, Clark Shannon, Tom Wilshire Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

Mid-May 2001: CIA Assigns Officer to Examine Malaysia Summit in Her Free Time CIA manager Tom Wilshire recommends that an officer be assigned to review information about al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit, to see if there are any connections between it and the attack against the USS Cole. The task is assigned to Margaret Gillespie, an agent on loan from the FBI. Author Lawrence Wright will comment: “[B]ut [Wilshire] did not reveal that some of the participants might be in the United States. More important, he conveyed none of the urgency reflected in [an e-mail he sent his superiors around this time]; he told [Gillespie] that she should examine the material in her free time. She didn’t get around to it until the end of July.” Perhaps partially due to the request’s lack of urgency, it seemingly takes Gillespie three months to work out what Wilshire already knows: that some of the 9/11 hijackers have entered the US. One reason is that a database search conducted by Gillespie is incomplete (see (Late May-Early June)). However, Gillespie will alert one of Wilshire’s associates at the FBI to the men’s presence in the US in late August (see August 21-22, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 297-8 ; NEW YORKER, 7/10/2006 ] Entity Tags: Margaret Gillespie, Tom Wilshire, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Lawrence Wright, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, 2000 USS Cole Bombing

May 16, 2001: Vice President Cheney’s Energy Plan Foresees Government Helping US Companies Expand into New Markets

National Energy Policy report. [Source: Climate Change Technology Program] Vice President Cheney’s National Energy Policy Development Group releases its energy plan. The plan, titled Reliable, Affordable, and Environmentally Sound Energy for America’s Future, warns that the quantity of oil imported per day will need to rise more than fifty percent to 16.7 million barrels by 2020. “A significant disruption in world oil supplies could adversely affect our economy and our ability to promote key foreign and economic policy objectives, regardless of the level of US dependence on oil imports,” the report explains. To meet the US’s rising demand for oil, the plan calls for expanded oil and gas drilling on public land and the easing of regulatory barriers to building nuclear power plants. [US PRESIDENT, 5/16/2001, PP. 8.5 ; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/9/2002; GUARDIAN, 1/23/2003] Emphasis on Foreign Oil - The report places substantial emphasis on oil from the Persian Gulf region. Its chapter on “strengthening global alliances” states: “By any estimation, Middle East oil producers will remain central to world oil security. The Gulf will be a primary focus of US international energy policy.” [US PRESIDENT, 5/16/2001, PP. 8.5 ] But it also suggests that the US cannot depend exclusively on traditional sources of supply to provide the growing amount of oil that it needs and will have to obtain substantial supplies from new sources, such as the Caspian states, Russia, Africa, and the Atlantic Basin. Additionally, it notes that the US cannot rely on market forces alone to gain access to these added supplies, but will also require a significant effort on the part of government officials to overcome foreign resistance to the outward reach of American energy companies. [JAPAN TODAY, 4/30/2002] Revamping of Clean Air Act - The plan also calls for a clarification of the New Source Review section of the Clean Air Act, which requires energy companies to install state-of-the-art emission control technology whenever it makes major modifications to its plants. The administration’s energy plan gives the Environmental Protection Agency 90 days to review NSR and determine whether it is discouraging companies from constructing or expanding power plants and refineries. It also instructs the attorney general to review current NSR litigation efforts against utility companies to determine whether those efforts are contributing to the country’s energy problems. “The outcome could determine whether the government drops some cases, approaches others more leniently, or even renegotiates settlements already reached,” the New York Times reports. [US PRESIDENT, 5/16/2001, PP. 8.5 ; NEW YORK TIMES, 5/18/2001] Dodging the EPA - The representative of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on the task force had blocked the recommendation of a technique called “hydraulic fracturing.” Sometimes called “fracking,” the technique, used to extract natural gas from the earth, often contaminates aquifers used for drinking water and irrigation. The recommendation was removed to placate the EPA official, then quietly reinserted into the final draft. Halliburton, Cheney’s former firm, is the US leader in the use of hydraulic fracturing. [DUBOSE AND BERNSTEIN, 2006, PP. 18] Cheney Stayed Largely behind the Scenes - Much of the task force’s work was done by a six-member staff, led by executive director Andrew Lundquist, a former aide to senators Ted Stevens (R-AK) and Frank Murkowski (R-AK). Lundquist served as the Bush-Cheney campaign’s energy expert, earning the nickname “Light Bulb” from the president. Lundquist will leave the Bush administration and become a lobbyist for such firms as British Petroleum, Duke Energy, and the American Petroleum Institute. Much of the report is shaped by Lundquist and his colleagues, who in turn relied heavily on energy company executives and their lobbyists. For himself, Cheney did not meet openly with most of the participants, remaining largely behind the scenes. He did meet with Enron executive Kenneth Lay (see April 17, 2001 and After), with officials from Sandia National Laboratories to discuss their economic models of the energy industry, with energy industry consultants, and with selected Congressmen. Cheney also held meetings with oil executives such as British Petroleum’s John Browne that are not listed on the task force’s calendar. [WASHINGTON POST, 7/18/2007] Controversial Meetings with Energy Executives - Both prior to and after the publication of this report, Cheney and other Task Force officials meet with executives from Enron and other energy companies, including one meeting a month and a half before Enron declares bankruptcy in December 2001 (see After January 20, 2001), Mid-February, 2001, March 21, 2001, March 22, 2001, April 12, 2001, and April 17, 2001). Two separate lawsuits are later filed to reveal details of how the government’s energy policy was formed and whether Enron or other players may have influenced it, but the courts will eventually allow the Bush administration to keep the documents secret (see May 10, 2005). [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/9/2002] Entity Tags: Kenneth Lay, Halliburton, Inc., Environmental Protection Agency, Enron, Andrew Lundquist, Bush administration, American Petroleum Institute, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, British Petroleum, Duke Energy, John Browne Timeline Tags: Bush's Environmental Record, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Peak Oil Category Tags: Pipeline Politics, US Dominance

Mid-May 2001: CIA Withholds Photo of Al-Qaeda Leader from FBI Although three surveillance photographs of al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit are passed to the FBI at this time (see Late May, 2001 and June 11, 2001), another key photograph the CIA has of the meeting is withheld by CIA officers Clark Shannon and Tom Wilshire. The key photograph shows al-Qaeda logistics manager Khallad bin Attash, who commanded the attack on the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000). Author Lawrence Wright will later comment: “Thanks to [FBI agent Ali] Soufan’s interrogation of [USS Cole bomber Fahad al-Quso], the Cole investigators had an active file on Khallad and were preparing to indict him. Knowledge of that fourth photo would likely have prompted [FBI manager John] O’Neill to demand that the CIA turn over all information relating to Khallad and his associates. By withholding the picture of Khallad attending the meeting with the future hijackers [Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi], the CIA may in effect have allowed the September 11th plot to proceed.” [NEW YORKER, 7/10/2006 ] The CIA also has video and even more photos of the meeting (see January 5, 2000 and January 5-8, 2000 and Shortly After), but these are not shared either, and it is unclear how aware Wilshire and Shannon are of this additional material. Entity Tags: Tom Wilshire, Tawfiq bin Attash, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Clark Shannon, Lawrence Wright Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Key Hijacker Events

May 16, 2001: Two 9/11 Hijackers Refused Entry to Bahamas; US Immigration Mistakenly Thinks They Have Left US

Waleed Alshehri. [Source: US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division] 9/11 hijackers Satam Al Suqami and Waleed Alshehri attempt to enter the Bahamas, but are refused entry because they do not have visas. They fly from Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to Freeport, Bahamas, where they have a hotel reservation for three nights, but are turned away by the local authorities and have to return to the US. The 9/11 Commission will speculate that the trip is an unsuccessful attempt to extend Al Suqami’s visa, which is due to expire within days (see May 20, 2001). However, as they are refused entry to the Bahamas, they are regarded as never having left the US and Al Suqami is not given an extension to his permitted length of stay when he returns to Florida. Alshehri is stopped by US customs during pre-clearance in the Bahamas, but he is not searched and his luggage is not X-rayed; the inspection lasts one minute. There is an error regarding Alshehri’s port of departure on his INS record which indicates that he leaves from Fall River, Massachusetts, not Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The two hand over their departure records when they leave, but, since they do not enter the Bahamas, they do not receive new arrival records when they return to the US. This causes INS records to incorrectly indicate that the two are outside the country from this date until 9/11. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 23, 41 ] Entity Tags: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Satam Al Suqami, Waleed M. Alshehri Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, Hijacker Contact w Government in US

May 16, 2001: US Strengthens Military Relations with Central Asian Republics US General Tommy Franks, later to head the US occupation of Afghanistan, visits the capital of Tajikistan. He says the Bush administration considers Tajikistan “a strategically significant country” and offers military aid. This follows a visit by a Department of Defense official earlier in the year. The Guardian later asserts that by this time, “US Rangers were also training special troops in Kyrgyzstan. There were unconfirmed reports that Tajik and Uzbek special troops were training in Alaska and Montana.” [GUARDIAN, 9/26/2001] Entity Tags: Bush administration, Thomas Franks Category Tags: US Dominance

May 16-17, 2001: US Warned Bin Laden Supporters Are Inside US and Planning an Attack On May 16, an anonymous person calls the US embassy in the United Arab Emirates and warns that bin Laden supporters have been in the US and are planning an attack in the US using “high explosives.” The caller mentions that operatives are infiltrating the US from Canada, but there is no mention of when or where the attack might occur. The next day, based on this warning, the first item on the agenda for counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke’s interagency Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) is entitled: “[Osama bin Laden]: Operation Planned in US.” The anonymous caller’s tip cannot be later corroborated. In July, the CIA will share the warning with the FBI, the INS, the US Customs Service, and the State Department. It will also be mentioned in the August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Briefing given to President Bush (see August 6, 2001) and Bush will be told that the CIA and FBI are investigating it. But eventually, neither the CIA nor FBI is able to corraborate the information in the call. [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 9/19/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 255, 262, 535] There are some other possibly interlinked warnings this month also warning of an al-Qaeda plot to attack the US from Canada using explosives (see May 30, 2001, May 2001, and May 2001). Entity Tags: White House, Osama bin Laden, Counterterrorism and Security Group, Richard A. Clarke, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Warnings, Warning Signs, Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB

Mid-May 2001: CIA Officer Misrepresents Hijacker Alhazmi’s Travel to US in Email Copied to FBI Agent In an email sent to a fellow CIA officer Clark Shannon and copied to FBI agent Margaret Gillespie, who is working on the USS Cole bombing and the Malaysia summit, Tom Wilshire, a CIA officer assigned to the FBI, misrepresents the travel of hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi and an associate to the US. According to the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General, the e-mail says that Alhazmi and an associate traveled from Bangkok to Los Angeles to Hong Kong, indicating they did not remain in the US and left for Hong Kong. However, Alhazmi and hijacker Khalid Almihdhar traveled from Bangkok to Hong Kong and then to Los Angeles. Gillespie and Shannon will subsequently attend a meeting at which this information should be shared, but is not (see June 11, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 282-3, 288, 300 ] Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi, Margaret Gillespie, Office of the Inspector General (DOJ), Clark Shannon, Tom Wilshire Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

May 17, 2001: US Gives Taliban Millions for Poppy Ban Secretary of State Powell announces that the US is granting $43 million in aid to the Taliban government, purportedly to assist hungry farmers who are starving since the destruction of their opium crop occurred in January on orders of the Taliban. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 5/22/2001] Powell promises that the US will “continue to look for ways to provide more assistance to the Afghans.” [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 4/13/2004] And in fact, in the same month Powell asks Congress to give Afghanistan $7 million more, to be used for regional energy cooperation and to fight child prostitution. [COLL, 2004, PP. 559] This follows $113 million given by the US in 2000 for humanitarian aid. [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 12/11/2001] A Newsday editorial notes that the Taliban “are a decidedly odd choice for an outright gift… Why are we sending these people money—so much that Washington is, in effect, the biggest donor of aid to the Taliban regime?” [NEWSDAY, 5/29/2001] However, there were allegations that the drug ban was merely a means for the Taliban to drive up prices (see July 2000). In fact, according to a March 2001 State Department report, “Prospects for progress on drug-control efforts in Afghanistan remain dim as long as the country remains at war. Nothing indicates that either the Taliban or the Northern Alliance intend to take serious action to destroy heroin or morphine base laboratories, or stop drug trafficking.” [USA TODAY, 10/16/2001] Entity Tags: US Department of State, Colin Powell, Taliban Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Drugs

(Late May-Early June): FBI Agent at CIA Searches Only One of Two Databases with Information about 9/11 Hijackers Margaret Gillespie, an FBI agent detailed to the CIA who has been asked to research the connection between al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit and the bombing of the USS Cole, checks a CIA database and finds some NSA information about 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi and their travel to an al-Qaeda summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, that was monitored by the US. The database she uses is Intelink, which only has information the CIA makes available to other intelligence agencies. However, she does not also examine the CIA’s Hercules database. It is unclear why she does not do so and whether, as an FBI agent, she has access to it. If she did access it, she would have a complete picture of the CIA’s knowledge of Almihdhar and Alhazmi and would know Almihdhar had a US visa and Alhazmi had traveled to the US (see January 2-5, 2000 and March 5, 2000). As Gillespie is only working this line of inquiry in her free time, she does not put together the information contained in the Hercules system until late August (see August 21-22, 2001). [WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 340, 425] Entity Tags: Alec Station, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Margaret Gillespie Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

May 20, 2001: Hijacker Overstays US Visa 9/11 hijacker Satam Al Suqami becomes an illegal overstay on this day. He entered the US on April 23 (see April 23-June 29, 2001) and was allowed to stay for 30 days, so, according to the 9/11 Commission, his permission to remain in the US expires on this day. He remains in illegal status until 9/11. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 8, 21, 23 ] Both Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi also overstayed their visas (see January 10, 2001 and January 11-18, 2001). At least one more of the hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar, lied on his visa application form, meaning he was in the US illegally (see August 29, 2001). Entity Tags: Satam Al Suqami Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers

May 23, 2001: White House Told Al-Qaeda May Stage Hijacking or Storm Embassy A Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) sent to top White House officials is entitled, “Terrorist Groups Said Cooperating on US Hostage Plot.” It warns of a possible hostage plot against the US abroad to force to release of prisoners being held in the US, including Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman (see July 1990). The report notes operatives might hijack an aircraft or storm a US embassy overseas. SEIBs are typically based on the previous day’s President Daily Briefing (see January 20-September 10, 2001), so it is probable President Bush is given this information. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 255-256, 533; US DISTRICT COURT OF EASTERN VIRGINIA, 5/4/2006, PP. 2 ] This report leads to an FAA warning to airlines noting the potential for “an airline hijacking to free terrorists incarcerated in the United States.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 255-256] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, White House, Omar Abdul-Rahman Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman, Presidential Level Warnings, US Air Security

May 23, 2001: Former Unocal Employee Becomes Bush’s Special Assistant to Middle East and Central Asia

Zalmay Khalilzad. [Source: US Embassy, Iraq] Zalmay Khalilzad is appointed Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Gulf, Southwest Asia and Other Regional Issues on the National Security Council. Khalilzad was an official in the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations. During the Clinton years, he worked for Unocal. [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2001; INDEPENDENT, 1/10/2002] He previously worked under Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and helped him write a controversial 1992 plan for US world domination.(see March 8, 1992) [NEW YORK TIMES, 3/23/2003] He was a member of the neoconservative think tank Project for the New American Century. The Asia Times notes, “It was Khalilzad—when he was a huge Taliban fan—who conducted the risk analysis for Unocal (Union Oil Company of California) for the infamous proposed $2 billion, 1,500 kilometer-long Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan [TAP] gas pipeline.” [ASIA TIMES, 12/25/2003] After 9/11, he will be appointed as special envoy to Afghanistan (see January 1, 2002) and then US ambassador to Afghanistan (see November 2003). Entity Tags: Unocal, Paul Wolfowitz, Project for the New American Century, National Security Council, Taliban, Zalmay M. Khalilzad Category Tags: Pipeline Politics

May 23-24, 2001: Rumsfeld Warns of Inevitability of Strategic Surprise; Refers to Pearl Harbor

Thomas Schelling. [Source: University of Maryland] During a meeting with the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says that the inevitability of surprise is a guiding principle of the Bush administration’s national security strategy. To emphasize his point about the need to prepare for the unexpected, he gives panel members copies of the foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter’s 1962 book, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. This foreword, written by Thomas Schelling, argues that in order to prepare for the next crisis, the US military needs to avoid thinking that the most familiar threat is also the most likely one. Rumsfeld says that, in line with this reasoning, a key element of the administration’s strategy will be preparing for the unexpected. [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 5/23/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 5/24/2001] The following day, he has a similar closed-door meeting with the Senate Armed Services Committee. He hands out to senators a four-page paper dealing with the inevitability of strategic surprise, and summarizing various defense surprises and incorrect predictions made during the 20th century. The paper states that the Department of Defense should “give some thought to the flexibility of a capability-based strategy, as opposed to simply a threat-based strategy.” What this means, according to the Washington Post, is that the “US military needs to move away from a Cold War structure designed to counter one large, clear threat—from the Soviet Union—and to develop capabilities to respond to everything from ballistic missiles to terrorist attacks.” [NPR, 5/25/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 5/25/2001] Rumsfeld had previously warned of the danger of a surprise attack, like Pearl Harbor, during his confirmation hearing in January (see January 11, 2001). Journalist Bob Woodward will later report that one of the main themes Rumsfeld referred to in the eight months prior to 9/11 was surprise, and he had “routinely handed out or recommended” Wohlstetter’s book on Pearl Harbor. [WOODWARD, 2002, PP. 22-23] Yet when, in July, he receives a CIA briefing about the imminent danger of an al-Qaeda attack on an American target, Rumsfeld reportedly responds with “vehement dismissal,” and criticizes the CIA for its “gullibility” (see July 11-17, 2001). [COCKBURN, 2007, PP. 9] Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs

May 24, 2001: Canadian Cell Said to Be Planning Attack against US An anonymous caller tells US intelligence about a terrorist cell in Canada that might be planning an attack against the US. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 256] Category Tags: Warning Signs

May 24-August 14, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Make Several Unexplained Trips to Vegas Several of the 9/11 hijackers make trips to Las Vegas and the west coast over the summer: May 24-27: Marwan Alshehhi flies to Vegas (see May 24-27, 2001); June 7-10: Ziad Jarrah takes a trip to Vegas (see June 7-10, 2001); June 28-July 1: Mohamed Atta takes his first trip to Vegas, flying from Fort Lauderdale to Boston and then, the next day, to Las Vegas via San Francisco with United Airlines. He stays there three nights, then returns to Boston via Denver, and flies to New York the next day; July 31-August 1: Waleed Alshehri flies from Fort Lauderdale to Boston and then takes American Airlines flight 195 to San Francisco the next day. After spending a night at the La Quinta Inn, he returns to Miami via Las Vegas; [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 1-2, 16, 18 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 55-7 ] August 1: Actor James Woods sees four people he will later suspect are hijackers, including individuals he believes to be Khalid Almihdhar and Hamza Alghamdi, on a transcontinental flight (see August 1, 2001). Abdulaziz Alomari is reported to try to get into the cockpit on a different flight from Vegas on the same day (see August 1, 2001); August 13-14: Atta, Hani Hanjour, and Nawaf Alhazmi all fly to Vegas, possibly meeting some other hijackers there (see August 13-14, 2001). Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar also made frequent car trips to Las Vegas from San Diego, where they lived in 2000. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/1/2002; MCDERMOTT, 2005, PP. 192] The reason for these trips is never definitively determined, although there will be speculation the hijackers are casing aircraft similar to those they will hijack on 9/11. The 9/11 Commission will comment, “Beyond Las Vegas’s reputation for welcoming tourists, we have seen no credible evidence explaining why… the operatives flew to or met in Law Vegas.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 242, 248] After 9/11, it will be reported that the hijackers may use these cross-country flights to take pictures of airline cockpits and check out security at boarding gates. During the flights, the hijackers apparently take notes, watch the crews, and even videotape them. There are some reports that two, or perhaps more, of the hijackers sit in “jumpseats” in the pilot’s cabin, a courtesy extended by airlines to other pilots, during the surveillance flights (see Summer 2001) and on the day of 9/11 itself (see November 23, 2001). [BOSTON GLOBE, 11/23/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 5/29/2002] There are reports that the hijackers drink alcohol, gamble, and frequent strip clubs while they are in Las Vegas. For example, according to a dancer named “Samantha,” Marwan Alshehhi stares up at her blankly while she “undulate[s] her hips inches from his face” and only gives her $20, although he is a “light drinker.” [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 10/4/2001; NEWSWEEK, 10/15/2001] Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Waleed M. Alshehri Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Hani Hanjour, Ziad Jarrah, Other 9/11 Hijackers, Key Hijacker Events

May 24-27, 2001: Hijacker Alshehhi Goes to Vegas, Believes He Is Followed Marwan Alshehhi takes a three-day trip to Las Vegas, and will later say he was followed on the trip. One of the hijackers’ associates, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, will later say in a 2002 interview that Alshehhi felt he was followed on a flight from New York to California by “security officers.” Bin al-Shibh will also say that fellow hijacker Ziad Jarrah felt he was followed on a similar flight (see June 7-10, 2001). Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar have also been concerned about possibly having been followed on a flight to the US (see January 15, 2000 and Mid-July 2000). [FOUDA AND FIELDING, 2003, PP. 135] After arriving in New York from Florida and spending the night there, Alshehhi flies from New York to Las Vegas via San Francisco. He spends all but one night in Las Vegas at the St. Louis Manor hotel. He is clearly remembered by staff, who recall his face, manners, and that he was once visited by another man of Middle Eastern descent. He returns via the same route. [LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, 10/31/2001; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 53-4 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 3, 19 ] Several other hijackers also travel to Vegas (see May 24-August 14, 2001). Entity Tags: Marwan Alshehhi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi

Late May, 2001: CIA Officer Passes Three Malaysia Summit Photographs to FBI, but Fails to Mention Some Important Details Tom Wilshire, a CIA officer on loan to the FBI, obtains three photographs from the surveillance of al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit (see January 5-8, 2000), and passes them to Dina Corsi, an agent with the FBI’s bin Laden unit. Corsi learned of the photographs’ existence following a discussion with CIA officer Clark Shannon. Although Wilshire does not have a “substantive conversation” with Corsi about the photos, he does identify hijacker Khalid Almihdhar in one of them, and says Almihdhar traveled from Sana’a, Yemen, to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and then Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in early January 2000. However, Wilshire omits to mention that Almihdhar has a US visa, his associate hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi has traveled to the US, or another associate, Khallad bin Attash, has been identified in the photos. He also does not say why the photos were taken. Author Lawrence Wright will later say the photos are passed because Wilshire wants to know what the FBI knows. The CIA says it thinks the photos may show Fahad al-Quso, an al-Qaeda operative involved in the USS Cole bombing. Corsi understands that the photos are “not formally passed” to the FBI, but are only for limited use at a forthcoming meeting. Therefore, only limited information about them is provided at the meeting, causing a disagreement (see June 11, 2001). However, Wilshire will later say that Corsi could give the photos to the FBI, but the FBI could not then give them to a foreign government (note: the photos had been provided to a foreign government five months previously, so this restriction is meaningless). [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 286-7, 293-4 ; NEW YORKER, 7/10/2006 ] Other pictures of the summit are available to the CIA, and there is even video footage (see February 2000 and Mid-May 2001), but these are not shared with the FBI or widely discussed. Entity Tags: Tom Wilshire, Tawfiq bin Attash, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, Dina Corsi, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Clark Shannon, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

