Boston Center

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Staff

Facility manager = Terry Biggio

ATC =Pete Zalewski

Timeline

(After 8:14 a.m.-8:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 11 Pilot Repeatedly Pushes Talk Back Button

At some unknown point after the hijacking begins, Flight 11’s talkback button is activated, which enables Boston flight controllers to hear what is being said in the cockpit. It is unclear whether John Ogonowski, the pilot, activates the talkback button, or whether a hijacker accidentally does so when he takes over the cockpit.

A controller later says, “The button [is] being pushed intermittently most of the way to New York.” An article later notes that “his ability to do so also indicates that he [is] in the driver’s seat much of the way” to the WTC. Such transmissions continue until about 8:38 a.m.

However, Ogonowski fails to punch a four-digit emergency code into the plane’s transponder, which pilots are taught to do the moment a hijack situation is known

(8:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Flight Control Thinks Flight 11 May Be Hijacked?

FAA’s Boston Center [Source: ABC News] According to some reports, Boston flight control decides that Flight 11 has probably been hijacked, but apparently, it does not notify other flight control centers for another five minutes, and does not notify NORAD for approximately 20 minutes. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/15/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001] ABC News will later say, “There doesn’t seem to have been alarm bells going off, [flight] controllers getting on with law enforcement or the military. There’s a gap there that will have to be investigated.” [ABC NEWS, 9/14/2001] (Note the conflicting account at 8:21 a.m. (see (8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001) Entity Tags: Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

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8:24 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Air Traffic Controllers Hear Flight 11 Hijacker Say, ‘We Have Some Planes,’ but Uncertain of Origin of Transmission

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Because the talkback button on Flight 11 has been activated, Boston Center air traffic controllers can hear a hijacker on board say to the passengers: “We have some planes. Just stay quiet and you’ll be OK. We are returning to the airport.”

Air traffic controller Pete Zalewski recognizes this as a foreign, Middle Eastern-sounding voice, but does not make out the specific words “we have some planes.” He responds, “Who’s trying to call me?” Seconds later, in the next transmission, the hijacker continues: “Nobody move. Everything will be OK. If you try to make any moves you’ll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.”

Bill Peacock, the FAA director of air traffic services, later claims, “We didn’t know where the transmission came from, what was said and who said it.” David Canoles, the FAA’s manager of air traffic evaluations and investigations, adds: “The broadcast wasn’t attributed to a flight. Nobody gave a flight number.” Similarly, an early FAA report will state that both these transmissions came from “an unknown origin.”

Zalewski asks for an assistant to help listen to the transmissions coming from the plane, and puts its frequency on speakers so others at Boston Center can hear. Because Zalewski didn’t understand the initial hijacker communication from Flight 11, Terry Biggio,the manager of Boston Center instructs Bob Jones, the center’s quality assurance specialist to “pull the tape” of the transmission, listen to it carefully, and then report back. They do this, and by about 9:03 a.m. Terry Biggio will report having deciphered what was said in the first hijacker transmission

Fellow Boston controller Don Jeffroy also hears the tape of the hijacker transmissions, though he doesn’t state at what time. He says: “I heard exactly what Pete [Zalewski] heard. And we had to actually listen to it a couple of times just to make sure that we were hearing what we heard.” At some point, Ben Sliney, the national operations manager at the FAA’s Herndon Command Center, gets word of the “We have some planes” message, and later says the phrase haunts him all morning. American Airlines Executive Vice President for Operations Gerard Arpey is also informed of the “strange transmissions from Flight 11” at some point prior to when it crashes at 8:46 a.m. Boston Center will receive a third transmission from Flight 11 about ten minutes later .

8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Flight Control Tells Other Centers About Hijack, But Not NORAD

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Boston Center reportedly “notifies several air traffic control centers that a hijack is taking place.” This is immediately after Boston controllers heard a transmission from Flight 11, declaring, “We have some planes”, and would be consistent with a claim later made to the 9/11 Commission by Mike Canavan, the FAA’s associate administrator for civil aviation security. He says,

“[M]y experience as soon as you know you had a hijacked aircraft, you notify everyone.… [W]hen you finally find out, yes, we do have a problem, then… the standard notification is it kind of gets broadcast out to all the regions.”

