United Airlines Flight 175 complete timeline:8am-9am

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8:13 a.m.-9:28 a.m.
September 11, 2001: Pilots of All Four Hijacked Planes Fail to Dial Standard Distress Code In the event of a hijacking, all airline pilots are trained to key an emergency four-digit code into their plane’s transponder. This would surreptitiously alert air traffic controllers, causing the letters “HJCK” to appear on their screens. The action, which pilots should take the moment a hijack situation is known, only takes seconds to perform. Yet during the hijackings of flights 11, 175, 77, and 93, none of the pilots do this.

8:14 a.m.
Flight 175 takes off from Logan Airport, 16 minutes after its scheduled 7:58 departure time.

between 8:24 and 8:34 am
Flight 175 overhears a suspicious transmission, later reported to ATC. assumeing it Flight 11 they heard, it was either at 8:24 am or 8:34 am.

8:37 a.m.
Flight 175 Pilots Asked to Look for Flight 11 Flight controllers ask the United Airlines Flight 175 pilots to look for a lost American Airlines plane 10 miles to the south. They respond that they can see it. They are told to keep away from it. Apparently, Flight 175 is not told Flight 11 has been hijacked. Flight 175 itself is hijacked a few minutes later (see 8:41 a.m.-8:42 a.m..

Between 8:40 a.m. and 8:54 a.m.
Boston Center Military Liaison Calls New York Center with Report about Flight 11; Timing Unclear Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, calls the FAA’s New York Center but is quickly cut off when the air traffic controller who answers says the center is busy dealing with a hijacking. According to author Lynn Spencer, Scoggins “calls New York Center to notify them that American 11 appears to be descending toward New York, most likely to land at JFK” International Airport. But the controller who takes the call snaps at him: “We’re too busy to talk. We’re working a hijack,” and then hangs up. According to Spencer, the New York Center controller is referring to Flight 175, but “Scoggins just figures that he’s talking about American 11. He has no idea that a second airliner is in crisis.” However, the timing of this call is unclear. If it is made while Flight 11 is descending toward New York, this would mean it occurs in the minutes before 8:46, when Flight 11 crashes (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). But in Spencer’s account, the call is made just after New York Center controller Dave Bottiglia notices that Flight 175’s transponder code has changed and he calls out to another controller, “I can’t get a hold of UAL 175 at all right now and I don’t know where he went to” (see 8:51 a.m.-8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). The transcript of radio communications between the New York Center and Flight 175 shows that this would mean Scoggins’s call occurs around 8:53 a.m.-8:54 a.m., about seven minutes after Flight 11 crashes.

8:40 a.m.
Flight 175 passes from the airspace of the FAA’s Boston Center to the airspace of the New York Center. New York Center air traffic controller Dave Bottiglia takes over monitoring the flight from Boston Center controller John Hartling] (see [[(8:34 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Flight 175 waits nearly 45 seconds to check in with Bottiglia. According to author Lynn Spencer, this is “rather long, and Bottiglia is just about to call the plane.” But then Captain Victor Saracini, the pilot of Flight 175, makes radio contact, saying, “New York, United 175 heavy.”

8:41 a.m.-8:42 a.m
September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Reports ‘Suspicious Transmission’ Heard over Radio as It Departed Airport

Just after Flight 175 enters the airspace of the FAA’s New York Center (see 8:40 a.m), its pilot reports to Dave Bottiglia,the air traffic controller now managing the flight, a suspicious transmission he had heard on departing Boston’s Logan Airport. The pilot, Captain Victor Saracini, tells Bottiglia: “We figured we’d wait to go to your center. Ah, we heard a suspicious transmission on our departure out of Boston, ah, with someone, ah, it sounded like someone keyed the mikes and said, ah, ‘Everyone, ah, stay in your seats.’” Saracini is presumably referring to one of the three radio transmissions from Flight 11, where the voice of a hijacker could be heard (see 8:24 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (8:34 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, none of these had included the hijacker telling people to stay in their seats, as Saracini describes, although the second and third transmissions included the hijacker telling the passengers, “Nobody move.” Bottiglia responds: “Oh, okay. I’ll pass that along.” Referring to the fact that this was the end of the transmission he heard, Saracini adds, “It cut out,” and then asks Bottiglia, “Did you copy that?” This is the last radio transmission from Flight 175. The 9/11 Commission will conclude that the plane is hijacked within the next four minutes (see (Between 8:42 a.m. and 8:46 a.m.). According to author Lynn Spencer, since controllers are only given information on a need-to-know basis, Bottiglia was unaware there were problems with Flight 11, which has not yet entered his airspace. He touches his computer screen to connect to the hotline for his sector controller, and then reports: “UAL 175 just came on my frequency and he said he heard a suspicious transmission when they were leaving Boston. ‘Everybody stay in your seats’—that’s what he heard… just to let you know.”

Senior United Airlines personnel are, unusually, not informed about air traffic control communications with Flight 175.The information is not passed on to personnel at the United Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center, just outside Chicago. Rich Miles, the manager there, will later tell the 9/11 Commission that, “though he normally received relevant information about United flights from FAA air traffic control, on September 11, 2001, he did not recall receiving information about any air traffic control communications with or from Flight 175, including the 8:41 a.m. report.” None of the other senior United Airlines officials at the SOC on this morning are told of the 8:41 communication, although they will tell the 9/11 Commission that air traffic controllers will “first and foremost” communicate directly with pilots. Furthermore, these officials will recall, “they never received any communication… from the FAA or the air traffic control system advising United to contact its aircraft about the hijackings.” The 9/11 Commission will not offer any explanation for this lack of communication between the FAA and United Airlines.

8:42 a.m.-8:46 a.m.
September 11, 2001: New York Center Controller Informed Flight 11 Is Suspected Hijack, Then Follows It on Radar

After Flight 11 appears on his radar screen, Dave Bottiglia, an air traffic controller at the FAA’s New York Center, is informed that this aircraft is suspected of having been hijacked. Because he is focused on Flight 11, Bottiglia will not notice when Flight 175’s transponder code changes at 8:47 (see 8:46 a.m.-8:47 a.m.). The New York Center was first notified of Flight 11’s hijacking at 8:25 a.m. (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001), though this information was not passed on to Bottiglia.

