September 11 morning

Intro
Originally going to be 6am to midday, now looks like break down further, prob by hours.

September 11 6am-7am

September 11 7am-8am

September 11 8am-9am

September 11 9am-10am

Timeline
At some time between 10:32 a.m. and 11:45 a.m. on 9/11, Russian President Vladimir Putin will call the White House to say the Russians are voluntarily halting their exercise.

Early Morning September 11, 2001: Langley Pilot Asks to Be Taken off Alert Later On
At Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, one of the pilots that will take off to defend Washington in response to the terrorist attacks (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) asks to be removed from “alert” status later this morning, so he and another pilot can participate in a training mission. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/19/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 116] Being on “alert” means that a pilot’s fighter jet is kept on the runway, armed, fueled up, and ready to take off within minutes if called upon. [AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, 2/2002; BERGEN RECORD, 12/5/2003] Pilot Requests 'Download' - The pilot, Major Dean Eckmann, calls NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and requests that he be removed from alert status at 11:00 a.m. He wants to be able to join in with a scheduled training mission being conducted from Langley Air Force Base, along with another pilot from his unit, Captain Craig Borgstrom. (Borgstrom is not one of the unit’s alert pilots, but will take off along with Eckmann in response to the terrorist attacks.) According to author Lynn Spencer, such requests for removal from alert status—known as “download”—are customary, “since the detachment typically flies two training missions each week, and as long as the other NORAD alert sites on the East Coast—at Otis [Air National Guard Base] on Cape Cod and Homestead [Air Reserve Base] in Florida—are up on alert, the requests are generally approved.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 116 AND 141-144] Alert Duty Usually Uneventful - The alert unit at Langley Air Force Base is in fact part of the North Dakota Air National Guard’s 119th Fighter Wing, which has a small detachment at Langley, located away from the base’s central facilities. The unit is housed in two cramped buildings, and has just four aircraft and 18 full-time members of staff. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 114] According to journalist and author Jere Longman, being on alert duty is usually fairly uneventful for the pilots involved: “Protecting American airspace from attack was not a demanding job before September 11.… A week at Langley was a time to relax, watch television, work out, spend time on the computer, catch up on business. Like firemen, the pilots sat and waited for something to happen. When it did, they were usually scrambled to escort Navy jets with transponder problems to their home bases. Or to find doctors lost over the ocean in their Beechcraft Bonanzas. Or, occasionally, to sniff out drug runners. It was a sleepy job. Dozing for dollars, they called it.” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 64] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Dean Eckmann, Craig Borgstrom Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

Early Morning September 11, 2001: Helicopter Crew at Aviation Unit near Pentagon Away for ‘Traffic Survey’
A helicopter and its crew that are always on standby for “contingency” missions in the Washington area are away from base early this morning conducting a traffic survey, but apparently return at some point before the Pentagon is hit. The crew belongs to the 12th Aviation Battalion. [US ARMY CENTER FOR MILITARY HISTORY, 11/14/2001 ; ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, 11/14/2001 ] The 12th Aviation Battalion is stationed at Davison Army Airfield at Fort Belvoir, located 12 miles south of the Pentagon. It is the aviation support unit for the Military District of Washington, and operates UH-1 “Huey” and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. [MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, 8/2000] According to a chief warrant officer with the unit, the 12th Aviation Battalion has “two crews that are always on standby for any kind of contingency mission.” It is one of these crews that is “out flying around doing a traffic survey.” [ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, 11/14/2001 ] The exact time period during which the crew and their helicopter are away from base is unstated, but they apparently return to Davison Airfield before 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon is hit (see Shortly Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [US ARMY CENTER FOR MILITARY HISTORY, 11/14/2001 ] They will be the first crew with the battalion to take off in support of the rescue operations at the Pentagon once the unit’s aircraft are permitted to launch again following the attack. Others members of the 12th Aviation Battalion are also away from base this morning, for weapons training (see 8:46 a.m.-9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, 11/14/2001 ] Entity Tags: 12th Aviation Battalion, Davison Army Airfield Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

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(Between 8:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Numerous Aircraft at Base near Washington Participating in Training Exercises
Many aircraft at Andrews Air Force Base, which is just a few miles outside Washington, DC, are taking part in training exercises. James Ampey, an FAA air traffic controller who is currently on duty in the control tower at the base, will later recall that there are “an unusually high number of aircraft taking off and landing at Andrews [this] morning, because previously scheduled military exercises [are] underway.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/28/2003 ] It is unclear what specific exercises these aircraft are participating in, and the exact time period Ampey is referring to. Militarized 747 Involved in 'Global Guardian' Exercise - According to journalist and author Dan Verton, around the time of the Pentagon attack, “civilian and military officials [are] boarding a militarized version of a Boeing 747, known as the E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC), at an airfield outside of the nation’s capital. They [are] preparing to conduct a previously scheduled Defense Department exercise” (see (Shortly Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [VERTON, 2003, PP. 143-144] This airfield could well be Andrews Air Force Base, which is just 10 miles from Washington. [GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 11/15/2001] The exercise being referred to is apparently the US Strategic Command’s annual exercise, Global Guardian, for which three E-4Bs are reportedly launched (see 8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001 and Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). [OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 2/27/2002; OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 9/8/2002] Whether other aircraft that are taking off or landing at Andrews are participating in Global Guardian is unknown. NORAD Exercise, 'Vigilant Guardian' - Another major exercise taking place this morning is called Vigilant Guardian. All of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is participating in it (see (6:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, 1/25/2002; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002] However, Andrews is not one of NORAD’s seven “alert” sites around the US. [AIRMAN, 12/1999] And the 113th Wing of the District of Columbia Air National Guard, which is based at Andrews, is not part of the NORAD air defense force. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 76] Furthermore, members of the 113th Wing have just returned from a major training exercise in Nevada (see Late August-September 8, 2001), and so, with only a few pilots and planes available, today is a “light flying day” for their unit. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/11/2004 ] Presumably the 113th Wing is therefore not currently participating in Vigilant Guardian or any other major exercises. Numerous Units at Andrews - There are, however, many units at Andrews that may be participating in exercises. Among more than 60 separate organizations located at the base are units from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard. [DC MILITARY (.COM), 6/2001; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 11/15/2001] These units include Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 321 (VMFA-321), which flies the F/A-18 Hornet fighter jet, and Naval Air Facility, Washington, DC, which has numerous aircraft available, including the F/A-18 Hornet. [DC MILITARY (.COM), 2/9/2001; DC MILITARY (.COM), 6/2001] Andrews Units Respond to Attacks - DC Air National Guard fighters will later take off from Andrews to protect Washington in response to the morning’s attacks (see (10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001, 10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001, and 11:11 a.m. September 11, 2001). [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002] And a member of VMFA-321 calls NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) at around 9:50 a.m. to offer his unit’s assistance in response to the attacks (see (9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 188] Entity Tags: James Ampey, Andrews Air Force Base Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

(8:13 a.m.-9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Pilots of All Four Hijacked Planes Fail to Dial Standard Distress Code
In the event of a hijacking, all airline pilots are trained to key an emergency four-digit code into their plane’s transponder. This would surreptitiously alert air traffic controllers, causing the letters “HJCK” to appear on their screens. [CNN, 9/13/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/13/2001; NEWS (PORTUGAL), 8/3/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 17-18] The action, which pilots should take the moment a hijack situation is known, only takes seconds to perform. [CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001] Yet during the hijackings of flights 11, 175, 77, and 93, none of the pilots do this. [CNN, 9/11/2001] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight UA 175, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

8:38 a.m. and After September 11, 2001: NEADS Technicians Try Locating Flight 11, but Reportedly Hindered by Outdated Equipment
Technicians at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) try frantically to locate Flight 11 on their radar scopes, but are supposedly hindered by their outdated equipment. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 31-32] NEADS has just been alerted to the hijacking of Flight 11 (see (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] Its technicians realize they need to find the location of the hijacked plane quickly, so that the weapons team will be able to pass this information on to any fighter jets that are launched after it. Locating Flight 11 Is a 'Grueling Process' - Author Lynn Spencer will later explain: “To identify American 11, the surveillance and ID techs must go through a grueling process. Their radar scopes are filled with hundreds of radar returns not just from aircraft but from weather systems, ground interference, and what’s called anomalous propagation—false returns caused by conditions in the atmosphere, or by such obstructions as flocks of birds. The technicians must first determine which radar data on their screens is for aircraft, which they do by monitoring its movement, which is distinctive for planes. The technician must observe for at least 36 seconds to a minute just to confirm that a blip is in fact an aircraft track. The tech must attach what’s called a tactical display number to it, which tells the computer to start tracking and identifying the target. If the target is in fact a plane, then over a period of 12-20 seconds, the computer will start to generate information on the track: heading, speed, altitude, latitude, longitude, and the identifying information being transmitted by the transponder.” However, Flight 11’s transponder has been switched off (see (Between 8:13 a.m. and 8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Therefore, “With the hundreds of pieces of radar data filling their screens, and little information as to the location of the flight,” the task of locating it “is daunting.” Radar Equipment Supposedly Unsuitable - Spencer will suggest that trying to locate Flight 11 is made more difficult because the radar equipment at NEADS is outdated and unsuited to the task at hand. She writes: “[T]he NEADS radar equipment is different from that used by air traffic controllers. It’s much older, developed in the 1970s and brought into use by NEADS in the early 1980s. The system was designed to monitor the shoreline for incoming high-altitude threats: missiles coming from across the ocean. Slow and cumbersome, and not nearly as user friendly as more modern equipment, the NEADS monochromic radar displays are not designed to take internal FAA radar data or to identify radar tracks originating from inside the United States. The system offers little, if any, such low-level coverage over the country.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 31-32] Several of the NEADS personnel will later complain of their inability to locate Flight 11 on their scopes (see Shortly After 8:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). But Master Sergeant Joe McCain, the mission crew commander technician at NEADS, believes he has located Flight 11 on the radar screen just before it crashes into the World Trade Center (see 8:45 a.m.-8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11

(8:45 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Secret Service Does Not Use Its Stinger Missiles to Protect New York and Washington
Soldier firing a Stinger missile. [Source: US Army] In New York, the Secret Service has a Stinger missile secretly stored in the World Trade Center, to be used to protect the president if the city were attacked when he visits it. Presumably it keeps this is in WTC Building 7, where its field office is. [TECH TV, 7/23/2002; WEISS, 2003, PP. 379] Stinger missiles provide short-range air defense against low-altitude airborne targets, such as fix-winged aircraft, helicopters, and cruise missiles. They have a range of between one and eight kilometers. [FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, 8/9/2000; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 4/27/2005] Whether the Secret Service makes any attempt at defending New York from the two attacking planes with its Stinger missile is unknown. The agency is also known to have air surveillance capabilities. These include a system called Tigerwall, which provides “early warning of airborne threats” and “a geographic display of aircraft activity” (see (September 2000 and after)). And according to Barbara Riggs, who is in the Secret Service’s Washington, DC headquarters on this day, the agency is “able to receive real time information about other hijacked aircraft,” through “monitoring radar and activating an open line with the FAA.” [US DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, 9/2000, PP. 28 ; PCCW NEWSLETTER, 3/2006; STAR-GAZETTE (ELMIRA), 6/5/2006] These capabilities would presumably be of use if the Secret Service wanted to defend the World Trade Center. Furthermore, according to the British defense publication Jane’s Land-Based Air Defence, “the American president’s residences in Washington and elsewhere are protected by specialist Stinger teams in case of an aerial attack by terrorist organizations.” [JANE'S LAND-BASED AIR DEFENCE, 10/13/2000] Knight Ridder has previously reported “several sources” telling it, “Stinger missiles are in the Secret Service’s arsenal.” [KNIGHT RIDDER, 9/12/1994] And according to the London Telegraph, the Secret Service is “believed to have a battery of ground-to-air Stinger missiles” ready to defend the White House. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 9/16/2001] Flight 77 reportedly comes within four miles of the White House before turning toward the Pentagon. [ABC NEWS, 10/24/2001; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Whether the Secret Service makes any attempt at defending the place with its Stinger missiles is unknown. However, the Washington Post will later claim it is an “urban legend that Stinger missiles are mounted on the White House roof.” [WASHINGTON POST, 4/4/2002] Entity Tags: Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight UA 175, Flight AA 77, World Trade Center

(8:45 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines Security Director Informs FBI of Flight 11 Hijacking

Larry Wansley. [Source: Publicity photo] At 8:45 a.m., Larry Wansley learns of the hijacking of Flight 11. Wansley is the managing director of corporate security for American Airlines, and is at the company’s headquarters in Fort Worth, Texas. He is informed of the hijacking in an urgent phone call from the airline’s Command Center, located on the floor above its System Operations Control (SOC), about a mile away from headquarters (see (Before 8:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The SOC learned there was some kind of problem with Flight 11 at 8:20 a.m. (see 8:20 a.m. September 11, 2001). Since as early as 8:21, details of Flight 11 attendant Betty Ong’s emergency call have been constantly relayed to Craig Marquis, a manager at the SOC (see (8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Yet the 8:45 call is apparently Wansley’s first notification of the hijacking. He calls Danny Defenbaugh, the special agent in charge of the Dallas FBI office. Wansley is himself a former undercover FBI agent, and Defenbaugh is a longtime friend of his. This call is “the first step in the well-researched, secret hijack-response plan all commercial airlines have in place.” As Wansley is relaying information, he hears screaming from an adjacent conference room, as several employees watch the aftermath of the first WTC crash on television. The TV in Defenbaugh’s office has been turned on, but reportedly neither of the two men connects the images of the burning tower with the hijacking they are trying to deal with. As they continue discussing their response plans, television shows the second plane hitting the South Tower. No doubt realizing this is a terrorist attack, Defenbaugh says, “The ball game just changed.” Around this time, Wansley learns that the first plane to hit the WTC was the hijacked American Airlines flight. He will subsequently make a hurried drive to the nearby Command Center, where the FBI will already be setting up its own command post (see Shortly After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). [DALLAS OBSERVER, 11/21/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 14 ] Entity Tags: Larry Wansley, Federal Bureau of Investigation, American Airlines, Danny Defenbaugh Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11

8:46 a.m.-9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Aviation Unit Based near Pentagon away for Weapons Training at Time of Attacks

Fort AP Hill. [Source: United States Army] At the time of the attacks on the World Trade Center, members of the Army’s aviation support unit for the Washington, DC, area are away for weapons training, and do not set out to return to their base until after the time the Pentagon is hit. [ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, 11/14/2001 ; PENTAGRAM, 11/16/2001; FORT BELVOIR NEWS, 1/18/2002] The 12th Aviation Battalion is the Military District of Washington’s aviation support unit, and includes three helicopter companies. It operates UH-1 “Huey” and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. The battalion is stationed at Davison Army Airfield, which is at Fort Belvoir, 12 miles south of the Pentagon. [MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, 8/2000] Davison Airfield’s missions include maintaining “a readiness posture in support of contingency plans,” exercising “operational control” of the Washington area airspace, and providing “aviation support for the White House, US government officials, Department of Defense, Department of the Army, and other government agencies.” [PENTAGRAM, 5/7/1999] A chief warrant officer with the 12th Aviation Battalion will later recall that members of the battalion are away this morning, at the shooting range at another Virginia Army base, Fort AP Hill, for their annual weapons training. They had set off early and driven there—a journey of one and a half to two hours. They are at the range when the attacks on the WTC take place, and only learn of them when the sister of one of their captains calls her brother with news of the attacks, presumably after seeing the coverage on television. The chief warrant officer will recall that, after hearing of the second attack on the WTC, “[W]e were all pretty much thinking we probably need to go—you know, probably need to come to work.” The range officer calls Davison Airfield and is told that the members of the battalion should “pack it in and come on back” to base. He is also told during the call that an aircraft has crashed into the Pentagon (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001), meaning this call does not occur until after 9:37 a.m. According to the chief warrant officer, the Pentagon “is basically one of our missions. So we just pretty much packed up and came back up here and came into work.” Exactly how many of the 12th Aviation Battalion’s members are away from base for the weapons training is unstated, as is the exact time they arrive back at Davison Airfield. But considering it is one and a half to two hours drive between there and the range, they presumably do not get there until some time after about 11:15 a.m. When they do eventually get back to base, the battalion members will prepare to launch helicopters in response to the Pentagon attack (see (After 11:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, 11/14/2001 ; FORT BELVOIR NEWS, 1/18/2002] Entity Tags: 12th Aviation Battalion Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon, Training Exercises

(8:45 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Stratcom Commander and Battle Staff Absent From Command Center Due to Visiting Business Leaders
The US Strategic Command command center. [Source: US Strategic Command] At the time the attacks in New York occur, a small group of business leaders are having breakfast at Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha, Nebraska, where the US Strategic Command (Stratcom) is headquartered. With them is Admiral Richard Mies, the commander in chief of Stratcom. They are in town for an annual charity fundraiser event due to take place later in the day, hosted by the multi-billionaire Warren Buffett. Along with other visitors who have come for the fundraiser, they are scheduled to tour the Stratcom underground command center, located 60 feet below Offutt, and receive an unclassified mission briefing. According to the Omaha World-Herald, staff members have left the command center in advance of their visit. It is only after the second attack occurs, at 9:03, that Admiral Mies excuses himself from the breakfast and the battle staff reconvenes in the center. [SAN FRANCISCO BUSINESS TIMES, 2/1/2002; OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 2/27/2002] It is unclear what effect the absence of Mies and the members of the battle staff have upon the military’s ability to respond effectively to the first attacks. However, the command center does have significant capabilities that would, presumably, be of much use under such a crisis. Stratcom is the military command responsible for the readiness of America’s nuclear forces. [ARKIN, 2005, PP. 59] The Lincoln Journal Star describes its underground command center as “a military nerve center that collects and assesses information from high-tech ‘eyes and ears’ across—and above—the globe.” [JOURNAL STAR (LINCOLN), 10/25/2000] The cavernous room has eight giant video screens and complex communications systems. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2/21/2002; OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 2/27/2002] Stratcom itself states that the senior controller in the command center “has a direct line to the National Military Command Center in Washington, DC, and to the other major command headquarters.” This system, called the Joint Chiefs of Staff Alerting Network, allows the commander in chief of Stratcom to make “prompt contact with the president, the secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other unified commanders.” Furthermore, “Through satellites and radio networks (VLF, LF, UHF and HF), the command center can communicate with aircraft in flight over any part of the world. A principal purpose of these networks is to pass National Command Authority [i.e. the president and secretary of defense] orders to the alert forces.” While only the president can order nuclear strikes, the commander in chief of Stratcom “can launch aircraft for survival.” [UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND, 6/22/2001] With the command center’s sophisticated capabilities, after Mies returns to it from his breakfast, the eight video screens there are “loaded up with data,” providing him with “the latest information on the unfolding drama.” [OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 2/27/2002] And at the time President Bush arrives at Offutt, later in the day (see 2:50 p.m. September 11, 2001), the battle staff in the center will reportedly be “watching the skies over the United States” and “tracking a commercial airliner on its way from Spain to the United States.” [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002; CBS NEWS, 9/10/2003] Entity Tags: Richard Mies, US Strategic Command Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

8:46 a.m.-9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: New Jersey Air National Guard Fighters away on Training Mission, Unaware of Attacks in New York At the time of the attacks on the World Trade Center, two F-16 fighter jets are performing a training mission just eight minutes flying time away from New York, but the pilots are unaware of the crisis taking place. The two jets belong to the 177th Fighter Wing of the New Jersey Air National Guard, which is based at Atlantic City International Airport. [GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 10/29/2001; BERGEN RECORD, 12/5/2003] F-16s at Atlantic City are involved in scheduled training missions every day, and their first mission is usually between 8:30 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. [GRIFFIN, 2007, PP. 62] The two fighter jets are unarmed and performing practice bombing runs over a section of the Pine Barrens in New Jersey that is designated for military drills. The pilots are unaware of the attacks in New York. They will not be called back to base until shortly after the second WTC tower is hit, and will then have their training munitions replaced with live air-to-air missiles. At the time of the second attack, another two jets from the 177th FW are preparing to take off for routine bombing training, but they too have their mission canceled (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). No jets will take off from Atlantic City in response to the attacks until after 9:37, when the Pentagon is hit. [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 10/2002; BERGEN RECORD, 12/5/2003] NEADS and FAA Tried Contacting 177th Fighter Wing - Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, is aware that the 177th FW launches F-16s for training flights every morning around this time, and suggested to NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) that it contact Atlantic City to use these jets in response to the hijacked Flight 11. However, when NEADS tried phoning the unit, its call was not answered (see (Between 8:40 a.m. and 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [GRIFFIN, 2007, PP. 62; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 33-34] Apparently around 8:34 a.m., the Boston Center also attempted to contact the Atlantic City unit, but the outcome of that call is unclear (see (8:34 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] F-16s Might Have Prevented Attacks on WTC - Author Peter Lance will later point out that, had the two Atlantic City F-16s flying over the Pine Barrens “been notified by the FAA at 8:34… they could have reached the Twin Towers by 8:42 a.m.,” four minutes before Flight 11 hit the North Tower (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). “Even unarmed, and without a shootdown order, they might have been able to take defensive action to prevent the big 767 from crashing into the tower. In any case, the fighters would certainly have been on patrol and able to interdict UA 175, which didn’t hit the South Tower until 9:03 a.m.” [LANCE, 2004, PP. 230-231] Yet despite the crucial role these two fighters could have played, the 9/11 Commission Report will make no mention of them. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004] Pointing out the irony of having the two F-16s so near to Manhattan yet with such an unrelated mission, 177th Fighter Wing public affairs officer Lt. Luz Aponte will later remark, “Isn’t that something?” [BERGEN RECORD, 12/5/2003] Entity Tags: 177th Fighter Wing, Luz Aponte Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight UA 175, Training Exercises

=(After 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Emergency Response Plans Activated by Officials, Not by Bush = President Bush will say in a speech later that evening, “Immediately following the first attack, I implemented our government’s emergency response plans.” [US PRESIDENT, 9/17/2001] However, the Wall Street Journal reports that lower level officials activate CONPLAN (Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan) in response to the emerging crisis. CONPLAN, created in response to a 1995 Presidential Decision Directive issued by President Clinton and published in January 2001, details the responsibility of seven federal agencies if a terrorist attack occurs. It gives the FBI the responsibility for activating the plan and alerting other agencies. Bush in fact later states that he doesn’t give any orders responding to the attack until after 9:55 a.m. [US GOVERNMENT, 1/2001; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 3/22/2004 ] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

(After 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Establishes Open Telephone Line with the Secret Service Shortly after the WTC is hit, the FAA opens a telephone line with the Secret Service to keep the White House informed of all events. [ [SOURCES: RICHARD (“DICK”) CHENEY] A few days later, Vice President Cheney will state, “The Secret Service has an arrangement with the FAA. They had open lines after the World Trade Center was…” (He stopped himself before finishing the sentence.) [MSNBC, 9/16/2001] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

Shortly After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: Newark Airport Controllers Contact Other FAA Facilities about Burning WTC

Bob Varcadipane. [Source: NBC News] At the air traffic control tower at Newark International Airport in New Jersey, controllers see the smoke coming from the World Trade Center in the distance and start calling other FAA facilities in the area about this. Controller Rick Tepper looks out the window of the tower across the Hudson River at New York City, and sees the huge cloud of smoke coming from the North Tower, which Flight 11 has crashed into it. He points this out to fellow controller Greg Callahan. In his office at the tower, Bob Varcadipane, the supervisor there, starts receiving a flood of phone calls reporting that a small aircraft has hit the WTC. According to author Lynn Spencer, “The assumption is that only a small plane could have gone so badly off course.” The Newark tower controllers start calling the towers at JFK, La Guardia, and Teterboro Airports, along with other air traffic control facilities in the area, to see if any of them has lost an aircraft. But none say they have; they have not yet been informed of the crash and are shocked at what they see when told to look out their windows at the burning WTC. Varcadipane calls the FAA’s New York Center to find out if they know whose plane hit the Twin Towers. He is told: “No, but Boston Center lost an airplane. They lost an American 767.” Varcadipane wonders if this 767 is the plane that hit the WTC, and says back: “I have a burning building and you have a missing airplane. This is very coincidental.” According to NBC: “a horrific realization dawns on controllers. American Flight 11, still missing from radar, finally has been found.” Word of the plane’s fate subsequently “quickly travels throughout the air traffic control world.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 41-42] However, the FAA’s Indianapolis Center, which handles Flight 77, will reportedly not learn of the first hijackings until around 9:20 a.m. (see (9:20 a.m.-9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32 ] Entity Tags: Teterboro Airport, World Trade Center, Newark International Airport, Rick Tepper, La Guardia Airport, John F. Kennedy International Airport, Bob Varcadipane, Greg Callahan, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11

After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: Hijacker’s Passport Allegedly Found near World Trade Center

Satam Al Suqami’s remarkably undamaged passport, marked and wrapped in plastic. It was shown as evidence in the 2006 Zacarias Moussaoui trial. [Source: FBI] The passport of hijacker Satam Al Suqami is reportedly found a few blocks from the World Trade Center. [ABC NEWS, 9/12/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/16/2001; ABC NEWS, 9/16/2001] Barry Mawn, the director of the FBI’s New York office, will say that police and the FBI find it during a “grid search” of the area. [CNN, 9/18/2001] However a senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission will later claim the passport is actually discovered by a passerby and given to a New York City Police Department detective, “shortly before the World Trade Center towers collapsed.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004] The Guardian will comment, “The idea that Mohamed Atta’s passport had escaped from that inferno unsinged [tests] the credulity of the staunchest supporter of the FBI’s crackdown on terrorism.” (Note that, as in this Guardian account, the passport will frequently be mistakenly referred to as Atta’s passport.) [GUARDIAN, 3/19/2002] Entity Tags: Barry Mawn, New York City Police Department, Satam Al Suqami, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Other 9/11 Hijackers, FBI 9/11 Investigation

(After 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001: PR Firm Helps American Airlines Respond to Attacks According to PR Week magazine, “immediately” after the attacks on this day, Tim Doke, the vice president for corporate communications for American Airlines, calls Ken Luce, who is the president of the Southwest offices of public relations firm Weber Shandwick Worldwide (WSW). In response, WSW sends more than 20 people to American Airlines’ headquarters in Fort Worth, and to airports around the US. Thus, “While American couldn’t answer many questions, spokespeople subtly steered reporters away from false rumors and leaked information. Employees from WSW and American’s other agency, Burson-Marsteller, served as the firm’s eyes and ears in the airports its staff couldn’t reach while planes were grounded.” [PR WEEK, 11/5/2001] The American Airlines operations center in Fort Worth was reportedly alerted to the emergency on Flight 11 around 8:21 a.m. (see (8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 5] However, according to the 9/11 Commission, it is not until 9:30 a.m. that the airline confirms that this aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16 ] So the exact time when Doke called Luce is unclear. The FBI has “essentially gagged” American Airlines from any meaningful communication with the media immediately following the attacks. According to Doke, though, in response to subsequent media demands about how the terrorists got through security, American will make use of a number of airline security people it had “intentionally cultivated relationships with over the years to help carry our messages and put some of the media hysteria into perspective.” [JACK O'DWYER'S NEWSLETTER, 12/4/2002] Entity Tags: Tim Doke, American Airlines, Ken Luce, Weber Shandwick Worldwide Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Between 8:46 a.m. and 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Deputy Mayor Calls Navy; Requests Air Cover Over New York

Naval Station Norfolk. [Source: US Navy] Rudy Washington, who is one of Rudolph Giuliani’s deputy mayors, sees the smoking North Tower as he is being driven into downtown Manhattan. He immediately calls Admiral Robert Natter, the commander of the US Atlantic Fleet at Norfolk Naval Station, Virginia, the world’s largest naval base. He requests air cover over New York. Norfolk Naval Station is in the region of Naval Air Station Oceana, which has F-14 Tomcats and F/A-18 Hornets. It is also near Langley Air Force Base. Natter says he will need to get in touch with the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), but will then call back. [DIGITAL JOURNALIST, 10/2001; GLOBAL SECURITY (.ORG), 11/15/2001; CBS NEWS, 4/3/2003; NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, 5/20/2004] Around this time, Washington also calls Patrick Burns at the base. Burns usually works in New York as the director of fleet support for the Navy, a civilian position that works closely with the mayor’s office and numerous other agencies. He is at Norfolk Naval Station for his two-week Naval Reserve obligation. Washington tells Burns, “I need you here.” No doubt anticipating there will be mass casualties, he adds, “I need that hospital ship.” He is referring to the hospital ship the USNS Comfort. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001; NOTRE DAME MAGAZINE, 4/2007] However, the Comfort, which is based in Baltimore, will only set off for New York at 3 p.m. the following day, and arrive at Pier 92 in Manhattan late in the evening of September 14. [US NAVY, N.D.; MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND, 9/18/2001] Entity Tags: Robert Natter, Rudy Washington, Patrick Burns, North American Aerospace Defense Command, US Department of the Navy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

Shortly After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: FBI Arrives at American Airlines’ Command Center and Takes Charge of Crisis Response Shortly before 9/11, American Airlines revised its crisis plan for dealing with situations including “plane crashes and 1978-style hijackings” (see Late Summer 2001). However, on this day, “American abandoned its freshly minted crisis communications plan almost immediately, not because putting the CEO out front isn’t the best plan of action in a crisis, but because the FBI rushed to American’s Command Center and made it clear who was in charge.” [PR WEEK, 11/5/2001] Larry Wansley, the American Airlines director of security, is at the company’s headquarters in Fort Worth, Texas. He had contacted the Dallas FBI about the hijacking of Flight 11 at around 8:45 a.m. (see (8:45 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). After learning of the two planes hitting the World Trade Center, he makes a hurried drive to the airline’s Command Center, about a mile from the headquarters, on the floor above its System Operations Control (SOC). Already, by the time he arrives, the FBI is setting up its own command post there, reviewing the Flight 11 passenger manifest, and replaying the recording of flight attendant Betty Ong’s emergency phone call. [DALLAS OBSERVER, 11/21/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] Tim Doke, the American Airlines vice president for corporate communications, later recounts that the “FBI essentially gagged us from any meaningful media interaction immediately following the terrorist attacks.” [JACK O'DWYER'S NEWSLETTER, 12/4/2002] American Airlines’ first press release, issued within a few hours of the attacks, will refer all questions to the FBI. [PR WEEK, 11/5/2001] Entity Tags: Larry Wansley, Federal Bureau of Investigation, American Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: Navy Officials Monitor Events at Antiterrorist Alert Center Within moments of the attack in New York, the US Navy’s Antiterrorist Alert Center (ATAC) goes to full alert. ATAC is located at the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) headquarters in southeast Washington, DC, across the Potomac River from the Pentagon. [US NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, N.D.; US DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, 2/2002 ; CNN, 8/27/2002] Established in 1983, it was the first 24-hour terrorism watch center in the US intelligence community. [US NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, N.D.] In it, top Navy officials are now monitoring the day’s events. According to CNN—which gains access to a video recording of the center during the attacks—just before the Pentagon is hit, these officials are “concerned attacks on Washington could be next.” After the attack on the Pentagon, the Navy’s top leaders will start arriving at the center (see After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CNN, 8/27/2002] Entity Tags: US Department of the Navy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Between 8:46 a.m. and 9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Key Administration Officials Allegedly Think First Crash Is an Accident A number of key White House officials later claim that, when they learn of the first crash at the World Trade Center, they initially think it is just an accident: President Bush says that, when he learns of the crash while in Sarasota, Florida, “my first reaction was—as an old pilot—how could the guy have gotten so off course to hit the towers? What a terrible accident that is” (see (Between 8:55 a.m. and 9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 42] White House chief of staff Andrew Card, who is with the president, says, “It was first reported to me… that it looked like it was a, a twin-engine pro—prop plane, and so the natural reaction was—‘What a horrible accident. The pilot must have had a heart attack.’” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Adviser Karl Rove, who is also with the president in Florida, is later questioned about his feelings after the first crash. When it is suggested, “I guess at that point, everyone is still thinking it is an accident,” Rove concurs, “Yes, absolutely.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] White House press secretary Ari Fleischer, also traveling with the president on this day, says, “[W]hen only the first tower had been hit, it was all of our thoughts that this had been some type of terrible accident.” [CNN, 9/11/2006] National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, who is in her White House office, is informed of the crash by her executive assistant (see (9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). She later recalls, “I thought, what a strange accident.” [O, THE OPRAH MAGAZINE, 2/1/2002; MSNBC, 9/11/2002] White House counselor Karen Hughes receives a phone call informing her of the first crash as she is about to leave her Washington, DC home. She later recalls, “they thought it was a small plane at the time… so, of course, my immediate thought was what a terrible accident.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; CNN, 4/6/2004] She adds, “We all assumed it was some kind of weird accident; at that point terrorism didn’t occur to us.” [HUGHES, 2004, PP. 234] The 9/11 Commission later describes, “In the absence of information that the crash was anything other than an accident, the White House staff monitored the news as they went ahead with their regular schedules.” It will only be when they learn of the second tower being hit at 9:03 that “nearly everyone in the White House… immediately knew it was not an accident.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 35] However, when couterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke is called some time after the first crash but before the second by Lisa Gordon-Hagerty—a member of his staff who is at the White House (see (9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001)—she tells him, “Until we know what this is, Dick, we should assume the worst.” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 1] And when CIA Director George Tenet learns of the first crash, reportedly he is told specifically, “The World Trade tower has been attacked,” and his initial reaction is, “This has bin Laden all over it” (see (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WOODWARD, 2002, PP. 4] Entity Tags: Andrew Card, Richard A. Clarke, Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, Condoleezza Rice, Karen Hughes, George J. Tenet, Karl Rove, Ari Fleischer, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush, Richard Clarke

(8:47 a.m.-9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Engineer Finds Major Damage in Basement and Lobby of North Tower

Mike Pecoraro. [Source: Chief Engineer] Mike Pecoraro, an engineer who is part of the crew that services the WTC complex, is at work in the mechanical shop in the second subbasement of the north WTC tower when it is hit. When the room he is in starts filling with white smoke and he can smell kerosene (jet fuel), he heads up stairs with a co-worker towards a small machine shop on the C level. Yet, he says, “There was nothing there but rubble. We’re talking about a 50 ton hydraulic press—gone!” He then heads for the parking garage, yet finds that “there were no walls, there was rubble on the floor, and you can’t see anything.” He ascends to the B level where he sees a 300-pound steel and concrete fire door, which is lying on the floor, wrinkled up “like a piece of aluminum foil.” Pecoraro recalls seeing similar things at the Center when it was bombed in 1993 and is therefore convinced that a bomb has gone off this time. When he makes it into the main lobby, he sees massive damage: “The whole lobby was soot and black, elevator doors were missing. The marble was missing off some of the walls. 20-foot section of marble, 20 by 10 foot sections of marble, gone from the walls.… Broken glass everywhere, the revolving doors were all broken and their glass was gone.” Pecoraro says he only later hears that “jet fuel actually came down the elevator shaft, blew off all the (elevator) doors and flames rolled through the lobby. That explained all the burnt people and why everything was sooted in the lobby.” He makes it out of the North Tower before it collapses. [CHIEF ENGINEER, 8/1/2002] Entity Tags: Mike Pecoraro, World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center

(Shortly After 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001: New York Center Air Traffic Controllers Notice Problems with Flight 175

Curt Applegate sitting next to his air traffic control terminal. [Source: NBC News] After being focused on Flight 11, Dave Bottiglia, an air traffic controller at the FAA’s New York Center, first notices problems with Flight 175. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 21] Both Flight 11 and Flight 175 have been in the airspace that Bottiglia is responsible for monitoring (see 8:40 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (8:42 a.m.-8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Bottiglia has just watched Flight 11’s radar blip disappear, which means the plane has dipped below his radar’s coverage area, so is below 2,000 feet. But he does not yet realize it has crashed. He says aloud, “Well, we know he’s not high altitude anymore.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 37] Around this time, Flight 175’s transponder changes twice in the space of a minute (see 8:46 a.m.-8:47 a.m. September 11, 2001). Conflicting Accounts - According to MSNBC, “within seconds” of losing Flight 11’s blip, “Bottiglia has another unexpected problem.” While looking for Flight 11, he realizes that Flight 175 is also missing, and “instinctively… knows the two [planes] are somehow related.” He asks another controller to take over all of his other planes. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] But according to the 9/11 Commission’s account, Bottiglia is still trying to locate Flight 11 after it crashes, and so it is not until 8:51 a.m. that he notices the problem with Flight 175 (see 8:51 a.m.-8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 21 ] 'An Intruder over Allentown' - Around the time Flight 175 changes its transponder code, air traffic controller Curt Applegate, who is sitting at the radar bank next to Bottiglia’s, sees a blip that might be the missing Flight 11. He shouts out: “Look. There’s an intruder over Allentown.” According to the Washington Post, “In air traffic jargon, an ‘intruder’ is a plane with an operating transponder that has entered restricted airspace without permission.” In fact, it is the missing Flight 175. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/17/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002] However, these accounts make no mention of NORAD being notified about the problems with Flight 175 at this time. But according to a NORAD timeline released shortly after 9/11, NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) was alerted about Flight 175 by the FAA several minutes earlier, at 8:43 a.m. (see 8:43 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001] Entity Tags: Dave Bottiglia, Curt Applegate, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight UA 175

(8:47 a.m.-9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Mayor Giuliani Learns of First WTC Crash, Yet Doesn’t Go to Special Emergency Command Center

Rudolph Giuliani. [Source: Publicity photo] New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani is promptly informed of the first WTC crash while having breakfast at the Peninsula Hotel on 55th Street. He later claims that he goes outside and, noticing the clear sky, immediately concludes, “It could not have been an accident, that it had to have been an attack. But we weren’t sure whether it was a planned terrorist attack, or maybe some kind of act of individual anger or insanity.” Only after the second plane hits at 9:03 will he be convinced it is terrorism. After leaving the hotel, he quickly proceeds south. In his 2002 book, Leadership, he will claim that he heads for his emergency command center. This $13 million center is located on the 23rd floor of Building 7 of the WTC, and was opened by Giuliani in 1999, specifically for coordinating responses to emergencies, including terrorist attacks (see June 8, 1999). Referring to it, he writes, “As shocking as [the first] crash was, we had actually planned for just such a catastrophe.” At around 9:07 a.m., Giuliani meets Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik at Barclay Street, on the northern border of the WTC complex. [GIULIANI, 2002, PP. 3-6; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/19/2004; BARRETT AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 7] Yet they do not go to the command center. According to Kerik, “The Mayor and I… determined early on that the City’s pre-designated Command and Control Center… was unsafe because of its proximity to the attack.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/18/2004 ] Instead, they head to West Street, where the fire department has set up a command post, and arrive there at around 9:20 a.m. However, in his private testimony before the 9/11 Commission in 2004, Giuliani will apparently change his story, claiming he’d never even headed for his command center in the first place. He says, “Even if the Emergency Operations Center had been available, I would not have gone there for an hour or an hour and a half. I would want to spend some time at the actual incident, at operations command posts.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/19/2004; BARRETT AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 44-45 AND 340-341] Other accounts indicate that the emergency command center is mostly abandoned from the outset, with emergency managers instead heading to the North Tower (see (Soon After 8:46 a.m.-9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Rudolph (“Rudy”) Giuliani, Bernard Kerik Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

8:47 a.m.-10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: Hundreds Die in WTC Elevators, as Elevator Mechanics Flee During the 9/11 catastrophe, around 200 people die in the WTC’s elevators without getting help from elevator mechanics, according to an in-depth study later performed by USA Today. Some of the victims are burned by the initial explosion, some die as the elevator cars plummet when their cables are severed, and some are stuck and perish in the collapse. USA Today will say it “could not locate any professional rescues of people stuck in elevators. The Fire Department of New York and the Port Authority also could not cite successful rescues.” After the North Tower is hit, most of the WTC’s 83 elevator mechanics gather in the lobby of the South Tower, but when the second plane hits, they evacuate. In contrast, a passing elevator mechanic from another company runs into the WTC and dies trying to free trapped passengers. USA Today will comment: “When the World Trade Center was bombed in 1993, Otis Elevator’s mechanics led the rescue of 500 people trapped in elevators. Some mechanics were dropped onto the roofs of the Twin Towers by helicopter. Others, carrying 50-pound oxygen tanks on their backs, climbed through smoke to machine rooms high in the towers. On Sept. 11, the elevator mechanics—many of the same men involved in the rescues in 1993—left the buildings after the second jet struck, nearly an hour before the first building collapsed.” Although ACE Elevator, the local company which won the WTC contract from Otis in 1994, will say it was acting in accordance with procedure, USA Today will note: “The departure of elevator mechanics from a disaster site is unusual. The industry takes pride in rescues. In the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, elevator mechanics worked closely with the firefighters making rescues.” Robert Caporale, editor of Elevator World will say, “Nobody knows the insides of a high-rise like an elevator mechanic. They act as guides for firefighters, in addition to working on elevators.” The Port Authority will also say that their departure was in conflict with the emergency plan. “There was no situation in which the mechanics were advised or instructed to leave on their own.” [USA TODAY, 12/19/2001; USA TODAY, 9/4/2002] Entity Tags: World Trade Center, ACE Elevator, New York Port Authority, Robert Caporale Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: Software Company Reconstructs Paths of Four Hijacked Planes A Fairfax, Virginia company that makes computer software that tracks and records the flight paths of planes helps media companies and airlines to reconstruct the paths of all four of the hijacked aircraft. [WASHINGTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, 9/11/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/13/2001] Flight Explorer sells an Internet-accessible application that provides constantly updated information on the positions of aircraft in flight. It uses radar feeds that the FAA collects from control centers across the US. [BUSINESS WIRE, 6/16/2000; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 8/12/2001] All of Flight Explorer’s employees begin sorting through its data “after the first crash [of Flight 11] was reported,” so presumably this is at around 8:50 a.m. Whether any particular agency, such as the FAA, requests this or they do it of their own initiative is unknown. Although there are some 4,000 planes in the air above the US at the time of the attacks, the company is quickly able to pinpoint the paths of all four hijacked aircraft. It then creates charts and animated videos of the four flights’ actual and intended routes. About 12 news agencies, including all the major networks, request these animated illustrations. [WASHINGTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, 9/11/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/13/2001] Flight Explorer is apparently unhindered by the fact that flights 11 and 93 have their transponders turned off during the hijackings. Its reconstruction of Flight 77’s path ends, however, at 8:57, around the time that aircraft’s transponder goes off and it disappears from controllers’ radar screens (see (8:56 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Yet the 9/11 Commission will later say that, despite this disappearance, “Radar reconstructions performed after 9/11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked the flight from the moment its transponder was turned off.” Why the Flight Explorer illustration does not therefore show the rest of Flight 77’s journey is not clear. [AVWEB, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Until a few years back, Flight Explorer was the only company that recorded flight paths. Since the 1999 death of golfer Payne Stewart (see October 25, 1999) the FAA has also been recording these paths. [WASHINGTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, 9/11/2001] The final report of the 9/11 Commission will make no mention of the Flight Explorer flight path recordings. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 222] Entity Tags: Flight Explorer Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Between 8:48 a.m. and 9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Langley Air Force Base Pilots Learn of WTC Crash At Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, the operations manager with the unit that is involved in NORAD’s air defense mission first learns that a plane has hit the World Trade Center in a phone call from his fiancée. He then receives a call from the unit’s intelligence officer, who warns that the pilots at Langley need to “get ready.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 116-117] Manager Learns of Attack - The alert unit at Langley Air Force Base is a small detachment from the North Dakota Air National Guard’s 119th Fighter Wing, which is based in Fargo, ND. [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/15/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/27/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 114] Captain Craig Borgstrom is its operations manager. In the event of an order to scramble the unit’s two F-16s that are kept on “alert,” his job would be to man the battle cab and serve as the supervisor of flying (SOF), being responsible for getting any necessary information about the mission to the pilots. Borgstrom’s fiancée, Jen, calls him at the base and asks, “Did you hear that some airplane just ran into the World Trade Center?” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 116; TAMPA TRIBUNE, 6/8/2008] This is the first that Borgstrom has heard about the attack. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 63] He replies, “Probably some idiot out sightseeing or someone trying to commit suicide in a Cessna 172,” but Jen tells him, “It’s a pretty big fire for a small airplane.” Intelligence Officer Warns, 'Get Ready' - The chief enlisted manager then enters Borgstrom’s office and informs him that Darrin Anderson, the unit’s intelligence officer, is on the phone from the wing’s base in Fargo, “and needs to talk to you right away.” Borgstrom heads to the main reception desk and takes the call. After asking if Borgstrom is aware of what happened in New York, Anderson tells him, “[W]e think there might be more to this, so you guys get ready.” Borgstrom tells the chief enlisted manager about this call and then heads out toward the alert hangars. Pilot Learns of Attack - Meanwhile, in one of the hangars, the crew chief goes upstairs with some information for Major Dean Eckmann, who is one of the pilots on alert duty. Eckmann is unaware of events in New York. When his crew chief informs him a plane has hit the WTC, he replies: “Poor, dumb sucker. I hope no one in the building got hurt.” Before Eckmann has a chance to switch on the television to check the news, a Klaxon horn sounds, indicating that the two alert pilots at Langley are to go to “battle stations.” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 64; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 116-117] According to the 9/11 Commission, this battle stations signal occurs at 9:09 a.m. (see (9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] Eckmann, along with Borgstrom and another of the unit’s pilots, will take off in order to defend Washington, DC at 9:30 a.m. (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16 ; RIP CHORD, 12/31/2006] Entity Tags: Langley Air Force Base, Dean Eckmann, Darrin Anderson, Craig Borgstrom Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77 =to sort=

(8:48 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Special NSA Warning Center First Learns from Television that US Is Under Attack
Within the headquarters of the National Security Agency (NSA) in Fort Meade, Maryland is a little-known unit called the Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center (DEFSMAC). According to author James Bamford, who is an expert on the NSA, the center’s purpose is “to serve as the nation’s chief warning bell for a planned attack on America. It serves as the focal point for ‘all-source’ intelligence—listening posts, early-warning satellites, human agents, and seismic detectors.” According to one former NSA official, DEFSMAC “has all the inputs from all the assets, and is a warning activity. They probably have a better feel for any worldwide threat to this country from missiles, aircraft, or overt military activities, better and more timely, at instant fingertip availability, than any group in the United States.” If they received indications that an attack was imminent, DEFSMAC officials could “immediately send out near-real-time and in-depth, all-source intelligence alerts to almost two hundred ‘customers,’ including the White House Situation Room, the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, the [Defense Intelligence Agency] Alert Center, and listening posts around the world.” Its analysts could be “closely monitoring all intercepts flooding in; examining the latest overhead photography; and analyzing data from early-warning satellites 22,300 miles above the equator. DEFSMAC would then flash the intelligence to the US Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, NORAD at Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado, and other emergency command centers.” But on this morning, as Bamford concludes, “DEFSMAC learned of the massive airborne attacks after the fact—not from America’s multibillion-dollar spy satellites or its worldwide network of advanced listening posts, or its army of human spies, but from a dusty, off-the-shelf TV set.” [BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 33-35] The NSA had in fact intercepted numerous calls between some of the hijackers in the US and an al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen, beginning in early 2000 and ending just weeks before 9/11 (see Early 2000-Summer 2001). [MSNBC, 7/21/2004] It also intercepted two messages in Arabic on September 10, stating, “The match is about to begin,” and “Tomorrow is zero hour,” but these are supposedly not translated until September 12 (see September 10, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 6/20/2002] The NSA even intercepted a series of communications between 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) and lead 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta beginning in the summer of 2001 (see Summer 2001), continuing to a message where KSM gives Atta the final go-ahead for the attacks on September 10, 2001 (see September 10, 2001). Michael Hayden, the director of the NSA, will later claim that the “NSA had no [indications] that al-Qaeda was specifically targeting New York and Washington… or even that it was planning an attack on US soil” (see October 17, 2002). [NATIONAL JOURNAL, 6/19/2006] Entity Tags: National Security Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

==(8:48 a.m.-9:02 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Navy Command Center Personnel Think WTC Crash Is an Accident

Michael Allen Noeth. [Source: Associated Press / Army Times] Personnel in the Navy Command Center at the Pentagon, which is located on the first floor of the building’s southwest face, learn of the attack on the WTC from television reports. The center is tasked with constantly monitoring global current events and also monitoring the latest status of all US Naval assets around the world. Its employees have to keep Navy leaders in Washington up to date on what is happening in the world as it directly relates to Navy operations and other security or military issues. Admiral Timothy Keating, who is the Navy’s director of operations in the Pentagon, describes it as a “nerve center.” Forty to 50 people man it constantly, 24 hours every day. Located within the center is the Chief of Naval Operations Intelligence Plot (CNO-IP), a small, highly secretive intelligence unit that constantly monitors geopolitical developments and military movements that could threaten American forces. The Navy Command Center has just been renovated, and its dozens of employees have been moving in during the past month. According to the Washington Post, the first the Command Center knows of the unfolding crisis is when Petty Officer Michael Allen Noeth sees the scene from the World Trade Center on the TV sets bolted to the wall, and shouts, “My God! What’s happened?” Another employee Lt. Kevin Shaeffer later recalls, “We quickly knew what was going on in New York City after the first plane hit the first tower… and stood up a watch to start logging events and tracking things for the Navy.” [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/14/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/16/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 1/20/2002; CHIPS, 3/2003] Despite the center supposedly being a “nerve center,” those in it supposedly are not initially aware that this is a terrorist attack. According to Timothy Keating, who is presently in the Navy Command Center receiving his daily briefing, “We were quite bewildered. We couldn’t understand how a pilot could make such a significant navigational error on a day when the skies were crystal clear blue.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/16/2001; AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 9/11/2006] All 30 people in the Command Center’s main room watch the footage of the WTC on the large televisions there, whispering to each other, “Think it’s an accident?” [VIRGINIAN-PILOT, 9/7/2002] However, according to the Washington Post, “A few old hands muttered to themselves that the Pentagon was probably next.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/16/2001] According to one officer, it is only when the second plane hits the WTC that there will be an “almost instantaneous recognition” that this is a terrorist attack. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 9/11/2002] By that time, Keating will have gone back to his office. He too supposedly only realizes this is an attack when he sees television showing the second crash. [AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 9/11/2006] Much of the Navy Command Center will be destroyed when the Pentagon is hit at 9:37 a.m. Forty-two of the 50 people working in it will be killed. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/20/2002; NATIONAL DEFENSE MAGAZINE, 6/2003] Entity Tags: US Department of the Navy, Timothy Keating, Kevin Shaeffer, Michael Allen Noeth Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(8:48 a.m.-9:04 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NSA Director Only Learns US Is Under Attack from TV Reports Air Force Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden, the director of the National Security Agency (NSA), is in his office at NSA headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland, meeting with his senior staff. His executive assistant, Cindy Farkus, comes in and informs him of the first plane hitting the World Trade Center. He later says, “The immediate image I had was a light plane, off course, bad flying.” He is able to see the initial CNN reports showing the WTC on a muted television in his office. Nevertheless, he continues with his meeting. Immediately after the second attack occurs, Farkus again comes into Hayden’s office to inform him of it. Saying that “One plane’s an accident, two planes is an attack,” Hayden immediately adjourns his meeting and requests that the agency’s top security officials be summoned to his office. Author James Bamford, who is an expert on the NSA, later comments that this is “not the way it was supposed to be. NSA was not supposed to find out about an airborne attack on America from CNN, after millions of other Americans had already witnessed it. It was supposed to find out first, from its own ultrasecret warning center, and then pass the information on to the White House and the strategic military forces” (see (8:48 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 18, 20 AND 33] Entity Tags: Cindy Farkus, National Security Agency, Michael Hayden Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Soon After 8:46 a.m.-9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Emergency Management Staff Go to North Tower, Leaving Special Command Center Nearly Vacant

Richard Sheirer [Source: Publicity photo] Richard Sheirer is in a meeting at New York City Hall when he is informed by telephone of the first plane hitting the World Trade Center. Sheirer is the director of the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM), which was set up in 1996 to coordinate the city’s overall response to major incidents, including terrorism (see 1996). It has an emergency command center on the 23rd floor of WTC 7, specially intended for coordinating the response to catastrophes such as terrorist attacks (see June 8, 1999). Yet instead of going to this, Sheirer heads to the North Tower, and arrives at the fire command post set up in its lobby before the second crash at 9:03 a.m. [NEW YORK MAGAZINE, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/18/2004 ] John Odermatt, Sheirer’s top deputy, also goes to the North Tower and says that, after the first plane hit, he leaves only two staffers at the command center. John Farmer, who heads the 9/11 Commission unit that assesses the city response to the attacks, will find it “strange that Sheirer, four OEM deputies, and a field responder went straight to the North Tower… rather than to the nearby emergency command center.” Journalists Wayne Barrett and Dan Collins will conclude, “[T]he command center was out of business from the outset.” [BARRETT AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 31 AND 34] Sheirer stays at the North Tower lobby until soon after 9:30 a.m., when Mayor Giuliani requests he joins him at the temporary command post at 75 Barclay Street (see (9:50 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/18/2004 ] John Farmer will later complain, “We [the 9/11 Commission] tried to get a sense of what Sheirer was really doing. We tried to figure it out from the videos. We couldn’t tell. Everybody from OEM was with him, virtually the whole chain of command. Some of them should have been at the command center.” Fire Captain Kevin Culley, who works as a field responder at OEM, is later asked why most of the OEM’s top brass were with him at the scene of the incident. He says, “I don’t know what they were doing. It was Sheirer’s decision to go there on his own. The command center would normally be the focus of a major event and that would be where I would expect the director to be.” When the 9/11 Commission later investigates OEM’s shortcomings on 9/11, “No rationale for Sheirer’s prolonged lobby stay, no information conveyed to commanders, and no steps to coordinate the response” will be discovered. [BARRETT AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 31-32 AND 34] Entity Tags: Office of Emergency Management, John Odermatt, Kevin Culley, Richard Sheirer Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

