September 10

Timeline
September 9-11, 2001: NORAD Begins Northern Vigilance Military Operation NORAD begins Operation Northern Vigilance. For this military operation, it deploys fighters to Alaska and Northern Canada to monitor a Russian air force exercise in the Russian Arctic and North Pacific Ocean, scheduled for September 10 to September 14. The Russian exercise involves its bombers staging a mock attack against NATO planes that are supposedly planning an assault on Russia. [BBC, 2001, PP. 161; NORAD, 9/9/2001; WASHINGTON TIMES, 9/11/2001] The NORAD fighters are due to stay in Alaska and Canada until the end of the Russian exercise. At some time between 10:32 a.m. and 11:45 a.m. on 9/11, Russian President Vladimir Putin will call the White House to say the Russians are voluntarily halting their exercise. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002] It is unknown from which bases NORAD sends fighters for Operation Northern Vigilance, and how many US military personnel are involved. However, in December 2000, it took similar action—called Operation Northern Denial—in response to a “smaller scale” Russian “long-range aviation activity in northern Russia and the Arctic.” More than 350 American and Canadian military personnel were involved on that occasion. [CANADIAN CHIEF OF DEFENSE STAFF, 5/30/2001, PP. 6 ; NORAD, 9/9/2001] Entity Tags: Bush administration, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Operation Northern Vigilance, Vladimir Putin Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Military Exercises, US Air Security

September 9-11, 2001: 9/11 Plot Facilitators Leave United Arab Emirates 9/11 facilitators Ali Abdul Aziz Ali and Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi leave the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in a hurry. At a hearing held in Guantanamo Bay in 2007 to determine Ali’s combat status, his departure from the UAE just before 9/11 will be included in the facts supporting his designation as an enemy combatant. However, he will deny having foreknowledge of 9/11 and say he had to leave the UAE as his work permit was canceled. [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 4/12/2007 ] Al-Hawsawi leaves Dubai on the morning of 9/11 for Karachi. Shortly before, he had learned that the operation for which the hijackers had traveled to the US would take place on September 11, and had been advised by fellow operatives Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed that he should return to Pakistan. [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 3/21/2007 ] Before leaving, al-Hawsawi transferred $40,000 the hijackers had returned to him to his Visa card (see September 5-10, 2001). He makes six ATM withdrawals on the card in Pakistan two days later and then disappears. [MSNBC, 12/11/2001] Entity Tags: Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Shortly Before September 11, 2001: WTC Tower Has Security Increased The day after 9/11, Newsday will report that, according to security guard Hermina Jones, bulletproof windows and fireproof doors have recently been installed in a 22nd-floor computer command center in one of the WTC towers. Jones will claim that this was done to secure the tower from aerial attacks, though it is not clear if this is merely her post-9/11 opinion or if she had evidence to believe that was the reason for the improvement. [NEWSDAY, 9/12/2001] Entity Tags: World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: WTC Investigation

September 10, 2001: Rumsfeld Announces Defense Department Cannot Track $2.3 Trillion in Transactions In a speech to the Department of Defense, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld announces that the Department of Defense “cannot track $2.3 trillion in transactions.” CBS later calculates that 25 percent of the yearly defense budget is unaccounted for, and quotes a long-time defense budget analyst: “[Their] numbers are pie in the sky. The books are cooked routinely year after year.” Coverage of this rather shocking story is nearly nonexistent given the events of the next day. [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 9/10/2001; CBS NEWS, 1/29/2002] In April 2002 it will be revealed that $1.1 trillion of the missing money comes from the 2000 fiscal year. Auditors won’t even quantify how much money is missing from fiscal year 2001, causing “some [to] fear it’s worse” than 2000. The Department of the Army will state that it won’t publish a stand-alone financial statement for 2001 because of “the loss of financial-management personnel sustained during the Sept. 11 terrorist attack.” [INSIGHT, 4/29/2002] This $1.1 trillion plus unknown additional amounts continues to remain unaccounted for, and auditors say it may take eight years of reorganization before a proper accounting can be done. [INSIGHT, 8/21/2003] Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, US Department of the Army, US Department of Defense Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events

Shortly Before September 11, 2001: Flight 11 Pilot Not Originally Scheduled for that Flight John Ogonowski, who will pilot American Airlines Flight 11—the first plane to hit the World Trade Center—on 9/11, is not originally supposed to be on that flight, but is scheduled to fly it shortly before September 11. The original pilot is Walter Sorenson. But, according to the Georgetown Record, Sorenson is “disappointed when he [is] replaced by Captain John Ogonowski, who [has] seniority over Sorenson and requested to fly [on 9/11].” [GEORGETOWN RECORD, 9/18/2003] However, other reports indicate Ogonowski is later unhappy about having to fly on September 11, and tries, unsuccessfully, to switch to another flight. [PUBLIC RADIO INTERNATIONAL, 9/13/2002] Pilots on two of the other aircraft hijacked on 9/11 are also not originally scheduled to fly that day, but are booked onto those planes shortly before September 11 (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001 and Shortly Before September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: John Ogonowski, Walter Sorenson Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events

September 10, 2001: Trader Makes Suspicious Investments Moves; Later Accused of 9/11 Foreknowledge

Amr “Tony” Elgindy. [Source: San Diego Union Tribune] Amr Elgindy orders his broker to liquidate his children’s $300,000 trust account fearing a sudden crash in the market. He also tells his stockbroker that the Dow Jones average, then at 9,600, will fall to below 3,000. Elgindy is arrested in San Diego in May 2002, along with FBI agents Jeffrey Royer and Lynn Wingate, who, according to government prosecutors, were using their FBI positions to obtain inside information on various corporations. They also questioned whether Elgindy had foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks. [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/23/2002; LONDON TIMES, 5/30/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 6/8/2002] A report published in the San Diego Union-Tribune, however, casts some doubt on the government’s allegations. [SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, 6/16/2002] In 2005, now former FBI agent Jeffrey Royer admits to giving Elgindy confidential details of federal investigations, including a probe of the 9/11 attacks. Royer claims he did it to use Elgindy’s knowledge to help develop evidence of criminal wrongdoing. A court case against Royer and Elgindy continues. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1/5/2005] Entity Tags: Jeffrey Royer, Lynn Wingate, Amr Elgindy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge

Shortly Before September 11, 2001: More Than Half of Attendants on Flight 175 Are Assigned to It after Not Originally Being Scheduled for This Flight

Amy Jarret. [Source: Family photo] At least four of the seven flight attendants who will be on United Airlines Flight 175—the second plane to hit the World Trade Center—on 9/11 are not originally supposed to take this flight, and are only assigned to be on it shortly before September 11: Amy Jarret will be on Flight 175 because she switches shifts with one of the original attendants, Elaine Lawrence. [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 10/23/2001] Robert Fangman takes the place of attendant Elise O’Kane, who accidentally enters an incorrect code into the computer when signing up for flights, and is instead scheduled for flights to Denver during September 2001. [BOSTON GLOBE, 5/22/2005; CNN, 10/8/2005] Lauren Gurskis reschedules herself to a September 12 flight so she can drive her son to his first day of kindergarten. Kathryn Laborie is most likely the attendant who takes her place. [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/8/2002] Barbara McFarland swaps shifts with another attendant so she can spend an extra day with her son. The attendant that replaces her is unstated. [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/14/2001; CAPE COD TIMES, 3/10/2002] Many of the flight attendants who will be on the other three hijacked planes are also only assigned to those flights shortly before 9/11 (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001-Early Morning September 11, 2001, Shortly Before September 11, 2001-Early Morning September 11, 2001, and Shortly Before September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Amy Jarret, Barbara McFarland, Robert Fangman, Elaine Lawrence, Kathryn LaBorie, Lauren Gurskis, Elise O’Kane Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events

Before September 11, 2001: US Misses Chance to Capture High-ranking Al-Qaeda Figure Due to Delay by NSA Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, misses a chance to capture an unnamed high-ranking al-Qaeda leader in the Netherlands. The US intelligence community learned of the chance through intercepts of al-Qaeda communications, but there is a battle over access to such intelligence. The NSA, which acquires the information, insists that it will not provide the CIA will full transcripts of calls between al-Qaeda members that it intercepts, but only with summaries of them, which the CIA finds less useful. In this case, there is a delay by the NSA in preparing the summary, and by the time it is passed to Alec Station, the al-Qaeda leader is no longer within reach. [NEWSWEEK, 8/21/2007] Entity Tags: National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Alec Station Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11, Remote Surveillance

September 10, 2001: Ashcroft Opposes Counterterrorism Funding Attorney General Ashcroft rejects a proposed $58 million increase in financing for the FBI’s counterterrorism programs. The money would have paid for 149 new counterterrorism field agents, 200 additional analysts and 54 additional translators. On the same day, he sends a request for budget increases to the White House. It covers 68 programs—but none of them relate to counterterrorism. He also sends a memorandum to his heads of departments, stating his seven priorities—none of them relate to counterterrorism. [GUARDIAN, 5/21/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 6/1/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 6/2/2002] He further proposes cutting a program that gives state and local counterterrorism grants for equipment like radios and preparedness training from $109 million to $44 million. Yet Ashcroft stopped flying public airplanes in July due to an as yet undisclosed terrorist threat (see July 26, 2001), and in a July speech he proclaimed, “Our No. 1 priority is the prevention of terrorist attacks.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 2/28/2002] Entity Tags: Bush administration, John Ashcroft Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

September 10, 2001: Pakistan Guards Osama as He Receives Medical Treatment

CBS News footage of the Rawalpindi, Pakistan, hospital where bin Laden was allegedly treated the day before 9/11. [Source: CBS News] CBS later reports that on this day, bin Laden is admitted to a military hospital in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, for kidney dialysis treatment. Pakistani military forces guard bin Laden. They also move out all the regular staff in the urology department and send in a secret team to replace them. It is not known how long he stays there. [CBS NEWS, 1/28/2002] Entity Tags: Pakistan, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI

September 10, 2001: Three 9/11 Hijackers Stay at Same Hotel as Senior Saudi Official