Between 8:42 a.m. and 8:46 a.m.
According to the 9/11 Commission, Flight 175 is hijacked some time between 8:42—when its flight crew make their last communication with the ground—and 8:46. The Commission describes that the hijackers “used knives (as reported by two passengers and a flight attendant), Mace (reported by one passenger), and the threat of a bomb (reported by the same passenger). They stabbed members of the flight crew (reported by a flight attendant and one passenger). Both pilots had been killed (reported by one flight attendant).” These witness accounts come from phone calls made from the rear of the plane, from passengers who’d been assigned seats in the front or middle of the cabin. According to the Commission, this is “a sign that passengers and perhaps crew [are] moved to the back of the aircraft.” An employee at the FAA’s Boston Center later says the hijacking occurs when Flight 175 is above Albany, NY, about 140 miles north of New York City. The first “operational evidence” that something is wrong is at 8:47, when Flight 175’s transponder code changes twice within a minute (see 8:46 a.m.-8:47 a.m. September 11, 2001).

8:43 a.m.

 * NORAD Reportedly Notified that Flight 175 Has Been Hijacked, 9/11 Commission Will Dispute This

After 9/11, NORAD and other sources will claim that NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector(NEADS) is notified at this time that Flight 175 has been hijacked. However, the FAA’s New York Center, which is handling Flight 175, first alerts its military liaison about the hijacking at around 9:01 (see 9:01 a.m.-9:02 a.m.). In addition, according to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS is not informed until two minutes later (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to the Commission, the first “operational evidence” that there is something wrong on Flight 175 is not until 8:47, when its transponder code changes (see 8:46 a.m.-8:47 a.m. September 11, 2001), and it is not until 8:53 that the air traffic controller handling it concludes that Flight 175 may be hijacked (see 8:51 a.m.-8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001).

Shortly After 8:42 a.m.
According to an employee at the FAA’s Boston Center, Flight 11 and Flight 175 nearly crash into each other while heading toward their targets in New York. The unnamed employee says, “The two aircraft got too close to each other down by Stewart” International Airport, which is in New Windsor, NY, about 55 miles north of New York City. Describing the incident, the Nashua Telegraph says that the terrorists “nearly had their plans dashed when the two planes almost collided.” It is unclear exactly when this incident occurs, though it is presumably shortly after 8:42, when Flight 175 has its last communication with air traffic control.

8:44 a.m.
The pilot of US Airlines Flight 583 tells an unidentified flight controller, regarding Flight 175, “I just picked up an ELT [emergency locator transmitter] on 121.5. It was brief but it went off.” The controller responds, “O.K. they said it’s confirmed believe it or not as a thing, We’re not sure yet…” One minute later, another pilot says, “We picked up that ELT, too, but it’s very faint.” Flight 175 appears to have been the only trigger of any emergency signal on 9/11. It is possible the ELT came from Flight 11 instead.

8:45 a.m.-9:37 a.m.
Secret Service Does Not Use Its Stinger Missiles to Protect New York and Washington

In New York, the Secret Service has a Stinger missile secretly stored in the World Trade Center, to be used to protect the president if the city were attacked when he visits it. Presumably it keeps this is in WTC Building 7, where its field office is. Whether the Secret Service makes any attempt at defending New York from the two attacking planes with its Stinger missile is unknown. The agency is also known to have air surveillance capabilities. These include a system called Tigerwall, which provides “early warning of airborne threats” and “a geographic display of aircraft activity” (see (September 2000 and after)). And according to Barbara Riggs, who is in the Secret Service’s Washington, DC headquarters on this day, the agency is “able to receive real time information about other hijacked aircraft,” through “monitoring radar and activating an open line with the FAA.”

8:46 a.m.-9:03 a.m.
At the time of the attacks on the World Trade Center, two F-16 fighter jets are performing a training mission just eight minutes flying time away from New York, but the pilots are unaware of the crisis taking place. The two jets belong to the 177th Fighter Wing of the New Jersey Air National Guard, which is based at Atlantic City International Airport. F-16s at Atlantic City are involved in scheduled training missions every day, and their first mission is usually between 8:30 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. The two fighter jets are unarmed and performing practice bombing runs over a section of the Pine Barrens in New Jersey that is designated for military drills.They will not be called back to base until shortly after the second WTC tower is hit, and will then have their training munitions replaced with live air-to-air missiles. At the time of the second attack, another two jets from the 177th FW are preparing to take off for routine bombing training, but they too have their mission canceled (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). No jets will take off from Atlantic City in response to the attacks until after 9:37, when the Pentagon is hit. NEADS and FAA Tried Contacting 177th Fighter Wing - Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, is aware that the 177th FW launches F-16s for training flights every morning around this time, and suggested to NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) that it contact Atlantic City to use these jets in response to the hijacked Flight 11. However, when NEADS tried phoning the unit, its call was not answered (see (Between 8:40 a.m. and 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Apparently around 8:34 a.m., the Boston Center also attempted to contact the Atlantic City unit, but the outcome of that call is unclear (see (8:34 a.m.) September 11, 2001). F-16s Might Have Prevented Attacks on WTC - Author Peter Lance will later point out that, had the two Atlantic City F-16s flying over the Pine Barrens “been notified by the FAA at 8:34… they could have reached the Twin Towers by 8:42 a.m.,” four minutes before Flight 11 hit the North Tower (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). “Even unarmed, and without a shootdown order, they might have been able to take defensive action to prevent the big 767 from crashing into the tower. In any case, the fighters would certainly have been on patrol and able to interdict UA 175, which didn’t hit the South Tower until 9:03 a.m.” Yet despite the crucial role these two fighters could have played, the 9/11 Commission Report will make no mention of them. Pointing out the irony of having the two F-16s so near to Manhattan yet with such an unrelated mission, 177th Fighter Wing public affairs officer Lt. Luz Aponte will later remark, “Isn’t that something?”

8:46 a.m.
Two F-15 fighter jets are scrambled from Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, which is 153 miles from New York City. The fighters are launched in response to the hijacked Flight 11, but this plane is already crashing into the World Trade Center at this time (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). The FAA’s Boston Center alerted NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) to the hijacking of Flight 11 and requested that fighter jets be scrambled at just before 8:38 a.m. (see (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but the mission crew commander at NEADS only instructed the leader of his weapons team to launch the Otis fighters at 8:45 a.m. (see 8:45 a.m. September 11, 2001). As soon as the pilots at Otis Air Base are strapped into their aircraft, the green light directing them to launch goes on. They start their engines and taxi out of the hangar to the nearest runway. One of the pilots, Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy, radios his command post for guidance, asking, “Do you have words?” The response he gets is, “Possible hijack, American Flight 11, 737, flight level 290 [29,000 feet], over JFK [International Airport in New York City].” (This flight information is partly incorrect, since American 11 is a 767, not a 737.) According to the Cape Cod Times, the jets will be up in the air before their radar kicks in. The Otis pilots have already been preparing for the scramble order to come since learning of the hijacking from the FAA’s Cape Cod facility, some time shortly after 8:34 a.m. (see (8:36 a.m.-8:41) September 11, 2001). Their jets are reportedly not airborne until seven minutes after being scrambled, at 8:53 a.m. (see 8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001) and there will be conflicting accounts of what their original destination is (see (8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001).