=to sort=

(8:48 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Transportation Secretary Mineta and FAA Administrator Garvey in Meeting Together; Notified of First WTC Crash Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta is in a breakfast meeting with the Belgian transportation minister, to discuss aviation issues. FAA Administrator Jane Garvey is also in the meeting, which is in the conference room next to Mineta’s office at the Department of Transportation (DOT) in Washington, DC. Soon after 8:45 a.m., Mineta’s Chief of Staff John Flaherty interrupts, and takes Mineta and Garvey aside to Mineta’s office to tell them that news agencies are reporting that some kind of aircraft has flown into the WTC. While Garvey immediately goes to a telephone and contacts the FAA Operations Center, Mineta continues with the meeting. But a few minutes later Flaherty again takes him aside to tell him the plane is confirmed to be a commercial aircraft, and that the FAA had received an unconfirmed report of a hijacking. The TV is on and Mineta sees the second plane hitting the WTC live. He terminates his meeting with the Belgian minister, and Garvey heads off to the FAA headquarters. The White House calls and requests that Mineta go and operate from there, so he quickly heads out too. He will soon arrive there, and enters its underground bunker at around 9:20 a.m. (see (Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US CONGRESS, 9/20/2001; FRENI, 2003, PP. 62-63; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Before leaving the Department of Transportation, Mineta orders the activation of the DOT’s Crisis Management Center (see 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). [US CONGRESS, 10/10/2001] Entity Tags: Norman Mineta, Jane Garvey, John Flaherty Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Shortly After 8:48 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Learns Crashed Plane Belonged to American Airlines, but Director Unable to Contact Corporate Officials about This Apparently, managers at United Airlines’ System Operations Control (SOC) center, just outside Chicago, are unaware of any unfolding emergency until they see CNN reporting the burning World Trade Center (see 8:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). “Within minutes,” the air traffic control coordinator at United Airlines’ headquarters, located next to the SOC, calls an official at the FAA’s Herndon Command Center to confirm that the plane that just hit the WTC was not one of United’s aircraft. The FAA official tells him the plane had been a hijacked American Airlines 757. Soon afterwards, the air traffic control coordinator briefs Bill Roy and Mike Barber—the director and the dispatch manager at United’s SOC—on this information from the FAA. Barber then tries notifying United’s top corporate officials about it. However, he is unable to because the airline’s pager system is not working. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 21-22 ] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Bill Roy, Mike Barber, United Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

Soon after 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: FBI Arrives at Boston Air Traffic Control Center The FBI arrives at the FAA’s Boston Center, in Nashua, New Hampshire, “minutes after Flight 11 crashed into the World Trade Center,” and seizes tape recordings of radio transmissions from the hijacked plane. Boston Center handled Flight 11, and recorded intermittent radio transmissions from its cockpit (see (After 8:14 a.m.-8:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 9/13/2001] According to FAA spokeswoman Laura Brown, the FAA has to turn over all its records from 9/11 to the FBI immediately afterwards. She says it is not unusual for the FAA to turn over its records after a major disaster, but normally this is to the National Transportation Safety Board, not the FBI. [GRIFFIN, 2004, PP. 185] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Laura Brown, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(8:50 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Learning of First Crash, Libby Doesn’t Want to be Disturbed, ‘Unless it’s Terrorism’ Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief of staff, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, had met briefly with Cheney earlier in the morning, but is now back in his own office in the Old Executive Office Building, located next door to the White House. According to journalist and author Stephen Hayes, Libby has just commenced a meeting with John Hannah, who serves on the vice president’s national security staff. [HAYES, 2007, PP. 328 AND 330] However, Newsweek reports that he is with his top deputy, Eric Edelman. The meeting is reportedly to discuss the stalled peace process in the Middle East. [NEWSWEEK, 12/31/2001] Before it started, Libby had given his assistant Jennifer Mayfield strict instructions not to interrupt. But as soon as she sees a plane has hit the World Trade Center, Mayfield goes in and tells Libby about it. [HAYES, 2007, PP. 330] Asked, “Do they think it’s terrorism?” she replies that no one is sure, and it appears that a small plane hit the building. [NEWSWEEK, 12/31/2001] Libby tells her, “Unless it’s terrorism, don’t interrupt me again.” [HAYES, 2007, PP. 330] He turns on his television briefly, but then turns it off again as he does not want to be distracted from his conversation about the Middle East. [NEWSWEEK, 12/31/2001] After the second tower is hit, Mayfield goes back in and tells Libby, “It’s terrorism.” [HAYES, 2007, PP. 331] She marches across the office and turns on the TV. Libby later comments, “That’s very unlike her, so I knew it was serious.” Edelman later recalls, “We looked at each other and said, ‘That’s no accident.’” [NEWSWEEK, 12/31/2001] Libby receives a call from Dick Cheney, summoning him to the White House, and soon afterwards hurries across to rejoin the vice president. [HAYES, 2007, PP. 331] Entity Tags: Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby, John Hannah, Jennifer Mayfield, Eric Edelman Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Between 8:50 a.m. and 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Janitor Hears Explosions and Other Strange Noises in North Tower After firefighters arrive at the North Tower, janitor William Rodriguez leads some of them up its stairs. Being one of only five people possessing a master key, he opens emergency exit doors as he goes up, allowing people to escape from the building. But between the tower’s 20th and 30th floors he hears a series of explosions. The source of these is unknown. Then, when he reaches the 33rd floor he hears what sounds like heavy equipment being dragged across the floor of the level above. He finds this puzzling, he later says, because the 34th floor is supposed to be empty and has been off limits for weeks due to a construction project. After he reaches the 39th floor, Rodriguez is ordered to turn back by the firefighters with him. He then hears the sound of the second plane hitting the WTC, at 9:03 a.m. Rodriguez also claims he heard an explosion from the North Tower’s basement just seconds before it was hit at 8:46 a.m. (see (8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001). He will later be credited with saving many lives on 9/11, and be treated as a hero. [CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 3/25/2004; WESTERN MORNING NEWS, 12/2/2006; HERALD (GLASGOW), 2/16/2007; ARGUS (BRIGHTON), 2/26/2007] Entity Tags: William Rodriguez, World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

(8:50 a.m.-Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Director of Operations of the Joint Staff Does Not Go to NMCC after Learning of WTC Crash; Keeps Dental Appointment Instead

Scott Fry. [Source: NATO] Vice Admiral Scott Fry, a top official at the Pentagon with important responsibilities, goes to a dental appointment and only becomes involved with the response to the attacks after the second crash in New York. [CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 4-6] Fry is the director of operations of the Joint Staff, a post he has held since 1998. [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 9/23/1998; STARS AND STRIPES, 10/4/2001] In this position, he is responsible for running the National Military Command Center (NMCC)—“the Pentagon’s highly secure nerve center”—and the Executive Support Center (ESC)—a suite of rooms at the Pentagon “where the secretary of defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior officials would meet to discuss urgent matters.” [CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 5-6] He is due to leave shortly for Italy, where he is to take up an important Navy command. [DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 9/4/2001; STARS AND STRIPES, 10/4/2001; CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 4-5] Fry is anxious to go to the dentist before leaving for Italy. As he is about to leave his office for a 9:00 a.m. appointment, his executive assistant draws his attention to the television coverage of the first attack in New York. Reportedly believing the crash was “probably just a freak accident,” instead of heading to the NMCC or the ESC, Fry continues to the clinic (which is presumably within the Pentagon), and is in the dentist’s chair when the second attack occurs. His assistant then calls him on his cell phone to alert him to this. Fry reportedly concludes: “One airplane hitting a skyscraper, that was damned suspicious. But two… there was no doubt about it. It had to be a terrorist attack.” He promptly cancels his appointment and hurries to the NMCC. From there, he goes upstairs to the ESC, where a group is already assembling (see Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). In the ESC, a “video teleconference link could connect them to the White House, the State Department, the CIA, and military commanders throughout the world.” There, Fry discusses events in New York with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s aide Stephen Cambone. But, reportedly, what the men know is “not much, except what they could see on TV.” [CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 4-6] Only a few months previously, on June 1, 2001, a new Defense Department directive on dealing with domestic hijackings was issued under Fry’s signature (see June 1, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 6/1/2001 ] Entity Tags: National Military Command Center, Scott Fry, Executive Support Center, Stephen A. Cambone Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(Shortly After 8:51 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Pentagon Command Center Possibly Knows Flight 77 Is Hijacked, yet NEADS Not Notified An article in the New York Times will later suggest that officials in the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) promptly become aware of the problems with Flight 77, long before NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) is alerted to the flight. The article will state, “During the hour or so that American Airlines Flight 77 [is] under the control of hijackers, up to the moment it struck the west side of the Pentagon, military officials in [the NMCC are] urgently talking to law enforcement and air traffic control officials about what to do.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/15/2001] This appears consistent with what would be expected under normal procedures. According to the FAA’s acting Deputy Administrator Monte Belger: “Prior to 9/11, FAA’s traditional communication channel with the military during a crisis had been through the National Military Command Center (NMCC). They were always included in the communication net that was used to manage a hijack incident.” He will say that, since the FAA does not have direct dedicated communication links with NORAD, in a hijack scenario the NMCC has “the responsibility to coordinate [the Defense Department]‘s response to requests from the FAA or the FBI.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] NEADS reportedly is not alerted to Flight 77 until significantly later: at 9:24 a.m. by some accounts (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001), or, according to other accounts, at 9:34 a.m., when it only learns that Flight 77 is missing (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, National Military Command Center, Monte Belger Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Pentagon

(After 8:52 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NORAD Scramble Delayed? Witness Casts Doubt on NORAD’s Scramble Time William Wibel, principal of a school inside Otis Air National Guard Base, is inside the Otis base preparing for a meeting when he learns that the WTC has been attacked and his meeting is canceled. He says, “As I drove away, and was listening to the news on the radio, the 102nd was scrambling into duty.” [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/12/2001] The WTC crash does not break on local news and radio until about 8:52 a.m. Even if he hears CNN’s early reporting starting at 8:48 a.m., it still presumably takes time to learn the meeting is canceled, go back to his car and so forth. NORAD says the fighters took off from Otis at 8:52 a.m. Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, William Wibel Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

(8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Fighters Fly toward New York Area; Accounts Unclear over Speed
The two F-15 fighter jets that took off from Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod head toward the New York area. But accounts will be unclear regarding what speed they fly at as they respond to the hijacking of Flight 11. The two jets were scrambled from Otis at 8:46 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), and are airborne by 8:53 (see 8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] Flying Supersonic - In a number of accounts, it is claimed the fighters fly faster than the speed of sound. [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002] Lead pilot Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy will tell the BBC: “I was supersonic.… I don’t know what we could have done to get there any quicker.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] He tells ABC News, “[W]e go supersonic on the way, which is kind of nonstandard for us.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] According to author Lynn Spencer, “against regulations, [Duffy] takes his plane supersonic, breaking the sound barrier as he passes through 18,000 feet. This is a violation that can get a pilot into a good deal of trouble since the sonic boom tends to break windows in the homes down below.” When the other Otis pilot, Major Daniel Nash, radios and says, “You’re supersonic,” Duffy responds, “Yeah, I know, don’t worry about it.” Then, “Without hesitation, [Nash] follows his lead” and also goes supersonic. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 43] Flying 'Full Blower' - Duffy will recall, “I was in full blower all the way,” as he flies toward New York. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002] In another account, he similarly says, “When we took off I left it in full afterburner the whole time.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 57] F-15s can fly at up to 1,875 miles per hour. [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/12/2001; US AIR FORCE, 3/2008] According to an Otis Air Base spokeswoman, “An F-15 departing from Otis can reach New York City in 10 to 12 minutes.” [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/16/2001] But, according to the Boston Globe, while “In their prime, the planes can go Mach 2.5 [and] could have been to New York in less than 10 minutes,” Duffy and Nash are “flying F-15 Eagles that were built in 1977.… Because of their age and the three large fuel tanks they were carrying… the planes couldn’t attain that speed, both pilots said.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/11/2005] Different Speeds Given - Various speeds will later be given for how fast the Otis jets are traveling. Consistent with Duffy’s claims of flying “supersonic,” ABC News says the two fighters fly “at Mach 1.2, nearly 900 miles per hour.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] According to the Boston Globe, the fighters are flying at “about Mach 1.4—more than 1,000 miles per hour.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/11/2005] Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental Region, says they fly at “about 1.5 Mach, which is, you know, somewhere—11 or 1,200 miles an hour.” [MSNBC, 9/23/2001; SLATE, 1/16/2002] Major General Paul Weaver, the director of the Air National Guard, says the jets fly “like a scalded ape,” but as to their exact speed, he only says they are “topping 500 mph.” [DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 9/16/2001] And by 9:03 a.m., when the second World Trade Center tower is hit, the Otis fighters are still 71 miles from New York, according to NORAD. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001] The 9/11 Commission will state that they only arrive over Manhattan at 9:25 a.m. (see 9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001), though accounts of most witnesses on the ground indicate they do not arrive until after 10:00 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.-10:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] Accounts are contradictory regarding what exact destination the Otis jets are initially heading toward after taking off (see (8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Timothy Duffy, Paul Weaver, Larry Arnold, Daniel Nash Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight UA 175

(8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Fighters Head toward New York Area; Accounts Conflict over Exact Destination

Route of the Otis Air National Guard fighters to New York City. [Source: Yvonne Vermillion/ MagicGraphix.com] The two F-15 fighter jets launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod respond to the hijacking of Flight 11, but there will be conflicting accounts regarding their initial destination. The fighters were scrambled at 8:46 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), and are airborne by 8:53 (see 8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] Flying toward New York City - News reports shortly after 9/11 will say that, after taking off, the Otis fighters begin “racing towards New York City.” [CBS NEWS, 9/14/2001; CNN, 9/14/2001; CAPE COD TIMES, 9/15/2001] Other news reports similarly say they initially head toward New York City. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; FOX NEWS, 9/8/2002] Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental Region, will say the fighters are “coming to New York.” [MSNBC, 9/23/2001; SLATE, 1/16/2002] Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy, the lead Otis pilot, tells the BBC, “When we took off we started climbing a 280-heading, basically towards New York City.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] In one account, Duffy recalls that, after launching, he calls for the location of his target and is told, “Your contact’s over Kennedy,” meaning New York’s JFK International Airport. Duffy will add, “[W]e started heading right down to Long Island, basically.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002; BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 15] In another account, he says that he and the other Otis pilot, Major Daniel Nash, “climbed up, [and] we were supersonic going down to Long Island.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 57] Without a Target, Heading for Military Airspace - According to some accounts, however, the two Otis fighters do not initially head toward Manhattan. Major James Fox, the leader of the weapons team at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), will later recall: “We had no idea where [Flight 11] was. We just knew it was over land, so we scrambled [the Otis fighters] towards land.” [NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, 1/25/2002] The 9/11 Commission will conclude that, after taking off, because they are “Lacking a target,” the fighters are “vectored toward military-controlled airspace off the Long Island coast.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] Colonel Robert Marr, the battle commander at NEADS, says that when the Otis fighters took off, his “intent was to scramble [them] to military airspace while we found out what was going on.” He says that, before 9:03 when the second World Trade Center tower is hit, the fighters are “heading down south toward Whiskey 105 and we don’t really have a mission for them at this point.” Whiskey 105 is military training airspace southeast of Long Island, a few minutes flying time from New York City. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 56 AND 58-59] To New York, then Redirected to Military Airspace - Other accounts will say the Otis fighters initially head toward New York City, but are subsequently redirected to the military airspace off Long Island. According to author Lynn Spencer, after taking off, Duffy and Nash fly “supersonic toward New York for approximately 15 minutes.” But just after the second WTC tower is hit, Duffy suggests to the weapons controller at NEADS that the two fighters head to the Whiskey 105 training airspace off Long Island, and that is where they then go. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 83-85] Tape recordings of the NEADS operations floor will reveal that, at 8:45 a.m., Major Kevin Nasypany, the facility’s mission crew commander, gave Major Fox a coordinate north of New York City, and told him to “Head [the Otis jets] in that direction” (see 8:45 a.m. September 11, 2001). Then, at 8:52, he told one of his staff members, “Send ‘em to New York City still” (see 8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). But, according to Vanity Fair, shortly after the second tower is hit, the NEADS weapons technicians get “pushback” from civilian FAA controllers, who are “afraid of fast-moving fighters colliding with a passenger plane,” so the two fighters are directed to a “holding area” just off the coast, near Long Island (see 9:09 a.m.-9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001). [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Accounts are also unclear regarding what speed the Otis jets fly at after taking off (see (8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: James Fox, Larry Arnold, Daniel Nash, Robert Marr, Timothy Duffy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight UA 175

(8:53 a.m.-10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Pilots Unclear about What Is Happening After taking off in their F-15s, the two pilots scrambled from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to Flight 11 are not properly informed about the unfolding events. One of these pilots, Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy, later describes, “When you get the scramble order… you are usually not sure what is going on.” However, after they were informed there had been a hijacking (see 8:34 a.m. September 11, 2001), the two “knew it was the real thing,” according to Major Daniel Nash, the other pilot. [FOX NEWS, 9/8/2002] But as they are “headed right down Long Island,” Duffy recalls, “[w]e had no idea what was going on.” [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/10/2006] When the second World Trade Center tower is hit at 9:03, they are unaware that a second plane has been in trouble, and their request for clarification of their mission from NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) is met with “considerable confusion” (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 60-63] (According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS itself only receives its first notification about a second possible hijacking at 9:03 (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 24 ] ) Furthermore, it is not until after 10:30 a.m. that the two pilots will learn that Washington has also been attacked, when a controller informs them of this in passing, but does not elaborate. [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002] Nash will later complain: “Anybody watching CNN that morning had a much better idea of what was going on than we did. We were not told anything.” [MICHAEL BRONNER, 2006] Duffy later reflects: “People lose track of how much chaos there was. We were in a situation that was just a mess, you know, and we were trying to get our arms around it a little bit.” [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/10/2006] Entity Tags: Daniel Nash, Timothy Duffy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

(8:55 a.m.-9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: CIA Director Tenet in Communications Blackout as He Returns to CIA Headquarters; Recalls Bojinka Plot CIA Director George Tenet has just learned of the first attack on the WTC while having breakfast with former Senator David Boren (D) at the St. Regis Hotel in Washington, DC. He later says, “It was obvious to us both that I had to leave immediately.” Along with Tim Ward, the head of his security detail, he gets into his car and, with lights flashing, hurries back to the CIA headquarters in Langley. Tenet later recalls that in these first minutes after the attack, “All the random dots we had been looking at started to fit into a pattern.… [M]y head was exploding with connections. I immediately thought about the ‘Bojinka’ plot to blow up twelve US airliners over the Pacific and a subsequent plan to fly a small airplane into CIA headquarters, which was broken up in 1994.” During his journey, he calls John Moseman, his chief of staff, and instructs him to assemble the senior CIA staff and key people from the Counterterrorist Center in the conference room next to his office. However, Tenet claims, it is difficult for him to get calls through on the secure phone, meaning he is “Essentially… in a communications blackout between the St. Regis and Langley, the longest twelve minutes of my life.” He only learns that a second plane hit the World Trade Center when he arrives at CIA headquarters. Tenet enters the conference room at around 9:15 a.m. By that time, he says, “I don’t think there was a person in the room who had the least doubt that we were in the middle of a full-scale assault orchestrated by al-Qaeda.” [TENET, 2007, PP. 161-163] Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(8:56 a.m.-9:04 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Senior Commanders at Otis Air Base Learn of Attacks, Order ‘Battle Staff’

Paul Worcester. [Source: Paul Blackmore / Cape Cod Times] Senior commanders at Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, become aware of the attacks on the World Trade Center from television coverage, and one commander then orders the base’s battle staff to assemble. The commanders have just been in the first of the base’s regular Tuesday morning meetings, which ended at 8:55 a.m. They are taking a short break before the next meeting, which is scheduled for 9:00 a.m., and are apparently unaware that a plane has crashed into the WTC. Wing Commander Sees Burning WTC on Television - One of those in the meeting was Lieutenant Colonel Paul Worcester, the logistics group commander of the 102nd Fighter Wing, which is based at Otis. As Worcester walks past the break room he notices that everyone inside it is fixated on the television. He goes in to find what they are watching and gets his first sight of the coverage of the burning North Tower. Worcester finds it odd that a plane could have hit the WTC, and thinks to himself: “On such a clear day, planes don’t just go astray. That just doesn’t happen.” Although he is aware that the base’s two F-15s that are kept on alert have been scrambled in response to a suspected hijacking (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), he does not connect this with what he is seeing on television. Commanders See Second Attack - Worcester is joined in the break room by more of the senior commanders. They watch as the live television coverage shows Flight 175 crashing into the South Tower (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), and all of them then realize that America is under attack. One commander immediately shouts out, “We need to go to battle staff!” The senior commanders disperse and head toward the adjacent operations building, where they will reconvene in the battle cab of the installation operations center (see Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). A voice sounds out over the base’s loudspeakers: “The commander has ordered the 102nd core battle staff to assemble. Please report to the operations building immediately.” Unit Mobilizes for War - Subsequently, as author Lynn Spencer will describe: “Under the leadership of the [102nd Fighter] Wing commander, the various subordinate group commanders cross-brief on scramble activity, training flight issues, available munitions, personnel available to begin uploading more fighters to combat-ready status, security force increases, and more. In short, they begin to mobilize the wing for war, keeping NEADS [NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector] in the loop on their preparations.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 87-88, 153-154] Base Learned of First Hijacking 20 Minutes Earlier - The 102nd Fighter Wing of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, which is based at Otis Air Base, is responsible for protecting the Northeast United States, including New York, Washington, and Boston. Its mission includes defending the region against terrorist attacks. [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/12/2001; CAPE COD TIMES, 9/12/2001] On a typical day, it has about a dozen pilots on duty. [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/15/2001] It is equipped with 18 F-15 fighter jets, two of which are kept on 24-hour alert, ready to be in the air within five minutes of being called upon. [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/15/2001; CAPE COD TIMES, 9/21/2001] These were the two jets that launched at 8:46 a.m. in response to the hijacking of Flight 11. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] The base was notified about this first hijacking shortly after 8:34 a.m. (see (8:36 a.m.-8:41) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 27-28] Why the senior commanders did not initiate their crisis response at that time is unclear. Entity Tags: Paul Worcester, Otis Air National Guard Base Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(After 8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Serious Communications Problems Experienced in Washington Area, Affect Key Government Officials
In the Washington, DC, area, members of the public, emergency responders, and government officials experience serious communications problems. Telephone and cell phone services around the capital remain unavailable to members of the public for most of the day. [VERTON, 2003, PP. 149] Particular problems are experienced around the Pentagon. Reportedly, cellular and landline telephone communications there are “virtually unreliable or inaccessible during the first few hours of the response,” after it is hit at 9:37 (see After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. C36] Some senior government officials also experience communications difficulties: CIA Director George Tenet has problems using his secure phone while heading from a Washington hotel back to CIA headquarters, located about eight miles outside Washington (see (8:55 a.m.-9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [INDEPENDENT, 11/6/2002; TENET, 2007, PP. 161-162] Secretary of State Colin Powell has to take a seven-hour flight from Peru, to get back to the capital. He later complains that, during this flight, “because of the communications problems that existed during that day, I couldn’t talk to anybody in Washington” (see (12:30 p.m.-7:30 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] Between the time of the second WTC attack and about 9:45 a.m., Vice President Dick Cheney, who is at the White House, has problems reaching Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert at the US Capitol by secure telephone (see (9:04 a.m.-9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [DAILY HERALD (ARLINGTON HEIGHTS), 9/11/2002; HAYES, 2007, PP. 336-337] Even President Bush experiences difficulties communicating with Washington after leaving a school in Florida, and subsequently while flying on Air Force One (see (9:34 a.m.-11:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/10/2006] A classified after-action report will later be produced, based on observations from a National Airborne Operations Center plane launched near Washington shortly before the time of the Pentagon attack (see (Shortly Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to one government official, the report indicates that the nation was “deaf, dumb, and blind” for much of the day. [VERTON, 2003, PP. 150-151] Members of the public in New York City also experience communications problems throughout the day, particularly with cell phones (see (After 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Colin Powell, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Dennis Hastert, George J. Tenet, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush, Dick Cheney, Pentagon

(8:56 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Disappears from Indianapolis Center Radar Screens According to the 9/11 Commission, “Radar reconstructions performed after 9/11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked [Flight 77] from the moment its transponder was turned off at 8:56 [a.m.].” However, for eight minutes and 13 seconds, between 8:56 and 9:05, this primary radar data is not displayed to Indianapolis Center air traffic controllers. “The reasons are technical, arising from the way the software processed radar information, as well as from poor primary radar coverage where American 77 was flying.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] According to the Washington Post, Flight 77 “was hijacked in an area of limited radar coverage.” The Post adds that there are two particular types of radar system. “Secondary” radar “is the type used almost exclusively today in air traffic control. It takes an aircraft’s identification, destination, speed, and altitude from the plane’s transponder and displays it on a controller’s radar screen.” “Primary” radar, on the other hand, “is an older system. It bounces a beam off an aircraft and tells a controller only that a plane is aloft—but does not display its type or altitude. The two systems are usually mounted on the same tower.” Normally, “If a plane simply disappears from radar screens, most controllers can quickly switch on the primary system, which should display a small plus sign at the plane’s location, even if the aircraft’s transponder is not working. But the radar installation near Parkersburg, W. Va., was built with only secondary radar—called ‘beacon-only’ radar. That left the controller monitoring Flight 77 at the Indianapolis Center blind when the hijackers apparently switched off the aircraft’s transponder (see 8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001), sources said.” [WASHINGTON POST, 11/3/2001] In its final report, the 9/11 Commission will include a rather elaborate explanation for the loss of primary radar contact with Flight 77, saying it is because “the ‘preferred’ radar in this geographic area had no primary radar system, the ‘supplemental’ radar had poor primary coverage, and the FAA ATC [air traffic control] software did not allow the display of primary radar data from the ‘tertiary’ and ‘quadrary’ radars.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 460] The Commission will note that two managers at the Indianapolis Center who assist in the search on radar for the missing aircraft do “not instruct other controllers at Indianapolis Center to turn on their primary radar coverage to join in the search for American 77.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(8:57 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Air Traffic Controllers Watch Flight 175 on Radar as It Heads into New York

Flight 175 an instant before it hits the WTC South Tower. [Source: Associated Press] About a half-dozen air traffic controllers at the FAA’s New York Center in Ronkonkoma, NY, watch Flight 175 on the radar screen in its final minutes, as it approaches Manhattan. [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 ; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Flight 175 is marked on the screen with the letter “I” for “intruder.” Initially, those at the center think it might be heading for Newark Airport, maybe for an emergency landing there. But controller Jim Bohleber says, “No, he’s too fast and low, he’ll never make Newark.” [NEWSDAY, 9/10/2002] The controllers start speculating what Flight 175 is aiming for, with one of them guessing the Statue of Liberty. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] They are astonished at the extraordinary rate at which it is descending (see (8:58 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). A controller counts down its altitude, “Eight, six, four” thousand feet, and then says, “My god, he’s in the ground in the next step.” But someone else at the center says, “No, that’s the Trade Center right there.” [THE LEARNING CHANNEL, 2005] But, according to the 9/11 Commission, the New York Center does not notify NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) about Flight 175 until 9:03 a.m., the same time as it crashes into the South Tower (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 23] Workers at the crisis center at United Airlines’ headquarters outside Chicago, also closely watch Flight 175 head into New York City on radar. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Entity Tags: New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Jim Bohleber Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

(8:58 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Controllers Watch Flight 175 Descending 10,000 Feet per Minute Air traffic controllers at the FAA’s New York Center who are watching Flight 175 on the radar screen (see (8:57 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001) see the aircraft descending at an astonishing rate of up to 10,000 feet per minute. [THE LEARNING CHANNEL, 2005] From 8:58 a.m., Flight 175 is constantly descending toward New York. [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 ] One of the New York Center controllers, Jim Bohleber, is looking at his radar scope and calls out the plane’s rate of descent every 12 seconds, each time the screen updates, saying: “It’s six thousand feet a minute. Now it’s eight. Now ten.” [NEWSDAY, 9/10/2002; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Dave Bottiglia, the controller responsible for monitoring Flight 175, will later comment that 10,000 feet per minute is “absolutely unheard of for a commercial jet. It is unbelievable for the passengers in the back to withstand that type of force as they’re descending. [The hijackers are] actually nosing the airplane down and doing what I would call a ‘power dive.’” [THE LEARNING CHANNEL, 2005] While Flight 175 is in this rapid descent, it heads directly into the paths of several other aircraft, and narrowly avoids a mid-air collision with flight Midex 7 (see (9:01 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 73-76] Entity Tags: Dave Bottiglia, Jim Bohleber, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

==8:59 a.m.-9:02 a.m. September 11, 2001: Orders Given to Evacuate WTC Buildings, But Not Heard by Fire Safety Director == At 8:59 a.m., the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) commanding officer of the World Trade Center complex calls for the evacuation of the North Tower and the South Tower, saying, “As soon as we’re able, I want to start a building evacuation, building one and building two, till we find out what caused this.” Thirty seconds later, the officer repeats his order, but this time calls for all the buildings in the WTC complex to be evacuated. At 9:02, he repeats this, saying, “Evacuate all buildings in the complex. You copy? All buildings in the complex.” However, his order is given over WTC police radio channel W, which cannot be heard by the deputy fire safety director in the South Tower. [BERGEN RECORD, 8/29/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 293; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 28, 32 AND 200-202 ] Entity Tags: World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska Is Directing Global Guardian Training Exercise

Admiral Richard Mies. [Source: Public domain] Offutt Air Force Base, near Omaha, Nebraska, appears to be the headquarters of the US Strategic Command (Stratcom) exercise Global Guardian that is “in full swing” when the 9/11 attacks begin. At least the director of the exercise, Admiral Richard Mies, commander in chief of Stratcom, is at Offutt this morning. Because of Global Guardian, bombers, missile crews, and submarines around America are all being directed from Stratcom’s command center, a steel and concrete reinforced bunker below Offutt. [BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 11/12/1997; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2/21/2002; OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 2/27/2002; BBC, 9/1/2002; OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 9/10/2002] This bunker is staffed with top personnel and they are at a heightened security mode because of the exercise. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2/21/2002; AIR FORCE WEATHER OBSERVER, 7/2002 ] Because of Global Guardian, three special military command aircraft with sophisticated communications equipment, based at Offutt, are up in the air the morning of 9/11. These E-4B National Airborne Operations Center planes—nicknamed “Doomsday” planes during the Cold War—are intended to control nuclear forces from the air in times of crisis. They are capable of acting as alternative command posts for top government officials from where they can direct US forces, execute war orders and coordinate the actions of civil authorities in times of national emergency. The Federal Advisory Committee (whose chairman is retired Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft) is aboard one of these Doomsday planes, being brought to Offutt to observe the exercise. Global Guardian will be cancelled some time after the second WTC tower is hit (see 9:11 a.m. September 11, 2001), with the battle staff at Offutt switching to “real-world mode.” However, even after Global Guardian is called off, the three E-4Bs will remain airborne. Also on this morning, a small group of business leaders are at Offutt because of a charity fundraiser event due to take place later in the day, hosted by the multi-billionaire Warren Buffett (see (8:45 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 2/27/2002; AIR FORCE WEATHER OBSERVER, 7/2002 ; BBC, 9/1/2002; OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 9/8/2002] Entity Tags: Global Guardian, Federal Advisory Committee, Brent Scowcroft, Richard Mies, US Strategic Command Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Two Otis Fighters Prepared for Training Mission over Ocean Weapons supervisor Jeff Isch’s team in the 102nd Fighter Wing at Otis Air National Guard Base, Cape Cod, Massachusetts, finishes loading dummy missiles onto two fighter jets that are going to fly a training mission over the Atlantic Ocean. Shortly after the second World Trade Center tower is hit at 9:03 a.m., the pilots will be called back. [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/8/2002] Six Jets Training over the Ocean - Around 15 minutes after the second crash, six fighters from Otis that are training over the Atlantic will be recalled to base (see (9:15 a.m.-9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/11/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 155] It is unclear whether these jets include the two that Isch’s team has prepared for takeoff, or whether those two aircraft have not yet taken off at the time the second tower is hit and their pilots are recalled. At 8:46 a.m., two F-15s launched from Otis in response to the first hijacking, of Flight 11 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] One of the pilots of those F-15s, Daniel Nash, is reportedly standing in for the usual “alert” pilot, who is “scheduled for training” on this day. [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002] Unit's Mission Is to Protect Northeast US - According to its own statement, the 102nd Fighter Wing at Otis Air Base has aircraft and their crews “on continuous 24-hour, 365-day alert to guard our skies.” It says its “mission is to protect the Northeast United States from armed attack from another nation, terrorist attack, and activities such as smuggling, illicit drug activity, and illegal immigration.” Its large area of responsibility includes “the major industrial centers of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Detroit, and all national command centers in Washington, DC.” [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/12/2001] The 102nd Fighter Wing is equipped with 18 F-15 Eagles, two of which are kept on 24-hour alert, ready to be in the air within five minutes (these were the two aircraft launched in response to Flight 11). [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/15/2001; CAPE COD TIMES, 9/21/2001] Entity Tags: 102nd Fighter Wing, Jeff Isch Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Army Base Outside New York Prepares for Terrorist Attack Exercise Staff at Fort Monmouth, an Army base in New Jersey located about 50 miles south of New York City, is preparing to hold a “disaster drill” to test emergency response capabilities to a fake chemical attack. The exercise, called Timely Alert II, is to involve various law enforcement agencies and emergency personnel, including Fort Monmouth firefighters and members of the New Jersey State Police. Personnel are to be deployed and measures taken as in a real emergency. A notice has been sent out, warning that anyone not conducting official business will be turned away from Fort Monmouth during the exercise. Soon after 9 a.m., the exercise director tells a group of participating volunteers that a hijacked plane has crashed into the World Trade Center. The participants pretend to be upset, believing this is just part of the simulation. When they see the live televised footage of the WTC attacks, some people at the base think it is an elaborate training video to accompany the exercise. One worker tells a fire department training officer: “You really outdid yourself this time.” Interestingly, the follow-up exercise held in July 2002 (Timely Alert III) does incorporate simulated television news reports to give participants the impression that the emergency is real. And in the first Timely Alert exercise, held on the base in January 2001, a call had come through of a supposed “real” bomb situation, but this “fortunately turned out to be a report related to a training aid being used during the exercise.” On 9/11, Fort Monmouth is geared to go into high-alert status as part of Timely Alert II. The exercise is called off once the base is alerted to the real attacks. [MONMOUTH MESSAGE, 2/9/2001; HUB, 9/21/2001; MONMOUTH MESSAGE, 9/21/2001; ASBURY PARK PRESS, 7/24/2002; MONMOUTH MESSAGE, 8/23/2002; US DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, 7/26/2003 ; MONMOUTH MESSAGE, 9/12/2003] Fort Monmouth is home to various Army, Defense Department, and other government agencies. The largest of these is the US Army’s Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM). CECOM serves to “develop, acquire, field, and sustain superior information technologies and integrated systems for America’s warfighters.” It is tasked with the “critical role of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).” [GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 10/21/2001; COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS COMMAND, 4/17/2002; US DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, 1/2003 ] Fort Monmouth services also directly assist in the emergency response later in the day. Its fire department deploys to Atlantic Highlands to assist passengers coming from Manhattan by ferry, and members of its Patterson Army Health Clinic are also sent out to help. Teams of CECOM experts from the base are later deployed to ground zero in New York with equipment capable of locating cellular phone transmissions within the ruins of the collapsed World Trade Center. Its explosive ordnance company is also deployed to assist authorities should they come across anything they think might be explosives, while digging through the debris in search of victims. [HUB, 9/21/2001; MONMOUTH MESSAGE, 9/21/2001] Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Army’s Communications-Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, Timely Alert II Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

add 8:55 to midday
(8:54 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Veers Off Course Flight 77 from Washington begins to go off course over southern Ohio, turning to the southwest. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Nearly Collides with Two Other Planes Flight 175 almost collides in mid-air with at least two other planes as it descends towards Manhattan. At the FAA’s New York Center, air traffic controller Chris Tucker sees it turn toward the path of Delta Flight 2315, a Boeing 737 heading southwest at 28,000 feet. He tells the Delta pilot: “Traffic 2 o’clock. Ten miles. I think he’s been hijacked. I don’t know his intentions. Take any evasive action necessary.” The Delta plane begins to turn to get out of the way, but Flight 175 turns as well. According to the Washington Post, the two planes’ radar targets actually merge on the radar screen. Controller Dave Bottiglia later says, “It was a terrifying moment just to watch the two airplanes miss by less than, I think it was 200 feet.” Shortly after this near miss, Flight 175 almost collides with US Airways Flight 542, another 737, flying just below and four miles behind Delta 2315. This plane’s onboard collision alert system sounds an alarm as Flight 175 comes closer and closer to it. Its pilot descends, managing to avoid a collision. According to an early FAA report, after this incident, several New York air traffic controllers speculate that the unknown aircraft heading towards New York City—only later confirmed to be Flight 175—is an emergency and is heading for an airport to land. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; WASHINGTON POST, 9/17/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/10/2002; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/12/2002] Earlier on, Flight 175 nearly collided with Flight 11 (see (Shortly After 8:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and minutes later it will narrowly avoid another collision, with Midwest Airlines Flight 7 (see (9:01 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Dave Bottiglia, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Chris Tucker Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

(Between 8:55 a.m. and 9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: President Bush First Told About WTC Crash? Suggests Accident

Karl Rove, Andrew Card, and Dan Bartlett. [Source: White House, US Office Pristina, Kosovo, White House] President Bush’s motorcade has arrived at Booker Elementary School and Bush enters the school with his entourage. The beepers of politicians’ aides are going off with news of the first WTC crash as Bush arrives. According to one account, Bush learns of the crash when adviser Karl Rove takes Bush aside in a school corridor and tells him about the calamity. According to this account, Rove says the cause of the crash was unclear. Bush replies, “What a horrible accident!” Bush also suggests the pilot may have had a heart attack. This account is recalled by photographer Eric Draper, who was standing nearby at the time. [DAILY MAIL, 9/8/2002] Dan Bartlett, White House Communications Director, also says he is there when Bush is told: “[Bush] being a former pilot, had kind of the same reaction, going, was it bad weather? And I said no, apparently not.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] One account states that Rove tells Bush the WTC has been hit by a large commercial airliner. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001] However, Bush later remembers Rove saying it appeared to be an accident involving a small, twin-engine plane. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] In a third version of the story, Bush later recalls that he first learns of the crash from chief of Staff Andrew Card, who says, “‘Here’s what you’re going to be doing; you’re going to meet so-and-so, such-and-such.’ And Andy Card says, ‘By the way, an aircraft flew into the World Trade Center.’” [WASHINGTON TIMES, 10/7/2002] “From the demeanor of the president, grinning at the children, it appeared that the enormity of what he had been told was taking a while to sink in,” according to a reporter standing nearby at the time. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001; DAILY MAIL, 9/8/2002] Entity Tags: Karl Rove, George W. Bush, Andrew Card, Dan Bartlett, Eric Draper Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush, Key Day of 9/11 Events

(8:55 a.m.-9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: CIA Director Tenet in Communications Blackout as He Returns to CIA Headquarters; Recalls Bojinka Plot CIA Director George Tenet has just learned of the first attack on the WTC while having breakfast with former Senator David Boren (D) at the St. Regis Hotel in Washington, DC. He later says, “It was obvious to us both that I had to leave immediately.” Along with Tim Ward, the head of his security detail, he gets into his car and, with lights flashing, hurries back to the CIA headquarters in Langley. Tenet later recalls that in these first minutes after the attack, “All the random dots we had been looking at started to fit into a pattern.… [M]y head was exploding with connections. I immediately thought about the ‘Bojinka’ plot to blow up twelve US airliners over the Pacific and a subsequent plan to fly a small airplane into CIA headquarters, which was broken up in 1994.” During his journey, he calls John Moseman, his chief of staff, and instructs him to assemble the senior CIA staff and key people from the Counterterrorist Center in the conference room next to his office. However, Tenet claims, it is difficult for him to get calls through on the secure phone, meaning he is “Essentially… in a communications blackout between the St. Regis and Langley, the longest twelve minutes of my life.” He only learns that a second plane hit the World Trade Center when he arrives at CIA headquarters. Tenet enters the conference room at around 9:15 a.m. By that time, he says, “I don’t think there was a person in the room who had the least doubt that we were in the middle of a full-scale assault orchestrated by al-Qaeda.” [TENET, 2007, PP. 161-163] Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001: President Bush Chats with Greeting Committee Instead of Taking Urgent Call from Rice

Adam Putnam. [Source: Congressional Pictorial Directory] At the Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, a small greeting committee has been waiting for the president to arrive. Among this group are two congressmen, Adam Putnam (R) and Dan Miller (R). A White House staffer has informed them that the president has an important call to take from Condoleezza Rice. According to Putnam, they were told, “When he arrives, and he’ll be here in a minute, he’s going to walk past you. He’s not being rude; he’s just got to take this phone call.” [GW HATCHET, 4/8/2002; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/8/2002] President Bush reportedly is informed of the first WTC crash when he arrives at the school (see (Between 8:55 a.m. and 9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Like others traveling in the president’s motorcade (see (Between 8:46 a.m. and 8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001), Captain Deborah Loewer, the director of the White House Situation Room, learned of the crash during the journey. She runs up to the president, she later says, “[a]s soon as the motorcade stopped,” and informs him of it (see (8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [DAYTON DAILY NEWS, 8/17/2003; SPRINGFIELD NEWS-SUN, 7/6/2006] Yet in spite of therefore likely already knowing of the crash, Bush seems in no hurry to take Rice’s call. Putnam later recalls, “Well, he comes up and does not go past us. He stops and talks with us, having a good chat with the teacher of the year.” (This is Edwina Oliver, who is also part of the greeting committee.) White House chief of staff Andrew Card says, “Mr. President. You have a phone call from National Security Adviser Rice you need to take.” According to Putnam, Bush “says OK. [But he] goes on talking with the teacher of the year. ‘I’ll be right there.’ Card comes back to him, grabs him by the arm and says, ‘Mr. President, you need to take this call right now.’” [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 43; GW HATCHET, 4/8/2002; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/8/2002] The president then takes the call from Rice (see (9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Andrew Card, Dan Miller, Condoleezza Rice, Adam Putnam, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

8:55 a.m.-8:57 a.m. September 11, 2001: Confusion at NEADS over Identity of Plane that Hit WTC

Master Sergeant Maureen Dooley. [Source: ABC News] Rumors have started circulating through the civilian air traffic system that the plane that hit the World Trade Center was a small Cessna. There is increasing confusion on the operations floor at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) as to whether it was really Flight 11. ID tech Stacia Rountree is on the phone with Colin Scoggins, a civilian manager who is the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center. Scoggins initially seems to confirm that the plane was Flight 11, saying: “Yeah, he crashed into the World Trade Center.… [D]isregard the tail number [given earlier for American 11].” When Rountree asks, “He did crash into the World Trade Center?” Scoggins replies, “[T]hat’s what we believe, yes.” However, an unidentified male staff member at NEADS overhears, and queries: “I never heard them say American Airlines Flight 11 hit the World Trade Center. I heard it was a civilian aircraft.” Master Sergeant Maureen Dooley takes the phone from Rountree and asks Scoggins, “[A]re you giving confirmation that American 11 was the one?” Apparently contradicting what he’d previously said, Scoggins replies: “No, we’re not gonna confirm that at this time. We just know an aircraft crashed in.… The last [radar sighting] we have was about 15 miles east of JFK [International Airport in New York City], or eight miles east of JFK was our last primary hit. He did slow down in speed… and then we lost ‘em.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] This confusion will continue later on, when NEADS will be misinformed that Flight 11 is still airborne (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Stacia Rountree, Colin Scoggins, Maureen Dooley, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11

(8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001: President Bush Arrives at Elementary School for Photo-Op

Bush’s motorcade arrives at Booker Elementary School. [Source: Lions Gate Films] President Bush’s motorcade arrives at Booker Elementary School for a photo-op to promote his education policies. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/16/2001; SARASOTA MAGAZINE, 9/19/2001; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001; SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, 9/10/2002; ALBUQUERQUE TRIBUNE, 9/10/2002; ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002; WASHINGTON TIMES, 10/7/2002] If he left the Colony Resort around 8:35 a.m. as reported, the timing of his arrival at 8:55 a.m. is consistent with the fact that the trip from the resort to the school is said to take 20 minutes. The Booker Elementary School is reportedly “well-equipped for the brief presidential visit. Police and Secret Service agents [are] on the roof, on horseback and in every hallway. The White House [has] installed 49 new phone lines for staffers and reporters.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/16/2001; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/8/2002; MSNBC, 10/29/2002] Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

(8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA’s New York Center Believes Flight 175 Has Been Hijacked, but NEADS Reportedly Not Informed The head air traffic controller at the FAA’s New York Center notifies a manager at the facility that she believes Flight 175 has been hijacked. The manager tries to notify regional managers about this, but cannot reach them because they are discussing the hijacking of Flight 11 and refuse to be disturbed. However, even though the controller managing Flight 175 said, “we may have a hijack” at 8:53 a.m. (see 8:51 a.m.-8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001), the 9/11 Commission will conclude that NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) is not notified about the aircraft until 9:03 a.m. (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] The Commission’s account will conflict with previous accounts that state that NEADS was notified of the Flight 175 hijacking at 8:43 a.m. (see 8:43 a.m. September 11, 2001). The head of the New York Center, Mike McCormick, has already decided at 8:52 a.m. that Flight 175 has been hijacked and is on a suicide run to New York City (see (8:52 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 8/12/2002] Entity Tags: New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Mike McCormick Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

(8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Situation Room Director Informs President Bush of WTC Crash

Captain Deborah Loewer. [Source: Military Sealift Command] Captain Deborah Loewer, director of the White House Situation Room, is traveling in President Bush’s motorcade toward Booker Elementary School, when she learns of the first WTC crash from her deputy in the Situation Room at the White House. According to some reports, as soon as the motorcade reaches the school, Loewer runs from her car to Bush’s car, and informs Bush. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 11/26/2001; CATHOLIC TELEGRAPH, 12/7/2001] Note that Bush maintains that he learns of the crash at a later time. Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Deborah Loewer Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 77’s Transponder Signal Disappears, yet NEADS Is Not Alerted Flight 77’s transponder is turned off, meaning that the aircraft’s speed, altitude, and flight information are no longer visible on radar displays at the FAA’s Indianapolis Center. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] The Indianapolis Center air traffic controller in charge of Flight 77 watched the plane go off course and head southwest before its data disappeared from his radar screen. He looks for primary radar signals along the aircraft’s projected flight path as well as in the airspace where it had started to turn, but cannot find it. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] He tries contacting the plane repeatedly, saying “American 77, Indy,” and: “American 77, Indy, radio check. How do you read?” But there is no response. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001] NEADS Not Contacted - US News and World Report will later comment, “[E]xperts say that an airliner making a 180-degree turn followed by a transponder turnoff should have been a red flag to controllers.” It will quote Robert Cauble, a 20-year veteran of Navy air traffic control, who says: “The fact that the transponder went off, they should have picked up on that immediately. Everyone should have been on alert about what was going on.” [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 10/8/2001] Yet the Indianapolis Center supposedly does not notify NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS). According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS will only learn that Flight 77 is missing at 9:34 a.m. (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 26-27] Controller Thinks Plane Suffered Mechanical Failure - While several air traffic control centers were reportedly informed of the Flight 11 hijacking as early as 8:25 a.m. (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001), according to the 9/11 Commission, the controller handling Flight 77 does not realize other aircraft have been hijacked, and he is unaware of the situation in New York. He mistakenly assumes Flight 77 has experienced an electrical or mechanical failure. [GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] After he informs other Indianapolis Center personnel of the developing situation, they will clear all other aircraft from the plane’s westerly route so their safety will not be affected if Flight 77 is still flying along its original path but unable to be heard. [FRENI, 2003, PP. 29; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 460; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 30 ] Airline and Possibly Pentagon Learn of Flight 77 Problems - While NEADS is not alerted about the errant aircraft, a controller at the Indianapolis Center will contact American Airlines at 8:58 to inform it that contact has been lost with Flight 77 (see 8:58 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 30 ] And an article in the New York Times will indicate that the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) promptly becomes aware of the problems with Flight 77 (see (Shortly After 8:51 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/15/2001] Entity Tags: Robert Cauble, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(8:56 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Disappears from Indianapolis Center Radar Screens According to the 9/11 Commission, “Radar reconstructions performed after 9/11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked [Flight 77] from the moment its transponder was turned off at 8:56 [a.m.].” However, for eight minutes and 13 seconds, between 8:56 and 9:05, this primary radar data is not displayed to Indianapolis Center air traffic controllers. “The reasons are technical, arising from the way the software processed radar information, as well as from poor primary radar coverage where American 77 was flying.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] According to the Washington Post, Flight 77 “was hijacked in an area of limited radar coverage.” The Post adds that there are two particular types of radar system. “Secondary” radar “is the type used almost exclusively today in air traffic control. It takes an aircraft’s identification, destination, speed, and altitude from the plane’s transponder and displays it on a controller’s radar screen.” “Primary” radar, on the other hand, “is an older system. It bounces a beam off an aircraft and tells a controller only that a plane is aloft—but does not display its type or altitude. The two systems are usually mounted on the same tower.” Normally, “If a plane simply disappears from radar screens, most controllers can quickly switch on the primary system, which should display a small plus sign at the plane’s location, even if the aircraft’s transponder is not working. But the radar installation near Parkersburg, W. Va., was built with only secondary radar—called ‘beacon-only’ radar. That left the controller monitoring Flight 77 at the Indianapolis Center blind when the hijackers apparently switched off the aircraft’s transponder (see 8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001), sources said.” [WASHINGTON POST, 11/3/2001] In its final report, the 9/11 Commission will include a rather elaborate explanation for the loss of primary radar contact with Flight 77, saying it is because “the ‘preferred’ radar in this geographic area had no primary radar system, the ‘supplemental’ radar had poor primary coverage, and the FAA ATC [air traffic control] software did not allow the display of primary radar data from the ‘tertiary’ and ‘quadrary’ radars.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 460] The Commission will note that two managers at the Indianapolis Center who assist in the search on radar for the missing aircraft do “not instruct other controllers at Indianapolis Center to turn on their primary radar coverage to join in the search for American 77.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(8:56 a.m.-9:04 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Senior Commanders at Otis Air Base Learn of Attacks, Order ‘Battle Staff’

Paul Worcester. [Source: Paul Blackmore / Cape Cod Times] Senior commanders at Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, become aware of the attacks on the World Trade Center from television coverage, and one commander then orders the base’s battle staff to assemble. The commanders have just been in the first of the base’s regular Tuesday morning meetings, which ended at 8:55 a.m. They are taking a short break before the next meeting, which is scheduled for 9:00 a.m., and are apparently unaware that a plane has crashed into the WTC. Wing Commander Sees Burning WTC on Television - One of those in the meeting was Lieutenant Colonel Paul Worcester, the logistics group commander of the 102nd Fighter Wing, which is based at Otis. As Worcester walks past the break room he notices that everyone inside it is fixated on the television. He goes in to find what they are watching and gets his first sight of the coverage of the burning North Tower. Worcester finds it odd that a plane could have hit the WTC, and thinks to himself: “On such a clear day, planes don’t just go astray. That just doesn’t happen.” Although he is aware that the base’s two F-15s that are kept on alert have been scrambled in response to a suspected hijacking (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), he does not connect this with what he is seeing on television. Commanders See Second Attack - Worcester is joined in the break room by more of the senior commanders. They watch as the live television coverage shows Flight 175 crashing into the South Tower (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), and all of them then realize that America is under attack. One commander immediately shouts out, “We need to go to battle staff!” The senior commanders disperse and head toward the adjacent operations building, where they will reconvene in the battle cab of the installation operations center (see Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). A voice sounds out over the base’s loudspeakers: “The commander has ordered the 102nd core battle staff to assemble. Please report to the operations building immediately.” Unit Mobilizes for War - Subsequently, as author Lynn Spencer will describe: “Under the leadership of the [102nd Fighter] Wing commander, the various subordinate group commanders cross-brief on scramble activity, training flight issues, available munitions, personnel available to begin uploading more fighters to combat-ready status, security force increases, and more. In short, they begin to mobilize the wing for war, keeping NEADS [NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector] in the loop on their preparations.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 87-88, 153-154] Base Learned of First Hijacking 20 Minutes Earlier - The 102nd Fighter Wing of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, which is based at Otis Air Base, is responsible for protecting the Northeast United States, including New York, Washington, and Boston. Its mission includes defending the region against terrorist attacks. [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/12/2001; CAPE COD TIMES, 9/12/2001] On a typical day, it has about a dozen pilots on duty. [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/15/2001] It is equipped with 18 F-15 fighter jets, two of which are kept on 24-hour alert, ready to be in the air within five minutes of being called upon. [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/15/2001; CAPE COD TIMES, 9/21/2001] These were the two jets that launched at 8:46 a.m. in response to the hijacking of Flight 11. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] The base was notified about this first hijacking shortly after 8:34 a.m. (see (8:36 a.m.-8:41) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 27-28] Why the senior commanders did not initiate their crisis response at that time is unclear. Entity Tags: Paul Worcester, Otis Air National Guard Base Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(8:56 a.m.-9:04 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Senior Commanders at Otis Air Base Learn of Attacks, Order ‘Battle Staff’