May 25-26, 2001: Bush Told Bin Laden May Be Hinting about New Attack A Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) sent to top White House officials on May 26, 2001, is entitled, “Bin Laden Network’s Plans Advancing.” Further details are unknown. The New York Times will later report that President Bush and Vice President Cheney were among those who received this warning. SEIBs are typically summaries of the previous days’ President Daily Briefings (see January 20-September 10, 2001), so it is probable Bush is given this warning on May 25. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 255; US DISTRICT COURT OF EASTERN VIRGINIA, 5/4/2006, PP. 2 ] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, White House Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Key Warnings, Presidential Level Warnings

May 26, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Enters Saudi Arabia, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar enters Saudi Arabia on a flight from Sana’a, Yemen. [BAMFORD, 2008, PP. 64] Almihdhar is on the terrorist watch list there (see 1997), and his passport contains an indicator the Saudi authorities use to track terrorists (see April 6, 1999), so the Saudis presumably register his arrival. Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar

May 29, 2001: Clarke Asks for More to Be Done to Stop Expected Al-Qaeda Attacks Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke suggests to National Security Adviser Rice that she ask CIA Director George Tenet what more the US can do to stop al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida from launching “a series of major terrorist attacks.” It is believed these attacks will probably be directed at Israeli targets, but possibly on US facilities. Clarke writes to Rice and her deputy, Stephen Hadley, “When these attacks occur, as they likely will, we will wonder what more we could have done to stop them.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 256] Entity Tags: Stephen J. Hadley, George J. Tenet, Condoleezza Rice, Richard A. Clarke, Abu Zubaida Category Tags: Warning Signs, Abu Zubaida, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

May 29, 2001: US Citizens Overseas Cautioned The State Department issues an overseas caution connected to the conviction of defendants in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. That warning says, “Americans citizens abroad may be the target of a terrorist threat from extremist groups” with links to bin Laden. The warning will be reissued on June 22. [CNN, 6/23/2001] Entity Tags: US Department of State, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Warning Signs, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

May 29, 2001: CIA and FBI Possibly Have Meeting about Cole and Malaysia Summit, but Nobody Will Later Remember Anything about It There is some evidence CIA and FBI representatives meet on this day to compare notes about the investigation into the USS Cole bombing and al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit, but an investigation by the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) will not be able to confirm the meeting takes place, as all the participants say they are unable to recall whether they attended the meeting or not. If the meeting actually occurs, it is probably attended by CIA officer Clark Shannon, FBI agent Dina Corsi, an FBI agent known as “Kathy”, and FBI agent Margaret Gillespie. The topics of discussion may include the state of the Cole investigation and the identification of Khallad bin Attash in photographs of al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit. Despite the poor memories of the potential attendees, the OIG will later find an email from Shannon to Gillespie saying that they met on this date, and Kathy will say that Shannon’s name sounds familiar. However, the OIG will conclude, “We were unable to determine with certainty whether a meeting… took place on May 29.” [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 285, 296 ] Entity Tags: Margaret Gillespie, Tawfiq bin Attash, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Clark Shannon, Dina Corsi, “Kathy”, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

May 30, 2001: CIA Leaders Warn Rice about Expected Al-Qaeda Attack During a regularly scheduled weekly meeting between National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and CIA Director George Tenet, CIA official Richard Blee describes a “truly frightening” list of warning signs of an upcoming terrorist attack. He says that al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida is working on attack plans. CIA leaders John McLaughlin and Cofer Black are also present at this meeting, as is counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke and Mary McCarthy, a CIA officer serving as National Security Council senior director. [TENET, 2007, PP. 145] Just the day before, Clarke suggested that Tenet and Rice discuss what could be done to stop Zubaida from launching “a series of major terrorist attacks,” so presumably this discussion is in response to that (see May 29, 2001). Tenet will later recall: “Some intelligence suggested that [Zubaida’s] plans were ready to be executed; others suggested they would not be ready for six months. The primary target appeared to be in Israel, but other US assets around the world were at risk.” Rice asks about taking the offensive against al-Qaeda and asks how bad the threat is. Black estimates it to be a seven on a one-to-10 scale, with the millennium threat at the start of 2000 ranking an eight in comparison. Clarke tells her that adequate warning notices have been issued to the appropriate US entities. [TENET, 2007, PP. 145-146] Entity Tags: Rich B., Richard A. Clarke, John E. McLaughlin, George J. Tenet, Al-Qaeda, Abu Zubaida, Condoleezza Rice, Cofer Black, Mary McCarthy Category Tags: Key Warnings, Warning Signs, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Abu Zubaida

May 30, 2001: FBI Is Warned of Major Al-Qaeda Operation in the US Involving Hijackings, Explosives, and/or New York City

Ahmed Ressam as pictured in his Canadian passport. [Source: FBI] Ahmed Ressam is convicted in the spring of 2001 for attempting to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport (see December 14, 1999). Facing the likelihood of life in prison, he starts cooperating with authorities in an attempt to reduce his sentence. On this day, he details his experiences in al-Qaeda training camps and his many dealings with top al-Qaeda deputy Abu Zubaida. According to FBI notes from Ressam’s interrogation, Zubaida asked Ressam to send him six original Canadian passports to help Zubaida “get people to America” (see May 2001 and May 2001). Zubaida “wanted an operation in the US” and talked about the need to get explosives into the US for this operation, but Ressam makes it clear this was a separate plot from the one he was involved with. Notes from this day further explain that Ressam doesn’t know if any explosives made it into the US because once an operation is initiated, operators are not supposed to talk about it to anyone. [CALGARY HERALD, 4/3/2002; NEWSWEEK, 4/28/2005] Zubaida told this to Ressam in 1999, but also indicated that he is willing to wait a year or more to make sure the plot comes to fruition successfully. [TENET, 2007, PP. 146] Similarity to 9/11 Attacks - There’s no concrete evidence that Ressam knows any detail of the 9/11 attacks. [NEWSWEEK, 4/28/2005] However, Fox News will later report that roughly around this time Ressam testifies “that attack plans, including hijackings and attacks on New York City targets, [are] ongoing.” [FOX NEWS, 5/17/2002] Questioned shortly after 9/11, Ressam will point out that given what he’s already told his US interrogators, the 9/11 attacks should not be surprising. He notes that he’d described how Zubaida talked “generally of big operations in [the] US with big impact, needing great preparation, great perseverance, and willingness to die.” Ressam had told of “plans to get people hired at airports, of blowing up airports, and airplanes.” [NEWSWEEK, 4/28/2005] Sharing the Warning - The CIA learns of this warning in June. [TENET, 2007, PP. 146] Ressam will repeat some of this in a public trial in July (see July 8, 2001). Apparently, the FBI also waits until July to share the information from this debriefing with most other intelligence agencies, the INS, Customs Service, and the State Department. Ressam’s warnings will first be mentioned to Bush in his now famous August 6, 2001 briefing (see August 6, 2001), but as Newsweek will note, “The information from Ressam that was contained in [Bush’s] PDB [is] watered down and seem[s] far more bland than what the Algerian terrorist was actually telling the FBI.” Zubaida’s second plot will be boiled down to one sentence in the PDB: “Ressam also said that in 1998 Abu Zubaida was planning his own US attack.” [NEWSWEEK, 4/28/2005] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Ahmed Ressam, Los Angeles International Airport, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Abu Zubaida Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Millennium Bomb Plots, Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB, Abu Zubaida

May 30, 2001: Yemenis Are Caught Taking Suspicious New York Photos Two Yemeni men are detained after guards see them taking photos at 26 Federal Plaza in New York City. They are questioned by INS agents and let go. A few days later, their confiscated film is developed, showing photos of security checkpoints, police posts, and surveillance cameras of federal buildings, including the FBI’s counterterrorism office. The two men are later interviewed by the FBI and determined not to be a threat. However, they had taken the pictures on behalf of a third person said to be living in Indiana. By the time the FBI looks for him, he has fled the country and his documentation is found to be based on a false alias. In 2004, the identity of the third man reportedly still will be unknown. The famous briefing given to President George W. Bush on August 6, 2001 (see August 6, 2001), will mention the incident, warning that the FBI is investigating “suspicious activity in this country consistent with the preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.” When Bush’s August 6 briefing will be released in 2004, a White House fact sheet will fail to mention the still missing third man. [NEW YORK POST, 7/1/2001; NEW YORK POST, 9/16/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 5/16/2004] In 2004, it will be reported that Dhiren Barot (a.k.a. Issa al-Hindi or Issa al-Britani), an alleged al-Qaeda operative in British custody, was sent to the US in early 2001 by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to case potential targets in New York City. He headed a three-man team that surveyed the New York Stock Exchange and other buildings. While there are obvious similarities between the two Yemeni man with an unknown boss and Barot with two helpers, it is not known if the two cases are related. [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/7/2004] Entity Tags: Dhiren Barot, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Warnings, Warning Signs, Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB

May 31, 2001: Network of Al-Qaeda US Cells Mentioned in US Media The Wall Street Journal summarizes tens of thousands of pages of evidence disclosed in a recently concluded trial of al-Qaeda operatives. They are called “a riveting view onto the shadowy world of al-Qaeda.” The documents reveal numerous connections between al-Qaeda and specific front companies and charities. They even detail a “tightly organized system of cells in an array of American cities, including Brooklyn, N.Y.; Orlando, Fla.; Dallas, Tex.; Santa Clara, Calif.; Columbia, Mo., and Herndon, Va.” The 9/11 hijackers had ties to many of these same cities and charities. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 5/31/2001] Category Tags: Warning Signs

Summer 2001: Lead 7/7 London Bomber Already Radicalized, Linked to Two Future Suicide Bombers

Omar Sharif (left) and Asif Hanif (right). [Source: Reuters/ Corbis] Manchester businessman Kursheed Fiaz will later claim that in the summer of 2001, he is visited by Mohammad Sidique Khan, Omar Sharif, and Asif Hanif. Khan will later be known as the lead suicide bomber in the 7/7 London bombings (see July 7, 2005), while Sharif and Hanif will both die bombing a cafe in Israel in 2003, killing three (see April 30, 2003). Fiaz will claim that the three came to his offices to encourage young Muslims working there in “the new ways of Islam.” The three discuss traveling to Syria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to better understand Islam, but the mention of places like Afghanistan turns the potential recruits off. This incident will suggest that Khan was radicalized earlier than previously thought. He apparently attends an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan around this time (see July 2001). The incident also confirms links between the three men, increasing suspicions that Khan helped the other two in a trip to Israel shortly before their suicide attack (see February 19-20, 2003). Fiaz will not disclose this incident until after the 7/7 bombings. [BBC, 7/9/2006] Khan and Sharif are particularly close, as both attend the same mosque in the small town of Beeston, near Leeds. [INDEPENDENT, 7/24/2005] Entity Tags: Omar Sharif, Kursheed Fiaz, Asif Hanif, Mohammad Sidique Khan Category Tags: 2005 7/7 London Bombings, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism

Summer 2001: Transportation Department Not Told of Impending Al-Qaeda Threat Although the CIA, FBI, and White House Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) are well aware that there is a heightened threat environment at this time because of warning signs of an impending al-Qaeda attack, the Department of Transportation is not informed of this. Although he is responsible for the FAA, Coast Guard, and other agencies that should help prepare for a domestic terrorist attack, Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta will later tell the 9/11 Commission, “We had no information of that nature at all.” When he testifies to the Commission, Mineta will not recall any special effort by the White House to warn his department, or any special interagency meetings during this period. Author Philip Shenon will say that this is “proof of how little the Bush White House had done to prepare domestic agencies for a terrorist attack that summer,” adding that this shows that Mineta “and the Transportation Department had no sense at all of how dire the terrorist warning were in 2001.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 116] Entity Tags: US Department of Transportation, Norman Mineta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: US Air Security

Summer 2001: Tenet Believes Something Is Happening

CIA Director George Tenet. [Source: CIA] Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage later will claim that at this time, CIA Director “Tenet [is] around town literally pounding on desks saying, something is happening, this is an unprecedented level of threat information. He didn’t know where it was going to happen, but he knew that it was coming.” [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 ] Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Richard Armitage Category Tags: Warning Signs, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Summer 2001: Computer Intruders Probe US Infrastructure’s Digital Switches; Al-Qaeda Connection Feared A police officer with the Mountain View Police Department in California uncovers a pattern of suspicious electronic probing of the computer systems of public utilities and government offices in the San Francisco Bay area. He notifies the FBI’s computer intrusion squad. The investigation reveals that the intruders are operating from the Middle East and South Asia. They are targeting the computer systems used to control the physical infrastructure of water systems and power plants throughout the US, suggesting a plan for a cyber attack. For many experts who have long warned against cyber terrorism or warfare, the “Mountain View case” as it is called, should be seen as a wake-up call for the government as well as the private sector (see 1996-2008). In a later interview, Richard Clarke, the national presidential adviser on cyberspace security from 2001 to 2003, will say: “The bottom line on the Mountain View case is the ease with which people can do virtual reconnaissance from overseas on our physical infrastructure and our cyber infrastructure.… We were lucky… that there were good people watching.” [WASHINGTON POST, 6/27/2002] Despite fears that al-Qaeda may be behind the intrusions (see 2002), the identity of the hackers will not be established. In 2003, Ron Dick, who was the head of the FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) at the time, will say that the “case is still pending.… We never were… able to tie it back to any terrorist organizations.” [PBS FRONTLINE, 3/18/2003] Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Ron Dick, Al-Qaeda, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events

Summer 2001: Bin Laden Speech Mentions 20 Martyrs in Upcoming Attack; Other Hints of Attack Spread Widely Word begins to spread within al-Qaeda that an attack against the US is imminent, according to later prison interrogations of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Many within al-Qaeda are aware that Mohammed has been preparing operatives to go to the US. Additionally, bin Laden makes several remarks hinting at an upcoming attack, spawning rumors throughout Muslim extremist circles worldwide. In a recorded speech at the Al Farooq training camp in Afghanistan, bin Laden specifically urges trainees to pray for the success of an upcoming attack involving 20 martyrs. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/16/2004] Members of the “Lackawanna Six” see bin Laden give a recorded speech at the Al Farooq camp in which he urges trainees to pray for 40 en route on a very important mission. It is not known if this is the same as the other Al Farooq speech or a separate one (see (June 2001)). A bin Laden bodyguard later will claim that in May 2001 or earlier in the year he heard bin Laden tell people in Afghanistan that the US would be hit with an attack, and thousands would die (see Early 2001). [GUARDIAN, 11/28/2002] In mid-June 2001, bin Laden tells training camp trainees there will be an attack in the near future. US intelligence soon learns of this (see Mid-June 2001). There are other indications that knowledge of the attacks spreads in Afghanistan. The Daily Telegraph later reports that “the idea of an attack on a skyscraper [is] discussed among [bin Laden’s] supporters in Kabul.” At some unspecified point before 9/11, a neighbor in Kabul sees diagrams showing a skyscraper attack in a house known as a “nerve center” for al-Qaeda activity. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 11/16/2001] US soldiers will later find forged visas, altered passports, listings of Florida flight schools and registration papers for a flight simulator in al-Qaeda houses in Afghanistan. [NEW YORK TIMES, 12/6/2001] Entity Tags: Al Farooq training camp, Al-Qaeda, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Osama bin Laden Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Warnings, Warning Signs, Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge, Foreign Intelligence Warnings

Summer 2001: Hijackers Use a Variety of Means to Get into Cockpit During Test Flights According to the Boston Globe, during various cross-country test run flights in the summer of 2001, “Some of the hijackers were seen videotaping crews on their flights. Other times, they asked for cockpit tours. Two also rode in the cockpit of the planes of one national airline, said a pilot who requested anonymity. The practice, known as ‘jumpseating,’ allows certified airline pilots to use a spare seat in the cockpit when none is available in the passenger cabin. Airlines reciprocate to help pilots get home or to the city of their originating flight.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 11/23/2001] Abdulaziz Alomari fails in an effort to sit in a jumpseat in August 2001 (see August 1, 2001). Entity Tags: Abdulaziz Alomari Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training

Summer 2001: Pentagon’s Police Force Holds Various, Unknown Emergency Drills The Pentagon’s police force, the Defense Protective Service (DPS), conducts emergency drills throughout summer 2001. Some members of the DPS subsequently assist in directing rescue efforts at the Pentagon on 9/11. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/13/2001] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Military Exercises

Summer 2001: FBI Neglects Chance to Infiltrate Al-Qaeda Training Camp A confidential informant tells an FBI field office agent that he has been invited to a commando-training course at a camp operated by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The information is passed up to FBI headquarters, which rejects the idea of infiltrating the camp. An “asset validation” of the informant, a routine but critical exercise to determine whether information from the source was reliable, is also not done. The FBI later has no comment on the story. [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 6/10/2002] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Federal Bureau of Investigation Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Other Possible Moles or Informants

Summer 2001: Hijackers Have ‘a Great Time’ Riding Scooters on Florida Beaches During much of the summer, four of the alleged 9/11 hijackers rent scooters from AAA Car Rental in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Like many students do, they pass time riding up and down the city’s beaches. One of the owners of AAA Car Rental later remarks, “For guys that hated America, they sure looked like they were having a great time here. They didn’t seem to have a care in the world.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/16/2001] Though the identities of the four are unstated, many of the hijackers are reportedly in the Fort Lauderdale area around this time, including Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, Ziad Jarrah, and nine of the so-called “muscle hijackers” (see April 23-June 29, 2001). [US CONGRESS, 9/26/2002] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Ziad Jarrah, Other 9/11 Hijackers

Summer 2001: FBI Field Offices Not Told to Increase Surveillance of Terrorism Suspects According to National Security Adviser Rice, in the summer of 2001, “The FBI tasked all 56 of its US field offices to increase surveillance of known suspected terrorists and to reach out to known informants who might have information on terrorist activities.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 4/8/2004] But the 9/11 Commission later will conclude, “An NSC [National Security Council] staff document at the time describes such a tasking as having occurred in late June but does not indicate whether it was generated by the NSC or the FBI.… [H]owever, the FBI could not find any record of having received such a directive.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 264] According to Newsday, 9/11 Commissioner Tim Roemer “told Rice that the Commission had ‘to date… found nobody, nobody at the FBI, who knows anything about a tasking of field offices.’ Even Thomas Pickard, at the time acting FBI director, told the panel that he ‘did not tell the field offices to do this,’ Roemer said.” [NEWSDAY, 4/10/2004] The last time the FBI field offices were tasked about the Muslim extremist threat was in April 2001 (see April 13, 2001). Pickard claims that he did individually warn some field offices about the heightened threat in July, but the 9/11 Commission will conclude, “We found little evidence that any such concerns had reached FBI personnel beyond the New York Field Office.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 264, 536] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Osama bin Laden, 9/11 Commission Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Summer 2001: NSA Fails to Share Intercepted Information about Calls between Atta and KSM Around this time, the NSA intercepts telephone conversations between Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) and Mohamed Atta, but apparently does not share the information with any other agencies. The FBI has had a $2 million reward for KSM since 1998 (see January 8, 1998), while Atta is in charge of hijacker operations inside the US. [KNIGHT RIDDER, 6/6/2002; INDEPENDENT, 6/6/2002] The NSA either fails to translate these messages in a timely fashion or fails to understand the significance of what was translated. [KNIGHT RIDDER, 6/6/2002] However, it will later be revealed that an FBI squad built an antenna in the Indian Ocean some time before 9/11 with the specific purpose of listening in on KSM’s phone calls, so they may have learned about these calls to Atta on their own (see Before September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, National Security Agency, Mohamed Atta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Warnings, Warning Signs, Mohamed Atta, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Remote Surveillance

Summer 2001: Saudi and Taliban Leaders Reportedly Discuss Bin Laden An Asia Times article published just prior to 9/11 claims that Crown Prince Abdullah, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, makes a clandestine visit to Pakistan around this time. After meeting with senior army officials, he visits Afghanistan with ISI Director Mahmood. They meet Taliban leader Mullah Omar and try to convince him that the US is likely to launch an attack on Afghanistan. They insist bin Laden be sent to Saudi Arabia, where he would be held in custody and not handed over to any third country. If bin Laden were to be tried in Saudi Arabia, Abdullah would help make sure he is acquitted. Mullah Omar apparently rejects the proposal. The article suggests that Abdullah is secretly a supporter of bin Laden and is trying to protect him from harm. [ASIA TIMES, 8/22/2001] A similar meeting may also take place about a week after 9/11 (see September 19, 2001). Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Mahmood Ahmed, Mullah Omar, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud Category Tags: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the ISI

Summer 2001: Tenet Believes Rumsfeld Is Blocking Effort to Develop Strategy to Get Bin Laden According to a 2006 book by journalist Bob Woodward, in the months before 9/11, CIA Director Tenet believes that Defense Secretary Rumsfeld is impeding the effort to develop a coherent strategy to capture or kill bin Laden. Rumsfeld questions al-Qaeda communications intercepts by the NSA and other other intelligence. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/29/2006] Woodward writes in his book, “Could all this be a grand deception? Rumsfeld had asked. Perhaps it was a plan to measure US reactions and defenses. Tenet had the NSA review all the intercepts, and the agency concluded they were of genuine al-Qaeda communications.” As a result of these doubts, on June 30, 2001, a Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) sent to top White House officials contains an article entitled, “Bin Laden Threats Are Real” (see June 30, 2001). [WOODWARD, 2006, PP. 50] However, apparently this does not quell the doubts. For instance, in mid-July 2001, Tenet is told that Deputy Defense Secretary and close Rumsfeld ally Paul Wolfowitz still doubts the surge of warnings and suggests that bin Laden may merely be trying to study US reactions to an attack threat (see Mid-July 2001). Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Donald Rumsfeld, George J. Tenet, Paul Wolfowitz Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Presidential Level Warnings, Warning Signs