8:46 a.m.-8:47 a.m.
Flight 175 stops transmitting its transponder signal. It is currently flying near the New Jersey-Pennsylvania border. However, the transponder is turned off for only about 30 seconds, and then comes back on as a signal that is not designated for any plane on this day. Then, within the space of a minute, it is changed to another new code. But New York Center air traffic computers do not correlate either of these new transponder codes with Flight 175. Consequently, according to an early FAA report, “the secondary radar return (transponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude, and flight information began to coast and was no longer associated with the primary radar return.” Therefore, while controllers are able “to track the intruder easily… they couldn’t identify it.” However, Dave Bottiglia, the New York Center air traffic controller responsible for Flight 175, is currently trying to locate the already-crashed Flight 11, and therefore supposedly does not notice the transponder code changes on Flight 175 until 8:51 a.m. (see 8:51 a.m.-8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). According to a “Flight Path Study” by the National Transportation Safety Board, the change of Flight 175’s transponder code is the “first indication of deviation from normal routine.”

(Between 8:46 a.m. and 9:03 a.m.)
September 11, 2001: Deputy Mayor Calls Navy; Requests Air Cover Over New York

Rudy Washington, who is one of Rudolph Giuliani’s deputy mayors, sees the smoking North Tower as he is being driven into downtown Manhattan. He immediately calls Admiral Robert Natter, the commander of the US Atlantic Fleet at Norfolk Naval Station, Virginia, the world’s largest naval base. He requests air cover over New York. Norfolk Naval Station is in the region of Naval Air Station Oceana, which has F-14 Tomcats and F/A-18 Hornets. It is also near Langley Air Force Base. Natter says he will need to get in touch with the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), but will then call back. Around this time, Washington also calls Patrick Burns at the base. Burns usually works in New York as the director of fleet support for the Navy, a civilian position that works closely with the mayor’s office and numerous other agencies. He is at Norfolk Naval Station for his two-week Naval Reserve obligation. Washington tells Burns, “I need you here.” No doubt anticipating there will be mass casualties, he adds, “I need that hospital ship.” He is referring to the hospital ship the USNS Comfort. However, the Comfort, which is based in Baltimore, will only set off for New York at 3 p.m. the following day, and arrive at Pier 92 in Manhattan late in the evening of September 14.

Shortly After 8:46 a.m.
September 11, 2001: New York Center Air Traffic Controllers Notice Problems with Flight 175

Curt Applegate sitting next to his air traffic control terminal. [Source: NBC News] After being focused on Flight 11, Dave Bottiglia, an air traffic controller at the FAA’s New York Center, first notices problems with Flight 175. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 21] Both Flight 11 and Flight 175 have been in the airspace that Bottiglia is responsible for monitoring (see 8:40 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (8:42 a.m.-8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Bottiglia has just watched Flight 11’s radar blip disappear, which means the plane has dipped below his radar’s coverage area, so is below 2,000 feet. But he does not yet realize it has crashed. He says aloud, “Well, we know he’s not high altitude anymore.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 37] Around this time, Flight 175’s transponder changes twice in the space of a minute (see 8:46 a.m.-8:47 a.m. September 11, 2001). Conflicting Accounts - According to MSNBC, “within seconds” of losing Flight 11’s blip, “Bottiglia has another unexpected problem.” While looking for Flight 11, he realizes that Flight 175 is also missing, and “instinctively… knows the two [planes] are somehow related.” He asks another controller to take over all of his other planes. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] But according to the 9/11 Commission’s account, Bottiglia is still trying to locate Flight 11 after it crashes, and so it is not until 8:51 a.m. that he notices the problem with Flight 175 (see 8:51 a.m.-8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 21 ] 'An Intruder over Allentown' - Around the time Flight 175 changes its transponder code, air traffic controller Curt Applegate, who is sitting at the radar bank next to Bottiglia’s, sees a blip that might be the missing Flight 11. He shouts out: “Look. There’s an intruder over Allentown.” According to the Washington Post, “In air traffic jargon, an ‘intruder’ is a plane with an operating transponder that has entered restricted airspace without permission.” In fact, it is the missing Flight 175. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/17/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002] However, these accounts make no mention of NORAD being notified about the problems with Flight 175 at this time. But according to a NORAD timeline released shortly after 9/11, NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) was alerted about Flight 175 by the FAA several minutes earlier, at 8:43 a.m. (see 8:43 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001] Entity Tags: Dave Bottiglia, Curt Applegate, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight UA 175

8:48 a.m.
September 11, 2001: CNN First Major Network to Show WTC Crash Footage CNN is the first major network to show the footage of the crash site. It breaks into a commercial and anchor Carol Lin says, “This just in. You are looking at… obviously a very disturbing live shot there—that is the World Trade Center, and we have unconfirmed reports this morning that a plane has crashed into one of the towers of the World Trade Center.” CNN then switches to Sean Murtagh, the network’s vice president of finance, who says in a live telephone interview, “I just witnessed a plane that appeared to be cruising at a slightly lower than normal altitude over New York City. And it appears to have crashed into—I don’t know which tower it is—but it hit directly in the middle of one of the World Trade Center towers. It was a jet, maybe a two-engine jet, maybe a 737… a large passenger commercial jet… It was teetering back and forth, wing-tip to wing-tip, and it looks like it has crashed into—probably, twenty stories from the top of the World Trade Center—maybe the eightieth to eighty-fifth floor. There is smoke billowing out of the World Trade Center.” [CNN, 9/11/2001; BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 16-17] Many reports do not come until a few minutes later. For instance, ABC first breaks into regular programming with the story at 8:52 a.m. [ABC NEWS, 9/14/2002] Incredibly, a NORAD timeline presented to the 9/11 Commission in 2003 claims that CNN doesn’t begin its coverage of the attacks until 8:57. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Entity Tags: Carol Lin, Sean Murtagh, World Trade Center, CNN Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight UA 175, World Trade Center