Sami Omar Hussayen, nephew of Saleh Ibn Abdul Rahman Hussayen. [Source: Family photo] Three hijackers, Hani Hanjour, Khalid Almihdhar, and Nawaf Alhazmi, check into the same hotel as a prominent Saudi government official, Saleh Ibn Abdul Rahman Hussayen. [WASHINGTON POST, 10/2/2003] Hussayen originally stayed at a different nearby hotel, but moved to this hotel on the same day the hijackers checked in. [TRENTO AND TRENTO, 2006, PP. 45] Investigators have not found any evidence that the hijackers met with Hussayen, and stress it could be a coincidence. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 3/10/2003] However, one prosecutor working on a related case will assert, “I continue to believe it can’t be a coincidence.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/2/2003] An FBI agent will later say that Hussayen “may have had some connection to the attacks and is likely to have met with those funding the hijackers if not the hijackers themselves.” [TRENTO AND TRENTO, 2006, PP. 45] Hussayen is interviewed by the FBI shortly after 9/11, but according to testimony from an FBI agent, the interview is cut short when Hussayen “feign[s] a seizure, prompting the agents to take him to a hospital, where the attending physicians [find] nothing wrong with him.” The agent recommends that Hussayen “should not be allowed to leave until a follow-up interview could occur.” [WASHINGTON POST, 10/2/2003] The agent returns to the hotel the next day, but finds Hussayen unhelpful. After she leaves, Hussayen calls the Saudi embassy, which contacts the FBI. Another, less aggressive agent is sent to talk to Hussayen and finds no additional information, so the FBI says he can leave the US. The first agent does not want him to go without answering her questions, but, according to authors Joe and Susan Trento, “Because of pressure from [Saudi ambassador to the US] Prince Bandar on the Bush administration… the agent’s superiors overruled her.” The superiors are not named. [TRENTO AND TRENTO, 2006, PP. 45] For most of the 1990s, Hussayen was director of the SAAR Foundation, a Saudi charity that is being investigated for terrorism ties and will be raided in early 2002 (see March 20, 2002). A few months after 9/11 he is named a minister of the Saudi government and put in charge of its two holy mosques. Hussayen had arrived in the US in late August 2001 planning to visit some Saudi-sponsored charities. Many of the charities on his itinerary, including the Global Relief Foundation, Muslim World League, IIRO (International Islamic Relief Organization), IANA (Islamic Assembly of North America), and World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), have since been shut down or investigated for alleged ties to Islamic militant groups. [WASHINGTON POST, 10/2/2003] His nephew, Sami Omar Hussayen, will be indicted in early 2004 for using his computer expertise to assist militant groups, and will be charged with administering a website associated with IANA, an organization which expressly advocated suicide attacks and using airliners as weapons in the months before 9/11. Investigators also will claim the nephew was in contact with important al-Qaeda figures. [WASHINGTON POST, 10/2/2003; SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, 1/10/2004] The nephew will be acquitted later in 2004 of the terrorism-related charges. The defense will not dispute that he posted messages advocating suicide bombings, but will argue that he had the Constitutional right to do so. The jury will deadlock on most of the counts. [WASHINGTON POST, 6/11/2004] IANA apparently will remain under investigation, as well as the flow of money from the uncle to nephew. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 3/10/2003] The uncle is not charged with any crime. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/2/2003] Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Muslim World League, Nawaf Alhazmi, SAAR Foundation, World Assembly of Muslim Youth, Sami Omar Hussayen, Susan Trento, Joseph Trento, Saleh Ibn Abdul Rahman Hussayen, International Islamic Relief Organization, Al-Qaeda, Bandar bin Sultan, Islamic Assembly of North America, Global Relief Foundation, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hani Hanjour Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Hani Hanjour, Saudi Arabia, Terrorism Financing

September 10, 2001: Likely Hijacker Associates in Florida Predict American Bloodshed Tomorrow

The Pink Pony strip club. [Source: Durand Patrick / Corbis] In the Pink Pony strip club in Daytona Beach, Florida the night before the 9/11 attacks, three men make anti-American sentiments and talk of impending bloodshed. One says, “Wait ‘til tomorrow. America is going to see bloodshed.” These are not any of the hijackers, since they had all left Florida by this time, but it is suspected these men knew the hijackers. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/14/2001; MSNBC, 9/23/2001] Mohamed Atta is said to have regularly frequented the same bar (see Before September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge

Before September 11, 2001: Militant Operatives Told to Use Prominent Saudi Bank

Al-Rajhi Bank logo. [Source: Al-Rajhi Bank.] A 2003 CIA report will claim that extremists “ordered operatives in Afghanistan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Yemen” to use accounts at the Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp. The Al-Rajhi Bank is one of the biggest Saudi banks, with billions in assets. Who gave this order and when has not been made public. However, some examples of militants using the bank are later alleged: When al-Qaeda leaer Mamdouh Mahmud Salim is arrested in late 1998 (see September 20, 1998), he is carrying records of an Al-Rajhi account. When Wadih El-Hage’s house in Kenya is raided in 1997, investigators find contact information in his address book for Salah Al-Rajhi, one of the billionaire co-owners of the bank (see Shortly After August 21, 1997). [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 7/26/2007] Some of the 9/11 hijackers use the bank. For instance, Hani Hanjour is sent wire transfers from Al-Rajhi bank in Saudi Arabia at least six times in 1998 and 1999. In September 2000, Nawaf Alhazmi uses $2,000 in Al-Rajhi traveler’s checks paid for by an unnamed person in Saudi Arabia. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 19, 31, 33, 34, 41, 87 ] And Abdulaziz Alomari has an account at the bank (see September 7, 2001). The bank is used by a number of charities suspected of militant links, including the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), the Muslim World League, the Saudi branch of Red Crescent, Global Relief Foundation, and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/13/2003] An al-Qaeda affiliate in Spain holds accounts at the bank. According to a fax later recovered by Spanish police, the group’s chief financier tells a business partner to use the bank for their transactions. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/13/2003] In 2000, Al-Rajhi Bank couriers deliver money to insurgents in Indonesia to buy weapons and bomb-making materials. According to a 2003 German report, bank co-founder Sulaiman Abdul Aziz al-Rajhi contributes to a charity front buying weapons for Islamic militants in Bosnia in the early 1990s. He also was on the “Golden Chain,” a list of early al-Qaeda funders (see 1988-1989). A US intelligence memo from shortly after 9/11 says that a money courier for al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri travels on a visa obtained by the bank. The 2003 CIA report will state: “Islamic extremists have used Al-Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation since at least the mid-1990s as a conduit for terrorist transactions.… Senior al-Rajhi family members have long supported Islamic extremists and probably know that terrorists use their bank.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 7/26/2007] Entity Tags: International Islamic Relief Organization, Red Crescent (Saudi branch), World Assembly of Muslim Youth, Global Relief Foundation, Sulaiman Abdul Aziz al-Rajhi, Salah al-Rajhi, Abdulaziz Alomari, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Hani Hanjour, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, Nawaf Alhazmi, Wadih El-Hage, Muslim World League Category Tags: Saudi Arabia, Terrorism Financing

September 10, 2001: NSA Monitors Call as KSM Gives Mohamed Atta Final Approval to Launch Attacks Mohamed Atta calls Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) in Afghanistan. KSM gives final approval to Atta to launch the attacks. The specifics of the conversation haven’t been released. [INDEPENDENT, 9/15/2002] Unnamed intelligence officials later tell Knight Ridder Newspapers that the call is monitored by the NSA, but only translated after the 9/11 attacks. KSM, “using coded language, [gives] Atta final approval” for the attacks. [KNIGHT RIDDER, 9/9/2002] NSA monitored other calls between KSM and Atta in the summer of 2001 but did not share the information about this with other agencies (see Summer 2001). Additionally, it will later be revealed that an FBI squad built an antenna in the Indian Ocean some time before 9/11 with the specific purpose of listening in on KSM’s phone calls, so they may have learned about this call to Atta on their own (see Before September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States, National Security Agency, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Mohamed Atta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Key Warnings, Warning Signs, Mohamed Atta, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Remote Surveillance

September 10, 2001: Alshehhi Checks out of Boston Hotel Marwan Alshehhi checks out of his hotel in Boston. It is unclear where he spends the night before 9/11, but at 11:57 a.m. on this day he wires some money to a co-conspirator in the Middle East from the Greyhound bus station in Boston. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] One eyewitness will claim to see him at Dulles Airport in Washington later this evening (see Around 8:15 p.m. September 10, 2001), but apparently he is back in Boston by the next morning (see (6:20 a.m.-7:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Marwan Alshehhi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi

September 10, 2001: Cheney’s Domestic Terrorism Task Force Finally Beginning to Hire Staff The domestic terrorism task force announced by President Bush and Vice President Cheney in May 2001 is just gearing up. Cheney appointed Admiral Steve Abbot to lead the task force in June, but he does not receive his White House security pass until now. Abbot has only hired two staffers and been working full time for a few days prior to 9/11. The task force was to have reported to Congress by October 1, 2001, a date they could not have met. [NEW YORK TIMES, 12/27/2001; CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, 4/15/2004] Entity Tags: Steve Abbot, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Shortly Before September 11, 2001: Pilot on Flight 77 Only Signs Up for Flight Shortly before 9/11 One of the pilots on American Airlines Flight 77—the third plane to be hijacked on 9/11—is not originally booked to be on that flight, and only accepts it shortly before September 11. American Airlines pilot Bill Cheng is originally due to fly Flight 77 on 9/11. But in late August he applies for that day off, so he can go camping. “When another pilot signed up for the slot, Mr. Cheng’s application was accepted.” Whether his replacement is Charles Burlingame, the plane’s captain, or David Charlebois, its first officer, is unstated. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2001] Pilots on two of the other aircraft hijacked on 9/11 are also not originally scheduled to fly that day, but are booked onto those planes shortly before September 11 (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001 and Shortly Before September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Bill Cheng, Charles Burlingame, David Charlebois Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events

Shortly Before September 11, 2001: Some Bin Laden Family Members Cross Border to Iran Several members of Osama bin Laden’s family cross into Iran on foot shortly before the 9/11 attacks. The exact number of family members that cross at this time is unknown, although 19 of bin Laden’s relatives will soon be present in Iran: one wife, seven children, and 11 grandchildren. The children are Saad, who is 20; Ossman, 17; Mohammed, 15; Fatma, 14; Hamza, 12; Iman, 9; and Bakr, 7. They are placed under virtual house arrest in a high-security compound near Tehran, “for their own safety.” The Iranian authorities will publicly deny their presence in the country, and will attempt to cut off their communications with the outside world. Al-Qaeda operatives will also be held in Iran after 9/11 (see Spring 2002). The whereabouts of the detained family members will remain unknown until November 2009, when they will contact another son of bin Laden, Omar Ossama, who is currently living in Qatar with his wife. The family will tell Omar they live as normal a life as possible, cooking meals, watching television, and reading. They will be allowed out only rarely for shopping trips. As a number of families are being held in the compound, some of the older siblings will be able to marry and have their own children. “The Iranian government did not know what to do with this large group of people that nobody else wanted, so they just kept them safe,” Omar Ossama will later say. [TIMES (LONDON), 12/23/2009] Entity Tags: Iman bin Laden, Bakr bin Laden, Hamza bin Laden, Omar Ossama bin Laden, Ossman bin Laden, Mohammed bin Laden, Fatma bin Laden, Saad bin Laden Category Tags: Warning Signs

