September 11 7am-8am

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early morning* morning* 6am-7am* 7am-8am* 8am-8:30am* 8:30am - 8:40am* 8:40 a.m. to 8:45 a.m.* 8:45 a.m. to 8:50 a.m.* 8:50 a.m.* |9am-10am 10:00-10:10* 10:05-10:10* 11am-midday* afternoon

(Shortly Before 7:00 a.m.-7:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Cheney Receives Daily Intelligence Briefing; Heads to White House

Just before 7:00 a.m., Vice President Dick Cheney sits in the library of the vice president’s residence at the Naval Observatory in Washington, DC, for his regular CIA briefing. His solo briefing is more detailed than the president’s because he asks for more material. According to journalist and author Stephen Hayes , the briefing is “unremarkable.” Cheney typically sets off for the three-mile drive to the White House at 7:30 a.m. He usually joins the president for his intelligence briefing, but with George W. Bush away in Florida, there is no briefing at the White House on this day. According to David Kuo, a special assistant to the president, Cheney arrives at the White House at just after 7:00 a.m. this morning. Kuo will later recall that Cheney “looked like an absentminded professor, deep in thought, oblivious to the world.”

7:00 a.m. -9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Preparations Continue at New York Pier for September 12 Bioterrorism Exercise

At Pier 92 on the Hudson River , preparations are underway for a training exercise due to take place there the following day. The exercise, called Tripod, which had been scheduled months earlier, is intended to test how well New York’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM) can administer treatment in response to a biological-terrorism attack . [NEW YORK MAGAZINE, 10/15/2001; GIULIANI, 2002, PP. 355] Pier 92, located just over four miles north-northwest of the World Trade Center, has been set up as a model distribution station where the simulated victims will be treated. [JENKINS AND EDWARDS-WINSLOW, 9/2003, PP. 15 AND 20] Ken Longert, the owner of a theatrical lighting business, arrives at the pier at 7:00 a.m. to help get the place ready for the exercise. He will later recall, “Two or three hundred cadets [presumably with the New York police and fire departments] were there, learning the proper procedures in case some kind of disaster hit New York.” Longert will recall that, seconds after the second WTC tower is hit at 9:03, “all the people from OEM disappeared” from the pier. After OEM’s original command center is destroyed when World Trade Center 7 —where it is located—collapses , Pier 92 will be selected as the location for the substitute command center. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/19/2004] Members of OEM staff have also arrived early this morning at the OEM offices in WTC 7 to prepare for the exercise .

(7:00 a.m.-7:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Computer Screening Program Selects Some Hijackers; Fails to Stop Them

Sometime during this period, the hijackers pass through airport security checkpoints at the various airports. The FAA has a screening program in called CAPPS. CAPPS selects three of the five Flight 11 hijackers. Since Waleed Alshehri checked no bags, his selection had no consequences. Wail Alshehri and Satam Al Suqami have their bags scanned for explosives, but are not stopped. No Flight 175 hijackers are selected. Only Ahmad Alhaznawi is selected from Flight 93. His bag is screened for explosives, but he is not stopped. The 9/11 Commission later concludes that Alhaznawi and Ahmed Alnami, also headed to Flight 93, have suspicious indicators and that they could have been linked to al-Qaeda upon inspection, but it has not been explained why or how.

(7:03 a.m.-7:48 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Hijackers Check in at Airport and Board Plane; Only One Selected for Additional Screening

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According to the 9/11 Commission, between 7:03 a.m. and 7:39 a.m. the four alleged Flight 93 hijackers check in at the United Airlines ticket counter at Newark (New Jersey) Liberty International Airport.

Only Ahmad Alhaznawi is selected for additional scrutiny by airport security under the FAA’s CAPPS program The only consequence is that his checked bag is screened for explosives, and not loaded onto the plane until it is confirmed that he has boarded.

On their way to boarding the plane, all four would pass through a security checkpoint, which has three walk-through metal detectors, two X-ray machines, and explosive trace detection equipment.

The 9/11 Commission later claims Newark Airport has no video cameras monitoring its security checkpoints, so there is no documentary evidence showing when the hijackers passed through the checkpoint or what alarms may have been triggered.

However, Michael Taylor , the president of American International Security Corp, who has done consulting work for the New York Port Authority (which operates the airport), claims that Newark does use security cameras at the time of 9/11. All of the screeners on duty at the checkpoint are subsequently interviewed, and none report anything unusual or suspicious having occurred.

The 9/11 Commission later concludes that the passports of Ahmad Alhaznawi and fellow Flight 93 hijacker Ahmed Alnami have suspicious indicators and could have been linked to al-Qaeda, but it does not elaborate on this.

(7:15 a.m.-7:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Hijack Suspects Set Off Airport Alarms; Allowed to Board Anyway

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Around 7:15 a.m., Flight 77 hijackers Majed Moqed and Khalid Almihdhar check in at the American Airlines ticket counter at Washington Dulles International Airport.

The FAA has a computer system in place, called CAPPS, which identifies those passengers most likely requiring additional scrutiny by airport security . CAPPS selects both men, but the only consequence is that Moqed’s luggage is not loaded onto Flight 77 until after his boarding is confirmed.

Dulles Airport has surveillance cameras monitoring its security checkpoints, and video later viewed by the 9/11 Commission shows the two passing through the Main Terminal’s west security screening checkpoint at 7:18 a.m.

When they go through, their carry-on bags fail to set off any alarms, but both men set off the alarm when they pass through the first metal detector. They are directed to a second metal detector, where Almihdhar passes, but Moqed fails again. He is subjected to a personal screening with a metal detection hand wand. This time he is cleared and permitted to pass through the checkpoint.