Shortly After 8:48 a.m.
September 11, 2001: United Airlines Learns Crashed Plane Belonged to American Airlines, but Director Unable to Contact Corporate Officials about This Apparently, managers at United Airlines’ System Operations Control (SOC) center, just outside Chicago, are unaware of any unfolding emergency until they see CNN reporting the burning World Trade Center (see 8:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). “Within minutes,” the air traffic control coordinator at United Airlines’ headquarters, located next to the SOC, calls an official at the FAA’s Herndon Command Center to confirm that the plane that just hit the WTC was not one of United’s aircraft. The FAA official tells him the plane had been a hijacked American Airlines 757. Soon afterwards, the air traffic control coordinator briefs Bill Roy and Mike Barber—the director and the dispatch manager at United’s SOC—on this information from the FAA. Barber then tries notifying United’s top corporate officials about it. However, he is unable to because the airline’s pager system is not working. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 21-22 ] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Bill Roy, Mike Barber, United Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

8:50 a.m.-9:00 a.m.
September 11, 2001: Boston Airport Directors Learn of Crashed and Missing Planes Thought to Be from Their Airport At Boston’s Logan Airport, from which Flight 11 and Flight 175 took off, directors learn that a plane thought to be from there has hit the World Trade Center, and another from there is missing. John Duval, the airport’s deputy director of operations, is at his desk in the executive aviation office, when his son calls and informs him of the first plane hitting the WTC. A duty manager then calls, saying he has been on the phone with the FAA control tower at the airport. The manager tells Duval he has been informed that, as well as the plane that hit the WTC, “Another one is missing,” and, “They think the two planes came from here.” Duval immediately calls Ed Freni, who is Logan’s director of aviation operations. Duval passes on the news of the WTC crash and the other information from his duty manager. The two men arrange to meet in five minutes time at the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport) aviation office on the 18th floor of the FAA control tower at the airport. [MURPHY, 2006, PP. 30-33] Entity Tags: John Duval, Ed Freni Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight UA 175

8:50 a.m.
September 11, 2001: FAA Establishes Phone Bridges, Including with the Military, Earlier than Claimed by 9/11 Commission According to a statement by two high-level FAA officials, “Within minutes after the first aircraft hit the World Trade Center, the FAA immediately established several phone bridges [i.e., telephone conference calls] that included FAA field facilities, the FAA command center, FAA headquarters, [Defense Department], the Secret Service, and other government agencies.” The FAA shares “real-time information on the phone bridges about the unfolding events, including information about loss of communication with aircraft, loss of transponder signals, unauthorized changes in course, and other actions being taken by all the flights of interest, including Flight 77. Other parties on the phone bridges in turn shared information about actions they were taken.” The statement says, “The US Air Force liaison to the FAA immediately joined the FAA headquarters phone bridge and established contact with NORAD on a separate line.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Another account says the phone bridges are “quickly established” by the Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC). This is a small office at the FAA’s Herndon Command Center, which is staffed by three military officers at the time of the attacks (see (Between 8:48 a.m. 9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). It serves as the center’s liaison with the military. According to Aviation Week and Space Technology, the phone bridges link “key players, such as NORAD’s command center, area defense sectors, key FAA personnel, airline operations, and the NMCC.” [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/10/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] According to an FAA transcript of employee conversations on 9/11, one of the phone bridges, between the FAA Command Center, the operations center at FAA headquarters, and air traffic control centers in Boston and New York, begins before Flight 11 hits the World Trade Center at 8:46 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION AUTHORITY, 10/14/2003, PP. 3-10 ] If these accounts are correct, it means someone at NORAD should learn about Flight 77 when it deviates from its course (see (8:54 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, the 9/11 Commission will later claim that the FAA teleconference is established about 30 minutes later (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The Air Force liaison to the FAA will claim she only joins it after the Pentagon is hit (see (Shortly After 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Secret Service, Federal Aviation Administration, Air Traffic Services Cell, US Department of Defense Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93

8:50 a.m.
September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Goes Off Course According to a timeline provided to CNN by unnamed but “informed defense officials,” Flight 175 deviates from its assigned flight path at this time. [CNN, 9/17/2001] Other accounts give slightly different times. According to a National Transportation Safety Board report, which is based on various sources of recorded radar, Flight 175 deviates from its assigned altitude at 8:51 a.m., and then begins turning to the southeast at 8:52, climbing during the turn up to 33,500 feet. [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 ] The 9/11 Commission Report is unspecific about when it goes off course. It says only that “Minutes later,” after its final 8:42 a.m. communication, “United 175 turned southwest without clearance from air traffic control.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 21] New York Center air traffic controller Curt Applegate later says that he follows Flight 175 on the radar screen as it turns to the left and descends. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

8:51 a.m.-8:53 a.m.
September 11, 2001: Air Traffic Controller Declares Flight 175 as Possibly Hijacked According to the 9/11 Commission, Dave Bottiglia, the air traffic controller handling Flight 175, only notices now that this flight’s transponder signal has changed (see 8:46 a.m.-8:47 a.m. September 11, 2001). Bottiglia asks Flight 175 to return to its proper transponder code. There is no response. Beginning at 8:52 a.m., he makes repeated attempts to contact it, but there is still no response. Bottiglia contacts another controller at 8:53 a.m., and says: “We may have a hijack. We have some problems over here right now.… I can’t get a hold of UAL 175 at all right now and I don’t know where he went to.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 48] This account apparently conflicts with earlier accounts that claim NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) was notified at 8:43 a.m. that Flight 175 had been hijacked (see 8:43 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001] Entity Tags: Dave Bottiglia Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

(8:51 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Air Traffic Controller Watches Flight 175 Suddenly Climb 3,000 Feet, NEADS Not Contacted The air traffic controller at the FAA’s New York Center who is responsible for monitoring Flight 175 sees the now-hijacked plane on his radar screen making a sharp turn (see (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and is astonished as it rapidly climbs 3,000 feet. [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 ; THE LEARNING CHANNEL, 2005] Around this time, the controller, Dave Bottiglia, first notices that Flight 175’s transponder code has changed (see 8:51 a.m.-8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 21 ] As he will later recall: “As I’m watching, United 175 makes a hard left-hand turn and starts climbing. Not only did he make a sharp turn, but he also climbed 3,000 feet in a matter of approximately one minute, which is a very fast rate of climb.” Bottiglia will add, “This is something that we have never seen before.” He immediately turns to the manager at the New York Center and says, “I believe I just lost United 175.” [THE LEARNING CHANNEL, 2005] Yet, according to the 9/11 Commission, the center does not alert NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) to Flight 175 until 9:03 a.m. (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 23] Entity Tags: New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Dave Bottiglia Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