Summer 2001: Threat Alerts Increase to Record High Congressman Porter Goss (R), Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, later says on the intelligence monitoring of US-designated terrorist groups, “The chatter level [goes] way off the charts” around this time and stays high until 9/11. Given Goss’s history as a CIA operative, presumably he is kept “in the know” to some extent. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 5/18/2002] A later Congressional report will state: “Some individuals within the intelligence community have suggested that the increase in threat reporting was unprecedented, at least in terms of their own experience.” [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] Two counterterrorism officials later describe the alerts of this summer as “the most urgent in decades.” [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] Entity Tags: Porter J. Goss Category Tags: Warning Signs, Key Warnings, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Summer 2001: Radical London Imam Abu Hamza Encourages Supporters to Pledge Loyalty to Bin Laden, British Authorities Take No Action Leading radical cleric and British intelligence informer Abu Hamza al-Masri tells his supporters to pledge “bayat”—an oath of loyalty—to Osama bin Laden. The instruction is set out in an announcement pinned to the notice board at the Finsbury Park mosque, where Abu Hamza is the Friday preacher. The pledge is mandatory for all members of Abu Hamza’s Supporters of Shariah organization, while other worshippers at the mosque are merely encouraged to follow their example. However, one of the moderate trustees at the mosque, Kadir Barkatullah, objects, saying that a mosque is no place to praise a terrorist. After he is thrown out of the mosque for trying to explain this to Abu Hamza, he goes to the local police, but they take no action. [O'NEILL AND MCGRORY, 2006, PP. 95-96] Despite being an informer for the authorities himself (see Early 1997), Abu Hamza is also under surveillance by them (see Summer 1996-August 1998, March 1997-April 2000, and Late January 1999), but neither MI5 not the Metropolitan Police’s Special Branch appears to take any action against him over the matter. Entity Tags: Finsbury Park Mosque, Abu Hamza al-Masri, Supporters of Shariah, Kadir Barkatullah Category Tags: Abu Hamza Al-Masri, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism

Summer 2001: FBI Tells Local Law Enforcement There Is No Credible Threat of Terrorism In the US The FBI shares information on terrorist threats with state and local law enforcement entities through National Law Enforcement Threat System (NLETS) reports. However, at this time, the heightened state of alert for an attack in the US is not reflected at all in these NLETS reports. The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry notes, “In a May 2001 NLETS report, for example, the FBI assessed the risk of terrorism as ‘low,’ and, in a July 2, 2001 NLETS report, stated that the FBI had no information indicating a credible threat of terrorist attack in the United States, although the possibility of such an attack could not be discounted.” Further reports focus only on the potential of attacks against US interests overseas. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003] On July 5 and 6, 2001, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke specifically warns FBI officials that al-Qaeda is planning “something spectacular,” and says, “They may try to hit us at home. You have to assume that is what they are going to do.” Yet apparently the FBI doesn’t pass any of Clarke’s warnings or sense of urgent emergency to the state and local emergency responders (see July 5, 2001) (see July 6, 2001). Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Al-Qaeda, Richard A. Clarke, National Law Enforcement Threat System Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Summer 2001: Israel Warns US of ‘Big Attack’ The Associated Press will report in May 2002, “Israeli intelligence services were aware several months before Sept. 11 that bin Laden was planning a large-scale terror attack but did not know what his targets would be, Israeli officials have said. An Israeli official, speaking on condition of anonymity, tells the Associated Press shortly after the attacks that ‘everybody knew about a heightened alert and knew that bin Laden was preparing a big attack.’ He said information was passed on to Washington but denied Israel had any concrete intelligence that could have been used to prevent the Sept. 11 attacks.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 5/19/2002] The claim that Israel lacks concrete intelligence is contradicted by other media reports (see August 8-15, 2001) (see August 23, 2001) (see September 4, 2001). Entity Tags: Israel, Osama bin Laden, Israel Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks (Mossad) Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Israel, Warning Signs, Key Warnings, Foreign Intelligence Warnings

Summer 2001: Some Hijackers Use Computers at Florida Public Library According to Kathleen Hensman, a librarian at the Delray Beach, Florida public library, several hijackers use the library’s Internet computers during the summer months. She will remember them because, on one occasion, Marwan Alshehhi asks her about any good restaurants in the city. On another occasion, Mohand Alshehri and another individual keep staring at her while using a terminal. “They wanted to be aware of what I was doing,” she will say. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/17/2001 ; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/30/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 11/23/2001] Entity Tags: Kathleen Hensman, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohand Alshehri Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Other 9/11 Hijackers

Summer 2001: Pakistani Intelligence Protects Al-Qaeda Leader from Arrest

Ahmed Said Khadr. [Source: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation] The Pakistani ISI allows an al-Qaeda leader to escape arrest. Egyptian investigators are looking for Ahmed Said Khadr, because he is wanted for funding the bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, in 1995 (see November 19, 1995). [TIME, 5/6/2002; NATIONAL POST, 10/14/2003] Khadr, a Canadian citizen, had been arrested in Pakistan shortly after the bombing but was then let go after a hunger strike and an appeal by the Canadian government. He runs the Pakistan office of a Canadian charity called Human Concern International. [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 4/20/2006] A 1996 CIA report that referred to Khadr called this a charity front that funds radical militants (see January 1996). Khadr’s name appeared on a list of top al-Qaeda suspects issued by the United Nations in 1999. [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 3/3/2004] Egyptians surround the safe house in Pakistan where Khadr is hiding. They notify the ISI to help arrest him, and ISI Director Mahmood Ahmed promises swift action. Instead, a car sent by the ISI filled with Taliban and having diplomatic plates arrives, grabs Khadr, and drives him to safety in Afghanistan. Time magazine will later comment: “It was no surprise to foreign spooks that the ISI let [him] escape from Peshawar. He knew too much, they say, about the ISI’s alleged ties with al-Qaeda.” [TIME, 5/6/2002] Khadr will be killed in an October 2003 shootout with the Pakistani Army (see October 2, 2003). After his death, a sympathetic jihadist group will refer to him as a “founding member” of al-Qaeda. [NATIONAL POST, 10/14/2003; CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 4/20/2006] Entity Tags: Taliban, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Al-Qaeda, Human Concern International, Ahmed Said Khadr, Mahmood Ahmed Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Mahmood Ahmed

Summer 2001: Military Plans Reducing Domestic Air Defenses Still Further During this period, apparently, there are only 14 fighter planes on active alert to defend the continental United States (and six more defending Canada and Alaska). [BERGEN RECORD, 12/5/2003] However, in the months before 9/11, rather than increase the number, the Pentagon is planning to reduce the number still further. Just after 9/11, the Los Angeles Times will report, “While defense officials say a decision had not yet been made, a reduction in air defenses had been gaining currency in recent months among task forces assigned by [Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld to put together recommendations for a reassessment of the military.” By comparison, in the Cold War atmosphere of the 1950s, the US had thousands of fighters on alert throughout the US. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/15/2001] In fact, there will be high level military discussions as late as September 8, 2001, where the option of eliminating the bases altogether is considered (see September 7-8, 2001). As late as 1998, there were 175 fighters on alert status. [BERGEN RECORD, 12/5/2003] Also during this time, FAA officials try to dispense with “primary” radars altogether, so that if a plane were to turn its transponder off, no radar could see it. NORAD rejects the proposal [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, US Department of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, US Air Security

Summer 2001: Manager Where Hijacker Hanjour Trains Has Concerns But FBI Does Not Contact Him

Hani Hanjour. [Source: US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division] While most evidence places 9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour on the East Coast in the summer of 2001, he may undergo some flight training in Phoenix, Arizona. Hanjour had trained at the Sawyer School of Aviation previously (see 1998), and there is some evidence he returns there. One school document records Hanjour’s name for use of a flight simulator on June 23, 2001, though his name does not appear on payment records. Faisal al-Salmi, Rayed Abdullah, and Lotfi Raissi also use the flight simulator that day. Al-Salmi will later be convicted of lying about his associations with Hanjour (see February 15, 2002). Abdullah had moved with Hanjour from Florida in 1997, and is known for giving extremist speeches at a Phoenix mosque (see October 1996-Late April 1999). Raissi will later be suspected of involvement in the 9/11 plot, then cleared (see September 21, 2001). There are also indications that Hanjour signs up to use a flight simulator in August with three other Muslim men, including al-Salmi. One Sawyer employee is fairly certain she sees Hanjour during the summer. Another witness sees Hanjour with al-Salmi elsewhere in Phoenix. The 9/11 Commission will note that the evidence of Hanjour training in Phoenix during the summer is not definitive, but “the FBI’s Phoenix office believes it is plausible that Hanjour return[s] to Arizona for additional training.” On July 10, 2001, Phoenix FBI agent Ken Williams sends a memorandum to FBI headquarters urging a nationwide check on Middle Eastern students at flight schools (see July 10, 2001). Yet he does not seem to conduct any kind of check on Phoenix flight schools at this time. Phoenix flight school managers will later claim that the FBI did not ask them for tips on suspicious students before 9/11. A Sawyer School manager apparently had suspicions about some of his students (though he does not mention Hanjour specifically). He later will say that had he known the FBI was concerned that some students might be Islamic militants, “I would have called someone.” Another flight school manager claims he has a good relationship with the FBI and is surprised he is not asked about Williams’ concerns. He will complain, “Should flight schools be clairvoyant?” [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/24/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 529] Entity Tags: Sawyer School of Aviation, Rayed Abdullah, 9/11 Commission, Hani Hanjour, Lotfi Raissi, Faisal al-Salmi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Hani Hanjour, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training, Phoenix Memo

Summer 2001: Two CIA Bin Laden Experts Consider Resigning in Protest According to the 9/11 Commission, two unnamed veteran CIA Counterterrorist Center officers deeply involved in Osama bin Laden-related issues are so worried about an impending attack that they consider resigning and going public with their concerns. Apparently they are also unhappy with the Bush administration’s lack of response to recent warnings. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/24/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 259-260] In a 2008 book by journalist Philip Shenon, one of the officials will be named as Michael Scheuer, head of the CIA’s bin Laden unit, Alec Station, from 1996 to 1999. The other is his replacement Richard Blee (see June 1999), the CIA manager currently responsible for Alec Station. Neither will have commented publicly on their threatened resignations. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 395] Entity Tags: Rich B., Michael Scheuer, Central Intelligence Agency, Counterterrorist Center, Alec Station Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Summer 2001: Al-Qaeda Plot Described as Upcoming ‘Hiroshima’ on US Soil After 9/11, Secretary of State Colin Powell will claim that the Bush administration received a “lot of signs” throughout the summer of 2001 that Islamic militants were plotting US attacks. These include al-Qaeda mentions of an impending “Hiroshima” on US soil. [USA TODAY, 10/15/2001] The 2002 book The Cell also describes an intercepted al-Qaeda message in the summer of 2001 talking about a “Hiroshima-type” event coming soon. [MILLER, STONE, AND MITCHELL, 2002, PP. 288] So this appears to be a different warning than an intercepted communication in 2000 warning of a “Hiroshima-type event” (see (August 2000)), or perhaps a repeat of that. Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Colin Powell Category Tags: Warning Signs, Key Warnings

Summer 2001: Human Rights Report Details ISI’s Massive Support to Taliban According to a July 2001 report from Human Rights Watch, the ISI has been “bankrolling Taliban military operations… arranging training for its fighters, planning and directing offensives, providing and facilitating shipments of ammunition and fuel, and on several occasions apparently directly providing combat support.” [SLATE, 10/9/2001] The report further states that Pakistan’s assistance “include[s] soliciting funding for the Taliban, bankrolling Taliban operations, providing diplomatic support as the Taliban’s virtual emissaries abroad, arranging training for Taliban fighters, recruiting skilled and unskilled manpower to serve in Taliban armies… In April and May 2001 Human Rights Watch sources reported that as many as thirty trucks a day were crossing the Pakistan border; sources inside Afghanistan reported that some of these convoys were carrying artillery shells, tank rounds, and rocket-propelled grenades. Such deliveries are in direct violation of UN sanctions.… Pakistan’s army and intelligence services, principally the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), contribute to making the Taliban a highly effective military force. While these Pakistani agencies do not direct the policies of the [Taliban’s army], senior Pakistani military and intelligence officers help plan and execute major military operations. A retired senior Pakistani military officer claimed in an interview with Human Rights Watch that up to 30 percent of Taliban fighting strength is made up of Pakistanis serving in units organized by [Pakistani] political parties.” [HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 7/1/2001] Entity Tags: Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Human Rights Watch, Taliban Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI

Summer 2001-September 10, 2001: US Domestic Agencies Fail to Mobilize in Response to Attack Warnings The 9/11 Commission will later conclude that in spite of an unprecedented attack threat in the months before 9/11, US “domestic agencies never mobilized in response to the threat. They did not have direction, and did not have a plan to institute. The borders were not hardened. Transportation systems were not fortified. Electronic surveillance was not targeted against a domestic threat. State and local law enforcement were not marshaled to augment the FBI’s efforts. The public was not warned.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 265] Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Spring 2001 of After: Captured Millennium Bomber Implicates Top London Imam Abu Hamza as Major Al-Qaeda Figure After being convicted for his part in al-Qaeda’s failed millennium attacks (see December 14, 1999), Ahmed Ressam tells US authorities that London-based radical cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri is an important figure in al-Qaeda. Ressam says that he heard many stories about Abu Hamza when he was in Afghanistan and that Abu Hamza has the power to refer recruits to other senior al-Qaeda figures. [O'NEILL AND MCGRORY, 2006, PP. 28] Abu Hamza already has a relationship with British security services (see Early 1997). Entity Tags: Ahmed Ressam, Al-Qaeda, Abu Hamza al-Masri Category Tags: Abu Hamza Al-Masri, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism

June-August 2001: Major Increase in US Currency in Circulation Possibly Indicates Foreknowledge of 9/11 Attacks

William Bergman. [Source: Publicity photo] An unexplained significant increase in the amount of US currency in circulation causes one economist to later consider whether some individuals might have had foreknowledge of the impending September 11 attacks. Between June and August 2001, the currency component of the “M1 aggregate”—which includes currency in circulation and demand deposits—reported by the US Federal Reserve, increases by the greatest amount over the June-August period since 1947, the first year for which this data is reported. [SANDERS RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, 9/16/2005; DEVINE AND MILES, 1/20/2006 ] Economist William Bergman, who works at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago from 1990 to 2004, will later point out: “The August increase alone was the third largest single monthly increase since 1947, trailing only December 1999 (with pre-Y2K concern as well as terrorism threats) and January 1991 (the onset of US military action in Iraq, and an important enforcement month in the BCCI money laundering scandal).… The above-average growth in currency in July and August 2001 totaled over $5 billion.” Bergman will suggest the spike in currency growth might indicate some people possessing foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks: “[A]nyone mindful that their financial assets might be seized or otherwise at risk after the attacks converted their bank accounts to a more liquid asset before the attacks.” He will explain: “Under money laundering and other laws, including those applied in a time of war or a declared national emergency, assets in the banking system can be frozen and seized. The implied incentives help explain a related phenomenon called ‘wartime hoarding.’ Historically, in wartime, currency in circulation outside of banks has tended to rise relative to other forms of money like bank deposits.… Was ‘wartime hoarding’ at work right before 9/11? The conversion of bank accounts into currency could have been responsible for the surge in currency in July and August 2001.” A less sinister alternative explanation for the currency surge might possibly be the currently deteriorating banking conditions in Argentina. [SANDERS RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, 1/4/2006] There is also a high level of fear within the US government and intelligence community around this time, about the threat in general of an imminent terrorist attack (see Summer 2001, June-July 2001, June 28, 2001, and June 28, 2001). As the Government Accountability Project will in 2006 write: “The [Federal Reserve’s] failure to date to publicly address the growth in currency in mid-2001 is conspicuous. If a benign explanation exists, or if for whatever reasons the currency growth is irrelevant, the Fed should say so publicly, and explain why this is the case. A failure to do so raises… troubling questions.” [DEVINE AND MILES, 1/20/2006 ] Also around this time, on August 2, 2001, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors issues—without explanation—a letter to Federal Reserve banks, which emphasizes the importance of monitoring suspicious activity reports (see August 2, 2001). [SPILLENKOTHEN, 8/2/2001] Entity Tags: US Federal Reserve, William Bergman Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge

June 2001: Hijacker Almihdhar Requests More Information about Planned Attack on US Warship

Jemaah Islamiyah operative Faiz abu Baker Bafana. [Source: Channel News Asia] 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar makes another visit to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to continue planning for an attack on a US warship in Singapore (see October 2000). He asks Faiz abu Baker Bafana, an operative for the al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) group, for more information about the operation and for a proposed budget. Almihdhar was apparently involved in the attacks on the USS The Sullivans and USS Cole in Yemen (see Late 1999 and Around October 12, 2000). Bafana then begins meeting with two other bin Laden operatives to discuss the Singapore operation and an attack that is being planned for Manila. They end up only meeting twice, because by the second meeting Bafana believes he is under surveillance by Malaysian intelligence. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 3/8/2006; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 3/8/2006] JI has been under increased surveillance from the authorities in Southeast Asia since a series of bomb attacks at the end of 2000 (see December 24-30, 2000 and January 2001 and after). Malaysian intelligence also monitored an al-Qaeda summit held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, which Almihdhar and JI leader Hambali attended (see January 5-8, 2000 and January 5-8, 2000 and Shortly After). If Malaysian intelligence did monitor this meeting, they had an opportunity to recognize Almihdhar from their earlier surveillance of the 2000 al-Qaeda summit, but it is not known if they did so. Entity Tags: Malaysian Secret Service, Faiz abu Baker Bafana, Khalid Almihdhar, Jemaah Islamiyah Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar

June 2001: Hijacker Almihdhar Said to Receive Money from Plot Facilitator According to the 9/11 Commission’s Terrorist Finance Monograph, Khalid Almihdhar receives $4,900 from plot facilitator Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi in the United Arab Emirates. Almihdhar then uses the money to buy traveler’s checks in Saudi Arabia. The commission says, “According to al-Hawsawi’s notebook, al-Hawsawi gave the funds to Almihdhar in the UAE in June 2001.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 137 ] However: The section of the 9/11 Commission’s main report that details his travel during this time does not include a trip to the United Arab Emirates; [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 237] Al-Hawsawi’s substitute for testimony at the trial of Zacarias Moussoaui does not mention this transaction or any meeting with Almihdhar, although it deals with al-Hawsawi’s meetings with four other hijackers and telephone conversations with Mohamed Atta, as well as his dealings with some other al-Qaeda operatives; [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] No mention of this transaction is made at al-Hawsawi’s Combat Status Review Tribunal hearing, even though it again deals with the assistance provided to four hijackers and conversations with Atta. [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 3/21/2007 ] Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar

June 2001: Moussaoui Expresses Interest in Crop-Dusting Zacarias Moussaoui, living in the US, makes some professional inquires about crop-dusting. He uses the pretext of launching a crop-spraying company. Information about this, including a computer disk about the aerial dispersal of pesticides, will be found on Moussaoui’s computer after 9/11. [GUNARATNA, 2003, PP. 146] Roughly around the same time, Mohamed Atta expresses interest in flying crop-duster planes (see March-August 2001). Counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna will later comment that this suggests al-Qaeda was already working on another plot using crop-duster aircraft to distribute unconventional weapons. [GUNARATNA, 2003, PP. 146] Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

June 2001: KLA Begins an Offensive in Macedonia The KLA launches an offensive in Macedonia. Many of the KLA commanders involved in the offensive also held appointments in the UN’s Kosovo Protection Corps. The regular Macedonian security forces are forced to withdraw, and the Macedonian military and elite police forces engage the KLA. [TAYLOR, 2002, PP. 119-120] Entity Tags: Kosovo Liberation Army Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Balkans

June 2001: Wolfowitz Asks CIA and DIA to Look into Theory that Iraq Masterminded 1993 Bombing of WTC Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz asks the CIA to look over the 2000 book, Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein’s Unfinished War Against America by Laurie Mylroie, which argued that Iraq was behind the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center (see October 2000). Wolfowitz will mention shortly after 9/11 how he asked the CIA to do this, but it is unknown what their response is. Presumably it is not one Wolfowitz liked. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 559] Wolfowitz also asks Thomas Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), to have his analysts look at the book. The DIA is unable to find any evidence that support the theory. [ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 76] Around late July, the US reopens the files on WTC bomber Ramzi Yousef, presumably in response to these requests (see Late July or Early August 2001). But no evidence will be found to support Mylroie’s theory that Yousef was an Iraqi agent. The 9/11 Commission will conclude in 2004, “We have found no credible evidence to support theories of Iraqi government involvement in the 1993 WTC bombing.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 559] Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Central Intelligence Agency, Thomas Wilson, Paul Wolfowitz, Defense Intelligence Agency, Ramzi Yousef Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Neoconservative Influence Category Tags: 1993 WTC Bombing, Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

June 2001: Abrams, Other Think Tank Neoconservatives Move to Join White House Hardline neoconservative Elliott Abrams (see June 2, 1987) joins the National Security Council as senior director of Near East and North African affairs. A State Department official will later recall: “Elliott embodied the hubris of the neocon perspective. His attitude was, ‘All the rest of you are pygmies. You don’t have the scope and the vision we have. We are going to remake the world.’ His appointment meant that good sense had been overcome by ideology.” Rush of Neoconservatives into Administration - Abrams’s entry into the White House heralds a rush of former Project for the New American Century members (PNAC—see January 26, 1998 and September 2000) into the Bush administration, almost all of whom are staunch advocates of regime change in Iraq. “I don’t think that most people in State understood what was going on,” the State Department official will say later. “I understood what this was about, that PNAC was moving from outside the government to inside. In my mind, it was an unfriendly takeover.” [UNGER, 2007, PP. 205] Neoconservatives Well-Organized, Contemptuous of Congress - In June 2004, former intelligence official Patrick Lang will write: “It should have been a dire warning to the US Congress when the man who had been convicted of lying to Congress during the Iran-contra affair [Abrams] was put in charge of the Middle East section of the NSC staff. One underestimated talent of the neocon group in the run-up to this war was its ability to manipulate Congress. They were masters of the game, having made the team in Washington in the 1970s on the staffs of two of the most powerful senators in recent decades, New York’s Patrick Moynihan and Washington’s Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson (see Early 1970s). The old boy’s club—Abe Shulsky at OSP [the Office of Special Plans—see September 2002], Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, Middle East Desk Officer at the NSC Abrams, Defense Policy Board Chairman Richard Perle—had not only worked together in their early government years in these two Senate offices, but they had stayed together as a network through the ensuing decades, floating around a small number of businesses and think tanks, including the American Enterprise Institute and the openly neoimperialist Project for a New American Century. The neocons were openly contemptuous of Congress, as they were of the UN Security Council.” [MIDDLE EAST POLICY COUNCIL, 6/2004] Entity Tags: Richard Perle, Project for the New American Century, United Nations Security Council, US Department of State, Paul Wolfowitz, Henry (“Scoop”) Jackson, Office of Special Plans, Bush administration, American Enterprise Institute, Patrick Lang, Douglas Feith, Abram Shulsky, National Security Council, Elliott Abrams, Daniel Patrick Moynihan Timeline Tags: US International Relations, Neoconservative Influence Category Tags: US Dominance