Paul Worcester. [Source: Paul Blackmore / Cape Cod Times] Senior commanders at Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, become aware of the attacks on the World Trade Center from television coverage, and one commander then orders the base’s battle staff to assemble. The commanders have just been in the first of the base’s regular Tuesday morning meetings, which ended at 8:55 a.m. They are taking a short break before the next meeting, which is scheduled for 9:00 a.m., and are apparently unaware that a plane has crashed into the WTC. Wing Commander Sees Burning WTC on Television - One of those in the meeting was Lieutenant Colonel Paul Worcester, the logistics group commander of the 102nd Fighter Wing, which is based at Otis. As Worcester walks past the break room he notices that everyone inside it is fixated on the television. He goes in to find what they are watching and gets his first sight of the coverage of the burning North Tower. Worcester finds it odd that a plane could have hit the WTC, and thinks to himself: “On such a clear day, planes don’t just go astray. That just doesn’t happen.” Although he is aware that the base’s two F-15s that are kept on alert have been scrambled in response to a suspected hijacking (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), he does not connect this with what he is seeing on television. Commanders See Second Attack - Worcester is joined in the break room by more of the senior commanders. They watch as the live television coverage shows Flight 175 crashing into the South Tower (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), and all of them then realize that America is under attack. One commander immediately shouts out, “We need to go to battle staff!” The senior commanders disperse and head toward the adjacent operations building, where they will reconvene in the battle cab of the installation operations center (see Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). A voice sounds out over the base’s loudspeakers: “The commander has ordered the 102nd core battle staff to assemble. Please report to the operations building immediately.” Unit Mobilizes for War - Subsequently, as author Lynn Spencer will describe: “Under the leadership of the [102nd Fighter] Wing commander, the various subordinate group commanders cross-brief on scramble activity, training flight issues, available munitions, personnel available to begin uploading more fighters to combat-ready status, security force increases, and more. In short, they begin to mobilize the wing for war, keeping NEADS [NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector] in the loop on their preparations.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 87-88, 153-154] Base Learned of First Hijacking 20 Minutes Earlier - The 102nd Fighter Wing of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, which is based at Otis Air Base, is responsible for protecting the Northeast United States, including New York, Washington, and Boston. Its mission includes defending the region against terrorist attacks. [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/12/2001; CAPE COD TIMES, 9/12/2001] On a typical day, it has about a dozen pilots on duty. [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/15/2001] It is equipped with 18 F-15 fighter jets, two of which are kept on 24-hour alert, ready to be in the air within five minutes of being called upon. [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/15/2001; CAPE COD TIMES, 9/21/2001] These were the two jets that launched at 8:46 a.m. in response to the hijacking of Flight 11. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] The base was notified about this first hijacking shortly after 8:34 a.m. (see (8:36 a.m.-8:41) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 27-28] Why the senior commanders did not initiate their crisis response at that time is unclear. Entity Tags: Paul Worcester, Otis Air National Guard Base Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001: Attendant Supposedly Makes Second Call from Flight 175; United Airlines Concludes Otherwise According to GTE Airfone records, an attendant on Flight 175 makes a call to the United Airlines maintenance office in San Francisco at this time, but the employee who would have answered it denies this. The call is supposedly made using an Airfone in row 31 at the back of the plane, and lasts 31 seconds. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 90-91 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] A Flight 175 attendant, possibly Robert Fangman, called the maintenance office four minutes earlier and spoke with employee Marc Policastro (see 8:52 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 7] But Policastro, who would have also answered this second call had it occurred, later recalls only one communication from the flight. United Airlines investigators will conclude that only one call is received. According to Airfone records, a third call from Flight 175 to the maintenance office is attempted a minute later, at 8:57, but this fails to connect. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 90-91 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] Entity Tags: Marc Policastro, Robert Fangman Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(8:57 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Fire Department Advice to Evacuate WTC Tower Fails to Reach People Inside

People inside the World Trade Center flee down a stairway. [Source: Shannon Stapleton] By 8:57 a.m., fire department commanders at WTC Tower One advise Port Authority police and building personnel to evacuate Tower Two. According to the 9/11 Commission, the reason for this is not concern of a possible second plane, but because the fire chiefs judge the impact of the plane into the North Tower to have made the entire WTC complex unsafe. However, there is no evidence that this advice is communicated effectively to the building personnel in Tower Two. When an announcement is made to evacuate at 9:02 a.m. (one minute before the building is hit), it does not direct everyone to evacuate, and advises only that everyone may wish to start an orderly evacuation if warranted by conditions on their floor. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/19/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 287 AND 290] Entity Tags: World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175, World Trade Center

8:57 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Turns toward New York City Flight 175, now in descent, briefly levels off at 28,500 feet and starts turning northeast. A minute later, it resumes its descent as it heads toward New York City. [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 22 ] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

8:57 a.m. September 11, 2001: Jet Fuel in North Tower Burns Up The jet fuel that spilled from Flight 11 when it hit the North Tower (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) has mostly burned up by this time. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which investigates the collapses, will say “The initial jet fuel fires themselves lasted at most a few minutes.” [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 183 ] Engineering professor Forman Williams will say the jet fuel “burned for maybe 10 minutes.” [POPULAR MECHANICS, 3/2005] Flight 11, a Boeing 767, had a fuel capacity of 23,980 gallons, but was only carrying about 10,000 gallons when it hit the WTC. NIST will estimate that less than 1,500 gallons were consumed in a fireball inside the tower and a comparable amount was consumed in the fireballs outside the building. Therefore, approximately 7,000 gallons splashed onto the office furnishings and started fires on various floors. However, after the jet fuel is used up, office fires burn until the building collapses. NIST will calculate that there were about four pounds per square foot of combustibles in the office space, or about 60 tons per floor. Offices in the WTC actually have fewer combustibles than some other similar spaces due to the small number of interior walls and limited bookshelf space. NIST will later find that only three of sixteen perimeter columns it recovers reached a temperature of 250°C and neither of the two core columns it retrieves reached this temperature. NIST will also find that none of the samples it acquires reaches a temperature above 600°C (see August 27, 2003). Although steel does not melt until its temperature is about 1,600°C, it may begin to lose significant strength at over 500°C. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 20, 29, 24, 77 ] The jet fuel will also burn up in the South Tower about 10 minutes after it is hit (see 9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Forman Williams, World Trade Center, National Institute of Standards and Technology Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center

(8:57 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Air Traffic Controllers Watch Flight 175 on Radar as It Heads into New York

Flight 175 an instant before it hits the WTC South Tower. [Source: Associated Press] About a half-dozen air traffic controllers at the FAA’s New York Center in Ronkonkoma, NY, watch Flight 175 on the radar screen in its final minutes, as it approaches Manhattan. [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 ; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Flight 175 is marked on the screen with the letter “I” for “intruder.” Initially, those at the center think it might be heading for Newark Airport, maybe for an emergency landing there. But controller Jim Bohleber says, “No, he’s too fast and low, he’ll never make Newark.” [NEWSDAY, 9/10/2002] The controllers start speculating what Flight 175 is aiming for, with one of them guessing the Statue of Liberty. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] They are astonished at the extraordinary rate at which it is descending (see (8:58 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). A controller counts down its altitude, “Eight, six, four” thousand feet, and then says, “My god, he’s in the ground in the next step.” But someone else at the center says, “No, that’s the Trade Center right there.” [THE LEARNING CHANNEL, 2005] But, according to the 9/11 Commission, the New York Center does not notify NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) about Flight 175 until 9:03 a.m., the same time as it crashes into the South Tower (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 23] Workers at the crisis center at United Airlines’ headquarters outside Chicago, also closely watch Flight 175 head into New York City on radar. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Entity Tags: New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Jim Bohleber Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

8:58 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Passenger Says Passengers Want to Do Something about Hijacking

Brian Sweeney. [Source: Family photo] Brian Sweeney, a passenger on Flight 175, calls his wife, but can only leave a message. “We’ve been hijacked, and it doesn’t look too good.” Then he calls his mother and tells her what is happening onboard. [HYANNIS NEWS, 9/13/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/21/2001] She recalls him saying, “They might come back here. I might have to go. We are going to try to do something about this.” She also recalls him identifying the hijackers as Middle Eastern. Then he tells his mother he loves her and hangs up the phone. The mother turns on the television and soon sees Flight 175 crash into the WTC. The 9/11 Commission later concludes that the Flight 175 passengers planned to storm the cockpit but did not have time before the plane crashed. [NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, 3/9/2004; CNN, 3/10/2004] Entity Tags: Brian Sweeney Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

8:58 a.m. September 11, 2001: Indianapolis Center Informs American Airlines of Loss of Contact with Flight 77 An air traffic controller at the FAA’s Indianapolis Center contacts the American Airlines dispatch office in Texas, and informs it that contact has been lost with Flight 77. The controller is a sector radar associate, whose job is to help with hand-offs and to coordinate with other sectors and facilities. He speaks to American Airlines dispatcher Jim McDonnell. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 30 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 63] The controller begins, “This is Indianapolis Center trying to get a hold of American 77.” McDonnell asks for clarification, “Who you trying to get a hold of?” and the controller replies: “American 77.… On frequency 120.27.… We were talking to him and all of a sudden it just, uh…” McDonnell interjects: “Okay, all right. We’ll get a hold of him for you.” The call comes to an abrupt end and the controller then continues trying to contact Flight 77. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 63-64] Soon after this call, American Airlines’ executive vice president of operations, Gerard Arpey, will give an order to stop all American flight takeoffs in the Northeast US (see Between 9:00 a.m. and 9:10 a.m. September 11, 2001). By 8:59 a.m., American Airlines begins attempts to contact Flight 77 using ACARS (a digital communications system used primarily for aircraft-to-airline messages). Within minutes, some time between 9:00 a.m. and 9:10 a.m., American will get word that United Airlines also has lost contact with a missing airliner (presumably Flight 175). When reports of the second WTC crash come through after 9:03 a.m., one manager will mistakenly shout, “How did 77 get to New York and we didn’t know it?” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 454; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31 ] The sector radar associate at the Indianapolis Center will call American Airlines again about Flight 77 at 9:02, and again speak with McDonnell (see 9:02 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001] Entity Tags: American Airlines, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center, Jim McDonnell Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(8:58 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Controllers Watch Flight 175 Descending 10,000 Feet per Minute Air traffic controllers at the FAA’s New York Center who are watching Flight 175 on the radar screen (see (8:57 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001) see the aircraft descending at an astonishing rate of up to 10,000 feet per minute. [THE LEARNING CHANNEL, 2005] From 8:58 a.m., Flight 175 is constantly descending toward New York. [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 ] One of the New York Center controllers, Jim Bohleber, is looking at his radar scope and calls out the plane’s rate of descent every 12 seconds, each time the screen updates, saying: “It’s six thousand feet a minute. Now it’s eight. Now ten.” [NEWSDAY, 9/10/2002; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Dave Bottiglia, the controller responsible for monitoring Flight 175, will later comment that 10,000 feet per minute is “absolutely unheard of for a commercial jet. It is unbelievable for the passengers in the back to withstand that type of force as they’re descending. [The hijackers are] actually nosing the airplane down and doing what I would call a ‘power dive.’” [THE LEARNING CHANNEL, 2005] While Flight 175 is in this rapid descent, it heads directly into the paths of several other aircraft, and narrowly avoids a mid-air collision with flight Midex 7 (see (9:01 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 73-76] Entity Tags: Dave Bottiglia, Jim Bohleber, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Acting Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Learns of First Crash from Television

Air Force General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and acting chairman on 9/11. [Source: NORAD] According to his own account, Air Force General Richard Myers, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sees reports of the first WTC crash on television. Myers is acting chairman of the US military during the 9/11 crisis because Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army General Henry Shelton is flying across the Atlantic for a NATO meeting in Europe. [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002; AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 9/8/2006] Myers has a 9 o’clock appointment with Senator Max Cleland (D) in one of the Senate office buildings. He is heading into this meeting and sees a television in Cleland’s outer office showing the burning North Tower, with the commentator suggesting it has been hit by an airplane. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Myers later recalls, “They thought it was a small plane or something like that.” [ARMED FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION SERVICE, 10/17/2001; AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 10/23/2001] He says, “And we’re standing around saying, ‘What in the world happened?’ I remember the day being beautiful. I said, ‘How could a pilot be that stupid, to hit a tower? I mean, what’—but then you think, ‘Well, whatever.’” So he goes ahead and walks into the meeting, and is with Cleland at the time the second tower is hit (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 6/29/2006] On several occasions, Cleland will confirm that Myers had this meeting with him. [US CONGRESS, 9/13/2001; CNN, 11/20/2001; ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, 6/16/2003] But counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke seems to contradict this account. He claims that, when he joins a video teleconference shortly after arriving at the White House, he sees Myers on screen, indicating that Myers is at the Pentagon rather than with Cleland (see (9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 1-3] Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Henry Hugh Shelton, Max Cleland, Richard B. Myers Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska Is Directing Global Guardian Training Exercise

Admiral Richard Mies. [Source: Public domain] Offutt Air Force Base, near Omaha, Nebraska, appears to be the headquarters of the US Strategic Command (Stratcom) exercise Global Guardian that is “in full swing” when the 9/11 attacks begin (see 8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). At least the director of the exercise, Admiral Richard Mies, commander in chief of Stratcom, is at Offutt this morning. Because of Global Guardian, bombers, missile crews, and submarines around America are all being directed from Stratcom’s command center, a steel and concrete reinforced bunker below Offutt. [BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 11/12/1997; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2/21/2002; OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 2/27/2002; BBC, 9/1/2002; OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 9/10/2002] This bunker is staffed with top personnel and they are at a heightened security mode because of the exercise. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2/21/2002; AIR FORCE WEATHER OBSERVER, 7/2002 ] 'Doomsday' Planes Airborne for Exercise - Because of Global Guardian, three special military command aircraft with sophisticated communications equipment, based at Offutt, are up in the air this morning. These E-4B National Airborne Operations Center planes—nicknamed “Doomsday” planes during the Cold War—are intended to control nuclear forces from the air in times of crisis. They are capable of acting as alternative command posts for top government officials from where they can direct US forces, execute war orders and coordinate the actions of civil authorities in times of national emergency. The federal advisory committee (whose chairman is retired Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft) is aboard one of these Doomsday planes, being brought to Offutt to observe the exercise. Global Guardian will reportedly be put on pause at 9:11 a.m. (see 9:11 a.m. September 11, 2001), but not formally terminated until 10:44 a.m. (see (10:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and the battle staff at Offutt will switch to “real-world mode” once the attacks are apparent. However, even after Global Guardian is called off, the three E-4Bs will remain airborne. Also this morning, a small group of business leaders are at Offutt because of a charity fundraiser event due to take place later in the day, hosted by the multi-billionaire Warren Buffett (see (8:45 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 2/27/2002; AIR FORCE WEATHER OBSERVER, 7/2002 ; BBC, 9/1/2002; OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 9/8/2002; BOMBARDIER, 9/8/2006 ] Entity Tags: Brent Scowcroft, US Strategic Command, Global Guardian, Federal Advisory Committee, Richard Mies Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Two Otis Fighters Prepared for Training Mission over Ocean Weapons supervisor Jeff Isch’s team in the 102nd Fighter Wing at Otis Air National Guard Base, Cape Cod, Massachusetts, finishes loading dummy missiles onto two fighter jets that are going to fly a training mission over the Atlantic Ocean. Shortly after the second World Trade Center tower is hit at 9:03 a.m., the pilots will be called back. [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/8/2002] Six Jets Training over the Ocean - Around 15 minutes after the second crash, six fighters from Otis that are training over the Atlantic will be recalled to base (see (9:15 a.m.-9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/11/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 155] It is unclear whether these jets include the two that Isch’s team has prepared for takeoff, or whether those two aircraft have not yet taken off at the time the second tower is hit and their pilots are recalled. At 8:46 a.m., two F-15s launched from Otis in response to the first hijacking, of Flight 11 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] One of the pilots of those F-15s, Daniel Nash, is reportedly standing in for the usual “alert” pilot, who is “scheduled for training” on this day. [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002] Unit's Mission Is to Protect Northeast US - According to its own statement, the 102nd Fighter Wing at Otis Air Base has aircraft and their crews “on continuous 24-hour, 365-day alert to guard our skies.” It says its “mission is to protect the Northeast United States from armed attack from another nation, terrorist attack, and activities such as smuggling, illicit drug activity, and illegal immigration.” Its large area of responsibility includes “the major industrial centers of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Detroit, and all national command centers in Washington, DC.” [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/12/2001] The 102nd Fighter Wing is equipped with 18 F-15 Eagles, two of which are kept on 24-hour alert, ready to be in the air within five minutes (these were the two aircraft launched in response to Flight 11). [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/15/2001; CAPE COD TIMES, 9/21/2001] Entity Tags: 102nd Fighter Wing, Jeff Isch Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

8:59 a.m.-9:02 a.m. September 11, 2001: Orders Given to Evacuate WTC Buildings, But Not Heard by Fire Safety Director At 8:59 a.m., the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) commanding officer of the World Trade Center complex calls for the evacuation of the North Tower and the South Tower, saying, “As soon as we’re able, I want to start a building evacuation, building one and building two, till we find out what caused this.” Thirty seconds later, the officer repeats his order, but this time calls for all the buildings in the WTC complex to be evacuated. At 9:02, he repeats this, saying, “Evacuate all buildings in the complex. You copy? All buildings in the complex.” However, his order is given over WTC police radio channel W, which cannot be heard by the deputy fire safety director in the South Tower. [BERGEN RECORD, 8/29/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 293; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 28, 32 AND 200-202 ] Entity Tags: World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Learns about Flight 175 Hijacking

Jim Goodwin. [Source: Chicago Tribune] Rich Miles, the manager at the United Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center just outside Chicago, receives a call from a supervisor at United’s maintenance office in San Francisco, informing him that Flight 175 has been reported as hijacked. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 22 ] The maintenance office received a call minutes earlier from a flight attendant on United 175, who said their plane had been hijacked (see 8:52 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 7-8] When the supervisor tells Miles about this, he initially responds, “No, the information we’re getting is that it was an American 757.” (The FAA has just informed United Airlines that the plane that hit the World Trade Center was a hijacked American Airlines 757 (see (Shortly After 8:48 a.m.) September 11, 2001).) But the supervisor insists, “No, we got a call from a flight attendant on 175.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001] Miles notifies his boss Bill Roy, the SOC director, about this information. Roy then contacts United’s CEO Jim Goodwin and its chief operating officer Andy Studdert, who are in a meeting at the airline’s headquarters, located next to the SOC. Roy then begins the process of activating the crisis center at the United headquarters, which will take about 30 minutes to complete. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 22 ] Entity Tags: Andy Studdert, Jim Goodwin, Rich Miles, United Airlines, Bill Roy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Army Base Outside New York Prepares for Terrorist Attack Exercise Staff at Fort Monmouth, an Army base in New Jersey located about 50 miles south of New York City, is preparing to hold a “disaster drill” to test emergency response capabilities to a fake chemical attack. The exercise, called Timely Alert II, is to involve various law enforcement agencies and emergency personnel, including Fort Monmouth firefighters and members of the New Jersey State Police. Personnel are to be deployed and measures taken as in a real emergency. A notice has been sent out, warning that anyone not conducting official business will be turned away from Fort Monmouth during the exercise. Soon after 9 a.m., the exercise director tells a group of participating volunteers that a hijacked plane has crashed into the World Trade Center. The participants pretend to be upset, believing this is just part of the simulation. When they see the live televised footage of the WTC attacks, some people at the base think it is an elaborate training video to accompany the exercise. One worker tells a fire department training officer: “You really outdid yourself this time.” Interestingly, the follow-up exercise held in July 2002 (Timely Alert III) does incorporate simulated television news reports to give participants the impression that the emergency is real. And in the first Timely Alert exercise, held on the base in January 2001, a call had come through of a supposed “real” bomb situation, but this “fortunately turned out to be a report related to a training aid being used during the exercise.” On 9/11, Fort Monmouth is geared to go into high-alert status as part of Timely Alert II. The exercise is called off once the base is alerted to the real attacks. [MONMOUTH MESSAGE, 2/9/2001; HUB, 9/21/2001; MONMOUTH MESSAGE, 9/21/2001; ASBURY PARK PRESS, 7/24/2002; MONMOUTH MESSAGE, 8/23/2002; US DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, 7/26/2003 ; MONMOUTH MESSAGE, 9/12/2003] Fort Monmouth is home to various Army, Defense Department, and other government agencies. The largest of these is the US Army’s Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM). CECOM serves to “develop, acquire, field, and sustain superior information technologies and integrated systems for America’s warfighters.” It is tasked with the “critical role of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).” [COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS COMMAND, 4/17/2002; US DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, 1/2003 ; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 2/12/2006] Fort Monmouth services also directly assist in the emergency response later in the day. Its fire department deploys to Atlantic Highlands to assist passengers coming from Manhattan by ferry, and members of its Patterson Army Health Clinic are also sent out to help. Teams of CECOM experts from the base are later deployed to ground zero in New York with equipment capable of locating cellular phone transmissions within the ruins of the collapsed World Trade Center. Its explosive ordnance company is also deployed to assist authorities should they come across anything they think might be explosives, while digging through the debris in search of victims. [HUB, 9/21/2001; MONMOUTH MESSAGE, 9/21/2001] Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Army’s Communications-Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, Timely Alert II Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

(10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 93’s Autopilot Turned Off; Alarms Sound
Based on information from the plane’s flight data recorder, the National Transportation Safety Board will later determine that Flight 93’s autopilot is turned off at “about 10:00,” and remains off for the flight’s final minutes. [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/13/2002 ] Phil Bradshaw, whose wife is an attendant on Flight 93, will later hear the plane’s cockpit voice recording. Being a pilot himself, he recognizes on it the sound of the alarm that goes off when the autopilot is disconnected. [NEWS AND RECORD (PIEDMONT TRIAD, NC), 9/11/2002] CNN’s Kelli Arena will hear the recording during the 2006 Zacarias Moussaoui trial and will report that, shortly after this alarm sounds, “Another alarm goes off.” [CNN, 4/12/2006] According to journalist and author Jere Longman, as well as the alarm set off when the autopilot was disconnected, another alarm “would have sounded because the plane was traveling at five hundred seventy-five miles an hour in the final minutes, far exceeding the design limits of four hundred twenty-five miles an hour below twenty thousand feet and two hundred eighty-seven miles an hour below ten thousand feet.” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 208] So presumably this is the second alarm described by Arena. Entity Tags: National Transportation Safety Board, Jere Longman, Kelli Arena, Phil Bradshaw Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Langley Pilots Hear Warning that Planes Could Be Shot Down; Ordered to Protect the White House The pilots that took off from Langley Air Force Base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) hear a warning over radio that errant aircraft will be shot down, and receive an instruction from the Secret Service to protect the White House. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 222-223] Pilots Learn of FAA Order - The three Langley fighter jets have now reached the Baltimore-Washington area. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 222] The pilots hear over their radios that the FAA has ordered all civilian aircraft to land. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001] (The FAA issued this instruction at around 9:45 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US CONGRESS. HOUSE. COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 9/21/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 29] ) Borgstrom Hears Shootdown Warning - The three pilots are all on different radio frequencies, but are able to communicate between themselves on their auxiliary frequency. According to author Lynn Spencer, one of them, Captain Craig Borgstrom, hears a message over the emergency radio frequency that is in response to the FAA’s recent order: “Attention all aircraft! Attention all aircraft! You are ordered to land at the nearest suitable airport. All aircraft must land immediately. Violators will be shot down.” The source of this message is unstated. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 66; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 222-223] (Author Leslie Filson will describe the Langley pilots hearing what is apparently a separate but similar message later on, some time after 10:42 a.m. (see 10:05 a.m.-11:05 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 82] ) Instructed to Protect the White House - Around the time Borgstrom hears this, Major Dean Eckmann, the lead Langley pilot, is on the radio with the FAA’s Washington Center. A Secret Service agent has arrived there and wants to talk to him. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 68; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 222-223] Eckmann then receives a garbled message over his radio, which is difficult to make out. [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/15/2001] The message is, “Protect the house.” Eckmann will later recall, “I took it to mean protect the White House.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 68] He notifies the two other pilots—Borgstrom and Major Brad Derrig—of this message. He tells them, “I think I just talked to the Secret Service, but I’m not sure.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/15/2001] Possible Shootdown Order? - According to Spencer, this message means that “Unknown to NEADS” (NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector), Eckmann has been “given shootdown authority directly from the Secret Service, bypassing the military chain of command.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 223] But Borgstrom and Derrig will later say they “never received explicit orders to fire on incoming planes perceived to be hostile.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/15/2001] Borgstrom radios NEADS weapons director Steve Citino and asks for specific instructions about what to do (see 10:07 a.m. September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 223] According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS will only learn that NORAD has been given clearance to shoot down threatening aircraft at 10:31 a.m., and even then it does not pass this order along to the fighter pilots under its command (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42-43] Entity Tags: Brad Derrig, Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center, Craig Borgstrom, Dean Eckmann, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Transponder Gives Brief Signal The transponder for Flight 93 briefly turns back on. The plane is at 7,000 feet. The transponder stays on until about 10:03 a.m. It is unclear why the transponder signal briefly returns. [GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Alert Fighters at Tyndall Air Base Do Not Launch to Escort Air Force One

Logo of the 148th Fighter Wing. [Source: Air National Guard] Although the White House has requested a fighter escort for Air Force One (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001), fighter jets that are kept on alert at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida reportedly fail to launch in order to accompany the president’s plane after it takes off from Sarasota, Florida (see (9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 87; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/4/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 38] Fighters on 'Battle Stations' but Not Launched - The 148th Fighter Wing of the Minnesota Air National Guard has a full time active duty detachment at Tyndall Air Force Base, near Panama City. [FILSON, 1999; US AIR FORCE, 2004; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 8/21/2005] This unit serves as one of NORAD’s seven “alert” sites around the US, which all have a pair of fighter jets on the runway, armed, fueled, and ready to take off within minutes if called upon. [AIRMAN, 12/1999; AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, 2/2002; BERGEN RECORD, 12/5/2003] But, according to the 1st Air Force’s book about 9/11, although NORAD’s Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS) puts the alert jets at Tyndall on “battle stations,” it does not launch them. The jets’ pilots sit “in their cockpits awaiting word to go, but Air Force One moved so quickly they were never scrambled.” Instead, F-16s from Ellington Field in Texas are scrambled, and escort Air Force One to Barksdale Air Force Base (see (After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (11:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 87] However, in a 2002 interview, Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region, will claim that after NORAD is told “just to follow the president” on Air Force One, it “scrambled available airplanes from Tyndall and then from Ellington in Houston, Texas. The Ellington F-16s chased Air Force One and landed with the president at Barksdale AFB in Louisiana.” [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002] Other Alert Fighters in Florida Not Launched - NORAD also keeps two fighters on alert at Homestead Air Reserve Base, near Miami, Florida, but it is unclear whether these are scrambled after Air Force One, and apparently they never accompany the president’s plane (see (10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Philip Melanson, an expert on the Secret Service, will later comment: “I can’t imagine by what glitch the protection was not provided to Air Force One as soon as it took off. I would have thought there’d be something in place whereby one phone call from the head of the security detail would get the fighters in the air immediately.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 87; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/4/2004] Entity Tags: Southeast Air Defense Sector, Larry Arnold, 148th Fighter Wing Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Hijackers Respond to Passenger Revolt According to the 9/11 Commission, the hijacker pilot of Flight 93, presumably Ziad Jarrah, has been rolling the plane sharply to the left and right in an attempt to prevent passengers from reaching the cockpit. At this time, he stabilizes the plane and asks another hijacker, “Is that it? Shall we finish it off?” Another voice answers, “No. Not yet. When they all come, we finish it off.” The pilot starts pitching the nose of the airplane up and down. A few seconds later a passenger’s voice can be heard saying, “In the cockpit. If we don’t we’ll die!” Another voice says, “Roll it!” which some speculate could be a reference to pushing a foot cart into the cockpit door. By 10:01, the pilot stops the pitching and says, “Allah o akbar! Allah o akbar!” (“God is great”), then asks, “Is that it? I mean, shall we put it down?” Another hijacker responds, “Yes, put it in it, and pull it down.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 7/22/2004; SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 7/23/2004] Entity Tags: Ziad Jarrah Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Fighters Possibly Scrambled from Florida Air Base toward Air Force One, but Apparently Do Not Reach It

An F-15 Eagle from the 125th Fighter Wing. [Source: Shaun Withers / US Air Force] Fighter jets belonging to a military unit in Jacksonville, Florida, launch to escort Air Force One after it takes off from Sarasota, Florida (see (9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001), some accounts will later indicate. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/16/2001; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001] However, other accounts will indicate that these jets, if launched, never reach the president’s plane. [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002; CBS NEWS, 9/10/2003; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 255] Fighters Reportedly Launched - The New York Times will report that at 10:41 a.m., Air Force One is “headed toward Jacksonville to meet jets scrambled to give the presidential jet its own air cover.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/16/2001] And, according to a report in the Daily Telegraph, after Air Force One climbs to 40,000 feet, it is “joined by an escort of F-16 fighters from a base near Jacksonville.” [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001] These reports are presumably referring to jets belonging to the 125th Fighter Wing, a unit of the Florida Air National Guard located at Jacksonville International Airport. The wing keeps two F-15s on alert at Homestead Air Reserve Base, near Miami, ready for immediate takeoff, as part of NORAD’s air sovereignty mission. [AIRMAN, 12/1999; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 8/21/2005; FLORIDA AIR NATIONAL GUARD, 2009] Fighters Likely Launched from Homestead - If 125th Fighter Wing jets are scrambled to accompany Air Force One, it appears they would be the unit’s F-15s on alert at Homestead, rather than its fighters at Jacksonville Airport. Major Charles Chambers, who is at the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, will state within a week of the attacks, “Fighters had been scrambled from Homestead [Air Reserve Base] and were escorting Air Force One westward.” [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 9/2001] In contrast, at Jacksonville International Airport, according to a 2007 report in the Florida Times-Union, “Within hours of the 2001 terrorist attacks, the wing’s aircraft were sitting on a JIA runway ready for the order to scramble.” [FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, 9/15/2007] And an account published by the Florida Air National Guard will only say, “On Sept. 11, 2001, several loaded F-15 aircraft lined Runway 13/31 [at Jacksonville Airport] for the first time in history.” [EAGLE'S EYE, 2007 ] Fighters Apparently Do Not Reach Air Force One - Most accounts will contradict Chambers’ claim that, if indeed 125th Fighter Wing jets are scrambled toward the president’s plane, they are subsequently “escorting Air Force One westward.” According to the 1st Air Force’s book about 9/11, it is in fact “[f]our F-16s from the 147th Fighter Wing, Texas Air National Guard,” that accompany Air Force One “from the panhandle of Florida to Barksdale Air Force Base.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 87] CBS News will report that the first fighters to reach Air Force One are two F-16s from the 147th Fighter Wing (see (11:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CBS NEWS, 9/10/2003; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 255] And Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region, will only say that 147th Fighter Wing F-16s “chased Air Force One and landed with the president at Barksdale AFB in Louisiana,” making no mention of any 125th Fighter Wing jets being scrambled. [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002] At NORAD’s other alert site in Florida besides Homestead—a unit at Tyndall Air Force Base—the two alert fighters are put on “battle stations,” but apparently do not take off to escort Air Force One (see (10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 87] Entity Tags: Larry Arnold, 125th Fighter Wing, Charles Chambers Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

(Between 10:00 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: President Bush and Vice President Cheney Said to Confer on Shootdown Orders; 9/11 Commission Later Doubts Their Account

Dick Cheney talking to Condoleezza Rice. [Source: David Bohrer / White House] (click image to enlarge) According to the 9/11 Commission, Vice President Dick Cheney is told that the Air Force is trying to establish a combat air patrol (CAP) over Washington. Cheney, who is in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House, then calls President Bush on Air Force One to discuss the rules of engagement for this CAP. Cheney later tells the 9/11 Commission that he’d felt “it did no good to establish the CAP unless the pilots had instructions on whether they were authorized to shoot if the plane would not divert.” He recalls that “the president signed off on that concept.” Bush will recall this phone call and emphasize to the 9/11 Commission that, during it, he had authorized the shootdown of hijacked aircraft. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, who is in the PEOC with Cheney, will tell the Commission she recalls hearing Cheney inform the president: “Sir, the CAPs are up. Sir, they’re going to want to know what to do.” Then she hears Cheney say, “Yes sir.” However, as the Commission will later note, “Among the sources that reflect other important events that morning there is no documentary evidence for this call, although the relevant sources are incomplete” (see (Mid 2004)). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 40-41] Reportedly, some members of the Commission’s staff will not believe this call between Bush and Cheney ever took place. [NEWSWEEK, 6/20/2004] Cheney phones Bush at 10:18 (see 10:18 a.m.-10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001). According to the 9/11 Commission, it is in fact during that call that Bush authorizes the military to shoot down threatening aircraft. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 41] Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, George Bush, Dick Cheney

(10:00 a.m.-10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Returns to the Pentagon; Speaks to President Bush and Temporarily Joins White House Teleconference Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld returns from the Pentagon crash site “by shortly before or after 10:00 a.m.” Then he has “one or more calls in my office, one of which was with the president,” according to his testimony before the 9/11 Commission. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/23/2004] The commission later concludes that Rumsfeld’s call with President Bush has little impact: “No one can recall any content beyond a general request to alert forces.” The possibility of shooting down hijacked planes is not mentioned. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Rumsfeld then goes to the Executive Support Center (ESC) located near his office, arriving there at around 10:15 a.m. In the ESC already are Stephen Cambone, Rumsfeld’s closest aide, Larry Di Rita, Rumsfeld’s personal chief of staff, and Victoria Clarke, the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs. Rumsfeld had instructed Di Rita and Clarke to go to the ESC and wait for him there when they’d come to his office soon after the second WTC tower was hit at 9:03 A.M. (see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Presently, Rumsfeld gives them their first confirmation that a plane hit the Pentagon, saying, “I’m quite sure it was a plane and I’m pretty sure it’s a large plane.” According to Clarke, he pulls out a yellow legal pad and writes down three categories, “by which his thinking would be organized the rest of the day: what we needed to do immediately, what would have to be underway quickly, and what the military response would be.” [CLARKE, 2006, PP. 221-222; COCKBURN, 2007, PP. 5-6] The Executive Support Center has secure video facilities, and while there, Rumsfeld participates in the White House video teleconference. This is the video conference that counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke claims Rumsfeld is a part of much of the morning (see (9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Then at around 10:30 a.m., he moves on to the National Military Command Center NMCC, located next door to the ESC (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON TIMES, 2/23/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 43-44] Those in the NMCC are apparently unaware of Rumsfeld’s whereabouts during the half-hour from 10 a.m. to 10:30 a.m.: Brigadier General Montague Winfield later recalls, “For 30 minutes we couldn’t find him. And just as we began to worry, he walked into the door of the [NMCC].” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: National Military Command Center, Stephen A. Cambone, Victoria Clarke, Richard A. Clarke, George W. Bush, Larry DiRita, Donald Rumsfeld, Executive Support Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Donald Rumsfeld, Pentagon

(10:00 a.m.-6:30 p.m.) September 11, 2001: Members of Congress at Police Headquarters Poorly Informed, Receive Few Details about Security Situation Members of Congress who are assembled at the headquarters of the Capitol Police in Washington, DC receive regular briefings from police officers, but these reveal little more than what is being reported in the news. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001] After being evacuated from the Capitol building, many members of Congress go to the Capitol Police headquarters, located a block and a half away (see (9:55 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001). [DASCHLE AND D'ORSO, 2003, PP. 110-112] Throughout the day, several hundred of them go there, though some Congressional leaders are moved to a secure bunker outside Washington around late morning or early afternoon (see (Between Late Morning and Early Afternoon) September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002; CNN, 9/11/2002] According to Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D), the police headquarters becomes “Congress’s central command center for the rest of the day.” [DASCHLE AND D'ORSO, 2003, PP. 112] But, CNN will report, “In a place where power means knowing things, nobody knew very much.” Deputy Chief James Rohan of the Capitol Police later describes, “There was somebody [at the headquarters] had brought out a little four inch black and white TV with just an antenna stick on it, plugged it in, and they were getting all their information from the networks from this tiny little TV.” [CNN, 9/11/2002] The Senate and House members at the headquarters receive hourly briefings from Capitol Police officers. But, according to the Washington Post, “lawmakers privately described the sessions as ‘rudimentary,’ offering few details beyond published reports.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001] According to Daschle, who is among those moved to the secure bunker outside Washington, members of Congress who remain at the police headquarters spend the day “crammed into several conference rooms and offices, working the telephones and watching the TV monitors for developing news,” though he gives no specific details of what they do. [DASCHLE AND D'ORSO, 2003, PP. 112] Late in the afternoon, about 50 of them speak by phone with the Congressional leaders at the secure bunker (see (5:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001), and during the evening, many of them will join the leaders on the steps of the Capitol building for a press conference (see 7:24 p.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Capitol Police (Washington, DC), James Rohan, Tom Daschle Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Between 10:00 a.m. and 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Vice President Bush Supposedly Speaks with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld about Shootdown Procedure, but Accounts Conflict According to some accounts, just after President Bush authorizes the military to shoot down threatening aircraft, he speaks with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld about this. According to the Washington Post, Bush gave the shootdown authorization after taking off on Air Force One (see (Shortly After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). He then talks “to Rumsfeld to clarify the procedures military pilots should follow in trying to force an unresponsive plane to the ground before opening fire on it. First, pilots would seek to make radio contact with the other plane and tell the pilot to land at a specific location. If that failed, the pilots were to use visual signals. These included having the fighters fly in front of the other plane. If the plane continued heading toward what was seen as a significant target with apparently hostile intent, the US pilot would have the authority to shoot it down.” [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] Journalist and author Bill Sammon gives a similar account, saying that, having spoken with Cheney soon after Air Force One took off, Bush “then explained the shootdown order to Donald Rumsfeld, who was at the still-burning Pentagon.” [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 102] The 9/11 Commission concurs that the “president apparently spoke to Secretary Rumsfeld for the first time… shortly after 10:00.” However, contradicting earlier accounts, it says, “No one can recall the content of this conversation, but it was a brief call in which the subject of shootdown authority was not discussed” (see (10:00 a.m.-10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to the Commission, furthermore, the phone call between Bush and Cheney where the president gives the shootdown authorization is not until 10:18 (see 10:18 a.m.-10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 41 AND 43] Bush’s senior adviser Karl Rove, who is on Air Force One with him, also says this critical call occurs “at about 10:20,” and adds that, after it, Bush reports that he has just talked to Rumsfeld as well as Cheney. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Rumsfeld will indicate he first learns that shootdown authorization has been given from Cheney rather than Bush, telling the 9/11 Commission that the vice president “informed me of the president’s authorization to shoot down hostile aircraft” over the air threat conference call. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/23/2004] The conversation he is referring to does not occur until 10:39 (see 10:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 43] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, George Bush, Donald Rumsfeld

(10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Counterterrorist Center Does Not Evacuate with Rest of CIA Headquarters

Counterterrorist Center logo. [Source: CIA] At around 10 a.m., following reports that several aircraft were not responding to communications and could be heading toward Washington, CIA Director George Tenet orders the evacuation of the CIA headquarters building in Langley, Virginia (see (9:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, Cofer Black, the director of the Counterterrorist Center (CTC), is unhappy about this and tells Tenet, “Sir, we’re going to have to exempt CTC from this because we need to have our people working the computers.” The CTC, according to the Los Angeles Times, is “the nerve center for the CIA’s effort to disrupt and deter terrorist groups and their state sponsors.” About 200 employees are currently working in it. Eight of them are in the Global Response Center on the sixth floor of the building, monitoring the latest intelligence on terrorism throughout the world. The rest are in a windowless facility low down in the building. When Tenet points out that the Global Response Center staff will be at risk, Black responds, “They have the key function to play in a crisis like this. This is exactly why we have the Global Response Center.” When Tenet points out, “They could die,” Black replies, “Well, sir, then they’re just going to have to die.” After pausing, Tenet agrees, “You’re absolutely right.” Tenet later says, “Now that we were under attack, the Counterterrorist Center, with its vast data banks and sophisticated communications systems, was more vital than ever. Even as we were discussing going or staying, CTC was sending out a global alert to our stations around the world, ordering them to go to their liaison services and agents to collect every shred of information they could lay their hands on.” [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 10/12/2001; WOODWARD, 2002, PP. 8-9; TENET, 2007, PP. 164-165] Entity Tags: Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency, George J. Tenet, Cofer Black Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Between 9:59 a.m. and 10:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Firefighters Do Not Hear Any Message to Evacuate North Tower

Someone falling from the WTC. Well over 50 jumped or fell from the North Tower, none from the South Tower. [Source: Associated Press] At some point between the collapse of the two WTC towers, it is claimed that fire chiefs order the firefighters to come down. It has not been reported exactly who issued this order or when. Witnesses claim that scores of firefighters, unaware of the danger, were resting on lower floors in the minutes before the second tower collapsed. “Some firefighters who managed to get out said they had no idea the other building had already fallen, and said that they thought that few of those who perished knew.” At least 121 firefighters in the remaining tower die. The Fire Department blames a faulty radio repeater. However, the Port Authority claims later transcripts of radio communications show the repeaters worked. [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/9/2002] Entity Tags: New York Port Authority Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

(Shortly After 9:59 a.m.-12:10 p.m.) September 11, 2001: Security Officer Heads into WTC 7 and Gets Trapped in Building A security officer for one of the businesses in Building 7 of the World Trade Center (WTC 7) goes up WTC 7 and subsequently becomes trapped on its seventh floor. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 109-110 ; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 11/2008, PP. 298-299 ] Although most people were evacuated from the building around the time the South Tower was hit, if not earlier (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001), after the South Tower collapses at 9:59 a.m. the security officer heads up to a floor in the 40s in WTC 7, reportedly to check that all his personnel have left. (The name of the company he works for is unstated.) He is initially accompanied by a police officer, but at around the 10th floor this officer has difficulty breathing, and so goes back down and exits the building. When the North Tower collapses at 10:28 a.m., WTC 7 shakes and the stairwell goes dark. The security officer, who has reached the 30th floor by this time, heads back down the stairs. When he reaches the 23rd floor, where the headquarters of New York’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM) is located, he opens the door to check for any members of staff that might still be there, but finds the area filled with smoke. (The OEM was evacuated at about 9:30 a.m., if not earlier (see (Soon After 8:46 a.m.-9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001).) He then continues down to the seventh floor, where he has to stop because he is unable to see or breathe. He is able to break a window, and calls for help. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 11/2008, PP. 298-299 ] At around 12:10 to 12:15 p.m., firefighters will enter the building and rescue the security officer, escorting him down the stairs and out of the building. They will also rescue two men who are trapped on the eighth floor (see 12:10 p.m.-12:15 p.m. September 11, 2001). [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 6/2004 ; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 110 ] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

Shortly After 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001: Fire Department Expert on Building Collapses Thinks Bombs Caused South Tower to Come Down

Ray Downey. [Source: Unknown] When the WTC’s South Tower collapses, Father John Delendick—one of New York Fire Department’s chaplains—runs down a ramp to the garages below the nearby World Financial Center, to escape the dust cloud. He speaks there with Fire Chief Ray Downey, and asks him if the jet fuel from the plane had blown up, causing the collapse. [CITY OF NEW YORK, 12/6/2001] Downey is in fact a renowned expert on building collapses. Robert Ingram, a battalion chief in the New York Fire Department later refers to him as “the premiere collapse expert in the country.” [US CONGRESS. SENATE. COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 10/11/2001 ] 9/11 Commissioner Timothy Roemer calls Downey a “very, very respected expert on building collapse.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/18/2004] And Fire Chief Mike Antonucci, who is a best friend of Downey’s, says he “was probably the most knowledgeable person on building collapses there was. That was his [hobby], to study building collapses—what affected the engineering of buildings, how they [would] weaken and how he could respond and stay safe.” [INLAND VALLEY DAILY BULLETIN, 9/7/2006] In response to Delendick’s question, Downey replies that, “at that point he thought there were bombs up there because [the collapse] was too even.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 12/6/2001] Earlier on, Downey told other fire chiefs responding at the WTC that he was worried about “explosive devices” in the Twin Towers “that could hurt the firemen” (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). He is killed when the North Tower collapses at 10:28 a.m. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/9/2005] Entity Tags: Ray Downey, John Delendick Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

(Between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Astronauts Record Devastation in New York from Space Station

Space view of New York on 9/11/01 [Source: NASA] The commander of the International Space Station, Frank Culbertson, is informed of the 9/11 attacks by NASA’s ground control. The station is orbiting the earth at a distance of about 300 miles. In addition to Culbertson, the station is manned by two Russian cosmonauts, Vladimir Dezhurov and Mikhail Tyurin. Culbertson quickly determines that the station will soon fly over New England. He positions himself with video and photographic equipment to record what he can see from space. One of his pictures, apparently taken after the collapse of both towers, shows a plume of smoke rising tens of miles into the sky. Vladimir Dezhurov will later take part in a televised debate during which he will apparently express skepticism about the US government’s version of the attacks (see September 12, 2008). [NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA), 9/12/2001; CNN, 10/15/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 11/27/2001; GUARDIAN, 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Frank Culbertson, Vladimir Dezhurov, Mikhail Tyurin Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Between 10:00-10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Cell Call Listeners Hear Silence, Strange Sounds

Potential pilots Don Greene and Andrew Garcia. [Source: Family photos] During this time, there apparently are no calls from Flight 93. Several cell phones that are left on record only silence. For instance, although Todd Beamer does not hang up, nothing more is heard after he puts down the phone, suggesting things are quiet in the back of the plane. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 218] The only exception is Richard Makely, who listens to Jeremy Glick’s open phone line after Glick goes to attack the hijackers. A reporter summarizes Makely explaining that, “The silence last[s] two minutes, then there [is] screaming. More silence, followed by more screams. Finally, there [is] a mechanical sound, followed by nothing.” [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 9/17/2001] The second silence lasts between 60 and 90 seconds. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 219] Near the end of the cockpit voice recording, loud wind sounds can be heard. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 270-271; CNN, 4/19/2002] “Sources claim the last thing heard on the cockpit voice recorder is the sound of wind—suggesting the plane had been holed.” [MIRROR, 9/12/2002] There was at least one passenger, Don Greene, who was a professional pilot. Another passenger, Andrew Garcia, was a former flight controller. [NEWSWEEK, 9/22/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 7/31/2002] Entity Tags: Andrew Garcia, Jeremy Glick, Don Greene, Richard Makely, Todd Beamer Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(After 9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Richard Clarke Orders Securing of Buildings, Harbors, and Borders Some time after the first WTC tower collapse, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke orders all landmark buildings and all federal buildings in the US evacuated. He also orders all harbors and borders closed. [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 14-15] The Sears Tower in Chicago begins evacuation around 10:02 a.m. Other prominent buildings are slower to evacuate. [OTTAWA CITIZEN, 9/11/2001] Entity Tags: Sears Tower, Richard A. Clarke Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke

After 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001: New York Deputy Mayor Develops and Implements Emergency Strategy

Rudy Washington. [Source: Congress of Racial Equality] After being caught in the dust plume when the WTC’s South Tower collapses at 9:59, Rudy Washington, who is one of Rudolph Giuliani’s deputy mayors, heads to City Hall, where he coordinates the city’s emergency response to the attacks. He is in contact with New York Governor George Pataki, high-ranking New York Police Department officers, and Navy Admiral Robert Natter, the commander of the US Atlantic Fleet (see (Shortly After 9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). He orders the closing of bridges. (Though, according to some accounts, the New York Port Authority ordered all bridges to be closed earlier on, at 9:21 (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001).) As New York Daily News columnist Stanley Crouch later describes, Washington also finds “heavy machinery to get downtown for the cleanup and got the Navy to guard against a seaborne attack. He evacuated City Hall, which shook like crazy when the second tower fell. He gathered people who could give medical help, gave the order to find lights that could be used at Ground Zero and worked out new phone communications, since power was being lost. Accompanied by city engineers, he went into the streets around the fallen towers, testing the ground to make sure it would hold when the heavy equipment came in.” Washington’s efforts at developing an emergency strategy are reportedly aided by what he learned at an anti-terrorist training session chaired by counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke and held at the WTC, in preparation for the millennium celebration (see (Late 1999)). Stanley Crouch later credits Rudy Washington with having “ran New York for the first few hours after the attack during a period when Giuliani was thought to have been killed inside the first building that went down.” [NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, 5/20/2004] During the initial hours following the attacks, between around 9:50 a.m. and midday, Mayor Giuliani is moving around between a series of temporary command posts (see (9:50 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (After 10:28 a.m.-12:00 pm.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Rudy Washington, Robert Natter, New York City Police Department, George E. Pataki, Rudolph (“Rudy”) Giuliani Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(After 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Cell Phones Not Working in New York City Throughout the day of 9/11 and after, members of the public in New York City experience significant communications problems, particularly with cell phones. “In the aftermath [of the attacks], and for several days afterwards, cellular phone services were either not working or were severely overloaded.” [SATNEWS, 10/19/2001] As Time magazine reports, “Lines formed, at least 20 people long, at all pay phones, because cell phones were not working.” [TIME, 9/14/2001] (Reportedly, though, the 911 system is not disrupted.) Later accounts will suggest that an increased volume of phone calls being made in response to the attacks may have overloaded networks. Within minutes of the first attack, according to the New York Times, there were “tens of millions of [phone] calls—many from worried relatives and friends—that threatened to clog the system.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/20/2001] The call volume of Verizon Communications, which has its main regional switching station across the street from the World Trade Center, reaches twice its normal daily rate of 115 million calls in New York City. “And although it remained operational, the wireless network experienced massive congestion that prevented most calls from getting through. During the peak of the chaos, Verizon experienced nearly 100 percent more traffic than normal on its nationwide wireless network.” [VERTON, 2003, PP. 148] Some of the communications problems in the New York area are later attributed to physical damage to the infrastructure. A report by the Mineta Transportation Institute will summarize, “The collapse of the World Trade Center towers knocked out Verizon’s switching center in Lower Manhattan and severely damaged the infrastructure for cellular telephones. Telephone communications for NYPD Command and Control was also destroyed in the attack. As a consequence, cell phone service was subsequently overloaded. NYC Transit lost a key portion of its fiber-optic network in one tunnel.” [JENKINS AND EDWARDS-WINSLOW, 9/2003, PP. 33] Similar communication problems are also experienced around Washington, DC, and some top government officials are affected (see (After 8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to one government official, the nation was “deaf, dumb, and blind” for much of the day. [VERTON, 2003, PP. 151] Entity Tags: Verizon Communications, Verizon Wireless Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(After 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Vice President Cheney Assembles Legal Team for Expanding Presidential Power