8:52 a.m.-8:59 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Passenger Tries to Call Wife

Garnet ‘Ace’ Bailey. [Source: Los Angeles Kings] Garnet “Ace” Bailey, a passenger on Flight 175, tries four times to call his wife Katherine, on both her business and home phone lines. According to the 9/11 Commission, his attempts are unsuccessful, and he never gets to speak to her. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 21 ; ESPN, 9/7/2006] Bailey was assigned a seat in row 6 of the plane but attempts the calls using a phone in row 32. According to a summary of phone calls from the hijacked flights presented at the 2006 Zacarias Moussaoui trial, however, while one of his calls does not connect, the other three do and last for 22 seconds, 25 seconds, and 9 seconds. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] Bailey’s wife will later appear to confirm not having received any calls from her husband, recalling that when the plane struck the South Tower at 9:03 a.m., “We had no idea” Garnet was on it, and that “I had no thought he was in harm’s way.” [PRESS-TELEGRAM (LONG BEACH, CA), 9/10/2007] Garnet Bailey is a scout for the Los Angeles Kings of the National Hockey League, and played in the NHL himself from 1968 to 1978. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2001] Entity Tags: Garnet Bailey Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

8:52 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Attendant Reports Plane Has Been Hijacked; Accounts Conflict over Details

Robert Fangman. [Source: Family photo] A flight attendant on Flight 175 calls the United Airlines maintenance office in San Francisco and speaks with Marc Policastro, an employee there. The attendant reports that Flight 175 has been hijacked, both of its pilots have been killed, a flight attendant has been stabbed, and the hijackers are probably flying the plane. The line then goes dead. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 7-8; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 21 ] The call, which lasts 75 seconds, is made using an Airfone in row 31 at the back of the plane. Flight crews on United aircraft are able to contact the maintenance office simply by dialing *349 on an Airfone. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 90-91 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] The identity of the attendant making the call is unclear. According to the Wall Street Journal, the caller is “a female flight attendant.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001] The 9/11 Commission Report, however, refers to them as “a male flight attendant,” and one of the Commission’s earlier staff statements will specifically name Robert Fangman, who is one of the attendants on Flight 175. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 7; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 18 ] A summary of the phone calls made from the four hijacked planes presented at the 2006 Zacarias Moussaoui trial will refer to the caller simply as a “flight attendant,” with a question mark signifying their name. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] After the call ends, Policastro and also another employee at the maintenance office try contacting Flight 175 using ACARS (an e-mail system that enables personnel on the ground to rapidly communicate with those in the cockpit of an aircraft), but they receive no response to these and subsequent attempts at reaching the flight. According to GTE Airfone records, another successful call will be made from Flight 175 to the maintenance office four minutes after this first one (see 8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001). However, other evidence indicates only one call is made. Shortly before 9:00 a.m., a supervisor at the maintenance office will call the United Airlines System Operations Control center, just outside Chicago, and inform a manager there of the reported hijacking of Flight 175 (see Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). The supervisor also calls the airline’s security chief. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 21-22 AND 90 ] Entity Tags: Marc Policastro, Robert Fangman Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(8:52 a.m.) September 11, 2001: New York Controller Tracks Flight 175 into New York, NEADS Not Alerted

Mike McCormick. [Source: Associated Press] Mike McCormick, the head of the FAA’s New York Center, sees the coverage of the first World Trade Center attack on CNN. He assumes that Flight 175, which he is tracking on his radar screen, is also headed into the WTC. He will recall: “Probably one of the most difficult moments of my life was the 11 minutes from the point I watched that aircraft, when we first lost communications until the point that aircraft hit the World Trade Center. For those 11 minutes, I knew, we knew, what was going to happen, and that was difficult.” [CNN, 8/12/2002] Yet, according to the 9/11 Commission, the New York Center will not notify NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) about Flight 175 until around the time it crashes, at 9:03 a.m. (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 23] Entity Tags: New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Mike McCormick Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

(8:52 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Passenger Details Stabbing

Peter Hanson. [Source: Family photo] Businessman Peter Hanson calls his father from Flight 175 and says, “Oh, my God! They just stabbed the airline hostess. I think the airline is being hijacked.” Despite being cut off twice, he manages to report how men armed with knives are stabbing flight attendants, apparently in an attempt to force crewmembers to unlock the doors to the cockpit. He calls again a couple of minutes before the plane crashes. [BBC, 9/13/2001; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 9/16/2001; TORONTO SUN, 9/16/2001] Hanson’s father immediately calls the local police department and relays what he heard. [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 7/23/2004] Entity Tags: Peter Hanson Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(After 8:52 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NORAD Scramble Delayed? Witness Casts Doubt on NORAD’s Scramble Time William Wibel, principal of a school inside Otis Air National Guard Base, is inside the Otis base preparing for a meeting when he learns that the WTC has been attacked and his meeting is canceled. He says, “As I drove away, and was listening to the news on the radio, the 102nd was scrambling into duty.” [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/12/2001] The WTC crash does not break on local news and radio until about 8:52 a.m. Even if he hears CNN’s early reporting starting at 8:48 a.m., it still presumably takes time to learn the meeting is canceled, go back to his car and so forth. NORAD says the fighters took off from Otis at 8:52 a.m. Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, William Wibel Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

(8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Fighters Head toward New York Area; Accounts Conflict over Exact Destination