June 2001: US Still Fails to Aid Taliban Resistance The US considers substantially aiding Ahmed Shah Massoud and his Northern Alliance. As one counterterrorism official put it, “You keep [al-Qaeda terrorists] on the front lines in Afghanistan. Hopefully you’re killing them in the process, and they’re not leaving Afghanistan to plot terrorist operations.” A former US special envoy to the Afghan resistance visits Massoud this month. Massoud gives him “all the intelligence he [has] on al-Qaeda” in the hopes of getting some support in return. However, he gets nothing more than token amounts and his organization isn’t even given “legitimate resistance movement” status. [TIME, 8/4/2002] Entity Tags: Northern Alliance, United States, Ahmed Shah Massoud, Al-Qaeda Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden

June 2001: Enron Shuts Down Expensive Indian Plant After Afghan Pipeline Fails to Materialize Enron’s power plant in Dabhol, India, is shut down. The failure of the $3 billion plant, Enron’s largest investment, contributes to Enron’s bankruptcy in December. Earlier in the year, India stopped paying its bill for the energy from the plant, because energy from the plant cost three times the usual rates. [NEW YORK TIMES, 3/20/2001] Enron had hoped to feed the plant with cheap Central Asian gas, but this hope was dashed when a gas pipeline through Afghanistan was not completed. The larger part of the plant is still only 90 percent complete when construction stops around this time. [NEW YORK TIMES, 3/20/2001] Enron executives meet with Commerce Secretary Donald L. Evans about its troubled Dabhol power plant during this year [NEW YORK TIMES, 2/21/2002], and Vice President Cheney lobbies the leader of India’s main opposition party about the plant this month. [NEW YORK TIMES, 2/21/2002] Entity Tags: Enron, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, India, Donald L. Evans Category Tags: Pipeline Politics

June 2001: Group of 9/11 Hijackers Allegedly Meet in London British investigators believe that at least five of the 9/11 hijackers have a “vital planning meeting” held in a safe house in north London, Britain. No specific hijacker names are mentioned, but eleven of the hijackers are known to visit London around this time (see January-June 2001 and April 22-June 27, 2001). [LONDON TIMES, 9/26/2001] Authorities suspect that the meeting takes place in a home owned by Mustapha Labsi, an Algerian. It is believed Labsi also trained the hijackers in Afghanistan. However, Labsi could not have been at the June meeting because he was arrested in February 2001 in Britain and will be held continuously after that. He is a suspect in Ahmed Ressam’s attempting bombing of the Los Angeles airport. He is also wanted in France for planning a suspected attack at the 1996 G7 summit. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 9/30/2001] Entity Tags: Mustapha Labsi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism

June or July 2001: Hijackers Plan Attacks from German University Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, and an unknown third person are seen in the ground-floor workshops of the architecture department at this time, according to at least two witnesses from the Hamburg university where Atta had studied. They are seen on at least two occasions with a white, three-foot scale model of the Pentagon. Between 60 and 80 slides of the Sears building in Chicago and the WTC are found to be missing from the technical library after 9/11. [SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), 2/3/2002] A Hamburg friend of Atta’s, Margritte Schroeder, will confirm that Atta is in Hamburg around this time, saying later in 2001, “I saw him here in early July and he was as nice as ever.” Other eyewitnesses see Atta and Alshehhi in Hamburg as well. But there is no record of Alshehhi leaving the US around this time, which suggests that he travels on a false passport for this trip. [MILLER, STONE, AND MITCHELL, 2002, PP. 251, 290] Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Pentagon, Marwan Alshehhi, World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Al-Qaeda in Germany

June 2001: Janitor Claims to Witness Hijacker inside World Trade Center

Mohand Alshehri. [Source: FBI] Janitor William Rodriguez, who has worked at the World Trade Center for 20 years, believes he sees Flight 175 hijacker Mohand Alshehri in one of the towers. Rodriguez is cleaning washrooms on the Trade Center’s concourse level one weekend, when a person he later believes to have been Alshehri approaches him and asks, “[H]ow many public bathrooms are in this area?” Rodriguez says he finds this “very strange.” After 9/11, he will recognize the man from newspaper photos as having been the suspected hijacker. He will say he is “very certain, I’ll give it 90 percent” that the man he’d seen was Alshehri. He will tell the FBI of this encounter, but will never hear back from them. FBI officials later say they have never heard of Rodriguez, but they do not discount his story. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 6/15/2004; MSNBC, 6/15/2004; NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, 6/15/2004] According to FBI and 9/11 Commission accounts, Mohand Alshehri has only recently entered the US, on May 28, 2001 (see April 23-June 29, 2001), though other reports suggest he was in the country several months earlier (see January or July 28, 2001). [US CONGRESS, 9/26/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 23 ] Entity Tags: Mohand Alshehri, William Rodriguez Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers

June 2001: Spain Does Not Heed French Warning to Arrest Future Madrid Train Bomber In June 2001, Jean-Louis Bruguiere, a French judge who specializes in terrorism cases, concludes that Jamal Zougam, a Moroccan who owns a cell phone store in Madrid, Spain, is a major contact for Islamist militant recruits in Europe and Morocco. He warns the Spanish government that Zougam should be arrested. [NEW YORKER, 7/26/2004] The French became interested in Zougam because of his links to David Courtailler, a French convert to Islam. The CIA told the French in 1998 that Courtailler and others had just come back from an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan to plan attacks in Europe. The French tracked Courtailler to London (where he was roommates with Zacarias Moussaoui (see 1996-2001 and After August 7, 1998). Then they tracked him to Madrid and Tangier, Morocco, where he met with Zougam and Abdelaziz Benyaich, another Islamist militant. [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/28/2004] The Spanish were already monitoring Zougam in 2000, and had linked him with Barakat Yarkas, leader of an al-Qaeda cell in Madrid, and the radical British imam Abu Qatada (see 2000-Early March 2004). But Zougam is not arrested. In November 2001, the main suspects in Yarkas’s cell will be arrested, but again Zougam will remain free (see November 13, 2001). Bruguiere will have to wait a year before the Spanish police will allow him to question Zougam. Bruguiere will later comment, “In 2001, all the Islamist actors in Madrid were identified.” [NEW YORKER, 7/26/2004] Zougam will eventually be sentenced to life in prison for a key role in the 2004 Madrid train bombings. [DAILY MAIL, 11/1/2007] Entity Tags: Abdelaziz Benyaich, Central Intelligence Agency, David Courtailler, Jean-Louis Bruguiere, Jamal Zougam, Barakat Yarkas, Abu Qatada Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Spain, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, 2004 Madrid Train Bombings

June-September 11, 2001: CD Cover Depicts Scene Much Like 9/11 Attacks on WTC

The original cover design for The Coup’s album Party Music. [Source: 75 Ark] Cover artwork is designed for a forthcoming CD, which looks eerily like the attack on the World Trade Center that occurs three months later. The CD, “Party Music,” is the fourth album by a little-known hip-hop group called The Coup, which is known for its political activism. [CNN, 9/13/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 5/22/2002] The intended cover design shows the two members of the group standing in front of the Twin Towers. One of them is pressing a button on a guitar tuner, as if it was a detonator, and two fireballs are exploding from the top floors of the WTC above them. [VILLAGE VOICE, 11/2/2001] Days after 9/11, Wired magazine comments, “If it weren’t for the super-imposed images of the Oakland, California, hip-hop duo known as The Coup, the scene could pass for a remarkably precise replica of the horrific tragedy that befell New York City on Tuesday morning.” The CD is in fact initially scheduled for release in early September, but at some point before 9/11, it is pushed back two months for release in November. Furthermore, as Wired describes, “Timing of the original album printing was disturbingly in sync with real-world events. The printers were set to crank out copies of the fiery World Trade Center image on Tuesday [September 11]… when the label put in a last-minute call, urging them to stop the presses.” [WIRED NEWS, 9/13/2001] The group’s lead member, Raymond “Boots” Riley, is described by Kansas City newspaper The Pitch as a “confessed communist” who “has built a career out of making bold political statements.” [PITCH, 11/8/2001] Riley later says he’d come up with the idea for the CD cover along with his photographer, and they’d finished work on it by the beginning of June. He says, “Any similarities [with 9/11] are totally coincidental, and it was originally supposed to be more of a metaphor for destroying capitalism—where the music is making capitalist towers blow up.” [STRANGER, 9/20/2001] A new cover will be designed and used when the CD is eventually released. [PITCH, 11/8/2001] But copies are sent out prior to 9/11 to members of the press and others, and reviews appear in several publications before September 11 that show the original cover artwork of the exploding WTC. [WIRED NEWS, 9/13/2001] Entity Tags: The Coup, Raymond, World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events

June 2001: Germans Warn of Plan to Use Aircraft as Missiles on US and Israeli Symbols German intelligence warns the CIA, Britain’s intelligence agency, and Israel’s Mossad that Middle Eastern militants are planning to hijack commercial aircraft to use as weapons to attack “American and Israeli symbols, which stand out.” A later article quotes unnamed German intelligence sources who state the information was coming from Echelon surveillance technology, and that British intelligence had access to the same warnings. However, there were other informational sources, including specific information and hints given to, but not reported by, Western and Near Eastern news media six months before 9/11. [FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (FRANKFURT), 9/11/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/14/2001; FOX NEWS, 5/17/2002] Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Israel Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks (Mossad), Echelon Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Foreign Intelligence Warnings, Remote Surveillance, Key Warnings

June 2001: US Intelligence Warns of Spectacular Attacks by Al-Qaeda Associates US intelligence issues a terrorist threat advisory, warning US government agencies that there is a high probability of an imminent attack against US interests: “Sunni extremists associated with al-Qaeda are most likely to attempt spectacular attacks resulting in numerous casualties.” The advisory mentions the Arabian Peninsula, Israel, and Italy as possible targets for an attack. Afterwards, intelligence information provided to senior US leaders continues to indicate that al-Qaeda expects near-term attacks to have dramatic consequences on governments or cause major casualties. [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda Category Tags: Warning Signs

June 2001: Bank Refuses to Cash Check for ‘Suspicious’ Hijacker A branch of the SunTrust Bank in Florida refuses to cash a $2,180 check for hijacker pilot Marwan Alshehhi, as he arouses suspicion by presenting identification documents with different addresses and the bank personnel think the signature on the check does not match the signature on the file. The bank manager refuses to cash the check and issues an internal alert to other SunTrust branches to watch out for possible fraud. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 53, 140 ] Entity Tags: SunTrust Bank, Marwan Alshehhi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi

June 2001: Al-Qaeda and Islamic Jihad Complete Merger Two major terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda and the Egypt-based Islamic Jihad, formally merged into one. This completes a merging process that had been going on for years (see August 11-20, 1988, December 1, 1996-June 1997, and February 22, 1998). The technical name of the new entity is Qaeda al-Jihad, though it is widely called al-Qaeda. Bin Laden remains in charge, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Islamic Jihad, remains second in command. [NEW YORKER, 9/9/2002] Entity Tags: Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden, Islamic Jihad, Al-Qaeda Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden

June 2001: US Intelligence Fears Al-Qaeda Will Strike on Fourth of July The CIA provides senior US policy makers with a classified warning of a potential attack against US interests that is thought to be tied to Fourth of July celebrations in the US. [SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/23/2001] The head of counterterrorism at the FBI, Dale Watson, will later recall that he and Cofer Black, the head of counterterrorism at the CIA, expected an attack to occur around the Fourth of July. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 265] Entity Tags: Cofer Black, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Dale Watson, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

June 2001: CIA Gets Hints of Imminent, Multiple Al-Qaeda Attacks CIA Director George Tenet will later write that in June 2001, the CIA learns that Arabs in Afghanistan are said to be anticipating as many as eight celebrations. Additionally, al-Qaeda operatives are being told to await important news within days. [TENET, 2007, PP. 148-149] Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency Category Tags: Warning Signs

June 2001: Clarke Asks for Different Job as White House Fails to Share His Urgency about Terrorism Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke asks for a transfer to start a new national program on cyber security. His request is granted, and he is to change jobs in early October 2001 (which he does, see October 9, 2001). He makes the change despite the 9/11 attacks. He claims that he tells National Security Adviser Rice and her deputy Steve Hadley, “Perhaps I have become too close to the terrorism issue. I have worked it for ten years and to me it seems like a very important issue, but maybe I’m becoming like Captain Ahab with bin Laden as the White Whale. Maybe you need someone less obsessive about it.” [WHITE HOUSE, 10/9/2001; CLARKE, 2004, PP. 25-26] He later claims, “My view was that this administration, while it listened to me, either didn’t believe me that there was an urgent problem or was unprepared to act as though there were an urgent problem. And I thought, if the administration doesn’t believe its national coordinator for counterterrorism when he says there’s an urgent problem, and if it’s unprepared to act as though there’s an urgent problem, then probably I should get another job.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 3/24/2004] Entity Tags: Stephen J. Hadley, Richard A. Clarke, Osama bin Laden, Condoleezza Rice Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

June 2001: DEA Draws Up Report on Israeli Spies

States the Israeli spy ring were known to have operated in, according to a June 2001 Drug Enforcement Administration report (this Fox news graphic was based on information from that report). [Source: Fox News] The DEA’s Office of Security Programs prepares a 60-page internal memo on the Israeli “art student spy ring.” [DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, 6/2001] The Memo is a compilation of dozens of field reports, and was meant only for the eyes of senior officials at the Justice Department (of which the DEA is adjunct), but it is leaked to the press around December 2001. The report connects the spies to efforts to foil investigations into Israeli organized crime activity involving the importation of the drug Ecstasy. The spies also appear to be snooping on top-secret military bases. For instance, on April 30, 2001, an Air Force alert was issued from Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma City concerning “possible intelligence collection being conducted by Israeli art students.” Tinker AFB houses AWACS surveillance craft and Stealth bombers. By the time of the report, the US has “apprehended or expelled close to 120 Israeli nationals” but many remain at large. [LE MONDE (PARIS), 3/5/2002; SALON, 5/7/2002] An additional 20 or so Israeli spies are apprehended between June and 9/11. [FOX NEWS, 12/12/2001] Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, “Israeli art students”, Office of Security Programs Category Tags: Israel

June 2001: CIA Hears Key Al-Qaeda Operatives Are Disappearing, Preparing for Suicide Attack In June 2001, the CIA learns that key al-Qaeda operatives are disappearing, while others are preparing for martyrdom. [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] CIA Director George Tenet will later elaborate in a 2007 book that during the month of June, the CIA learns: Several training camps in Afghanistan are closing, a sign that al-Qaeda is anticipating a retaliatory strike. Bin Laden is leaving Afghanistan in fear of a US strike (this later turns out to be erroneous). Al-Qaeda operatives are leaving Saudi Arabia and returning to Afghanistan, which fits a pattern of movement just before attacks. Ayman al-Zawahiri is warning associates in Yemen to flee in anticipation of a crackdown. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, one of the masterminds of the USS ‘Cole’ bombing, has disappeared. Other important operatives are disappearing or preparing for martyrdom. A key Afghan training camp commander was reportedly weeping for joy because he believed he could see his trainees in heaven. [TENET, 2007, PP. 148-149] The CIA also heard in May that operatives are disappearing and preparing for martyrdom (see May 2001). Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency Category Tags: Warning Signs

(June 2001): ’Lackawanna Six’ Hear Bin Laden Give Speech Mentioning 40 Suicide Attackers Taking Part in Very Important Mission A group of seven Yemeni-Americans from Lackawanna, New York, go to train in Afghanistan (see April-August 2001). Just two days after some of them have arrived, two of the seven—Sahim Alwan and Jaber Elbaneh, plus their mentor Kamal Derwish, briefly meet Osama bin Laden in a small group setting. One of the men asks bin Laden about a rumor that something big is about to happen. Bin Laden responds: “They’re threatening us. And we’re threatening them. But there are brothers willing to carry their souls in their hands.” [TEMPLE-RASTON, 2007, PP. 107-108] A couple of weeks later, the seven Lackawanna men and Derwish begin training at the Al Farooq training camp near Kandahar. One day, bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri come to their camp and bin Laden gives a speech in Arabic to the hundreds of trainees there. The crowd is told the speech is being videotaped. In his 20-minute speech, he discusses the merger between al-Qaeda and Islamic Jihad. At the end, he calls on the gathering to pray for the 40 operatives who are en route for a very important mission. He drops hints about suicide operations against the US and Israel. One of the seven men, Yaseinn Taher, speaks Arabic well enough to understand the speech, and explains the gist of it to the other six. The Lackawanna men also sense a mood in the camp that something big is going to happen soon. For instance, the camp is regularly conducting evacuation drills in anticipation of the US bombing it. [TEMPLE-RASTON, 2007, PP. 117-120] One by one, all the members of the group except for Jaber Elbaneh drop out and go home before their basic training course is done. They will later be known as the “Lackawanna Six.” But none of the six tell any US authorities what they learned when they get back to the US before 9/11. Some of the six, such as Taher and Alwan, will later say that on the morning of 9/11 they realize the attack they are watching on television is what bin Laden was talking about when he discussed the 40 men on a suicide mission. [TEMPLE-RASTON, 2007, PP. 136-138] Entity Tags: Kamal Derwish, Al Farooq training camp, Jaber Elbaneh, Yaseinn Taher, Shafel Mosed, Faysal Galab, Osama bin Laden, Sahim Alwan, Mukhtar al-Bakri, Yahya Goba Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, "Lackawanna Six"

(June 2001): FAA Committee Prepares to Change ‘Preemptive Surrender’ Approach to Hijackings In response to some hijacking incidents abroad, an FAA advisory committee looks at the FAA’s longstanding “preemptive surrender” approach regarding the response to attempted hijackings. [FREEDOM DAILY, 12/7/2005] This policy, called the Common Strategy, teaches “flight crews that the best way to deal with hijackers [is] to accommodate their demands, get the plane to land safely, and then let law enforcement or the military handle the situation,” according to the 9/11 Commission. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 85] Less than three months before 9/11, the FAA advisory committee decides to upgrade the training manuals and official guidance for responding to hijacking attempts. The updated materials are to be available some time in the fall of this year. FAA official Mike Morse says the new scenario prepared for in training “will be one involving a team of hijackers with a higher degree of sophistication and training.” In addition, the scenario will “replicate what we’ve faced in some of the international hijackings abroad in recent years.” [FREEDOM DAILY, 12/7/2005] An exercise to study the new policy will take place during the summer (see Summer 2001). Entity Tags: Mike Morse, Federal Aviation Administration Category Tags: US Air Security

June-July 2001: Terrorist Threat Reports Surge, Frustration with White House Grows During this time, President Bush and other top White House officials are given a series of Presidential Daily Briefings relating to an al-Qaeda attack (see January 20-September 10, 2001). The exact contents of these briefings remain classified, but according to the 9/11 Commission they consistently predict upcoming attacks that will occur “on a catastrophic level, indicating that they would cause the world to be in turmoil, consisting of possible multiple—but not necessarily simultaneous—attacks.” CIA Director Tenet later will recall that he feels President Bush and other officials grasp the urgency of what they are being told. [9/11 COMMISSION, 4/13/2004] But Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin later states that he feels a great tension, peaking these months, between the Bush administration’s apparent misunderstanding of terrorism issues and his sense of great urgency. McLaughlin and others are frustrated when inexperienced Bush officials question the validity of certain intelligence findings. Two CIA officials even consider resigning in protest (see Summer 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/24/2004] Dale Watson, head of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, wishes he had “500 analysts looking at Osama bin Laden threat information instead of two.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 4/13/2004] Entity Tags: Dale Watson, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Bush administration, John E. McLaughlin, Osama bin Laden, George J. Tenet, George W. Bush Category Tags: Warning Signs, Key Warnings

Early June 2001: US Meets with Pakistani Officials, but Only Give Vague Warnings about Supporting Bin Laden Since the Bush administration came into office in January 2001, it has been slow to develop an approach on how to deal with Pakistan. In February 2001, President Bush and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf exchanged formal letters, but to little impact. The Bush administration is working on a regional policy review, but will not complete it before 9/11 (see January-September 10, 2001). The first substantial diplomatic contact between the US and Pakistan takes place in June 2001, when Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar and ISI Maj. Gen. Faiz Jilani visit Washington, Canada, and Britain. Jilani is accompanying Sattar because it is well known that the ISI controls Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban. Sattar and Jilani meet with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice in early June. Another Pakistani diplomat who attends the meeting will later recall: “She told us that the Taliban were dead in the water and we should drop them. It was a very rough meeting.” But Rice does not give any specific threats or incentives, presumably because the Bush administration has yet to make much progress with its policy review. Despite the harsh words, the Bush administration actually is more conciliatory than the Clinton administration had been. Later in June, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage says in an interview: “I don’t want to see Pakistan only through the lens or the prism of Osama bin Laden. We want to look at Pakistan and see what Pakistan thinks about Pakistan’s future.” Bush writes another letter to Musharraf in August, but it simply repeats previous warnings (see August 4, 2001). Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, author of the 2000 book Taliban, will later comment: “There was now even less incentive for Musharraf to change his policies toward the Taliban and there was no extraordinary US pressure to go after al-Qaeda. Dealing with Bush was going to be much easier than dealing with Clinton. Whereas Clinton resisted the wool being pulled over his eyes, the Bush administration simply closed their eyes themselves.” [RASHID, 2008, PP. 56-58] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Abdul Sattar, Bush administration, Faiz Jilani, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Richard Armitage, Condoleezza Rice, Pervez Musharraf Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Pakistan and the ISI

Early June 2001: Taliban Leader Claims Interest in Resolving bin Laden Issue Reclusive Taliban leader Mullah Omar says the Taliban would like to resolve the bin Laden issue, so there can be “an easing and then lifting of UN sanctions that are strangling and killing the people of [Afghanistan].” [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 4/9/2004] Entity Tags: Mullah Omar, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden

Early June 2001: FBI Misses Tip on Likely Al-Qaeda Cell in Buffalo

Sahim Alwan. [Source: PBS] The FBI’s Buffalo, New York, field office receives an anonymous, handwritten letter from someone in the Yemeni community of Lackawanna, near Buffalo. The letter says that a group has traveled to “meet bin Laden and stay in his camp for training.” The person who wrote it adds, “I can not give you my name because I fear for my life.” It says that “two terrorists” have been recruiting in Lackawanna, and that eight men have gone to train in Afghanistan, and four more are planning to go later. It gives the names of the men. In fact, all eight of the men named are currently in an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. This group will later be dubbed the “Lackawanna Six,” for the six of them that eventually return to the US (see September 13, 2002). The letter is assigned to FBI agent Edward Needham, the only Buffalo agent at this time working on counterterrorism. He runs the names through criminal databases and finds that many of them have criminal records for drug dealing and cigarette smuggling. He is skeptical that drug dealers would fight for al-Qaeda, but he sends the letter up the chain of command and formally opens an investigation on June 15. Three of them—Faysal Galab, Shafel Mosed, and Yaseinn Taher—are stopped on June 27 when they arrive in New York on a flight back from Pakistan, because Needham put their names on an FBI watch list. But they are merely questioned for two hours and released. He keeps occasional tabs on the men as they return from Afghanistan over the next months, but does not learn they actually were in an al-Qaeda training camp until after 9/11. [PBS FRONTLINE, 10/16/2003; TEMPLE-RASTON, 2007, PP. 124-125, 129] Entity Tags: Yaseinn Taher, Yahya Goba, Shafel Mosed, Mukhtar al-Bakri, Kamal Derwish, Edward Needham, Faysal Galab, Sahim Alwan, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Jaber Elbaneh Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11, "Lackawanna Six"

Early June 2001: Counterterrorism Plan Circulated, but Contingency Plans Are Not Created

Steve Hadley. [Source: NATO] Deputy National Security Adviser Steve Hadley circulates a draft presidential directive on policy toward al-Qaeda. Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke and his staff regard the new approach as essentially the same as the proposal that they developed in December 2000 and presented to the Bush administration in January 2001. The draft has the goal of eliminating al-Qaeda as a threat over a multi-year period, and calls for funding through 2006. It has a section calling for the development of contingency military plans against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Hadley contacts Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz to tell him these contingency plans will be needed soon. However, no such plans are developed before 9/11. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and others later admit that the contingency plans available immediately after 9/11 are unsatisfactory. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/24/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/24/2004] The draft is now discussed in three more deputy-level meetings. Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Bush administration, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard A. Clarke, Stephen J. Hadley, Paul Wolfowitz Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Early June-September 10, 2001: Armed Drone Ready to Hit Bin Laden, but Bureacratic Concerns Prevent Its Use

A Predator drone firing a Hellfire missile. [Source: US Air Force] An armed version of the Predator drone successfully passes a test showing it is ready for use in Afghanistan. The Predator had been used successfully in 2000 to spot bin Laden (see September 7-October 2000), but it was not used in early 2001 while an armed version was prepared (see January 10-25, 2001). A Hellfire missile was successfully test fired from a Predator on February 16, 2001. [CBS NEWS, 6/25/2003] In early June 2001, a duplicate of the brick house where bin Laden is believed to be living in Kandahar, Afghanistan, is built in Nevada, and destroyed by a Predator missile. The test shows that the missile fired from miles away would have killed anyone in the building, and one participant calls this the long sought after “holy grail” that could kill bin Laden within minutes of finding him. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/20/2002] But National Security Adviser Rice reportedly wants to use the Predator only after an overall strategy for confronting al-Qaeda is worked out, and no such plan is close to being ready. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6/22/2003] She and her deputy Steve Hadley decide to delay reconnaissance flights until all the arrangements for using the armed version can be worked out. In July 2001, Hadley directs the military to have armed Predators ready to deploy no later than September 1. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/24/2004] The main hold up seems to be bureaucratic. Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke repeatedly advocates using the Predator, armed or unarmed. However, infighting between the CIA and the Air Force over who would pay for it and take responsibility delays its use. Clarke later says, “Every time we were ready to use it, the CIA would change its mind.” [NEW YORKER, 7/28/2003] The issue comes to a head in early September 2001, but even then, a decision to use the Predator is delayed (see September 4, 2001). [NEW YORKER, 7/28/2003] The armed Predator will finally be used in Afghanistan just days after 9/11. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6/25/2003] Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Osama bin Laden, Bush administration, Condoleezza Rice, National Security Council Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11

Summer 2001: FBI Internal Report Highlights Lack of Resources For Counterterrorism But Ashcroft Denies More Funding The New York Times will later report that, according to senior government officials, “A top secret report warned top officials of the FBI in the months before Sept. 11 that the bureau faced significant terrorist threats from Middle Eastern groups like al-Qaeda but lacked enough resources to meet the threat.” The internal assessment finds that virtually every major FBI field office is undermanned for evaluating and dealing with the threat from groups like al-Qaeda. The report gives detailed recommendations and proposes spending increases to address the problem. [NEW YORK TIMES, 6/1/2002] The report is the result of “MAXCAP 05,” short for maximum feasible capability, an evaluation effort launched by Dale Watson, the head of the new counterterrorism division created in 1999, to identify the FBI’s weaknesses in counterterrorism and remedy them by 2005. It is presented to Robert Mueller upon his appointment as FBI director in early September. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 78-79; ZEGART, 2007, PP. 142] The report will not be made public. [NEW YORK TIMES, 6/27/2007] However, in August 2001, acting FBI Director Tom Pickard meets Attorney General John Ashcroft to ask for supplemental funding for counterterrorism, but his request is turned down. On September 10, 2001, Ashcroft rejects a proposed $58 million increase in FBI counterterrorism funding for the next year’s budget (see September 10, 2001). Entity Tags: Thomas Pickard, Robert S. Mueller III, Dale Watson, Federal Bureau of Investigation, John Ashcroft Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

June 1, 2001: Revised Hijacking Procedure Outlines Defense Department Responsibilities A military instruction is issued by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, outlining the procedure for dealing with hijackings within the United States. The instruction, titled “Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects,” states that “the administrator, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), has exclusive responsibility to direct law enforcement activity related to actual or attempted aircraft piracy (hijacking) in the ‘special aircraft jurisdiction’ of the United States. When requested by the administrator, Department of Defense will provide assistance to these law enforcement efforts.” It adds that the National Military Command Center (NMCC) within the Pentagon “is the focal point within Department of Defense for providing assistance. In the event of a hijacking, the NMCC will be notified by the most expeditious means by the FAA. The NMCC will, with the exception of immediate responses as authorized by reference d, forward requests for DOD assistance to the secretary of defense for approval.” [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 6/1/2001 ] Some will later assume that this requirement for defense secretary approval was new with this instruction. [NEW YORK OBSERVER, 6/20/2004] But it has in fact been a requirement since 1997, when the previous instruction was issued, if not earlier. [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 7/31/1997 ] Although the defense secretary has this responsibility, the 9/11 Commission will conclude that, on the day of 9/11, the “secretary of defense did not enter the chain of command until the morning’s key events were over.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 15 ] Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld will later incorrectly claim that, up to 9/11, terrorism and domestic hijackings were “a law enforcement issue.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/23/2004; PBS, 3/25/2004; US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 6/14/2005] Entity Tags: National Military Command Center, US Department of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, Federal Aviation Administration Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, US Air Security

Summer 2001: 9/11 Hijackers’ Associates Call Monitored Al-Qaeda Communications Hub in Yemen Associates of the 9/11 hijackers call a number in Yemen also called by the radicals who bombed two US embassies in East Africa in 1998. The calls, which MSNBC says are made “in the weeks before the attacks,” are presumably to an al-Qaeda communications hub in Sana’a, Yemen, run by Ahmed al-Hada, an associate of Nairobi embassy bomber Mohamed al-Owhali (see August 4-25, 1998). The number is monitored by US intelligence at this time and is also called by the hijackers themselves (see Early 2000-Summer 2001), at least one of the calls being around this time (see (August 2001)). But it is not clear what intelligence the NSA and CIA gleaned from these calls or which associates of the hijackers make the calls. [MSNBC, 10/3/2001] However, it is thought that one of the hijackers’ associates, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, met with an associate of al-Hada’s in Yemen the year before (see Before October 12, 2000) and traveled to Yemen before the bombing of the USS Cole (see Around September 15-16 and October 10-21, 2000). Entity Tags: Ahmed al-Hada, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, National Security Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Remote Surveillance, Yemen Hub

June 1, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Alhaznawi Leaves Saudi Arabia, Possibly Tracked by Saudi Authorities 9/11 hijacker Ahmed Alhaznawi departs Saudi Arabia, traveling to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 151 ] According to the 9/11 Commission, Alhaznawi may have had a passport with an indicator of Islamic extremism (see Before November 12, 2000). Such indicators were used by the Saudi authorities to track some of the hijackers before 9/11 (see November 2, 2007), so the Saudis may register his departure. Entity Tags: Ahmed Alhaznawi Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers

June 1-2, 2001: Military Conducts Exercises Based on Scenario in which Cruise Missiles Are Launched against US

Osama bin Laden is pictured on the cover of the Amalgam Virgo exercise. [Source: NORAD] The US military conducts Amalgam Virgo 01, a multi-agency live-fly homeland security exercise sponsored by the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and involving the hypothetical scenario of a cruise missile being launched by “a rogue [government] or somebody” from a barge off the East Coast. Osama bin Laden is pictured on the cover of the proposal for the exercise. [GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 4/14/2002; AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 6/4/2002; ARKIN, 2005, PP. 253] The exercise takes place at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida. Drones simulating cruise missiles are launched from Tyndall, head out to sea, circle a ship as if they are being launched from there, and then head back to land. Air Force F-16s, Navy gunners, and Army missile defense units attempt to find and track the drones. The Coast Guard attempts to catch the ship serving as the dummy launch site. [TAMPA TRIBUNE, 6/3/2001] Another scenario in the exercise involves a suicide mission in which a Haitian man with AIDS attempts to deliberately crash a small private plane into NORAD’s Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS) at Tyndall AFB. [US AIR FORCE, 2001] The next Amalgam Virgo exercise, scheduled to take place in 2002, will involve two simultaneous commercial aircraft hijackings. Planning for that exercise will begin in July 2001 (see July 2001). [AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 6/4/2002; USA TODAY, 4/18/2004] Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Amalgam Virgo, North American Aerospace Defense Command Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Military Exercises

Summer 2001: State Department Official Allegedly Receives Bribe from Nuclear Proliferation Network An unnamed high-ranking State Department official is said to receive a $15,000 bribe around this time in connection with assistance he provides to a nuclear smuggling ring run by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan (see (1997-2002) and Summer-Autumn 2001), according to FBI translator Sibel Edmonds. Edmonds will later leave the FBI, becoming a whistleblower, and will say she knows this based on telephone conversations she translated. [SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), 1/27/2008] According to an intercepted phone call, the package is to be dropped off at an agreed location by someone in the Turkish diplomatic community who is working for the network. [SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), 1/6/2008] The high-ranking State Department official who is not named by the Sunday Times is said to be Marc Grossman by both Larisa Alexandrovna of Raw Story and former CIA officer Philip Giraldi, writing in the American Conservative. [RAW STORY, 1/20/2008; AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, 1/28/2008] Entity Tags: Marc Grossman, Larisa Alexandrovna, US Department of State, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Philip Giraldi, Sibel Edmonds Timeline Tags: A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network Category Tags: Sibel Edmonds, Pakistani Nukes & Islamic Militancy

Summer-Autumn 2001: State Department Official Allegedly Tips Off Nuclear Smuggling Ring about CIA Front Company

Marc Grossman at an American-Turkish Council meeting in 2005. [Source: Canal+] An unnamed high-ranking State Department official tips off members of a nuclear smuggling ring about a CIA operation to penetrate it, according to FBI translator Sibel Edmonds. Edmonds will later leave the FBI, becoming a whistleblower, and will say she knows this based on telephone conversations she translated. The ring is headed by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, and includes Pakistan’s ISI intelligence agency, as well as Turkish and Israeli representatives. The official is said to tell a member of the ring that a company the ring wants to do business with, Brewster Jennings & Associates, is a CIA front company. Brewster Jennings & Associates is a front for Valerie Plame Wilson, who will later be outed as a CIA officer in 2003, and possibly other operatives. A group of Turkish agents come to the US on the pretext of researching alternative energy sources and are introduced to Brewster Jennings through a lobby group, the American Turkish Council (ATC). The Turks apparently believe Brewster Jennings are energy consultants and plan to hire them. According to Edmonds, the State Department official finds out about this and contacts a foreign target under FBI surveillance, telling him, “[Y]ou need to stay away from Brewster Jennings because they are a cover for the government.” The FBI target then warns several people about Brewster Jennings, including a person at the ATC and an ISI agent, and Plame Wilson is moved to another operation. Comments and Denial - The Sunday Times will comment: “If the ISI was made aware of the CIA front company, then this would almost certainly have damaged the investigation into the activities of Khan. Plame [Wilson]‘s cover would also have been compromised, although Edmonds never heard her name mentioned on the intercepts.” The unnamed State Department official will deny the allegations, calling them “false and malicious.” Former CIA officer Philip Giraldi will comment: “It’s pretty clear Plame [Wilson] was targeting the Turks. If indeed that [State Department] official was working with the Turks to violate US law on nuclear exports, it would have been in his interest to alert them to the fact that this woman’s company was affiliated to the CIA. I don’t know if that’s treason legally but many people would consider it to be.” [SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), 1/27/2008] Official Said to be Marc Grossman - The high-ranking State Department official who is not named in the Sunday Times is said to be Marc Grossman by both Larisa Alexandrovna of Raw Story and Giraldi, writing in the American Conservative. [RAW STORY, 1/20/2008; AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, 1/28/2008] Entity Tags: Sibel Edmonds, Valerie Plame Wilson, Philip Giraldi, US Department of State, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Larisa Alexandrovna, Brewster Jennings & Associates, American-Turkish Council, Marc Grossman, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network, Niger Uranium and Plame Outing Category Tags: Sibel Edmonds, Pakistani Nukes & Islamic Militancy

June 1, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Acquires New Saudi Passport Despite Presence on Saudi Watchlist 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar obtains a new passport in Saudi Arabia, despite being on the terrorist watch list there due to his part in a failed gunrunning plot (see 1997). The passport contains an indicator of possible terrorist affiliation used by the Saudi authorities to track terrorist suspects (see November 2, 2007) and lacks an expiry date. Although the nature of the indicator is not clear, one of the other hijackers, Ziad Jarrah, has an overlay of the Koran in his passport and immigration officials in the United Arab Emirates are said to find this suspicious, so the indicator in Almihdhar’s passport may be similar. Nevertheless, Almihdhar uses it to obtain a US visa (see June 13, 2001) and travels to the US on it (see July 4, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 496; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 24, 27 ] Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Saudi General Intelligence Directorate Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Saudi Arabia

Summer 2001: FAA Participates in Exercise Based around Hijacking of a Boeing 767 The FAA takes part in a training exercise based around the hijacking of a Boeing 767, the same kind of aircraft as those that hit the Twin Towers on 9/11. The exercise is conducted as part of efforts to update the strategy for dealing with hijackings. Its participants include the FAA, the FBI’s Miami field office, Miami-Dade County Police Department, a SWAT team, and Varig Airlines, and it utilizes a 767. Further details are unknown, but the hijacking exercise presumably takes place somewhere in the Miami area of Florida. [9/11 COMMISSION, 9/15/2003, PP. 6 ] Entity Tags: FBI Miami Field Office, Federal Aviation Administration, Miami-Dade County Police Department, Varig Airlines Category Tags: US Air Security, Military Exercises

Summer 2001: CIA Allegedly Tells Bush Al-Qaeda Has Been Penetrated The CIA tells President Bush that co-operation between the CIA and Saudi Arabia’s GID intelligence agency has enabled the US to penetrate al-Qaeda, according to a later account by investigative reporters Joe and Susan Trento. They will write: “The great secret of why the president and his team were complacent about warnings of an impending 9/11 attack in the summer of 2001 is that the CIA had assured the national command authority that the CIA’s cooperative arrangement with Saudi intelligence had resulted in the penetration of al-Qaeda at the highest levels, according to intelligence sources who worked in this area for both the Saudi and US services.” This may be a reference to 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, who the Trentos claim are Saudi intelligence agents (see August 6, 2003). [TRENTO AND TRENTO, 2006, PP. 193-4] Entity Tags: Joseph Trento, George W. Bush, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, Susan Trento, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11, Presidential Level Warnings, Other Possible Moles or Informants, Warning Signs

June 2, 2001: Wolfowitz Discusses Danger of Surprise Attack, Like Pearl Harbor Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz gives a commencement address at the United States Military Academy graduation at West Point, New York, where he focuses on the danger of surprise attacks. To an audience of about 15,000 people, he points out that 2001 marks the 60th anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor—“a military disaster whose name has become synonymous with surprise”—and notes that, “Interestingly, that ‘surprise attack’ was preceded by an astonishing number of unheeded warnings and missed signals.” He continues, “Yet military history is full of surprises… Very few of these surprises are the product of simple blindness or simple stupidity. Almost always there have been warnings and signals that have been missed.” He says one of the reasons these warnings have so often been missed is “a routine obsession with a few familiar dangers,” which “has gotten whole governments, sometimes whole societies, into trouble.” He stresses the need to “use the benefit of hindsight to replace a poverty of expectations with an anticipation of the unfamiliar and the unlikely,” thereby overcoming “the complacency that is the greatest threat to our hopes for a peaceful future.” [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 6/1/2001; US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 6/2/2001] Journalist James Mann will later reflect on this speech, saying that Wolfowitz “was more prescient than he could have imagined. America was about to be attacked. Once again the United States was unable to deal with the unfamiliar and the unlikely. Once again there were unheeded warnings and missed signals.” [MANN, 2004, PP. 29] In spite of his words of caution, around this time Wolfowitz himself appears to be ignoring the danger of a possible attack by al-Qaeda. In July, he will reportedly doubt whether the recent surge in al-Qaeda warnings is really of significance (see Mid-July 2001). And at a meeting on terrorism in April, he’d complained, “I just don’t understand why we are beginning by talking about this one man bin Laden” (see April 30, 2001). Entity Tags: Paul Wolfowitz Category Tags: Warning Signs

June 3, 2001-July 24, 2001: Al-Qaeda Leader Escapes Ireland Despite Being under Surveillance On June 3, 2001, a British newspaper reveals that Hamid Aich, who is on the FBI’s international wanted list, is living in Dublin where he is applying for asylum. [MIRROR, 2/18/2001; NEWS OF THE WORLD, 6/3/2001] Irish intelligence has been monitoring Aich’s movements since 1997, when authorities tied him to the mass murder of 77 tourists in Luxor, Egypt (see November 18, 1997). [MIRROR, 10/17/2001; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 11/8/2001] He has since been linked to a number of militant groups (see, e.g., December 14, 1999). It is believed that between 1999 and 2001, Aich assisted 22 Islamic terrorist organizations, and even funded non-Islamic groups, for instance giving $200,000 to the ETA, a separatist group in the Basque region of Spain. Aich was also the director of Mercy International’s Ireland branch. (This charity has several known al-Qaeda connections by this time (see 1988-Spring 1995 and Late 1996-August 20, 1998).) Despite these connections, he will continue to live openly in Dublin after the newspaper discloses his location. [MIRROR, 9/17/2001] Irish authorities only publicly say, “Aich’s case is at a very delicate stage.” [NEWS OF THE WORLD, 6/3/2001] Then, on July 24, he leaves Ireland using a false passport. The FBI, which took no action against him while he was living in Dublin, is reportedly “furious” with Irish police for allowing him to escape. He has not been heard of since, and he has not been included in any known lists of wanted al-Qaeda leaders. It is believed that Aich eventually ends up in Afghanistan. After 9/11, Aich will be described as “one of the FBI’s chief targets” and “one of bin Laden’s most trusted men” who ranks seventh in al-Qaeda’s hierarchy. [MIRROR, 9/17/2001] Entity Tags: Hamid Aich, Zacarias Moussaoui, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mercy International, Al-Qaeda, Ahmed Ressam Category Tags: Remote Surveillance, Terrorism Financing, Millennium Bomb Plots

June 4, 2001: Congressional Committee Warned of Large Attacks Soon A deputy head of the CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center warns a closed session of the House Intelligence Committee, “We’re on the verge of more attacks that are larger and more deadly.” Apparently this is based on the spike in “chatter” picked up by NSA and CIA monitors and the realization that a number of well-known al-Qaeda operatives have gone underground. [VANITY FAIR, 11/2004] Entity Tags: House Intelligence Committee, Counterterrorist Center Category Tags: Warning Signs

June 4, 2001: Illegal Afghans Overheard Discussing New York City Hijacking Attack
At some point in 2000, three men claiming to be Afghans but using Pakistani passports entered the Cayman Islands, possibly illegally. [MIAMI HERALD, 9/20/2001] In late 2000, Cayman and British investigators began a yearlong probe of these men, which will last until 9/11. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/20/2001] They are overheard discussing hijacking attacks in New York City during this period. On this day, they are taken into custody, questioned, and released some time later. This information is forwarded to US intelligence. [FOX NEWS, 5/17/2002] In late August, a letter to a Cayman radio station will allege these same men are agents of bin Laden “organizing a major terrorist act against the US via an airline or airlines.” [MIAMI HERALD, 9/20/2001; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/20/2001] Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Foreign Intelligence Warnings, Key Warnings

June 4, 2001: Warrant Issued for Arrest of Mohamed Atta in Florida On June 4, 2001, a warrant is issued for the arrest of Mohamed Atta in the state of Florida. On April 26, he had been stopped at a random inspection near Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and given a citation for having no driver’s license. He failed to show up for his May 28 court hearing, resulting in the arrest warrant. After this, he flies all over the US using his real name, and even flies to Spain and back in July (see July 8-19, 2001), but is never stopped or questioned. The police apparently never try to find him. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/16/2001; AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 11/12/2001] Atta will be stopped for speeding in July, but apparently his arrest warrant will not yet be added to the police database (see July 5, 2001). Three other hijackers are also stopped for speeding in the US (see April 1, 2001, August 1, 2001, and September 9, 2001). Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Hijacker Contact w Government in US, Key Hijacker Events

June 7-10, 2001: Hijacker Jarrah Suspects He Is Followed as He Flies to Vegas

Ziad Jarrah. [Source: National Geographic] Ziad Jarrah takes a trip to Las Vegas, but will reportedly later say he was followed on the trip. One of the hijackers’ associates, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, will later say that Jarrah felt he was followed on a flight from New York to California by “security officers.” Bin al-Shibh will also say that fellow hijacker Marwan Alshehhi was followed on a similar flight (see May 24-27, 2001). Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar also thought they were followed on a flight to the US (see January 15, 2000 and Mid-July 2000). [FOUDA AND FIELDING, 2003, PP. 135] Jarrah flies first class from Baltimore to Los Angeles on a United Airlines Boeing 757, the same type of plane he will apparently fly on 9/11, and then continues to Las Vegas. Three days later he returns his rental car, having driven 350 miles, and flies back to Baltimore, where he boards a plane back to Fort Lauderdale. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 23 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 55 ] His uncle will describe the trip as a “gambling junket.” [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 10/23/2001] Several other hijackers also travel to Vegas (see May 24-August 14, 2001). Entity Tags: Ziad Jarrah Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Ziad Jarrah