David Addington. [Source: David Bohrer / White House] According to an in-depth examination by the Washington Post, within hours of the 9/11 attacks, Vice President Dick Cheney begins working to secure additional powers for the White House. Cheney had plans in place to begin acquiring these powers for the executive branch before the attacks, but had not begun to execute them. Gathering the Team - David Addington, Cheney’s general counsel and legal adviser, had been walking home after having to leave the now-evacuated Eisenhower Executive Office Building. He receives a message from the White House telling him to turn around, because the vice president needs him. After Addington joins Cheney in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the East Wing of the White House, the pair reportedly begin “contemplating the founding question of the legal revolution to come: What extraordinary powers will the president need for his response?” Later in the day, Addington connects by secure video with Timothy Flanigan, the deputy White House counsel, who is in the White House Situation Room. John Yoo, the deputy chief of the Office of Legal Counsel, is also patched in from the Justice Department’s command center. White House counsel Alberto Gonzales joins them later. This forms the core legal team that Cheney will oversee after the terrorist attacks. Associate White House counsel Bradford Berenson will later recall: “Addington, Flanigan and Gonzales were really a triumvirate. [Yoo] was a supporting player.” Addington dominates the group. Gonzales is there primarily because of his relationship with President Bush. He is not, Yoo will later recall, “a law-of-war expert and [doesn’t] have very developed views.” Along with these allies, Cheney will provide what the Washington Post calls “the rationale and political muscle to drive far-reaching legal changes through the White House, the Justice Department, and the Pentagon,” which will free the president to fight the war on terror, “as he saw fit.” Drafting the AUMF - The team begins drafting the document that will become the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF—see October 10, 2002) passed by Congress for the assault on Afghanistan. In the words of the group, the president is authorized “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States.” Extraordinarily Broad Language - The language is extraordinarily broad; Yoo will later explain that they chose such sweeping language because “this war was so different, you can’t predict what might come up.” The AUMF draft is the first of numerous attempts to secure broad powers for the presidency, most justified by the 9/11 attacks. The Washington Post will later report, “In fact, the triumvirate knew very well what would come next: the interception—without a warrant—of communications to and from the United States” (see September 25, 2001). [CNN, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001; UNGER, 2007, PP. 220-221; WASHINGTON POST, 6/24/2007] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, John C. Yoo, Timothy E. Flanigan, Craig Unger, Bradford Berenson, David S. Addington, Alberto R. Gonzales Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, Civil Liberties Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Dick Cheney

(Shortly After 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Condoleezza Rice Has Diplomatic Cable Sent Out Stating that US Government Is Still Functioning At the instruction of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage sends a cable out around the world saying the US government is still functioning. [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 9/8/2006] Having recently arrived at the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House (see (Shortly Before 9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001), the first thing that occurs to Rice, she will later say, is that it is important to get a cable out to all diplomatic posts around the world, to say the United States government has “not been decapitated by this attack.… I thought to myself, we need to let everybody know that we’re still up and running.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] She therefore tells her deputy, Stephen Hadley, to call Armitage at the State Department, and urge him to send a cable to all overseas posts with this message. [BBC RADIO 4, 8/1/2002 ; BUMILLER, 2007, PP. XVI] Entity Tags: Stephen J. Hadley, Richard Armitage, Condoleezza Rice Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(After 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FBI Immediately Identifies Hijackers on Dulles Security Video Shortly after arriving at Washington’s Dulles Airport, from which Flight 77 took off, the FBI confiscates a security tape from a checkpoint through which the hijackers passed before boarding the plane. Airport security manager Ed Nelson will later say: “They pulled the tape right away.… They brought me to look at it. They went right to the first hijacker on the tape and identified him. They knew who the hijackers were out of hundreds of people going through the checkpoints. They would go ‘roll and stop it’ and showed me each of the hijackers.… It boggles my mind that they had already had the hijackers identified.… Both metal detectors were open at that time, and lots of traffic was moving through. So picking people out is hard.… I wanted to know how they had that kind of information. So fast. It didn’t make sense to me.” [TRENTO AND TRENTO, 2006, PP. 37] Some of the hijackers are identified on the passenger manifests around this time (see (9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and this knowledge is disseminated in the US intelligence community (see (After 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Ed Nelson, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Hani Hanjour, Other 9/11 Hijackers, All Day of 9/11 Events, FBI 9/11 Investigation

10:01 a.m.-10:15 a.m. September 11, 2001: Delta 1989 Pilot’s Failure to Use Standard Term in Communications Makes Controllers Suspicious Air traffic controllers at the Cleveland Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) remain suspicious of Delta Air Lines Flight 1989 as it is coming in to land at Cleveland Hopkins Airport, due to the pilot’s failure to use an important standard term in his communications with them. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/16/2001] A TRACON is an FAA facility that guides aircraft approaching or departing an airport. Flights coming in to land will subsequently be passed on to the airport’s air traffic control tower once they are within five miles of the airport and below 2,500 feet. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/24/2006] The Cleveland TRACON is in contact with Delta 1989 as it descends from 9,000 feet down to 3,000 feet. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/16/2001] Delta 1989, a Boeing 767 out of Boston, is mistakenly suspected of being hijacked (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (Shortly After 9:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and has been instructed to land as soon as possible in Cleveland (see (9:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27-28; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 167-168; USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] Pilot Does Not Use Term 'Heavy' - A detailed timeline provided by the Cleveland Airport control tower shortly after 9/11 will describe, “One anomaly that perpetuated concern by approach controllers in the face of constant information that there was nothing going on with [Delta 1989] was that the pilot never used the HEAVY designator in his communications.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/16/2001] The term “heavy” alerts controllers to provide extra spacing behind very large aircraft, which are above a certain weight, because these aircraft generate significant wake turbulence. [USA TODAY, 6/1/2005; USA TODAY, 5/22/2006] Controllers Skeptical of Delta 1989's Security - While the TRACON controllers use the “heavy” designator, “the pilot [of Delta 1989] did not respond with it.” The control tower’s timeline will state that, while this detail “may seem minor,” it “should not be overlooked. The use of HEAVY in the terminal environment is of the highest importance. Increased separation standards are required, and misapplication of separation standards can be disastrous. For pilots, not referring to a heavy aircraft as HEAVY is tantamount to calling a doctor ‘Mister.’” As a result, “This omission, along with all of the other information flying around, kept everyone alert and skeptical of the security of the flight.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/16/2001] Entity Tags: Cleveland Terminal Radar Approach Control, Paul Werner Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

10:01 a.m. September 11, 2001: Toledo Pilots Apparently Think Call from NEADS Is a Joke

Pilots from the 180th Fighter Wing who are called to service on 9/11. [Source: WTOL] Two fighter pilots with a Toledo, Ohio, military unit that answer a call from NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), requesting assistance in response to the morning’s attacks, respond as if they think the call is a joke. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178-179] The pilots belong to the 180th Fighter Wing of the Ohio Air National Guard, which is based at Toledo Express Airport. [GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 1/1/2002; WTOL, 9/11/2006] Pilot Puzzled by Call - When a weapons technician at NEADS contacts the Toledo unit, his call is answered by F-16 pilot Ed Rinke. The weapons technician says, “We need you to scramble two airplanes right now.” However, according to author Lynn Spencer, “to Rinke, the order makes no sense.” The Toledo unit “is not an alert squadron and does not report to NEADS.” Rinke is only a part-time pilot, and thinks someone more suitable should be taking the call. He shouts down the hall: “Hey, we’ve got a phone call at the duty desk. Some guy wants us to launch alert fighters!” Pilot Scott Reed responds: “What? We don’t do that!” Pushing the phone toward Reed, Rinke says: “You take it! It’s somebody on drugs.” Second Pilot Tells NEADS It Is Calling 'the Wrong People' - After Reed takes the phone, the weapons technician repeats his request, saying, “Major Reed, we need you to scramble two airplanes.” Yet Reed sounds as baffled as Rinke had been. He answers: “You’re calling Toledo, Ohio. Do you not understand who you’re calling here? Who are you trying to call, because you are obviously calling the wrong people. This is Toledo. We don’t have any alert birds. This is Toledo. Do you understand that?” Commander Takes Call, Orders Launch - Fortunately, the two pilots’ wing commander then takes over the call and responds to it more appropriately. Within minutes, according to Spencer, he will instruct Reed and Rinke to take off in two F-16s. Rinke reportedly thinks to himself, “Things must be really bad if NEADS is launching Toledo on an active air scramble!” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178-179] The Toledo Blade will later comment, “Toledo’s response on Sept. 11 is believed to be the first time the unit has answered a call from the North American Aerospace Defense Command.” Two 180th Fighter Wing jets will take off from the Toledo unit at 10:17 a.m., but accounts will conflict over who the pilots are (see 10:17 a.m. September 11, 2001). [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001; WTOL, 9/11/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 179] Entity Tags: 180th Fighter Wing, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Ed Rinke, Scott Reed Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

10:01 a.m. September 11, 2001: Local Pilot Sees Flight 93 Rocking Back and Forth

Bill Wright. [Source: WTAE-TV] Bill Wright is piloting a small plane when an air traffic controller asks him to look around outside his window, according to his later claims. Wright sees Flight 93 three miles away—close enough that he can see the United Airlines colors. Air traffic control asks him the plane’s altitude, and then commands him to get away from the plane and land immediately. Wright sees the plane rock back and forth three or four times before he flies from the area. He will later say, “That’s one of the first things that went through my mind when they told us to get as far away from it as fast as we could—that either they were expecting it to blow up or they were going to shoot it down, but that’s pure speculation.” [PITTSBURGH CHANNEL, 9/19/2001] According to the 9/11 Commission, the FAA Command Center tells FAA headquarters that a nearby plane has seen Flight 93 “waving his wings.” The Commission will say, “The aircraft had witnessed the radical gyrations in what we believe was the hijackers’ effort to defeat the passenger assault.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] This presumably is a reference to Wright. Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Bill Wright Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(After 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Some Aircraft Debris Visible Inside Pentagon

John McWethy. [Source: Steve Fenn / ABC] ABC News correspondent John McWethy was at the Pentagon at the time it was hit. [NEWSWEEK, 9/24/2001] At some later time, an army general he knows offers to take him in closer to the crash site. McWethy recalls: “I got in very close, got a look early on at the bad stuff. I could not, however, see any plane wreckage—it was well inside and had been, basically, vaporized.” [GILBERT ET AL., 2002, PP. 187] The following day, Arlington County Fire Chief Ed Plaugher will similarly tell reporters: “[T]here are some small pieces of aircraft visible from the interior during this firefighting operation… but not large sections. In other words, there’s no fuselage sections and that sort of thing.” [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 9/12/2001] According to the Defense Department’s book about the Pentagon attack: “The front part of the relatively weak fuselage [of Flight 77] disintegrated, but the mid-section and tail-end continued moving for another fraction of a second.… The chain of destruction resulted in parts of the plane ending up inside the Pentagon in reverse of the order they had entered it, with the tail-end of the airliner penetrating the greatest distance into the building.” [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 17] Navy Lt. Kevin Shaeffer reportedly sees a “chunk of the 757’s nose cone and front landing gear” in the service road between the Pentagon’s B and C Rings. [VIRGINIAN-PILOT, 9/9/2002] Other witnesses say they see a large airplane tire. [OFFICE OF MEDICAL HISTORY, 9/2004, PP. 117-118; GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 54] Army Staff Sgt. Mark Williams, whose search and rescue team enters the Pentagon less than four hours after the attack, recalls seeing “the scorched bodies of several airline passengers… still strapped into their seats” inside the building. [USA TODAY, 9/13/2001] Entity Tags: Mark Williams, Kevin Shaeffer, Edward Plaugher, John McWethy, Pentagon Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

10:01 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Calls Toledo Unit, Requests Fighter Jets NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) contacts an Air National Guard unit in Toledo, Ohio, and requests that it launch two fighter jets in response to the attacks. [WTOL, 9/11/2006; LYNN SPENCER, 2008; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178] First Time that Unit Has Answered a NORAD Request - The 180th Fighter Wing of the Ohio Air National Guard is based at Toledo Express Airport. It has 20 F-16 fighter jets and about three dozen pilots. [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001] Its “primary mission” is “to provide combat ready F-16C and support units capable of deploying worldwide in minimum response time.” [180TH FIGHTER WING, 9/19/2001; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG.), 10/21/2001] The unit is not one of NORAD’s seven alert facilities around the US, and this is believed to be the first time it has ever answered a request for help from NORAD. [AIRMAN, 12/1999; TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001] Call due to Concern over Delta 1989 - According to author Lynn Spencer, a weapons technician at NEADS makes the call to the 180th FW due to concerns about Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, which is incorrectly thought to have been hijacked (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 177-178] NEADS has already contacted units in Minnesota and Michigan about this aircraft (see (Shortly After 9:41 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/23/2004 ; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] The weapons technician calls the Toledo unit after Master Sergeant Joe McCain gives an update across the NEADS operations floor: “Delta [19]89! Hard right turn!” According to Spencer, the weapons technician knows the 180th FW is much better positioned than the Selfridge unit’s fighters are to reach Delta 1989. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178] NORAD Commander Gives Different Explanation - But according to Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region, the weapons technician’s call might also be in response to concerns over Flight 93. Arnold will say that NEADS calls the 180th FW “because we thought [Flight] 93 or Delta Flight 1989 might be headed toward Chicago.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 71] Two Toledo pilots who initially answer the call from NEADS appear to believe the call is a joke, but their wing commander then picks up the line and responds appropriately (see 10:01 a.m. September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178-179] Unit Prepared for Crisis Like This - Although it is not one of NORAD’s alert facilities, Lt. Col. Gary Chudzinski, a former commander of the 180th FW, will later comment that the Toledo unit has always been aware that it could be alerted to crises such as the current one, “but you just don’t expect it.” According to General Paul Sullivan, who heads all Ohio Air National Guard units, the 180th FW’s pilots practice “air interception,” but a typical mission focuses on either a plane ferrying drugs or enemy fighters approaching America’s coasts. [AIRMAN, 12/1999; TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001] Two 180th FW jets will take off from the Toledo unit at 10:17 a.m. (see 10:17 a.m. September 11, 2001). [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001; WTOL, 9/11/2006] Entity Tags: Gary Chudzinski, Joe McCain, Larry Arnold, 180th Fighter Wing, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Paul Sullivan Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(After 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Plane Heading for Britain Appears Suspicious, Emits Strange Transponder Signals

Richard Dearlove. [Source: Daily Express] CIA Director George Tenet later recalls that, at some unspecified time during this day, a commercial passenger jet on its way to Britain behaves suspiciously, raising fears that al-Qaeda might have launched a two-continent attack. Aircraft are equipped with a device called a transponder, which transmits information to controllers on the ground, such as the plane’s flight number, altitude and speed. But this plane is emitting all kinds of “squawks,” with its transponder going off and on. Tenet calls Richard Dearlove, his counterpart at the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), to inform him of what is going on. Eventually, according to Tenet, the problem is resolved, and it turns out to have been caused simply by the transponder being faulty. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/17/2001; TENET, 2007, PP. 166] Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Richard Dearlove Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

10:01 a.m. September 11, 2001: Passenger Andrew Garcia Calls Wife from Flight 93

Dorothy Garcia. [Source: Darryl Bush / San Francisco Chronicle] Andrew Garcia, a passenger on Flight 93, makes a phone call to his wife, Dorothy Garcia, but is quickly cut off and does not call again. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 190-191; DISCOVERY CHANNEL, 2005] Garcia, a 62-year-old businessman from Portola Valley in the San Francisco Bay Area, calls his wife on his cell phone. He is only able to get out one word, her name “Dorothy.” [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/14/2001; SUN (SUNNYVALE), 9/26/2001; SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 12/27/2001] According to Garcia’s son, the line then “got staticky and faded out.” [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 9/14/2001] Entity Tags: Andrew Garcia, Dorothy Garcia Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(After 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Tells FAA Flight 93 Is over Maryland, Says Military Will Be Informed United Airlines official Sandy Rogers calls Ellen King at the FAA’s Command Center to discuss Flight 93. The timing of the call is not known specifically, although it appears to be after the Pentagon was hit and could not be long after Flight 93 is thought to have crashed, which is shortly after 10:00 a.m. (see (10:03 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Rogers tells King that Flight 93 has been hijacked, and King responds, “Oh God… thank you,” indicating she was previously unaware of the hijacking. However, the FAA had been aware of the situation since a few minutes after the hijacking took place (see (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). Rogers also says: “It’s over Hagerstown now and you’re not aware of it. It’s heading toward Washington, DC, and we are under a threat of a hijacking on board and this flight is out of our control now heading toward Washington, DC.” Rogers states that United Airlines is “advising the military” about the plane and King also says that the FAA will do the same. [FEDERAL AVIATION AUTHORITY, 10/14/2003, PP. 37-39 ] However, there are no other reports of Flight 93 ever being over Hagerstown, which is in Maryland. Flight 93 is said to crash in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, and is thought never to reach Maryland. There will be some—apparently mistaken—reports that the plane is still airborne after it is thought to have crashed (see (Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 10:10 a.m.-10:11 a.m. September 11, 2001), and this may be another such report. Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Ellen King, United Airlines, Sandy Rogers Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

10:02 a.m. September 11, 2001: Cockpit Voice Recording Ends Early? The cockpit voice recording of Flight 93 was recorded on a 30-minute reel, which means that the tape is continually overwritten and only the final 30 minutes of any flight would be recorded. The government later permits relatives to hear this tape. Apparently, the version of the tape played to the family members begins at 9:31 a.m. and runs for 31 minutes, ending one minute before, according to the government, the plane crashes. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 206-207; CNN, 4/19/2002] The New York Observer comments, “Some of the relatives are keen to find out why, at the peak of this struggle, the tape suddenly stops recording voices and all that is heard in the last 60 seconds or so is engine noise. Had the tape been tampered with?” [NEW YORK OBSERVER, 6/20/2004] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

10:02 a.m. September 11, 2001: 9/11 Commission Later Details the Moments before Flight 93 Crash According to the 9/11 Commission, a Flight 93 hijacker says, “Pull it down! Pull it down!” The airplane rolls onto its back as one of the hijackers shouts, “Allah o akbar! Allah o akbar!” The commission comments, “The hijackers remained at the controls but must have judged that the passengers were only seconds from overcoming them.” Presumably the plane crashes seconds later. [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 7/23/2004] However, there are questions as to whether the voice recording actually ends at this time. Furthermore, there is a near complete disconnect between these quotes and the quotes given in previous accounts of what the cockpit recording revealed (see (9:57 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001). For instance, in other accounts, passenger voices saying, “Give it to me!,” “I’m injured,” and “Roll it up” or “Lift it up” are heard just before the recording ends. [OBSERVER, 12/2/2001; NEWSWEEK, 12/3/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 270-271; MSNBC, 7/30/2002; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 7/31/2002] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

10:02 a.m. September 11, 2001: Secret Service Warns Vice President Cheney that Hijackers Are Headed Toward Washington Vice President Cheney and other leaders now in the White House bunker begin receiving reports from the Secret Service of a presumably hijacked aircraft heading toward Washington. The Secret Service is getting this information about Flight 93 through links to the FAA. However, they are looking at a projected path, not an actual radar return, so they do not realize that the plane crashes minutes later. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Dick Cheney

(Before 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Witnesses See Flight 93 Rocking Wings as It Slowly Descends In the tiny town of Boswell, about ten miles north and slightly to the west of Flight 93’s crash site, Rodney Peterson and Brandon Leventry notice a passenger jet lumbering through the sky at about 2,000 feet. They realize such a big plane flying so low in that area is odd. They see the plane dip its wings sharply to the left, then to the right. The wings level off and the plane keeps flying south, continuing to descend slowly. Five minutes later, they hear news that the plane has crashed. Other witnesses also later describe the plane flying east-southeast, low, and wobbly. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/14/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 205-206] “Officials initially say that it looks like the plane was headed south when it hit the ground.” [NEWS CHANNEL 5 (CLEVELAND), 9/11/2001] Entity Tags: Brandon Leventry, Rodney Peterson Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

10:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: FBI/CIA Anti-Terrorist Task Force Away From Washington on Training Exercise in California NBC News reports that the FBI has been “operating a massive exercise from their hostage rescue unit. All of their top teams, about 50 personnel, helicopters, equipment, [have been] in Monterey, California for the last two days, scheduled to fly back today commercially. So all of those people are out of place.” [NBC 4, 9/11/2001] USA Today later adds that the day’s attacks are “so unexpected that a joint FBI/CIA anti-terrorist task force that specifically prepared for this type of disaster was on a training exercise in Monterey, Calif. As of late Tuesday, with airports closed around the country, the task force still hadn’t found a way to fly back to Washington.” [USA TODAY, 9/11/2001] NBC News concludes, “It’s fair to say, according to sources that we’ve talked to here at NBC, that the FBI rescue operations and other FBI operations are really in chaos right now, because they can’t reach their officials in New York, all of their phone lines are down. And now you’ve got all of their special experts on this stuck in Monterey, California.… So they are seriously out of pocket, and there is a real breakdown of the FBI anti-terror coordination team, which is of course the principal team that would lead any effort.” [NBC 4, 9/11/2001] The US politics website evote.com similarly concludes, “[J]ust as the worst terrorist act was being committed on American lives and property, the chief federal agency responsible for preventing such crimes was being AWOL.” [EVOTE [.COM], 9/11/2001] Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

10:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: NMCC Learns of Flight 93 Hijacking, NORAD Still Not Told According to the 9/11 Commission, the NMCC learns about the Flight 93 hijacking at this time. Since the FAA has not yet been patched in to the NMCC’s conference call, the news comes from the White House. The White House learned about it from the Secret Service, and the Secret Service learned about it from the FAA. NORAD apparently is still unaware. Four minutes later, a NORAD representative on the conference call states, “NORAD has no indication of a hijack heading to Washington, D.C., at this time.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: Secret Service, Federal Aviation Administration, National Military Command Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Key Day of 9/11 Events

(10:03 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Crashes; Seven-Minute Discrepancy on Exact Timing of Crash Exactly when Flight 93 crashes remains unclear. According to NORAD, Flight 93 crashes at 10:03 a.m. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001] The 9/11 Commission gives an exact time of 11 seconds after 10:03 a.m. It will claim this “time is supported by evidence from the staff’s radar analysis, the flight data recorder, NTSB [National Transportation Safety Board] analysis, and infrared satellite data.” It does note that “[t]he precise crash time has been the subject of some dispute.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] However, a seismic study authorized by the US Army and drafted by scientists Won-Young Kim and Gerald Baum to determine when the plane crashed will conclude that the crash happened at 10:06:05 a.m. [KIM AND BAUM, 2002 ; SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 12/9/2002] The discrepancy is so puzzling that the Philadelphia Daily News will publish an article on the issue, titled “Three-Minute Discrepancy in Tape.” This notes that leading seismologists agree on the 10:06 a.m. time, give or take a couple of seconds. [PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, 9/16/2002] The New York Observer will note that, in addition to the seismology study, “The FAA gives a crash time of 10:07 a.m. In addition, the New York Times, drawing on flight controllers in more than one FAA facility, put the time at 10:10 a.m. Up to a seven-minute discrepancy? In terms of an air disaster, seven minutes is close to an eternity. The way our nation has historically treated any airline tragedy is to pair up recordings from the cockpit and air traffic control and parse the timeline down to the hundredths of a second. However, as [former Inspector General of the Transportation Department] Mary Schiavo points out, ‘We don’t have an NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) investigation here, and they ordinarily dissect the timeline to the thousandth of a second.’” [NEW YORK OBSERVER, 2/15/2004] Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Mary Schiavo, 9/11 Commission, Won-Young Kim, Gerald R. Baum, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

Just Before 10:06 a.m. September 11, 2001: Locals Hear a Missile Before Flight 93 Crashes? Several local people believe they hear a missile overhead just before Flight 93 goes down. Barry Lichty, a US Navy veteran and mayor of Indian Lake Borough (just to the east of where Flight 93 crashes), is watching television with his wife. He says he hears “a loud roar above the house that sounded like a missile.… Shortly thereafter, we heard an explosion and a tremor. My first reaction, as a former utility employee, was that maybe someone shot a missile into the substation.” He says Flight 93 “did not come over my house. I don’t know what we heard.” [KASHURBA, 2002, PP. 158-159] Joe Wilt, who lives a quarter-mile from the crash site, hears a “whistling like a missile, then a loud boom.” He says, “The first thing I thought it was, was a missile.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/12/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001] And Ernie Stuhl, the mayor of Shanksville, later says, “I know of two people - I will not mention names - that heard a missile. They both live very close, within a couple of hundred yards.… This one fellow’s served in Vietnam and he says he’s heard them, and he heard one that day.” [PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, 11/18/2001] Officials will emphatically deny that Flight 93 was shot down, as some people later suggest (see September 14, 2001). [PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 9/14/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 264] However, a number of witnesses report seeing a small, white jet plane near the crash site, around the time Flight 93 reportedly goes down (see (Before and After 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Barry Lichty, Joe Wilt Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

(Before 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Witnesses See Flight 93 Flying Erratically and Making Strange Noises Numerous eyewitnesses see and hear Flight 93 just before its crash: Terry Butler, at Stoystown: He sees the plane come out of the clouds, low to the ground. “It was moving like you wouldn’t believe. Next thing I knew it makes a heck of a sharp, right-hand turn.” It banks to the right and appears to be trying to climb to clear one of the ridges, but it continues to turn to the right and then veers behind a ridge. About a second later it crashes. [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/12/2001] Accounts of the plane making strange noises - Laura Temyer of Hooversville: “I didn’t see the plane but I heard the plane’s engine. Then I heard a loud thump that echoed off the hills and then I heard the plane’s engine. I heard two more loud thumps and didn’t hear the plane’s engine anymore after that.” (She insists that people she knows in state law enforcement have privately told her the plane was shot down, and that decompression sucked objects from the aircraft, explaining why there was a wide debris field.) [PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, 11/15/2001] Charles Sturtz, a half-mile from the crash site: The plane is heading southeast and has its engines running. No smoke can be seen. “It was really roaring, you know. Like it was trying to go someplace, I guess.” [WPXI 11 (PITTSBURGH), 9/13/2001] Michael Merringer, two miles from the crash site: “I heard the engine gun two different times and then I heard a loud bang…” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/12/2001] Tim Lensbouer, 300 yards away: “I heard it for ten or 15 seconds and it sounded like it was going full bore.” [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/12/2001] Accounts of the plane flying upside down - Rob Kimmel, several miles from the crash site: He sees it fly overhead, banking hard to the right. It is 200 feet or less off the ground as it crests a hill to the southeast. “I saw the top of the plane, not the bottom.” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 210-211] Eric Peterson of Lambertsville: He sees a plane flying overhead unusually low. The plane seemed to be turning end-over-end as it dropped out of sight behind a tree line. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/12/2001] Bob Blair of Stoystown: He sees the plane spiraling and flying upside down, not much higher than the treetops, before crashing. [DAILY AMERICAN, 9/12/2001] Accounts of a sudden plunge and more strange sounds - An unnamed witness says he hears two loud bangs before watching the plane take a downward turn of nearly 90 degrees. [NEWS CHANNEL 5 (CLEVELAND), 9/11/2001] Tom Fritz, about a quarter-mile from the crash site: He hears a sound that “wasn’t quite right” and looks up in the sky. “It dropped all of a sudden, like a stone,” going “so fast that you couldn’t even make out what color it was.” [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/12/2001] Terry Butler, a few miles north of Lambertsville: “It dropped out of the clouds.” The plane rose slightly, trying to gain altitude, then “it just went flip to the right and then straight down.” [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/12/2001] Lee Purbaugh, 300 yards away: “There was an incredibly loud rumbling sound and there it was, right there, right above my head—maybe 50 feet up.… I saw it rock from side to side then, suddenly, it dipped and dived, nose first, with a huge explosion, into the ground. I knew immediately that no one could possibly have survived.” [INDEPENDENT, 8/13/2002] Upside down and a sudden plunge - Linda Shepley: She hears a loud bang and sees the plane bank to the side. [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2001] She sees the plane wobbling right and left, at a low altitude of roughly 2,500 feet, when suddenly the right wing dips straight down, and the plane plunges into the earth. She says she has an unobstructed view of Flight 93’s final two minutes. [PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, 11/15/2001] Kelly Leverknight in Stony Creek Township of Shanksville: “There was no smoke, it just went straight down. I saw the belly of the plane.” It sounds like it is flying low, and it’s heading east. [DAILY AMERICAN, 9/12/2001; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/12/2001] Tim Thornsberg, working in a nearby strip mine: “It came in low over the trees and started wobbling. Then it just rolled over and was flying upside down for a few seconds… and then it kind of stalled and did a nose dive over the trees.” [WPXI 11 (PITTSBURGH), 9/13/2001] Some claim that these witness accounts support the idea that Flight 93 is hit by a missile. [PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, 11/15/2001] While this theory certainly can be disputed, it is worth noting that some passenger planes hit by missiles continued to fly erratically for several minutes before crashing. For instance, a Korean Airline 747 was hit by two Russian missiles in 1983, yet continued to fly for two more minutes. [KOREAN AIR, 8/31/1983] Kelly Leverknight, whose home is a couple of miles from the Flight 93 crash site, adds that planes going overhead are nothing unusual here because the area is a “military flight corridor.” [DAILY AMERICAN, 9/12/2001] Entity Tags: Terry Butler, Kelly Leverknight, Eric Peterson, Linda Shepley, Lee Purbaugh, Rob Kimmel, Tim Thornsberg, Michael Merringer, Tim Lensbouer, Tom Fritz, Bob Blair, Laura Temyer, Charles Sturtz Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Flight UA 93, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

(Just Before 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Lights Go Out Before Flight 93 Crashes, Allegedly Indicating a Missile Being Fired John Fleegle, a manager at the Indian Lake Marina about 1.5 miles from where Flight 93 crashes, is indoors with some colleagues, watching the televised coverage of the World Trade Center attack. Then, as he later describes, “All of a sudden the lights flickered and we joked that maybe they were coming for us. Then we heard engines screaming close overhead. The building shook. We ran out, heard the explosion and saw a fireball mushroom,” following the crash. When he later describes this incident while on a training course in Atlanta, Fleegle will be told that what happened means Flight 93 “was shot down.” A man there who says he is a retired Air Force officer will tell Fleegle, “[W]hen your lights flickered, [it was because] they zap the radar frequency on everything before they shoot. Your lights didn’t flicker from the impact—your lights flickered because they zapped the radar system before they shot it.” However, William “Buck” Kernan, a retired four-star Army general, will dispute this claim, saying, “[R]egarding an aircraft engaging an airborne target having an electrical disruption on the ground, no, this would not be a result of lock on or any electromagnetic pulsing.” He will suggest it is “possible that overpressure from explosions could momentarily disrupt microwave connections or cause sensations on ground relays, wiring, etc.” that might result in the lights having flickered. [PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 9/14/2001; LAPPE AND MARSHALL, 2004, PP. 35-36] But, consistent with Fleegle’s allegation, a number of local residents—including military veterans—say they heard the sound of a missile overhead just before the time of the crash (see Just Before 10:06 a.m. September 11, 2001). Another local resident, Val McClatchey, will report her lights and phone going out around the time of the crash. [PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 9/11/2002] According to Barry Lichty, the mayor of Indian Lake Borough, the town’s electricity goes out around this time. He later learns that the plane crash had disrupted service to the borough. [PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 9/12/2001] Interestingly, one alternative theory later suggested is that Flight 93 could have been brought down using “electromagnetic interference” (see August 13, 2002). The US Air Force and Pentagon have in fact “conducted extensive research on ‘electronic warfare applications’ with the possible capacity intentionally to disrupt the mechanisms of an airplane in such a way as to provoke, for example, an uncontrollable dive.” [INDEPENDENT, 8/13/2002] Entity Tags: Barry Lichty, Val McClatchey, John Fleegle, William Kernan Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

(Before 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Fighters Trailing Flight 93 When It Crashes, According to Some Accounts; Other Accounts Contradict This Shortly after 9/11, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) will say the nearest fighter jets to Flight 93 at the time it crashes are the F-16s from Langley Air Force Base that are flying a combat air patrol over Washington, DC (see (Between 9:49 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 34 ] Other accounts will conflict over whether or not there are any fighter jets near Flight 93 when it goes down: Two days after the attacks, it will be reported that an unnamed New England air traffic controller has ignored a ban on controllers speaking to the media, and this controller claims “that an F-16 fighter closely pursued Flight 93.… [T]he F-16 made 360-degree turns to remain close to the commercial jet.” The controller adds that the fighter pilot “must’ve seen the whole thing.” He reportedly learned this from speaking to controllers who were closer to the crash. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/13/2001; TELEGRAPH (NASHUA), 9/13/2001] Five days after the attacks, on September 16, CBS News will report that two F-16s are tailing Flight 93 and are within 60 miles of it when it goes down. [CBS NEWS, 9/16/2001; INDEPENDENT, 8/13/2002] But, also on September 16, Major General Paul Weaver, the director of the Air National Guard, will say that no military planes were sent after Flight 93. [SEATTLE TIMES, 9/16/2001] In April 2002, Anthony Kuczynski will tell the University of St. Thomas’s weekly newspaper that he had flown toward Pittsburgh alongside two F-16s on 9/11. He says he was piloting an E-3 Sentry AWACS plane, which has advanced radar and surveillance equipment that can be used to direct fighter jets to their targets. He was just about to intercept Flight 93 when it crashed. He says, “I was given direct orders to shoot down an airliner.” (E-3s are unarmed, so, if this account is accurate, the order presumably applied to the fighters Kuczynski was accompanying.) [ST. THOMAS AQUIN, 4/12/2002; US AIR FORCE, 11/20/2009] A year after the attacks, ABC News will report that the “closest fighters” to Flight 93 when it crashes “are two F-16 pilots on a training mission from Selfridge Air National Guard Base” near Detroit, Michigan. These are ordered after Flight 93, according to some accounts, even though they are unarmed. [ABC NEWS, 8/30/2002; ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] However, other accounts will state that these jets are in fact ordered to intercept another aircraft, Delta 1989, or are simply told to return to their base (see (9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:56 a.m.-10:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28; MOUNT CLEMENS-CLINTON-HARRISON JOURNAL, 9/6/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178] Stacey Taylor, an air traffic controller at the FAA’s Cleveland Center, will claim not to have seen any fighter jets on radar around the area of the crash. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Five years after 9/11, Bill Keaton, a Cleveland Center controller who tracked Flight 93 as it flew eastward (see (9:41 a.m.-10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001), will be asked whether there were fighter jets in the vicinity of the plane when it crashed. He will reply, “[T]hat goes beyond the scope of what I can comment on.” (Air traffic controllers reportedly can lose their security clearances if they discuss the movements of military aircraft.) [CLEVELAND FREE TIMES, 9/6/2006] Entity Tags: Stacey Taylor, Anthony Kuczynski, Bill Keaton, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Paul Weaver Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(Before 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Breaks Up Prior to Crash? Flight 93 apparently starts to break up before it crashes, because debris is found very far away from the crash site. [PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, 11/15/2001] The plane is generally obliterated upon landing, except for one half-ton piece of engine found some distance away. Some reports indicate that the engine piece was found over a mile away. [INDEPENDENT, 8/13/2002] The FBI reportedly acknowledges that this piece was found “a considerable distance” from the crash site. [PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, 11/15/2001] Later, the FBI will cordon off a three-mile wide area around the crash, as well as another area six to eight miles from the initial crash site. [CNN, 9/13/2001] One story calls what happened to this engine “intriguing, because the heat-seeking, air-to-air Sidewinder missiles aboard an F-16 would likely target one of the Boeing 757’s two large engines.” [PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, 11/15/2001] Smaller debris fields are also found two, three, and eight miles away from the main crash site. [INDEPENDENT, 8/13/2002; MIRROR, 9/12/2002] Eight miles away, local media quote residents speaking of a second plane in the area and burning debris falling from the sky. [REUTERS, 9/13/2001] Residents outside Shanksville reported “discovering clothing, books, papers, and what appeared to be human remains. Some residents said they collected bags-full of items to be turned over to investigators. Others reported what appeared to be crash debris floating in Indian Lake, nearly six miles from the immediate crash scene. Workers at Indian Lake Marina said that they saw a cloud of confetti-like debris descend on the lake and nearby farms minutes after hearing the explosion…” [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/13/2001] Moments after the crash, Carol Delasko initially thinks someone had blown up a boat on Indian Lake: “It just looked like confetti raining down all over the air above the lake.” [PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 9/14/2001] Investigators say that far-off wreckage “probably was spread by the cloud created when the plane crashed and dispersed by a ten mph southeasterly wind.” [NEWS JOURNAL (WILMINGTON, DE), 9/16/2001] However, much of the wreckage is found sooner than that wind could have carried it, and not always southeast. Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Carol Delasko Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Key Day of 9/11 Events, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

10:05 a.m.-10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Alerted to Flight 93, Reportedly for the First Time The military liaison at the FAA’s Cleveland Center calls NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and alerts it to the hijacked Flight 93. According to the 9/11 Commission, this is the first notification NEADS receives about Flight 93, but it comes too late, since the plane has already crashed (see (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 30; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 46 ] 'Bomb on Board' Flight 93 - At 10:05 a.m., the military liaison at the Cleveland Center, who is unaware that Flight 93 has just crashed, calls NEADS to inform it that Flight 93 is heading toward Washington, DC. Even though communicating with NEADS is not one of his responsibilities, he wants to make sure it is in the loop. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 224] At NEADS, the call is answered by Tech Sergeant Shelley Watson. Shortly into the call, at 10:07, the military liaison tells her: “We got a United 93 out here. Are you aware of that?” He continues, “That has a bomb on board.” Watson asks: “A bomb on board? And this is confirmed? You have a mode three [beacon code], sir?” The military liaison replies, “No, we lost his transponder” (see (9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The news about Flight 93 is shouted out to Major Kevin Nasypany, the NEADS mission crew commander. Nasypany responds: “Gimme the call sign. Gimme the whole nine yards.… Let’s get some info, real quick. They got a bomb?” Liaison Wants Fighters Sent toward Flight 93 - The military liaison continues, asking Watson if NEADS scrambled fighter jets in response to Delta 1989, an aircraft that was mistakenly reported as having been hijacked (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). Watson replies: “We did. Out of Selfridge and Toledo” (see (9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 10:01 a.m. September 11, 2001), and says these jets are airborne. When the military liaison asks if the fighters can be directed to where Flight 93 is, Watson asks him if the Cleveland Center has latitude and longitude coordinates for this aircraft. The military liaison replies that he has not got this information available right now. All he knows is that Flight 93 has “got a confirmed bomb on board… and right now, his last known position was in the Westmoreland area.… Which is… in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, area.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] NEADS Searches on Radar - The news of a bomb on board Flight 93 spreads quickly at NEADS, and personnel there search for the aircraft’s primary return on their radar screens. But because the plane has already crashed, they will be unable to locate it. NEADS will only learn that Flight 93 has crashed at 10:15 a.m., during a call with the FAA’s Washington Center (see 10:15 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 30-31] FAA Failed to Notify Military Earlier - The Cleveland Center’s notification to NEADS about Flight 93 comes 39 minutes after the plane was hijacked (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and 33 minutes after FAA headquarters was alerted to the hijacking (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 11, 28] At the time NEADS is alerted to Flight 93, NORAD is similarly uninformed about this aircraft, according to the 9/11 Commission. The Commission will state, “At 10:07, its representative on the air threat conference call stated that NORAD had ‘no indication of a hijack heading to DC at this time.’” According to the Commission, the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon learned about the Flight 93 hijacking slightly earlier on, at 10:03 a.m. (see 10:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). However, the NMCC was notified by the White House, not the FAA. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42] A former senior FAA executive, speaking on condition of anonymity, will later try to explain why it takes the FAA so long to alert NEADS to Flight 93. He will say, “Our whole procedures prior to 9/11 were that you turned everything [regarding a hijacking] over to the FBI.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Yet military instructions contradict this, stating, “In the event of a hijacking, the NMCC will be notified by the most expeditious means by the FAA.” [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 7/31/1997 ; US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 6/1/2001 ] NORAD Commanders Claim Earlier Awareness of Flight 93 - Two senior NORAD officials will contradict the 9/11 Commission’s conclusion, and claim they were aware of Flight 93 well before it crashed (see Before 9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (9:36 a.m.-10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 68, 71-73] Colonel Robert Marr, the NEADS battle commander, will tell the Commission that, while the flight was still airborne, “his focus was on UAL 93, which was circling over Chicago,” and he “distinctly remembers watching the flight UAL 93 come west, and turn over Cleveland.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/27/2003 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/23/2004 ] Major General Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental US NORAD Region, will recall, “[W]e watched the [Flight] 93 track as it meandered around the Ohio-Pennsylvania area and started to turn south toward DC.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 71] Entity Tags: Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Kevin Nasypany, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Shelley Watson Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

10:05 a.m.-11:05 a.m. September 11, 2001: Andrews Air Force Base Tower Broadcasts Warnings that Planes Could Be Shot Down The air traffic control tower at Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington, DC, broadcasts regular warnings over radio that any aircraft entering the restricted airspace around the capital will be shot down, even though, according to the 9/11 Commission, the president does not authorize the shooting down of threatening aircraft until 10:18 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/11/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 41] The Andrews control tower begins broadcasting warning messages over the Air Traffic Information System (ATIS) at 10:05 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/11/2004 ] The ATIS is an automatic information system over which “[p]re-recorded airfield advisory information is automatically transmitted at timed intervals over the airways on a specific frequency.” [US AIR FORCE, 10/1/1999 ] Planes Told They Could Be 'Shot Down' - A 9/11 Commission document summarizing key transmissions from the Andrews tower will show that warning messages are broadcast about once or twice every 10 minutes. The messages, which are all quite similar, include: “No fly notice. Remain clear of Andrews Class B airspace or you will be shot down,” and, “Any aircraft monitoring Andrews Approach Control frequency: remain clear of Andrews Class B airspace or you will be shot down.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004] (Class B airspace is restricted airspace in which no one is supposed to fly without a working transponder and permission from an air traffic controller. The airspace around much of Washington is designated Class B airspace. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/29/2001] ) Fighter Pilots Hear Warning - At least one of the warning messages is heard by District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) fighter pilots who launch from Andrews Air Force Base at 10:42 a.m. (see 10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001) and by pilots launched from Langley Air Force Base by NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) earlier on (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). DCANG pilots Marc Sasseville and Heather Penney Garcia are flying at low altitude over Washington, while the three Langley pilots are above them at around 20,000 feet. Although they are on different radio frequencies, both sets of pilots hear a message over a shared channel: “Attention all aircraft monitoring Andrews tower frequency. Andrews and Class Bravo airspace is closed. No general aviation aircraft are permitted to enter Class Bravo airspace. Any infractions will be shot down.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 82] Officers Hear Warning - The warning messages are also heard by DCANG officers at Andrews. After hearing that violators of the Washington airspace will be shot down, Brigadier General David Wherley thinks to himself, “I guess that will be us doing the shooting.” [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 446] Apparently referring to the warnings from the Andrews tower, Lieutenant Colonel Phil Thompson will later recall: “We kind of winced at that, because there are plenty of hard reasons to not shoot somebody down. We were really in an ID posture—and trying to really be careful.” [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002] Shootdown Not Authorized until 10:18 - Although the first of the warnings is broadcast at 10:05 a.m., President Bush only gives authorization for hostile aircraft to be shot down at 10:18 a.m., according to the 9/11 Commission, in a phone call with Vice President Dick Cheney (see 10:18 a.m.-10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001). Furthermore, NEADS only learns that NORAD has been given clearance to shoot down threatening aircraft at 10:31 a.m. (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). The 9/11 Commission document of Andrews tower transmissions will show that the warnings are broadcast until at least 11:05 a.m., although presumably they continue after that. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 41-42] Entity Tags: District of Columbia Air National Guard, Heather Penney Garcia, Marc Sasseville, Phil Thompson, David Wherley, Andrews Air Force Base Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

10:06 a.m.-10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001: Some NEADS Staff and Others Uncertain Whether Day’s Training Exercise Is Over Tape recordings of the operations floor at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) indicate that some military personnel are uncertain whether a training exercise that was being conducted on this day has been canceled. NEADS has been participating in a major exercise called Vigilant Guardian. [NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, 1/25/2002] This was reportedly called off “shortly after” the second WTC tower was hit at 9:03 (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [AIRMAN, 3/2002] But at 10:06, someone calls NEADS and asks, “Is the exercise knocked off?” to which they are told, “Yes.” Two minutes later, a member of the NEADS staff is heard saying, “If this is an exercise input, this is a good one.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001] It is around this time that NEADS is first alerted to Flight 93 (although this plane has already crashed) (see 10:05 a.m.-10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001) and also hears a report of an unidentified aircraft over the White House (see 10:07 a.m. September 11, 2001). So presumably it is one of these incidents that is considered a possible “exercise input,” meaning a simulated scenario. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

(10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Crashes into Filled-in Mine in Pennsylvania Countryside

Flight 93 crashed in the Pennsylvania countryside. Resue vehicles arrive in the distance. [Source: Keith Srakocic/ Associated Press] Flight 93 crashes into an empty field just north of the Somerset County Airport, about 80 miles southeast of Pittsburgh, 124 miles or 15 minutes from Washington, D.C. [CNN, 9/12/2001; NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; MSNBC, 9/3/2002] The point of impact is a reclaimed coal mine, known locally as the Diamond T Mine, that was reportedly abandoned in 1996. [PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 9/12/2001; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/12/2001; PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 9/11/2002] Being “reclaimed” means the earth had been excavated down to the coal seam, the coal removed, and then the earth replaced and planted over. [KASHURBA, 2002, PP. 121] A US Army authorized seismic study times the crash at five seconds after 10:06 a.m. [KIM AND BAUM, 2002 ; SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 12/9/2002] As mentioned previously, the timing of this crash is disputed and it may well occur at 10:03 a.m., 10:07 a.m., or 10:10 a.m. Entity Tags: NBC, San Francisco Chronicle Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Key Day of 9/11 Events, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

(Before and After 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Witnesses See Low-Flying, Small White Jet at Flight 93 Crash Site

Looking straight down onto the Flight 93 crash site. North is to the top. Note the impact point north of the road, and the burned trees to the south of it. [Source: FBI] A second plane, described “as a small, white jet with rear engines and no discernible markings,” is seen by at least ten witnesses flying low and in erratic patterns, not much above treetop level, over the crash site within minutes of United Flight 93 crashing. [INDEPENDENT, 8/13/2002] Lee Purbaugh: “I didn’t get a good look but it was white and it circled the area about twice and then it flew off over the horizon.” [MIRROR, 9/12/2002] Susan Mcelwain: Less than a minute before the Flight 93 crash rocked the countryside, she sees a small white jet with rear engines and no discernible markings swoop low over her minivan near an intersection and disappear over a hilltop, nearly clipping the tops of trees lining the ridge. [BERGEN RECORD, 9/14/2001] She later adds, “There’s no way I imagined this plane—it was so low it was virtually on top of me. It was white with no markings but it was definitely military, it just had that look. It had two rear engines, a big fin on the back like a spoiler on the back of a car and with two upright fins at the side. I haven’t found one like it on the Internet. It definitely wasn’t one of those executive jets. The FBI came and talked to me and said there was no plane around.… But I saw it and it was there before the crash and it was 40 feet above my head. They did not want my story—nobody here did.” [MIRROR, 9/12/2002] John Fleegle and two work colleagues arrive at the crash site “before any fireman or paramedics or anybody.” According to Fleegle, “When we got there, there was a plane flying up above and he was smart, he flew straight for the sun so you couldn’t look at it and see exactly what type of plane, if it was a fighter or what it was.” However, Fleegle claims the plane “was decent sized. It wasn’t just a little private jet or something like that, from what we could see.” [LAPPE AND MARSHALL, 2004, PP. 35-36] Dennis Decker and/or Rick Chaney, say: “As soon as we looked up [after hearing the Flight 93 crash], we saw a midsized jet flying low and fast. It appeared to make a loop or part of a circle, and then it turned fast and headed out.” Decker and Chaney described the plane as a Learjet type, with engines mounted near the tail and painted white with no identifying markings. “It was a jet plane, and it had to be flying real close when that 757 went down. If I was the FBI, I’d find out who was driving that plane.” [BERGEN RECORD, 9/14/2001] Kathy Blades, who is staying about quarter of a mile from the impact site, runs outside after the crash and sees a jet, “with sleek back wings and an angled cockpit,” race overhead. [PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, 11/18/2001] Anna Ruth Fisher says, “After the crash, another jet went near over to look.” Her mother, Anna B. Fisher, adds, “We were looking at the smoke cloud when we saw the jets circling up there.” [KASHURBA, 2002, PP. 27] Jim Brandt sees a small plane with no markings stay about one or two minutes over the crash site before leaving. [PITTSBURGH CHANNEL, 9/12/2001] Bob Page sees a large plane circling the crash site for about two or three minutes, before climbing almost vertically into the sky. He cannot see what kind of plane it is or if there are any markings on it, but says, “It sure wasn’t no puddle jumper.” [PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 9/12/2001] Tom Spinelli: “I saw the white plane. It was flying around all over the place like it was looking for something. I saw it before and after the crash.” [MIRROR, 9/12/2002] The FBI later claims this was a Fairchild Falcon 20 business jet, directed after the crash to fly from 37,000 feet to 5,000 feet and obtain the coordinates for the crash site to help rescuers (see 10:07 a.m. September 11, 2001). [PITTSBURGH CHANNEL, 9/15/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/16/2001] The FBI also says there was a C-130 military cargo aircraft flying at 24,000 feet about 17 miles away (see 10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001), but that plane wasn’t armed and had no role in the crash. [PITTSBURGH CHANNEL, 9/15/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/16/2001] Note that this is the same C-130 that flies very close to Flight 77 right as that planes crashes into the Pentagon (see 9.36 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Anna B Fisher, Dennis Decker, Anna Ruth Fisher, Bob Page, Susan Mcelwain, Kathy Blades, Federal Bureau of Investigation, John Fleegle, Tom Spinelli, Lee Purbaugh, Jim Brandt, Rick Chaney Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

Before 10:07 a.m. September 11, 2001: Military Liaison Learns of Hijacking of Flight 93 The military liaison at the FAA’s Cleveland Center is informed that Flight 93 has been hijacked and is given information about its location. It is unclear when the liaison first receives this information, but it must happen before 10:07, as he telephones NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) at this time to pass on the information (see 10:05 a.m.-10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 30] Military liaison officers at the FAA’s Command Center are also said to be informed of the hijacking of Flight 93 (see After 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Local Resident Captures ‘One-of-a-Kind’ Photo of Flight 93 Crash Explosion A local resident is able to take the only photo showing the Flight 93 crash in the seconds after the plane went down. Val McClatchey lives just over a mile away from the crash site. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 9/12/2006] She is at home watching television when she hears the surge of a plane engine, sees a silver flash outside, and then hears a loud boom that causes her house to shake. Luckily she has her new digital camera ready by her door. She was planning to photograph a friend who had promised to fly over in a helicopter on this day. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 6/29/2003; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 8/6/2006; TRIBUNE-DEMOCRAT (JOHNSTOWN), 9/9/2006] She grabs it and from her front porch manages to take a picture of the smoke cloud rising into the sky, “approximately five seconds after impact,” she says. [PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 9/11/2002; WINDSOR PARK STORIES, 3/23/2003] Her photo will appear in numerous newspapers and magazines. According to the FBI, it is the only known image taken within seconds of the crash. Considering the sparsely populated area in which Flight 93 went down, Pittsburgh FBI agent Jeff Killeen calls it “one-of-a-kind.” [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 8/6/2006; TRIBUNE-DEMOCRAT (JOHNSTOWN), 9/9/2006; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 9/12/2006] Entity Tags: Val McClatchey Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

(10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Nearby Cottage Destroyed When Flight 93 Crashes The local structure most severely damaged when Flight 93 crashes in rural Pennsylvania is a stone cottage, an estimated 1,000 feet from the crash site. Located within thick trees, the cottage belongs to Barry Hoover who is away at work at the time of the crash. Reportedly, “every window and door” has been “blown off and obliterated, its ceilings and floor tiles had been blasted loose and much of the interior was wrecked.” Hoover describes it as “like what you see after a tornado or hurricane goes through—a total ruin.” The garage adjacent to it has its door blown off by the shockwave from the crash. According to Somerset County Solicitor Dan Rullo, “The way it was described to me was that it must have been blown up, the springs snapped, and it came back upside down.” The surrounding area is scattered with remains and debris. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/14/2001; KASHURBA, 2002, PP. 122; WASHINGTON POST, 5/12/2002] Entity Tags: Barry Hoover Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

After 10:06 a.m. September 11, 2001: Emergency Dispatch Reports Second Suspicious Plane Heading Toward Johnstown Airport? Soon after Flight 93 has crashed, Sherry Stalley, who is a reporter with a Johnstown, Pennsylvania, television station, is traveling in a car and hears a dispatch over the scanner (a type of radio receiver used by reporters), reporting that apparently another plane, possibly with a bomb onboard, is heading towards the Johnstown airport (located about 14 miles north of the Flight 93 crash site). According to Stalley, “The scanner was jammed with talk. Emergency crews and firefighters were being sent to the airport. Police were being dispatched to shut down roads. Every available unit within a thirty-mile radius was asked to help.” [GILBERT ET AL., 2002, PP. 111] The control tower at the Johnstown airport was evacuated at around 10 a.m., following reports of a suspect aircraft heading towards it (see (Between 9:40 and 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Sherry Stalley Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

(After 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Michigan Fighters Diverted Toward Flight 1989 At some point after Flight 93 crashes, NORAD diverts “unarmed Michigan Air National Guard fighter jets that happened to be flying a training mission in northern Michigan since the time of the first attack.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/30/2002] The 9/11 Commission concludes these fighters and fighters from Ohio are scrambled for Delta Flight 1989, a flight that was never hijacked or even out of contact. Meanwhile, reportedly, no fighters are scrambled after Flight 93 at all, which has already crashed. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(After 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Fighter Said to Fly Past Flight 93 Crash Site “Up above, a fighter jet streak[s] by,” just after Flight 93 crashes, according to ABC News. [ABC NEWS, 9/15/2002] It isn’t clear what evidence this ABC News claim is based on. There are other accounts of a fighter or fighters in the area before the crash, mentioned previously. Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