An early FAA report will say only that Boston controllers begin “inter-facility coordination” with New York air traffic control at this time , but the New York Times reports that controllers at Washington Center also know “about the hijacking of the first plane to crash, even before it hit the World Trade Center.”

However, the Indianapolis Center flight controller monitoring Flight 77 claims to not know about this or Flight 175’s hijacking twenty minutes later at 8:56 a.m. . Additionally, the flight controllers at La Guardia airport are never told about the hijacked planes and learn about them from watching the news. Boston Center also begins notifying the FAA chain of command of the suspected Flight 11 hijacking at this time , but it does not notify NORAD for another 6-15 minutes, depending on the account .

8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Starts Notifying Chain of Command

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Boston Center begins notifying the chain of command that a suspected hijacking of Flight 11 is in progress. Those notified include the center’s own facility manager, the FAA’s New England Regional Operations Center (ROC) in Burlington, Massachusetts , and the FAA Command Center in Herndon, Virginia

According to the 9/11 Commission, this is consistent with FAA protocol:

“From interviews of controllers at various FAA centers, we learned that an air traffic controller’s first response to an aircraft incident is to notify a supervisor, who then notifies the traffic management unit and the operations manager in charge. The FAA center next notifies the appropriate regional operations center (ROC), which in turn contacts FAA headquarters.”

But according to Ben Sliney, the national operations manager at the FAA’s Command Center, “the protocol was in place that the center that reported the hijacking would notify the military.… I go back to 1964, where I began my air traffic career, and they have always followed the same protocol.”

Yet Boston Center supposedly will not contact NORAD about Flight 11 until about 12 minutes later . Already about ten minutes have passed since controllers first noticed a loss of contact with Flight 11. Boston reportedly also contacts several other air traffic control centers about the suspected hijacking at this time

(8:25 a.m.-8:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Military Liaison Arrives Late at Boston Center, Learns of First Hijacking

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Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at Boston Center, arrives at work an hour late and is informed of the hijacking of Flight 11. Scoggins is an experienced air traffic controller and specializes in airspace, procedures, and military operations. He is responsible for managing operating agreements between the Boston Center and other air traffic control facilities, and between Boston Center and the military. He is also responsible for generating the military schedules that keep FAA facilities synchronized with military airspace requirements, and has therefore developed personal relationships with most of the military units in his region.

In a 2006 radio interview, Scoggins will recall that he arrives at work one hour late, saying, “That morning I actually came in, took an hour early on the front of my shift, so I didn’t get in until 8:30.” But in a statement that will be provided to the 9/11 Commission, he says he arrives at the Boston Center slightly earlier, at “about 8:25 a.m.” When he enters the building, a colleague tells him about the hijacking of Flight 11.

Rather than going immediately to help deal with the hijacking, Scoggins heads to the credit union at the center. He will recall, “I wasn’t in a rush because when hijacks do occur, sometimes too many people try to get involved, but instead they just get in the way.”

When he gets to the credit union, Scoggins decides he should go to the center’s traffic management unit, to make sure that fighter jets are launched in response to the hijacking. As he will later recall, he says to an employee at the credit union that “if it really came to it,” and fighter jets “had to stop the hijack from hitting a building or something, there wasn’t much [the fighters] could do.”

Scoggins then heads to the center’s operational floor, arriving there at about 8:35. He goes to the traffic management unit and the desk of Daniel Bueno, who is the unit’s supervisor. Bueno brings Scoggins up to date on the details of the hijacking. He tells him: “It sounds real. We heard a Mideastern or Arabic voice on radio. They’ve also turned off the transponder to prevent the hijack code from appearing.” Bueno says the Boston Center controllers are still tracking the primary radar return for [[Flight 11], but they lack information on its altitude. According to author Lynn Spencer, it occurs to Scoggins that NEADS might be able to provide altitude information for Flight 11, “because the FAA radar system filters out certain altitude information that NEADS gets.” He will therefore phone NEADS as soon as he arrives at his station .

(8:26 a.m.-8:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 11 Turns, Many Watch It on Primary Radar

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At 8:26, Flight 11, which is already way off course, makes an unplanned 100-degree turn to the south over Albany, New York. A minute later, it turns right, to the south-southwest. Then, two minutes on, at 8:29, it turns left to the south-southeast. Boston Center air traffic controllers never lose sight of the flight, though they can no longer determine altitude as the transponder is turned off. Its last known altitude was 29,000 feet.