June 9, 2001-July 10, 2001: Wright Says FBI Unit Is Making ‘Virtually No Effort’ to Neutralize Known Terrorists Inside the US FBI agent Robert Wright gives the FBI a mission statement he wrote that outlines his complaints against his agency. It reads, in part, “Knowing what I know, I can confidently say that until the investigative responsibilities for terrorism are removed from the FBI, I will not feel safe. The FBI has proven for the past decade it cannot identify and prevent acts of terrorism against the United States and its citizens at home and abroad. Even worse, there is virtually no effort on the part of the FBI’s International Terrorism Unit to neutralize known and suspected terrorists residing within the United States. Unfortunately, more terrorist attacks against American interests, coupled with the loss of American lives, will have to occur before those in power give this matter the urgent attention it deserves.” Wright asks the FBI for permission to make his complaints public. Larry Klayman, chairman of the public-interest group Judicial Watch, claims that regulations require the FBI to give or deny clearance within 30 days, which would have made FBI failures an issue before 9/11. But the FBI delays making a decision and will only allow Wright to publicly reveal his mission statement in May 2002. [CYBERCAST NEWS SERVICE, 5/30/2002; FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, 5/30/2002] One month later, Wright and his lawyer David Schippers have a meeting with a reporter from the CBS news program 60 Minutes to express the concerns in his statement. He claims that he says it is only a matter of time before there will be an attack on US soil. However, he is prohibited by his superior from speaking to 60 Minutes or any other media outlet. [FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, 6/2/2003] Schippers will later claim that this month he also attempts to contact a number of important politicians with his concerns based on information from Wright and other FBI agents that he knows, but he was rebuffed (see July-Late August 2001). Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, David Schippers, Larry Klayman, Robert Wright, International Terrorism Unit Category Tags: Robert Wright and Vulgar Betrayal, Terrorism Financing, Warning Signs, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

June 11, 2001: FBI and CIA Hold Shouting Match over Information on Al-Qaeda; CIA Still Withholds Information The FBI and the CIA hold a meeting to discuss the investigation into the USS Cole bombing and a possible connection between it and al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit (see January 5-8, 2000). However, the CIA and FBI headquarters refuse to share all they know, and agents investigating the Cole bombing become angry over this. Attendees - The meeting, which lasts between two and four hours, is attended by CIA officer Clark Shannon, FBI headquarters agent Dina Corsi, an FBI agent loaned to the CIA named Margaret Gillespie, FBI agent Steve Bongardt, FBI agent Russell Fincher, and assistant US attorney David Kelley. Purpose - Although there is no agenda for the meeting and Corsi will later say it is a brainstorming session, author Lawrence Wright will say that one of the reasons for the meeting is that CIA officer Tom Wilshire, an associate of Shannon’s, “want[ed] to know… what the FBI knew” about al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit. Photos Shown - Initially, Bongardt and Fincher brief Shannon on progress in the Cole investigation. Corsi then shows the two Cole investigators three photographs taken at al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit in 2000 (see January 5-8, 2000), showing 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and another man, and Shannon asks if the agents recognize Fahad al-Quso, who is thought to have attended the Malaysia meeting and has been interviewed by the FBI. However, one of the photos shows Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and a tree, and the CIA has already recognized Almihdhar and Alhazmi, so it is unclear how the Cole investigators are supposed to recognize al-Quso in the photo. Corsi received the photographs from CIA officer Tom Wilshire, but Wilshire did not provide her with all the relevant information about them (see Late May, 2001). Questions Asked - Bongardt and Fincher ask who is in the pictures, why were taken, and whether there are other photos of the meeting. Shannon refuses to say, but Corsi eventually admits one of the men is named Khalid Almihdhar. As a name alone is not sufficient to start an investigation, Bongardt asks for a date of birth or other details that will allow him to know which Khalid Almihdhar in the world is being discussed, but Shannon refuses to provide them. Shannon admits that Almihdhar was traveling on a Saudi passport and then leaves the meeting. Author Lawrence Wright will say that providing a date of birth is “standard procedure—the first thing most investigators would do.” Realizing that the photos pertain to the Cole investigation, Bongardt and Fincher become angry at the lack of information being provided and the meeting descends into a “shouting match.” [ABC NEWS, 8/16/2002; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 289-294 ; NEW YORKER, 7/10/2006 ] What Shannon Knew - Shannon will later admit that at the time he knew Almihdhar had a US visa, that Alhazmi had traveled to the US in 2000, that al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash had been recognized in one of the photos, and that Alhazmi was known to be an experienced operative. However, he does not tell any of this to any FBI agents, as he apparently thinks he does not have the authority. He does not let them keep copies of the photos either and will give conflicting accounts of the meeting after 9/11 (see Between September 12, 2001 and October 17, 2002). [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 ; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 289-292 ] Corsi Withholds Information - Corsi has NSA information saying Almihdhar and Alhazmi attended the Malaysia meeting, but apparently believes that the Cole agents cannot be told more because of restrictions on sharing intelligence with criminal agents (see July 19, 1995). However, one of the Cole agents present is an intelligence agent, so the information can be communicated to him immediately without Corsi obtaining permission from the NSA and/or Justice Department. In addition, the NSA sent the information to the FBI’s New York field office, where the Cole investigators are based, in 1999 (see December 1999-January 2000). Further, when she asks the NSA’s permission to share the information 10 weeks later, the NSA approves the request on the same day (see August 27-28, 2001). She does not share the information at this time, but promises Bongardt and Fincher to try to do so later. The Cole agents will not receive more information for months. [US CONGRESS, 9/20/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 269, 537] Almihdhar Gets New Visa - Two days after this meeting, Almihdhar has no trouble getting a new, multiple reentry US visa (see May 2001 and June 13, 2001). [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 12/12/2001; US CONGRESS, 9/20/2002] Entity Tags: Dina Corsi, Khalid Almihdhar, Federal Bureau of Investigation, David Kelley, Margaret Gillespie, Central Intelligence Agency, Tawfiq bin Attash, Steve Bongardt, Russell Fincher, Clark Shannon, Nawaf Alhazmi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

June 11-14, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Seen in Hotel before He Apparently Enters US

Saeed Alghamdi. [Source: US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division] 9/11 hijacker Saeed Alghamdi is seen in a Florida hotel by the manager before he is said to enter the US. Although the 9/11 Commission will say he arrives in America on June 27 (see April 23-June 29, 2001), the manager of the Deluxe Inn in Dania, Florida, will tell the FBI that he stays there for these three nights from June 11-14 together with fellow hijackers Mohamed Atta, Ahmed Alnami, and Marwan Alshehhi, who completed the registration forms. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 157 ] Entity Tags: Saeed Alghamdi, Mohamed Atta, Ahmed Alnami, Marwan Alshehhi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers

June 12, 2001: CIA Learns KSM Is Sending Operatives to US to Meet Up with Operatives Already There A CIA report says that a man named “Khaled” is actively recruiting people to travel to various countries, including the US, to stage attacks. CIA headquarters presume from the details of this report that Khaled is Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM). On July 11, the individual source for this report is shown a series of photographs and identifies KSM as the person he called “Khaled.” [USA TODAY, 12/12/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 277, 533] This report also reveals that: Al-Qaeda operatives heading to the US would be “expected to establish contact with colleagues already living there.” KSM himself had traveled to the US frequently, and as recently as May 2001. KSM is a relative of bomber Ramzi Yousef. He appears to be one of bin Laden’s most trusted leaders. He routinely tells others that he can arrange their entry into the US as well. However, the CIA doesn’t find this report credible because they think it is unlikely that he would come to the US (in fact, it appears he had (see Summer 1998)). Nevertheless, they consider it worth pursuing. One agent replies, “If it is KSM, we have both a significant threat and an opportunity to pick him up.” In July, the source clarifies that the last time he can definitely place KSM in the US was in the summer of 1998 (see Summer 1998). The CIA disseminates the report to all other US intelligence agencies, military commanders, and parts of the Treasury and Justice Departments. The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry will later request that the CIA inform them how CIA agents and other agencies reacted to this information, but the CIA does not respond to this. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003] It appears that KSM will send at least one and probably two operatives to the US after this time and before 9/11 (see August 4, 2001 and September 10, 2001). On July 23, 2001, the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia will give KSM a US visa (he uses an alias but his actual photo appears on his application) (see July 23, 2001). Also, during this summer and as late as September 10, 2001, the NSA will intercept phone calls between KSM and Mohamed Atta, but the NSA will not share this information with any other agencies (see Summer 2001). Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, US Department of Justice, US Department of the Treasury, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Key Warnings, Other Possible Moles or Informants

June 12, 2001: Sting Operation Exposes Al-Qaeda, ISI, and Drug Connections; Investigators Face Obstacles to Learn More

Kevin Ingram, Randy Glass, and Diaa Mohsen in August 1999. [Source: Getty Images] (click image to enlarge) Operation Diamondback, a sting operation uncovering an attempt to buy weapons illegally for the Taliban, bin Laden, and others, ends with a number of arrests. An Egyptian named Diaa Mohsen and a Pakistani named Mohammed Malik are arrested and accused of attempting to buy Stinger missiles, nuclear weapon components, and other sophisticated military weaponry for the Pakistani ISI. [CNN, 6/15/2001; SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, 8/23/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 8/2/2002] Malik appears to have had links to important Pakistani officials and Kashmiri militants, and Mohsen claims a connection to a man “who is very connected to the Taliban” and funded by bin Laden. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/2/2002; MSNBC, 8/2/2002] Some other ISI agents came to Florida on several occasions to negotiate, but they escaped being arrested. They wanted to pay partially in heroin. One mentioned that the WTC would be destroyed. These ISI agents said some of their purchases would go to the Taliban in Afghanistan and/or militants associated with bin Laden. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/2/2002; MSNBC, 8/2/2002] Both Malik and Mohsen lived in Jersey City, New Jersey. [JERSEY JOURNAL, 6/20/2001] Mohsen pleads guilty after 9/11, “but remarkably, even though [he was] apparently willing to supply America’s enemies with sophisticated weapons, even nuclear weapons technology, Mohsen was sentenced to just 30 months in prison.” [MSNBC, 8/2/2002] Malik’s case appears to have been dropped, and reporters find him working in a store in Florida less than a year after the trial ended. [MSNBC, 8/2/2002] Malik’s court files remain completely sealed, and in Mohsen’s court case, prosecutors “removed references to Pakistan from public filings because of diplomatic concerns.” [WASHINGTON POST, 8/2/2002] Also arrested are Kevin Ingram and Walter Kapij. Ingram pleads guilty to laundering $350,000 and he is sentenced to 18 months in prison. [CNN, 6/15/2001; BLACK ENTERPRISE, 6/19/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/1/2001] Ingram was a former senior investment banker with Deutsche Bank, but resigned in January 1999 after his division suffered costly losses. [BLACK ENTERPRISE, 6/19/2001; JERSEY JOURNAL, 6/20/2001] Walter Kapij, a pilot with a minor role in the plot, is given the longest sentence, 33 months in prison. [CNN, 6/15/2001; BLACK ENTERPRISE, 6/19/2001; PALM BEACH POST, 1/12/2002] Informant Randy Glass plays a key role in the sting, and has thirteen felony fraud charges against him reduced as a result, serving only seven months in prison. Federal agents involved in the case later express puzzlement that Washington higher-ups did not make the case a higher priority, pointing out that bin Laden could have gotten a nuclear bomb if the deal was for real. Agents on the case complain that the FBI did not make the case a counterterrorism matter, which would have improved bureaucratic backing and opened access to FBI information and US intelligence from around the world. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/2/2002; MSNBC, 8/2/2002] Federal agents frequently couldn’t get prosecutors to approve wiretaps. [COX NEWS SERVICE, 8/2/2002] Glass says, “Wouldn’t you think that there should have been a wire tap on Diaa [Mohsen]‘s phone and Malik’s phone?” [WPBF 25 (WEST PALM BEACH), 8/5/2002] An FBI supervisor in Miami refused to front money for the sting, forcing agents to use money from US Customs and even Glass’s own money to help keep the sting going. [COX NEWS SERVICE, 8/2/2002] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mohammed Malik, Kevin Ingram, World Trade Center, Diaa Mohsen, US Customs Service, Walter Kapij, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Osama bin Laden, Taliban, Randy Glass, Operation Diamondback Timeline Tags: A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network Category Tags: Randy Glass/ Diamondback, Pakistan and the ISI, Drugs, Other Possible Moles or Informants

June 12, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Obtains US Visa, despite Lying on Application

Saeed Algahdmi, in a video apparently made in the spring of 2001. [Source: As-Sahab] Future 9/11 hijacker Saeed Alghamdi obtains a US visa from the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The application is made through the Visa Express program (see May 2001), using a passport issued two days earlier. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 24 ] The visa is issued by Shayna Steinger, a consular official who apparently issues the 9/11 hijackers with 12 visas (see July 1, 2000). [9/11 COMMISSION, 12/30/2002, PP. 2; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (US DEPARTMENT OF STATE), 1/30/2003] Lies on Application - Alghamdi lies on his application form, claiming that he has never before applied for a US visa, when in fact he obtained one the previous year, also from Steinger (see September 4, 2000). Fellow hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Ahmed Alnami make similar false statements on their visa applications around this time (see April 23, 2001 and June 13, 2001), although Alnami corrects his application. The information about his previous visa is available at the consulate, but is not accessed, as consular workers do not usually examine previous visa issunces, only refusals. The 9/11 Commission will speculate that he lied on purpose to conceal the previous application. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 24 ] Fraudulent Features - The Commission will also suggest that one or more of Alghamdi’s passports may contain fraudulent features, but will claim that this is not certain, as Alghamdi’s passport was not recovered after 9/11. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 563-4; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 42 ] This is an error by the Commission, as Alghamdi’s passport will actually be found after 9/11 and the Commission will be aware of this (see Shortly After September 11, 2001). KSM's Travel Agent - The travel agency used for the Visa Express application is Minhal Travel, which will also later be used by 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to obtain a US visa (see July 23, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 24, 29 ] Entity Tags: Shayna Steinger, US Consulate, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Office, Minhal Travel, Saeed Alghamdi Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers

June 12-September 11, 2001: Cole Investigator Repeatedly Asks FBI Headquarters for Information Leading to 9/11 Hijackers, but Gets Nothing Following a meeting at which FBI agents investigating the attack on the USS Cole were shown pictures of operatives who attended al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit, including 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, but were not given all the relevant information (see June 11, 2001), deputy head of the investigation Steve Bongardt continues to ask for the material, but FBI headquarters fails to provide it. Bongardt apparently has “heated telephone conversations and e-mail exchanges” with FBI headquarters agent Dina Corsi over the passage of the information. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 291, 294 ] Bongardt will tell the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, “I’ve had several conversations with the analyst [Corsi] after that, because we would talk on other matters, and almost every time I would ask her, ‘What’s the story with the Almihdhar information, when is it going to get passed, do we have anything yet, when is it going to get passed,’ and each time I was told that the information had not been passed yet. And the sense I got from here, based on our conversations, was that she was trying as hard as she could to get the information passed or at least the ability to tell us about the information.” [US CONGRESS, 9/20/2002] But in fact Corsi does not appear to take any steps towards having the information passed to the Cole investigators for two and a half months after the meeting. Part of the relevant information is from a wiretap on Almihdhar’s phone (see Shortly Before December 29, 1999) and, due to measures related to the “wall,” the NSA general counsel has to approve its passage to criminal agents. Corsi finally asks the NSA to approve passage of the information on August 27; the NSA immediately agrees, but Corsi continues to withhold the information from Bongardt (see August 27-28, 2001). The other part of the information consists of photos of the two hijackers in Malaysia with other extremists (see January 5-8, 2000). Corsi will later say she “probably” has follow up conversations about passing the photographs with the two CIA officers, Tom Wilshire and Clark Shannon, who gave them to her (see Late May, 2001), but these alleged conversations do not result in the photos being passed to Bongardt, even though Wilshire will later say that, as far as he was concerned at this point, they could be distributed through the FBI. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 294 ] After Corsi is told that Almihdhar is in the US (see August 21-22, 2001), this information is made available to intelligence investigators at the FBI (see August 28, 2001), but not to the team investigating the Cole bombing (see August 28, 2001). Entity Tags: Dina Corsi, FBI Headquarters, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Steve Bongardt Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

June 13, 2001: Counterterrorism Not Part of Bush Defense Plan At President Bush’s first meeting with NATO heads of state in Brussels, Belgium, Bush outlines his five top defense issues. Missile defense is at the top of the list. Terrorism is not mentioned at all. This is consistent with his other statements before 9/11. Almost the only time he ever publicly mentions al-Qaeda or bin Laden before 9/11 is later in the month, in a letter that renews Clinton administration sanctions on the Taliban. [CNN, 6/13/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 4/1/2004] He only speaks publicly about the dangers of terrorism once before 9/11, in May, except for several mentions in the context of promoting a missile defense shield. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/20/2002] Entity Tags: Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Clinton administration, Osama bin Laden, George W. Bush Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

June 13, 2001: Egypt Warns that Bin Laden Wants to Assassinate President Bush with an Explosives-Filled Airplane Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak later claims that Egyptian intelligence discovers a “communiqué from bin Laden saying he wanted to assassinate President Bush and other G8 heads of state during their summit in Genoa, Italy” on this day. The communiqué specifically mentions this would be done via “an airplane stuffed with explosives.” The US and Italy are sent urgent warnings of this. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/26/2001] Mubarak will claim that Egyptian intelligence officials informed American intelligence officers between March and May 2001 that an Egyptian agent had penetrated al-Qaeda. Presumably, this explains how Egypt is able to give the US these warnings. [NEW YORK TIMES, 6/4/2002] Entity Tags: Hosni Mubarak, Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Foreign Intelligence Warnings, Al-Qaeda in Italy

June 13, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Salem Alhazmi Enters Saudi Arabia, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities 9/11 hijacker Salem Alhazmi enters Saudi Arabia from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 35 ] According to the 9/11 Commission, Alhazmi has had a passport with an indicator of Islamic extremism (see April 4, 1999). Such indicators are used by the Saudi authorities to track some of the hijackers before 9/11 (see November 2, 2007), so the Saudis presumably register his arrival. Entity Tags: Salem Alhazmi Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers

June 13, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Obtains US Visa despite Incorrect Passport and Lies on Application; US Intelligence Knows He Is an Al-Qaeda Operative Future 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar obtains a second US visa from the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 24-25 ] The visa is issued by Shayna Steinger, a consular official who apparently issues the future 9/11 hijackers with 12 visas (see July 1, 2000). [9/11 COMMISSION, 12/30/2002, PP. 2; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (US DEPARTMENT OF STATE), 1/30/2003] Almihdhar’s passport, which was issued two weeks previously (see June 1, 2001), lacks an expiry date, but contains an indicator of possible terrorist affiliation used by the Saudi authorities to track suspected radicals (see November 2, 2007). His application form is incomplete, as it lists his occupation as “businessman,” but does not give his employer’s name and address. Lies on Application Form - The form, which is submitted through the Visa Express program (see May 2001), meaning Almihdhar is not interviewed, contains two lies: Almihdhar says he has never received an American visa or traveled to the US, whereas he received a visa in 1999 (see April 3-7, 1999) and traveled to the US on it in 2000 (see January 15, 2000). As Almihdhar’s first visa was also issued by the Jeddah consulate, through which the CIA sent radical Arabs to the US for training during the Soviet-Afghan war (see September 1987-March 1989), consular officials could discover he is lying, but information about prior visas issuances is not automatically displayed to them. Known Terrorist - By this time, several intelligence agencies are aware that Almihdhar is an al-Qaeda operative; for example, the CIA (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000), NSA (see December 29, 1999), FBI (see January 5-6, 2000), a US Army intelligence program (see January-February 2000), the Saudi General Intelligence Directorate (see 1997), Malaysian Special Branch (see January 5-8, 2000), and an intelligence service in the United Arab Emirates (see January 2-5, 2000)). Parallels to Case of Blind Sheikh - Almihdhar will re-enter the US on the visa three weeks later (see July 4, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will find that the series of missteps preceding the issuance of visas to Almihdhar and the other future 9/11 hijackers has some “eerie parallels” to the “series of exceptional failures” that led to US visas being issued to the “Blind Sheikh,” Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman (see December 15, 1986-1989 and July 1990). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 24-27, 33, 49 ] Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Shayna Steinger, US Consulate, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Office Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar

June 13, 2001: Extensive ISI Support for Taliban Continues

Arnaud de Borchgrave. [Source: Publicity photo] United Press International (UPI) reporter Arnaud de Borchgrave interviews top Taliban leader Mullah Omar in Afghanistan on June 13, 2001. The next day, in an article about the interview, de Borchgrave writes, “Saudi Arabia and the [United Arab Emirates] secretly fund the Taliban government by paying Pakistan for its logistical support to Afghanistan. Despite Pakistan’s official denials, the Taliban is entirely dependent on Pakistani aid. This was verified on the ground by UPI. Everything from bottled water to oil, gasoline and aviation fuel, and from telephone equipment to military supplies, comes from Pakistan.” [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 6/14/2001; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 4/9/2004] Entity Tags: Arnaud de Borchgrave, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Mullah Omar, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Taliban Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Saudi Arabia

June 14, 2001: Asian Alliance Seeks to Counter US Dominance in Central Asia

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization logo. [Source: Shanghai Cooperation Organization] The Shanghai Five (see 1996) becomes known as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and expands to include Uzbekistan. [BBC, 6/11/2001] SCO member-states agree unanimously to take the organization to a “higher level” and expand its mission beyond the original objectives of resolving border disputes and dealing with Islamic separatists to include issues such as regional economic development, commerce, and investment. [SHANGHAI COOPERATION [.ORG], 6/20/2005] Leaders of the organization’s member-states say they hope the SCO will counterbalance US dominance of world affairs. According to Chinese President Jiang Zemin, the organization will foster “world multi-polarization” and contribute to the “establishment of a fair and reasonable international order.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6/15/2001] During their meeting in Shanghai, members sign a letter of support for the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (see May 26, 1972), which the United States has said it wants to scrap to make way for a missile defense shield (see December 13, 2001). [BBC, 6/15/2001] SCO members say the defense system will have a “negative impact on world security.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6/15/2001] One Russian official at the meeting says the 1972 ABM Treaty is the “cornerstone of global stability and disarmament.” [BBC, 6/15/2001] China and Russia also discuss collaborating on a joint program to develop a radar system capable of tracking US F-117A stealth fighter planes. [CNN, 6/20/2001] Entity Tags: Russia, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran Category Tags: US Dominance

Mid-June 2001: US Hears Bin Laden Tell Followers of an Attack in Near Future Bin Laden tells trainees in his Afghanistan training camps that there will be an attack in the near future. US intelligence learns of this comment and it is mentioned to top US leaders in an early July 2001 briefing (see July 10, 2001). More details, such as how the US learned this or how many people bin Laden told this to, have not been made public. [TENET, 2007, PP. 152] But in the summer of 2001, bin Laden is overheard making a number of similar comments hinting at upcoming attacks (see Summer 2001). Entity Tags: US intelligence, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Warning Signs