(10:07 a.m.-10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Headquarters Learns of Smoke Plume Rising at Flight 93’s Last Known Location

Hank Krakowski. [Source: Unisys] After seeing Flight 93’s radar track stopping over Pennsylvania, a senior United Airlines official contacts an airport in that area and receives confirmation of what appears to be an airplane crash nearby. Along with other United Airlines managers, Hank Krakowski, United’s director of flight operations, has just been watching Flight 93 on a large screen in the crisis center at the airline’s headquarters, outside Chicago (see (9:36 a.m.-10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). A dispatcher has determined the plane’s last position was south of Johnstown, Pennsylvania, so Krakowski tries phoning the Johnstown airport. However, due to an apparent power failure, there is no reply. He has to call the airport manager’s cell phone number. He asks the manager: “We might have a plane down in your area there. See anything unusual?” The manager reports a black smoke plume visible about 30 miles to the south of the airport. Krakowski thinks, “We just watched one of our airplanes crash.” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 214; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Therefore, by 10:15 a.m. according to the 9/11 Commission, United Airlines headquarters has “confirmed that an aircraft [has] crashed near Johnstown, Pennsylvania, and [it] believed that this was Flight 93.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 47 ] Entity Tags: United Airlines, Hank Krakowski Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

(After 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Witnesses Report Lack of Plane Wreckage at Flight 93 Crash Scene

The Flight 93 crater later in the morning. Notice the destruction of the airplane is nearly total. [Source: Associated Press] Numerous individuals who see the Flight 93 crash site describe a lack of plane wreckage: Jon Meyer, a reporter with WJAC-TV, says, “I was able to get right up to the edge of the crater.… All I saw was a crater filled with small, charred plane parts. Nothing that would even tell you that it was the plane.… There were no suitcases, no recognizable plane parts, no body parts. The crater was about 30 to 35 feet deep.” [NEWSEUM ET AL., 2002, PP. 148] According to Mark Stahl, who goes to the crash scene, “There’s a crater gouged in the earth, the plane is pretty much disintegrated. There’s nothing left but scorched trees.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001] Frank Monaco of the Pennsylvania State Police says, “If you would go down there, it would look like a trash heap. There’s nothing but tiny pieces of debris. It’s just littered with small pieces.” [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/12/2001] Scott Spangler, a photographer with a local newspaper, says, “I didn’t think I was in the right place. I was looking for a wing or a tail. There was nothing, just this pit.… I was looking for anything that said tail, wing, plane, metal. There was nothing.” [NEWSEUM ET AL., 2002, PP. 149] According to Ron Delano, a local who rushes to the scene after hearing about the crash, “If they hadn’t told us a plane had wrecked, you wouldn’t have known. It looked like it hit and disintegrated.” [PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 9/12/2001] Gabrielle DeRose, a news anchor with KDKA-TV, views the crash site from a hill overlooking it. She says, “It was very disturbing to think all the remains just disintegrated…. There were no large pieces of airplane, no human remains, no baggage.” [SYLVESTER AND HUFFMAN, 2002, PP. 160-161] Local assistant volunteer fire chief Rick King, who sees the crater at the crash site, says, “Never in my wildest dreams did I think half the plane was down there.” King sends his men into the woods to search for the plane’s fuselage, but they keep coming back and telling him, “Rick. There’s nothing.” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 216] Bob Craig of the FBI’s evidence-gathering team later explains what is supposed to have occurred: “Turn the picture of the second plane hitting the World Trade Center on its side, and, for all intents and purposes, the face of the building is the strip mine in Shanksville [where Flight 93 crashed].” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 260] When the plane’s two black boxes are later discovered (see September 13-14, 2001), they are reportedly found 15 and 25 feet inside the crater. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 217; WASHINGTON POST, 5/12/2002] Entity Tags: Gabrielle DeRose, Frank Monaco, Scott Spangler, Ron Delano, Jon Meyer, Mark Stahl, Rick King Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Key Day of 9/11 Events, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

10:07 a.m. September 11, 2001: Langley Pilot Reports Aircraft over White House, Asks NEADS for Instructions

NEADS personnel who are on duty the morning of 9/11. [Source: Vanity Fair] (click image to enlarge) One of the pilots that took off from Langley Air Force Base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) calls NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) to relay information he has received about an aircraft over the White House, and is promptly instructed to intercept this aircraft. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Borgstrom Wants Instructions - The three F-16s that took off from Langley Air Force Base are now flying in the Baltimore-Washington area. They have just heard a warning over the radio that errant aircraft will be shot down, and received an instruction from the Secret Service to protect the White House (see (10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The FAA’s Washington Center also notified them of a suspicious aircraft flying at high speed toward the White House. In response, pilot Craig Borgstrom radios NEADS and asks weapons director Steve Citino for instructions on what to do. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 222-223] Borgstrom says: “Baltimore [the Washington Center] is saying something about an aircraft over the White House. Any words?” Citino replies: “Negative. Stand by,” and then relays Borgstrom’s message to Major James Fox, the leader of the NEADS weapons team. Fox then notifies Major Kevin Nasypany, the NEADS mission crew commander, of the aircraft over the White House. Ordered to Intercept - Instinctively, Nasypany responds, “Intercept!” and he then elaborates, “Intercept and divert that aircraft away from there.” Citino passes this instruction to the Langley fighters, telling them their mission is to “intercept aircraft over White House. Use FAA for guidance.” Fox then adds: “Divert the aircraft away from the White House. Intercept and divert it.” Borgstrom confirms the order, saying, “Divert the aircraft.” Unidentified Aircraft a False Alarm - As the F-16s head for the White House, the NEADS controllers are unable to find the building on their dated equipment, and also have trouble communicating with the Langley pilots. NEADS personnel speculate that the unidentified object is probably just a helicopter or smoke from the burning Pentagon. Minutes later, the suspect aircraft will be realized to probably be one of the Langley fighters, mistakenly reported by a Washington Center air traffic controller who was unaware of the military’s scrambles. Citino will comment: “That was cool. We intercepted our own guys.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Kevin Nasypany, Steve Citino, Craig Borgstrom, James Fox Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

After 10:06 a.m. September 11, 2001: Paper Debris Survives Flight 93 Crash

Paper debris found in New Baltimore, six miles from the crash site. [Source: Steve Mellon / Pittsburgh Post-Gazette] (click image to enlarge) Despite the apparent lack of plane wreckage and human remains at the Flight 93 crash site (see (After 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 10:45 a.m. September 11, 2001), a large amount of paper debris is found there, mostly intact. Faye Hahn, an EMT who responds to the initial call for help, finds “pieces of mail” everywhere. [MCCALL, 2002, PP. 31-32] Roger Bailey of the Somerset Volunteer Fire Department finds mail “scattered everywhere” around the site. He says, “I guess there were 5,000 pounds of mail on board.” [KASHURBA, 2002, PP. 38] Some envelopes are burned, but others are undamaged. Flight 93 had reportedly been carrying a cargo of thousands of pounds of US mail. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 213-214] Whether this is later examined as crime scene evidence is unclear: According to Bailey, over subsequent days, whenever a lot of this mail has been recovered, the post office will be called and a truck will come to take it away. Several of the first responders at the crash site also see an unscorched bible lying open on the ground, about 15 yards from the crash crater. [KASHURBA, 2002, PP. 43, 110 AND 129; ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, 6/13/2006] Local coroner Wallace Miller will later come across a second bible at the warehouse where the Flight 93 victims’ belongings are kept. [WASHINGTON POST, 5/12/2002] Other paper debris rains down on the nearby Indian Lake Marina (see (Before 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to witness Tom Spinelli, this is “mainly mail,” and also includes “bits of in-flight magazine.” [MIRROR, 9/12/2002] Other paper items will be recovered from the crash site in the following days. These include a fragment of Ziad Jarrah’s passport and a business card linking al-Qaeda conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui to the 9/11 hijackers. [CNN, 8/1/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 9/25/2002] A flight crew log book and an in-flight manual belonging to Lorraine Bay, a flight attendant on Flight 93, will also be recovered. [NATIONAL MUSEUM OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 9/20/2003] Entity Tags: Tom Spinelli, Faye Hahn, Roger Bailey Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

(After 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Richard Clarke Updated on Fighter Situation, Told Flight 93 Still Headed toward Washington Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke is told by White House Situation Room Deputy Director Ralph Seigler, “Secret Service reports a hostile aircraft ten minutes out.” Two minutes later, he is given an update: “Hostile aircraft eight minutes out.” In actual fact, when Flight 93 crashed at 10:06 a.m., it was still about 15 minutes away from Washington. Clarke is also told that there are 3,900 aircraft still in the air over the continental US (which is roughly accurate); four of those aircraft are believed to be piloted by terrorists (which is inaccurate by this time). Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Richard Myers then reports: “We have three F-16s from Langley over the Pentagon. Andrews is launching fighters from the DC Air National Guard. We have fighters aloft from the Michigan Air National Guard, moving east toward a potential hostile over Pennsylvania. Six fighters from Tyndall and Ellington are en route to rendezvous with Air Force One over Florida. They will escort it to Barksdale.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; CLARKE, 2004, PP. 8-9] However, fighters do not meet up with Air Force One until about an hour later (see (11:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Franklin Miller, a senior national security official who is working alongside Clarke on 9/11, and another official who is also in the Situation Room, will later fail to recall hearing any warning that a plane could be only minutes away. [NEW YORK TIMES, 3/30/2004] The time of this incident is unstated, but the Michigan fighters are not diverted until after 10:06 a.m. (see (After 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). If it takes place after 10:06 a.m., this would parallel similar warnings about Flight 93 after it has already crashed provided to Vice President Dick Cheney elsewhere in the White House (see (Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Secret Service, Richard B. Myers, Franklin Miller, Ralph Seigler, Richard A. Clarke Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Richard Clarke

10:07 a.m. September 11, 2001: Business Jet Asked to Help Locate Flight 93 Crash Site

Falcon 20 business jet. [Source: Portuguese Air Force] According to some accounts, following a request from the FAA’s Cleveland Center, a Fairchild Falcon 20 business jet reports seeing puffs of smoke in the area of Flight 93’s last known position. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/16/2001; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ] The FBI later says the business jet was within 20 miles of Flight 93 when it crashed, at an altitude of 37,000 feet, and on its way to Johnstown. It was asked to descend to 5,000 feet to help locate the crash site for the benefit of the responding emergency crews. [PITTSBURGH CHANNEL, 9/15/2001] Stacey Taylor appears to be the Cleveland Center controller who made the request. She later recalls: “I had another airplane [other than Flight 93] that I was working. And I told him, I said, ‘Sir,’ I said, ‘I think we have an aircraft down.’ I said, ‘This is entirely up to you, but if you’d be willing to fly over the last place that we spotted this airplane—and see if you can see anything.‘… So he flew over and at first he didn’t see anything and then he said, ‘We see a great big plume or a cloud of smoke.’” [MSNBC, 9/9/2006] The business jet belongs to VF Corp, a Greensboro, North Carolina clothing firm. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/16/2001] According to David Newell, VF Corp’s director of aviation and travel, Cleveland Center contacted the plane’s copilot Yates Gladwell when it was at an altitude “in the neighborhood of 3,000 to 4,000 ft,” rather than 37,000 feet, as claimed by the FBI. He will add: “They got down within 1,500 ft. of the ground when they circled. They saw a hole in the ground with smoke coming out of it. They pinpointed the location and then continued on.” [POPULAR MECHANICS, 3/2005] This incident occurs around 40 minutes after the FAA initiated a nationwide ground stop, which required planes in the air to land as soon as reasonable (see (9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [TIME, 9/14/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 25] The FBI will claim the VF Corp business jet is probably the plane some witnesses on the ground see up above, shortly after the crash of Flight 93 (see (Before and After 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [PITTSBURGH CHANNEL, 9/15/2001] However, at least two witnesses say they saw a plane overhead even before the time of the Flight 93 crash, and one of them describes it as “definitely military,” rather than a business jet. Also, some will describe it as flying much lower than the Falcon 20 was—just “40 feet above my head,” according to one witness. [BERGEN RECORD, 9/14/2001; MIRROR, 9/12/2002] Entity Tags: Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Stacey Taylor, Yates Gladwell Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

(Shortly After 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: CIA Director Tenet Tells Vice President Cheney Attackers Are ‘Done for the Day’ At some unspecified time, apparently relatively soon after Flight 93 crashed, Vice President Dick Cheney calls CIA Director George Tenet and asks him if he is anticipating any further attacks. Tenet replies, “No. My judgment is that they’re done for the day.” Tenet will later explain his reasoning behind this judgment: “There was a lull in the action, and to me that was telling.… I had no data to go on. But the pattern of spectacular multiple attacks within a very tight attack window was consistent with what we knew of al-Qaeda’s modus operandi based on the East African embassy attacks and others. Events happened within a strict timeline, and then they were done.” Yet at 10 a.m., Tenet had wanted the CIA headquarters evacuated, following reports that several airplanes were not responding to communications and were perhaps heading toward Washington. A large number of the CIA’s workforce had therefore been sent home (see (9:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [TENET, 2007, PP. 164 AND 167] And according to recordings of the operations floor at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) later obtained by Vanity Fair magazine, “inside NEADS there was no sense that the attack was over with the crash of United 93; instead, the alarms go on and on. False reports of hijackings, and real responses, continue well into the afternoon” (see 10:15 a.m. and After September 11, 2001). [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Tenet and his staff will return to the CIA headquarters building at around 1 p.m. after having earlier evacuated to the CIA’s printing plant nearby. By that time, Tenet will say, “The danger was over for the day, in our estimation.” [TENET, 2007, PP. 168] Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Dick Cheney

(After 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: CIA Receives Passenger Lists From Hijacked Planes After Initial Problems At some unspecified time after when Flight 93 crashed, CIA Director George Tenet receives the passenger lists for the hijacked planes. He is currently in the CIA’s printing plant, after having evacuated the agency’s headquarters building (see (9:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). An analyst from the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC) has raced across to the plant with the list, and says, “Some of these guys on one of the planes are the ones we’ve been looking for in the last few weeks.” He specifically points at the names Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi (two of the alleged Flight 77 hijackers). According to Tenet, this is “the first time we had absolute proof of what I had been virtually certain of from the moment I heard about the attacks: we were in the middle of an al-Qaeda plot.” Tenet will later say that after the CTC had first “requested passenger lists from the planes that had been turned into weapons that morning… the initial response from some parts of the bureaucracy (which parts since mercifully forgotten) was that the manifests could not be shared with CIA. There were privacy issues involved.” They were only obtained after some “gentle reasoning, and a few four-letter words.” [TENET, 2007, PP. 167] The agency that provided these lists to the CTC may have been the Customs Office of Intelligence. According to Robert Bonner, the commissioner-designate of US Customs, “through an evaluation of data related to the passengers manifest for the four terrorist hijacked aircraft, Customs Office of Intelligence was able to identify the likely terrorist hijackers. Within 45 minutes of the attacks, Customs forwarded the passenger lists with the names of the victims and 19 probable hijackers to the FBI and the intelligence community” (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004] Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke will claim he was told as early as 9:59 a.m. that the FBI had received the passenger manifests from the airlines (see (9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 13-14] Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, George J. Tenet Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

10:07 a.m. September 11, 2001: Police Helicopter Reports Top of North Tower ‘Glowing Red’; Says Collapse is ‘Inevitable’

A helicopter flying above the burning World Trade Center. [Source: History Channel] Minutes after the collapse of the south WTC tower, police helicopters fly near the North Tower to check on its condition. The pilot of one helicopter radios, “About 15 floors down from the top, it looks like its glowing red,” and adds, “It’s inevitable.” Seconds later, another helicopter pilot reports, “I don’t think this has too much longer to go. I would evacuate all people within the area of that second building.” While these warnings are relayed to police officers, fire and rescue personnel do not hear them, as they operate on a different radio system. [NEW YORK TIMES, 7/7/2002; INTER PRESS SERVICE, 8/25/2005; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 224 ] The North Tower will collapse 21 minutes later (see 10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: World Trade Center, New York City Police Department Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

(10:06 a.m.-10:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FBI Informed of Plane Crash; Agents Head to Flight 93 Crash Scene Wells Morrison is the supervisory special agent in charge of the FBI’s Mon Valley Resident Agency, a satellite of the bureau’s Pittsburgh field office. [PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 4/13/2003] He receives a call informing him that a plane has crashed in Somerset County. Another phone call informs him that Westmoreland County 911 received a call saying a plane had been hijacked. (This is the call believed to have been from Flight 93 passenger Edward Felt (see 9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001).) He sends an agent out, who quickly seizes the tape of the call from the emergency dispatchers. Morrison also has agents sent to the Flight 93 crash site and subsequently goes there himself, being one of the first FBI agents to arrive at the scene. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; KASHURBA, 2002, PP. 109-110] Patrick Madigan of the Pennsylvania State Police, who arrives at the crash site around 10:20 a.m., says the first FBI agent gets there soon after him. Initially, four or five FBI agents will be there. [DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, 2002 ; KASHURBA, 2002, PP. 60 AND 110] In the subsequent days, about 150 agents will be involved in the recovery effort (see (September 11-27, 2001)). [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 259] As it is a crime scene, the FBI is in charge of the Flight 93 crash site and the subsequent investigation. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 11/4/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 2/17/2002] Entity Tags: Patrick Madigan, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Wells Morrison Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

(After 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Richard Clarke Told of Flight 93 Crash Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke is told by an aide, “United 93 is down, crashed outside of Pittsburgh. It’s odd. Appears not to have hit anything much on the ground.” The timing of this event is unclear. [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 14-15] Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Richard Clarke

(After 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: President Bush Is Told of Flight 93 Crash, Wonders If It Was Shot Down President Bush is told that Flight 93 crashed a few minutes after it happened, but the exact timing of this notice is unclear. Because of Vice President Cheney’s earlier order, he asks, “Did we shoot it down or did it crash?” Several hours later, he is assured that it crashed. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, George Bush

(After 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Al-Qaeda Agents Heard Saying ‘We’ve Hit the Targets’ According to Newsweek, “shortly after the suicide attacks,” US intelligence picks up communications among bin Laden associates relaying the message: “we’ve hit the targets.” [NEWSWEEK, 9/13/2001] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, US intelligence Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Informed that Flight 93 Has Crashed, Confirms Crash Nine Minutes Later According to the 9/11 Commission, the FAA Command Center reports to FAA headquarters at this time that Flight 93 has crashed in the Pennsylvania countryside. “It hit the ground. That’s what they’re speculating, that’s speculation only.” The Command Center confirms that Flight 93 crashed at 10:17 a.m. [GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(10:08 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NORAD Commanders Arnold and Marr Consider Possibility of Shootdown Authorization Two senior NORAD officials, Colonel Robert Marr and Major General Larry Arnold, have to address the possibility of issuing shootdown authorization to fighter jets under their command, after a report is received about an aircraft over the White House. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 224-225] Aircraft over White House - Marr, the battle commander at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) in Rome, New York, is in the NEADS battle cab. On the NEADS operations floor, mission crew commander Major Kevin Nasypany has just learned of a report of an aircraft flying over the White House (see 10:07 a.m. September 11, 2001), and now talks to Marr over the phone. Nasypany asks: “Okay, did you hear that? Aircraft over the White House. What’s the word? Intercept and what else?” Marr has a phone to each ear and does not hear what Nasypany says. Nasypany therefore repeats, “Aircraft… over… the White House!” pausing on each word for emphasis. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 224] Commanders Discuss Shootdown Order - The news of an aircraft over the White House forces Marr and Arnold, with whom he has been communicating, to address the issue of authorizing the shooting down of aircraft. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 225] Arnold, the commander of NORAD’s Continental US Region (CONR), is at the CONR air operations center at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida. [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002] According to author Lynn Spencer, he has not yet received any instructions from his higher-ups regarding shootdown authorization. “He talked to Major General Rick Findley,” who is at NORAD’s operations center in Colorado, “and asked him to get shootdown authority from the vice president, but he’s still heard nothing back.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 225] Arnold Possibly Authorizes Shootdown - Arnold will later tell author Leslie Filson that he has “the authority in case of an emergency to declare a target hostile and shoot it down under an emergency condition.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 75] But according to Vanity Fair, he only passes the current request for rules of engagement further up his chain of command. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] However, Spencer will claim otherwise, stating, “In light of the imminent attack on the White House,” Arnold “decides he will exercise the authority he has to protect the nation in an emergency.” He tells Marr: “We will intercept and attempt to divert. If we can’t, then we’ll shoot it down.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 225] Alleged Shootdown Authorization Not Passed On - Minutes later, though, Nasypany will tell his staff that the pilots that took off from Langley Air Force Base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) have “negative clearance to shoot” aircraft over Washington (see 10:10 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 31] And according to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS only learns that NORAD has been given clearance to shoot down threatening aircraft at 10:31 a.m., and even then it does not pass this order along to the fighter pilots under its command (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42-43] Entity Tags: Larry Arnold, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Kevin Nasypany, Robert Marr Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001: Guards Surround the White House Armed agents deploy around the White House. [CNN, 9/12/2001] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001: Military Cargo Plane Pilot Asked to Verify Flight 93 Crash

Lt. Col. Steve O’Brien standing in front of a C-130. [Source: CBC] Cleveland Center air traffic controller Stacey Taylor has asked a nearby C-130 pilot to look at Flight 93’s last position and see if he can find anything. Remarkably, this C-130 pilot, Lt. Col. Steve O’Brien, is the same pilot who was asked by air traffic control to observe Flight 77 as it crashed into the Pentagon earlier on (see 9.36 a.m. September 11, 2001). O’Brien tells Taylor that he saw smoke from the crash shortly after the hijacked plane went down. [GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] An article in the London Independent will later suggest that Flight 93 might have been brought down by the US military using “electronic warfare applications” that can disrupt the mechanisms of an airplane (See August 13, 2002); it will refer to this C-130, since “in 1995 the Air Force installed ‘electronic suites’ in at least 28 of its C-130s—capable, among other things, of emitting lethal jamming signals.” [INDEPENDENT, 8/13/2002] Entity Tags: Stacey Taylor, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Steve O’Brien Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

10:10 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Personnel Told Langley Fighters Cannot Shoot Down Hijacked Planes The mission crew commander at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) tells members of his staff that the fighter jets launched from Langley Air Force Base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) have “negative clearance to shoot” aircraft over Washington. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2003; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 226-227] Marr Does Not Pass on Authorization - NEADS battle commander Colonel Robert Marr has just been talking on the phone with Major General Larry Arnold, the commander of NORAD’s Continental US Region, and the two men have discussed whether fighters should be authorized to shoot down hostile aircraft (see (10:08 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to author Lynn Spencer, Arnold told Marr that if a suspicious aircraft cannot be diverted, “then we’ll shoot it down.” However, this is not the instruction that Marr then passes on to Major Kevin Nasypany, the NEADS mission crew commander. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 225-227] Marr will later tell the 9/11 Commission that at this time, he “may have had the authority” to order a plane shot down, “but he never gave [Nasypany] clearance to fire.” Marr “does not believe at this point there was a clearance to ‘kill.’” [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/23/2004 ] Order Issued: 'Negative Clearance to Fire' - Nasypany relays the instructions Marr gives him to those on the operations floor, saying: “Negative. Negative clearance to shoot.” He then adds: “ID. Type. Tail.” This means the orders are for fighter jets to identify aircraft by their type and tail number, and nothing more. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 46-47 ; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] About a minute later, Nasypany’s instructions will be passed to the Langley pilots (see 10:11 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2003] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Robert Marr, Kevin Nasypany Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Vice President Cheney Is Told that Flight 93 Is Still Heading to Washington, Orders It Shot Down

Dick Cheney in the White House bunker, speaking to administration officials including (from left) Joshua Bolten, Karen Hughes, Mary Matalin (standing), Condoleezza Rice and I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby. [Source: David Bohrer / White House] (click image to enlarge) The Secret Service, viewing projected path information about Flight 93, rather than actual radar returns, does not realize that Flight 93 has already crashed. Based on this erroneous information, a military aide tells Vice President Dick Cheney and others in the White House bunker that the plane is 80 miles away from Washington. Cheney is asked for authority to engage the plane, and he quickly provides it. The aide returns a few minutes later and says the plane is 60 miles out. Cheney again gives authorization to engage. A few minutes later and presumably after the flight has crashed or been shot down, deputy White House chief of staff Josh Bolten suggests Cheney contact President Bush to confirm the engage order. Bolten later tells the 9/11 Commission that he had not heard any prior discussion on the topic with Bush, and wanted to make sure Bush knew. Apparently, Cheney calls Bush and obtains confirmation (see 10:18 a.m.-10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] However, there is controversy over whether Bush approved a shootdown before this incident or whether Cheney gave himself the authority to make the decision on the spot. As Newsweek notes, it is a moot point in one sense, since the decision was made on false data and there is no plane to shoot down. [NEWSWEEK, 6/20/2004] Entity Tags: Secret Service, Joshua Bolten, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Dick Cheney

10:10 a.m.-10:11 a.m. September 11, 2001: Dispatcher Tells Flight 93 Not to Divert to Washington Unaware the aircraft has crashed, United Airlines flight dispatcher Ed Ballinger instructs Flight 93 not to divert to Washington. At 10:10, he sends a text message to Flight 93, stating: “Don’t divert to DC. Not an option.” A minute later, he resends this same message to it. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 46 ] Someone on Flight 93 had contacted the FAA at 9:30, requesting a new flight plan with the destination of Washington (see 9:30 a.m. September 11, 2001), and at 9:55 the pilot hijacker reprogrammed the plane’s navigational system for the new destination of Washington’s Reagan National Airport (see 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001). United Airlines will not confirm that Flight 93 has crashed until around 10:15 (see (10:07 a.m.-10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and will notify its employees of this at 10:17 (see 10:17 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Ed Ballinger Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Military Put on High Alert All US military forces are ordered to Defcon Three (or Defcon Delta), “The highest alert for the nuclear arsenal in 30 years.” [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001; CNN, 9/4/2002; ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002; CLARKE, 2004, PP. 15] Rumsfeld claims that he makes the recommendation, but it is hard to see how he can do this, at least at this time. He later asserts that he discusses the issue with acting Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers in the NMCC first. However, they do not arrive at the PEOC until about 10:30 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/23/2004] At 10:15 a.m., the massive blast doors to US Strategic Command, headquarters for NORAD in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, are closed for the first time in response to the high alert. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; BBC, 9/1/2002] In another account, acting Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers gives the Defcon order by himself. President Bush later contradicts both accounts, asserting that he gives the order. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 3/22/2004 ] According to the 9/11 Commission’s final report, though, the decision to go to Defcon Three takes place about 35 minutes later (see (10:43 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: George W. Bush, National Military Command Center, Richard B. Myers, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Donald Rumsfeld, 9/11 Commission, US Strategic Command Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Donald Rumsfeld

10:11 a.m. September 11, 2001: After Communications Problems, NEADS Tells Langley Pilots They Cannot Shoot Down Hijacked Planes A weapons director at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) informs the fighter jets launched from Langley Air Force Base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) that they do not have permission to shoot down aircraft over Washington, though he is delayed in giving this instruction due to communications problems. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 45; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 227] Citino Cannot Reach Borgstrom - Major Kevin Nasypany, the NEADS mission crew commander, has just told his staff that the Langley fighters have “negative clearance to shoot,” and the orders from higher headquarters are that the jets are to identify aircraft by their type and tail number, and nothing more (see 10:10 a.m. September 11, 2001). Now Master Sergeant Steve Citino, a NEADS weapons director, tries relaying these instructions to Captain Craig Borgstrom, one of the three Langley pilots. However, he cannot get through to him over the radio. According to author Lynn Spencer, this is because the “reception is weak over the Washington area, and NEADS loses the ability to communicate whenever [Borgstrom] flies below a certain altitude.” Citino complains to Major James Fox, the leader of the weapons team: “I can’t talk to ‘em. They’re too low.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 227] Citino Issues Instructions - Finally, about a minute after receiving the instructions from Nasypany, Citino reaches Borgstrom. He tells him, “Reiterating, mission is ID by type… divert if necessary.” Borgstrom acknowledges this instruction, telling Citino, “Quit 2-6 copies.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2003] When two of the Langley pilots later discuss this day’s events at a news conference, they will say they “never received explicit orders to fire on incoming planes perceived to be hostile.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/15/2001] Entity Tags: Steve Citino, James Fox, Craig Borgstrom Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

10:12 a.m. September 11, 2001: Syracuse Fighter Jets Still Not Ready to Launch Someone from the 174th Fighter Wing, which is based at Hancock Field Air National Guard Base near Syracuse, NY, calls NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and speaks with Major Kevin Nasypany, the mission crew commander there. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001] Earlier on, shortly after seeing the second plane hitting the World Trade Center at 9:03, a commander of the 174th Fighter Wing called NEADS to offer fighter jets to help (see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). They’d said: “Give me ten [minutes] and I can give you hot guns. Give me 30 [minutes] and I’ll have heat-seeker [missiles]. Give me an hour and I can give you slammers.” [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; NEWS 10 NOW, 9/12/2006] Yet, now, more than an hour after the second attack, these fighters have still not been launched. Syracuse tells Nasypany, “I’ve got guys that’ll be launching in about 15 minutes.” Despite the earlier promise to have heat-seekers and slammers on the planes, Syracuse says: “We’ve got hot guns. That’s all I’ve got.” Nasypany says: “I’ve got another possible aircraft with a bomb on board. It’s in Pennsylvania, York, approximate area.” He adds that there is “another one, that’s possibly at Cleveland area.” These aircraft, he says, are United Airlines Flight 93 and Delta ‘89, respectively. (Although Flight 93 has already crashed, NEADS apparently does not learn of this until 10:15 (see 10:15 a.m. September 11, 2001).) NEADS was alerted to Delta Flight 1989 at 9:41, and mistakenly suspects it has been hijacked (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). Syracuse says: “I’ve got two jets right now. Do you need more than two?” After NEADS requests another two, Syracuse replies, “Get four set up, yep.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001] According to the Syracuse Post-Standard, the first fighters to launch from Hancock Field are two F-16s that take off at 10:42 a.m. A further three take off at about 1:30 p.m., and two more launch around 3:55 p.m. (see 10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001). [POST-STANDARD (SYRACUSE), 9/12/2001] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Kevin Nasypany, 174th Fighter Wing Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

10:13 a.m. September 11, 2001: Washington Buildings Evacuate More prominent buildings in Washington begin evacuation. The United Nations building in New York City evacuates first; many federal buildings follow later. [CNN, 9/12/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/12/2001] Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke apparently began arranging these evacuations a short time before this. [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 14-15] Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, United Nations Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(10:13 a.m.-10:23 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Projected Flight 93 Arrival into Washington; Could It Have Been Shot Down? The 9/11 Commission later concludes that if Flight 93 had not crashed, it would probably have reached Washington around this time. The commission notes that there are only three fighters over Washington at this time, all from Langley, Virginia. However, the pilots of these fighters were never briefed about why they were scrambled. As the lead pilot explained, “I reverted to the Russian threat… I’m thinking cruise missile threat from the sea. You know, you look down and see the Pentagon burning and I thought the b_stards snuck one by us.… You couldn’t see any airplanes, and no one told us anything.” The pilots knew their mission was to identify and divert aircraft flying within a certain radius of Washington, but did not know that the threat came from hijacked planes. In addition, the commission notes that NEADS did not know where Flight 93 was when it crashed, and wonders if they would have determined its location and passed it on the pilots before the plane reached Washington. They conclude, “NORAD officials have maintained that they would have intercepted and shot down United 93. We are not so sure.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

10:14 a.m.-10:19 a.m. September 11, 2001: White House Informs NMCC that Cheney Has Given Shootdown Authorization A lieutenant colonel at the White House repeatedly relays to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon that Vice President Dick Cheney has confirmed that fighter jets are cleared to engage an inbound aircraft if they can verify that the aircraft is hijacked. The lieutenant colonel notifies the NMCC of the authorization over the air threat conference call (see (9:29 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Cheney, who is in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House, said at sometime between 10:10 and 10:15 that fighters could engage an aircraft that was reportedly approaching Washington (see (Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, it is only when Cheney calls President Bush at 10:18 a.m. that Bush confirms the shootdown order (see 10:18 a.m.-10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001). The shootdown order will be received by NORAD, and then, at 10:31 a.m., sent out to its three air defense sectors in the continental US (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 41-42; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 240] Entity Tags: National Military Command Center, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Dick Cheney

10:14 a.m. September 11, 2001: First of Three Fighters Returning from Training Lands at Base near Washington, but Does Not Take Off Again The first of three District of Columbia Air National Guard F-16s that was away on a training mission at the time of the attacks in New York lands back at its base just outside Washington, DC, but does not take off again to defend the capital. The fighter jet is being piloted by Eric Haagenson. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004] It belongs to the 121st Fighter Squadron, part of the 113th Wing of the DC Air National Guard, which is based at Andrews Air Force Base, 10 miles from Washington. [DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AIR NATIONAL GUARD, 7/24/2001; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 10/21/2001; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002] Along with two other jets, it took off from Andrews at 8:36 a.m. for a routine training mission about 200 miles away, over North Carolina (see 8:36 a.m. September 11, 2001). Denied Entry into Andrews Airspace - Haagenson apparently headed back to base earlier than the other aircraft with him over North Carolina because he was so low on fuel. Major Billy Hutchison, the flight lead of the F-16s on the training mission, learned over radio that Haagenson was then “being denied entry to airspace over Andrews” Air Force Base. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/8/2004 ] This was presumably because airspace restrictions had been implemented around Washington: The supervisor of flying with Haagenson’s unit had been concerned that such restrictions would be put into effect after he’d learned of the second attack on the World Trade Center. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 122-123] Hutchison therefore instructed Haagenson to go to Pawtucket, Rhode Island (presumably to land at an airfield there), because he was so low on fuel, so that he would not run out. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004] But by 10:14 a.m., Haagenson has been cleared to land at Andrews, and touches down at the base. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004] Haagenson Does Not Take Off Again - Hutchison will later recall that Haagenson “didn’t go back up” into the air after landing at Andrews, “because he was a brand new pilot.” The training mission he returned from “was his first flight outside an instructional arena.” The other two F-16s that were with him, piloted by Hutchison and Lou Campbell, will land at Andrews at 10:36 a.m., but Hutchison will be instructed to take off again immediately (see (10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004] Entity Tags: 121st Fighter Squadron, District of Columbia Air National Guard, Eric Haagenson, Billy Hutchison Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: DC Air National Guard Permitted to Shoot Down Threatening Planes over Washington

David Wherley. [Source: US Air Force] Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG), finally receives specific instructions from the Secret Service for his fighter jets to follow when they launch over Washington, and is told they can use “whatever force is necessary” to prevent another aircraft hitting a building. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/28/2003; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 446; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 218] Instructions Received within 'Half-Hour' of Request - Wherley phoned the Secret Service’s White House Joint Operations Center after arriving at the headquarters of the DCANG’s 121st Fighter Squadron at Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington (see (Shortly After 9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The agent he talked to requested that DCANG fighters be sent up over the capital, but Wherley asked for more specific instructions (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Secret Service agents at the White House have been working hard to get these. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 184-185, 218] According to the Washington Post, “within a half-hour,” Wherley receives “oral instructions from the White House giving the pilots extraordinary discretion to shoot down any threatening aircraft.” [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002] Jets May Use 'Whatever Force Is Necessary' - Wherley had been talking to Secret Service agent Kenneth Beauchamp, but these instructions are given to him by Becky Ediger, the deputy special agent in charge of the Presidential Protective Division, who now comes on the line. Ediger says the instructions have come directly from Vice President Dick Cheney. She tells Wherley: “We want you to intercept and turn away any airplane that attempts to fly within 20 miles of the Washington area. If you are not able to turn them away, use whatever force is necessary to keep them from hitting any buildings downtown.” Wherley Wants to Talk to Military - Wherley asks if there is anybody in a uniform—i.e. from the military—with Ediger that he could talk to. Ediger alludes to a Navy captain who is busy with other things, but says no one from the military is available. Although the instructions he has been given are not in military terms, Wherley feels they are understandable enough. [PEABODY GAZETTE-BULLETIN, 2/12/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/28/2003; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 218] According to the 9/11 Commission, Wherley translates Ediger’s instructions in military terms to flying “weapons free,” meaning “the decision to shoot rests in the cockpit, or in this case in the cockpit of the lead pilot.” He will pass these instructions to the DCANG pilots that take off at 10:42 a.m. and after (see 10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 11:11 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 44] Instructions Coming from Cheney - Wherley will later say that Ediger is “standing next to the vice president” during their call. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 79] However, the 9/11 Commission will apparently state differently, saying a “Secret Service agent” (presumably Ediger) has “a phone in each ear, one connected to Wherley and the other to a fellow agent at the White House, relaying instructions that the White House agent said he was getting from the vice president.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 44] White House Denies Cheney Involvement - In 2004, Secret Service officials will confirm that its agents’ actions relating to the DCANG on September 11 are ordered by Cheney. The agency will issue a statement, clarifying, “The Secret Service is not authorized to, nor did it, direct the activation or launch of Department of Defense aviation assets.” But two unnamed White House officials that are involved in the emergency response to the attacks will say the Secret Service acts on its own. An official speaking on behalf of Cheney will say he doesn’t know whether the vice president directed Secret Service agents to call the DCANG, and he would not be able to find out. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 3/22/2004 ] The 9/11 Commission will state that both Cheney and President Bush “indicated to us they had not been aware that fighters had been scrambled out of Andrews, at the request of the Secret Service and outside the military chain of command.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 44] Wherley Wants More Information - Wherley still has questions about the rules of engagement for his fighter jets, which will subsequently be answered by a Secret Service agent at the White House, possibly Ediger (see (Between 10:16 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/28/2003] Entity Tags: District of Columbia Air National Guard, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Becky Ediger, David Wherley, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: 1st Fighter Wing Cannot Assist NORAD as It Has Been Told to Stand By

Logo of the 1st Fighter Wing. [Source: US Air Force] The 1st Fighter Wing at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, notifies NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) that it is unable to provide fighter jets to escort the president’s plane, Air Force One, because a lieutenant general at the Air Combat Command (ACC) has instructed the wing to stand by. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 239-240] The White House has requested a fighter escort for Air Force One (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001), and officers at the headquarters of the Continental US NORAD Region in Florida have been calling around to find any available jets that might be able to provide that escort, irrespective of what branch of the military they belong to. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 38; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 239] Wing Told to Stand By - As a result, a colonel from the 1st Fighter Wing now calls NEADS. He says that although his unit would love to help, the lieutenant general at ACC has told it to stand by, as, technically, the wing belongs to ACC, not NORAD. Author Lynn Spencer will comment, “In times of war, commanders can waive a significant amount of the military bureaucracy and make such decisions.” However, “they are assuming an enormous personal responsibility if they do so and something terribly wrong happens.” Personnel at NEADS are thus “reminded of the military bureaucracy governing orders and authorizations.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 239-240] Wing's F-15s Take Off Following Attacks - F-15s from the 1st Fighter Wing will take off later on—“within two hours” of the terrorist attacks, according to one account—to provide “protection for the National Command Authority and the rest of the nation’s civilian and military leadership,” and to patrol the skies of the East Coast. [AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION, 10/2/2002; LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, 1/2005; 1ST FIGHTER ASSOCIATION, 3/14/2006] Eventually, fighters from Ellington Field in Texas and elsewhere will escort Air Force One (see (11:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 87] ACC Is Air Force's Combat Arm - The ACC, which is headquartered at Langley Air Force Base, is the main combat arm of the US Air Force, and is responsible for supplying forces to regional military commanders around the world. [VIRGINIAN-PILOT, 9/20/2001; US AIR FORCE, 2/26/2010] The 1st Fighter Wing is the “host unit” at Langley, and, as such, operates and maintains one of the largest fighter bases in the ACC. It includes three fighter squadrons, which fly the F-15 Eagle fighter jet. [VIRGINIAN-PILOT, 9/20/2001; LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, 11/2003; AIR FORCE PRINT NEWS, 11/9/2006] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Air Combat Command, 1st Fighter Wing Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

10:15 a.m. September 11, 2001: NORAD Sectors Told Peacetime Rules of Engagement Still Apply A message is put out on NORAD’s computer chat system, notifying its three air defense sectors in the US that peacetime rules of engagement (ROE) still apply, which means fighter jets are not permitted to shoot down hostile aircraft. As a 9/11 Commission memorandum will later describe, on the chat log it is reiterated at this time “that the defensive posture [is] still peacetime ROE.” The person or organization that issues this message is unstated. NORAD’s computer chat system allows those with the proper access to communicate with each other, similarly to the way members of the public do in Internet chat rooms. The NORAD system includes three main chat rooms. The message about the current rules of engagement goes out in the chat room for the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR). This is where CONR’s three sectors—including the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), which has been coordinating the military’s response to the hijackings—communicate with each other. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/22/2004 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 139] It is not until 10:31 a.m. that Major General Larry Arnold, the CONR commander, will issue an instruction over the chat system, stating that NORAD has been cleared to shoot down threatening aircraft (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42] Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

10:15 a.m. September 11, 2001: NORAD Operations Center Closes Blast Doors Due to Warning of Hijacked Plane

Blast doors at NORAD headquarters in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. [Source: Eugene Chavez] The FBI has issued a warning that a plane originating in San Diego might be hijacked and specifically targeting Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, where NORAD’s operations center is located. In response, the massive steel doors designed to protect the mountain from a nuclear blast are closed for the first time in its history. One report suggests, however, that these doors are closed in response to the US military being put on high alert (see (10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The NORAD operations center is also informed that a Ryder rental truck driven by “Arab-looking men” and packed with explosives is heading their way. Lt. Col. William Glover, chief of NORAD’s air defense operations, says, “It didn’t make sense, but those phone calls were happening.” [TORONTO STAR, 12/9/2001; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; BBC, 9/1/2002] Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(10:15 a.m.-10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Emergency Responders at Pentagon Evacuated Due to Supposed Approaching Hijacked Aircraft

With reports of another airplane headed toward Washingon, fire and rescue workers were directed to temporarily move away from the Pentagon. [Source: Jon Culberson] (click image to enlarge) At around 10:15 a.m., fire and rescue workers at the Pentagon in response to the attack there are evacuated away from the site, due to a warning of another hijacked aircraft flying towards Washington, DC, currently 20 minutes away. The warning is passed on by Special Agent Chris Combs, the FBI’s representative at the Pentagon crash site. Assistant Fire Chief James Schwartz then orders the fire and rescue personnel to evacuate to a highway overpass several hundred yards from the Pentagon. Combs receives the information about the inbound aircraft from the FBI’s Washington Field Office, which is in direct contact with the FAA. He then confirms it with the control tower at Washington’s Reagan National Airport. According to a report put out by the government of Arlington County, Virginia, updates are announced of the approaching aircraft “until the last warning when [it] went below radar coverage in Pennsylvania, an estimated 4 minutes flying time from the Pentagon.” [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. A16 AND A30; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 315] Yet if the timing of this account is correct, the approaching plane could not have been Flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania considerably earlier (see (10:03 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Finally, Combs is informed by Jim Rice, his boss at the Washington Field Office, “You’re all clear.” Rice adds, incorrectly, “The plane hit Camp David.” [CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 131] At 10:38, firefighters and rescue workers are allowed to return to the Pentagon and resume their activities. [FIRE ENGINEERING, 11/2002] There will be two more evacuations of the Pentagon site in the following 24 hours, also due to false alarms over reports of unidentified inbound aircraft (see (2:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001 and (10:00 a.m.) September 12, 2001). Entity Tags: Chris Combs, Jim Rice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, James Schwartz Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Pentagon

10:15 a.m. September 11, 2001: Pentagon Section Collapses

The wall where the Pentagon was hit before and after its collapsed at 10:15. [Source: Jason Ingersoll, public domain] (click image to enlarge) The front section of the Pentagon that had been hit by Flight 77 collapses. [CNN, 9/12/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/12/2001] A few minutes prior to its collapse, firefighters saw warning signs and sounded a general evacuation tone. No firefighters were injured. [NFPA JOURNAL, 11/1/2001] Entity Tags: Pentagon Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

10:15 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Learns Flight 93 Is Down According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS calls Washington flight control at this time. Asked about Flight 93, flight control responds, “He’s down.” It is clarified that the plane crashed “somewhere up northeast of Camp David.… That’s the last report. They don’t know exactly where.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] The crash site is in fact about 85 miles northwest of Camp David. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

10:15 a.m. and After September 11, 2001: NEADS Informed of Further Suspected Hijackings Less than 30 seconds after hearing that Flight 93 has crashed, NEADS receives a call informing it of yet another suspected hijacking in its area. Although the skies will be clear of all commercial and private aircraft soon after midday, false reports of hijackings will continue well into the afternoon. For hours, fighters above New York and Washington DC (and later Chicago and Boston) will race around intercepting suspicious aircraft. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Between 10:16 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: DC Air National Guard Commander Wherley Discusses ‘Rules of Engagement’ for Fighters Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG), talks to a Secret Service agent at the White House regarding some questions he has about the rules of engagement for his fighter jets. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/28/2003] Wherley, who is at the headquarters of the DCANG’s 121st Fighter Squadron at Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington, has been talking over the phone with Becky Ediger, a senior Secret Service agent at the White House, and told his fighters can use “whatever force is necessary” to prevent an aircraft crashing into a building in the capital (see (10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 3/22/2004 ; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 445-446; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 218] Wherley Concerned about Rules of Engagement - As Wherley will later tell the 9/11 Commission, he still has “some questions about rules of engagement” that his jets are supposed to follow. He “finally” speaks with a Secret Service agent who answers his concerns. (From the account Wherley gives to the 9/11 Commission, it is unclear if this agent is Ediger, or someone else.) The agent confirms that DCANG fighters are free to engage aircraft if they cannot successfully be diverted. This seems clear enough to Wherley, and, like the previous instructions he received, he interprets it as flying “weapons free,” meaning the decision whether his jets shoot down a threatening aircraft rests with the lead pilot. Agent Possibly Standing next to Cheney - Wherley will tell the 9/11 Commission that the agent he talks to at this time is “standing next to the vice president.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/28/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 44] If correct, this would mean they are in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House, where Vice President Dick Cheney was evacuated to earlier on (see (9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ABC NEWS, 9/14/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 39-40] Entity Tags: David Wherley, District of Columbia Air National Guard, Becky Ediger, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(After 10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Condoleezza Rice and Transportation Secretary Mineta Track Unidentified Aircraft from White House Bunker In the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta track numerous suspicious aircraft. Mineta will recall that, even after the time Flight 93 went down in Pennsylvania: “we still had these unaccounted for aircraft. So the question was where are they and who are the targets for that?” He says that, at “about 10:30, 11 o’clock in the morning,” they are aware of “about seven or eight unaccounted-for aircraft.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Rice will describe: “There were false reports of planes, unidentified planes, squawking all over the place. We were doing many, many things, but we would write down on a yellow pad that these numbers are still out there.” [BUMILLER, 2007, PP. XV] She recalls, “[F]or several hours the most difficult thing is that we didn’t know what else was coming because there were planes still in the air, we were trying to ground civil aviation, there were still planes in the air, some were supposedly not responding properly to command to go to the ground.” [AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, Norman Mineta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(After 10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Police See People, Including Military Personnel, Stealing Debris from Pentagon Crash Site Two Pentagon police officers see people—some of them members of the military—stealing crash debris from in front of the Pentagon. After the Pentagon was hit, Lt. Robbie Turner had been helping the injured at a triage area. When, at around 10:15 a.m., reports are received of a possible second plane heading for the Pentagon (see (10:15 a.m.-10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001), he sets about evacuating people away from there. As this is going on, he later recalls: “[W]e had to try to collect up evidence, as much of the evidence as we possibly could. Take pictures of it or whatever.” However, some people are apparently trying to steal plane debris from the road in front of the Pentagon. According to Turner, “[W]e had to try to stop other people from pilfering the wreckage because, believe it or not, there were people—military personnel involved—you know, included, rather, that was picking up the wreckage of the plane from off the highway as we were running away.” [LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 12/3/2001] Later on in the day, around 3:00 p.m., another Pentagon police officer, Roosevelt Roberts Jr., is called to the heliport near where the Pentagon was hit, and remains there for the next 13 hours. He will recall that, during this time, “we had a lot of people vandalizing, stealing evidence.” He does not specify who these people are, or what this “evidence” is that is being stolen and vandalized. [LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 11/30/2001] Entity Tags: Robbie Turner, Roosevelt Roberts Jr. Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

10:17 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Informs Employees of Flight 93 Crash Andy Studdert, the chief operating officer of United Airlines, sends out an operational alert message to the airline’s personnel, informing them of the crash of Flight 93. The message states: “UAL 93-11 EWR-SFO has been involved in an accident. Crisis center has been activated.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 47 ] Along with other United Airlines managers, Studdert watched Flight 93’s radar track as it came to a halt on a screen in the airline’s crisis center, at its headquarters outside Chicago (see (9:36 a.m.-10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). By 10:15, United had learned from the manager of the Johnstown airport in Pennsylvania of a plume of smoke rising up in the area where Flight 93 crashed (see (10:07 a.m.-10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 77 AND 214] Entity Tags: Andy Studdert, United Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

10:17 a.m. September 11, 2001: Non-Alert Jets Take off from Toledo Unit

F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft at the 180th Fighter Wing. [Source: Jodi Joice / US Air Force] Two F-16 fighter jets take off from a military unit in Toledo, Ohio, in response to the morning’s attacks, but accounts will conflict over what their mission is and who the pilots are. [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001; FILSON, 2003, PP. 71; WTOL, 9/11/2006] The 180th Fighter Wing of the Ohio Air National Guard is based at Toledo Express Airport. Although the unit is not one of NORAD’s seven alert facilities around the US, it has recently received a call from NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), requesting that it launch two of its fighters (see 10:01 a.m. September 11, 2001). [AIRMAN, 12/1999; TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001; WTOL, 9/11/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178-179] The 180th Maintenance Squadron, which is responsible for maintaining the unit’s aircraft and equipment, was also contacted, and has loaded the F-16s’ guns with 500 rounds of 20-caliber ammunition. [180TH FIGHTER WING, 9/19/2001; WTOL, 9/11/2006] Jets Head East - The two F-16s, which were being set up for training missions, now take off and head east. [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001] According to author Lynn Spencer, they are piloted by Scott Reed and Ed Rinke. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 179] However, a local television station will report that the pilots are Scott Reed and Keith Newell. [WTOL, 9/11/2006] Mission Unclear - It is unclear what role the two jets play in defending the nation. Toledo Air National Guard officials will later refuse to talk about this morning’s events, even in the general terms permitted by the military. [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001] According to Spencer, NEADS wanted the 180th FW jets to respond to Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, which is incorrectly thought to have been hijacked and will land in Cleveland at around 10:18 (see (10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will similarly say the Toledo jets are ordered to intercept Delta 1989. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/16/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27-28; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 177-178] But Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region, will say the 180th FW was contacted “because we thought [Flight] 93 or Delta Flight 1989 might be headed toward Chicago.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 71] NEADS battle commander Colonel Robert Marr will say the two F-16s “never had a track close enough that they were directed to engage. [But] if a valid direction had come from the appropriate level to engage a target, or shoot down a target at some time, they could have done that.” Response Is 'Very Quick' - Marr will describe the 180th FW’s response to NEADS’s request for assistance as “very, very, very quick.” [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001] However, the fourth hijacked aircraft, Flight 93, has already crashed by the time the two jets take off (see (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 30] Entity Tags: Ed Rinke, Keith Newell, 180th Fighter Wing, Robert Marr, Scott Reed, Larry Arnold Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

10:17 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA out of the Loop; Finally Joins NMCC Teleconference The FAA finally joins an emergency teleconference being conducted by the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon. The NMCC has been holding this teleconference since 9:29 a.m. It began as a “significant event” conference, but after eight minutes continued as an air threat conference call (see (9:29 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Yet, according to the 9/11 Commission, the FAA has not been included in it until this time, because operators have had “equipment problems and difficulty finding secure phone numbers.” NORAD asked three times before 10:03 a.m., when the last hijacked plane crashed, to confirm the presence of FAA on the teleconference, to provide an update on hijackings, but without success. Furthermore, the FAA representative who now joins the teleconference has “no familiarity with or responsibility for hijackings, no access to decisionmakers, and none of the information available to senior FAA officials.” The highest level Defense Department officials rely on this teleconference to coordinate with their counterparts at the FAA. As a result of the FAA’s absence from it, the leaders of NORAD and the FAA have effectively been out of contact with each other. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 37-38] General Richard Myers, the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will later write that the lack of communication with the FAA has contributed to confusion at the NMCC over the flight numbers of the aircraft that were hijacked. However, according to Myers, the NMCC could not contact the FAA over ordinary phone lines because “[t]errorists who could hijack aircraft so readily could probably also eavesdrop on unsecured phone lines.” [MYERS, 2009, PP. 153] Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Richard B. Myers, Federal Aviation Administration, National Military Command Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