Before this turn, the FAA had tagged Flight 11’s radar dot for easy visibility and, at American Airlines’ System Operations Control (SOC) in Fort Worth, Texas, “All eyes watched as the plane headed south. On the screen, the plane showed a squiggly line after its turn near Albany, then it straightened.” Boston air traffic controller Mark Hodgkins later says, “I watched the target of American 11 the whole way down.” However, NEADS has different radar. When they are finally told about the flight, they cannot find it NEADS has to repeatedly phone the FAA, airlines, and others, for clues as to the plane’s location. NEADS will eventually focus on a radar blip they believe might be Flight 11, and watch it close in on New York.

8:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Command Center Informed of Flight 11 Hijacking, Establishes Teleconference between Air Traffic Control Centers

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Boston Center calls the FAA Command Center and says it believes Flight 11 has been hijacked and is heading toward the New York Center’s airspace. The Command Center immediately establishes a teleconference between the Boston, New York, and Cleveland Center air traffic control centers, so Boston can help the other centers understand what is happening, in case Flight 11 should enter their airspace. Minutes later, in line with the standard hijacking protocol, the Command Center will pass on word of the suspected hijacking to the FAA’s Washington headquarters

Tom Paccionea supervisor at the Command Center, promptly passes on the news of the possible hijacking to Ben Sliney, who is on his first day as the national operations manager there. The supervisor says the plane in question is “American Flight 11—a 767 out of Boston for Los Angeles.” According to author Lynn Spencer, “Sliney flashes back to the routine for dealing with hijackings from the days when they were more common.” The procedure is to

"[k]eep other aircraft away from the errant plane. Give the pilots what they need. The plane will land somewhere, passengers will be traded for fuel, and difficult negotiations with authorities will begin. The incident should resolve itself peacefully, although the ones in the Middle East, he recalls, often had a more violent outcome.”

Apparently not expecting anything worse to happen, Sliney continues to the conference room for the daily 8:30 staff meeting there

The FAA Command Center is located in Herndon, Virginia, 25 miles from Washington, DC. According to Spencer, it

“is a communications powerhouse, modeled after NASA’s Mission Control. The operations floor is 50 feet wide and 120 feet long, packed with tiered rows of computer stations, and at the front, seven enormous display screens show flight trajectories and weather patterns.”

The center has nearly 50 specialists working around the clock, planning and monitoring the flow of air traffic over the United States. These specialists work with airlines and air traffic control facilities to fix congestion problems and deal with weather systems.

(Between 8:30 a.m. and 8:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Boston Center Supervisor Alerts Otis Air Base Tower to Flight 11, Requests Fighters

Daniel Bueno, a supervisor at Boston Center, calls the air traffic control tower at Otis Air National Guard Base to alert it to the problems with Flight 11 and request military assistance. Otis Air Base is one of NORAD’s seven alert sites in the continental United States, which keeps two armed fighter jets ready for immediate takeoff.

Bueno calls the control tower at Otis even though, according to Lynn Spencer, he “knows it’s not standard operating procedure to call the military directly—that’s supposed to be done by FAA headquarters.” But he has “checked the FAA regulation manual, and in the back under section FAAO 7610.4J, Appendix 16, it states that fighters can be launched directly at FAA request, so he is going to make that happen. He may not be FAA headquarters, but he is FAA!”

Bueno tells Tim Spence,the controller at the Otis tower, that Flight 11 has lost its identification signal and appears to be headed toward Manhattan; it looks like a possible hijacking, and fighter jets are needed, fast. But the controller tells Bueno that he must follow the protocol, which is to contact NEADS. The controller says: “You’ve got to go through the proper channels. They’re the only ones with the authority to initiate a scramble order.” Bueno asks the controller for the telephone number for NEADS. Following this call, the tower controller will contact the Otis Air Base operations desk, to let it know that it might be receiving a call from NEADS .