Early-Late June, 2001: Plot Facilitator Assists Four 9/11 Hijackers in United Arab Emirates

Documentation used by Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi in the United Arab Emirates. [Source: US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division] Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi assists four hijackers transiting Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on their way to the US: Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Salem Alhazmi, Abdulaziz Alomari, and Saeed Alghamdi. Banihammad stays at al-Hawsawi’s flat in nearby Sharjah for two or three weeks and they open bank accounts together (see June 25, 2001 and Early August-August 22, 2001), and al-Hawsawi recognizes Alghamdi and Alhazmi from Afghanistan. He coordinates their arrival dates in telephone conversations with Mohamed Atta (see Late June-August, 2001) and then purchases tickets for them, paying for Alomari and Alhazmi. Al-Hawsawi provides this information to the US under interrogation, which is considered by some to make it unreliable (see June 16, 2004), and then again before a military tribunal in Guantanamo Bay to determine his combat status (see March 9-April 28, 2007). [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 3/21/2007 ] It is unclear who assisted the nine muscle hijackers who transited Dubai before this: Waleed Alshehri, Satam Al Suqami, Ahmed Alghamdi, Maqed Moqed, Hamza Alghamdi, Mohand Alshehri, Ahmed Alnami, Ahmed Alhaznawi, and Wail Alshehri (see April 11-June 28, 2001 and April 23-June 29, 2001). Entity Tags: Salem Alhazmi, Saeed Alghamdi, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, Mohamed Atta, Abdulaziz Alomari, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers

June 16, 2001: Major Simulated Terrorist Attack Exercise is Held in Pennsylvania A major training exercise based upon a simulated terrorist attack is held in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, which neighbors Somerset County where Flight 93 crashes on 9/11. The exercise, called Mall Strike 2001, is conducted in Greengate Mall, Hempfield, and involves over 600 emergency first responders and emergency managers responding to the simulated release of a toxic chemical agent and the simulated release of radiation and radiological contamination. [WESTMORELAND COUNTY ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT, 2001 ; CONNELLSVILLE DAILY COURIER, 9/11/2002] Mall Strike is organized by the Pennsylvania Region 13 Working Group: a 13-county organization that began preparing for terrorist attacks in 1998. When Flight 93 crashes on September 11, the Region 13 Working Group’s chair immediately contacts other members of the group and emergency teams are quickly deployed to the crash site. The group’s four years of preparing and working together “allowed them to develop and train teams that could work efficiently together during an event of this magnitude.” [DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 3/12/2003 ] Entity Tags: Mall Strike 2001 Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Military Exercises

June 16, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Salem Alhazmi Receives Passport Containing Suspicious Indicator of Islamist Extremism, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities 9/11 hijacker Salem Alhazmi receives a new passport in Saudi Arabia. According to the 9/11 Commission, the passport contains an “indicator of extremism” that is “associated with al-Qaeda.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 9, 25, 33 ] According to author James Bamford, this is a “secret coded indicator, placed there by the Saudi government, warning of a possible terrorist affiliation.” [BAMFORD, 2008, PP. 58-59] Alhazmi’s previous passport contained the same indicator (see April 4, 1999). The Saudi government will reportedly use this indicator to track Alhazmi and other Saudi hijackers before 9/11 “with precision” (see November 2, 2007). Entity Tags: Salem Alhazmi Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers

June 17, 2001: USS Cole Investigators Withdrawn from Yemen over Threats

A guard on the US embassy in Sana’a, Yemen. [Source: CNN] In early June, new threats are received in Yemen and create a security crisis for the FBI team investigating the bombing of the USS Cole, as Yemeni authorities say they have arrested eight men who are part of a plot to blow up the US embassy in Sana’a, where the team is staying. Although the FBI is apparently on the verge of being granted access to a group of people who may have further information about the bombing, FBI manager John O’Neill and director Louis Freeh agree that the team should be pulled out and they all fly home. The investigation moved at a reduced pace after staff were relocated from Aden, where the attack occurred, to Sana’a, the country’s capital. O’Neill will send agents back to Yemen on his last day with the FBI in late August (see August 22, 2001). [TIME, 7/10/2001; NEW YORKER, 7/10/2006 ] Entity Tags: John O’Neill, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Louis J. Freeh Category Tags: 2000 USS Cole Bombing

June 18, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Obtains US Visa Using Passport with Fraudulent Travel Stamps Future 9/11 hijacker Abdulaziz Alomari obtains a US visa from the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 525] The visa is issued by Shayna Steinger, a consular official who apparently issues the 9/11 hijackers with 12 visas (see July 1, 2000). [9/11 COMMISSION, 12/30/2002, PP. 2; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (US DEPARTMENT OF STATE), 1/30/2003] Alomari’s application is incomplete, as he lists his home address as the Alqudos Hotel in Jeddah. He is not interviewed and the application is submitted by Attar Travel as a part of the Visa Express program (see May 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 25 ] Further, Alomari leaves blank the fields for his sex, his wife’s name, and his school’s address, although he says he is a student. He claims to be a tourist, that he wants to stay two months from June 25, and that he will first stay at the JKK Whyndam Hotel. [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 6/18/2001] The 9/11 Commission will say Alomari’s passport contains fraudulent travel stamps whose use will subsequently be associated with al-Qaeda. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 563-4; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 25 ] Entity Tags: Abdulaziz Alomari, Shayna Steinger, US Consulate, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Office Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers

June 18, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Gets US Visa in United Arab Emirates despite Mistakes on Application 9/11 hijacker Fayez Ahmed Banihammad applies for and receives a US visa, although his application is incomplete and his passport is only five days old. Banihammad is a citizen of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The consular officer in Abu Dhabi, UAE, who adjudicates his visa will later say that interviews were almost never required of UAE nationals for visas and it was treated as a de facto visa waiver country. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 25 ] Banihammad neglects to list a present occupation or the purpose of his trip. In the field asking where he intends to stay in the US, he writes, “No.” [JEWISH WORLD REVIEW, 10/9/2002] He is apparently a former UAE immigration officer. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 25 ] His birth date is wrongly entered into the system—as May 19, 1977, instead of March 19, 1977. This means that if he comes into contact with US consular officials again, the computer system that provides details about visa applicants will not associate this visa application with Banihammad and his real date of birth, and it will appear he did not apply for a US visa at this time. [UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 10/21/2002, PP. 46 ] Entity Tags: Fayez Ahmed Banihammad Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers

June 19, 2001: Bin Laden Calls for ‘Blood and Destruction’ and Tells Followers to ‘Penetrate America and Israel’

Scenes in the al-Qaeda recruitment video show operatives training at the al-Farouq camp in Afghanistan. [Source: CBC] An al-Qaeda recruitment video created months earlier is made public. The video had been circling amongst radical militants, but appears on the news worldwide after a Kuwaiti newspaper gets a copy. The video celebrates the bombing of the USS Cole. Bin Laden appears on the video, and while he does not take credit for the bombing, others in the video do. Bin Laden says that Muslims have to leave countries that are ruled by “allies of Jews and Christians,” and join his cause to be “prepared” for holy war. In an address to Palestinians, he calls for “blood, blood and destruction, destruction.” He says, “We give you the good news that the forces of Islam are coming…” He also issues a call to arms: “Your brothers in Palestine are waiting for you; it’s time to penetrate America and Israel and hit them where it hurts the most.” He also tells his supporters to “slay the United States and Israel.” A similar video appeared shortly before the bombing of the USS Cole. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6/20/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6/20/2001; NEWSWEEK, 7/22/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/11/2001] Intrest in the videotape will grow in the Muslim world in the months before the 9/11 attacks (see September 9, 2001). Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Warning Signs, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements, Osama Bin Laden

June 19, 2001: Hanjour Fails Night Flying Test Hani Hanjour attempts to obtain pilot’s certification to fly at night, but is unsuccessful as he fails the test. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 67 ] More details, such as the location of the airfield where the test was taken, are not known, but Hanjour’s flying skills were previously said to be poor (see January-February 2001). Entity Tags: Hani Hanjour Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Hani Hanjour, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training

June 19-25, 2001: Nawaf Alhazmi Flies to Miami to Meet Other 9/11 Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi flies from Newark to Miami and presumably meets the other hijackers there. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 243] Earlier in the month the CIA showed the FBI a photo of Alhazmi taken at a meeting in Malaysia with other al-Qaeda members, but refused to identify him in the photo (see June 11, 2001). The CIA will watchlist Alhazmi in August (see August 23, 2001), but his Florida trip apparently fails to lead US intelligence to the other hijackers. He obtains a Florida driver’s license on June 25 (see April 12-September 7, 2001), giving the same address as two of the other Florida-based hijackers, but this will not be noticed before 9/11 either. [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/16/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 26 ] Alhazmi purchased his ticket for the outward journey at Apollo Travel in Paterson, New Jersey, which was also used by Mohamed Atta (see March 2001-September 1, 2001), and perhaps some of the other hijackers (see July 2001). [CNN, 10/29/2001] Entity Tags: Apollo Travel, Nawaf Alhazmi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar

June 20, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Salem Alhazmi Obtains US Visa, despite NSA Surveillance, Incomplete Application, and Possible Lie on Application Future 9/11 hijacker Salem Alhazmi obtains a US visa from the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. There are some problems with his visa application, which is submitted through the Visa Express program (see May 2001): The application is incomplete; Alhazmi gives his occupation as “unemployed” (this does not concern consular staff because Saudi Arabia is a rich country); His passport is only four days old; The passport contains a suspicious indicator of Islamic extremism placed their by Saudi intelligence in order to track him (see June 16, 2001 and November 2, 2007). Some of the radicals who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 also had Saudi passports with the same indicator (see Around February 1993); [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 563-4; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 25-6 ] Some of the other future hijackers who apply for visas around this time lie on their applications, claiming never to have received a US visa before, although the opposite is true (see April 23, 2001, June 12, 2001, and June 13, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will not discuss whether Alhazmi claims on this application to have received a US visa before or not, as the Commission will appear to be unaware of any such previous application by him. However, according to the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Alhazmi did previously obtain a US visa, in 1999 (see April 3-7, 1999); [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004 ] The NSA has been intercepting calls between Alhazmi and an al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen for at least two years (see Early 1999, Shortly Before December 29, 1999, and Summer 2000); The visa is issued by Shayna Steinger, a consular official who apparently issues the future 9/11 hijackers with 12 visas (see July 1, 2000). [9/11 COMMISSION, 12/30/2002, PP. 2; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (US DEPARTMENT OF STATE), 1/30/2003] Entity Tags: Salem Alhazmi, Shayna Steinger, US Consulate, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Office Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers

June 20, 2001: Time Magazine Mentions Al-Qaeda Planning to Use Planes as Weapons Time magazine reports: “For sheer diabolical genius (of the Hollywood variety), nothing came close to the reports that European security services are preparing to counter a bin Laden attempt to assassinate President Bush at next month’s G8 summit in Genoa, Italy. According to German intelligence sources, the plot involved bin Laden paying German neo-Nazis to fly remote-controlled model aircraft packed with Semtex into the conference hall and blow the leaders of the industrialized world to smithereens. (Paging Jerry Bruckheimer).” The report only appears on the Time website and not in the US version of the magazine. [TIME, 6/20/2001] This report follows warnings given by Egypt the week before. In addition, there are more warnings before the summit in July. James Hatfield, author of an unflattering book on Bush called Fortunate Son, repeats the claim in print a few days later, writing: “German intelligence services have stated that bin Laden is covertly financing neo-Nazi skinhead groups throughout Europe to launch another terrorist attack at a high-profile American target.” [ONLINE JOURNAL, 7/3/2001] Two weeks later, Hatfield apparently commits suicide. However, there is widespread speculation that his death was payback for his revelation of Bush’s cocaine use in the 1970s. [SALON, 7/20/2001] Entity Tags: James Hatfield, George W. Bush, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Warning Signs, Al-Qaeda in Italy

(Between June 20 and June 29, 2001): 9/11 Hijacker Salem Alhazmi Leaves Saudi Arabia, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities 9/11 hijacker Salem Alhazmi leaves Saudi Arabia. The precise date is unknown, although it must be some time between June 20, when he obtains a US visa in Jeddah (see June 20, 2001) and June 29, when he arrives in the US from the United Arab Emirates (see April 23-June 29, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 25-27 ] According to the 9/11 Commission, Alhazmi has a passport containing an indicator of Islamic extremism (see June 20, 2001). Such indicators are used by the Saudi authorities to track some of the hijackers before 9/11 (see November 2, 2007). Entity Tags: Salem Alhazmi Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers

June 21, 2001: Warnings Cause High Security Alert for US Forces in Arabia and Persian Gulf US Central Command raises the force protection condition level for US forces based in the Arabian peninsula and the Persian Gulf. In six countries the force protection level is raised to Delta, the highest level possible. The US orders all its naval ships docked in those countries out to sea, and the US Fifth Fleet moves out of port in Bahrain. Regional military exercises are canceled and US embassies are temporarily closed. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 256-257, 534] This is partly in response to an al-Qaeda video which surfaced the previous week containing the message, “It’s time to penetrate America and Israel and hit them where it hurts most” (see June 19, 2001). [BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 241; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 256, 534] Additionally, Newsweek reports at the time that this alert comes after “Western intelligence agencies picked up ‘quite reliable’ signs of increased activity among Islamic extremists with Afghanistan ties. These indications are said to have included information picked up through electronic monitoring of suspected militants, who US experts say have acquired fairly sophisticated communications and computer equipment.” [NEWSWEEK, 7/22/2001] However, as author James Bamford later notes, “No precautions were ever taken within the United States, only overseas.” [BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 241] Entity Tags: US Fifth Fleet, US Central Command Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11, Remote Surveillance

June 21, 2001: Senior Al-Qaeda Officials Say Important Surprises Coming Soon

Baker Atyani, reporter for the Middle East Broadcasting Company, sits with Ayman al-Zawahiri and bin Laden. [Source: CNN] (click image to enlarge) Baker Atyani, a reporter for the Middle East Broadcasting Company interviews bin Laden. Keeping a promise made to Taliban leader Mullah Omar, bin Laden does not say anything substantive, but Ayman al-Zawahiri and other top al-Qaeda leaders promise that “[the] coming weeks will hold important surprises that will target American and Israeli interests in the world.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6/24/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6/25/2001] Atyani says, “There is a major state of mobilization among the Osama bin Laden forces. It seems that there is a race of who will strike first. Will it be the United States or Osama bin Laden?” [REUTERS, 6/23/2001] He adds, “I told my channel that his followers were telling me that the coffin business will increase in the states, the United States.” [CNN, 8/23/2006] After 9/11, Aytani will conclude, “I am 100 percent sure of this, and it was absolutely clear they had brought me there to hear this message.” [BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 236] He is also shown a several-months-old videotape in which bin Laden declares, “It’s time to penetrate America and Israel and hit them where it hurts most.” The video is soon made public (see June 21, 2001). [CNN, 6/21/2001] Author James Bamford theorizes that the original 9/11 plot involved a simultaneous attack on Israel and that shoe bomber Richard Reid may have originally wanted to target an Israeli aircraft around this time. For instance, Reid flies to Tel Aviv, Israel on July 12, 2001, to test if airline security would check his shoes for bombs. [BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 236-39] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, James Bamford, Mullah Omar, Osama bin Laden, Baker Atyani Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Warning Signs, Key Warnings, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

June 22, 2001: CIA Warns of Imminent Al-Qaeda Suicide Attack The CIA notifies its station chiefs about intelligence suggesting a possible al-Qaeda suicide attack on a US target over the next few days. CIA Director George Tenet asks that all US ambassadors be briefed on the warning. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 256] Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda Category Tags: Warning Signs

June 22-23, 2001: Bio-Terror Exercise Simulates Smallpox Attack A dozen leading politicians, scholars, journalists, and security experts meet at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland for an exercise simulating the consequences of a biological terrorist attack, in this case the release of smallpox by terrorists. The participants include: Senator Sam Nunn (D), who plays the president of the United States; former presidential adviser David Gergen as the national security advisor; Frank Keating, the current governor of Oklahoma, who plays himself; James Woolsey playing the CIA director; and Jerome Hauer as the FEMA director. The exercise, named “Dark Winter,” starts with three states suddenly confronted with an outbreak of smallpox. Americans are no longer vaccinated against this virus because it was eradicated decades ago. Thousands quickly fall ill. The medical system is overwhelmed. Masses start to flee from the infected areas, but are stopped at the borders of neighboring states. Faced with chaos, the exercise ends with the president declaring martial law. Reviewing the exercise, participants and observers agree that the nation is vulnerable to biological terrorism and unprepared for an actual attack. [TIME, 9/24/2001; US MEDICINE, 12/2001; CENTER FOR BIOSECURITY, 2002; O'TOOLE, MAIR, AND INGLESBY, 4/1/2002] In the days following 9/11, Vice President Dick Cheney will watch a video report on the exercise, and, at his urging, the National Security Council will receive a “harrowing” and “gruesome” briefing on September 20, on the possibility of a biological attack. [MAYER, 2008, PP. 3-4] At about the same time as Dark Winter is taking place, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) returns smallpox to the list of reportable diseases. Smallpox had been removed from the list decades ago after worldwide eradication. The agency says it is increasing its surveillance efforts of infectious pathogens that could be used in a biological terrorist attack. [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 5/31/2001] After the 9/11 attacks, public health officials will deny that the re-listing of smallpox was the result of any specific intelligence warnings. [UPI, 10/22/2001] Entity Tags: Frank Keating, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, James Woolsey, Sam Nunn, David Gergen, Jerry Hauer, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Dark Winter Category Tags: Military Exercises

June 22, 2001: Bush Adviser Karl Rove Meets with Suspected Supporters of US-Designated Terrorist Groups

Abduraham Alamoudi (far left), Bush (center), and Rove (far right). Judging from the background, this picture was probably taken in 2000. [Source: PBS] (click image to enlarge) Sami al-Arian attends a meeting in the White House complex with President Bush’s adviser Karl Rove. Al-Arian is one of 160 members of the American Muslim Council who are briefed on political matters by Rove and others. Al-Arian had been under investigation for at least six years by this time, and numerous media accounts reported that US investigators suggested al-Arian had ties to US-designated terrorist groups. Yet al-Arian passes the Secret Service’s stringent security check, enabling him to attend the meeting. [NEWSWEEK, 7/16/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 2/22/2003] “A law-enforcement official… [said] the Secret Service had flagged al-Arian as a potential terrorist prior to the event,” Newsweek later reports. “But White House aides, apparently reluctant to create an incident, let him through anyway.” [NEWSWEEK, 3/3/2003] In 2005, al-Arian will be found innocent of serious terrorism charges, but sentenced to almost three years in a US prison on lesser charges (see December 6, 2005). Abduraham Alamoudi is also at the meeting. US intelligence have suspected Alamoudi of ties to bin Laden and Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman since 1994 (see Shortly After March 1994). Rove and Bush met with Alamoudi in 1999 and 2000 as well (see 1999 and July 2000). Alamoudi will later be sentenced to 23 years in a US prison for illegal dealings with Libya (see October 15, 2004). [WASHINGTON POST, 2/22/2003] Entity Tags: Sami Al-Arian, Karl Rove, George W. Bush, American Muslim Council, Abdurahman Alamoudi Category Tags: Terrorism Financing

June 23, 2001: White House Warned ‘Bin Laden Attacks May Be Imminent’ A Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) with the title “Bin Laden Attacks May Be Imminent” is sent to top White House officials. The details of this brief are not known. It is probable President Bush received this warning since SEIBs are usually rehashes of the previous days’ President Daily Briefing (see January 20-September 10, 2001). Also on this day a CIA cable is distributed with the title, “Possible Threat of Imminent Attack from Sunni Extremists.” The cable warns that there is a high probability of near-term “spectacular” terrorist attacks resulting in numerous casualties. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 256, 534] Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, George W. Bush, White House, Osama bin Laden Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Presidential Level Warnings

June 23-July 2001: Alleged Hijacker Associate Basnan Appears to Take over for Hijacker Associate Al-Bayoumi in San Diego Omar al-Bayoumi and Osama Basnan are friends with each other and suspected associates of 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi. On June 23, 2001, al-Bayoumi moves out of the Parkwood Apartments in San Diego where Almihdhar and Alhazmi had lived the year before, and possibly live in again just before 9/11 (see Early September 2001). Basnan had been living in an apartment complex nearby, but he moves into the Parkwood Apartments in July. On the rental application, Basnan lists al-Bayoumi as a personal reference and a friend. A classified FBI report shortly after 9/11 suggests that the fact that Basnan moved in shortly after al-Bayoumi left “could indicate he succeeded Omar al-Bayoumi and may be undertaking activities on behalf of the Government of Saudi Arabia.” Both Basnan and al-Bayoumi have been suspected to be Saudi government agents. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/3/2001 ] Al-Bayoumi moves to Britain (see September 21-28, 2001). Basnan remains in San Diego through 9/11. According to one US official, Basnan later “celebrate[s] the heroes of September 11” and talks about “what a wonderful, glorious day it had been” at a party shortly after the attacks. [NEWSWEEK, 11/24/2002; SAN DIEGO MAGAZINE, 9/2003] Entity Tags: Osama Basnan, Omar al-Bayoumi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi Connection

From September 25, 2001 to Summer 2002: Few Photographers Gain Access to Ground Zero After unauthorized photography at Ground Zero is banned by New York City authorities on September 25, 2001 (see September 25, 2001), independent or press-affiliated photographers find it difficult to enter the secured perimeter. Only one professional photographer, Gary M. Suson, obtains official permission to work at the site. He will publish his work in the book Requiem: Images of Ground Zero. [SUSON, 2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 5/28/2002] Photographs taken by New York Police officers will be gathered in the book Above Hallowed Ground: A Photographic Record of September 11, 2001. [DEPARTMENT, 2002] Joel Meyerowitz, a renowned independent photographer, is unable to obtain permission but manages to insert himself into “the forbidden city”. Wily and persistent, Meyerowitz makes friends among some police officers, acquires a hard hat and some gloves to look inconspicuous, and even forges a work permit on his home computer, and succeeds in photographing Ground Zero over a period of nine months. He will later publish this invaluable record in the 2006 book Aftermath: World Trade Center Archive. [MEYEROWITZ, 2006; OBSERVER, 8/27/2006; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/3/2006] Entity Tags: Joel Meyerowitz, Gary M. Suson Category Tags: WTC Investigation