10:18 a.m.-10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001: Cheney Calls Bush; Receives Shootdown Authorization, According to 9/11 Commission In a phone call with Vice President Dick Cheney, President Bush authorizes the military to shoot down hostile aircraft. Minutes earlier, in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House, a military aide had asked Cheney for the authority to engage what appeared to be an inbound aircraft, and Cheney had promptly given it (see (Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). During a subsequent quiet moment, deputy White House chief of staff Josh Bolten, who is also in the PEOC, suggested to Cheney that he contact the president to confirm the engage order. Therefore at 10:18 a.m., according to White House logs, Cheney calls Bush, who is on board Air Force One, and speaks with him for two minutes. White House press secretary Ari Fleischer notes that at 10:20 a.m., Bush informs him that he has authorized the shootdown of aircraft, if necessary. According to the 9/11 Commission, “Fleischer’s 10:20 note is the first mention of shootdown authority.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 41 AND 465] Bush’s senior adviser Karl Rove, who is also on Air Force One, gives a similar account, later telling NBC News that “at about 10:20,” Bush goes from his office into the private cabin in front of it, “and took a phone call, and came back in and said that he had talked to the vice president and to the secretary of defense and gave the authorization that [the] military could shoot down any planes not under control of their crews that were gearing critical targets.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] But other accounts indicate the president gives the shootdown authorization earlier than this. Bush and Cheney will claim that Bush gives the authorization during a call estimated to occur between about 10:00 and 10:15 (see (Between 10:00 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 40] Similarly, according to journalists Bob Woodward and Bill Sammon, Bush gives it in a call with Cheney soon after 9:56, when Air Force One takes off (see (Shortly After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 102; WOODWARD, 2002, PP. 17-18; WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke says it is given even earlier. He states that, at some point between about 9:38 and 9:56, he is instructed to tell the Pentagon it has authorization from the president to shoot down hostile aircraft (see (9:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ABC NEWS, 11/29/2003; CLARKE, 2004, PP. 8] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Karl Rove, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Ari Fleischer Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush, Dick Cheney

(10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Delta 1989 Lands at Cleveland Airport, Moves to Secure Area

An aircraft at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport. [Source: Cleveland Plain Dealer] Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, a Boeing 767 out of Boston that is wrongly suspected of being hijacked (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (Shortly After 9:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001), lands at Cleveland Hopkins Airport in Ohio, and is directed to a remote area of the airport. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/16/2001; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27-28; WKYC, 9/11/2006] Plane Flies Long Path toward Airport - Delta Air Lines had been concerned about Flight 1989, and ordered it to land as soon as possible in Cleveland (see (9:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 167; USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] As it was heading in to land, air traffic controllers instructed Delta 1989 to follow a trajectory that initially took it far past Cleveland Airport. Unknown to the plane’s pilots, the controllers incorrectly believe the flight has been hijacked and contains a bomb, and they were therefore making time to evacuate the airport before the plane landed (see (9:50 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 191] Plane Directed to Remote Area - Once Delta 1989 is on the ground, the Cleveland Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) informs the FAA’s Cleveland Center that Delta 1989 is “on the ground at 1418,” where “1418” means 10:18 a.m. Cleveland Center asks, “Very safely too, I hope?” The TRACON responds that the plane is being taken to the bomb area to check. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/16/2001] Delta 1989 is directed to “taxi left onto taxiway Bravo and wait there.” This taxiway leads to a remote part of the airport that is far away from the terminal. The pilot does as instructed. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 229] Passengers Not Allowed Off - The pilots radio the airport’s air traffic control tower and say: “Just to make sure we don’t have any misunderstandings here, our flaps are up, we are landing only as a precaution at the company’s request. You understand that?” They ask if they are going to get to their gate soon, but the controller responds that city authorities are in charge and he believes people will be coming to search the aircraft. The controller advises that city authorities have said to keep the plane’s passengers on the aircraft for now. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/16/2001] The passengers and crew will have to remain on board for perhaps a couple of hours, until FBI agents allow them off (see 11:28 a.m.-12:23 p.m. September 11, 2001). [WKYC, 9/11/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 270-271] Conflicting Reports of Landing Time - Subsequent accounts will give conflicting times for when Delta 1989 lands at Cleveland Airport. According to a detailed timeline provided by the airport’s control tower, the aircraft is “on the ground” at 10:18 a.m. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/16/2001] Several accounts will give similar landing times of between 10:05 a.m. and 10:10 a.m. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 1/2/2002 ; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] But a NORAD official will tell the 9/11 Commission that Delta 1989 landed at 9:47 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Other accounts will say it lands at between 10:33 a.m. and 10:45 a.m. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ] Entity Tags: Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Cleveland Terminal Radar Approach Control, Cleveland Hopkins International Airport, David Dunlap, Paul Werner Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Air Base Ordered to Launch All Available Fighters Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, receives the order from NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) to launch all its available fighter jets. Commander Briefs Pilots - Six Otis pilots that were recalled from a training mission about an hour earlier (see (9:15 a.m.-9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and other pilots that have recently come to the base from their homes are gathered in front of the operations desk. Squadron commander Lt. Col. Jon Treacy tells them: “This is what we know. This is clearly a national emergency. Two aircraft have been hijacked and flown into the World Trade Center. The Pentagon has been attacked. We need to get all our jets ready to go because we’re not sure where this is heading. We have information that there are more coming.” He instructs the pilots: “You must be prepared to meet any surprise.… You may be taking out an airliner. You must engage. You cannot fail. Our nation is relying on us.” He gives them their assignments, saying whether they are required to fly now or whether they will be needed later on, to take over when other pilots have landed. Launch Order Received - Just after Treacy finishes giving his briefing, someone comes into the room yelling out that NEADS has called the base with important orders. The person says, “We have to get everything we have airborne now!” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 244-245] NEADS started contacting Air National Guard bases around the Northeast US by about 10:00 a.m., with the instruction to get their fighters airborne (see (Between 9:50 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 180] Pilots Head out, but Most Jets Not Yet Armed - Treacy yells at his men, “Go, go, go!” and then the pilots run out to their aircraft. But, according to author Lynn Spencer, since the time the six pilots returned from their training mission, “there has not been time to do much more than fuel their jets.” Most of the base’s fighters “are still unarmed. Despite the furious pace of the weapons handlers, only a handful of jets have been uploaded with some armament.” The first two F-15s that take off in response to the NEADS order will both be unarmed (see (Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 245-246] Two F-15s that are kept on alert at Otis Air Base took off at 8:46 a.m. in response to the hijacking of Flight 11 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] Entity Tags: Otis Air National Guard Base, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Jon Treacy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center Controller Notices Unidentified Aircraft Approaching from East An air traffic controller at the FAA’s Boston Center is concerned about an unidentified aircraft flying in from the east, approaching Cape Cod. Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the Boston Center in Nashua, New Hampshire, has noticed the large, slow-moving target on his radar screen. It is just off the coast and heading directly for Boston. Concerned as to what the aircraft is, he phones the Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility in Virginia Beach, Virginia. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 242] The facility, known by its call sign, “Giant Killer,” is the Navy air traffic control agency that handles all over-water military operations. [NEW YORK TIMES, 2/10/1997; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 143] Scoggins says: “We have a large, slow-moving target approaching Cape Cod and heading for Boston. Do you have it? What is it?” The person at Giant Killer only replies, “We’re looking,” and then mentions, “We’ve got a fleet of ships heading toward the northeast and an Aegis cruiser [a high-tech warship] on the way.” Scoggins is worried that Giant Killer is unable to specifically identify the target he is seeing on his radar screen. It appears to be flying straight toward the Boston Center. He thinks to himself, “If I wanted to use airliners to attack a country, I would take out their air traffic control facilities!” Scoggins continues watching the suspicious aircraft on his radar screen. Shortly afterward, the Boston Center will be evacuated after the FAA’s New England regional office calls it and reports an unidentified aircraft heading toward the facility (see (Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 242-243] This is apparently a different aircraft to the one Scoggins is tracking. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/20/2001; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002 ] Whether the plane Scoggins is tracking is ever identified is unclear. Entity Tags: Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility, Colin Scoggins Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

10:21 a.m. September 11, 2001: All International Flights into US Diverted by FAA Jane Garvey, the head of the FAA, orders the diversion of all international flights with US destinations. Most of the flights are diverted to Canada. [CNN, 9/12/2001; TIME, 9/14/2001; MSNBC, 9/22/2001] Entity Tags: Jane Garvey, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA’s Boston Center Declares ‘ATC Zero’ Managers at the FAA’s Boston Center declare “air traffic control zero” (“ATC zero”), which completely shuts down the center’s airspace, after a report is received of a possible airborne threat to their facility. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/20/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 243] The Boston Center in Nashua, New Hampshire, has received a call from the FAA’s New England regional office, informing it that an unidentified aircraft is heading its way. In response, the center’s managers immediately order the evacuation of the facility (see (Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). At the same time, they make the declaration of ATC zero. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 243] The declaration of ATC zero means aircraft are not permitted to depart from, arrive at, or travel through the center’s airspace until further notice. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 24 ] According to author Lynn Spencer, ATC zero means all the aircraft a center is handling are pushed “onto neighboring sectors, and any new airplanes from adjacent sectors are turned back, at the sector boundaries if necessary.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 68] Although the exact time the managers declare ATC zero at is unclear, the Boston Center notifies the FAA’s Herndon Command Center of the declaration at 10:35 a.m. At 11:41 a.m., the ATC zero alert at the Boston Center is canceled. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002 ] The FAA’s New York Center declared ATC zero at 9:05 a.m. (see 9:05 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 24 ] Entity Tags: Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Air Traffic Control Center Evacuated following Report of Airborne Threat The FAA’s Boston Center is evacuated after it receives a report that an unidentified aircraft is heading its way. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/20/2001; USA TODAY, 8/11/2002; NEW HAMPSHIRE UNION LEADER, 9/11/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 243] The Boston Center, located in Nashua, New Hampshire, manages air traffic above New England, and monitored Flight 11 and Flight 175 earlier on. [USA TODAY, 8/11/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/12/2002] Employees there are already concerned because a large tractor-trailer has parked directly in front of their facility, on New Hampshire’s Route 3. State police have been called to get it away from there. Possible Airborne Threat Leads to Evacuation - The FAA’s New England regional office in Burlington, Massachusetts, now calls the Boston Center and reports that an unidentified aircraft is heading for the facility. In response to this potential threat, managers at the center immediately order the closure and evacuation of their building. They also declare “ATC zero,” which shuts down the Boston Center’s airspace (see (Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Employees run from the building while managers try to decide which, if any, personnel should remain in the facility. According to Colin Scoggins, the center’s military liaison, “at this time we honestly felt that we were targeted and an impact was imminent.” Bomb Threat to Childcare Facility - Making matters worse, a bomb scare phone call is received at the center’s childcare facility, which is the employees’ usual evacuation point. Center managers therefore decide that everyone must leave the building. Employees are advised to go to either 11 Murphy Drive—an FAA administrative facility—or a nearby Holiday Inn. According to Scoggins, three or four Flight Service Data Processing System personnel remain in the basement of the Boston Center when it is evacuated, apparently because there is no paging system in their office on which they can receive the evacuation order. Evacuation Time Unclear - The time the evacuation takes place at is unclear. According to the account of author Lynn Spencer, it occurs some time shortly after 10:20 a.m. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/20/2001; USA TODAY, 8/11/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 242-243] At 10:34 a.m., John White, a manager at the FAA’s Command Center, reports that the Boston Center “has received a threat,” and is “going down to skeleton staffing.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 11/4/2003] A 10:52 a.m. entry in the log of the FAA headquarters’ teleconference will state that the Boston Center is “evacuating the building.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002 ] USA Today will report that the center is evacuated at “about 11 a.m.” Few Employees Return to Building - About 30 minutes to an hour after the building is evacuated, some of the center’s personnel will return to work. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/20/2001; USA TODAY, 8/11/2002] By 12:16 p.m., the center is back in operation, but with only a skeleton staff. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002 ] Suspicious Aircraft Only a Coast Guard Plane - As it turns out, the approaching aircraft that prompts the evacuation is just a Coast Guard plane. According to Scoggins, “We had already identified it.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/20/2001] The aircraft was noted in a 10:18 a.m. entry in the log of the FAA headquarters’ teleconference, which stated: “Aircraft 160 miles east of Nantucket is headed westbound toward Boston at a high rate of speed.” But a log entry five minutes later, at 10:23 a.m., noted that the aircraft “is identified as a Coast Guard flight from Nantucket.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002 ] Shortly before the Boston Center is alerted to this aircraft, Scoggins had been tracking what is apparently another unidentified target on his radar screen: a slow-moving large aircraft that is also flying toward the Boston Center from the east (see (10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 242-243] The identity of that aircraft is unclear. Entity Tags: Colin Scoggins, Federal Aviation Administration, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: First Non-Alert Fighters Take off from Otis Air Base Unarmed

Joe McGrady. [Source: John P. Meyer] Fighter jets start taking off from Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, after NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) ordered the base to launch all its available aircraft (see (10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, the first of these jets are unarmed. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 245-246] The 102nd Fighter Wing of the Massachusetts Air National Guard operates from Otis, and is responsible for defending the northeastern US against various threats, including terrorist attacks. [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/12/2001; CAPE COD TIMES, 9/12/2001] The aircraft maintenance squadron officer started preparing the base’s F-15s for combat less than 15 minutes after the second attack in New York (see (9:15 a.m.-9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 155] But despite the reportedly “furious pace of the weapons handlers” who “hurried to fix all available jets with live weapons,” only a few jets have so far been loaded with any armament. [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/8/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 245] First Jets Have No Weapons - The first two fighter jets to take off are piloted by Dennis Doonan and Joe McGrady. As they are the first pilots to start their F-15s and taxi off the flight line (the parking and servicing area for aircraft), they are paired up. But Doonan suddenly realizes that, though he is being sent into a combat situation, his jet is unarmed. He radios McGrady and tells him, “I’m Winchester!” (“Winchester” is the code word for having no weapons.) McGrady’s aircraft is also unarmed, so he immediately radios squadron commander Lt. Col. Jon Treacy and in a panic tells him: “We’re Winchester, SOF [supervisor of flying]! We’re Winchester!” But Treacy instructs him: “Just go! You need to get airborne now!” McGrady and Doonan head out for takeoff, not knowing where they are going or what they will have to do, but realizing that if they have to take out a target, they must do so with their own aircraft. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 245-246] Another fighter jet, that of pilot Marty Richard, will subsequently take off with only one missile loaded instead of two. [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/11/2006] Takeoff Time Unclear - The exact time when Doonan and McGrady take off is unclear. According to the account of author Lynn Spencer, it appears to be shortly after 10:20 a.m. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 244-246] One local resident will recall noticing increased activity around Otis Air Base at about 10:00 or 10:30 a.m., with fighter jets taking off in pairs. Another local resident sees “jets leaving all day long.” [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/12/2001] By 6:00 p.m., 21 of the 24 F-15s that are stationed at Otis will be airborne. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 281] The base’s two F-15s that are kept on alert took off at 8:46 a.m. in response to the hijacking of Flight 11 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] Entity Tags: Otis Air National Guard Base, Jon Treacy, Dennis Doonan, Joe McGrady Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Jet Plane Allegedly Carrying United Airlines Executives Circles Flight 93 Crash Site Patrick Madigan, the commander of the Somerset Barracks of the Pennsylvania State Police, arrives at the Flight 93 crash scene around 10:20 a.m. [DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, 2002 ] He says that at some point later in the day (he does not specify a time), a “strange incident” occurs: “We were there at the site and an airplane started circling. It was a jetliner circling the crash site very low. No one knew what to expect because we knew that all of the planes were supposedly grounded.” (The FAA had, at about 9:45 a.m., ordered that all aircraft be instructed to land at the nearest airport (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001).) After a few minutes of uncertainty, it is announced that the plane is carrying United Airlines executives, who are circling the site to view it before they land in nearby Johnstown. [KASHURBA, 2002, PP. 63] Another low-flying jet plane was witnessed over the site earlier on, around the time Flight 93 went down (see (Before and After 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Patrick Madigan, United Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

(Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center Controller Contacts NEADS and Canadian Facility, Reports Center Evacuation and Airborne Threat

The Moncton Area Control Center. [Source: Nav Canada] Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, contacts NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and a Canadian air traffic control facility, to let them know that the Boston Center is shutting down its airspace and being evacuated, due to a possible airborne threat. Scoggins Does Not Immediately Evacuate - The Boston Center in Nashua, New Hampshire, has just received a call from the FAA’s New England regional office, alerting it to an unidentified aircraft heading its way. In response, the center’s managers ordered the evacuation of the facility (see (Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and declared “ATC zero,” which completely shuts down the center’s airspace (see (Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). But while others leave the building, Scoggins stays behind to make two phone calls. Scoggins Calls Canadian Facility and NEADS - His first call is to the Moncton Center, which is the Canadian air traffic control facility that handles flights arriving from over the Atlantic. He tells a supervisor there, “We’re going to ATC zero and evacuating.” Scoggins then calls NEADS with the same information. He says: “I wanted to let you know, Boston Center has declared ATC zero and we are evacuating due to an airborne threat. It’s approaching Martha’s Vineyard and it’s coming our way.” Before hanging up, he gives NEADS the speed and coordinates of the approaching aircraft. Scoggins then heads out of the building. According to the account of author Lynn Spencer, Scoggins’s call prompts NEADS to immediately call Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and order it: “Get everything you’ve got in the air! Now!” (see (10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). FBI and SWAT Teams Surround Center - By the time Scoggins is outside the Boston Center, FBI and SWAT teams are surrounding the facility. Scoggins will later recall that he sees the “Nashua SWAT team in the parking lot with automatic weapons, [and] the FBI running with the audio tapes with Bob Jones [a quality assurance specialist at the Boston Center] by their side.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/20/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 243-245] (The FBI reportedly arrived at the Boston Center “minutes after Flight 11 crashed into the World Trade Center,” and seized tape recordings of radio transmissions from the hijacked plane (see Soon after 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 9/13/2001] ) Scoggins Tracking Other Unidentified Plane - Before the Boston Center received the call from the FAA regional office about the approaching aircraft, Scoggins was tracking another unidentified target on his radar screen: a slow-moving aircraft also flying toward the center from the east (see (10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Whether he alerts NEADS to that aircraft when he calls it is unclear. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 242-243] Entity Tags: Moncton Area Control Center, Colin Scoggins, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

10:23 a.m. September 11, 2001: Exterior Wall of North Tower May Bow Outwards or Inwards before Collapse The exterior wall on the south side of the World Trade Center’s North Tower apparently bows before the building collapses. The first inquiry into the collapse, by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the American Society of Civil Engineers, states that the perimeter walls bow outward (see (9:21 a.m.-9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001)). However, a subsequent report by the National Institute of Standards and Technology states that the south wall of the North Tower bows inward. In places the wall is said to bow inward by approximately 55 inches at floor 97, and NIST interprets this bowing to mean that the floors must be sagging. NIST will find that the sagging and bowing are two of the seven major factors that led to the collapse of each tower, as the bowing walls are no longer able to support their share of the buildings’ weight, causing the buildings to tilt and the upper sections to fall. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 32-34, 87 ] Entity Tags: World Trade Center, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Federal Emergency Management Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center

(10:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Staff in White House Bunker Learns of Flight 93 Crash; Vice President Cheney Already Thinks an ‘Act of Heroism’ Occurred

Vice President Cheney pointing a finger inside the Presidential Emergency Operations Center. Footage of the World Trade Center plays on the televisions in the background (exact time is unknown). [Source: White House] Those inside the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House learn that an aircraft is down in Pennsylvania. (This turns out to be Flight 93.) Many of the people in the PEOC wonder whether military fighters shot it down. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 41] National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice later claims that, like her, Vice President Dick Cheney initially thinks, “it must have been shot down by the fighters.” [HAYES, 2007, PP. 339] However, Eric Edelman—Cheney’s national security adviser, who is also in the PEOC—will later recall: “The vice president was a little bit ahead of us.… He said, sort of softly, and to nobody in particular, ‘I think an act of heroism just took place on that plane.’” [CNN, 9/11/2002; CNN, 9/14/2002] Yet the Pentagon does not confirm that Flight 93 was not shot down until after midday (see (Shortly After 12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [NEWSWEEK, 12/31/2001] And the phone calls from Flight 93 that indicated a passenger revolt took place are only reported later on. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, Eric Edelman Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Dick Cheney

10:27 a.m. September 11, 2001: Most Workers in North Tower Who Could Evacuate Have Done So Almost all the occupants of the North Tower who are able to evacuate the building have done so. Only 107 occupants who were below the impact floors remain in the building, while around 7,400 have escaped. However, 1,355 building occupants in or above the impact zone have either already died or perish in the collapse, as do many emergency workers. Overall, 99 percent of building occupants below the impact floors escape to safety. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. XXXVIII, 32 ] Most workers in the South Tower also left the building before it collapsed (see 9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center

10:27 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Informs American Airlines of Flight 93 Crash United Airlines contacts American Airlines and notifies it of the crash of Flight 93. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 47 ] Flight 93 crashed in Pennsylvania shortly after 10:00 a.m. (see (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). United Airlines received confirmation of this by 10:15 (see (10:07 a.m.-10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: United Airlines, American Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

Shortly Before 10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: Ground Shakes Prior to North Tower Collapse Some witnesses feel the ground shaking just before the north WTC tower starts collapsing: Fire Patrolman Paul Curran is in front of the US Customs House (WTC 6), next to the North Tower. He says, “all of a sudden the ground just started shaking. It felt like a train was running under my feet.… The next thing we know, we look up and the tower is collapsing.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 12/18/2001] EMS Lieutenant Bradley Mann is heading toward the EMS staging area on Vesey Street. He’d felt the ground shaking prior to the first collapse (see Shortly Before 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001). He says, “The ground shook again, and we heard another terrible noise and the next thing we knew the second tower was coming down.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 11/7/2001] Jay Jonas is actually inside the North Tower, on its fourth floor. Seconds before the collapse he feels “a tremendous vibration and shaking; the floor began waving.” [PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: Jay Jonas, Bradley Mann, Paul Curran Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center

10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: WTC North Tower Collapses

The North Tower collapses in a matter of seconds. [Source: Ray Stubblebine/ Reuters/ Landov] (click image to enlarge) The North Tower of the World Trade Center tilts to the south and then collapses. Its north side was hit by Flight 11 at 8:46, 102 minutes earlier. [CNN, 9/12/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/12/2001; MSNBC, 9/22/2001; KIM AND BAUM, 2002 ; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 33 ] After the antenna starts to move (see (10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001)), the next sign that the top section of the building is moving downward is on floor 98, at the top of the impact zone. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 22, 87 ] The angle of the tilt will be disputed after 9/11 (see September-November 2005), as will the time it takes the towers to fall to the ground (see September 12, 2001-September 2005). [SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, 10/9/2001; EAGAR AND MUSSO, 12/2001; PBS NOVA, 5/2002; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 8/30/2006] The death toll could have been much worse—an estimated 15,000 people made it out of the WTC to safety after 8:46 a.m. [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/8/2002] Entity Tags: World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, Key Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: Reporter Sees Ground-Level Explosion When North Tower Collapses

Carol Marin. [Source: Columbia Journalism Review] CBS News correspondent Carol Marin witnesses what she describes as a “gigantic fireball” coming from the base of the North Tower as it starts to collapse. [USA TODAY, 9/11/2001; CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, 9/12/2001; DAILY HERALD (ARLINGTON HEIGHTS), 9/11/2002] Marin headed to the scene of the attacks and arrived on West Street after the South Tower collapsed. She then sees the second tower come down, later describing, “I was only a block or two away from the North Tower when the street trembled under my feet, a fireball of pooled jet fuel exploded out of the building’s base, and it too, unbelievably, started to collapse right in front of me.” [CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, 9/10/2006] (However, the explosion could not be due to “pooled jet fuel,” as, according to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, “The jet fuel” from the planes “was mostly consumed within the first few minutes after impact.” [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 6/18/2004; NEW YORK TIMES, 4/5/2005] ) In one telling, Marin describes, “a roar seemed to come out of the earth,” causing the fireball. [GILBERT ET AL., 2002] In another, she says, “there was a roar, an explosion, and we could see coming toward us a ball of flame, stories high.” She runs, and a firefighter throws her against a building to protect her. She recalls, “The flame somehow stopped short of us.” [CBS NEWS, 2002, PP. 54] Other witnesses also describe the ground shaking before the North Tower collapse (see Shortly Before 10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). And some witnesses similarly report seeing a fireball at ground level coming from the South Tower when it collapsed (see Shortly Before 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Carol Marin Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: Some Witnesses Hear Explosions as North Tower Collapses

Fire Lieutenant Gregg Hansson [Source: BBC] Many witnesses hear explosions during the collapse of the north WTC tower. Some report hearing a single explosion: Reporter Mike Sheehan hears “another deafening explosion. I looked up and saw the top of the North Tower, the mast, begin to fall.” [GILBERT ET AL., 2002, PP. 126] Fire Lieutenant William Wall: “[W]e heard an explosion. We looked up and the building was coming down right on top of us.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 12/10/2001] Firefighter Roy Chelsen: “All of a sudden we heard this huge explosion, and that’s when the tower started coming down.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 1/18/2002] EMT Jason Charles: “I heard a ground level explosion and I’m like holy shit, and then you heard that twisting metal wreckage again.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 1/23/2002] Firefighter Kevin Murray: “When the tower started—there was a big explosion that I heard and someone screamed that it was coming down.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/9/2001] Firefighter James Ippolito: “I heard an explosion and turned around and the building was coming down.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 12/13/2001] Fire Lieutenant Gregg Hansson: “[A] large explosion took place. In my estimation that was the tower coming down, but at that time I did not know what that was. I thought some type of bomb had gone off.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/9/2001] Firefighter Kevin Gorman: “I heard the explosion, looked up, and saw like three floors explode, saw the antenna coming down.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 1/9/2002] Others report hearing multiple explosions: EMT Gregg Brady: “I heard 3 loud explosions. I look up and the North Tower is coming down now.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 11/1/2001] Firefighter Richard Carletti: “I remember seeing the antenna do a little rock back and forth and I could just hear the floors pancaking. I heard it for about 30 pancakes, just boom, boom, boom, boom.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 1/2/2002] Fire Lieutenant Michael Cahill: “That’s when the second collapse started to come down. All kinds of noise. Boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, very loud.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/17/2001] Firefighter Sal D’Agostino is actually inside the North Tower, around its fourth floor, when the collapse occurs. He says, “It’s pancaking from the top down, and there were these huge explosions—I mean huge, gigantic explosions.” [PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, 9/11/2002; DWYER AND FLYNN, 2005, PP. 241-242] Firefighter Bill Butler, who is with D’Agostino inside the tower, says, “It was like a train going two inches away from your head: bang-bang, bang-bang, bang-bang.” [PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, 9/11/2002] EMT David Timothy: “[Y]ou started hearing more explosions. I guess this is when the second tower started coming down.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/25/2001] CTV will later assert, “When eyewitnesses claim to have heard explosions prior to the collapse, those were just the sounds of a massive building contorting and crushing anything inside.” [CTV, 9/12/2006] Entity Tags: Jason Charles, Roy Chelsen, James Ippolito, Bill Butler, David Timothy, Kevin Gorman, Kevin Murray, Mike Sheehan, Gregg Brady, World Trade Center, Michael Cahill, William Wall, Richard Carletti, Gregg Hansson, Sal D’Agostino Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center, WTC Investigation

10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: Some Witnesses Think North Tower Collapses Like a Controlled Demolition Some witnesses to the collapse of the North Tower think it resembles a demolition using explosives: Fire Captain Dennis Tardio: “I hear an explosion and I look up. It is as if the building is being imploded, from the top floor down, one after another, boom, boom, boom.” [SMITH, 2002, PP. 18] Assistant Fire Commissioner James Drury: “[P]eople in the street and myself included thought that the roar was so loud that the explosive—bombs were going off inside the building.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 10/16/2001] Firefighter James Curran: “I heard like every floor went chu-chu-chu. Looked back and from the pressure everything was getting blown out of the floors before it actually collapsed.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 12/30/2001] EMS Captain Karin Deshore: “Somewhere around the middle of the World Trade Center, there was this orange and red flash coming out. Initially it was just one flash. Then this flash just kept popping all the way around the building and that building had started to explode. The popping sound, and with each popping sound it was initially an orange and then a red flash came out of the building and then it would just go all around the building on both sides as far as I could see. These popping sounds and the explosions were getting bigger, going both up and down and then all around the building. I went inside… and I said I think we have another major explosion.” [CITY OF NEW YORK, 11/7/2001] The National Institute of Standards and Technology, in its report on the towers’ collapse, will reject suggestions that the Twin Towers were brought down with explosives (see August 30, 2006). [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 8/30/2006] Entity Tags: Karin Deshore, James Drury, World Trade Center, Dennis Tardio, James Curran Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center, WTC Investigation

(10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001): Falling Antenna Suggests North Tower’s Collapse Begins in Its Core Area The team studying the WTC collapses for the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will later observe that the antenna on WTC 1 began to fall before the exterior of the building: “Review of videotape recordings of the collapse taken from various angles indicates that the transmission tower on top of the structure began to move downward and laterally slightly before movement was evident at the exterior wall. This suggests that collapse began with one or more failures in the central core area of the building.” [FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, 5/1/2002, PP. 2-27] In a program featuring some members of the FEMA/ASCE team, the BBC will comment: “The mast was directly supported by the tower’s inner core. The way it fell suggests it was failure of the inner core that began the collapse, whereas in the South Tower it had been the outer walls.” [BBC, 3/7/2002] Entity Tags: American Society of Civil Engineers, World Trade Center, Federal Emergency Management Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center

Shortly after 10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001:: Suspicous Hebrew-Speaking Witnesses to the WTC Collapse Allegedly Observed at Liberty State Park According to an editorial written in the Black Agenda Report by executive editor Glen Ford written in 2008, Ford claims that he observes two presumably Israeli witnesses to the collapse of the second World Trade Center tower who exhibit suspicious behavior. They are already positioned at the river bank when he arrives at the scene on foot after having rushed past police, who had blocked all vehicular entrance to the park. They are thus the apparent owners of the only vehicle in the lot, having arrived prior to its closure, at an unknown time. The so-described athletic, military-aged duo is clicking away with two very expensive-looking cameras. They speak excitedly to each other in Hebrew—a language Mr. Ford instantly recognizes from his two decades as a Manhattanite—but clumsily claim to be “Polish” when asked where they are from. Informed by Ford that he is a reporter, they claim, “Yes, we are reporters, too!” They display two laminated New Jersey press cards that appear genuine except they are the wrong color, and cheerfully admit they are phony. “They are easy to make,” one says, laughing. When prompted, one states with pleasure that “yes, everything has changed” by the events just witnessed. [FORD, 10/8/2008] Entity Tags: Glen Ford Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Israel

After 10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: Fire Fighters Trying to Extinguish Fires in WTC 7 According to Captain Michael Currid, the sergeant at arms for the Uniformed Fire Officers Association, some time after the collapse of the North Tower, he sees four or five fire companies trying to extinguish fires in Building 7 of the WTC. Someone from the city’s Office of Emergency Management tells him that WTC 7 is in serious danger of collapse. Currid says, “The consensus was that it was basically a lost cause and we should not lose anyone else trying to save it.” Along with some others, he goes inside WTC 7 and yells up the stairwells to the fire fighters, “Drop everything and get out!” [MURPHY, 2002, PP. 175-176] However, other accounts contradict this, claiming that no attempt is made to fight the fires in WTC 7 (see (11:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). One report later claims, “Given the limited water supply and the first strategic priority, which was to search for survivors in the rubble, FDNY did not fight the fires [in WTC 7].” [FIRE ENGINEERING, 9/2002] And a 2002 government report says, “the firefighters made the decision fairly early on not to attempt to fight the fires, due in part to the damage to WTC 7 from the collapsing towers.” [FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, 5/1/2002, PP. 5-21] Building 7 eventually collapses late in the afternoon of 9/11 (see (5:20 p.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Office of Emergency Management, Michael Currid Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center

(Between 10:30 a.m. and 12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001: Condoleezza Rice Speaks to British Ambassador; Wonders If Iraq Involved in 9/11 During a phone call with Christopher Meyer, the British ambassador to the United States, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice suggests the possibility of Iraqi complicity in the attacks on New York and Washington. Following the strike on the Pentagon, Meyer held an emergency meeting of his staff at the British Embassy. He then calls Rice to offer condolences and support. He asks her who does she think was responsible for the attacks? In his 2005 memoirs, Meyer will recall: “The names al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden were already in circulation. She said that the early evidence suggested that it was them. But there could also be a connection with Iraq. That would need investigating.” [BBC RADIO 4, 2002 ; MEYER, 2005, PP. 188 AND 190] However, in a 2007 interview, he will suggest Rice might have made this reference to possible Iraqi complicity in a later call, saying, “I think it was in the same conversation [I had with Rice on the morning of September 11], or it may have been the next one we had very soon after, she said, ‘Well, one thing we need to look into is to see whether Iraq’s had anything to do with this.’” [PBS FRONTLINE, 12/20/2007] Entity Tags: Christopher Meyer, Condoleezza Rice Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

(10:30 a.m.-10:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: DC Air National Guard Commander Wants Fighters Launched in Response to Aircraft Approaching Washington, Supposedly Flight 93 Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) at Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington, wants his fighter jets to intercept a suspicious aircraft coming down the Potomac River toward the capital, which is apparently thought to be Flight 93, although that plane has already crashed (see (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 79-81; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/28/2003] Numerous Suspicious Aircraft - According to the Washington Post, the DCANG has learned there are “about a half-dozen suspicious aircraft in the air across the country, among them hijacked United Airlines Flight 93, on a path toward Washington.” Wherley will add: “Nobody knew it had crashed. We just knew there was an airplane out there that could be coming to Washington. We knew the threat was real.” Fighters Launched due to False Report - The first three DCANG fighters to take off in response to the attacks are ordered to go after this alleged inbound aircraft. [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002] Lieutenant Colonel Phil Thompson, the chief of safety for the DC Air National Guard, will later recall: “We had something coming down the Potomac at low altitude. Brigadier General Wherley is standing here, and we’ve got the tower with the Secret Service agent, and they want us to launch anything we’ve got. And the general said, ‘Do it.’” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 81] DCANG pilot Billy Hutchison, who takes off at 10:38 a.m. (see (10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001), will describe, “There was an aircraft coming down the Potomac that they needed me in the air for” that had to “be prevented from reaching the DC area.” He is told this aircraft is “coming from Pennsylvania.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004] And pilot Marc Sasseville, who, along with Heather Penney Garcia, takes off at 10:42 a.m. (see 10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001), later says: “We all realized we were looking for an airliner—a big airplane. That was Flight 93; the track looked like it was headed toward DC at that time.” [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 446] Incorrect Report Comes from Secret Service - According to Major David McNulty, the senior intelligence officer of the DCANG, his understanding is that “the information about the plane coming down the river” came from the Secret Service’s White House Joint Operations Center. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/11/2004 ] FAA personnel are also receiving similar information from the Secret Service. At 10:32, an FAA employee tells John White, a manager at the FAA’s Herndon Command Center, “Secret Service is reporting one unknown eight miles out, flying inbound.” Two minutes later, this employee says they are “[t]rying to tell [the] Secret Service about [Flight] 93,” because the Secret Service is “a little bit behind, still getting reports.” They then tell White, “Secret Service is saying the aircraft they are talking is coming up the Potomac right now.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 11/4/2003] Fire and rescue workers are evacuated away from the Pentagon site around this time, in response to a report from the FBI of a hijacked aircraft flying toward Washington (see (10:15 a.m.-10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001). This may be the same alleged plane that the DCANG and FAA learn of. [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. A30; FIRE ENGINEERING, 11/2002] Aircraft Supposedly a Helicopter - The incoming aircraft is apparently a false alarm. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/28/2003] After searching for it, Hutchison will be instructed to fly back toward Washington because, he will say, “the plane had been lost.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004] According to a 9/11 Commission memorandum, “FAA tapes and transcripts” reveal the aircraft to be “an Army National Guard helicopter based out of Davison Field, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, which had become isolated in Maryland as events unfolded and which wanted to return to its home field.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/11/2004 ] Secret Service Thinks Plane Crashed at Camp David - However, at 10:36, the FAA employee relays that the “Secret Service is saying they believe United 93 hit Camp David.” Seconds later, they add that the Secret Service is “confirming that UA 93 did go into Camp David.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 11/4/2003] Even President Bush is given an incorrect report of a plane going down near Camp David around this time (see (10:37 a.m.-11:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 108] So this erroneous information may be what leads to Hutchison being informed that the aircraft he was sent after has been lost. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004] Entity Tags: Secret Service, David Wherley, Billy Hutchison, Phil Thompson, David McNulty, John White, Marc Sasseville, District of Columbia Air National Guard, Heather Penney Garcia, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(After 10:28 a.m.-12:00 pm.) September 11, 2001: Giuliani Establishes Temporary Headquarters

Bernard Kerik. [Source: Publicity photo] After leaving 75 Barclay Street (see (9:50 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001), Mayor Giuliani and the group accompanying him search for somewhere to establish a new temporary headquarters. Soon after the North Tower’s collapse, they break into a vacant firehouse at the corner of Houston Street and Sixth Avenue. Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik, who is part of the group, wants the location kept secret. He gives out the order, “Okay, we’re going to establish a command center [here]. We’re not going to let anybody know. I don’t want it over the radio. We don’t know what’s happening. We don’t want them [presumably meaning the attackers] to know where we’re all going to be.” Giuliani is able to find a phone, and speaks with New York Governor George Pataki, the White House, and the Defense Department. At around 10:57, he speaks to the television channel New York 1 and offers a message of reassurance to the people of New York City. [FINK AND MATHIAS, 2002, PP. 108; GIULIANI, 2002, PP. 15-16; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/19/2004; BARRETT AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 13] Deciding that they need to be somewhere larger and more secure, Kerik suggests they move to the Police Academy on East 20th Street. [KERIK, 2001, PP. 342] Thus, Giuliani’s group—which now numbers more than twenty people plus a press contingent—gets into cars and drives to the academy, arriving around midday. [GIULIANI, 2002, PP. 18-19; BARRETT AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 13] This will remain as the city’s command center for several days, until it is replaced later in the week by a larger space at Pier 92 on the Hudson River. [CENTER FOR BIOSECURITY, 2/3/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/19/2004] Entity Tags: Bernard Kerik, Rudolph (“Rudy”) Giuliani Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Missing Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Finally Enters NMCC Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, missing for at least 30 minutes, finally enters the NMCC, where the military’s response to the 9/11 attacks is being coordinated. [CNN, 9/4/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Rumsfeld later claims that he only started to gain a situational awareness of what was happening after arriving at the NMCC. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Rumsfeld was in his office only 200 feet away from the NMCC until the Pentagon crash at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). His activities during this period are unclear. He went outside to the Flight 77 crash site and then stayed somewhere else in the Pentagon until his arrival at the NMCC. Brigadier General Montague Winfield later says, “For 30 minutes we couldn’t find him. And just as we began to worry, he walked into the door of the [NMCC].” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] Winfield himself apparently only shows up at the NMCC around 10:30 a.m. as well. Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, National Military Command Center, Montague Winfield Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Donald Rumsfeld, Key Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Medevac Helicopter Provides Scare for Bunkered Vice President Cheney and Others Vice President Cheney and others in the White House bunker are given a report of another airplane heading toward Washington. Cheney’s Chief of Staff, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, later states, “We learn that a plane is five miles out and has dropped below 500 feet and can’t be found; it’s missing.” Believing they only have a minute or two before the plane crashes into Washington, Cheney orders fighters to engage the plane, saying, “Take it out.” However, reports that this is another hijacking are mistaken. It is learned later that day that a Medevac helicopter five miles away was mistaken for a hijacked plane. [NEWSWEEK, 12/31/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Dick Cheney

(After 10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Gate Agent Has Singled Out Boarding Passes of Suspicious Flight 93 Passengers

Terri Rizzuto. [Source: ReclaimingTheSky.com] A United Airlines manager finds that a gate agent has already singled out boarding passes belonging to four suspicious passengers who were on Flight 93. Terri Rizzuto is the United Airlines station manager at Newark Airport, from where Flight 93 departed. Some time after hearing that this plane has crashed, she speaks on the phone with the FBI, which is requesting the plane’s manifest and its Passenger Name Record (PNR). After arranging permission to release these, she goes to Gate 17, from where she knows Flight 93 departed, wanting to talk to her staff there. When she arrives, a supervisor hands her four boarding passes. The supervisor tells her they are “The men, who did this maybe,” and points her toward one of the gate agents who had boarded the passengers onto the flight. When Rizzuto asks the gate agent, “How do you know?” he replies: “They were too well-dressed. Too well-dressed for that early in the morning. And their muscles rippled below their suits.… [A]nd their eyes.” [MURPHY, 2006, PP. 71-73] However, this report of men with rippling muscles contradicts the 9/11 Commission’s description of the so-called “muscle” hijackers (i.e. the non-pilot hijackers) on the four targeted planes: They “were not physically imposing,” with the majority of them being “slender in build.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/16/2004] Entity Tags: Terri Rizzuto Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, FBI 9/11 Investigation

10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001: Military and Law Enforcement Flights Resume The FAA allows “military and law enforcement flights to resume (and some flights that the FAA can’t reveal that were already airborne).” All civilian, military, and law enforcement flights were ordered at 9:26 a.m. to land as soon as reasonably possible. [TIME, 9/14/2001] Civilian flights remain banned until September 13. Note that the C-130 cargo plane that witnessed the Flight 77 crash (see 9.36 a.m. September 11, 2001) and which came upon the Flight 93 crash site (see 10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001) right after it had crashed was apparently not subject to the grounding order issued about an hour earlier. Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001: NORAD Passes on Shootdown Order to Its Air Defense Sectors The Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR) issues a message to its three air defense sectors—including the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS)—stating that Vice President Dick Cheney has authorized it to shoot down suspicious aircraft. Order Sent over Computer Chat System - About 15 minutes earlier, a military officer at the White House relayed to the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) that Cheney had confirmed that fighter jets were cleared to engage an inbound aircraft if they could verify that the aircraft was hijacked (see 10:14 a.m.-10:19 a.m. September 11, 2001). According to the 9/11 Commission, “It is not clear how [this] shootdown order was communicated within NORAD.” However, Major General Larry Arnold, the CONR commander, now instructs his staff to broadcast a message over a NORAD computer chat system, passing on Cheney’s authorization. The message states, “10:31 Vice president has cleared to us to intercept tracks of interest and shoot them down if they do not respond, per CONR CC [General Arnold].” The message is received at CONR’s three air defense sectors: the Western, Southeast, and Northeast. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 240] Arnold Could Issue Shootdown Order Himself - Arnold, who is at the CONR air operations center at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida, will later comment, “I have the authority in case of an emergency to declare a target hostile and shoot it down under an emergency condition… but it was comforting to know we legally had the authority from the president of the United States.” [FILSON, 2002; CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 75-76] The 10:31 chat message is the first notification personnel on the NEADS operations floor receive of the shootdown order. These personnel are reportedly confused over the order and do not pass it on to fighter pilots under their command (see 10:32 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42-43; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 47 ] Entity Tags: Continental US NORAD Region, Southeast Air Defense Sector, Western Air Defense Sector, Larry Arnold, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(10:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001: Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Works on Rules of Engagement for Fighter Pilots, Too Late to Be of Any Use After he finally arrives at the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), Donald Rumsfeld’s primary concern, according to the 9/11 Commission, is “ensuring that the [military fighter] pilots [have] a clear understanding of their rules of engagement.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 44] Rumsfeld later recalls, “It was clear they needed rules of engagement telling them what they should and should not do. They needed clarity. And there were no rules of engagement on the books for this first-time situation where civilian aircraft were seized and were being used as missiles.” By this time, the president has supposedly already given authorization for the military to shoot down hijacked aircraft (see (Between 10:00 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and Dick Cheney informs Rumsfeld of this over the air threat conference at 10:39 (see 10:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). Rumsfeld says that, “Throughout the course of the day,” along with acting Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers, he “returned to further refine those rules.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/23/2004] As journalist Andrew Cockburn will later remark though, Rumsfeld’s work on the rules of engagement “was an irrelevant exercise for he did not complete and issue them until 1:00 p.m., hours after the last hijacker had died.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 465; COCKBURN, 2007, PP. 7] Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Richard B. Myers Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Donald Rumsfeld

10:32 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Personnel Confused over Meaning of Shootdown Order, Do Not Pass It on to Fighters Personnel on the operations floor at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) are confused over the nature and effect of an order they have received, which states that the military can shoot down aircraft that do not respond to its directions, and they do not pass this order on to fighter pilots under their command. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42-43; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 47 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 240-241; FARMER, 2009, PP. 228-229] NEADS has just received a message over the NORAD computer chat system from Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR), stating that Vice President Dick Cheney has authorized NORAD to shoot down suspicious aircraft (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42] Weapons Director Alerted to Order - Major Steve Ovens sees the chat message and alerts Major James Fox, the leader of the NEADS weapons team, to it. Ovens says: “We need to read this. Region commander has declared that we can shoot down tracks that do not respond to our direction. Okay?” Fox replies, “Okay,” but Ovens is unconvinced that he has understood Arnold’s message, so he says again, “The region commander has declared that we can shoot down aircraft that do not respond to our directions, okay?” Fox replies, “Copy that.” NEADS Director Opposes Order - Ovens continues, “So if you’re trying to divert somebody and he won’t divert…” but Fox says, “DO [the director of operations] is saying no.” According to author Lynn Spencer, Fox means that Colonel Lanny McNeely, the NEADS director of operations, is indicating “no.” McNeely has “understood that the battle staff wanted to keep shootdown authority in the [NEADS] battle cab. The commanders were not prepared to pass such authorizations to airborne fighters.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 240-241] However, a 9/11 Commission memorandum will state that McNeely is away from NEADS on this day, in Texas, and no one is currently sitting in the director of operations position. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/30/2003 ] According to John Farmer, the senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission, Fox is instead referring to Colonel Robert Marr, the NEADS battle commander, saying “no,” not McNeely. [FARMER, 2009, PP. 229] Fox Agrees to Pass on Order to Commander - Ovens responds: “No? It came over the chat.… You got a conflict on that direction?” Fox replies, “Right now, no, but…” Showing Fox the chat message, Ovens says: “Okay. You read that from the vice president, right? Vice president has cleared…” Fox reads the message out loud, saying, “Vice president has cleared us to intercept traffic and shoot them down if they do not respond, per CONR CC.” Finally, he says, “Okay, I will pass it to MCC,” meaning Major Kevin Nasypany, the NEADS mission crew commander. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 241] NEADS Does Not Pass on Order to Pilots - NEADS personnel will later express to the 9/11 Commission their “considerable confusion over the nature and effect” of this shootdown order, and explain why they fail to pass it on to the fighter jets from Otis Air National Guard Base (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) and Langley Air Force Base (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001) that are under their command. Nasypany and Fox indicate to the Commission that “they did not pass the order to the fighters circling Washington and New York because they were unsure how the pilots would, or should, proceed with this guidance.” Consequently, “while leaders in Washington believed that the fighters above them had been instructed to ‘take out’ hostile aircraft, the only orders actually conveyed to the pilots were to ‘ID type and tail.’” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 43; FARMER, 2009, PP. 229] Entity Tags: Lanny McNeely, James Fox, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Kevin Nasypany, Robert Marr, Steve Ovens Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

Between 10:32 a.m. and 11:45 a.m. September 11, 2001: Russian President Calls the White House Russian President Vladimir Putin phones the White House, wanting to speak with the US president. With Bush not there, Condoleezza Rice takes the call. Putin tells her that the Russians are voluntarily standing down a military exercise they are conducting, as a gesture of solidarity with the United States. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] The Russian exercise began on September 10 in the Russian arctic and North Pacific oceans, and was scheduled to last until September 14. [NORAD, 9/9/2001; WASHINGTON TIMES, 9/11/2001] It involved Russian bombers staging a mock attack against NATO planes that are supposedly planning an assault on Russia. [BBC, 2001, PP. 161] Subsequently, Putin manages to talk to Bush while he is aboard Air Force One (see (After 11:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush, Vladimir Putin Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

10:32 a.m. September 11, 2001: Cheney Warns Bush of Apparent Threat to Air Force One; Official Account Murky, Disbelieved by Many Vice President Cheney reportedly calls President Bush and tells him of a threat to Air Force One and that it will take 40-90 minutes to get a protective fighter escort in place. Later, many will express doubt about the existence of this threat. For instance, Representative Martin Meehan (D) says, “I don’t buy the notion Air Force One was a target. That’s just PR, that’s just spin.” [WASHINGTON TIMES, 10/8/2002] A later account will call the threat “completely untrue,” and say Cheney probably made the story up. A well-informed, anonymous Washington official says, “It did two things for [Cheney]. It reinforced his argument that the president should stay out of town, and it gave George W. an excellent reason for doing so.” [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001] In 2004, the Wall Street Journal will investigate the alleged threat and report two differing accounts of this episode, one from White House spokesman Dan Bartlett, and the other from the office of Vice-President Cheney. No Actual Threat - Bartlett will say there had not been any actual threat, but that word of a threat results from confusion in the White House bunker, as multiple conversations go on simultaneously. Many of these exchanges apparently relate to rumors that turn out to be false, such as reports of attacks on the president’s ranch in Texas and the State Department. Bartlett will say, “Somebody was using the word ‘angel,’ [a code word for Air Force One and] that got interpreted as a threat based on the word ‘angel.’” Cheney's Account Changes - The vice president’s office will say it still could not rule out that a threat to Air Force One actually had been made. Cheney initially says word of the threat had been passed to him by Secret Service agents, but two former senior Secret Service agents on duty that day will deny their agency played any role in receiving or passing on the threat. An official in Cheney’s office will then say that Cheney was mistaken and that he had received word of the threat from “a uniformed military person” manning the underground bunker. Apparently, nobody knows the identity of this person. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 3/22/2004 ] Entity Tags: Martin Meehan, George W. Bush, Dan Bartlett, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush, Dick Cheney

(Shortly After 10:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Controller Passes on Shootdown Authorization to Toledo Fighters, Because NEADS Cannot Reach Them The FAA’s Cleveland Center has to authorize two Ohio Air National Guard fighter jets to shoot down threatening aircraft, because NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) is unable to communicate directly with those jets and give them the authorization itself. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 241-242] The two F-16s, which belong to the 180th Fighter Wing of the Ohio Air National Guard, took off from Toledo Express Airport at 10:17 a.m. (see 10:17 a.m. September 11, 2001). [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001; WTOL, 9/11/2006] NEADS Unable to Contact Fighters - NEADS has just received a message, informing it that Vice President Dick Cheney has authorized NORAD to shoot down suspicious aircraft (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42] A weapons officer wants to pass this important information to the two 180th FW fighter pilots. However, since the jets took off, NEADS has been unable to bring them up on their UHF frequency, and so the weapons officer has had to communicate with them indirectly, via the FAA’s Cleveland Center. He now phones the Cleveland Center and asks it to pass on the new rules of engagement to the 180th FW pilots. Controller Passes on Shootdown Authorization - A Cleveland Center air traffic controller then radios one of those pilots, Scott Reed, and asks him, “Sting 1-1 [Reed’s call sign], Cleveland Center, do you know what your ROE is?” Reed is surprised to hear a civilian controller use the military acronym for “rules of engagement.” He responds, “Sting 1-1, no.” The controller asks, “Would you like to know?” and then tells Reed, “Sting 1-1, if you have a non-military aircraft moving toward a population center, you are clear to engage.” Reed says, “Cleveland Center, Sting 1-1, please confirm ROE.” The controller responds, “Sting 1-1, if the airplane you are vectored against does not comply with your instructions, you are cleared to engage.” According to author Lynn Spencer, Reed “is shocked; he’s just been given clearance—from a civilian controller—to shoot down a commercial airliner.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 241-242] The two 180th FW jets never receive any subsequent orders to engage specific aircraft. According to NEADS battle commander, Colonel Robert Marr, the pilots “never had a track close enough that they were directed to engage. [But] if a valid direction had come from the appropriate level to engage a target, or shoot down a target at some time, they could have done that.” [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001] Though it notifies the 180th FW jets, NEADS fails to pass on the shootdown authorization to the fighters from Otis Air National Guard Base and Langley Air Force Base that are under its command (see 10:32 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 43; FARMER, 2009, PP. 229] Entity Tags: Robert Marr, Northeast Air Defense Sector, 180th Fighter Wing, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Scott Reed Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Secret Service Again Calls DC Air National Guard and Requests Fighters A Secret Service agent at the White House calls the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) at Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington, and asks it to launch fighter jets immediately. According to author Lynn Spencer, a report has been received at the White House from the FAA “that there are three planes unaccounted for,” and the Secret Service has therefore determined “it needs fighters up now.” It calls the DCANG to request these jets. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 236] Apparently around the same time, the DCANG receives a call from someone else at the White House—presumably another Secret Service agent—declaring the Washington area “a free-fire zone.” Lieutenant Colonel Marc Sasseville, one of the DCANG pilots, will later comment, “That meant we were given authority to use force, if the situation required it, in defense of the nation’s capital, its property, and people.” [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002] Between 10:38 a.m. and 11:11 a.m., five DCANG fighter jets will take off from Andrews to defend Washington (see (10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001, 10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001, and 11:11 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 446] The Secret Service contacted the DCANG several times earlier on, requesting that it launch fighters (see (Shortly After 9:04 a.m.) September 11, 2001, (Shortly After 9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001, and (Shortly After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 78; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 465] Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the DC Air National Guard, has been on the phone with Secret Service agents at the White House, who have told him his jets should “turn away any airplane that attempts to fly within 20 miles of the Washington area,” and the pilots can use “whatever force is necessary” to prevent another aircraft hitting a building (see (10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (Between 10:16 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/28/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 44; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 218] Entity Tags: Marc Sasseville, District of Columbia Air National Guard, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Unarmed Fighters Find Target Is Just US Military Aircraft