The two alert pilots at Otis Air Base will later criticize Bueno for calling the base directly. One of them, Major Daniel Nash, will complain: “It sounds like the FAA didn’t have their [act] together at all when they were calling the [Otis] tower.… To me, it sounded like there was someone who didn’t know what they were doing.” Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Duffy, the other alert pilot, will comment: “It didn’t happen the way it was supposed to.… We were the ones who were contacted right away and knew about it before the air defense sector.”

Bueno also calls the FAA’s Cape Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON), which is located on Otis Air Base, at 8:34 a.m. and requests that fighters be launched from Otis . Whether he makes that call before or after he calls the Otis tower is unstated. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, “the first notification received by the military—at any level—that American 11 had been hijacked” is when Boston Center calls NEADS just before 8:38 a.m.. If that is correct, it would indicate that Bueno calls the Otis tower after he calls the Cape TRACON.

(8:34 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Air Traffic Controller Takes over Monitoring Flight 11, but Is Unaware It Is Hijacked

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By 8:34 a.m., Flight 11 has entered airspace managed by Boston Center air traffic controller John Hartling.

Although Boston controller Pete Zalewski, who was managing Flight 11, concluded the plane was hijacked almost ten minutes earlier , at the time the blip for Flight 11 appears on Hartling’s radar screen, Hartling is unaware that a hijacking is taking place. According to Lynn Spencer, the reason is that

"The concentration required for the job is so intense that controllers operate on a need-to-know basis. They don’t need to know what’s happening in other controllers’ sectors unless it might affect their own airspace, and distractions are rigorously kept to a minimum.”

Tom Roberts, another Boston Center controller, has just been relieved from duty for a scheduled coffee break, and comes over to Hartling’s desk. Referring to Flight 11’s radar track, he tells Hartling,

“This—this aircraft, we believe, is hijacked, and he’s last reported at 29,000 feet.”

However, Hartling is incredulous. He will later recall that when Roberts says the plane is hijacked,

“I didn’t believe him.”

This is because

“I didn’t think that that stuff would happen anymore, especially in this country.”

Hartling continues tracking Flight 11 as it heads toward New York. Although its transponder has been turned off , he can tell that, at almost 600 mph, it is flying far faster than the 450 mph it should be moving at.

(8:34 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center Calls Atlantic City Military Unit to Request Fighters; Outcome of Call Unclear

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Apparently around 8:34 a.m., Boston Center attempts to contact an Atlantic City, New Jersey, military unit, to have it send fighters after Flight 11. However, the outcome of this call, and whether it is even answered, is unclear.

Atlantic City International Airport is the home of the 177th Fighter Wing of the New Jersey Air National Guard , which flies F-16 fighter jets. The 177th FW was part of NORAD’s alert force for many years, and kept two F-16s constantly on alert, ready to scramble when requested. But in October 1998, as a result of Pentagon cutbacks, it lost its scramble-ready status and began converting to a general-purpose F-16 mission . . 

The outcome of Boston Center’s attempt at contacting the Atlantic City unit is unclear. The 9/11 Commission will only state, “The center… tried to contact a former alert site in Atlantic City, unaware it had been phased out.” NEADS will also try contacting the unit minutes later, but its call will not be answered .

The Bergen Record will later comment that, with the removal of the Atlantic City fighters from NORAD’s alert mission, “the Pentagon left what seems to be a yawning gap in the midsection of its air defenses on the East Coast—a gap with New York City at the center.” .  Around this time, two F-16s from the 177th FW are away from base performing a training mission, and are just minutes from New York City, but the pilots are unaware of the unfolding crisis .

8:34 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Boston Center Supervisor Calls FAA Facility at Otis Air Base, Requests Fighters