Route of the Otis Air National Guard fighters to New York City. [Source: Yvonne Vermillion/ MagicGraphix.com] The two F-15 fighter jets launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod respond to the hijacking of Flight 11, but there will be conflicting accounts regarding their initial destination. The fighters were scrambled at 8:46 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), and are airborne by 8:53 (see 8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] Flying toward New York City - News reports shortly after 9/11 will say that, after taking off, the Otis fighters begin “racing towards New York City.” [CBS NEWS, 9/14/2001; CNN, 9/14/2001; CAPE COD TIMES, 9/15/2001] Other news reports similarly say they initially head toward New York City. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; FOX NEWS, 9/8/2002] Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental Region, will say the fighters are “coming to New York.” [MSNBC, 9/23/2001; SLATE, 1/16/2002] Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy, the lead Otis pilot, tells the BBC, “When we took off we started climbing a 280-heading, basically towards New York City.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] In one account, Duffy recalls that, after launching, he calls for the location of his target and is told, “Your contact’s over Kennedy,” meaning New York’s JFK International Airport. Duffy will add, “[W]e started heading right down to Long Island, basically.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002; BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 15] In another account, he says that he and the other Otis pilot, Major Daniel Nash, “climbed up, [and] we were supersonic going down to Long Island.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 57] Without a Target, Heading for Military Airspace - According to some accounts, however, the two Otis fighters do not initially head toward Manhattan. Major James Fox, the leader of the weapons team at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), will later recall: “We had no idea where [Flight 11] was. We just knew it was over land, so we scrambled [the Otis fighters] towards land.” [NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, 1/25/2002] The 9/11 Commission will conclude that, after taking off, because they are “Lacking a target,” the fighters are “vectored toward military-controlled airspace off the Long Island coast.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] Colonel Robert Marr, the battle commander at NEADS, says that when the Otis fighters took off, his “intent was to scramble [them] to military airspace while we found out what was going on.” He says that, before 9:03 when the second World Trade Center tower is hit, the fighters are “heading down south toward Whiskey 105 and we don’t really have a mission for them at this point.” Whiskey 105 is military training airspace southeast of Long Island, a few minutes flying time from New York City. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 56 AND 58-59] To New York, then Redirected to Military Airspace - Other accounts will say the Otis fighters initially head toward New York City, but are subsequently redirected to the military airspace off Long Island. According to author Lynn Spencer, after taking off, Duffy and Nash fly “supersonic toward New York for approximately 15 minutes.” But just after the second WTC tower is hit, Duffy suggests to the weapons controller at NEADS that the two fighters head to the Whiskey 105 training airspace off Long Island, and that is where they then go. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 83-85] Tape recordings of the NEADS operations floor will reveal that, at 8:45 a.m., Major Kevin Nasypany, the facility’s mission crew commander, gave Major Fox a coordinate north of New York City, and told him to “Head [the Otis jets] in that direction” (see 8:45 a.m. September 11, 2001). Then, at 8:52, he told one of his staff members, “Send ‘em to New York City still” (see 8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). But, according to Vanity Fair, shortly after the second tower is hit, the NEADS weapons technicians get “pushback” from civilian FAA controllers, who are “afraid of fast-moving fighters colliding with a passenger plane,” so the two fighters are directed to a “holding area” just off the coast, near Long Island (see 9:09 a.m.-9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001). [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Accounts are also unclear regarding what speed the Otis jets fly at after taking off (see (8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: James Fox, Larry Arnold, Daniel Nash, Robert Marr, Timothy Duffy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight UA 175

8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001: Otis Fighters Airborne, Allegedly Ordered toward New York

A typical F-15. [Source: US Air Force] Radar data will show that the two F-15s scrambled from Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, are airborne by this time. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/15/2001; NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] It is now eight minutes since the mission crew commander at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) ordered that the jets be launched (see 8:45 a.m. September 11, 2001). [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] It is 40 minutes since air traffic controllers had their last communication with Flight 11 (see 8:13 a.m. September 11, 2001), and 28 minutes since they became certain that the aircraft was hijacked (see (8:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Flight 11 crashed into the World Trade Center seven minutes ago (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 7, 19 AND 459] Commander Wants Fighters Sent to New York - In Rome, New York, NEADS has just received news of the plane hitting the WTC (see 8:51 a.m. September 11, 2001). Major Kevin Nasypany, the facility’s mission crew commander, is asked what to do with the Otis fighters. He responds: “Send ‘em to New York City still. Continue! Go! This is what I got. Possible news that a 737 just hit the World Trade Center. This is a real-world.… Continue taking the fighters down to the New York City area, JFK [International Airport] area, if you can. Make sure that the FAA clears it—your route all the way through.… Let’s press with this.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Yet there will be conflicting reports of the fighters’ destination (see (8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001), with some accounts saying they are directed toward military-controlled airspace off the Long Island coast. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 56-59; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Robert Marr, Kevin Nasypany, Otis Air National Guard Base Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

(8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Fighters Fly toward New York Area; Accounts Unclear over Speed The two F-15 fighter jets that took off from Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod head toward the New York area. But accounts will be unclear regarding what speed they fly at as they respond to the hijacking of Flight 11. The two jets were scrambled from Otis at 8:46 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), and are airborne by 8:53 (see 8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] Flying Supersonic - In a number of accounts, it is claimed the fighters fly faster than the speed of sound. [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002] Lead pilot Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy will tell the BBC: “I was supersonic.… I don’t know what we could have done to get there any quicker.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] He tells ABC News, “[W]e go supersonic on the way, which is kind of nonstandard for us.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] According to author Lynn Spencer, “against regulations, [Duffy] takes his plane supersonic, breaking the sound barrier as he passes through 18,000 feet. This is a violation that can get a pilot into a good deal of trouble since the sonic boom tends to break windows in the homes down below.” When the other Otis pilot, Major Daniel Nash, radios and says, “You’re supersonic,” Duffy responds, “Yeah, I know, don’t worry about it.” Then, “Without hesitation, [Nash] follows his lead” and also goes supersonic. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 43] Flying 'Full Blower' - Duffy will recall, “I was in full blower all the way,” as he flies toward New York. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002] In another account, he similarly says, “When we took off I left it in full afterburner the whole time.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 57] F-15s can fly at up to 1,875 miles per hour. [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/12/2001; US AIR FORCE, 3/2008] According to an Otis Air Base spokeswoman, “An F-15 departing from Otis can reach New York City in 10 to 12 minutes.” [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/16/2001] But, according to the Boston Globe, while “In their prime, the planes can go Mach 2.5 [and] could have been to New York in less than 10 minutes,” Duffy and Nash are “flying F-15 Eagles that were built in 1977.… Because of their age and the three large fuel tanks they were carrying… the planes couldn’t attain that speed, both pilots said.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/11/2005] Different Speeds Given - Various speeds will later be given for how fast the Otis jets are traveling. Consistent with Duffy’s claims of flying “supersonic,” ABC News says the two fighters fly “at Mach 1.2, nearly 900 miles per hour.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] According to the Boston Globe, the fighters are flying at “about Mach 1.4—more than 1,000 miles per hour.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/11/2005] Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental Region, says they fly at “about 1.5 Mach, which is, you know, somewhere—11 or 1,200 miles an hour.” [MSNBC, 9/23/2001; SLATE, 1/16/2002] Major General Paul Weaver, the director of the Air National Guard, says the jets fly “like a scalded ape,” but as to their exact speed, he only says they are “topping 500 mph.” [DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 9/16/2001] And by 9:03 a.m., when the second World Trade Center tower is hit, the Otis fighters are still 71 miles from New York, according to NORAD. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001] The 9/11 Commission will state that they only arrive over Manhattan at 9:25 a.m. (see 9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001), though accounts of most witnesses on the ground indicate they do not arrive until after 10:00 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.-10:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] Accounts are contradictory regarding what exact destination the Otis jets are initially heading toward after taking off (see (8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Timothy Duffy, Paul Weaver, Larry Arnold, Daniel Nash Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight UA 175