A KC-10 air tanker. [Source: Jerry Morrison / US Air Force] Two unarmed fighter jets intercept a suspicious target flying in from the east, which turns out to simply be some US military aircraft returning from Europe, and which are unaware of the attacks on America. Pilots Dennis Doonan and Joe McGrady took off from Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, after NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) ordered the base to launch all its available aircraft (see (Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, their F-15s had not yet been armed. Fighters Directed toward Target - The weapons controller the two pilots are communicating with instructs them, “Fly 090 for 100 to intercept,” meaning they are to fly east for 100 miles. Knowing his plane is unarmed, McGrady is concerned that he might have to take out their target by crashing into it. To his relief, when he gets near it, he discovers the target is a convoy of five US military aircraft: a KC-10 tanker and four A-10 jets. These aircraft are on their way back to Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, from the Azores, off Portugal. Because the aircraft are out of radio range of US controllers, they are unaware of the catastrophic events taking place in America. Fighters Sent toward Boston - Doonan and McGrady radio the A-10 flight lead with diversion instructions. They are then instructed to fly to Boston to establish a combat air patrol over the city. Doonan decides that the KC-10 in the convoy can assist them with refueling once they are over Boston, and radios its pilot with instructions to accompany him. The pilot asks, “What’s going on?” Doonan gives no details, only replying, “It’s serious sh_t and you’re coming with us.” [BRUCE VITTNER, 2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 245-247] Entity Tags: Dennis Doonan, Joe McGrady Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(10:37 a.m.-11:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Plane Incorrectly Reported to Have Crashed at Camp David The press incorrectly reports that an airliner has crashed on or near Camp David. [DAILY RECORD (BALTIMORE), 9/12/2001; US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 3/2002] Camp David is the presidential retreat, located about 70 miles north of Washington, DC, in the Catoctin Mountains of Maryland. [FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, 10/2/2000; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 7/30/2007] On Air Force One, at 10:37, White House chief of staff Andrew Card relays to the president the incorrect report of the crash. [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 108] At around 11:09, CBS News reports that “a plane apparently has crashed at or near Camp David.” [BROADCASTING AND CABLE, 8/26/2002] An early article by Forbes states, “There are reports of a fourth airliner [having] been brought down near Camp David… by US military fighters.” [FORBES, 9/11/2001] And an early report by the Northwestern Chronicle similarly states, “Air Force officials say an airliner has been forced down by F-16 fighter jets near Camp David.” [NORTHWESTERN CHRONICLE, 9/11/2001] Theresa Hahn, the catering manager for a restaurant in the Camp David area, hears the erroneous report. She subsequently describes, “Lots of fire trucks were on the road and no one can get up there.” But J. Mel Poole, the Catoctin Mountain Park superintendent, states there has been “no crash at Camp David.” [DAILY RECORD (BALTIMORE), 9/12/2001] At some point, the FAA calls the military to confirm the crash, and is reassured that no crash occurred at Camp David. [FRENI, 2003, PP. 42] The actual Flight 93 crash site is about 85 miles northwest of Camp David. [PBS, 9/11/2001] The Secret Service reportedly tells the White House that Flight 93 may have been on a course for Camp David. [PITTSBURGH CHANNEL, 9/11/2001] And, following a military briefing, Representative James Moran (D-VA) tells reporters that Flight 93 was apparently heading for Camp David. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 9/12/2001] (However, the 9/11 Commission will later state that its intended target was either the White House or the Capitol building. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 14] ) The source of the incorrect report of the Camp David crash is unclear. However, when the FAA’s Washington Center first informed NEADS that Flight 93 had crashed, at 10:15, it simply reported that it had gone down “somewhere up northeast of Camp David” (see 10:15 a.m. September 11, 2001), so this may have created some of the confusion. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] There are also numerous false reports of terrorist attacks having taken place in Washington, DC around this time (see (Between 9:50-10:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Some commentators make the connection that the 9/11 attacks come 23 years after the signing of the Camp David accords—a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt—on September 17, 1978. [FORBES, 9/11/2001; VILLAGE VOICE, 9/11/2001; DAILY RECORD (BALTIMORE), 9/12/2001] WCBS reports, “[T]here is speculation that perhaps, perhaps, this may be in retaliation for those accords.” [BROADCASTING AND CABLE, 8/26/2002] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, J. Mel Poole, Andrew Card, James Moran, Theresa Hahn, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

(10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001: DC Air National Guard Fighter Recalled from Training Takes Off to Defend Washington

Billy Hutchison. [Source: Family photo] The first fighter jet to launch from Andrews Air Force Base, 10 miles southeast of Washington, takes off in response to the attacks. [GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 11/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] The F-16 belongs to the 121st Fighter Squadron, which is part of the 113th Wing of the District of Columbia Air National Guard, and is piloted by Major Billy Hutchison. It is one of three F-16s that were flying on a training mission in North Carolina, over 200 miles from Andrews (see 8:36 a.m. September 11, 2001), and which have finally been recalled to the base (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002; AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 5/12/2005] Although the three jets met with a refueling plane, they did not fill their tanks up completely. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 216-217] Hutchison’s aircraft is the only one of them with enough fuel remaining to take off again immediately, though he only has 2,800 pounds, which is equivalent to one-eighth of a tank in a car. His jet has no missiles, and only training ammunition. Pilot Takes Off, Instructed to Protect Washington - Immediately after landing at Andrews at 10:36 a.m., Hutchison takes off again at the instruction of Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the DC Air National Guard. He is instructed “to intercept an aircraft coming toward DC and prevent it from reaching DC,” he will later recall. [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 79-81; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004] According to author Lynn Spencer, Lieutenant Colonel Phil Thompson, the supervisor of flying (SOF) at Andrews, tells Hutchison to “use whatever force is necessary to prevent [the aircraft] from getting to DC.” Thompson adds: “You are weapons free. Do you understand?” “Weapons free” means the decision to shoot at a target now rests solely with Hutchison. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 219] However, according to the 9/11 Commission, the “weapons free” instruction goes out to other pilots that launch from Andrews at 10:42 and after, but apparently not to Hutchison. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 44] Thompson will tell Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine simply that he instructs Hutchison “to ‘do exactly what [air traffic control] asks you to do.’ Primarily, he was to go ID [identify] that unknown [aircraft] that everybody was so excited about” (see (10:30 a.m.-10:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002] Hutchison takes off “without afterburner to conserve fuel, go across the White House over the Georgetown area and continue northwest up the Potomac,” he will recall (see 10:39 a.m.-10:45 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 81] Conflicting Timelines - Conflicting times will later be given for when Hutchison takes off from Andrews. The pilots with the 121st Fighter Squadron will admit that their own recollection of the morning’s timeline “is fuzzy.” [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002] According to 113th Wing operations desk records, Hutchison takes off at 10:33 a.m. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 81, 89] Based on an interview with David Wherley, the 9/11 Commission states he is airborne at 10:38 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 44, 465] Recordings of air traffic controller transmissions confirm this time. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004] But in her 2008 book Touching History, Lynn Spencer will claim Hutchison took off significantly earlier, some time after 9:50 but before Flight 93 crashed (which was just after 10:00 a.m.). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 216-220] (However, she will later amend her claim, saying instead, “Radio data indicates that Hutchison’s flight did not depart from Andrews… until just after 10:35.” [LYNN SPENCER, 2008] ) Two more fighters will take off from Andrews at 10:42 a.m. (see 10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001) and another two take off at 11:11 a.m. (see 11:11 a.m. September 11, 2001). Due to his plane’s limited fuel, Hutchison will only be airborne for about 10 minutes, and he lands back at Andrews at 10:47 a.m. (see 10:47 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/28/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 446] One Jet Landed Already - The first of the three F-16s to return from the training mission over North Carolina landed at Andrews at 10:14 a.m., but did not take off again to defend Washington (see 10:14 a.m. September 11, 2001). The other F-16, piloted by Lou Campbell, landed with Hutchison’s jet at 10:36 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004] The 113th Wing is not part of NORAD’s air sovereignty force and, according to the 1st Air Force’s book about 9/11, does not have an alert mission. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 76] According to Phil Thompson, “We’ve never been an air defense unit,” but “We practice scrambles, we know how to do intercepts and other things.” [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002] Entity Tags: Andrews Air Force Base, Billy Hutchison, Lou Campbell, 121st Fighter Squadron, David Wherley, District of Columbia Air National Guard, Phil Thompson Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

10:39 a.m. September 11, 2001: Vice President Cheney Brings Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Up to Date, but Errs about Pilot Knowledge of Shootdown Order Vice President Dick Cheney tries to bring Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld up to date over the National Military Command Center’s (NMCC) conference call (see (9:29 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001), as Rumsfeld arrived at the NMCC just minutes earlier (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Cheney explains that he has given authorization for hijacked planes to be shot down and that this has been passed on to the fighter pilots. Rumsfeld asks, “So we’ve got a couple of aircraft up there that have those instructions at the present time?” Cheney replies: “That is correct. And it’s my understanding they’ve already taken a couple of aircraft out.” Then Rumsfeld says: “We can’t confirm that. We’re told that one aircraft is down but we do not have a pilot report that they did it.” Cheney is incorrect about his authorization having reached the pilots (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld

10:39 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Closes All US Airports The FAA’s Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, issues a formal Notice to Airmen (NOTAM), closing all operations at all US airports. [US CONGRESS. HOUSE. COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 9/21/2001; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002 ; HARRALD ET AL., 7/15/2002 ] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

10:39 a.m.-10:45 a.m. September 11, 2001: DC Air National Guard Jet Searches Unsuccessfully for Approaching Aircraft, then Inspects Pentagon Having taken off after returning from a training mission, a pilot with the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) flies two loops up the Potomac River, reversing course near Georgetown and the Pentagon, but is unable to locate a suspicious approaching aircraft, and heads back to base less than 10 minutes after launching. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/11/2004 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 219-221] No Rules of Engagement - Major Billy Hutchison, a pilot with the 121st Fighter Squadron of the DCANG, had landed back at Andrews Air Force Base, 10 miles from Washington, but was ordered to take off again immediately (see (10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002] His plane has no missiles, and only training ammunition, and he has been given no specific rules of engagement other than being told to identify an aircraft that is coming down the river. [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/11/2004 ; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 446] Because the DCANG is not in the communication and command loops of NORAD or its Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), Hutchison is unaware that three fighter jets NEADS ordered into the air from Langley Air Force Base (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001) are also flying over Washington, albeit at a much higher altitude than he is. [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004] Controller Directs Hutchison - Hutchison calls the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) at Washington’s Reagan National Airport. He says, “Bully 1 [his call sign] is looking for a contact.” Victor Padgett, the operations supervisor at the TRACON, replies, “We have an intercept for you northwest of here and coming down the Potomac.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 219] Hutchison knows he is meant to be searching for a civilian aircraft, and will later recall that he is told it is coming from Pennsylvania. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004] In order to conserve fuel and gain airspeed, he flies low over the White House and Georgetown, reportedly staying between 500 and 1,000 feet above ground level. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 219] After Padgett gives him details of the approaching aircraft’s location, Hutchison spots it on his jet’s radar screen, but it quickly disappears. The aircraft reappears a minute later, but then both Hutchison and Padgett lose sight of it. Aircraft Claimed to Be Flight 93 - Some accounts will suggest the approaching aircraft is thought to be Flight 93 (see (10:30 a.m.-10:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001), even though that plane has already crashed (see (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 219-221] Hutchison will later recall that the TRACON at Reagan Airport is “frantic with what they seem to think are aircraft coming their way.… There is another aircraft, and it’s United Flight 93. They… apparently have been given information that it’s coming their way.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 81] Major David McNulty, the senior intelligence officer of the DCANG, will recall, “[I]t wasn’t until later that they realized the plane [coming down the river] might be UAL 93.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/11/2004 ] However, John Farmer, John Azzarello, and Miles Kara, who are all staff members of the 9/11 Commission, subsequently rebut this claim. They will write: “[R]adar records of the day [of 9/11] indicate that Major Hutchison did not take off until more than a half-hour after United 93 had crashed near Shanksville, PA, and a good 20 minutes after the wreckage had been located. He could not have seen United 93 on his scope, and could not have intercepted it.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2008] Told to Investigate Other Aircraft - After the aircraft disappears off Hutchison’s radar screen, Dan Creedon, an air traffic controller at the TRACON at Reagan Airport, is concerned about planes and helicopters that are taking off and landing across Washington, and tells Hutchison, “We have more contacts!” Hutchison confirms that he will investigate the targets Creedon alerts him to, but he keeps losing them among the ground clutter on his radar screen. According to author Lynn Spencer, “The flights are too close to the surface and, from what he can see, appear to be mostly helicopters flying medevac from the Pentagon.” Flies over the Pentagon - Hutchison, who’d noticed the burning Pentagon before he landed at Andrews Air Force Base (see (9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001), then decides he should investigate it. He descends and flies a steep turn over the Pentagon. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 234-235] He will later recall: “I circled at a couple of hundred feet at the most just to, one, investigate, and two, give the people on the ground some semblance of security of an American fighter coming by. And apparently it changed the mood for a lot of people when they saw that” (see (10:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Running out of Fuel - By now, Hutchison is almost out of fuel. He will recall, “After that point, I’m emergency fuel, the lowest I’ve ever been in an F-16, and tell [the FAA’s] Washington Center I must leave, and they say I’m cleared to return to base and that two more aircraft are coming out of Andrews.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 81-82] Hutchison will land at Andrews at 10:47 a.m. (see 10:47 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004] Entity Tags: Victor Padgett, Dan Creedon, Billy Hutchison, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, Pentagon, 121st Fighter Squadron, John Farmer, Miles Kara, David McNulty, John Azzarello, District of Columbia Air National Guard Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(10:40 a.m.-11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Rumsfeld Refuses to Leave Military Command Center, against Established Emergency Plan Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld refuses to leave the Pentagon, despite the smoke leaking into the National Military Command Center (NMCC) where he is currently working, the danger of a second attack on the Pentagon, and a White House request to begin implementing Continuity of Government (COG) measures. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 132] After being out of touch with his colleagues at the Pentagon since the time of the attack there (see (9:38 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001), Rumsfeld finally entered the NMCC at around 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 43-44; COCKBURN, 2007, PP. 2-6] It is now noticed that smoke is seeping into the center. With people beginning to cough, aides suggest Rumsfeld should leave the building, but he is uninterested in their advice. Even when they warn that the smoke might be toxic, he still ignores them. Rumsfeld’s deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, tells him he should leave the Pentagon. But Rumsfeld instead orders Wolfowitz to leave the NMCC and fly to Site R, the alternate command center outside Washington (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to journalist and author Steve Vogel, this is “contrary to the established Continuity of Government plan, which called for the secretary of defense to relocate to the alternate command center.… The secretary figured the 45 minutes to an hour it would take to evacuate to Site R would leave him out of touch for too long.” Rumsfeld will later explain: “That’s life. That’s what deputies are for.” [VOGEL, 2007, PP. 441] Entity Tags: Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Donald Rumsfeld

(10:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: First Fighter Seen Arriving over the Pentagon

Mike Walter. [Source: CNN] According to a number of witnesses on the ground, a US Air Force F-16 flies low over the Pentagon at this time; apparently becoming the first fighter to arrive over the scene of the third attack. [AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 10/11/2001; CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 130-131] Firefighters and other emergency responders at the Pentagon recently evacuated away from the crash site, due to reports of another supposedly hijacked aircraft flying toward Washington (see (10:15 a.m.-10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. A30] Steve Carter, the assistant building manager, is in the Pentagon’s center courtyard, expecting this plane to hit the building. He then sees an F-16 zoom “low and fast over the courtyard.” [CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 130] On Washington Boulevard, where many fire and rescue personnel relocated during the evacuation, cheers go up when the F-16 flies over. Firefighter Mike Smith shouts out: “Thank God that guy’s there! Where has he been?” [CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 130-131] Lieutenant Commander Dale Rielage will recall that an “arriving combat air patrol F-16 thundered overhead” after the alleged second hijacked plane was said to be approaching the Pentagon. [FIRE ENGINEERING, 11/1/2002] John Jester, the chief of the Defense Protective Service, which guards the Pentagon, says that, following the evacuation, “It wasn’t until an F-15 fighter jet crossed in the sky that we realized the danger had passed.” [MURPHY, 2002, PP. 246-247] USA Today reporter Mike Walter, who has been at the Pentagon since the attack there, recalls that, after the evacuation, an “F-16 came screaming by the Pentagon, and people cheered.” [PEOPLE, 9/24/2001] Staff Sergeant Edwin Rotger Jr. will also describe seeing fighters arriving over the Pentagon at this time. However, he says there are two of them, not one. [OFFICE OF MEDICAL HISTORY, 9/2004, PP. 49] According to the New York Times, “witnesses, including a reporter for the New York Times who was headed toward the building, did not see any [fighter jets over the Pentagon] until closer to 11 [o’clock].” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/16/2001] According to some accounts, the fighter that flies over the Pentagon at this time is Major Billy Hutchison’s F-16 from Andrews Air Force Base (see (10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 235] Hutchison will recall, “I circled at a couple of hundred feet at the most just to, one, investigate, and two, give the people on the ground some semblance of security of an American fighter coming by” (see 10:39 a.m.-10:45 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 81-82] However, some accounts contradict this. Major Dean Eckmann, from Langley Air Force Base, suggests his F-16 is the first to fly over the Pentagon, and this was at some time shortly after 9:45 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). He will say: “I heard stories that people went back in [the Pentagon] after seeing me fly over to help others out.… Now they knew they were safe.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 66] Other accounts similarly suggest that the first fighter jet (or jets) arrived over the Pentagon significantly earlier than is described by the witnesses on the ground, between 9:49 and 10:00 a.m. (see (Between 9:49 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/17/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 34 ] Entity Tags: Edwin Rotger Jr., Dale Rielage, Dean Eckmann, John Jester, Mike Walter, Steve Carter, Billy Hutchison, Mike Smith Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

10:40 a.m. September 11, 2001: Attorney General Ashcroft Ignores FAA Order for His Plane to Land The plane carrying Attorney General John Ashcroft is ordered to land by the FAA’s Cleveland Center, but Ashcroft is intent on reaching Washington, DC, and instructs his pilot to ignore the order. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002 ; ASHCROFT, 2006, PP. 117; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 258] Ashcroft learned of the attacks in New York while flying to Milwaukee in a small government jet, and immediately wanted to return to Washington, but his plane needed to land first in Milwaukee to refuel (see Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). Even though the FAA had issued a nationwide ground stop to prevent aircraft from taking off, Ashcroft then insisted that his plane leave Milwaukee to fly back to Washington (see After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). FAA Manager Furious, Wants Plane to Land - When Ben Sliney, the national operations manager at the FAA’s Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, hears about Ashcroft’s plane defying the ground stop order, he is livid. He immediately calls the FAA’s Cleveland Center and tells it to order the plane to land. An air traffic controller at the Cleveland Center then issues this order to Ashcroft’s plane. [NEWSWEEK, 3/10/2003; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 257-258] David Clemmer, the plane’s pilot, tells Ashcroft, “They’re instructing me to land outside of Detroit,” but Ashcroft tells him, “No, keep going.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/28/2001; ASHCROFT, 2006, PP. 117] Controller Reports that Plane Is Not Complying - According to a 2002 FAA report, Ashcroft then requests that his plane be allowed to immediately return to Washington, and he receives permission to do so. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002 ] But author Lynn Spencer will give a different account, saying that Clemmer “chooses to ignore the controller and continues toward Washington.” The Cleveland Center controller then informs the FAA Command Center that the pilot of Ashcroft’s plane is not responding and not complying. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 258] Ashcroft’s plane will subsequently be redirected toward Richmond, Virginia, and is threatened with being shot down if it does not land (see 11:11 a.m. September 11, 2001). [DAILY RECORD (GLASGOW), 9/29/2001; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002 ; ASHCROFT, 2006, PP. 118] Entity Tags: John Ashcroft, David Clemmer, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Ben Sliney Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001: Fighters Launched from Syracuse Air Base Two F-16 fighters take off from Hancock Field Air National Guard Base, near Syracuse, NY. The fighters belong to the 174th Fighter Wing, a unit of the New York Air National Guard. A commander from Syracuse had called NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) offering to help earlier in the morning (see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Although at that time they’d promised: “Give me 30 minutes and I’ll have heat-seeker [missiles]. Give me an hour and I can give you slammers,” the fighters now launching have bullets but no missiles. [POST-STANDARD (SYRACUSE), 9/12/2001; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; POST-STANDARD (SYRACUSE), 10/18/2002] The Hancock pilots are ordered to “Identify all aircraft… Intercept them. Tell them to land. ‘Engage’ them if they [don’t].” [POST-STANDARD (SYRACUSE), 9/25/2001] Also at some time this morning, following the attacks, 174th FW officials form a command center to monitor the situation across the US. [POST-STANDARD (SYRACUSE), 9/11/2001; POST-STANDARD (SYRACUSE), 9/12/2001] A hundred of the 174th FW’s staff have spent the last month deployed to Saudi Arabia and are due back this afternoon. However, they are diverted to Canada and arrive back at the base later in the week (see Mid-August-September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: 174th Fighter Wing Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001: Two DC Air National Guard Fighters Take Off, but without Missiles

Heather Penney Garcia. [Source: ABC] Two F-16 fighter jets belonging to the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) take off from Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington, but they have no missiles and only training bullets for their guns. The pilots are Lieutenant Colonel Marc Sasseville and Lieutenant Heather Penney Garcia. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 82; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 446] Possibly Given Shootdown Authorization - Before they headed to their jets, Sasseville and Penney Garcia were given a short briefing by Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the DC Air National Guard. Wherley will later recall telling Sasseville that he has “weapons free flight-lead control,” meaning he is responsible for deciding whether to fire on hostile aircraft (see (Between 9:40 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 82; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 44; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 446] But Sasseville will say he does not recall receiving any such rules of engagement until after he has taken off. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/8/2004 ] Jets Only Have Training Ammunition - The two pilots run out to their jets and climb into the cockpits. But their F-16s are armed only with “hot” guns and 511 rounds of non-explosive training practice (TP) ammunition. According to Sasseville: “They had two airplanes ready to go, and were putting missiles on numbers three and four. Maintenance wanted us to take the ones with missiles, but we didn’t have time to wait on those.” Rookie Pilot 'Never Scrambled Before' - Penney Garcia, who is a rookie pilot, will later say: “I’d never scrambled before, I’d never done this. I was screaming to the maintainers to pull the chocks, and the guys were pulling the pins to arm the guns. We were going without INS [inertial navigation system].” Sasseville and Penney Garcia are airborne about six minutes after reaching their jets. They are unaware that fighters launched from Langley Air Force Base are also flying over Washington, at around 20,000 feet (see (Between 9:49 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 82] Told to Look for Hijacked Plane - Over their radios, Sasseville and Penney Garcia receive instructions from their squadron to look for a hijacked aircraft approaching from the northwest and heading toward Georgetown (see (10:30 a.m.-10:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). But, Sasseville will later recall, “We didn’t know what we were looking for—how high he was coming, or low, or where he was going.” [VOGEL, 2007, PP. 446] He will say, “I don’t have the whole picture, but have word from Washington National Approach that something is coming.” Pilot 'Making Things Up on the Fly' - The two jets will fly over Washington at low altitudes, around 5,000 or 6,000 feet. Sasseville will later say, “I didn’t want to get too low for a good radar angle, and not too high, so we could get somewhere fast.” He will admit that he is “making things up on the fly,” as he has no precedent to draw upon. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 82] Another DCANG pilot, Billy Hutchison, launched from Andrews four minutes before Sasseville and Penney Garcia take off, but he is airborne for less than 10 minutes (see (10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 10:47 a.m. September 11, 2001). The next DCANG jets to take off, which will be armed with missiles, launch at 11:11 a.m. (see 11:11 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 446] Entity Tags: Heather Penney Garcia, David Wherley, District of Columbia Air National Guard, Andrews Air Force Base, 121st Fighter Squadron, Marc Sasseville Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(10:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Status of Three Planes Unknown; False Rumors Persist of More Terrorist Activity Around this time (roughly), the FAA tells the White House that it still cannot account for three planes in addition to the four that have crashed. It takes the FAA another hour and a half to account for these three aircraft. [TIME, 9/14/2001] Vice President Cheney later says, “That’s what we started working off of, that list of six, and we could account for two of them in New York. The third one we didn’t know what had happened to. It turned out it had hit the Pentagon, but the first reports on the Pentagon attack suggested a helicopter and then later a private jet.” [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/17/2001] Amongst false rumors during the day are reports of a bomb aboard a United Airlines jet that just landed in Rockford, Illinois. “Another plane disappears from radar and might have crashed in Kentucky. The reports are so serious that [FAA head Jane] Garvey notifies the White House that there has been another crash. Only later does she learn the reports are erroneous.” [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Jane Garvey Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(10:43 a.m.) September 11, 2001: 9/11 Commission Report Describes Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Deciding to Put Military on High Alert; Time Conflicts with Other Accounts According to the 9/11 Commission, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld makes the decision to go to Defcon Three, the “highest alert for the nuclear arsenal in 30 years.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] His decision is broadcast on the air threat conference call. Then, according to the Commission, “A minute later, Secretary Rumsfeld spoke to the Vice President, and he asked Rumsfeld to run the issue by the President. At 10:45 conferees were told to ‘hold off’ on Defcon 3, but a minute later the order was reinstated. Rumsfeld believed the matter was urgent and, having consulted [Defense Department] directives, concluded he had the authority to issue the order and would brief the President. Rumsfeld briefed the President on the decision at 11:15.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 326 AND 554] According to other accounts, the US military is put on high alert about 35 minutes earlier than the 9/11 Commission states (see (10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Donald Rumsfeld

(10:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Global Guardian Exercise Formally Canceled The US Strategic Command (Stratcom) formally terminates its Global Guardian exercise at this time, according to a 2006 article in The Bombardier, the newspaper for Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana. Global Guardian was put on pause just over 90 minutes earlier, according to the same article (see 9:11 a.m. September 11, 2001). [BOMBARDIER, 9/8/2006 ] However, other reports will suggest that Global Guardian was canceled significantly earlier than 10:44 a.m. One article in the Omaha World-Herald will state, “When the second World Trade Center tower was hit,” at 9:03 a.m., “the exercise was canceled, and the battle staff [at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska] moved to the real-world crisis.” [OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 9/8/2002] But an earlier article in the World-Herald will say that military authorities canceled Global Guardian “after the attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon,” suggesting some time after 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon was hit. [OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 2/27/2002] An E-4B National Airborne Operations Center aircraft that was involved in Global Guardian was reportedly only told to pull out of the exercise just after the Pentagon was hit (see (Shortly Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [VERTON, 2003, PP. 143-144] Even after Global Guardian is canceled, this plane and two other E-4Bs that are involved in the exercise will remain airborne. [OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 2/27/2002] The annual Global Guardian exercise tests Stratcom’s ability to fight a nuclear war (see 8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). [OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 2/27/2002; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 4/27/2005] Entity Tags: Global Guardian, US Strategic Command Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

(10:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: President Bush Heads for Louisiana on Air Force One, Following Warning from Cheney and Rice

Bush’s travels on 9/11. [Source: Yvonne Vermillion/ MagicGrapix.com] After Vice President Dick Cheney had alerted the president to a possible threat to Air Force One (see 10:32 a.m. September 11, 2001), Bush and his aides had begun discussing whether to change directions. They are currently flying off the coast of South Carolina, about half way on their 900-mile journey from Florida back to Washington, DC. Bush had suggested diverting to Camp David, the presidential retreat in Maryland, but Cheney favored him heading to a military base, such as Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska. At 10:41, Cheney had called the president again, telling him that both National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and himself agreed that Washington was no longer safe enough for Bush’s return. The president therefore gives the order for his plane to divert. Within minutes, Air Force One turns sharply to the left, and heads toward Barksdale Air Force Base near Shreveport, Louisiana, a distance of about 800 miles away. [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 106-109; WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush, Dick Cheney

10:45 a.m. September 11, 2001: Coroner Unable to Find Human Remains at Flight 93 Crash Site

Wallace Miller. [Source: Steve Mellon / Pittsburgh Post-Gazette] Wallace Miller, the coroner of Somerset County, is one of the first people to arrive at the Flight 93 crash scene. However, he is surprised by the absence of human remains there. He later says, “If you didn’t know, you would have thought no one was on the plane. You would have thought they dropped them off somewhere.” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 217] The only recognizable body part he sees is a piece of spinal cord with five vertebrae attached. He will later tell Australian newspaper The Age, “I’ve seen a lot of highway fatalities where there’s fragmentation. The interesting thing about this particular case is that I haven’t, to this day, 11 months later, seen any single drop of blood. Not a drop.” [AGE (MELBOURNE), 9/9/2002] Dave Fox, a former firefighter, also arrives early at the crash scene, but sees just three chunks of human tissue. He says, “You knew there were people there, but you couldn’t see them.” [PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 9/11/2002] Yet, in the following weeks, hundreds of searchers are able to find about 1,500 scorched human tissue samples, weighing less than 600 pounds—approximately eight percent of the total body mass on Flight 93. Months after 9/11, more remains are found in a secluded cabin, several hundred yards from the crash site. [WASHINGTON POST, 5/12/2002] Entity Tags: Dave Fox, Wallace Miller Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Shanksville, Pennsylvania, FBI 9/11 Investigation

10:47 a.m. September 11, 2001: DC Air National Guard Jet Lands Back at Base, Less than 10 Minutes after Taking Off The first fighter jet that launched from Andrews Air Force Base, just outside Washington, in response to the morning’s attacks lands at its base less than 10 minutes after taking off. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004] The F-16, which is piloted by Major Billy Hutchison, was ordered to take off immediately after arriving back at Andrews from a training mission in North Carolina (see (10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Hutchison has made two loops up the Potomac River, and flown over the burning Pentagon (see 10:39 a.m.-10:45 a.m. September 11, 2001). [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 235] His aircraft had only 2,800 pounds of fuel—equivalent to one-eighth of a tank in a car—remaining when he took off, and he’d subsequently noticed his fuel gauge pegged at the lowest level it can indicate, 400 pounds. He announced to the air traffic controller he was communicating with, “I’ve got to go.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 79; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 248] Hutchison will later recall that his plane is “on vapors” when he lands. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004] By now, two more F-16s have taken off from Andrews (see 10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 82; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 446] Hutchison’s jet is refueled and loaded with weapons, and he will then take off again to defend Washington. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 249] Entity Tags: Billy Hutchison, Andrews Air Force Base Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(10:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Local Farmer Flies over Flight 93 Crash Site

James K. Will. [Source: WTAE-TV] After hearing a plane has crashed in his area, a farmer flies over the Flight 93 crash site to take photos of the wreckage. James K. Will, who is an aerial photographer as well as a farmer, had just landed his Cessna on a private airstrip at his farm in Berlin, Pennsylvania, after visiting nearby Altoona. His mother rushed out and told him there were reports of a plane having crashed near Shanksville. He’d grabbed his camera and set off in his plane for the site, to take photos of the wreckage. He later recalls that he circles the Flight 93 crash scene around 45 minutes after the crash occurred. He says, “I thought it was just an accident.” He is then intercepted by a state police helicopter, which escorts him to the Johnstown airport. He will be questioned and briefly detained there before being released. His plane will be searched and then released. [PITTSBURGH CHANNEL, 9/15/2001; PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 9/15/2001] At around 9:45 a.m., all FAA facilities had been ordered to instruct every aircraft to land at the nearest airport (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). About 20 minutes earlier, the FAA had initiated a nationwide ground stop, which prohibited takeoffs and required planes in the air to land as soon as reasonable (see (9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [TIME, 9/14/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 25 AND 29] Entity Tags: James K. Will Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

10:53 a.m. September 11, 2001: New York Election Is Postponed New York’s primary elections, already in progress, are postponed. [CNN, 9/12/2001] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(10:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Air Force One Takes Evasive Action from False Alarm

Colonel Mark Tillman in the cockpit of Air Force One. [Source: CBS News] Col. Mark Tillman, pilot of Air Force One, is told there is a threat to President Bush’s plane. Tillman has an armed guard placed at his cockpit door while the Secret Service double-checks the identity of everyone on board. Air traffic controllers warn that a suspect airliner is dead ahead, according to Tillman: “Coming out of Sarasota there was one call that said there was an airliner off our nose that they did not have contact with.” Tillman takes evasive action, pulling his plane high above normal traffic. [CBS NEWS, 9/11/2002] Reporters on board notice the rise in elevation. [SALON, 9/11/2001; DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 8/28/2002] The report is apparently a false alarm. Entity Tags: Secret Service, Mark Tillman Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

(Between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001: Mystery Firefighters Seen Behaving Oddly inside Pentagon
A mysterious fire crew is witnessed inside the Pentagon, behaving completely at odds with how firefighters are trained to act. [CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 137] Chad Stamps is a firefighter with Rescue 104 of the Arlington County Fire Department. [NATIONAL FIRE AND RESCUE, 5/2002] Along with his crew, he has been fighting fires on the second floor of the Pentagon’s outer E Ring. With fires burning around him, he is astonished to see another crew walk past, carrying two packs of hose line, apparently on its way to fight fires elsewhere in the Pentagon. Describing this incident, authors Patrick Creed and Rick Newman will point out: “Firefighters are trained never to go through a fire without putting it out, since it might seal off your exit. You might as well walk into a burning room and lock the door behind you. Yet there they went.” Seeing the crew passing by, Stamps thinks, “This is totally disjointed.” [CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 137] The odd behavior of this crew is perhaps notable because there is at least one reported incident of fake firefighters being caught at the Pentagon following the attack there: On September 12, three people will be arrested who are not firefighters, yet who are dressed in firefighting gear (see September 12, 2001). [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 170] Entity Tags: Chad Stamps Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

September 11, 2001: FBI Agents Obtain Warrant for Moussaoui Too Late

Two pages from Moussaoui’s notebooks mentioning Ahad Sabet (Ramzi bin al-Shibh’s alias), plus phone number and mention of his residence in Germany. [Source: FBI] Within an hour of the 9/11 attacks, the Minnesota FBI uses a memo written to FBI headquarters shortly after Zacarias Moussaoui’s arrest to ask permission from a judge for the search warrant they have been desperately seeking. After the World Trade Center is hit for the first time at 8:46 a.m., Mike Maltbie of the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters calls the Minneapolis field office and talks to FBI agent Coleen Rowley. When Rowley says it is essential they get a warrant to search Moussaoui’s belongings, Maltbie instructs her to take no action, because it could have an impact on matters of which she is not aware. Rowley replies that it would have to be the “hugest coincidence” if Moussaoui were not related to the attack. She will recall that Maltbie replies that coincidence is the right word. Maltbie will later say he does not recall using the word “coincidence” in the conversation. Maltbie then consults Tom Ainora, an attorney at the FBI’s national security law unit, who says Minneapolis should seek the warrant. While Rowley is waiting for Maltbie to call back, one of her colleagues, Chris Briese, talks to RFU chief Dave Frasca. According to Briese, Frasca initially says there is not enough evidence for a criminal warrant, but when they find out the Pentagon has been hit Frasca consents. Frasca will say that he consents immediately. [TIME, 5/21/2002; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 178-9 ] Briese later tells Samit that Frasca also initially claims it is just “a coincidence.” [MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, 6/4/2006] A federal judge approves a criminal search warrant this afternoon. [NEW YORKER, 9/30/2002; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 3/9/2006] The Radical Fundamentalist Unit at FBI headquarters had previously blocked requests for criminal and intelligence search warrants (see August 21, 2001 and August 28, 2001). Rowley will note that this very memo was previously deemed insufficient by FBI headquarters to get a search warrant, and the fact that they are immediately granted one when finally allowed to ask shows “the missing piece of probable cause was only the [FBI headquarters’] failure to appreciate that such an event could occur.” [TIME, 5/21/2002] After the warrant is granted, Moussaoui’s belongings are then rushed to an evidence response team, which discovers documents linking Moussaoui to 11 of the hijackers (see August 16, 2001). Rowley later suggests that if they had received the search warrant sooner, “There is at least some chance that… may have limited the September 11th attacks and resulting loss of life.” [TIME, 5/27/2002] Entity Tags: Michael Maltbie, Tom Ainora, Radical Fundamentalist Unit, Zacarias Moussaoui, Harry Samit, FBI Minnesota field office, National Security Law Unit, David Frasca, Chris Briese, FBI Headquarters, Coleen Rowley Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

(11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NORAD Implements Cold War Era Plan to Clear Skies At the NORAD operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, NORAD commander in chief, General Ralph Eberhart, orders a limited version of a little known plan to clear the skies and give the military control over US airspace. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] The plan, Security Control of Air Traffic and Navigation Aids (SCATANA), was developed in the 1960s as a way to clear airspace above the US and off the US coast in the event of a confirmed warning of a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. Once it is activated a wartime air traffic priority list is established, allowing essential aircraft and personnel to use the airspace. Among others, this list includes the US president, essential national security staff, aircraft involved in continental defense missions, and airborne command posts. [SCHWARTZ, 1998] Eberhart Suggests Limited Version of Plan - Eberhart and his staff suggest implementing the limited version of SCATANA over the air threat conference call. Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta immediately concurs. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 73] Unlike a full SCATANA, this modified version allows ground navigation aids to stay on, for the benefit of aircraft that are still airborne. Under the plan, for about the next three days all flights other than military, law enforcement, fire fighters, and medevac, will require approval from the national Defense Department/FAA Air Traffic Services Cell, located within the FAA’s Herndon Command Center. [BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 11/2001; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/10/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Notice is sent out to all civil and military air traffic control facilities, informing them that the skies now officially belong to NORAD. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 269] Order Supposedly Made Late Due to Safety Concerns - The SCATANA order is issued over an hour after the FAA ordered all planes down (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and after at least three-quarters of them have already landed. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Eberhart will later say the delay is due to safety concerns, because NORAD would have been unable to control US airspace—with over 4,000 planes airborne at the time of the attacks—with its radar capabilities. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Defense Week magazine will suggest SCATANA is not implemented until even later, at around 2:00 p.m. It says NORAD issues a “notice to airmen” implementing the modified version of SCATANA about five hours after Flight 11 hit the World Trade Center. [BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 11/2001] Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Ralph Eberhart, Norman Mineta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Paul Wolfowitz and Others Leave Pentagon for Alternate Command Center Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz leaves the Pentagon and relocates to the alternate military command center outside Washington. Wolfowitz had evacuated from his office to an area in front of the Pentagon after the building was hit, but then went back inside and joined Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and others in the National Military Command Center (NMCC). [VANITY FAIR, 5/9/2003] With smoke seeping into the center, Wolfowitz advises Rumsfeld to leave the NMCC (see (10:40 a.m.-11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). But instead Rumsfeld orders Wolfowitz to leave and fly to Site R, the alternate command center, which is located inside Raven Rock Mountain, about six miles north of Camp David, on the Pennsylvania-Maryland border. [BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 11/2001; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 441] Wolfowitz will later recall that he “was not happy about” receiving this order. [VANITY FAIR, 5/9/2003] Minutes later, a helicopter lands outside the Pentagon, and carries Wolfowitz and several others off to the alternate command center. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 132] Site R was designed as a duplicate of the NMCC, and if the NMCC were ever destroyed in an attack or needs to be evacuated, it would serve as the Pentagon’s primary command center. [CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 174] It has “more than 700,000 square feet of floor space, sophisticated computer and communications equipment, and room for more than 3,000 people.” [BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 11/2001] Others who will relocate to Site R on this day include Army Secretary Thomas White and personnel from the office of the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, though White will return to the Pentagon later on. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/9/2002; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 135] According to journalist and author James Mann, Rumsfeld’s decision to order Wolfowitz to leave Washington has its roots in a top secret program Rumsfeld was involved in during the 1980s, which serves to ensure the “Continuity of Government” (COG) in the event of an attack on the US (see 1981-1992). [MANN, 2004, PP. 138-139] Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke activated the COG plan shortly before 10:00 a.m. this morning (see (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 8] Entity Tags: Site R, Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, Civil Liberties Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Skyscrapers, Tourist Attractions Closed More skyscrapers and tourist attractions are evacuated, including Walt Disney World, Philadelphia’s Liberty Bell and Independence Hall, Seattle’s Space Needle, and the Gateway Arch in St. Louis. [TIMES UNION (ALBANY), 9/11/2001] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: All Flights over US Soil Complying with Controllers The FAA Command Center is told that all the flights over the United States are accounted for and pilots are complying with controllers. There are 923 planes still in the air over the US. Every commercial flight in US airspace—about a quarter of the planes still in the air—is within 40 miles of its destination. Others are still over the oceans, and many are heading toward Canada. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Customs Claims to Determine the Names of All 19 Hijackers Robert Bonner, the head of Customs and Border Protection, later testifies, “We ran passenger manifests through the system used by Customs—two were hits on our watch list of August 2001.” (This is presumably a reference to hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, watch-listed on August 23, 2001.) “And by looking at the Arab names and their seat locations, ticket purchases and other passenger information, it didn’t take a lot to do a rudimentary link analysis. Customs officers were able to ID 19 probable hijackers within 45 minutes. I saw the sheet by 11 a.m. And that analysis did indeed correctly identify the terrorists.” [NEW YORK OBSERVER, 2/15/2004] However, Bonner appears to be at least somewhat incorrect: for two days after the attacks (see September 13, 2001-September 14, 2001), the FBI believes there are only 18 hijackers, and the original list contains some erroneous Arab-sounding names on the flight manifests, such as Adnan Bukhari and Ameer Bukhari. [CNN, 9/13/2001] Some hijacker names, including Mohamed Atta’s, were identified on a reservations computer around 8:30 a.m. (see (Before 8:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and Richard Clarke was told some of the names were al-Qaeda around 10:00 a.m. (see (9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001) Entity Tags: Robert Bonner, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Adnan Bukhari, Ameer Bukhari Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

After 11:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: INS Employee Tells Journalist Airport Workers Put Guns on Planes

Cathal Flynn. [Source: PBS] An Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) employee tells journalist Seymour Hersh that the 9/11 hijackings were accomplished with guns put on the planes by airport employees. Hersh then calls Rear Admiral Cathal Flynn, associate administrator of security at the Federal Aviation Administration, and tells him, “The guns were put onto the plane by the ramp workers.” When Flynn argues that there are no reports of this, Hersh replies, “Those ramp workers aren’t even checked,” and insists, “There were pistols and they were put onto the plane by the ramp workers.” [TRENTO AND TRENTO, 2006, PP. 47-8] Although there are some reports of guns being used on the hijacked flights (see (8:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001), the 9/11 Commission, for example, will not say that guns were used by the hijackers. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004] Entity Tags: Seymour Hersh, Cathal Flynn Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(After 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Command Center Further Increases Its Security Additional measures are taken to increase the level of security at the FAA Command Center in Herndon, Virginia. [FRENI, 2003, PP. 65] After the second attack on the World Trade Center, the Command Center’s doors were locked, and all non-FAA personnel were ordered to leave the premises immediately (see Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FRENI, 2003, PP. 64; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 81] Linda Schuessler, the deputy director of system operations, is still concerned about the security of the center, and calls the building owner to request additional protection. Soon, armed guards are stationed at all entrances and roaming the floor there. The exact time when this happens is unstated. [FRENI, 2003, PP. 65] It is unclear whether the increase in security is a general precaution, or is in response to specific threats against the Command Center. Entity Tags: Linda Schuessler, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

11:01 a.m.-12:10 p.m., September 11, 2001: Five Shocks Occur at Ground Zero, according to Seismological Data

The seismic record at Palisades, NY, 34 km north of the World Trade Center. [Source: Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory] (click image to enlarge) According to a seismographical study conducted by Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in Palisades, New York, five distinct shocks occur at the World Trade Center site. They occur at 11:01 a.m., 11:15 a.m., 11:29 a.m., 12:07 p.m., and 12:10 p.m. According to the study, the five resulting seismic signals “may have been generated by additional collapses.” [EARTH INSTITUTE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, 11/16/2001; KIM ET AL., 11/20/2001 ] Entity Tags: Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center, WTC Investigation

11:02 a.m. September 11, 2001: Giuliani Tells New Yorkers to Stay Indoors New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani urges New Yorkers to stay at home and orders the evacuation of the area south of Canal Street. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001] Entity Tags: Rudolph (“Rudy”) Giuliani Timeline Tags: Environmental Impact of 9/11, 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

11:06 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Advisory Officially Suspends Operations in US Airspace The FAA’s Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, sends out an advisory that suspends operations in the national airspace system, requiring all aircraft to land and prohibiting aircraft from taking off from all airports. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002 ; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 4/15/2002] At 9:26 a.m., the FAA ordered a national ground stop that prevented any aircraft from taking off (see (9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and at 9:45 a.m. it instructed all airborne aircraft to land at the nearest airport (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US CONGRESS. HOUSE. COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 9/21/2001] According to a 2002 FAA report, “With this advisory, the shutdown of the air traffic system en masse had officially begun.” The advisory states: “Due to extraordinary circumstances and for reasons of safety. Attention all aircraft operators. By order of the Federal Aviation Command Center all airports/airdromes are not authorized for landing and takeoff. All traffic including airborne aircraft are encouraged to land shortly, including all helicopter traffic. Aircraft involved in firefighting in the Northwest US are excluded. Please read this notice over the emergency frequencies, and VOR [VHF omnidirectional range] voice.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002 ] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

11:07 a.m. September 11, 2001: CNN Incorrectly Reports Possible Third Skyscraper Collapse in New York

Allan Dodds Frank. [Source: CNN] A CNN correspondent incorrectly suggests that a third skyscraper may have recently collapsed in New York. Reporting from Lower Manhattan, Allan Dodds Frank describes: “[J]ust two or three minutes ago there was yet another collapse or explosion. I’m now out of sight, a Good Samaritan has taken me in on Duane Street. But at a quarter to 11, there was another collapse or explosion following the 10:30 collapse of the second tower. And a firefighter who rushed by us estimated that 50 stories went down. The street filled with smoke. It was like a forest fire roaring down a canyon.” [CNN, 9/11/2001] A third tower—the 47-story World Trade Center Building 7—does collapse on this day. It will not come down, however, until 5:20 in the afternoon (see (5:20 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 11/29/2001] Entity Tags: Allan Dodds Frank Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

11:11 a.m. September 11, 2001: Attorney General Ashcroft’s Plane Diverted to Richmond, Threatened with Being Shot Down The plane carrying Attorney General John Ashcroft, which is heading toward Washington, DC, is threatened with being shot down by the military if it does not land, and is diverted to Richmond, Virginia. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/28/2001; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 258] Even though the FAA had issued a national ground stop preventing aircraft from taking off (see (9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001), Ashcroft insisted that his plane take off and fly back to Washington after it landed in Milwaukee to refuel (see After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). And though the FAA has been instructing all aircraft to land at the nearest airport (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001), Ashcroft told his pilot to ignore an order to land near Detroit, and instead continue toward Washington (see 10:40 a.m. September 11, 2001). [US CONGRESS. HOUSE. COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 9/21/2001; ASHCROFT, 2006, PP. 117; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 257-258] Fighters Intercept Ashcroft's Plane - When Ben Sliney, the national operations manager at the FAA’s Herndon Command Center, hears that Ashcroft’s pilot is refusing to land, he notifies NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS). As a result, two F-16 fighter jets from a nearby Air National Guard base intercept Ashcroft’s plane, but they remain out of sight and undetected by its pilot. The F-16s’ pilots report to NEADS that the errant plane is a private corporate jet without any markings, which is heading for Washington and does not seem to have any intention of landing. Sliney Wants Plane 'out of My Sky' - Ashcroft’s pilot, David Clemmer, has started broadcasting a message “in the blind,” meaning it is not intended for any specific air traffic controller, stating that the attorney general is on the plane and they are returning to Washington. The F-16 pilots notify NEADS of this, but when a NEADS officer then tells Sliney about the message, Sliney asks, “Can you guarantee me that it is indeed John Ashcroft on that plane?” The officer replies, “No sir, we cannot,” and so Sliney demands, “Then get him out of my sky!” NEADS issues the order to the two F-16 pilots that if the plane will not land voluntarily, then they must take it down. The F-16 flight lead calls the FAA’s Washington Center and arranges for one of its controllers to call the plane’s pilot and tell him that if he does not divert and land, his plane will be shot down. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 258] Pilot Warned Plane Could Be Shot Down - The Washington Center controller tells Clemmer, “Land your plane immediately, or risk getting shot down by the US Air Force.” [NEWSWEEK, 9/24/2001] Clemmer relays this warning to Ashcroft, telling him: “Sir, there’s a shootdown order. If we get any closer to Washington, they might blow us out of the sky.” [ASHCROFT, 2006, PP. 118] Clemmer also turns to an FBI agent who has been assigned to guard Ashcroft, and says, “Well, Larry, we’re in deep kimchi here, and basically, all the rules you and I know are out the window.” He tells air traffic controllers that he is carrying the attorney general, but is worried that this information won’t get through to military commanders who control the airspace around Washington. [NEWSWEEK, 9/24/2001] Clemmer will later recall: “We didn’t want to do anything that would jeopardize our safety or the safety of the [attorney general]. I know I didn’t want to get shot down either.” Plane Diverted to Richmond - According to some accounts, Ashcroft finally relents, and, at the insistence of the FAA, his plane is diverted to Richmond. Ashcroft will later recall, “It was a real negotiation [with the FAA].” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/28/2001; NEWSWEEK, 3/10/2003; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 258] However, according to a 2002 FAA report, Ashcroft’s plane is diverted to Richmond “due to air traffic requests for the release of medevac aircraft in the Washington, DC, area.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002 ] As the plane flies toward Richmond, Clemmer negotiates getting a fighter escort for it. Ashcroft will persist in his desire to reach Washington, and his plane will eventually be cleared to land in the capital (see 11:27 a.m. September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 9/28/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 272] Entity Tags: John Ashcroft, Northeast Air Defense Sector, David Clemmer, Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center, Ben Sliney Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

11:11 a.m. September 11, 2001: First DC Air National Guard Fighters with Missiles Take Off

Weapons load crew members from the District of Columbia Air National Guard arming an F-16 on September 11. [Source: Corensa Brooks / District of Columbia Air National Guard] (click image to enlarge) Two District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) fighter jets take off from Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington, to defend the capital, the first DCANG planes to launch armed with missiles as well as bullets. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/11/2004 ] The two F-16s are piloted by Captain Brandon Rasmussen and Major Daniel Caine. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002] Although Caine was his unit’s supervisor of flying (SOF) this morning, he decided earlier on that he was going to get airborne, and so Lieutenant Colonel Phil Thompson has taken his place as SOF (see (Shortly After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 76; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 184] Commander Supposedly Gave Shootdown Authority - As Caine and Rasmussen were passing the SOF area on the way to their fighters, they were quickly briefed by Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the DC Air National Guard. Wherley had by then received instructions from the Secret Service for his fighter jets to follow (see (10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (Between 10:16 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to author Lynn Spencer, he told the two pilots: “You need to establish a CAP [combat air patrol] over Washington. Intercept any incoming aircraft 60 miles out and use whatever force necessary to keep it from targeting buildings downtown.” Wherley said, “You will be weapons free,” which means the decision whether to fire on a hostile aircraft rests with the lead pilot, and added, “Just be careful.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 44; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 238] However, Rasmussen will contradict this account, saying that once he is airborne, “we still haven’t been told, ‘You are clear to engage anybody.’ They just said, ‘Get airborne as quick as you can.’” But while the two pilots were getting suited up ready to fly, Caine, who will be the flight lead, had reassured Rasmussen that he would take responsibility for firing on any hostile planes. He’d said: “Whatever you do, don’t be the first one to shoot.… Let me be the first one to shoot, if it comes to that, and then do what I do.” [RASMUSSEN, 9/18/2003] Fighters Loaded with Missiles - Three DCANG jets took off from Andrews earlier on, but none of them were armed with missiles (see (10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001). [VOGEL, 2007, PP. 446] Missiles were loaded onto Caine and Rasmussen’s F-16s while they were sitting in the cockpits. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002] Rasmussen will later recall that “we were probably 20 to 30 minutes behind” the previous two jets to launch, “because they were loading heat-seeking missiles on the aircraft.… Once they armed us up, we just rolled right down the runway and blasted off.” The jets take off with hot guns and two AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles each. According to Rasmussen, this is the first time he has flown with live missiles. He will say, “I had never flown with real missiles and had never so much as seen them on the jet.” Communicate with FAA Controllers - After taking off, Caine and Rasmussen communicate with the FAA’s Washington Center, “primarily to control us and give us an idea of the air picture,” according to Rasmussen. The Washington Center normally controls all of the air traffic in the area. However, its controllers are not trained as weapons controllers. Rasmussen will say: “[W]e’re used to working with AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System] weapons controllers or GCI [ground control intercept].” GCI is “a ground-based radar facility with weapons controllers who will give you the tactical air picture; control and coordinate who is targeting what aircraft; and run the air war that way.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 84; RASMUSSEN, 9/18/2003] Airborne for 3-4 Hours - DCANG pilot Marc Sasseville, who took off at 10:42 a.m., was initially the CAP commander, but Caine takes over this responsibility from him once he is in the air. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/8/2004 ; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 446] Caine and Rasmussen will remain airborne for three or four hours, which is at least twice as long as the usual maximum duration for an air-to-ground sortie, of about an hour and a half. [RASMUSSEN, 9/18/2003] Entity Tags: 121st Fighter Squadron, Daniel Caine, Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center, District of Columbia Air National Guard, David Wherley, Brandon Rasmussen Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Shortly After 11:11 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Fighters from Richmond and Atlantic City Arrive over Washington