Cape TRACON. [Source: FAA] Daniel Bueno, a supervisor at the FAA’s Boston Center, contacts the FAA’s Cape Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON), located on Otis Air National Guard Base at Cape Cod, Massachusetts, to alert it to the possible hijacking of Flight 11 and request that it arrange for military assistance in response. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 4/19/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] Bueno Requests Fighters - After his call is initially answered by an air traffic controller at the Cape TRACON, Bueno is quickly passed on to Tim Spence, an operational supervisor at the facility. Bueno says, “I have a situation with American 11, a possible hijack.” He adds that Flight 11 “departed Boston, going to LAX [Los Angeles International Airport]. Right now he’s south of Albany.” He says, “I’d like to scramble some fighters to go tail him.” Spence replies that he will contact Otis Air Base about the situation, and tells Bueno, “I’ll talk to these guys over here and see what we can do.” Bueno then adds that Flight 11 is currently airborne, is about 40 miles south of Albany, and is visible only on primary radar. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 4/19/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 9/30/2003 ] Bueno also calls the air traffic control tower at Otis Air Base around this time, to alert it to Flight 11 and request military assistance (see (Between 8:30 a.m. and 8:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 47; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 22] Whether he makes that call before or after he calls the Cape TRACON is unstated. Immediately after receiving the call from Bueno, Spence will call the Otis control tower to inform it of the situation, and he then calls the operations desk at Otis Air Base to let it know that it may be receiving orders (presumably from NEADS, NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector) soon (see (8:36 a.m.-8:41) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 9/30/2003 ] Bueno Supposedly Violating Protocol - Bueno will say he decided to call the Cape TRACON based on his memory of a previous aircraft hijacking. [9/11 COMMISSION, 9/22/2003 ] But according to the 9/11 Commission Report, by trying to get military assistance through the TRACON, the “Boston Center did not follow the protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of command.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] Indeed, Bueno will tell the 9/11 Commission that he knows his call should instead be to NEADS, “but due to the urgency of the circumstance [he] called directly to the FAA contact point for Otis.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 9/22/2003 ] And Spence will tell the Commission that arranging for fighters to be scrambled in response to a hijacking “is not the typical responsibility of an operations supervisor with the FAA,” like himself. He will also say that it is “unusual for the [air traffic control] centers to contact TRACON for information. Normally the FAA receives the call from the military for a scramble, but this time it went the other way around, and then the official order came back down from the military.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 9/30/2003 ] Bueno Praised by Colleagues for Actions - However, according to the 9/11 Commission, “Bueno gets high marks” from the Boston Center personnel it interviews, “for instinctively calling FAA traffic approach personnel at the location where he knew the fighters to be—Otis [Air National Guard Base].” Even Colin Scoggins, the Boston Center’s military liaison, “who knew that the call had to go to NEADS, did not fault Bueno for trying to call the Air Force wing directly through other FAA personnel.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 9/22/2003 ] Entity Tags: Cape Terminal Radar Approach Control, Daniel Bueno, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Tim Spence Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(8:34 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Flight Control Hears Hijacker Announcement

Flight controllers hear a hijacker on Flight 11 say to the passengers: “Nobody move, please, we are going back to the airport. Don’t try to make any stupid moves.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; BOSTON GLOBE, 11/23/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] This is the third hijacker transmission from Flight 11 heard by Boston Center. Following the previous two transmissions, controller Pete Zalewski had put the plane’s frequency on speakers so that others at the center could hear (see 8:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). This is therefore the first time some of them hear the hijacker’s voice. One controller says out loud, “That is really scary.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(8:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center Military Liaison Makes His First Call to NEADS, Though 9/11 Commission Does Not Mention It

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Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at Boston Center, claims he makes his first call to NEADS regarding Flight 11. He later recalls that he informs NEADS that the aircraft is “20 [miles] south of Albany, heading south at a high rate of speed, 600 knots.” Flight 11 was over Albany at 8:26 .

At such a high speed, it would have reached 20 miles south of there around 8:28. However, Scoggins says he is quite certain he only arrives on the floor at Boston Center at around 8:35. He says that although he’d later tried to write up a chronology of events, he “couldn’t get a timeline that made any sense.” Furthermore, Scoggins claims that even before he’d arrived, Joseph Cooper, a Boston Center air traffic management specialist, had already phoned NEADS about the hijacking. The 9/11 Commission Report makes no mention of either call. It says “the first notification received by the military—at any level—that American 11 had been hijacked” is when Boston Center calls NEADS just before 8:38 a.m. .

However, a report by ABC News is more consistent with Scoggins’ claims, indicating that Boston Center contacts NEADS about the hijacking earlier, at around 8:31. (Boston Center also contacts the FAA’s Cape Cod facility at 8:34 and requests that it notify the military about Flight 11 . Apparently around the same time, it tries contacting a military unit at Atlantic City .) Scoggins says he makes “about 40 phone calls to NEADS” in total on this day. NEADS Commander Robert Marr later comments that Scoggins “deserves a lot of credit because he was about the only one that was feeding us information. I don’t know exactly where he got it. But he was feeding us information as much as he could.”