September 10, 2001: Los Angeles FBI Office Search Assistance Comes Too Late, San Diego FBI Office Not Contacted at All FBI agent Robert Fuller began looking for Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar on September 4, 2001 (see September 4-5, 2001). Within one day, he found that Almihdhar had not stayed at the New York City hotel he listed as a destination when he arrived in the US in July 2001. Alhazmi and Almihdhar had traveled to Los Angeles on January 15, 2000. Immigation records indicated that they claimed to be destined for a Sheraton hotel in Los Angeles. On this day, Fuller drafts an investigative lead for the Los Angeles FBI office, asking that office to search Sheraton hotel records concerning any stays by Almihdhar and Alhazmi in early 2000. However, the lead is not transmitted to Los Angeles until the next day, after the 9/11 attacks have begun. The search will also turn up nothing, since neither of them stayed at a Sheraton hotel. [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002; US CONGRESS, 9/20/2002; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004; NEW YORK OBSERVER, 11/28/2004] Both men had been living in nearby San Diego for much of the previous two years. The San Diego FBI office is not notified about the need for a search until September 12, and even then, they are only provided with “sketchy” information. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/16/2001] The FBI handling agent in San Diego is certain they could have been located quickly had they known where to look. The FBI agent running the San Diego office will claim they could have easily found the two hijackers by looking their names up in the phone book (see September 11, 2001). [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 ] There is some evidence from eyewitnesses that a few days before 9/11, Almihdhar and two other hijackers are living in the same San Diego apartment that they had been living in off and on for the past two years, the address that was listed for them in the public phone book (see Early September 2001). Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khalid Almihdhar Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US

September 10, 2001: Review of Counterterrorism Legislation May Take Six Months, Says Cheney Aide Senator Dianne Feinstein (D), who, with Senator Jon Kyl (R), has sent a copy of draft legislation on counterterrorism and national defense to Vice President Cheney’s office on July 20, is told by Cheney’s top aide Lewis “Scooter” Libby on this day “that it might be another six months before he would be able to review the material.” [DIANNE FEINSTEIN, 5/17/2002; NEWSWEEK, 5/27/2002] Entity Tags: Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Jon Kyl, Dianne Feinstein Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

September 10, 2001: Alarm Bells Sound over Unusual Trading in US Stock Options Market According to CBS News, in the afternoon before the attack, “alarm bells were sounding over unusual trading in the US stock options market.” It has been documented that the CIA, the Mossad, and many other intelligence agencies monitor stock trading in real time using highly advanced programs such as Promis. Both the FBI and the Justice Department have confirmed the use of such programs for US intelligence gathering through at least this summer. This would confirm that the CIA should have had additional advance warning of imminent attacks against American and United Airlines planes. [CBS NEWS, 9/19/2001] There are even allegations that bin Laden was able to get a copy of Promis. [FOX NEWS, 10/16/2001] Entity Tags: Promis, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of Justice, Israel Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks (Mossad) Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge

Shortly Before September 11, 2001-Early Morning September 11, 2001: Two Attendants Are Assigned to Flight 77 after Not Originally Being Scheduled for This Flight

Michele Heidenberger. [Source: Family photo] At least two of the four flight attendants who will be on American Airlines Flight 77—the third plane to be hijacked—on 9/11 are not originally scheduled to be on this plane, and are only assigned to it shortly before—or early in the morning of—September 11: Michele Heidenberger regularly flies from Washington’s Reagan National Airport to Dallas. But she will tell a colleague she is working Flight 77 on 9/11 as she is building up vacation time so she can go to Italy in October. [MURPHY, 2006, PP. 42-43] Renee May is assigned to Flight 77 early in the morning of 9/11. Before she is offered the flight, American Airlines asks another attendant, Lena Brown, to take it, but Brown says she is unable to get to the airport in time. [ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, 8/9/2002; DAILY REFLECTOR, 9/11/2002] One of the pilots—either Charles Burlingame or David Charlebois—is also not originally scheduled to be on Flight 77 on September 11, and only accepts the flight shortly before then (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2001] Many of the flight attendants who will be on the other three hijacked planes are also only assigned to those flights shortly before 9/11 (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001-Early Morning September 11, 2001, Shortly Before September 11, 2001, and Shortly Before September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Renee May, Lena Brown, Michele Heidenberger Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events

September 10, 2001: NSA Intercepts: ‘The Match Begins Tomorrow’ and ‘Tomorrow Is Zero Hour’ At least two messages in Arabic are intercepted by the NSA. One states, “The match is about to begin” and the other states, “Tomorrow is zero hour.” Later reports translate the first message as, “The match begins tomorrow.” [REUTERS, 9/9/2002] The messages were sent between someone in Saudi Arabia and someone in Afghanistan. The NSA will claim that they are not translated until September 12, and that even if they had been translated in time, “they gave no clues that authorities could have acted on.” [ABC NEWS, 6/7/2002; REUTERS, 6/19/2002] Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee Bob Graham will later confirm that the messages were from al-Qaeda sources—a location or phone number—that made them a high priority, but that they were not from bin Laden or one of his top commanders. [GRAHAM AND NUSSBAUM, 2004, PP. 139] On the morning of September 12, 2001, the CIA will tell President Bush that a recently intercepted message from al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida referred to the 9/11 attacks as “zero hour,” but it is not clear if this is the same message or a different message (see September 12, 2001). These messages turn out to be only two of about 30 pre-9/11 communications from suspected al-Qaeda operatives or other militants referring to an imminent event. An anonymous official will say of these messages, including the “Tomorrow is zero hour” message: “You can’t dismiss any of them, but it does not tell you tomorrow is the day.” [REUTERS, 9/9/2002] There will be a later attempt to explain the messages away by suggesting they referred to the killing of Afghan opposition leader Ahmed Shah Massoud the day before (see September 9, 2001). [REUTERS, 10/17/2002] Entity Tags: Ahmed Shah Massoud, Al-Qaeda, National Security Agency, Abu Zubaida Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Warnings, Warning Signs, Remote Surveillance

September 10, 2001: Anti-Terrorism Meeting at WTC on 9/11 Is Canceled Silverstein Properties, Larry Silverstein’s company which took over the lease of the WTC weeks earlier (see July 24, 2001), has a meeting planned for the morning of 9/11 in it’s temporary offices on the 88th floor of the WTC North Tower, along with Port Authority officials. It is to discuss what to do in the event of a terrorist attack. However, this evening the meeting is canceled because one participant cannot attend. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/12/2001; HA'ARETZ, 11/21/2001] Of Silverstein Properties’ 160 staff, 54 are in the North Tower when it is hit, and four of them die. [GLOBE AND MAIL, 9/7/2002] Entity Tags: Larry Silverstein, Silverstein Properties, New York Port Authority Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events, WTC Investigation

September 10, 2001: US Intercepts: ‘Watch the News’ and ‘Tomorrow Will Be a Great Day for Us’ US officials later will admit American agents had infiltrated al-Qaeda cells in the US, though how many agents and how long they had been in al-Qaeda remains a mystery. On this day, electronic intercepts connected to these undercover agents hear messages such as, “Watch the news” and “Tomorrow will be a great day for us.” When asked why these messages did not lead to boosted security or warnings the next day, officials will refer to them as “needles in a haystack.” What other leads may have come from this prior to this day will not be revealed. [USA TODAY, 6/4/2002] At least until February 2002, the official story will be that the “CIA failed to penetrate al-Qaeda with a single agent.” [ABC NEWS, 2/18/2002] Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Remote Surveillance, Key Warnings, Other Possible Moles or Informants

Shortly Before September 11, 2001: More Than Half of Attendants on United 93 Are Assigned to It after Not Originally Being Scheduled for This Flight

Wanda Green. [Source: Family photo] Of the five flight attendants who will be on United Airlines Flight 93—the fourth hijacked aircraft—on 9/11, at least three are not originally scheduled to be on this flight, but are assigned to it late: Sandra Bradshaw picks “up Flight 93 late in the planning.” She trades flights with another attendant. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; GREENSBORO NEWS-RECORD, 9/3/2006] Wanda Green is originally scheduled to fly on September 13, but requests a change of shift due to commitments in her other job as a real estate agent. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 23] Deborah Welsh usually avoids early morning flights, but agrees to trade shifts with another worker. [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 10/2/2001; OBSERVER, 12/2/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/9/2006] The pilot, Jason Dahl, is also not originally meant to be on Flight 93 on September 11, but trades a trip later in the month in order to fly on that day (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001). And at least 16 of the passengers on Flight 93 only book onto it at a late date (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001-Early Morning September 11, 2001). Many of the flight attendants who will be on the other three hijacked planes are also only assigned to those flights shortly before 9/11 (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001-Early Morning September 11, 2001, Shortly Before September 11, 2001, and Shortly Before September 11, 2001-Early Morning September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Wanda Green, Debbie Welsh, Sandy Bradshaw Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events

September 10, 2001: US Generals Warned Not to Fly on Morning of 9/11 According to a Newsweek report on September 13, “[t]he state of alert had been high during the past two weeks, and a particularly urgent warning may have been received the night before the attacks, causing some top Pentagon brass to cancel a trip. Why that same information was not available to the 266 people who died aboard the four hijacked commercial aircraft may become a hot topic on the Hill.” [NEWSWEEK, 9/13/2001] Far from becoming a hot topic, the only additional media mention of this story will be in the next issue of Newsweek: “a group of top Pentagon officials suddenly canceled travel plans for the next morning, apparently because of security concerns.” [NEWSWEEK, 9/24/2001] Category Tags: Warning Signs, Key Warnings

September 10, 2001: Atta Allegedly Visits the WTC to Enter Coordinates Into GPS Device; One Report Claims Mistaken Identity Credit card receipts later discovered by the FBI apparently show that alleged lead hijacker Mohamed Atta is in Manhattan on this day. According to FBI agents, he visits the observation deck on the 107th floor of the south WTC tower. CNN will report, “Officials speculate Atta may have been in New York… to program the towers’ location into a global positioning system.” A global positioning system (GPS) uses satellite technology to pinpoint any location on Earth. According to the FBI, Atta bought himself such a device, costing about $500, by mail order. [ABC NEWS, 5/22/2002; CNN, 5/22/2002] Investigators will reportedly consider this trip necessary, “because they believe the hijackers were too inexperienced to handle the jumbo jets without help.” [NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, 5/22/2002] BBC reporter Jane Corbin points out that Atta was also witnessed at Boston’s Logan Airport the previous morning (see September 9, 2001), where he could have entered start-point co-ordinates for his 9/11 flight into the GPS device. [CORBIN, 2003, PP. 230] However, there is no mention of Atta’s New York visit in the 9/11 Commission Report. According to FBI Director Robert Mueller, Atta spent the previous night at the Milner Hotel in Boston, and then shortly after noon on this day is in Boston where he picks up Abdulaziz Alomari and drives to Portland, Maine. [US CONGRESS, 9/26/2002] The 200-mile journey from Boston to New York takes approximately four hours by car. [MIT, 5/25/2006] So if Mueller’s account is correct, it seems difficult to comprehend Atta having time to travel to New York, go up the WTC, make purchases on his credit card, and then return to Boston, all in the space of one morning. An article in the New York Post will in fact claim that the person in Manhattan was “a distinguished renal and gene specialist at Johns Hopkins University Hospital” in Baltimore, Maryland. This man, who is also called Mohamed Atta, happened to have visited New York in the days before 9/11, “for a whirlwind weekend with his new bride.” The article claims that it had erroneously been reported that alleged hijacker Mohamed Atta “was casing the Twin Towers days before Sept. 11—even after the FBI concluded it was just the kidney doctor, who had planned to take his wife to Windows on the World for dinner in the North Tower.” [NEW YORK POST, 5/28/2002] Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Mohamed Atta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta

Before September 11, 2001: US Military’s Special Forces Never Used Against Al-Qaeda Before 9/11 The US military never uses its elite units to hunt bin Laden or any other al-Qaeda leaders. US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is said to have less than 1000 operatives, mainly Navy Seals and Army Delta Force, which are the most trained and qualified personnel in the US for hunting fugitives. Professor Richard Shultz at Tufts University’s Fletcher School will be commissioned by the Pentagon shortly after 9/11 to research why such special forces were not used before 9/11 to hunt bin Laden or other al-Qaeda leaders. He will find that US military leaders always said they needed better intelligence. They did a lot of planning but took no action. Shultz will say, “It’s your strike force, and yet it was never used once for its primary mission before Sept. 11.” JSOC forces will have more successes after 9/11, including playing roles in the capture of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006 (see June 8, 2006). [SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, 3/2/2007] Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Richard Shultz, Al-Qaeda, Delta Force, Navy Seals, Special Operations Command Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden

Shortly Before September 11, 2001-Early Morning September 11, 2001: Four Attendants Are Assigned to Flight 11 after Not Originally Being Scheduled for This Flight

Jeffrey Collman. [Source: Family photo] At least four of the nine flight attendants who will be on American Airlines Flight 11—the first plane to hit the World Trade Center—on 9/11 are not originally scheduled to be on this flight, but are assigned to it shortly before September 11 or early in the morning of 9/11: Jeffrey Collman does not “normally work the Boston-to-Los Angeles route but [makes] an exception to get vacation time at the end of the month.” [SEATTLE TIMES, 9/17/2001] Barbara “Bobbi” Arestegui accepts extra shifts as she is saving up her earned vacation time. [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/18/2001; CAPE COD TIMES, 9/10/2002; CAPE COD TIMES, 9/11/2006] Jean Roger is on a “standby” work list in September 2001. Someone calls in sick the morning of 9/11 and she takes their place. [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 9/15/2001; BOSTON GLOBE, 9/9/2003] Sara Low is “not originally scheduled to work” Flight 11. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/25/2001] John Ogonowski, the plane’s pilot, is also not originally scheduled to be on Flight 11, but requests to fly it shortly before September 11 (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001). [GEORGETOWN RECORD, 9/18/2003] Many of the flight attendants on the other three hijacked planes are also only assigned to those flights shortly before 9/11 (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001, Shortly Before September 11, 2001-Early Morning September 11, 2001, and Shortly Before September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Jeffrey Collman, Jean Roger, Sara Low, Barbara Arestegui Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events

Before September 11, 2001: NEADS Staff Briefed on Possibility of Plane Hitting WTC Staff members at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) are apparently briefed on the possibility of terrorists deliberately crashing a plane into the World Trade Center. According to author Lynn Spencer, when Trey Murphy—a former US Marine who is now a weapons controller at NEADS—first sees the television footage on September 11 showing that a plane has hit the WTC, the news will bring to mind one of his briefings: “What if a terrorist flies an airplane with a weapon of mass destruction into the World Trade Center? It had always been one of the military’s big fears.… [T]he image on the [television] screen certainly reminded him of his briefing.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 179] It is also later reported that, in the two years prior to 9/11, NORAD conducts exercises simulating terrorists crashing hijacked aircraft into targets that include the WTC (see Between September 1999 and September 10, 2001). [USA TODAY, 4/18/2004] Yet, in May 2002, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice will claim, “I don’t think anybody could have predicted that these people would take an airplane and slam it into the World Trade Center… that they would try to use an airplane as a missile, a hijacked airplane as a missile” (see May 16, 2002). [WHITE HOUSE, 5/16/2002] And in 2004, NORAD commander General Ralph Eberhart will say, “Regrettably, the tragic events of 9/11 were never anticipated or exercised.” [USA TODAY, 4/18/2004] Entity Tags: Trey Murphy, World Trade Center, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, US Air Security

September 10, 2001: Intelligence Intercepts Show Al-Qaeda Agents Ordered to Return to Afghanistan by This Date In a major post-9/11 speech, British Prime Minister Tony Blair will claim that “shortly before September 11, bin Laden told associates that he had a major operation against America under preparation, [and] a range of people were warned to return back to Afghanistan because of action on or around September 11.” His claims will come from a British document of telephone intercepts and interrogations revealing al-Qaeda orders to return to Afghanistan by September 10. [CNN, 10/4/2001; TIME, 10/5/2001] However, Blair may have the direction incorrect, since would-be hijacker Ramzi bin al-Shibh later will claim that he is the one who passes to bin Laden the date the attacks will happen and warns others to evacuate. [AUSTRALIAN, 9/9/2002] Entity Tags: Tony Blair, Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, Ramzi bin al-Shibh Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Remote Surveillance

September 10, 2001: President Bush Arrives at Longboat Key Resort; Tight Overnight Security Includes Surface-to-Air Missiles At 6:30 p.m., President Bush arrives at the Colony Beach and Tennis Resort on Longboat Key, Florida. [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 13; SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, 9/10/2002] He is in Florida as part of a weeklong effort to place a national spotlight on education and reading, and visited a school in Jacksonville earlier in the day. [ABC NEWS, 9/10/2001; FLORIDA TIMES-UNION (JACKSONVILLE), 9/10/2001] In preparation for the president’s visit to the resort, all guests have been cleared out of the building “to make way for the invasion of White House staffers, aides, communications technicians—even an antiterrorism unit.” Overnight, snipers and surface-to-air missiles are located on the roof of the Colony and adjacent structures, to protect the president. “The Coast Guard and the Longboat Key Police Department manned boats that patrolled the surf in front of the resort all night. Security trucks with enough men and arms to stop a small army parked right on the beach. An Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) plane circled high overhead in the clear night sky.” [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 13 AND 25; SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, 9/10/2002] Whether this is a typical level of security for a presidential visit, or is increased due to recent terror warnings, is unstated. Entity Tags: George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events

September 10, 2001: WTC Leaseholder’s Publicist Cancels 9/11 Appointment at Trade Center

Howard Rubinstein. [Source: Rubenstein Public Relations] Howard Rubenstein cancels a meeting he had scheduled at the World Trade Center for the morning of September 11. Rubenstein, a famous public relations man for powerful New Yorkers, has represented Larry Silverstein, the World Trade Center leaseholder (see July 24, 2001), for many years. [DAILY DEAL, 6/7/2004] He will later recount how a staff meeting at his own firm requires him to cancel a meeting he has scheduled for the morning of 9/11 with John O’Neill, who was recently appointed as director of security at the World Trade Center (see August 23, 2001): “The Monday before the Tuesday, I get a call from John O’Neill.… He said, ‘Why don’t you come down on 9/11, come to a breakfast meeting at 8:00, where we’ll talk about what we’re doing to prevent terror attacks?’ So I said, ‘Okay.’ And he said, ‘Bring your staff, two people.’ I said that’s fine, because we were then representing the World Trade Center. Then I thought about it on Monday, and I called him, I said, ‘I have a staff meeting on Tuesday, do you mind if I don’t go?’ He said, ‘No, send somebody.’ I said, ‘But that somebody is also at my staff meeting.’ He said come at 9:00 instead of 8:00.” Rubenstein’s cancellation of this meeting appears to save his life. He will recall that, the morning of 9/11: “I’m sitting in my staff meeting, and my secretary runs in and said the World Trade Center just got hit, and you were supposed to be there. Everyone at that breakfast meeting died, including John O’Neill.” [PBS, 7/15/2004] After the attacks, Rubenstein and his firm, Rubenstein Associates, will play a leading role in publicizing Larry Silverstein’s legal claims against several insurance companies (see September 12, 2001). [PR WEEK, 2/10/2003] Entity Tags: John O’Neill, Howard Rubenstein Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events

September 10, 2001: NORAD Setting Stage for Major Exercise, Preparing for Possible Russian Reaction The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which is responsible for detecting and responding to any attack on the mainland United States, is in the early stages of a major training exercise called Vigilant Guardian that is to take place off the shores of the northeastern US and Canada. The exercise is not scheduled to really take off until the following day, September 11 (see (6:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but simulated intelligence briefings and meetings are now being held to set the stage for the mock engagements to come. According to author Lynn Spencer, Vigilant Guardian “is the kind of war game that the Russians usually respond to, even in this post-Cold War era.” The Russians have in fact announced that they will be deploying aircraft to several of their “Northern Tier” bases on September 11. Russian jets have penetrated North American airspace during previous NORAD exercises, and Colonel Robert Marr, the commander of NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), has prepared for them to do so again during the current exercise. If this happens, armed US fighter jets will intercept the Russian aircraft and escort them back to their own territory. In case there is any confrontation, Marr has ordered that his alert fighter jets be loaded with additional fuel and weapons. According to Spencer, on September 11, all alert fighters will be “loaded with live missiles in anticipation of any show of force that might be needed to respond to the Russians.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 3-5] NORAD has already announced that it is deploying fighters to Alaska and Northern Canada to monitor a Russian air force exercise being conducted in the Russian Arctic and North Pacific Ocean throughout this week (see September 9-11, 2001). [BBC, 2001, PP. 161; NORAD, 9/9/2001] According to the 9/11 Commission, the Vigilant Guardian exercise will in fact postulate “a bomber attack from the former Soviet Union.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 458] Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Robert Marr, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Vigilant Guardian Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Military Exercises

September 10, 2001: Training Exercise Scenario at NORAD’s Southeast Sector Involves Cubans Hijacking Plane, Wanting to Go to New York Personnel at NORAD’s Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS) at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, practice for the scenario of an aircraft being hijacked by Cuban asylum seekers. The scenario is part of the annual NORAD training exercise, Vigilant Guardian. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 3] In the scenario, the fictitious hijackers take over an Ilyushin IL-62 jet airliner that took off from Havana, Cuba. The hijackers, who are “demanding political asylum, demand to be taken to” New York City, according to a document later produced by the 9/11 Commission. As the scenario plays out, the FAA requests support from NORAD. The FAA directs the plane toward Jacksonville, Florida, but the hijackers then demand to be taken to Atlanta, Georgia. Finally, the hijacked plane lands safely at Dobbins Air Force Base in Georgia. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2004] The following morning, September 11, personnel at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) in Rome, New York, are scheduled to practice what is apparently a similar plane hijacking scenario, presumably as part of the same Vigilant Guardian exercise (see (9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to Vanity Fair, that scenario will involve “politically motivated perpetrators” seeking asylum “on a Cuba-like island.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Southeast Air Defense Sector, Federal Aviation Administration, Vigilant Guardian Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Military Exercises