Logo of the 192nd Fighter Wing. [Source: Air National Guard] More fighter jets arrive over Washington, DC. These include F-16s from Richmond, Virginia, and Atlantic City, New Jersey. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002] The Atlantic City jets belong to the 177th Fighter Wing (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and the Richmond jets belong to the 192nd Fighter Wing. [GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG.), 10/21/2001; CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 10/2002] Fighters from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia (see (Between 9:49 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and Andrews Air Force Base, just outside Washington (see 10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 11:11 a.m. September 11, 2001), are already flying over the capital. Captain Brandon Rasmussen, who took off from Andrews at 11:11 a.m., actually flies out to intercept the fighters from Richmond, apparently not realizing who they are. He will later recall: “I ended up running an intercept out of a two-ship out of Richmond, two-ship F-16 out of Richmond that just came flying north. In essence, we would find whatever we could on the radar, ask [the FAA’s] Washington Center if they knew who it was, and if they didn’t, we would run an intercept on them to visual identify who they were.” [RASMUSSEN, 9/18/2003] According to Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine, with jets from different units arriving over Washington, “The air picture was confused, at best, and radio frequencies were alive with chatter.” [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002] Entity Tags: 177th Fighter Wing, Brandon Rasmussen, 192nd Fighter Wing, Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

11:15 a.m. September 11, 2001: Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Speaks with President Bush Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld speaks with President Bush, and tells him that the Department of Defense is working on refining the rules of engagement, so pilots will have a better understanding of the circumstances under which an aircraft can be shot down. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 465] He also briefs the president on the earlier decision to go to Defcon Three (see (10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 554] Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, US Department of Defense, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Donald Rumsfeld, George Bush

(After 11:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Vladimir Putin Speaks with President Bush Russian President Vladimir Putin phones President Bush while he is aboard Air Force One. Putin is the first foreign leader to call Bush following the attacks. He earlier called the White House to speak with the president, but had to speak with Condoleezza Rice instead (see Between 10:32 a.m. and 11:45 a.m. September 11, 2001). Putin tells Bush he recognizes that the US has put troops on alert, and makes it clear that he will stand down Russian troops. US forces were ordered to high alert some time between 10:10 and 10:46 a.m. (see (10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001) Bush later describes, “In the past… had the President put the—raised the DEF CON levels of our troops, Russia would have responded accordingly. There would have been inevitable tension.” Bush therefore describes this phone call as “a moment where it clearly said to me, [President Putin] understands the Cold War is over.” [US PRESIDENT, 10/1/2001; US PRESIDENT, 11/19/2001; CNN, 9/10/2002] Putin also sends a telegram to Bush today, stating: “The series of barbaric terrorist acts, directed against innocent people, has evoked our anger and indignation.… The whole international community must rally in the fight against terrorism.” [RUSSIAN EMBASSY, 9/17/2001] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Vladimir Putin Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

(After 11:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Military Unit near Pentagon Prevented from Launching Helicopters to Assist Recovery

Helicopters belonging to the 12th Aviation Battalion. [Source: United States Army] Helicopter crews with an Army aviation unit based near the Pentagon are initially unable to launch after returning from weapons training, because, they are told, they are “locked down until further notice.” [ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, 11/14/2001 ] The 12th Aviation Battalion is stationed at Davison Army Airfield, which is at Fort Belvoir, 12 miles south of the Pentagon. It is the Military District of Washington’s aviation support unit, and includes three helicopter companies that fly UH-1 “Huey” and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. [MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, 8/2000] But at the time of the attacks on the World Trade Center, an unspecified number of the battalion’s members were away at the shooting range at Fort AP Hill, for their annual weapons training (see 8:46 a.m.-9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). They only set out on the one and a half to two hours drive back to base after the Pentagon was hit. One of the battalion’s helicopter pilots, who says the Pentagon is “basically one of our missions,” will later recall that after arriving back at Davison Airfield, his company commander “pretty much had us all get together, and he broke us down into aviation crews… and then he briefed us on what to expect.” The battalion’s helicopters are put “online,” meaning “we preflight our aircraft, got ready, and we went ahead and took everything out.” But, the pilot will say: “then basically we were locked down until further notice. That’s what we were told. And at that point, aviation got hit the hardest, so nobody was flying anywhere unless we had specific permission.… It was a waiting game.” The first helicopter to take off from Davison Airfield transports some engineers to the Pentagon, though the time it launches at is unstated. The 12th Aviation Battalion helicopters will subsequently be involved with supporting Operation Noble Eagle, the new homeland defense mission after 9/11. [ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, 11/14/2001 ] Entity Tags: 12th Aviation Battalion Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

11:16 a.m. September 11, 2001: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Reportedly Prepare Teams CNN reports that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is preparing emergency-response teams as a precaution. [CNN, 9/12/2001] Entity Tags: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Timeline Tags: Environmental Impact of 9/11, 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

11:17 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Publicly Confirms that Flight 93 Has Crashed United Airlines issues a press release confirming that Flight 93 has crashed. Flight 93 went down in Pennsylvania shortly after 10:00 a.m. (see (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The release states: “United Airlines has confirmed one of its flights has crashed near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. United Flight 93, a Boeing 757 aircraft, is the flight number involved. The flight originated in Newark and was bound for San Francisco.” The release adds, “United is deeply concerned about a further flight, United Flight 175, a Boeing 767, which was bound from Boston to Los Angeles.” [UNITED AIRLINES, 9/11/2001] Although Flight 175 hit the World Trade Center at 9:03 (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), United Airlines will not publicly confirm it has crashed until 11:53 a.m. (see 11:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: United Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

(11:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines Publicly Announces Loss of Flights 11 and 77 American Airlines issues a statement confirming that it has lost two of its aircraft in “tragic incidents this morning.” The statement identifies the aircraft as “Flight 11, a Boeing 767 en route from Boston to Los Angeles,” and “Flight 77, a Boeing 757 operating from Washington Dulles to Los Angeles.” The statement adds, “Because of the heightened security due to the nature of today’s events, American said it is working closely with US government authorities and will not release more information at this time.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2001 ; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001] Flight 11 hit the North Tower of the World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m. (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) and Flight 77 hit the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: American Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight AA 77

(11:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Marine Fighters Arrive over Washington but Lack Correct Authentication Code F-18 fighter jets from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 321 (VMFA-321) arrive in the airspace over Washington, DC, to assist the air defense of the capital, but NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) is initially unable to authenticate the pilots’ identities. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 264-265] Earlier on, a Marine with VMFA-321 called Trey Murphy, a friend of his who works as a weapons controller at NEADS, to offer his unit’s assistance. Minutes later, Murphy told a general from VMFA-321 who called NEADS, “[W]e could use your airplanes” (see (9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 188] Pilot Gives Incorrect Authentication Code - Now Murphy tries to get the authentication code from one of the Marine pilots who has arrived over Washington, which will show that he is who he says he is, and that his orders are legal. However, the pilot responds with incorrect authentication, giving a code that has too many letters. Murphy again tries to authenticate him, but the pilot responds, “Dude, I don’t know what you’re trying to tell me.” Weapons Controller Improvises Plan of Action - Murphy quickly realizes what the problem is: The VMFA-321 fighters are not normally part of NORAD, and so do not have NORAD authenticators. Instead, their authenticators are from the Air Combat Command. Realizing this is a problem that will recur as more non-NORAD fighters get airborne, Murphy instructs his fellow weapons controller Michael Julian to help him call the squadron commanders of the non-NORAD jets that are taking off to patrol the Northeast US, so as to resolve the issue. Doing so is critically important because, as author Lynn Spencer will point out, “The authentication system is set up to ensure that a pilot knows he is being given a valid order, and a pilot cannot legally comply with an order unless he can authenticate it first.” Murphy calls VMFA-321 at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, over a secured line and quickly improvises a plan of action. Soon after, faxes are sent off over secured lines to the squadrons that are launching aircraft, to make sure they all follow this plan. Murphy Checks in Marine Pilots - The Marine pilots that have arrived over Washington have now devised their own plan for checking in with NEADS. Since Murphy is a former Marine, some of them know him and recognize his voice. They have therefore decided they will accept orders from him alone. After one of the pilots insists to another NEADS weapons controller that he will only take orders from Murphy, Murphy gets on the line and checks him in, saying: “All right! Devil 1-1… I authenticate.… You’re in the [combat air patrol]. Here’s your mission.… I’m turning you over to my controller.” After the pilot responds, “Roger that!” Murphy checks in the rest of the Marine fighters. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 264-265] Entity Tags: Trey Murphy, Michael Julian, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 321, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(11:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS Instructs AWACS Plane to Return to Washington Area to Help It Communicate with Fighters

An E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft from Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma. [Source: John K. McDowell / US Air Force] An Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) plane that is on its way back to its base in Oklahoma is called by NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and instructed to head to Washington, DC, in order to provide radar and radio coverage, and help NEADS to communicate with fighter jets that are in the airspace over the capital. Poor Communications over Washington - NEADS is having trouble communicating with fighters that have arrived over Washington (see (Between 9:49 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (11:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and the radio reception is nonexistent when those aircraft go below 20,000 feet. As Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region, will later recall, NORAD’s “picture over DC was pretty poor. And the communication was poor.” As a result, “the aircrews themselves” of the fighters over Washington “coordinated the refueling and the combat air patrols.” NEADS Contacts AWACS Heading toward Oklahoma - NEADS weapons controller Trey Murphy therefore gets on the radio to an AWACS belonging to the 552nd Air Control Wing, based at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma. [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 265-266] An AWACS is a modified Boeing 707 equipped with long-range radar and sophisticated communications equipment, which can track aircraft within a radius of several hundred miles. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/23/1995; ASIA TIMES, 1/27/2000] The AWACS Murphy contacts had been flying a training mission earlier in the morning, somewhere near Washington (see Before 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001), but was directed to return to Tinker, supposedly as a result of the “immediate confusion after the attacks” (see (Between 9:05 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). AWACS Told to Head to Washington - Murphy instructs the pilot of the AWACS to turn around and head back toward Washington. He says: “Here’s the deal. We need you to cover the NCA [national capital area].” The pilot responds, “Roger that,” and asks, “Where do you want us?” Murphy replies: “No, no. You’re the one with the big jet with the rotor-dome on it. You tell me where you need to go to get me a surface to infinity look at that area.” As author Lynn Spencer will later describe, with Murphy’s request, “The problem of radar and radio coverage over DC has been solved.” After it arrives over the Washington area, according to Arnold, “The AWACS could talk to the Northeast [Air Defense] Sector and provide a better picture to them.” [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 265-266] Entity Tags: Larry Arnold, Northeast Air Defense Sector, 552nd Air Control Wing, Trey Murphy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

11:27 a.m. September 11, 2001: Attorney General Ashcroft’s Plane Met by Fighter Jet to Escort It into Washington

One of the FAA’s Cessna Citation V jet planes. [Source: Unknown] Although it was recently redirected toward Richmond, Virginia, the plane carrying Attorney General John Ashcroft tries again to head to Washington, DC, and a military fighter jet arrives to escort it into the capital. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/28/2001; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002 ; ASHCROFT, 2006, PP. 118] Ashcroft’s plane, a small government Cessna jet, has been trying to return to Washington after an engagement in Milwaukee was aborted due to the terrorist attacks (see Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). Ashcroft has ignored requests to land, and so his plane has been threatened with being shot down by the military and diverted to Richmond (see 11:11 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NEWSWEEK, 9/24/2001; NEWSWEEK, 3/10/2003; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 257-258] Pilot Persuaded to Head toward Washington - However, Ashcroft still wants to reach Washington. He therefore calls the Justice Department command center for assistance. Then, according to author Lynn Spencer, “With some high-level coordination,” one of the protective agents on Ashcroft’s plane “convinced the pilot to try once again to enter the city.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 272] The pilot, David Clemmer, negotiates to have fighter jets escort the plane into Washington. [NEWSWEEK, 9/24/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/28/2001] Controller Requests Fighter Escort - The FAA’s Washington Center consequently calls the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) at Washington’s Reagan National Airport. The Washington Center controller says: “Hey, we’ve got November 4 out here. He wants to land at [Reagan Airport]. There’s some concern and they want a fighter escort.” TRACON controller Dan Creedon recognizes the plane’s N-number (specifically, N4) as belonging to one of the FAA’s jet aircraft, and confirms, “Yeah, November 4 is based out of Washington.” He then calls District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) pilot Major Daniel Caine, who recently launched from Andrews Air Force Base to defend Washington (see 11:11 a.m. September 11, 2001), and tells him of the plane requesting a fighter escort. When Caine asks who is on it, Creedon replies: “I don’t know. My assumption is FAA-1 or DOT-1,” meaning FAA Administrator Jane Garvey or Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta. DCANG Pilot Gets Langley Jets to Provide Escort - Caine says the jets launched from Langley Air Force Base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) that are defending Washington (see (Between 9:49 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001) will handle this. He forwards Creedon’s request to Major Dean Eckmann, the lead pilot from Langley. Eckmann responds that the inbound plane “can have one” of his fighters. He then directs his wingman, Major Brad Derrig, to intercept it. [9/11 COMMISSION, 12/1/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 12/1/2003; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 272-273] While Ashcroft’s plane is waiting for Derrig’s fighter to arrive, it is put in a holding pattern outside of Washington. [9/11 COMMISSION, 12/17/2003 ] Ashcroft’s plane will be escorted to Reagan Airport, but the time it lands at is unclear (see (12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [NEWSWEEK, 9/24/2001; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002 ; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 453] Entity Tags: John Ashcroft, Dean Eckmann, Brad Derrig, Daniel Caine, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, US Department of Justice, Dan Creedon, David Clemmer, Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

11:28 a.m.-11:50 a.m. September 11, 2001: Reports Suggest Passenger Plane Shot Down by Military Several early news reports suggest that US military fighter jets may have shot down an aircraft, perhaps Flight 93. Ireland’s Thomas Crosbie Media reports, “A Boeing 767 has crashed near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.… US anti-aircraft fighters are in place—unconfirmed reports say this plane was shot out of the sky by US defense.” [TCM BREAKING NEWS, 9/11/2001] Forbes states, “There are reports of a fourth airliner [having] been brought down near Camp David, the presidential retreat in Maryland, by US military fighters.” [FORBES, 9/11/2001] And the Northwestern Chronicle states, “Air Force officials say an airliner has been forced down by F-16 fighter jets near Camp David.” [NORTHWESTERN CHRONICLE, 9/11/2001] However, according to later reports, military officials say US aircraft did not shoot down any of the hijacked planes. [CNN, 9/11/2001] Entity Tags: US Department of the Air Force Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

11:28 a.m.-12:23 p.m. September 11, 2001: SWAT Teams and FBI Finally Allow Passengers off Delta 1989 Passengers and crew members on board Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, which was wrongly suspected to have been hijacked, are finally allowed to get off their plane and are taken to be interviewed by the FBI. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/16/2001; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; WKYC, 9/11/2006] Delta 1989 made an emergency landing at Cleveland Hopkins Airport in Ohio after FAA and military personnel mistakenly thought it was hijacked and might have a bomb on board (see (10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27-28; WKYC, 9/11/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 167-169] The plane was directed to a remote part of the airport, far away from the terminal, and the pilots were told not to allow passengers off. No Evidence of Hijacking or Bomb - At 11:28 a.m., Cleveland Airport’s air traffic manager calls city officials and says he has no apparent reason to believe Delta 1989 has been hijacked, and he does not have any specific bomb threats. He says he has just received clearance from the FAA headquarters, which told him the airport had no reason to hold the aircraft unless city officials have other information from the FBI. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/16/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 229] SWAT Team and FBI Approach Plane - Delta 1989’s pilots, Captain Paul Werner and First Officer David Dunlap, are finally informed that the Cleveland Police SWAT (special weapons and tactics) team and a team of FBI agents are coming out to their aircraft. While the FBI agents approach the plane, the SWAT team takes up a position about 50 yards behind it. Lt. Bernie Barabas, the leader of the SWAT team, will later recall, “If there had been some sort of problem and this turned into a situation where this was a live hijacking, or if they started killing Americans, we were going to act.” SWAT Team Sees Pilot with Bloodied Face - Suspicion is aroused when Werner accidentally knocks his head and cuts it while returning to his seat, after going to the cabin to speak to the plane’s passengers. The members of the SWAT team outside are perplexed when they see him leaning out of the window to give the “all clear” signal, with blood running down his face. They then board the plane. [WKYC, 9/11/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 270] Passengers Taken off Plane - By 11:34 a.m., according to an FAA chronology, the FBI has commenced a controlled debarkation of Delta 1989. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ] The FBI agents slowly and carefully remove the passengers in small groups. [WKYC, 9/11/2006] According to some accounts, there are 78 people on the plane. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/16/2001] But other accounts say there are about 200 on it. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001; NEWSNET 5, 9/11/2001; WCPN, 9/12/2001] The FBI then instructs everyone that has got off to gather their belongings and line them up on the tarmac. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 270] Every piece of luggage and carry-on baggage will be opened and examined by security agents. [WKYC, 9/11/2006] Bomb-sniffing dogs board the aircraft, which is then searched, but no explosives will be found. Passengers Taken Away and Interviewed - The SWAT team gathers the plane’s crew and passengers onto nearby buses. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 271] According to a timeline provided by the Cleveland Airport air traffic control tower, at 12:23 p.m. the passengers are taken to the Federal Facilities Building, located on the opposite side of the airfield to the terminal, where they are debriefed by the FBI. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/16/2001] But the Associated Press will report that they are taken to a nearby NASA facility, presumably the Glenn Research Center, which is located next to the Cleveland airport. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001; NATIONAL JOURNAL'S TECHNOLOGY DAILY, 11/27/2002] After being interviewed separately by FBI agents, the passengers will be put up at a local Holiday Inn. [PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, 9/15/2001] Entity Tags: Cleveland Police Department, Bernie Barabas, Paul Werner, David Dunlap, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Cleveland Hopkins International Airport Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(11:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Fighter Jets Finally Reach Air Force One to Escort It

President Bush (center, bending) and others look out the windows of Air Force One as their fighter escort arrives. [Source: White House] President Bush, his entourage, and reporters accompanying them on board Air Force One notice fighter jets escorting their plane for the first time. Air Force One is currently flying westward over Mississippi, toward Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. [USA TODAY, 9/11/2001; SAMMON, 2002, PP. 109; CBS NEWS, 9/10/2003] The White House requested a fighter escort for it (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001) and the Secret Service asked Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region, to provide that escort. [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 38; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 255] Passengers Notice Fighters - Now, air traffic control radios Colonel Mark Tillman, the pilot of Air Force One, and notifies him, “[Y]ou’ve got two F-16s at about your—say, your 10 o’clock position.” [CBS NEWS, 9/10/2003; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 255] Reporters on board notice a fighter flying alongside the plane’s right wing, and then spot another one alongside its left wing. [USA TODAY, 9/11/2001] According to a photographer on the plane, these jets are “so close that we could see the pilot’s head.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] Bush also notices the fighters. [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 109] White House Communications Director Dan Bartlett will later recall: “The staff, and the president and us, were filed out along the outside hallway of his presidential cabin there and looking out the windows. And the president gives them a signal of salute, and the pilot kind of tips his wing, and fades off and backs into formation.” [CBS NEWS, 9/10/2003] Fighters Maybe Arrived Earlier, but Remained out of Sight - According to most accounts, the jets alongside Air Force One belong to the 147th Fighter Wing of the Texas Air National Guard. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 87; CBS NEWS, 9/10/2003; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/4/2004; ROSENFELD AND GROSS, 2007, PP. 40; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 255] But a few accounts will indicate they belong to a unit of the Florida Air National Guard in Jacksonville (see (10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 9/2001; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001] Four 147th Fighter Wing jets have been directed toward the president’s plane to accompany it (see (After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 87; ROSENFELD AND GROSS, 2007, PP. 40] But according to Sarasota Magazine, Air Force One is “currently being escorted by six jet fighters.” [SARASOTA MAGAZINE, 9/19/2001] Fifteen minutes earlier, at 11:14 a.m., an official, whose identity is unstated but who is not a member of the White House staff, told the reporters on Air Force One that the plane already had plenty of military escort, but the fighters were not visible at that time, presumably meaning they were escorting the plane from a distance. [USA TODAY, 9/11/2001] Jets Protecting '80-Mile Bubble' around Air Force One - The two jets seen by the passengers on Air Force One are reportedly being flown by pilots Shane Brotherton and Randy Roberts of the 147th Fighter Wing. Roberts will later recall, “We were trying to keep an 80-mile bubble… around Air Force One, and we’d investigate anything that was within 80 miles.” [CBS NEWS, 9/10/2003; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 255] The 147th Fighter Wing jets will accompany Air Force One to Barksdale Air Force Base, then on to Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, and finally to Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington, DC. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 87-88; GALVESTON COUNTY DAILY NEWS, 7/9/2005] Entity Tags: Dan Bartlett, 147th Fighter Wing, Randy Roberts, Mark Tillman, Shane Brotherton, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

11:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: Top US General Already Speculates on Television Al-Qaeda Is Responsible for Attacks General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Commander of NATO, says on television, “This is clearly a coordinated effort. It hasn’t been announced that it’s over.… Only one group has this kind of ability and that is Osama bin Laden’s.” [OTTAWA CITIZEN, 9/11/2001] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Wesley Clark Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(11:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Fire Chief Ordered to Put Out Fires in WTC 7, But Does Not Do So The New York Fire Department (FDNY) assigns a chief officer to take charge of operations at WTC Building 7. The chief is initially ordered to put out the fires there. It is determined around this time that there are fires on floors 6-8, 17, 21 and 30. However, there are problems with the water supply: There is no water coming out of the hydrant system nearby, and an FDNY chief officer who has been in WTC 7 says he opened a standpipe on the 4th floor of one stairway, but found no water in the standpipe system. This should not be a problem though, as two or three FDNY fireboats have been tied up on the Hudson shore, specifically to provide water to the site, and lines are already being stretched up to the WTC area. However, as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) will later report, “According to the FDNY first-person interviews, water was never an issue at WTC 7 since firefighting was never started in the building. When the Chief Officer in charge of WTC 7 got to Barclay Street and West Broadway, numerous firefighters and officers were coming out of WTC 7. These firefighters indicated that several blocks needed to be cleared around WTC 7 because they thought that the building was going to collapse.” [FIREHOUSE (.COM), 9/17/2001; TIME OUT NEW YORK, 9/27/2001; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 110-111 ] However, one fire captain later claims to have seen numerous firefighters trying to extinguish fires in WTC 7 at some unspecified time after the North Tower collapsed, until they were instructed to stop doing so (see After 10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: New York City Fire Department Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

(11:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron Begins Reconstructing Radar Data Within two hours of the attacks the 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron (RADES) based at Hill Air Force Base, Utah begins reviewing the radar trails of the four earlier hijacked aircraft, after Pentagon officials have turned to them to find out exactly what happened. Using their own software, the unit has the unique ability to create a “track of interest analysis,” singling out and zooming in on each of the planes. The unit has captured most of the flights of the four planes, but lost sight of Flight 93 at some point. [AIRMAN, 12/2003] The FBI also contacts RADES within hours of the attacks, requesting detailed information on the hijacked planes. [HILLTOP TIMES, 4/15/2004] NORAD official Colonel Alan Scott later will tell the 9/11 Commission that much of his radar data for the “primary targets” on 9/11 was not seen that day. He will say, “It was reconstructed days later by the 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron, and other agencies like it who are professionals at going back and looking at radar tapes and then given that they are loaded with knowledge after the fact, they can go and find things that perhaps were not visible during the event itself.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Data reconstructed by RADES will be used as a source several times in the account of the hijackings and military response to them in the 9/11 Commission’s final report. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 457-459] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of Defense, 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(11:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Congressmen Meet with President Bush Two congressmen, Dan Miller (R) and Adam Putnam (R), are on Air Force One. they’ve been receiving periodic updates on the crisis from President Bush’s adviser Karl Rove. At this time, they’re summoned forward to meet with the president. Bush points out the fighter escort, F-16s from a base in Texas, has now arrived. He says that a threat had been received from someone who knew the plane’s code name. However, there are doubts that any such threat ever occurred (see 10:32 a.m. September 11, 2001). [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/4/2004] Entity Tags: Adam Putnam, George W. Bush, Karl Rove, Dan Miller Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

(Shortly Before 11:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Union Official and Controllers Apprehensive about Recording Controllers’ Experiences of Attacks, but Persuaded to Go Ahead with Taping

Logo of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association. [Source: National Air Traffic Controllers Association] Several air traffic controllers at the FAA’s New York Center and a union official representing them express concern that the controllers are going to be recorded recalling their experiences of the morning’s attacks, but are persuaded to go ahead with the recording. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/1/2003 ; US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 5/4/2004 ; WASHINGTON POST, 5/7/2004] Mike McCormick, the New York Center manager, has directed that six controllers who communicated with, or tracked, the first two hijacked aircraft participate in a session where they are recorded giving their personal accounts of what happened. [WASHINGTON POST, 5/6/2004; AIR SAFETY WEEK, 5/17/2004] Controllers Apprehensive - According to McCormick, before the session commences there is a general concern among these controllers. He will later tell the 9/11 Commission that they “didn’t want to put things in a formal way that would be used in an investigation. There was also some worry about who would receive the tape.” Local Union President Concerned - McCormick consults with Mark DiPalmo, the local president of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA)—the air traffic controllers’ union. DiPalmo is concerned because the tape recording of statements is not a standard procedure. McCormick assures him that the tape will be available only to law enforcement officers, will only serve as a temporary measure until written statements have been prepared, and the controllers will be able to use their taped statements to help them prepare written ones. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/1/2003 ; US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 5/4/2004 ; NEW YORK TIMES, 5/6/2004] Ruth E. Marlin, the executive vice president of NATCA, will later say she cannot address the question of why DiPalmo wants the tape to be “temporary.” She will say, however, that if she were in his position, “my concern would be that if tapes were saved permanently, they might be subject to FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] request, and then controllers would be subject to hearing their own voices recounted on television over and over again.” [WASHINGTON POST, 5/7/2004] Controllers and Union President Consent - The controllers are reassured that the tape with their recorded statements on will not be used for disciplinary purposes, and will be strictly for use only by law enforcement personnel. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/1/2003 ] DiPalmo agrees to the recording of the controllers on the condition that the tape is only a temporary record until written statements are obtained, after which it should be destroyed. The recording session commences at 11:40 a.m. (see 11:40 a.m. September 11, 2001) and the resulting tape will be destroyed several months later (see Between December 2001 and February 2002). [US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 5/4/2004 ] Entity Tags: Mike McCormick, National Air Traffic Controllers Association, Mark DiPalmo, Ruth E. Marlin Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Other 9/11 Investigations

11:40 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA New York Center Controllers Recorded Recalling Experiences of Hijackings A number of air traffic controllers at the FAA’s New York Center provide accounts of their experiences of interacting with, or tracking, two of the hijacked aircraft, on a tape recording that will later be destroyed by one of the center’s managers. [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/6/2004; WASHINGTON POST, 5/7/2004; AIR SAFETY WEEK, 5/17/2004] Manager Directs Colleague to Record Controllers - Mike McCormick, the New York Center manager, directs the taping. He will later say he does so because he wants a contemporaneous recording of the controllers’ accounts that will be immediately available for law enforcement efforts, in case agencies like the FBI show up at the center. He is also concerned that the controllers might be taking stress-induced sickness leave in response to the attacks. They would therefore be unavailable to give conventional written witness statements in a timely manner, and their recollections would be less clear when they returned from leave. McCormick tells Kevin Delaney, the center’s quality assurance manager, to record the controllers’ statements, and a tape recorder is then set up to do this. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/1/2003 ; US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 5/4/2004 ; AIR SAFETY WEEK, 5/17/2004] Controllers Gathered Together - At least six of the center’s air traffic controllers are gathered in a room at the center nicknamed the “Bat Cave” for the fact-finding session. [US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 5/4/2004 ; NEW YORK TIMES, 5/6/2004] These controllers and a union official representing them were concerned about the controllers being recorded, but have been persuaded to go ahead with the session (see (Shortly Before 11:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/1/2003 ; US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 5/4/2004 ; WASHINGTON POST, 5/7/2004] Controllers Describe Experiences - Beginning at 11:40 a.m., a recording is made on a single, standard cassette tape. The controllers, who were involved in working radar positions during the hijackings and crashes of the first two targeted aircraft, Flight 11 and Flight 175, are asked to make statements. According to Mark DiPalmo, the local president of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, “We sat everyone in a room, went around the room, said, ‘What do you remember?’” The controllers give their statements in the group setting, with a microphone being passed from one of them to the next. They describe their actions interacting with, or tracking, the two hijacked aircraft. According to DiPalmo, the session is informal, and sometimes more than one person is speaking at a time. The resulting tape lasts about an hour, with each recorded statement lasting about five to 10 minutes. Other Employees Present - As well as the six controllers, approximately 10 other FAA employees are present during the session. (A signing-in sheet will show that about 16 center personnel are there. However, some witnesses will later indicate there may be additional individuals who do not sign in.) Two quality assurance specialists take notes, but these are sketchy, amounting to just three pages in total. After the tape of the session has been made, it is logged into the New York Center’s formal record of evidence. Recording Controllers Not Standard Procedure - Audio taping of witness statements following an accident or incident has not previously been conducted at the New York Center. [US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 5/4/2004 ; NEW YORK TIMES, 5/6/2004] However, David LaCates, the deputy operations manager there, will tell the 9/11 Commission that, “Since this was an unusual situation,” he believes McCormick wants “an immediate and accurate record of what had happened.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/2/2003 ] FBI Does Not Come to Center - Although McCormick is expecting law enforcement authorities to come to the New York Center quickly, none do. Yet, even though he will later claim he wanted the tape made for the benefit of these authorities, McCormick will not reach out to the FBI himself, nor tell FAA headquarters or regional headquarters that no one has come. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/1/2003 ; AIR SAFETY WEEK, 5/17/2004] Tape Later Destroyed - Despite its evidential value, Delaney will deliberately destroy the tape of the controllers’ statements several months later (see Between December 2001 and February 2002), before anyone has listened to, transcribed, or made a duplicate of it. [US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 5/4/2004 ; WASHINGTON POST, 5/7/2004] Even McCormick will say he never listens to the tape. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/1/2003 ] Prior to an investigation by the Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General in late 2003 and early 2004 (see May 6, 2004), apparently no one outside the New York Center will be aware of the tape’s existence or its destruction. [US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 5/4/2004 ] Entity Tags: Kevin Delaney, Mark DiPalmo, David LaCates, Mike McCormick Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Other 9/11 Investigations

11:45 a.m. September 11, 2001: Air Force One Lands at Louisiana Air Force Base

Air Force One at Barksdale Air Force Base. [Source: Win McNamee/ Reuters] Air Force One lands at Barksdale Air Force Base near Shreveport, Louisiana. “The official reason for landing at Barksdale was that President Bush felt it necessary to make a further statement, but it isn’t unreasonable to assume that—as there was no agreement as to what the president’s movements should be—it was felt he might as well be on the ground as in the air.” [SALON, 9/11/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/16/2001; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001; CBS NEWS, 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: Barksdale Air Force Base, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush, Key Day of 9/11 Events

(After 11:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Computers and Communications Systems Not Working Properly at Alternate Military Command Center

Raven Rock Mountain, the location of ‘Site R.’ [Source: Unknown] After arriving at the alternate military command center outside Washington, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz reports that the computer and communications systems there are hardly functioning. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered Wolfowitz to leave the Pentagon and relocate to the alternate command center—“Site R”—earlier on, and Wolfowitz was transported there by helicopter (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 132; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 441] Site R is located inside Raven Rock Mountain, about six miles north of Camp David, on the Pennsylvania-Maryland border. [BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 11/2001] According to authors Patrick Creed and Rick Newman, it “was designed as a duplicate of the NMCC” (the National Military Command Center, inside the Pentagon). “If an attack took out the NMCC, or it needed to be evacuated for any reason, Site R would become the Pentagon’s primary command center.” Since joining the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1998 as its director of operations, Vice Admiral Scott Fry had “instituted regular drills and other measures to make sure Site R could rapidly get up to speed in an emergency, without glitches that might be fatal in a war setting.” [CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 174] Yet when he calls the Pentagon from this alternate command center, Wolfowitz reports that “the computer and communication systems there functioned poorly or not at all.” He is, however, able to participate in video teleconference calls. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 132] These problems are not reported as causing any significant hindrance in the emergency response to the attacks. But Creed and Newman will comment: “The authority to order major military action rested jointly with the senior civilian leaders at both the White House and the Defense Department. Only they, together, could order troops to move, or missiles to fly. If the NMCC went down before Site R was up and running, the communications link required to utilize the nation’s military might be severed, for the first time since the system was put in place in 1947.” [CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 174-175] Entity Tags: Paul Wolfowitz, Site R Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

11:53 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Publicly Confirms that Flight 175 Has Crashed United Airlines finally issues a press release confirming that Flight 175 has crashed, nearly three hours after this aircraft hit the World Trade Center (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). The release states, “United Airlines has now confirmed that two of its aircraft have crashed.” These include “United Flight 175, a Boeing 767 aircraft, [that] departed from Boston at 7:58 a.m. local time, bound for Los Angeles, with 56 passengers onboard, two pilots and seven flight attendants.” [UNITED AIRLINES, 9/11/2001] United Airlines previously issued a press release, at 11:17, confirming the crash of Flight 93 (see 11:17 a.m. September 11, 2001), but this had stated that the airline was, at that time, only “deeply concerned” about Flight 175. [UNITED AIRLINES, 9/11/2001] However, at 9:22, the United Airlines System Operations Control manager had issued an advisory to all the airline’s facilities, stating that Flight 175 had been in an accident in New York (see 9:22 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 ] And Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, will later claim that United confirmed to the center that Flight 175 was down, “within two or three minutes” (see (9:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Entity Tags: United Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

(Shortly Before 12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Learns of Korean Airlines Flight Mistakenly Believed Hijacked The FAA’s Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, is informed that a Korean Airlines plane is a possible hijacking, although the aircraft is in fact fine. [CNN, 8/14/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 256-257] Korean Airlines Flight 85, a Boeing 747 with 215 people on board, is on its way from Seoul, South Korea, to New York. It is heading for a refueling stop in Anchorage, Alaska, and is currently several hundred miles west of Alaska, over the North Pacific. Pilots Sent Message Signifying Hijacking - The alarm has been raised by ARINC, a Maryland company that airlines pay to transmit text messages to and from their planes. In response to the morning’s terrorist attacks, the company had begun scanning every communication it had transmitted on this day, in a search for other hijacked aircraft. It found a message sent by the pilots of Flight 85 to the Korean Airlines headquarters at 11:08 a.m. that included the letters “HJK,” which is the code signaling a hijacking. ARINC officials are concerned the message was a coded plea for help, and so alert the FAA to it. In response to this notification, the FAA informs air traffic controllers in Anchorage of the suspicious flight, and alerts NORAD to it (see (12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 8/12/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 257] Reason for Message Unclear - The reason the Flight 85 pilots used the code for a hijacking in their ARINC message when their plane is not hijacked is unclear. Korean Airlines administrator Michael Lim will suggest the “HJK” code was intended as a question rather than a warning, but this was unclear in the message because pilots are unable to type question marks into ARINC messages. [ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, 9/8/2002] David Greenberg, the Korean Airlines operations chief, will say the pilots’ message was “innocent, part of a routine discussion on where to divert the flight after airspace in the United States had been closed.” He will add that the pilots used the hijack code “to refer to the hijackings that day.” [USA TODAY, 8/12/2002] Author Lynn Spencer will similarly suggest that the crew of Flight 85 had “simply been trying to relay to controllers their awareness of the hijackings on the East Coast.” She will add: “It was an odd idea for the pilots to have, and contrary to their training. But for whatever reason—perhaps because of some language or communication barrier, or some training failure—they made a very dangerous bad call.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 279] Flight 85 Redirected to Canada - At 1:24 p.m., the pilots of Flight 85 will set their plane’s transponder to indicate that the flight has been hijacked (see 1:24 p.m. September 11, 2001). The plane will be directed away from Anchorage (see (Shortly After 1:24 p.m.) September 11, 2001) and escorted by fighter jets to Whitehorse Airport in Canada, where it lands at 2:54 p.m. (see 2:54 p.m. September 11, 2001). Only then will officials be able to confirm that the aircraft has not been hijacked (see September 12, 2001). [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/12/2001; YUKON GOVERNMENT, 11/13/2001, PP. 16, 18 ; USA TODAY, 8/12/2002] Entity Tags: ARINC, Federal Aviation Administration, David Greenberg, Michael Lim, North American Aerospace Defense Command Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Between Late Morning and Early Afternoon) September 11, 2001: Congressional Leaders Evacuated to Secure Location outside Washington

Mount Weather. [Source: Department of Homeland Security] Congressional leaders are evacuated from Washington and flown to Mount Weather, a secret and secure bunker in Virginia, where they remain until late in the afternoon. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/12/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002; ABC NEWS, 9/15/2002] The Capitol building was evacuated shortly after the Pentagon was hit (see 9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). Most of the leadership teams of both parties subsequently assemble at the Capitol Police building. [DASCHLE AND D'ORSO, 2003, PP. 112] Around late morning or early afternoon, orders are given to take them to a secure location outside Washington. The Congressional leaders return to outside the Capitol building, and from there are flown by military helicopter to Mount Weather. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] Each is allowed to bring one staff member with them. [DASCHLE AND D'ORSO, 2003, PP. 114] The Mount Weather Emergency Operations Facility in Bluemont, Virginia, is located 48 miles—about 20 minutes journey by air—from Washington. [BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 11/2001; ABC NEWS, 9/15/2002] It was originally built to serve as the new seat of government if there was a nuclear war. [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2001] The underground complex contains about 600,000 square feet of floor space, and can accommodate several thousand people. [BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 11/2001] It has extensive communication systems linking it to the nationwide network of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) bunkers, relocation sites, and the White House Situation Room. [CENTER FOR LAND USE INTERPRETATION NEWSLETTER, 3/2002] Members of Congress taken to the facility include House Majority Leader Dick Armey (R), House Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R), House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt (D), House Minority Whip David Bonior (D), Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D), Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott (R), Assistant Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D), and Senate Minority Whip Don Nickles (R). [HASTERT, 2004, PP. 10] Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert was taken there earlier on (see (9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 80-81] The Congressional leaders will remain at Mount Weather until later in the afternoon, and then return to the Capitol around 6:00 p.m. (see (Between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [ABC NEWS, 9/15/2002; DASCHLE AND D'ORSO, 2003, PP. 116; HASTERT, 2004, PP. 10] The decision to send them outside Washington on this day has its roots in a top secret program dating back to the cold war, which serves to ensure the “Continuity of Government” (COG) in the event of an attack on the US (see 1981-1992). [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/11/2002; MANN, 2004, PP. 138-139] Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke activated the COG plan shortly before 10:00 a.m. this morning (see (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 8] Entity Tags: Harry Reid, David Bonior, Don Nickles, Trent Lott, Dick Armey, Tom Daschle, Mount Weather, Tom DeLay, Richard Gephardt Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, Civil Liberties Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

September 11, 2001: Germans Learn of 30 People Traveling for 9/11 Plot A few hours after the attacks, German intelligence intercepts a phone conversation between followers of bin Laden that leads the FBI to search frantically for two more teams of suicide hijackers, according to US and German officials. The Germans overhear the operatives refer to “the 30 people traveling for the operation.” The FBI scours flight manifests and any other clues for more conspirators still at large. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/29/2001] Two days later, authorities claim to have identified teams of as many as 50 infiltrators who supported or carried out the strikes. About 40 are accounted for as dead or in custody; ten are missing. They also believe a total of 27 suspected operatives received some form of pilot training. This corresponds with many analyses that the attacks required a large support network. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/13/2001] Yet there is no evidence that any accomplices in the US shortly before 9/11 have since been arrested or charged. Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Germany Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, FBI 9/11 Investigation

September 11, 2001: Television News Footage of Gleeful Palestinians Shown out of Context

Men in the Palestiani Shatila refugee camp, Lebanon, celebrating the 9/11 attacks. [Source: Associated Press / Mohamed Zatari] Television news coverage on 9/11 repeatedly shows images of Palestinians rejoicing over the 9/11 attack. According to Mark Crispin Miller, a professor of media studies at New York University who investigated the issue, the footage was filmed during the funeral of nine people killed the day before by Israeli authorities. He said, “To show it without explaining the background, and to show it over and over again is to make propaganda for the war machine and is irresponsible.” [AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 9/18/2001; AUSTRALIAN, 9/27/2001] Entity Tags: Mark Crispin Miller Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, Domestic Propaganda Category Tags: Media

September 11, 2001: Suspected Militants Found with Calling Cards An unnamed, young, Middle Eastern man flying from Amsterdam, Netherlands, to Detroit, Michigan, is arrested after his plane is diverted to Toronto, Canada. He is apparently found to be carrying a flight jacket, Palestinian Authority travel documents, and a picture of himself in a flight crew uniform in front of a fake backdrop of the WTC. [TORONTO STAR, 9/15/2001; TORONTO SUN, 9/15/2001; OTTAWA CITIZEN, 9/17/2001] Apparently, the man, who identifies himself as an aircraft maintenance engineer in Gaza, Palestine, was supposed to have arrived in the US a few days before but was delayed for unknown reasons. [CBS NEWS, 9/14/2001] A second man was arrested a few days earlier while trying to enter Canada carrying a similar photo. He also possessed maps and directions to the WTC. Both men are soon handed over to the US. [TORONTO STAR, 9/15/2001] A similar picture of suspected Egyptian al-Qaeda operative Mohammad Zeki Majoub, arrested in Canada in June 2000, in front of a fake WTC backdrop was found in the luggage of one of the US hijackers. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 3/1/2001; TORONTO SUN, 9/15/2001] Canadian officials “believe the photos could be calling cards used by the terrorists to identify those involved in plotting the attacks.” [TORONTO SUN, 9/15/2001] Entity Tags: Mohammad Zeki Majoub, World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Investigations, All Day of 9/11 Events

September 11, 2001: Existing Files on Hijackers Enables Investigation to Start Within Hours of Attacks One day after 9/11, the New York Times will report that FBI agents in Florida investigating the hijackers quickly “descended on flight schools, neighborhoods and restaurants in pursuit of leads.” At one flight school, “students said investigators were there within hours of Tuesday’s attacks.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2001] Also on September 12, the Times will report, “Authorities said they had also identified accomplices in several cities who had helped plan and execute Tuesday’s attacks. Officials said they knew who these people were and important biographical details about many of them. They prepared biographies of each identified member of the hijack teams, and began tracing the recent movements of the men.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2001] In September 2002, 9/11 victim’s relative Kristen Breitweiser, testifying before the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, will cite these news reports and will ask, “How did the FBI know exactly where to go only a few hours after the attacks? How did they know which neighborhoods, which flight schools and which restaurants to investigate so soon in the case?… How are complete biographies of the terrorists, and their accomplices, created in such short time? Did our intelligence agencies already have open files on these men? Were they already investigating them? Could the attacks of September 11th been prevented?” [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] In at least some cases, it appears that US intelligence did quickly access existing files on the hijackers. The Washington Post reports, “In the hours after Tuesday’s bombings, investigators searched their files on [Satam] Al Suqami and [Ahmed] Alghamdi, noted the pair’s ties to [Nabil] al-Marabh and launched a hunt for him.” A top Customs official claims that by checking flight manifests and comparing them with other information such as watch lists, he is able to determine the names of all 19 hijackers by 11:00 a.m.(see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 9/21/2001] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Ahmed Alghamdi, Satam Al Suqami, Kristen Breitweiser, Nabil al-Marabh Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: FBI 9/11 Investigation, All Day of 9/11 Events

(12:00 Noon) September 11, 2001: President Bush Provided Tight Security in Louisiana

Bush escorted into Barksdale Air Force Base. [Source: White House] President Bush arrives at the Barksdale Air Force Base headquarters in a Humvee escorted by armed outriders. Reporters and others are not allowed to say where they are. Bush remains in this location for approximately one hour, recording a brief message and talking on the phone. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001] Entity Tags: Barksdale Air Force Base, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

(12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001 and After: FBI Searches Pentagon Surroundings for Plane Debris

Personnel from several agencies searching for evidence at the Pentagon. [Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation] Beginning shortly before midday on September 11, 2001, and continuing until September 12, the FBI conducts a careful search across the grounds of the Pentagon, looking for remnants of the aircraft that hit the building. [PBS, 9/12/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 159] FBI Special Agent Tom O’Connor is in charge of the initial evidence recovery operation at the Pentagon. His first priority is to locate and gather all the airplane parts and other pieces of evidence from the lawn on the west side of the building. He sends out all available agents to conduct a grid search. The lawn is divided into quadrants, and then agents walk back and forth, sticking a small flag near any evidence they find, getting the evidence photographed in its place, and then scooping it into a bag. [CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 180] Arlington police officers, military personnel, and others also participate in the search. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 159] They also look for evidence across grass and roadways several hundred yards from the Pentagon. [PBS, 9/12/2001] Some pieces of the aircraft that hit the Pentagon are found nearly 1,000 feet away from the building, on the other side of Washington Boulevard. Thousands of tiny pieces of aluminum have also carried forward over the Pentagon, into its center courtyard. Other pieces of debris landed on its roof, along with body parts from at least one victim. [CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 29] According to the Defense Department’s book about the Pentagon attack, the searchers find “many scraps and a few personal items widely scattered on the grass and heliport. Plane remnants varied from half-dollar size to a few feet long.” [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 159] Authors Patrick Creed and Rick Newman will describe: “Agents found what looked like a big Plexiglas windowpane on the lawn, which might have been part of an airplane window, except it was too big.… Somebody suggested it could be one of the blast-proof windows from the Pentagon, somehow blown 500 feet from the building.” [CREED AND NEWMAN, 2008, PP. 180] Entity Tags: Tom O’Connor, Arlington County Police Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon, FBI 9/11 Investigation

(12:00 Noon) September 11, 2001: Senator Hatch Repeats Intelligence Community’s Conclusion that Osama Bin Laden Is Responsible Senator Orrin Hatch (R), a member of both the Senate Intelligence and Judiciary Committees, says he has just been “briefed by the highest levels of the FBI and of the intelligence community.” He says, “they’ve come to the conclusion that this looks like the signature of Osama bin Laden, and that he may be the one behind this.” [SALON, 9/11/2001] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Osama bin Laden, Orrin Hatch Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

September 11, 2001: French Bank Allegedly Makes ‘a Fortune’ in Response to Attacks

Jérôme Kerviel. [Source: Agence France-Presse] French bank Société Générale supposedly makes “a fortune” through trading, in response to the 9/11 attacks. This is according to rogue trader Jérôme Kerviel, who is employed by the bank between 2000 and 2008. In a 2009 interview with the French newspaper Le Parisien, Kerviel will say: “The best trading day in the history of Société Générale was September 11, 2001. At least, that’s what one of my managers told me.” He will add, “I don’t know how much they made, but apparently the gains were colossal.” Kerviel will not state how the bank makes these gains, but indicates it is through the short-selling of stock. He will continue the interview by saying, “I had a similar experience during the London attacks in July 2005” (see July 7, 2005), and then describe how he’d bet on a fall in the share price of German insurance company Allianz a few days before those attacks. The London bombings will cause the price of Allianz stock to crash, thereby earning Kerviel ”€500,000 in a few minutes.” [EVENING STANDARD, 1/22/2009; LONDON TIMES, 1/23/2009] Société Générale is France’s second largest bank, and one of the largest banks in Europe. [GUARDIAN, 1/24/2008; INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 1/24/2008] At the time of his interview with Le Parisien, Kerviel is alleged to have caused it record losses of almost €5 billion through his rogue dealings. He is under investigation for breach of trust, fabricating documents, and accessing computers illegally. [LONDON TIMES, 1/23/2009] Entity Tags: Société Générale, Jérôme Kerviel Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge

12:00 p.m. September 11, 2001: Defense Intelligence Agency Director Says Al-Qaeda Responsible for Attacks The director of the Defense Intelligence Agency informs military leaders in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon that al-Qaeda is responsible for the morning’s attacks. General Richard Myers, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will later describe: “At noon, Vice Admiral Tom Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, confirmed what everybody at the conference table had already surmised: The attacks had undoubtedly come from al-Qaeda.” [MYERS, 2009, PP. 156] Later in the day, Wilson will recall a relevant piece of intelligence “chatter” that was picked up a few months previously. When General Hugh Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, arrives in the NMCC at 5:40 p.m. after returning from his aborted flight to Europe, he will ask Wilson, “Have we had any intel ‘squeaks’ on an attack like this—anything at all?” Wilson will reply: “The only possible hint of this coming was several months ago when we got a single intercept requesting jumbo jet training. Since then, there’s been nothing.” According to Myers, Wilson is “referring to the vast electronic signals data-mining operations of our intelligence community that targeted known terrorist networks, such as al-Qaeda and their allies.” [MYERS, 2009, PP. 159] Entity Tags: Richard B. Myers, Hugh Shelton, Thomas Wilson, Al-Qaeda Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Between 12:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001: World Trade Center Leaseholder Discusses Possible Controlled Demolition of WTC 7 with Insurer, Reporter Will Later Claim

Jeffrey Scott Shapiro. [Source: University of Florida] Larry Silverstein, who recently took over the lease of the World Trade Center complex (see July 24, 2001), discusses possibly bringing down WTC Building 7 in a controlled demolition in a telephone conversation with his insurance carrier, according to a reporter who is at the WTC site this afternoon. [FOX NEWS, 4/22/2010] WTC 7 is a 47-story office building located just north of the Twin Towers. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) will say it suffered some structural damage (see 10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001) when the North Tower collapsed (see 10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001) and it has fires on several floors (see (10:28 a.m.-5:20 p.m.) September 11, 2001). It will collapse at 5:20 p.m., apparently becoming the first tall building ever to come down primarily as a result of fire (see (5:20 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 11/2008, PP. XXXV-XXXVI ] Silverstein Allegedly Wants WTC 7 Demolished - Investigative reporter Jeffrey Scott Shapiro, who is at the scene of the attacks in New York, will later recall: “Shortly before [WTC 7] collapsed, several NYPD officers and Con Edison workers told me that Larry Silverstein… was on the phone with his insurance carrier to see if they would authorize the controlled demolition of the building, since its foundation was already unstable and expected to fall. A controlled demolition would have minimized the damage caused by the building’s imminent collapse and potentially save lives.” Shapiro will add: “Many law enforcement personnel, firefighters, and other journalists were aware of this possible option. There was no secret.” [FOX NEWS, 4/22/2010] Preparing a large building for demolition usually takes weeks, or even months. This time is spent on operations such as wrapping concrete columns to ensure pieces do not fly off. [BALTIMORE SUN, 2/26/1995; PBS NOVA, 12/1996; CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT GUIDE, 2/24/2005] Discussion of Demolition Later Denied - Silverstein will later recall discussing WTC 7 over the phone with the commander of the New York Fire Department, and telling him, “We’ve had such terrible loss of life, maybe the smartest thing to do is pull it” (see After 12:00 Noon September 11, 2001), but a spokesman will subsequently claim that Silverstein was referring to withdrawing firefighters from the building, not bringing WTC 7 down with explosives. [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 9/16/2005; BBC, 7/4/2008] At the end of a three-year investigation into the building’s collapse, NIST will say WTC 7 “did not collapse from explosives,” but critics will dispute this conclusion (see August 21, 2008). [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2008; NEW YORK TIMES, 8/21/2008] Entity Tags: Jeffrey Scott Shapiro, New York City Police Department, Con Edison, World Trade Center, Larry Silverstein Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center