8:37 a.m.-8:38 a.m. September 11, 2001: American Airlines Reports that Flight 11 Is a Confirmed Hijacking

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American Airlines manager Craig Marquis is talking to Nydia Gonzalez, who in turn is talking to flight attendant Betty Ong on Flight 11.

Marquis tells Gonzalez,

“We contacted air traffic control, they are going to handle this as a confirmed hijacking. So they’re moving all the traffic out of this aircraft’s way.… He turned his transponder off, so we don’t have a definitive altitude for him. We’re just going by… They seem to think that they have him on a primary radar. They seem to think that he is descending.”

Boston air traffic control had in fact begun notifying its chain of command that Flight 11 was a suspected hijacking at around 8:25

(8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center Notifies NEADS of Hijacking, against Normal Procedures; Accounts Conflict over Timing

Source:http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a837noradnotified#a837noradnotified

in a template Boston Center calls NEADS to alert it to the suspected hijacking of Flight 11. According to the 9/11 Commission, this is “the first notification received by the military—at any level—that American 11 had been hijacked.”

The call is made by Joseph Cooper, an air traffic controller at the Boston Center, and answered by Jeremy Powell, a technical sergeant on the NEADS operations floor. Beginning the call, Cooper says:

“Hi. Boston Center TMU [traffic management unit], we have a problem here. We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York, and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up there, help us out.”

Powell replies,

“Is this real-world or exercise?”

Cooper answers,

“No, this is not an exercise, not a test.”

Shortly into the call, Powell passes the phone on to Lieutenant Colonel Dawne Deskins . Deskins identifies herself to Cooper, and he tells her, “We have a hijacked aircraft and I need you to get some sort of fighters out here to help us out.”

The 1st Air Force’s official history of the response to the 9/11 attacks will later suggest that Boston Center is not following normal procedures when it makes this call to NEADS. It states:

“If normal procedures had taken place… Powell probably wouldn’t have taken that phone call. Normally, the FAA would have contacted officials at the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center who would have contacted the North American Aerospace Defense Command. The secretary of defense would have had to approve the use of military assets to assist in a hijacking, always considered a law enforcement issue.”

The only explanation it gives for this departure from protocol is that “nothing was normal on Sept. 11, 2001, and many say the traditional chain of command went by the wayside to get the job done.”

There will be some conflict between different accounts, as to when this vital call from Boston Center to NEADS occurs. An ABC News documentary will indicate it is made as early as 8:31 a.m. Another ABC News report will state, “Shortly after 8:30 a.m., behind the scenes, word of a possible hijacking [reaches] various stations of NORAD.” NEADS logs indicate the call occurs at 8:40 a.m., and NORAD will report this as the time of the call in a press release on September 18, 2001.

The 8:40 time will be widely reported in the media prior to the 9/11 Commission’s 2004 report. But tape recordings of the NEADS operations floor that are referred to in the 9/11 Commission Report place the call at 8:37 and 52 seconds. If the 8:37 a.m. time is correct, this would mean that air traffic controllers have failed to successfully notify the military until approximately 12 minutes after they became certain that Flight 11 had been hijacked , 16 minutes after Flight 11’s transponder signal was lost , and 24 minutes after the plane’s pilots made their last radio contact At 8:34, the Boston Center tried contacting the military through the FAA’s Cape Cod facility, which is located on Otis Air National Guard Base, but was told that it needed to call NEADS .