The other three Flight 77 hijackers pass through the security checkpoint about 20 minutes later . The 9/11 Commission later concludes that Almihdhar’s passport was “suspicious” and could have been linked to al-Qaeda, but it does not explain why or how.

(7:25 a.m.-7:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Remaining Three Flight 77 Hijackers Check In at Airport; Allowed to Board Despite Security Checkpoint Problems

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The 9/11 Commission estimates that Hani Hanjour checks in for Flight 77 at the American Airlines ticket counter at Dulles International Airport some time between 7:25 a.m. and 7:35 a.m. (American Airlines will be unable to locate information confirming his check-in time.) He is selected for additional scrutiny by airport security under the FAA’s CAPPS program , but this has no consequences.

Brothers Nawaf and Salem Alhazmi, check in at approximately 7:29 a.m. The American Airlines customer service representative, Vaughn Allex makes both of them CAPPS selectees, because one of them cannot provide photo identification and seems unable to understand English, and he finds both of them suspicious. However, the only consequence is that Salem Alhazmi’s luggage is not loaded onto the plane until it is confirmed that he has boarded.

Surveillance cameras monitor the security checkpoints at Dulles Airport. According to the 9/11 Commission’s review of security footage, Hani Hanjour passes through the Main Terminal’s west security screening checkpoint at 7:35 a.m. He proceeds through the metal detector without setting off the alarm, and his two carry-on bags set off no alarms when placed on the X-ray belt. The Alhazmis arrive at the same checkpoint a minute later. Salem Alhazmi successfully clears the metal detector, and is permitted through the checkpoint. Nawaf Alhazmi sets off the alarms for both the first and second metal detectors and is subsequently subjected to a personal screening with a metal detection hand wand before being passed. His shoulder bag is swiped by an explosive trace detector and returned without further inspection.

Immediately after the attacks, when the FAA’s local civil aviation security office investigates the security screening at Dulles on 9/11, it finds the airport’s screeners recall nothing out of the ordinary, and cannot recall any of the passengers they screened having been CAPPS selectees.

The 9/11 Commission later concludes that the Alhazmi brothers’ passports are “suspicious” and could have been linked to al-Qaeda, but it does not explain why or how.^{[citation needed]}

(7:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Gate Agent Asks If Atta’s Luggage Has Been Loaded onto Flight 11

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A gate agent at Logan Airport calls Donald Bennett , the crew chief for Flight 11, and asks him if the two suitcases of a passenger who has just boarded the plane have arrived from US Airways. Bennett replies that the suitcases, which belong to Mohamed Atta, have arrived, but Flight 11’s baggage compartment has already been locked for departure, so they will not be loaded.

American Airlines baggage expediter Philip Depasquale will later claim that bags from US Airways are always late, and so this problem is a common occurrence. The luggage is turned over to Depasquale to have it sent to Los Angeles on another flight. According to Salvatore Misuraca, a ramp service manager for American Airlines at Logan Airport, gate agents do not usually call about a bag unless the passenger that owns it has specifically asked about it, to ensure that their bags have been put on their flight. Atta’s luggage will remain at Logan Airport and be found after the attacks, revealing important clues .

7:40 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 11 Pushes Back from Gate; Reports Conflict over Which Gate It Leaves From

American Airlines Flight 11 pushes back from the gate at Logan Airport. There are discrepancies over which gate it leaves from. Most early reports state that it pushes out from Gate 26 in Terminal B of the airport.

However, one unnamed Logan Airport employee will say it leaves from Gate 32, also in Terminal B. The transcript of radio communications with the flight confirms it left from Gate 32, and the 9/11 Commission also later states this. The reason for the discrepancy in these reports is unclear.

Flight 11, a Boeing 767 with a capacity of 158 passengers, is about half full on this day, with 81 passengers on board (including the five hijackers), along with the two pilots and nine flight attendants.

(7:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Hijack Suspects’ Bags Contain Airline Uniforms

Mohamed Atta and Abdulaziz Alomari board Flight 11. Atta’s bags are not loaded onto the plane in time and are later found by investigators. Investigators later find airline uniforms and many other remarkable items. It is later reported that at least two other hijackers on Flight 11 use stolen uniforms and IDs to board the plane.

(Before 7:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Inter Flight Phone Call Between Hijackers

Mohamed Atta on Flight 11 calls Marwan Alshehhi in Flight 175 as both planes sit on the runway. They presumably confirm the plot is on.

(7:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 11 Is Late Taking Off

Flight 11 takes off from Logan Airport, 14 minutes after its scheduled 7:45 departure time.

(Shortly Before 8:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Two Passengers Allegedly Get Off Flight 93 Just Before Take-off

Two passengers leave Flight 93 after hearing an announcement that there will be a five-minute delay in the plane pushing back from the gate. This is according to Terry Tyksinski, a longtime flight attendant with United Airlines, who says a customer service supervisor who witnessed the incident told her about it six months after 9/11. The two first-class passengers are reportedly of dark complexion, “kind of black, not black.” According to Tyksinski, the supervisor notes their names and is subsequently twice interviewed by the FBI. No other accounts, including the 9/11 Commission Report, mention this incident. And while Flight 93 is delayed on the ground until 8:42 a.m., reports state that it pushes back from the gate just one minute later than its scheduled departure, rather than there being a five-minute delay as Tyksinski suggests. There will only be 37 passengers on Flight 93, including the four hijackers. This is 20 percent of the plane’s passenger capacity of 182 and, according to the 9/11 Commission, “is considerably below the 52 percent average load factor for Flight 93 for Tuesdays in the three-month period prior to September 11.”