September 10, 2001: Dallas Fifth Grader Forecasts World War III A fifth grader in Dallas, Texas, casually tells his teacher, “Tomorrow, World War III will begin. It will begin in the United States, and the United States will lose.” The teacher reports the comment to the FBI, but does not know if they act on it at the time. The student skips the next two days of school. The event may be completely coincidental, but the newspaper that reports the story also notes that two charities, Holy Land Foundation and InfoCom, located in an adjacent suburb have been under investigation based on suspected fund-raising activities for Islamic militant organizations. One InfoCom employee had his name in the telephone book of Wadih El-Hage, bin Laden’s personal secretary, and he was seen with El-Hage as recently as 1998 (see September 16, 1998-September 5, 2001). [HOUSTON CHRONICLE, 9/19/2001] The FBI investigates and decides “no further investigation [is] warranted.” [HOUSTON CHRONICLE, 10/1/2001] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge, Wadih El-Hage

September 10, 2001: Chief US Al-Qaeda Prosecutor Warns Friend Al-Qaeda Will Hit US Again Patrick Fitzgerald was involved in the prosecution of all the major al-Qaeda legal cases in the US before 9/11. Just before 9/11, he switched to prosecuting political corruption cases and will later become known for prosecuting the leak of CIA agent Valerie Plame’s identity. On this day, he sends an e-mail to a colleague who is also switching from working on terrorism cases. He writes, “You can’t leave, they’re going to hit us again and someone has got to be around to work it.” [OBSERVER, 2/12/2006] Entity Tags: Patrick Fitzgerald Category Tags: Warning Signs

September 10, 2001: Army School Peacekeeping Report Says Mossad Can Target US Forces with False Flag Attacks A group of second-year students at the Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) produces a 68-page plan for sending peacekeepers to Israel in the event that the Israelis and Palestinians agree to a peace plan and the creation of a Palestinian state. Though the cover of the report indicates that the report has been written for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Maj. Chris Garver, a Fort Leavenworth spokesman, says that it was only an academic exercise. An article about the report appears in the Washington Times on September 10, 2001. The report refers to Israel’s armed forces as a “500-pound gorilla in Israel” that is “well armed and trained” and is “known to disregard international law to accomplish mission.” Of the Mossad, the report says: “Wildcard. Ruthless and cunning. Has capability to target US forces and make it look like a Palestinian/Arab act.” It describes Palestinian youths as “loose cannons; under no control, sometimes violent.” The SAMS officers write that US goals for the first 30 days of such a mission would be to “create conditions for development of Palestinian State and security of Israel”; ensure “equal distribution of contract value or equivalent aid” that would help legitimize the peacekeeping force and stimulate economic growth; “promote US investment in Palestine”; “encourage reconciliation between entities based on acceptance of new national identities”; and “build lasting relationship based on new legal borders and not religious-territorial claims.” [WASHINGTON TIMES, 9/10/2001] Entity Tags: Chris Garver, Army School of Advanced Military Studies Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks Category Tags: Israel

September 10, 2001: Suspicious Passengers on Flight to Boston Ask about WTC The night before 9/11, two men are observed behaving suspiciously on a United Airlines flight from San Diego to Boston. This is according Elaine Lawrence, who is one of the plane’s flight attendants. She later recalls that the men—one who appears Middle Eastern, the other Caucasian—upgrade from coach to first class, and then sit “on the left side of the plane, seats 3A and 3B,” near the cockpit door. She will comment: “It was really weird. They didn’t eat, they didn’t sleep, they didn’t watch the movie. Why upgrade?” Furthermore, she recalls: “[W]hen we were getting close to Boston they asked if we could see the World Trade Center towers. ‘Do we see the towers?’ the guy kept asking. I told him we wouldn’t be going by New York.” After the attacks the following day, she will call the FBI and inform them of this incident. Lawrence was in fact originally scheduled to be an attendant on Flight 175—the second plane to hit the WTC—on 9/11. However, as she is planning to go on vacation, she has traded shifts with another flight attendant, Amy Jarret (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001). [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 10/23/2001] Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Elaine Lawrence Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs

September 10, 2001: New Jersey Student Warns Teacher to Stay Away from Lower Manhattan A sixth-grade student of Middle Eastern descent in Jersey City, New Jersey, says something that alarms his teacher at Martin Luther King Jr. Elementary School. “Essentially, he [warns] her to stay away from lower Manhattan because something bad [is] going to happen,” says Sgt. Edgar Martinez, deputy director of police services for the Jersey City Police Department. [INSIGHT, 9/10/2002] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge

September 10, 2001: New WTC Security Director Warns of Danger of ‘Something Big’ John O’Neill, who is later described by the New Yorker magazine as the FBI’s “most committed tracker of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network of terrorists,” recently retired from the bureau and started a new job as director of security at the World Trade Center (see August 23, 2001). [NEW YORKER, 1/14/2002] On this day he meets up with his old friend Raymond Powers, the former New York Police Department chief of operations, to discuss security procedures. Their conversation turns to Osama bin Laden. According to journalist and author Murray Weiss, “just as he had reiterated since 1995 to any official in Washington who would listen, O’Neill said he was sure bin Laden would attack on American soil, and expected him to target the Twin Towers again.” He says to Powers, “It’s going to happen, and it looks like something big is brewing.” [WEISS, 2003, PP. 355 AND 359-360] Later on, O’Neill goes out in the evening with his friends Robert Tucker and Jerome Hauer. Again, he starts discussing bin Laden. He tells his friends, “We’re due. And we’re due for something big.” He says, “Some things have happened in Afghanistan. I don’t like the way things are lining up in Afghanistan.” This is probably a reference to the assassination of Afghan leader Ahmed Shah Massoud the previous day (see September 9, 2001). He adds, “I sense a shift, and I think things are going to happen.” Asked when, he replies, “I don’t know, but soon.” [NEW YORKER, 1/14/2002; PBS, 10/3/2002] O’Neill will be in his office on the 34th floor of the South Tower the following morning when the first attack occurs, and dies when the WTC collapses. [WEISS, 2003, PP. 366; FOX NEWS, 8/31/2004] Entity Tags: John O’Neill, Ahmed Shah Massoud, Jerry Hauer, World Trade Center, Raymond Powers, Osama bin Laden, Robert Tucker Category Tags: Warning Signs

September 10, 2001: Atta and Alomari Make Mysterious Trip to Portland, Maine

Hijacker Abdulaziz Alomari using an ATM in Portland, Maine, on September 10, at 8:41 p.m. Mohamed Atta can be seen further back in the first and last image. [Source: FBI] Hijackers Mohamed Atta and Abdulaziz Alomari arrive in Portland, Maine, where they spend the night. In October 2001, the FBI will release detailed information and photographs of the two hijackers in the town in an apparent attempt to find out from the public more about what they were doing there. According to the FBI, the pair leave Boston in the afternoon in a blue Nissan Altima and drive to South Portland, where they check into a Comfort Inn around 5:45 p.m. They are caught on security cameras visiting a gas station, two ATMs, and shopping at a Wal-Mart. The next morning they fly back to Boston, where they board the airplane they will hijack. [SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, 9/28/2001; BOSTON HERALD, 10/5/2001; PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, 10/5/2001; AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 11/12/2001] In September 2002, the New York Times speculates, “There have been many theories [for going to Portland]: that they made contact with a confederate in Portland who gave them the final go-ahead, or more likely, that by arriving on a connecting flight, they would avoid the security check in Boston. None of those explanations seems entirely satisfactory, given the risk….” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/11/2002] The 9/11 Commission will later speculate that the most “plausible theory” is that the hijackers make the trip so as to help avoid suspicion that might be created from all ten hijackers departing on Boston flights arriving in the Boston airport at roughly the same time. [WASHINGTON POST, 2/13/2005] Entity Tags: Comfort Inn, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mohamed Atta, 9/11 Commission, Abdulaziz Alomari Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Other 9/11 Hijackers, Key Hijacker Events

September 10, 2001: Alleged Al-Qaeda Operative Arrives in US Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, from Qatar but a legal US resident, arrives in the US with his wife and five children, reportedly to pursue a master’s degree in computer science at Bradley University in Peoria, Illinois. [PEORIA JOURNAL STAR, 12/19/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 6/21/2004] Al-Marri appears to have been sent to the US by 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM). During his interrogation, KSM will identify al-Marri as “the point of contact for al-Qaeda operatives arriving in the US for September 11 follow-on operations.” He will describe al-Marri as “the perfect sleeper agent because he has studied in the United States, had no criminal record, and had a family with whom he could travel.” [NEWSWEEK, 6/15/2003] However, there are doubts about the reliability of KSM’s interrogation, which is believed that have been obtained through the use of torture (see June 16, 2004). Al-Marri also lived in Illinois for part of 2000 under a different name. [NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, 1/11/2003] He is apparently related to Mohamed al-Khatani, who attempted to enter the US in August 2001 to join the 9/11 plot (see July 2002). [NEW YORK TIMES, 6/21/2004] In December 2001, al-Marri will be detained as a material witness to the 9/11 attacks (see December 12, 2001). Entity Tags: Mohamed al-Khatani, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events, Internal US Security After 9/11

September 10, 2001: Alleged CIA Informant Warns Syrian Government about 9/11 Attacks; Syria Apparently Fails to Pass on Warning

Luai Sakra. [Source: Associated Press] In his 2007 book At the Center of the Storm, former CIA Director George Tenet will write that on September 10, 2001, “a source we were jointly running with a Middle Eastern country went to see his foreign handler and basically told him that something big was about to go down. The handler dismissed him.” Tenet claims the warning was “frightening but without specificity.” [TENET, 2007, PP. 160] While Tenet will not mention the name of the source, his description perfectly matches a Syrian-born militant named Luai Sakra. Sakra will be arrested in Turkey in 2005 (see July 30, 2005) and reportedly will tell interrogators after his arrest, “I was one of the people who knew the 9/11 perpetrators, and I knew the plans and times beforehand.” He claims to have provided the pilots with passports and money (see September 2000-July 24, 2001). Der Spiegel will report, “Western investigators accept Sakra’s claims, by and large, since they coincide with known facts. On September 10, 2001, he tipped off the Syrian secret service… that terrorist attacks were about to occur in the United States. The evidently well-informed al-Qaeda insider even named buildings as targets, and airplanes as weapons. The Syrians passed on this information to the CIA—but only after the attacks.” [DER SPIEGEL (HAMBURG), 8/24/2005] In 2007, Sakra will also claim to have trained some of the 9/11 hijackers in Turkey starting in late 1999 (see Late 1999-2000). If Tenet is referring to Sakra, then it appears Sakra did develop a relationship with the CIA that continued at least through 9/11 (see 2000). Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, George J. Tenet, Luai Sakra, Syria Category Tags: Warning Signs, Luai Sakra, Al-Qaeda in Germany