8:40 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Learns of Threat to Flight 11 Cockpit

One of the ID technicians at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) calls the FAA’s Boston Center, and learns that there have been “threats in the cockpit” of Flight 11. The communications team at NEADS is currently trying to quickly find out all they can about the hijacked plane, such as its flight number, tail number, and where it is. ID tech Shelley Watson calls the management desk at the Boston Center, which had alerted NEADS to the hijacking minutes earlier (see (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001), wanting to make sure she has all the information that is available on Flight 11. Her call is answered by Boston Center’s military liaison, Colin Scoggins. Scoggins tells Watson: “He’s being hijacked. The pilot’s having a hard time talking to the… I mean, we don’t know. We don’t know where he’s goin’. He’s heading towards Kennedy [International Airport in New York City]. He’s… 35 miles north of Kennedy now at 367 knots. We have no idea where he’s goin’ or what his intentions are.” Scoggins says, “I guess there’s been some threats in the cockpit,” and adds, “We’ll call you right back as soon as we know more info.” Master Sergeant Maureen Dooley is standing over Watson, relaying any pertinent information she hears to Major Kevin Nasypany. She calls to him, “Okay, he said threat to the cockpit!” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 34] Entity Tags: Shelley Watson, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Colin Scoggins, Kevin Nasypany, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Maureen Dooley Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(8:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: ’Hubbub’ at NEADS Headquarters Thought to Be Result of Exercise Scenario

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At NEADS, a huddle of people is gathered around one of the radar scopes. NEADS Commander Robert Marr initially thinks this hubbub is due to the NORAD training exercise (presumably Vigilant Guardian) that is taking place on this day . He will later recall:

“I’ve seen many exercises… and as I saw that huddle I said, ‘There’s got to be something wrong, something is happening here.’ You usually see that whenever they find a track on the scope that looks unusual; it’s usually an indicator that something is getting ready to kick off.”. 

According to Lynn Spencer, Marr thinks the day’s exercise

“is kicking off with a lively, unexpected twist.… His bet is that his simulations team has started off the exercise by throwing out a ‘heart attack card’ to see how the troops respond to a first-aid call from a fellow soldier, testing their first responder training.”

He sends Lt. Colonel Dawne Deskins, the regional mission crew commander for the exercise, to check out what is going on. Deskins speaks briefly over the phone with Boston Center about the Flight 11 hijacking . She then runs back to the “battle cab”—the glass-walled room that overlooks the NEADS operations floor—and speaks to Marr with urgency in her voice. She tells him: “It’s a hijacking, and this is real life, not part of the exercise. And it appears that the plane is heading toward New York City.” Although Deskins has specifically stated, “not part of the exercise,” Marr reportedly thinks, “This is an interesting start to the exercise.” According to Spencer, he thinks “This ‘real-world’ mixed in with today’s simex [simulated exercise] will keep [his staff members] on their toes.” Regardless of whether the crisis is real or not, Marr decides to instruct that the two alert F-15s at Otis Air National Guard Base be ordered to battle stations .

(8:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Fighter Pilots Unofficially Told to Get Ready to Scramble After Flight 11

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Major Daniel Nash (codenamed Nasty) and Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Duffy (codenamed Duff) are the two F-15 pilots who would scramble after Flight 11. Apparently, they get several informal calls warning to get ready.

According to Nash, at this time, a colleague at the Otis Air National Guard Base tells him that a flight out of Boston has been hijacked, and that he should be on alert. NEADS senior technician Jeremy Powell (informed about the hijacking at 8:37 a.m.), says that he telephones Otis Air National Guard Base soon thereafter to tell it to upgrade its “readiness posture.”

Boston flight control had tried calling the Otis base directly at 8:34 a.m., although the result of that call remains unclear. Duffy recalls being warned:

“I was just standing up by the ops desk and I was told I had a phone call. I asked who it was and they said the [Boston] tower calling and something about a hijacking. It was Flight American 11, a 767 , out of Boston going to California. At the time we ran in and got suited up.” [, 6/3/2002;

At NEADS, the mission crew commander Major Kevin Nasypany orders his Weapons Team, which controls the fighters, to put the Otis planes on “battle stations.” This means the two “alert” pilots are “jolted into action by a piercing ‘battle horn.’ They run to their jets, climb up, strap in, and do everything they need to do to get ready to fly short of starting the engines.” NEADS Commander Robert Marr is also reported as having ordered the Otis pilots to battle stations. Duffy confirms, “Halfway to the jets, we got ‘battle stations’… which means to get ready for action.”

The actual scramble order does not come until the pilots are already waiting in the fighters: “We went out, we hopped in the jets and we were ready to go—standby for a scramble order if we were going to get one.” Duffy continues, “I briefed Nasty on the information I had about the American Airlines Flight. About four-five minutes later, we got the scramble order and took off.” </ref name=aw63 />However, the official notification to scramble these fighters does not come until 8:46 a.m.