June 25, 2001: Richard Clarke Tells Condoleezza Rice that Pattern of Warnings Indicates an Upcoming Attack Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke warns National Security Adviser Rice and Assistant National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley that six separate intelligence reports show al-Qaeda personnel warning of a pending attack. These include a warning by al-Qaeda leaders that the next weeks “will witness important surprises” (see June 21, 2001) and a new recruitment video making further threats (see June 19, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will say that “Clarke [argues] that this [is] all too sophisticated to be merely a psychological operation to keep the United States on edge…” It is unclear how Rice and Hadley respond, but the CIA agrees with Clarke’s assessment. [NEWSWEEK, 7/22/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 257] Entity Tags: Stephen J. Hadley, Condoleezza Rice, Central Intelligence Agency, 9/11 Commission, Al-Qaeda, Richard A. Clarke Category Tags: Warning Signs

June 25, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Opens Bank Account in Dubai

Fayez Ahmed Banihammad. [Source: US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division] 9/11 facilitator Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi uses a cash deposit to open a checking account at a Standard Chartered Bank branch in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE). (Al-Hawsawi is thought by some to be an alias for Saeed Sheikh, see September 7-10, 2001 and September 24, 2001-December 26, 2002). Hijacker Fayez Ahmed Banihammad opens a savings account and a checking account with approximately $30,000 in UAE currency, at the same branch. [MSNBC, 12/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 138 ] Banihammad, a UAE national apparently from the Emirate of Sharjah, flies to the US two days later. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] Banihammad gives power of attorney to al-Hawsawi on July 18. Then al-Hawsawi sends Visa and ATM cards to Banihammad in Florida and deposits an extra $4,900 in Banihammad’s account (see Early August-August 22, 2001). Banihammad uses the Visa card to buy his and Mohand Alshehri’s airplane ticket for 9/11. [MSNBC, 12/11/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 12/13/2001; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] Several other hijackers have foreign accounts that they use while they are in the US (see December 5, 2000). Entity Tags: Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers

June 25, 2001: White House Warned Multiple Attacks Are Expected within Days A Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) sent to top White House officials is entitled, “Bin Laden and Associates Making Near-Term Threats.” It reports that multiple attacks are expected over the coming days, including a “severe blow” against US and Israeli “interests” during the next two weeks. SEIBs usually contain the same information as the previous day’s President Daily Briefings (see January 20-September 10, 2001), so it is probable Bush received this warning. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 256, 534] Entity Tags: White House, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Presidential Level Warnings

Late June 2001: Attorney General Ashcroft Not Very Interested in Terrorism in First Briefing from Acting FBI Director Shortly after being appointed acting FBI director, Thomas Pickard gives his first briefing to Attorney General John Ashcroft. Pickard sends an agenda in advance, and terrorism is the first item on it, as the CIA is reporting there is an increased risk of attacks. During the briefing, Ashcroft suggests he does not know much about al-Qaeda, so Pickard fills him in. “I told him about al-Qaeda and [Osama] bin Laden, a little history about the World Trade Center bombing and East Africa,” Pickard will later say. Although Ashcroft listens to Pickard’s explanation, he shows more interest in other items on the agenda, such as ending delays on background checks for gun buyers, which interests him because of his relationship with the National Rifle Association. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 246-247] Entity Tags: John Ashcroft, Thomas Pickard Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

June 26, 2001: US, Russia, and Regional Powers Cooperate to Oust Taliban An Indian magazine reports more details of the cooperative efforts of the US, India, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran against the Taliban regime: “India and Iran will ‘facilitate’ US and Russian plans for ‘limited military action’ against the Taliban if the contemplated tough new economic sanctions don’t bend Afghanistan’s fundamentalist regime.” Earlier in the month, Russian President Vladimir Putin told a meeting of the Confederation of Independent States that military action against the Taliban may happen, possibly with Russian involvement using bases and forces from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as well. [INDIAREACTS, 6/26/2001] Entity Tags: Iran, Bob Kerry, India, Vladimir Putin, Taliban, Tajikistan, Russia Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden

June 26, 2001: State Department Issues Worldwide Caution The State Department issues a worldwide caution warning American citizens of possible attacks. [CNN, 3/2002] Around the same time, the State Department notifies all US embassies about the increased terrorist threat. [US DISTRICT COURT OF EASTERN VIRGINIA, 5/4/2006, PP. 3 ] Entity Tags: US Department of State, Al-Qaeda Category Tags: Warning Signs

June 27, 2001: India and Pakistan Discuss Building Pipeline Project Through Iran The Wall Street Journal reports that Pakistan and India are discussing jointly building a gas pipeline from Central Asian gas fields through Iran to circumvent the difficulties of building the pipeline through Afghanistan. Iran has been secretly supporting the Northern Alliance to keep Afghanistan divided so no pipelines could be put through it. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 6/27/2001] Entity Tags: Northern Alliance, India, Pakistan Category Tags: Pipeline Politics

June 27, 2001-July 11, 2001: Al-Marabh Arrested But Quickly Released; While in Prison He Boasts of FBI Ties

A courtroom artist’s depiction of Mahmoud Jaballah. [Source: CBC] On June 27, 2001, Nabil al-Marabh is arrested while trying to enter the US from Canada in the back of a tractor-trailer, carrying a forged Canadian passport and a bogus social insurance card. [ST. CATHERINES STANDARD, 10/2/2001] The New York Times will note that, “American officials had plenty of reason to believe that he was up to no good. Nine months earlier, he had been identified to American intelligence agents as one of Osama bin Laden’s operatives in the United States. American customs agents knew about money he had transferred to an associate of Osama bin Laden in the Middle East. And the Boston police had issued a warrant for his arrest after he violated probation for stabbing a friend with a knife. But [US officials] simply let him go.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/14/2001] The US turns him back to the Canadians. He is held for two weeks, then released on bail despite evidence linking him to militants (see Shortly Before July 11, 2001). During his two-week detention in a Canadian prison, al-Marabh boasts to other prisoners that he remains in contact with the FBI. When one prisoner asks him why, his reply is “because I’m special.” After 9/11, these prisoners will be puzzled that the FBI has not tried to interview them on what they know about al-Marabh. Al-Marabh will fail to show up for a Canadian deportation hearing in August and for a court date in September. It appears he quickly sneaks back into the US instead. [ST. CATHERINES STANDARD, 10/2/2001] Al-Marabh’s Boston landlord will later be asked if he thought al-Marabh could have been a terrorist. The landlord will reply, “He was too stupid, number one, to be a terrorist. Because terrorists today are very intelligent people. But he might be used by some smarter or intelligent sources, who use people like that.” [ABC NEWS 7 (CHICAGO), 1/31/2002] In July, just after he is released on bail in Canada, the Boston police will go to his former Boston address with a warrant for his March arrest, but he will not be there. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/14/2001] Also at some point in July, Canadian authorities inform US Customs about some dubious financial transactions involving al-Marabh, and apparently the information is used in a Customs money-laundering probe (see Spring 2001). [NEWSWEEK, 10/1/2001] One prominent former Canadian intelligence official will say that whether a more detailed look at al-Marabh at this time could have stopped the 9/11 attacks is an “intriguing question.… It becomes ever more intriguing as evidence seeps in.” [OTTAWA CITIZEN, 10/29/2001] Entity Tags: Nabil al-Marabh, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Canada Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Nabil Al-Marabh

June 27-July 16, 2001: Counterterrorism Plan Delayed with More Deputies Meetings The first Bush administration deputy-secretary-level meeting on terrorism in late April is followed by three more deputy meetings. Each meeting focuses on one issue: one meeting is about al-Qaeda, one about the Pakistani situation, and one on Indo-Pakistani relations. Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke’s plan to roll back al-Qaeda, which has been discussed at these meetings, is worked on some more, and is finally approved by National Security Adviser Rice and the deputies on August 13. It now can move to the Cabinet-level before finally reaching President Bush. The Cabinet-level meeting is scheduled for later in August, but too many participants are on vacation, so the meeting takes place in early September. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/20/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/24/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/24/2004] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, Bush administration, Al-Qaeda Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

June 27-August 23, 2001: Hijackers Open Bank Accounts in New Jersey, Information Sufficient to Roll Up Plot All the hijackers based in New Jersey open at least one bank account there: Hani Hanjour opens an account with the Hudson United Bank on June 27, 2001; He opens another account with the same bank three days later, when Nawaf Alhazmi also opens one; Ahmed Alghamdi, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Majed Moqed open accounts with the Dime Savings Bank on July 9, 2001; Khalid Almihdhar opens an account with the Hudson United Bank on July 18, 2001. He closes it on August 31; Salem Alhazmi opens an account with the Hudson United Bank on July 21, 2001; Abdulaziz Alomari opens an account with the Hudson United Bank on July 26, 2001; Khalid Almihdhar opens an account with the First Union National Bank on August 22, 2001 with a $50 deposit. He changes his contact address on September 5; Hani Hanjour opens an account with First Union National Bank on August 23, 2001 with a $50 deposit. He then attempts to withdraw $5,000 on September 5 and $4,900 from it on September 7, despite it containing nothing but the original $50. Unable to make the withdrawal, he cashes a $20 check instead. Hanjour closes the account the next day. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] These hijackers will subsequently fly on three of the planes on 9/11. In its Terrorist Financing monograph the 9/11 Commission will note: “Among other things they used the debit cards to pay for hotel rooms—activity that would have enabled the FBI to locate them, had the FBI been able to get the transaction records fast enough. Moreover, Alhazmi used his debit card on August 27 to buy tickets for himself… and fellow Flight 77 hijacker Salem Alhazmi. If the FBI had found either Almihdhar or Nawaf Alhazmi, it could have found the other. They not only shared a common bank but frequently were together when conducting transactions. After locating Almihdhar and Alhazmi, the FBI could have potentially linked them through financial records to the other Flight 77 hijackers… Nawaf Alhazmi and Flight 77 pilot Hani Hanjour had opened separate savings accounts at the same small New Jersey bank at the same time and both gave the same address. On July 9, 2001, the other Flight 77 muscle hijacker, Majed Moqed, opened an account at another small New Jersey bank at the same time as Nawaf Alhazmi, and used the same address. Given timely access to the relevant records and sufficient time to conduct a follow-up investigation, the FBI could have shown that Hani Hanjour, Majed Moqed, and Salem al Hazmi were connected to potential terrorist operatives Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 58-59, 141 ] The hijackers also open several other bank accounts (see June 28-July 7, 2000). Entity Tags: Hani Hanjour, Ahmed Alghamdi, Khalid Almihdhar, Salem Alhazmi, Nawaf Alhazmi, Abdulaziz Alomari, 9/11 Commission, Majed Moqed Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Hani Hanjour, Other 9/11 Hijackers

June 28, 2001: Clarke Warns Rice That Threat Level Has Reached a Peak Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke writes an e-mail to National Security Adviser Rice saying that the pattern of al-Qaeda activity indicating attack planning has “reached a crescendo.” He adds, “A series of new reports continue to convince me and analysts at State, CIA, DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], and NSA that a major terrorist attack or series of attacks is likely in July.” For instance, one report from an al-Qaeda source in late June warned that something “very, very, very, very” big is about to happen, and that most of bin Laden’s network is anticipating the attack. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 256; US DISTRICT COURT OF EASTERN VIRGINIA, 5/4/2006, PP. 1 ] CIA Director Tenet sends Rice a very similar warning on the same day (see June 28, 2001). The 9/11 Commission does not record Rice taking any action in response to these warnings. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 256] Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush, White House Category Tags: Warning Signs, Key Warnings

June 28, 2001: Tenet Warns Rice of Imminent Al-Qaeda Attack CIA Director Tenet writes an intelligence summary for National Security Adviser Rice: “It is highly likely that a significant al-Qaeda attack is in the near future, within several weeks.” A highly classified analysis at this time adds, “Most of the al-Qaeda network is anticipating an attack. Al-Qaeda’s overt publicity has also raised expectations among its rank and file, and its donors.” [WASHINGTON POST, 5/17/2002] The same day, CIA Director Tenet is briefed by another CIA official that bin Laden “will launch a significant terrorist attack against US and/or Israeli interests in the coming weeks. The attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against US facilities or interests” (see June 28, 2001). [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003] Apparently, these warnings are partly based on a warning given by al-Qaeda leaders to a reporter a few days earlier (see June 21, 2001). Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke also later asserts that Tenet tells him around this time, “It’s my sixth sense, but I feel it coming. This is going to be the big one.” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 235] Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Bush administration, Al-Qaeda, Condoleezza Rice, George J. Tenet Category Tags: Key Warnings, Warning Signs

June 28, 2001: CIA Leaders Told Bin Laden Will Launch Spectacular Attack against US and/or Israeli Targets within Weeks CIA official Richard Blee gives a briefing on the state of the terrorism threat to CIA Director George Tenet and Counterterrorist Center Director Cofer Black. According to an account by Tenet in his 2007 book, Blee identifies more than 10 specific pieces of intelligence about impending attacks. Tenet claims that experienced analysts call this intelligence “both unprecedented and virtually 100 percent reliable.” Blee specifically mentions: A key Afghanistan training camp commander was seen weeping with joy because he believed he could see his trainees in heaven, implying a successful suicide attack to come. For the last three to five months, al-Qaeda’s number two leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is believed to have been involved in an unprecedented effort to prepare terrorist operations. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, one of the USS Cole bombing masterminds, has disappeared. [TENET, 2007, PP. 149] Leaders of the Cole bombing are believed to be planning new attacks against the US. [TENET, 2007, PP. 147] Other important operatives around the world are disappearing or preparing for martyrdom. [TENET, 2007, PP. 149] Blee concludes by saying: “Based on a review of all source reporting over the last five months, we believe that [Osama bin Laden] will launch a significant terrorist attack against US and/or Israeli interests in the coming weeks. The attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against US facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning.” [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 322; TENET, 2007, PP. 149] This warning, including the concluding quote, is shared with “senior Bush administration officials” in early July. [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] Entity Tags: Rich B., George J. Tenet, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda, Cofer Black Category Tags: Key Warnings, Warning Signs

June 29, 2001: Surveillance Indicates Al-Qaeda Will Attack Genoa Summit with Multiple Planes

Abu Hamza al-Masri. [Source: BBC] The Italian Secret Service SISDE records a meeting in the Finsbury Park mosque, in northern London, Britain. Sheikh Abu Hamza al-Masri (an Afghanistan war veteran heading a radical Islamic group), Mustapha Melki (linked to al-Qaeda member Abu Doha—see February 2001), and a man only known as Omar talk to each other. Notes of the meeting state, “Abu Hamza proposed an ambitious but unlikely plot which involved attacks carried by planes.” This is apparently a reference to an attack on the upcoming G8 summit in Genoa scheduled in several weeks. But unlike other reports of an al-Qaeda attack on that summit, this refers to an attack using more than one plane. The notes of the meeting conclude, “The belief that Osama bin Laden is plotting an attack is spreading among the radical Islamic groups.” [DISCOVERY NEWS, 9/13/2001] Entity Tags: Secret Service, Osama bin Laden, Italian Secret Service, Al-Qaeda, Abu Hamza al-Masri, Mustapha Melki Category Tags: Warning Signs, Abu Hamza Al-Masri, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism

June 29, 2001: MASCAL Training Exercise Held at Fort Belvoir A MASCAL (mass casualty) training exercise is held at Fort Belvoir, an army base 12 miles south of the Pentagon. It is “designed to enhance the first ready response in dealing with the effects of a terrorist incident involving an explosion.” [MDW NEWS SERVICE, 7/5/2001] Entity Tags: Fort Belvoir Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Military Exercises

Late Summer 2001: US Intelligence Learns Al-Qaeda Is Considering Mounting Operations in the US US intelligence learns that an al-Qaeda operative is considering mounting operations in the US. There is no information on the timing or specific targets. [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda Category Tags: Warning Signs

Late Summer 2001: US Contingency Plans to Attack Afghanistan According to a later Guardian report, “reliable western military sources say a US contingency plan exist[s] on paper by the end of the summer to attack Afghanistan from the north.” [GUARDIAN, 9/26/2001] Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden

Late June 2001: Bin Al-Shibh Travels to Malaysia; Atta Fails to Meet Him There According to a statement later made by plot facilitator Ramzi bin al-Shibh under interrogation, at this time he is to courier operational details that are too sensitive to trust to telephone or e-mail to Mohamed Atta. He arranges a meeting with Atta in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and travels there on a genuine Saudi passport in the name of Hasan Ali al-Assiri. While in Kuala Lumpur, bin al-Shibh applies for a Yemeni passport, but Atta does not show up and bin al-Shibh travels to Bangkok. Atta fails to come to Bangkok as well and bin al-Shibh then flies to Amsterdam and travels to Hamburg by train. In Hamburg he purchases a plane ticket to Spain, where he finally meets Atta (see July 8-19, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 5 ] However, the reliability of such statements by detainees is questioned due to the methods used to extract them (see June 16, 2004). Another of the hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar, is in Malaysia around this time, but it is not clear whether he and bin al-Shibh meet (see June 2001). Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Ramzi bin al-Shibh Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

Late June 2001: FAA Disregards Recommended Antiterrorist Measures Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke gives a direct warning to the FAA to increase security measures in light of an impending terrorist attack. The FAA refuses to take such measures. [NEW YORKER, 1/14/2002] Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Federal Aviation Administration Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, US Air Security

Late June-Early July 2001: KLA Forces Are Rescued by US in Macedonia At the end of June, the KLA had captured the Macedonian town of Aracinovo on the outskirts of Kopje. However, within a few days 500 KLA fighters are surrounded by the Macedonian military and elite police units, cut off from re-supply and hopelessly outnumbered. The Macedonian forces are closing in and could easily capture or kill the entire KLA force there, except NATO intervenes. NATO brokers a deal with the Macedonians, under the threat of extreme economic sanctions, under which NATO would oversee the demilitarization of Aracinovo and transport the captured KLA members to internment camps in Kosovo. US troops then enter Aracinovo with 15 buses to evacuate the trapped KLA fighters. They are escorted safely away from the surrounding Macedonian forces, and then, contrary to the agreement, the KLA members are released to rejoin other KLA forces and fight again. The American forces involved in the rescue include 16 members of MPRI (see August 1994) (see 1999), who had been assisting and training the KLA forces. [TAYLOR, 2002, PP. 120-121] Entity Tags: Kosovo Liberation Army, United States Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Balkans

Late June-August, 2001: Atta Calls Plot Facilitator Several Times 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta makes several calls to plot facilitator Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi to coordinate the arrival in the US of four muscle hijackers (see April 23-June 29, 2001) and one candidate hijacker (see August 4, 2001) al-Hawsawi is assisting in the United Arab Emirates. Al-Hawsawi is in contact with Atta both before tickets are purchased, to learn where the hijackers are traveling, and after the hijackers arrive, to check whether they have made it through immigration. Atta and two other hijackers also call al-Hawsawi later to make arrangements for returning unspent money (see September 5-10, 2001). [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ; US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 3/21/2007 ] Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta

June 30, 2001: White House Warned ‘Bin Laden Planning High-Profile Attacks’ A Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) sent to top White House officials is entitled, “Bin Laden Planning High-Profile Attacks.” It states that bin Laden operatives expect near-term attacks to have dramatic consequences of catastrophic proportions. Despite evidence of delays possibly caused by heightened US security, the planning for the attacks is continuing. The briefing also contains another report entitled, “Bin Laden Threats Are Real.” SEIBs are typically based on the previous day’s President Daily Briefings (see January 20-September 10, 2001), so it is probable Bush is given this warning. Also on this day, Saudi Arabia declares its highest level of terror alert. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 256-257, 534; US DISTRICT COURT OF EASTERN VIRGINIA, 5/4/2006, PP. 3 ] Entity Tags: White House, Saudi Arabia, Osama bin Laden, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Key Warnings, Presidential Level Warnings

June 30-July 1, 2001: New York Times Reporter Told Al-Qaeda Is ‘Planning Something So Big the US Will Have to Respond,’ but Fails to Publish Warning

The three authors of the book Germs, Judith Miller (left), Stephen Engelberg (top), and William Broad (bottom). This was the book Miller was working on before 9/11; it was published several weeks after 9/11. [Source: Publicity photo] New York Times reporter Judith Miller learns her government counterterrorism sources are worried that al-Qaeda is going to attack a US target on the Fourth of July holiday. There has been an increase in chatter about an impending attack. In 2005, Miller will recall, “Everyone in Washington was very spun-up in the counterterrorism world at that time. I think everybody knew that an attack was coming—everyone who followed this.… I got the sense that part of the reason that I was being told of what was going on was that the people in counterterrorism were trying to get the word to the president or the senior officials through the press, because they were not able to get listened to themselves.” Conversation Overheard - She has a conversation with a still-anonymous top-level White House source who reveals there is some concern about a top-secret NSA intercept between two al-Qaeda operatives. She explains, “They had been talking to one another, supposedly expressing disappointment that the United States had not chosen to retaliate more seriously against what had happened to the [USS] Cole. And one al-Qaeda operative was overheard saying to the other, ‘Don’t worry; we’re planning something so big now that the US will have to respond.’ And I was obviously floored by that information. I thought it was a very good story: (1) the source was impeccable; (2) the information was specific, tying al-Qaeda operatives to, at least, knowledge of the attack on the Cole; and (3) they were warning that something big was coming, to which the United States would have to respond. This struck me as a major page one-potential story.” Not Printed - Miller tells her editor Stephen Engelberg about the story the next day. But Engelberg says, “You have a great first and second paragraph. What’s your third?” Miller finds only one other source to confirm these details. Yemen Connection - She later learns from her first source that the conversation occurred in Yemen. Though the telephone number is never disclosed, some circumstances suggest one of the parties taking part in the call may have been at the al-Qaeda communications hub in Sana’a, Yemen, that is monitored by US intelligence. One of the hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar, lives there with his wife and children (see Late August 1998), and communicates there will be forthcoming attacks to at least one family member (see Late October 2000-July 4, 2001). The hijackers in the US apparently call the Yemen hub around this time (see (August 2001)). On July 3, the CIA will request the arrest of Djamel Beghal (see July 3, 2001), an al-Qaeda operative whose calls to the hub are apparently being monitored at this time (see Before July 3, 2001). Regrets - Miller later regrets not following through more because she “had a book coming out” as well as other stories and that there wasn’t a “sense of immediacy” about the information. In 2005, Engelberg will confirm Miller’s story and agree that he wanted more specifics before running the story. Engelberg also later wonders “maybe I made the wrong call,” asking, “More than once I’ve wondered what would have happened if we’d run the piece?” The New York Times has yet to mention the warning in all of their post-9/11 reporting and the 9/11 Commission has never mentioned anything about the warning either. In 2005, Miller will spend 85 days in jail for refusing to reveal a source and then leave the New York Times after widespread criticism about her reporting. [COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW, 9/2005; ALTERNET, 5/18/2006; EDITOR & PUBLISHER, 5/18/2006] Entity Tags: Stephen Engelberg, Al-Qaeda, Judith Miller Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Warnings, Warning Signs, Yemen Hub, Remote Surveillance