(8:53 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NORAD Public Affairs Officer Calls Brother in WTC; Possibly Warns Him of Second Hijacked Plane

Adam Arias [Source: US Air Force] Major Don Arias, the public affairs officer for NORAD, has just learned of the first WTC crash from television and a phone call from NEADS (see (8:38 a.m.-8:52 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Alarmed because his younger brother works at the WTC, he calls him immediately. Adam Arias works for an investment company on the 84th floor of the South Tower. According to some accounts, Don Arias tells his brother that the aircraft that crashed into the North Tower was likely a hijacked plane that he has been informed of, and orders him to “Get out of there. Go home.” [FLORIDA STATE TIMES, 11/2001; NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, 1/25/2002; AIRMAN, 9/2002] But according to Newsday, Don Arias tells his brother he has heard there is “another hijacked airliner and might be another attack.” [NEWSDAY, 10/30/2001] This would be consistent with an early NORAD timeline, which had the agency receiving notification of the second hijacking at 8:43 a.m. (see 8:43 a.m. September 11, 2001). However, later accounts, including the 9/11 Commission Report, will claim NORAD only hears of it around the time the plane hits the South Tower (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Adam Arias reacts to his brother’s call with urgency, going around the floor exhorting people to leave, and physically throwing one woman out of her office. Several survivors will later credit him with saving their lives. [NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, 1/25/2002; AIRMAN, 9/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 124] Adam Arias will be killed when the South Tower collapses. [SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, 9/9/2003] Entity Tags: Don Arias Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

(8:53 a.m.-10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Pilots Unclear about What Is Happening After taking off in their F-15s, the two pilots scrambled from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to Flight 11 are not properly informed about the unfolding events. One of these pilots, Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy, later describes, “When you get the scramble order… you are usually not sure what is going on.” However, after they were informed there had been a hijacking (see 8:34 a.m. September 11, 2001), the two “knew it was the real thing,” according to Major Daniel Nash, the other pilot. [FOX NEWS, 9/8/2002] But as they are “headed right down Long Island,” Duffy recalls, “[w]e had no idea what was going on.” [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/10/2006] When the second World Trade Center tower is hit at 9:03, they are unaware that a second plane has been in trouble, and their request for clarification of their mission from NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) is met with “considerable confusion” (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 60-63] (According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS itself only receives its first notification about a second possible hijacking at 9:03 (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 24 ] ) Furthermore, it is not until after 10:30 a.m. that the two pilots will learn that Washington has also been attacked, when a controller informs them of this in passing, but does not elaborate. [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002] Nash will later complain: “Anybody watching CNN that morning had a much better idea of what was going on than we did. We were not told anything.” [MICHAEL BRONNER, 2006] Duffy later reflects: “People lose track of how much chaos there was. We were in a situation that was just a mess, you know, and we were trying to get our arms around it a little bit.” [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/10/2006] Entity Tags: Daniel Nash, Timothy Duffy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

(8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Nearly Collides with Two Other Planes Flight 175 almost collides in mid-air with at least two other planes as it descends towards Manhattan. At the FAA’s New York Center, air traffic controller Chris Tucker sees it turn toward the path of Delta Flight 2315, a Boeing 737 heading southwest at 28,000 feet. He tells the Delta pilot: “Traffic 2 o’clock. Ten miles. I think he’s been hijacked. I don’t know his intentions. Take any evasive action necessary.” The Delta plane begins to turn to get out of the way, but Flight 175 turns as well. According to the Washington Post, the two planes’ radar targets actually merge on the radar screen. Controller Dave Bottiglia later says, “It was a terrifying moment just to watch the two airplanes miss by less than, I think it was 200 feet.” Shortly after this near miss, Flight 175 almost collides with US Airways Flight 542, another 737, flying just below and four miles behind Delta 2315. This plane’s onboard collision alert system sounds an alarm as Flight 175 comes closer and closer to it. Its pilot descends, managing to avoid a collision. According to an early FAA report, after this incident, several New York air traffic controllers speculate that the unknown aircraft heading towards New York City—only later confirmed to be Flight 175—is an emergency and is heading for an airport to land. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; WASHINGTON POST, 9/17/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/10/2002; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/12/2002] Earlier on, Flight 175 nearly collided with Flight 11 (see (Shortly After 8:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and minutes later it will narrowly avoid another collision, with Midwest Airlines Flight 7 (see (9:01 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Dave Bottiglia, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Chris Tucker Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

(8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA’s New York Center Believes Flight 175 Has Been Hijacked, but NEADS Reportedly Not Informed The head air traffic controller at the FAA’s New York Center notifies a manager at the facility that she believes Flight 175 has been hijacked. The manager tries to notify regional managers about this, but cannot reach them because they are discussing the hijacking of Flight 11 and refuse to be disturbed. However, even though the controller managing Flight 175 said, “we may have a hijack” at 8:53 a.m. (see 8:51 a.m.-8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001), the 9/11 Commission will conclude that NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) is not notified about the aircraft until 9:03 a.m. (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] The Commission’s account will conflict with previous accounts that state that NEADS was notified of the Flight 175 hijacking at 8:43 a.m. (see 8:43 a.m. September 11, 2001). The head of the New York Center, Mike McCormick, has already decided at 8:52 a.m. that Flight 175 has been hijacked and is on a suicide run to New York City (see (8:52 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 8/12/2002] Entity Tags: New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Mike McCormick Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001: Attendant Supposedly Makes Second Call from Flight 175; United Airlines Concludes Otherwise According to GTE Airfone records, an attendant on Flight 175 makes a call to the United Airlines maintenance office in San Francisco at this time, but the employee who would have answered it denies this. The call is supposedly made using an Airfone in row 31 at the back of the plane, and lasts 31 seconds. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 90-91 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] A Flight 175 attendant, possibly Robert Fangman, called the maintenance office four minutes earlier and spoke with employee Marc Policastro (see 8:52 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 7] But Policastro, who would have also answered this second call had it occurred, later recalls only one communication from the flight. United Airlines investigators will conclude that only one call is received. According to Airfone records, a third call from Flight 175 to the maintenance office is attempted a minute later, at 8:57, but this fails to connect. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 90-91 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] Entity Tags: Marc Policastro, Robert Fangman Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(8:57 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Fire Department Advice to Evacuate WTC Tower Fails to Reach People Inside