Shortly Before September 11, 2001: Pilot of Flight 93 Not Originally Scheduled for that Flight, but Trades Shifts Pilot Jason Dahl, who will be at the controls of United Airlines Flight 93—the fourth hijacked aircraft—on 9/11, is not originally scheduled for that flight, but wants to get in extra hours so he can take time off work for his fifth wedding anniversary on September 14. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2006] Therefore, some time shortly before 9/11, he trades a trip later in September in order to fly September 11. [DENVER POST, 12/16/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 1] Yet the week before September 11, he sends out an e-mail seeking another pilot to take his place, so he can have that day with his family. [ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, 9/12/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/15/2001; SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 9/17/2001] Pilots on two of the other aircraft hijacked on 9/11 are also not originally scheduled to fly that day, but are booked onto those planes shortly before September 11 (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001 and Shortly Before September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Jason Dahl Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events

September 10, 2001: Suspicious Trading on United Airlines Stock Occurs at Pacific Exchange The trading ratio on United Airlines is 25 times greater than normal at the Pacific Exchange. Pacific Exchange officials later decline to state whether this abnormality is being investigated. [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 9/19/2001] Entity Tags: United Airlines, Pacific Exchange Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge

Shortly Before September 11, 2001-Early Morning September 11, 2001: About Half of Flight 93 Passengers Book onto Plane at Last Minute

Alan Beaven. [Source: Family photo / AP] Of the 33 passengers (excluding the four hijackers) who are on board Flight 93 on September 11, at least 16 are not originally booked on this flight, but arrange to be on it very shortly before 9/11, or—in some cases—on the morning of 9/11 itself: Environmental lawyer Alan Beaven arranges to take Flight 93 to San Francisco the day before 9/11, as he is duty-bound to go there to help settle a case after talks have just broken down. [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 9/17/2001; SACRAMENTO BEE, 9/30/2001] Todd Beamer would normally have flown the night of September 10, as he has a business meeting scheduled for later in the day of 9/11. But he delays his flight, as he wants some time with his children after returning from a trip to Italy. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2006] He usually flies Continental Airlines, but chooses United to save his company money. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 18] Edward Felt also usually flies Continental Airlines, but books himself onto Flight 93 at the last minute after his company gives him short notice of a meeting he needs to attend in San Francisco. [NEW JERSEY STAR-LEDGER, 9/15/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 194] Mark Bingham should be flying on September 10, but delays his flight as he has a hangover after a friend’s birthday party. [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 9/17/2001; NEWSWEEK, 9/27/2001] Deora Bodley is originally scheduled to fly from Newark to San Francisco on September 11 on United Airlines Flight 91. [SACRAMENTO BEE, 9/14/2001] She decides on the night of September 10 to switch to Flight 93, as its departure time is more than an hour earlier. [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 9/17/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001] Lauren Grandcolas is booked on Flight 91, but on September 11 arrives early at the airport and switches to Flight 93. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 12; MSNBC, 9/11/2006] Husband and wife Donald and Jean Peterson are booked on Flight 91, but also arrive early and switch to Flight 93. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 13 AND 16] Christine Snyder calls the airport early in the morning of September 11 and transfers from Flight 91 to Flight 93 for an earlier start. [PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001] Tom Burnett is scheduled for a later flight, but switches to Flight 93 to get home earlier. [KNIGHT RIDDER, 9/14/2001] According to journalist and author Jere Longman, he too is originally booked on Flight 91. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 8] But the San Francisco Chronicle says he is originally booked on a Delta Airlines flight in the afternoon of 9/11. [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 9/17/2001] Georgine Corrigan switches flights when she checks in at the airport early in the morning of 9/11, so as to get home sooner; her original plane would make two stops on the way to San Francisco, but Flight 93 is non-stop. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 12; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/9/2006] Jeremy Glick should be on a flight the night of September 10. According to some accounts there are problems due to a fire at Newark Airport. [DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 9/17/2001] The flight is rerouted to JFK Airport in New York and is due to arrive in California at 3:00 a.m., which does not suit Glick. [MSNBC, 9/11/2006] But according to Newsweek, Glick is originally due to take Flight 93 on September 10, but misses it after getting stuck in traffic on the way to the airport. [NEWSWEEK, 9/22/2001] Nicole Miller’s original flight the night of September 10 is canceled due to a thunderstorm. [SARATOGA NEWS, 9/26/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 55] She is then unable to get a seat on the same flight as her close friend Ryan Brown, as this is full, so takes Flight 93 instead. [TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL, 10/20/2002; MSNBC, 9/11/2006] Toy-company executive Lou Nacke is called by his boss the evening of September 10 and told to take the first plane to San Francisco, in order to help a customer. [NEWSWEEK, 9/27/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 124] In the few days prior to September 11, sisters-in-law Patricia Cushing and Jane Folger move forward the time of their flight. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 33 AND 35] Flight 93’s pilot is not originally meant to be flying on September 11 (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001), and at least three of the flight attendants are also assigned to Flight 93 at a late date (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001). The 37 passengers (including the four hijackers) that are on board constitute just 20 percent of the plane’s passenger capacity of 182. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 36 ] Entity Tags: Deora Bodley, Patricia Cushing, Todd Beamer, Tom Burnett, Christine Snyder, Nicole Miller, Mark Bingham, Alan Beaven, Lauren Grandcolas, Lou Nacke, Edward Felt, Georgine Corrigan, Donald Peterson, Jean Peterson, Jane Folger, Jeremy Glick Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events

Around 8:15 p.m. September 10, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Apparently Attempt to Penetrate Secure Area at Dulles Airport A group of five Arabs attempts to penetrate a secure area leading to parked aircraft at Washington’s Dulles Airport. However, they are seen by two security guards, Eric Gill and Nicolas de Silva. Gill, who will later identify two of the men as 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Marwan Alshehhi, notices they approach a door to the secure area in a suspicious manner and that only three of them are dressed as United Airlines ramp workers and have the correct passes. Gill, a Pakistani, prevents the two without passes from entering the secure area, and realizes that he does not recognize the other three, and that their uniforms are unusually dirty for United employees. The men tell Gill to “f_ck off” and say that they are “important people,” but Gill still refuses to let the two without passes enter, and eventually all five men retreat. Gill goes off duty at 10:00 p.m. and his supervisor will comment after 9/11, “If someone wanted access to the aircraft, say to plant weapons, it would have been easy for the group Eric saw to come back after he got off duty and simply use the ID cards they had to activate the electronic lock and slip through.” Reporters Joe and Susan Trento, who break this story, will be unable to interview another security guard, Khalid Mahmoud, who was guarding the next door, as he will be immediately taken by the INS after 9/11 and presumably deported. De Silva has a poor memory for faces and will recall the incident happening, but will not be able to identify any of the Arabs. The FBI and 9/11 Commission will apparently not place much weight on Gill’s identification of the hijackers, as Alshehhi is believed to be in Boston at this time (see Afternoon September 11, 2001). [TRENTO AND TRENTO, 2006, PP. 2-6, 44-5] However, Alshehhi checks out of his hotel on this date and his last recorded action in Boston is before noon, so he may have flown to Dulles in the afternoon and could return by the following morning (see September 10, 2001). An INS employee will tell journalist Seymour Hersh that guns were placed on the planes on 9/11 (see After 11:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). Security cameras record two of the hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and possibly Salem Alhazmi, at Dulles this same day, but it is unclear whether their presence is related to this incident. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 281 ] Entity Tags: Salem Alhazmi, Nawaf Alhazmi, Nicolas De Silva, Khalid Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, Eric Gill Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, Other 9/11 Hijackers

Before September 11, 2001: ‘We’re Ready to Go’ and ‘Big Thing Coming’ Intercepts Not Analyzed Until After 9/11 Though the NSA specializes in intercepting communications, the CIA and FBI intercept as well. After 9/11, CIA and FBI officials will discover messages with phrases like, “There is a big thing coming,” “they’re going to pay the price,” and “We’re ready to go.” Supposedly, most or all of these intercepted messages will not be analyzed until after 9/11. [NEWSWEEK, 10/1/2001] Entity Tags: National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Remote Surveillance

Before September 11, 2001: US Government Knows of Taliban, Saudi, and Pakistan Connections, but Does Nothing In June 2004, future 9/11 Commissioner Bob Kerrey will say that before 9/11, “There’s no question the Taliban was getting money from the Saudis… and there’s no question they got much more than that from the Pakistani government. Their motive is a secondary issue for us.” He claims this finding is based almost entirely on information known to the US government before 9/11. “All we’re doing is looking at classified documents from our own government, not from some magical source. So we knew what was going on, but we did nothing.” [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 7/16/2004] However, the 9/11 Commission will leave such material out of its final report and in fact make the claim in its last staff statement, “There is no convincing evidence that any government financially supported al-Qaeda before 9/11.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/16/2004] Entity Tags: Taliban, 9/11 Commission, Bush administration, Al-Qaeda, Saudi Binladin Group, Pakistan Category Tags: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the ISI, Terrorism Financing

Before September 11, 2001: Tenet Said to Warn Congresspeople about Imminent Attack on the US

Ike Skelton. [Source: Publicity photo] On the morning of 9/11, David Welna, National Public Radio’s Congressional correspondent, will say, “I spoke with Congressman Ike Skelton—a Democrat from Missouri and a member of the Armed Services Committee—who said that just recently the Director of the CIA [George Tenet] warned that there could be an attack—an imminent attack—on the United States of this nature. So this is not entirely unexpected.” More details, such as when Tenet said this, who else he may have said it to, and so forth, remain unknown. [NPR, 9/11/2001] Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Ike Skelton Category Tags: Warning Signs, Key Warnings

Before September 11, 2001: Atta E-mails US Defense Contractor Employees At some point, a man later believed to be Marwan Alshehhi buys a pilot’s headset from Eastern Avionics, a vendor at the Charlotte County Airport in Punta Gorda, Florida (see (2000-August 2001)). Subsequently, in the months leading up to 9/11, the salesperson receives e-mails, which may have been sent by Mohamed Atta as part of a mass mailing. Some are in Arabic, and appear to express Muslim concerns, with one including a photo taken in the Middle East of a dead child. After 9/11, the FBI will take hold of all these e-mails. The local sheriff will point out that there are some other people’s e-mail addresses that can be gleaned from the messages, although the FBI never publicly reveals the identities of these individuals. [CHARLOTTE SUN, 9/21/2001; CHARLOTTE SUN, 10/2/2001; NBC 2 (FORT MYERS), 4/24/2002] Investigative reporter Daniel Hopsicker, who later obtains copies of the e-mails, will report that some of the 40 or so addresses Atta sent to belong to employees of US defense contractors. [ATTA, 4/24/2002; HOPSICKER, 2004, PP. 104-105] Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Daniel Hopsicker Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta

Before September 11, 2001: Echelon Intelligence Network Used on Al-Qaeda

An Echelon station in Menwith Hill, Britain. [Source: BBC] By the 1980s, a high-tech global electronic surveillance network shared between the US, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand is gathering intelligence all over the world. The BBC describes Echelon’s power as “astounding,” and elaborates: “Every international telephone call, fax, e-mail, or radio transmission can be listened to by powerful computers capable of voice recognition. They home in on a long list of key words, or patterns of messages. They are looking for evidence of international crime, like terrorism.” [BBC, 11/3/1999] One major focus for Echelon before 9/11 is al-Qaeda. For instance, one account mentions Echelon intercepting al-Qaeda communications in Southeast Asia in 1996 (see Before September 11, 2001). A staff member of the National Security Council who regularly attends briefings on bin Laden states, “We are probably tapped into every hotel room in Pakistan. We can listen in to just about every phone call in Afghanistan.” However, he and other critics will claim one reason why US intelligence failed to stop terrorism before 9/11 was because there was too much of a focus on electronic intelligence gathering and not enough focus on human interpretation of that vast data collection. [TORONTO STAR, 2/2/2002] Entity Tags: United Kingdom, United States, Osama bin Laden, Echelon, National Security Council, Canada, Australia, Al-Qaeda, New Zealand Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, Civil Liberties Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11, Remote Surveillance

Before September 11, 2001: Hijackers Drink Alcohol and Watch Strip Shows, Especially towards Eve of Attacks

Cheetah’s nude bar in San Diego. [Source: Cheetah's] A number of the hijackers apparently drink alcohol heavily in bars, sleep with prostitutes, and watch strip shows in the US in the months and especially the days leading up to 9/11. In late February 2001, hijacker Ziad Jarrah frequents a strip club in Jacksonville, Florida (see February 25-March 4, 2001). In July 2001, hijackers Hamza Alghamdi and Marwan Alshehhi make two purchases of “pornographic video and sex toys” from a Florida store (see July 4-27, 2001). Some hijackers, including possibly Satam Al Suqami and Waleed and Wail Alshehri, sleep with prostitutes in the days before 9/11 (see September 7-11, 2001). On September 10, three hijacker associates spend $200 to $300 apiece on lap dances and drinks in the Pink Pony, a Daytona Beach, Florida strip club. While the hijackers had left Florida by this time, Mohamed Atta is reported to have visited the same strip club, and these men appear to have had foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks (see September 10, 2001). [BOSTON HERALD, 10/10/2001] Marwan Alshehhi and Mohamed Atta are seen entering the Hollywood, Florida, sports bar Shuckums already drunk. They proceed to drink even more hard alcohol there (see September 7, 2001). Atta and Alshehhi are seen at Sunrise 251, a bar in Palm Beach, Florida. They spend $1,000 in 45 minutes on Krug and Perrier-Jouet champagne. Atta is with a tall busty brunette in her late twenties; Alshehhi is with a shortish blonde. Both women are known locally as regular companions of high-rollers. [DAILY MAIL, 9/16/2001] A stripper at the Olympic Garden Topless Cabaret in Las Vegas, Nevada, later recalls Marwan Alshehhi being “cheap,” paying only $20 for a lap dance. [COX NEWS SERVICE, 10/16/2001] Several hijackers reportedly patronize the Nardone’s Go-Go Bar in Elizabeth, New Jersey. They are even seen there on the weekend before 9/11. [BOSTON HERALD, 10/10/2001; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/16/2001] Majed Moqed visits a porn shop on three occasions and rents a porn video. The mayor of Paterson, New Jersey, later says of the six hijackers who stayed there, “Nobody ever saw them at mosques, but they liked the go-go clubs.” [NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001; NEWSWEEK, 10/15/2001] Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar often frequent Cheetah’s, a nude bar in San Diego. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/1/2002] Marwan Alshehhi is possibly seen in the Cheetah nightclub in Pompado Beach, Florida, on July 1, 2001. Six dancers who work there later claim to have seen him. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 173 ] Hamza Alghamdi watches a porn video on September 10. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/16/2001] Temple University in Philadelphia professor Mahmoud Mustafa Ayoub will later comment: “It is incomprehensible that a person could drink and go to a strip bar one night, then kill themselves the next day in the name of Islam.… People who would kill themselves for their faith would come from very strict Islamic ideology. Something here does not add up.” [SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, 9/16/2001] Entity Tags: Hamza Alghamdi, Majed Moqed, Khalid Almihdhar, Mahmoud Mustafa Ayoub, Ziad Jarrah, Satam Al Suqami, Marwan Alshehhi, Nawaf Alhazmi, Waleed M. Alshehri, Wail Alshehri, Mohamed Atta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Other 9/11 Hijackers

Before September 11, 2001: Three Countries Hear Bin Laden Tell Wife to Return to Afghanistan; This Warning Sets Off ‘Scramble’ in US and Elsewhere A month after 9/11, the New York Times will report: “Interpreting intercepted communications, which are cryptic and in code, and sorting through all the rumors present a formidable challenge. One intercept before the Sept. 11 attack was, according to two senior intelligence officials, the first early warning of the assault and it set off a scramble by American and other intelligence agencies. In that call, Mr. bin Laden advised his wife in Syria to come back to Afghanistan. That message, which was intercepted by the intelligence services of more than one country, was passed on to the United States, officials from three countries said.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/21/2001] bin Laden apparently makes a similar phone call to his stepmother in Syria on September 9, 2001 (see September 9, 2001). Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Republic of Georgia Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, Foreign Intelligence Warnings, Remote Surveillance, Key Warnings

Before September 11, 2001: US Government Prepares for Hijackings, Some of Them Involving Multiple Planes Based on interviews with FBI officials, the New Yorker will report that, for several years prior to 9/11, the US government plans for “simulated terrorist attacks, including scenarios [involving] multiple-plane hijackings.” This presumably refers to more than just the Amalgam Virgo 02 exercise (see July 2001), which is based on the scenario of two planes being simultaneously hijacked. [NEW YORKER, 9/24/2001] Similarly, NORAD will state that before 9/11, it normally conducts four major exercises each year at headquarters level. Most of them include a hijack scenario, and some of them are apparently quite similar to the 9/11 attacks (see Between 1991 and 2001 and Between September 1999 and September 10, 2001). [USA TODAY, 4/18/2004; CNN, 4/19/2004] According to author Lynn Spencer, before September 11, “To prepare for their missions in support of NORAD, the Air National Guard pilots—some of the finest pilots in the world—often use hijacking scenarios to train for intercept tactics.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 84-85] John Arquilla, an associate professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, later says that while “No one knew specifically that 20 people would hijack four airliners and use them for suicide attacks against major buildings… the idea of such an attack was well known, [and] had been war gamed as a possibility in exercises before Sept. 11.” [MONTEREY COUNTY HERALD, 7/18/2002] Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, United States, Air National Guard, John Arquilla Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: US Air Security, Military Exercises

Just Before September 11, 2001: US Has Only 32 Air Marshals and None on Domestic Flights The number of US air marshals (specially trained, plainclothes armed federal agents deployed on airliners) has shrunk from about 2,000 during the Cold War to 32 by 9/11. None are deployed on domestic flights. The number is later increased to about 2,000, but it would take about 120,000 marshals at a cost of $10 billion a year to protect all daily flights to, from, or within the US. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 1/14/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 85] Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Just Before September 11, 2001: Key Counterterrorism Position Still Unfilled The position of Deputy Secretary for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, the Defense Department post traditionally dealing the most with counterterrorism, still has not been filled since being vacated in January 2001 when Bush became president. Aides to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld later tell the 9/11 Commission that “the new [Defense Department] team was focused on other issues” and not counterterrorism. [NEWSWEEK, 3/24/2004] Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, US Department of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, Central Intelligence Agency Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Just Before September 11, 2001: Deputies Still Putting Final Touches on Three-Year Plan to Stop Al-Qaeda Another deputies meeting further considers policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, and makes further revisions to the National Security Presidential Directive regarding al-Qaeda. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/24/2004] By the end of the meeting, a formal, three-phase strategy is agreed upon. An envoy is to go to Afghanistan and give the Taliban another chance to expel bin Laden. If this fails, more pressure will be put on the Taliban, including more support for the Northern Alliance and other groups. If the Taliban still refuse to change, the US will try to overthrow the Taliban through more direct action. The time-frame for this strategy is about three years. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/24/2004] CIA Director Tenet is formally tasked to draw up new authorities for the covert action program envisioned, and request funding to implement it. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/24/2004] The directive is then to be sent to National Security Adviser Rice for approval. President Bush is apparently aware of the directive and prepared to sign it (though he hasn’t attended any of the meetings about it), but he does not sign it until October. [MSNBC, 5/16/2002; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 5/18/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 4/1/2004] Entity Tags: Taliban, George W. Bush, Northern Alliance, Al-Qaeda, Condoleezza Rice, Osama bin Laden, George J. Tenet Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden

Just Before September 11, 2001: Core of Al-Qaeda Probably Less Than 1,000 Operatives Newsweek will report in 2006, “The intelligence community generally agrees that the number of true A-list al-Qaeda operatives out there around the time of 9/11 was no more than about 1,000, perhaps as few as 500, most in and around Afghanistan.” [NEWSWEEK, 6/28/2006] John Arquilla, a Special Operatives expert at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, makes a higher end estimate, claiming “there were probably 3,000 core al-Qaeda operatives” around the time of 9/11. [NEWSWEEK, 8/28/2007] US intelligence will later conclude that about 20,000 people passed through al-Qaeda training camps from 1996 to 9/11, and many of them will keep some level of affiliation with the group. However, only about 180 operatives had pledged loyalty to bin Laden by 9/11. Counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna will say, “Al-Qaeda is an elite organization that takes very few members.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/10/2002; US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 6/2/2003] Entity Tags: John Arquilla, Rohan Gunaratna, Al-Qaeda Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden

Just Before September 11, 2001: CIA, FBI Lack Counterterrorism Resources, and Focus Just prior to 9/11, the CIA and FBI do not have enough staff working on al-Qaeda. Only 17 to 19 people are working in the FBI’s special unit focusing on bin Laden and al-Qaeda. [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] The FBI has a $4.3 billion anti-terrorism budget, but of its 27,000 employees, just 153 are devoted to terrorism analysis. [SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 6/8/2002] The FBI’s “analytic expertise has been ‘gutted’ by transfers to operational units” and only one strategic analyst is assigned full time to al-Qaeda. The FBI office in New York is very aware of the threat from bin Laden, but many branch offices remain largely unaware. [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] A senior FBI official later tells Congress that there are fewer FBI agents assigned to counterterrorism on this day than in August 1998, when the US embassy bombings in Africa made bin Laden a household name. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/22/2002] The CIA has only about 35 to 40 people assigned to their special bin Laden unit. It has five strategic analysts working full time on al-Qaeda. [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] The CIA and FBI later complain that some of these figures are misleading. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/18/2002] “Individuals in both the CIA and FBI units… reported being seriously overwhelmed by the volume of information and workload prior to September 11, 2001.” Despite numerous warnings that planes could be used as weapons, such a possibility was never studied, and a congressional report later blames lack of staff as a major reason for this. [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] Senator Patrick Leahy (D) also notes, “Between the Department of Justice and the FBI, they had a whole task force working on finding a couple of houses of prostitution in New Orleans. They had one on al-Qaeda.” [CBS NEWS, 9/25/2002] Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Central Intelligence Agency, US Congress, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Patrick J. Leahy, Alec Station, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Before September 11, 2001: Some 9/11 Hijackers Have Same Mailing Address as ‘Blind Sheikh’ and His Associate Did

The Sphinx Trading sign. [Source: National Geographic] Some of the 9/11 hijackers rent mailboxes from a company called Sphinx Trading, which was also used by ‘Blind Sheikh’ Omar Abdul-Rahman and at least one of his associates. The mailboxes are located in Jersey City, New Jersey, four doors down from the mosque where Abdul-Rahman was imam in the early 1990s. El Sayyid Nosair, who assassinated Rabbi Meir Kahane and was linked to the Islamic militant cell Abdul-Rahman headed (see November 5, 1990 and December 7, 1991), also had a mailbox there before he was arrested in 1990. Sphinx Trading is owned by Waleed al-Noor, who was named an unindicted co-conspirator at the ‘Landmarks’ bomb plot trial (see June 24, 1993). The hijackers will later obtain fake IDs from al-Noor’s partner, Mohamed el-Atriss. The names of the hijackers who had mailboxes there are never given, but in the summer of 2001 el-Atriss interacts with hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi, Abdulaziz Alomari, Khalid Almihdhar, and Hani Hanjour (see (July-August 2001)), at least. [NEW YORK TIMES, 6/25/2003; NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, 10/20/2003; LANCE, 2006, PP. 372-4; BERGEN RECORD, 9/11/2006] An FBI agent will later comment: “The fact that this location was where Almihdhar, in particular, got his bogus credentials, is not only shocking, it makes me angry. The [Joint Terrorist Task Force] in the [New York Office] had this location back in 1991. In the mid-90s they listed al-Noor, the coowner, as a coconspirator, unindicted in the plot to blow up bridges and tunnels. And now we find out that this is the precise location where the most visible of all the hijackers in the US got his ID? Incredible. All the Bureau’s New York Office had to do was sit on that place over the years and they would have broken right into the 9/11 plot.” [LANCE, 2006, PP. 373] Entity Tags: Hani Hanjour, El Sayyid Nosair, Waleed al-Noor, Sphinx Trading, Omar Abdul-Rahman, Nawaf Alhazmi, Mohamed el-Atriss, Khalid Almihdhar, Abdulaziz Alomari Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Hani Hanjour, Other 9/11 Hijackers, Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman

Before September 11, 2001: Drug Smuggler Possibly Smuggles Two 9/11 Hijackers into US In October 2001, an Iranian named Mehrzad Arbane will tell an associate that he may have smuggled two of the 9/11 hijackers into the US. The associate, a known cocaine smuggler, will be so alarmed that he will become a government informant against Arbane. In 2004, Arbane will be convicted of smuggling cocaine from Latin America into the US and it will be reported he is also being investigated for money laundering and smuggling people from the Middle East into the US. It is not known which hijackers he may have smuggled into the US or when this may have taken place. [VILLAGE VOICE, 5/25/2004] This runs counter to the 9/11 Commission’s claim, as expressed by one 9/11 Commission staffer, “The plotters all used their own passports to get into the country.” [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 8/17/2005] Entity Tags: Mehrzad Arbane Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, Drugs, Other Possible Moles or Informants

Before September 11, 2001: CIA Uses Other Intelligence Agencies to Infiltrate Al-Qaeda It has been widely reported that the CIA never had any assets near bin Laden before 9/11. For instance, Lawrence Wright will write in his highly regarded 2006 book, The Looming Tower, “The fact is that the CIA had no one inside al-Qaeda or the Taliban security that surrounded bin Laden.” [WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 265] But author Ronald Kessler will write in a 2004 book, “Often, the CIA used operatives from Arab intelligence services like those of Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and other countries to infiltrate bin Laden’s organization.” A longtime CIA officer says, “Egyptians, Jordanians, [and] Palestinians penetrated the bin Laden organization for us. It’s B.S. that we didn’t.” Kessler further explains that such operations remain one of the CIA’s best-kept secrets and often occur even with intelligence agencies the CIA is sometimes otherwise at odds with. Kessler says, “In return for help, the CIA provided them with money, equipment, and intelligence on their adversaries. Over the years, the Jordanians, for example, relied on the CIA to alert them to plots against the king. Over time, the Jordanians became so good at the intelligence game that they were better at detecting plots than the CIA.” [KESSLER, 2004, PP. 143] Jack Cloonan, an FBI expert on al-Qaeda, will later say, “There were agents run into the camps. But most of them were not very well placed,” and lacked access to the inner circles. [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 11/27/2006] One example of such an asset may be Khalil Deek, who worked closely with al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida (see 1998-December 11, 1999) and was reportedly a mole for Jordanian intelligence (see Shortly After December 11, 1999). In the months before 9/11, Jordan will warn the US that al-Qaeda is planning a major attack inside the US using aircraft (see Late Summer 2001), and Egypt will warn the CIA that al-Qaeda has 20 operatives on a mission in the US, some of them training to fly (see Late July 2001). Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Syria, Jack Cloonan, Jordan General Intelligence Department, Khalil Deek, Egypt Category Tags: Warning Signs, Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11, Khalil Deek, Other Possible Moles or Informants

Before September 11, 2001: CIA Allegedly Thoroughly Monitors Al-Qaeda, Including Using Over 100 Assets in Afghanistan In a 2007 book, CIA Director George Tenet will say, “As a result of the intelligence community’s efforts, in concert with our foreign partners, by September 11, Afghanistan was covered in human and technical operations.” Tenet claims: The CIA is working with eight separate Afghan tribal networks. The CIA has “more than 100 recruited sources inside Afghanistan.” Satellites are repositioned over Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda training camps are systematically mapped. Efforts are stepped up to closely monitor news about al-Qaeda in the media around the world. “Major collection facilities” are placed on the borders of Afghanistan. Other “conventional and innovative collection methods” are used to penetrate al-Qaeda worldwide. According to Tenet, “Leadership of the FBI [is] given full transparency” into the CIA’s efforts. [TENET, 2007, PP. 120-121] Tenet has not explained how the CIA managed to miss learning about the 9/11 attacks if this is so, given that a major attack was being widely discussed in Afghanistan training camps in the months before 9/11 (see Summer 2001). Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Central Intelligence Agency Category Tags: Warning Signs, Other Possible Moles or Informants, Remote Surveillance

Shortly Before September 11, 2001: CIA Learns Pakistani Charity Front Tried to Sell Nuclear Weapon to Libya, but Takes No Effective Action Against It According to a 2007 book by former CIA Director George Tenet, shortly before 9/11, the CIA learns that a Pakistani charity front has been helping al-Qaeda acquire weapons of mass destruction. The charity, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau (UTN), was founded in 2000 by two prominent nuclear scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudiri Abdul Majeed (see 2000). UTN allegedly is conducting charitable projects in Afghanistan, but a friendly intelligence service tells the CIA that UTN is really helping al-Qaeda build weapons, especially nuclear weapons. Tenet will claim that he presses “all of our contacts worldwide to find out anything we could about the people and organizations with WMD that might be wiling to share expertise with al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.” Ben Bonk, deputy chief of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC), meets with Musa Kusa, head of Libya’s intelligence service, and Kusa tells him that Libya had contact with UTN. “Yes, they tried to sell us a nuclear weapon. Of course, we turned them down.” According to Tenet, this confirms other information from a different intelligence agency that UTN approached Libya with an offer to provide WMD expertise. The CIA then informs the Pakistani government of this, and Pakistan brings in seven board members of UTN for questioning. But according to Tenet, “The investigation was ill-fated from the get-go” and the UTN officials “were not properly isolated and questioned.” [TENET, 2007, PP. 262-263] Also shortly before 9/11, the CIA also learns that the two nuclear scientists who founded UTN had recently met with Osama bin Laden and advised him on how to make a nuclear weapon (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001). But despite all this the US takes no other action against UTN before 9/11, not even freezing the assets of the charity until December 2001 (see Early October-December 2001). Entity Tags: Musa Kusa, Ben Bonk, Central Intelligence Agency, Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, George J. Tenet, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, Osama bin Laden Timeline Tags: A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Pakistani Nukes & Islamic Militancy

Shortly Before September 11, 2001: CIA Learns Pakistani Nuclear Scientists Are Helping Al-Qaeda, but Takes No Effective Action In October 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell visits Pakistan and tells Pakistani officials that, shortly before 9/11, the CIA learned two prominent Pakistani nuclear scientists had met with al-Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in mid-August 2001 (see Early October-December 2001). In the meeting, the two scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, discussed helping al-Qaeda make a nuclear weapon (see Mid-August 2001). [FRANTZ AND COLLINS, 2007, PP. 268-269] In a 2007 book, former CIA Director George Tenet will confirm that the CIA learned of this prior to 9/11. He will write, “A Western intelligence service came to us in the fall of 2001 [with details of the meeting]… [The] CIA pressed the Pakistanis to confront Mahmood and Majeed with this new information. We put [evidence that a charity named Ummah Tameer-e-Nau run by Mahmood and Majeed tried to sell Libya a nuclear weapon] on the table. We also passed new information that had been collected by other intelligence services. To no avail. Then 9/11 struck, and there was no slowing down in this pursuit.” [TENET, 2007, PP. 264] But no evidence will come forward that President Bush or other top US officials were warned of this, or that there were any general warnings inside the US government about this. Pakistan is not successfully pressured about it before 9/11 (in fact, the Pakistani ISI already knew about it and failed to warn the US (see Between Mid-August and September 10, 2001)), and after 9/11 the only action Pakistan will take is to twice arrest and then quickly release the two scientists. Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will comment in a 2007 book that “This information, added to the missing canisters of highly enriched uranium [in Pakistan], might have been sufficient to redirect” top Bush officials to take sterner action against al-Qaeda before 9/11. [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 311] Entity Tags: Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, George J. Tenet, Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Central Intelligence Agency, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood Timeline Tags: A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network Category Tags: Warning Signs, Pakistan and the ISI, Pakistani Nukes & Islamic Militancy