People inside the World Trade Center flee down a stairway. [Source: Shannon Stapleton] By 8:57 a.m., fire department commanders at WTC Tower One advise Port Authority police and building personnel to evacuate Tower Two. According to the 9/11 Commission, the reason for this is not concern of a possible second plane, but because the fire chiefs judge the impact of the plane into the North Tower to have made the entire WTC complex unsafe. However, there is no evidence that this advice is communicated effectively to the building personnel in Tower Two. When an announcement is made to evacuate at 9:02 a.m. (one minute before the building is hit), it does not direct everyone to evacuate, and advises only that everyone may wish to start an orderly evacuation if warranted by conditions on their floor. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/19/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 287 AND 290] Entity Tags: World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175, World Trade Center

(8:57 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Air Traffic Controllers Watch Flight 175 on Radar as It Heads into New York

Flight 175 an instant before it hits the WTC South Tower. [Source: Associated Press] About a half-dozen air traffic controllers at the FAA’s New York Center in Ronkonkoma, NY, watch Flight 175 on the radar screen in its final minutes, as it approaches Manhattan. [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 ; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Flight 175 is marked on the screen with the letter “I” for “intruder.” Initially, those at the center think it might be heading for Newark Airport, maybe for an emergency landing there. But controller Jim Bohleber says, “No, he’s too fast and low, he’ll never make Newark.” [NEWSDAY, 9/10/2002] The controllers start speculating what Flight 175 is aiming for, with one of them guessing the Statue of Liberty. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] They are astonished at the extraordinary rate at which it is descending (see (8:58 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). A controller counts down its altitude, “Eight, six, four” thousand feet, and then says, “My god, he’s in the ground in the next step.” But someone else at the center says, “No, that’s the Trade Center right there.” [THE LEARNING CHANNEL, 2005] But, according to the 9/11 Commission, the New York Center does not notify NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) about Flight 175 until 9:03 a.m., the same time as it crashes into the South Tower (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 23] Workers at the crisis center at United Airlines’ headquarters outside Chicago, also closely watch Flight 175 head into New York City on radar. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] Entity Tags: New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Jim Bohleber Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

8:57 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Turns toward New York City Flight 175, now in descent, briefly levels off at 28,500 feet and starts turning northeast. A minute later, it resumes its descent as it heads toward New York City. [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 22 ] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

(8:58 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Controllers Watch Flight 175 Descending 10,000 Feet per Minute Air traffic controllers at the FAA’s New York Center who are watching Flight 175 on the radar screen (see (8:57 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001) see the aircraft descending at an astonishing rate of up to 10,000 feet per minute. [THE LEARNING CHANNEL, 2005] From 8:58 a.m., Flight 175 is constantly descending toward New York. [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 ] One of the New York Center controllers, Jim Bohleber, is looking at his radar scope and calls out the plane’s rate of descent every 12 seconds, each time the screen updates, saying: “It’s six thousand feet a minute. Now it’s eight. Now ten.” [NEWSDAY, 9/10/2002; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Dave Bottiglia, the controller responsible for monitoring Flight 175, will later comment that 10,000 feet per minute is “absolutely unheard of for a commercial jet. It is unbelievable for the passengers in the back to withstand that type of force as they’re descending. [The hijackers are] actually nosing the airplane down and doing what I would call a ‘power dive.’” [THE LEARNING CHANNEL, 2005] While Flight 175 is in this rapid descent, it heads directly into the paths of several other aircraft, and narrowly avoids a mid-air collision with flight Midex 7 (see (9:01 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 73-76] Entity Tags: Dave Bottiglia, Jim Bohleber, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

8:58 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Passenger Says Passengers Want to Do Something about Hijacking

Brian Sweeney. [Source: Family photo] Brian Sweeney, a passenger on Flight 175, calls his wife, but can only leave a message. “We’ve been hijacked, and it doesn’t look too good.” Then he calls his mother and tells her what is happening onboard. [HYANNIS NEWS, 9/13/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/21/2001] She recalls him saying, “They might come back here. I might have to go. We are going to try to do something about this.” She also recalls him identifying the hijackers as Middle Eastern. Then he tells his mother he loves her and hangs up the phone. The mother turns on the television and soon sees Flight 175 crash into the WTC. The 9/11 Commission later concludes that the Flight 175 passengers planned to storm the cockpit but did not have time before the plane crashed. [NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, 3/9/2004; CNN, 3/10/2004] Entity Tags: Brian Sweeney Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Learns about Flight 175 Hijacking

Jim Goodwin. [Source: Chicago Tribune] Rich Miles, the manager at the United Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center just outside Chicago, receives a call from a supervisor at United’s maintenance office in San Francisco, informing him that Flight 175 has been reported as hijacked. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 22 ] The maintenance office received a call minutes earlier from a flight attendant on United 175, who said their plane had been hijacked (see 8:52 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 7-8] When the supervisor tells Miles about this, he initially responds, “No, the information we’re getting is that it was an American 757.” (The FAA has just informed United Airlines that the plane that hit the World Trade Center was a hijacked American Airlines 757 (see (Shortly After 8:48 a.m.) September 11, 2001).) But the supervisor insists, “No, we got a call from a flight attendant on 175.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001] Miles notifies his boss Bill Roy, the SOC director, about this information. Roy then contacts United’s CEO Jim Goodwin and its chief operating officer Andy Studdert, who are in a meeting at the airline’s headquarters, located next to the SOC. Roy then begins the process of activating the crisis center at the United headquarters, which will take about 30 minutes to complete. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 22 ] Entity Tags: Andy Studdert, Jim Goodwin, Rich Miles, United Airlines, Bill Roy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175