(8:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Air Traffic Control Centers Receive False Bomb Threats?

CNN reports that, while Flight 11 is heading toward the World Trade Center, “[S]ources say there were bomb threats called in to air traffic control centers adding to the chaos.”

One center receiving such threats is the FAA’s Boston Center, which handles air traffic over New England and monitors flights 11 and 175. Cleveland Center, which will monitor Flight 93, receives similar threats. Whether other centers are threatened is unstated. According to Newsweek , “Officials suspect that the bomb threats were intended to add to the chaos, distracting controllers from tracking the hijacked planes.” Yet, just weeks after 9/11, the Washington Post will claim,

“Federal aviation officials no longer believe that accomplices of the hijackers made phony bomb threats to confuse air traffic controllers on Sept. 11. Sources said reports of multiple threats were apparently the result of confusion during the early hours of the investigation and miscommunication in the Federal Aviation Administration .”

8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Notices Flight 11 Disappear from Its Radar Screens, Does Not Realize It Has Crashed

Flight 11 disappears from primary radar four seconds before it hits the North Tower of the World Trade Center (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), according to an FAA timeline. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ] At the FAA’s Boston Center, Colin Scoggins, the center’s military liaison, notices the loss of the plane’s primary radar track. As the center only monitors high-level air traffic, its radar information does not pick up aircraft below 1,500 feet. But Scoggins does not realize Flight 11 has crashed. The Boston Center’s last known position for the plane before it disappears is nine miles northeast of New York’s JFK International Airport. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 49] Entity Tags: Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Colin Scoggins Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Soon after 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: FBI Arrives at Boston Air Traffic Control Center

The FBI arrives at the FAA’s Boston Center, in Nashua, New Hampshire, “minutes after Flight 11 crashed into the World Trade Center,” and seizes tape recordings of radio transmissions from the hijacked plane. Boston Center handled Flight 11, and recorded intermittent radio transmissions from its cockpit (see (After 8:14 a.m.-8:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 9/13/2001] According to FAA spokeswoman Laura Brown, the FAA has to turn over all its records from 9/11 to the FBI immediately afterwards. She says it is not unusual for the FAA to turn over its records after a major disaster, but normally this is to the National Transportation Safety Board, not the FBI. [GRIFFIN, 2004, PP. 185] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Laura Brown, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center Seeks Information about Plane that Hit WTC, Military Liaison Wonders if It Was Flight 11

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Employees at the Boston Center learn that a plane has hit the World Trade Center, and Colin Scoggins, the center’s military liaison, starts to wonder if this plane was Flight 11, which disappeared from radar just before the time of the crash

After the center’s manager informs them that a plane has crashed into the WTC, personnel at the system engineer’s desk turn on CNN and see the footage of the burning North Tower. Scoggins hears yelling from the desk and walks over to see what is going on. He sees the news reports, which currently state that just a small aircraft hit the tower. As author Lynn Spencer will describe: “His initial thought is that some controller must have really screwed up. Yet the more he thinks about it, the less that makes sense. It’s a clear day with unlimited visibility, and planes don’t just fly into buildings.”

Along with supervisor Daniel Bueno, Scoggins starts contacting other facilities, trying to find out more about what is going on. Several of these facilities are picking up an aircraft’s emergency locator transmitter—a device which begins transmitting a signal when a plane crashes. But Boston Center lacks the necessary equipment to pinpoint where the signal is coming from. Looking again at the TV footage showing the WTC, Scoggins wonders if Flight 11 crashed into the tower. He tells Bueno, “Call American [Airlines] and confirm if their aircraft is down!” Bueno complies, but soon reports back that American Airlines “can’t confirm that the plane that has hit the Trade Center is American 11. They’ve lost their radar track on the plane and cannot confirm where it is.”

Scoggins will later recall that American Airlines does not confirm that its plane has hit the North Tower for several hours. He says, “With American Airlines, we could never confirm if it was down or not, so that left doubt in our minds.”

8:51 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Learns of Plane Hitting WTC, Informs FAA’s New York Center

Technicians on the operations floor at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) receive what is apparently their first notification that a plane has hit the World Trade Center, in a phone call from the FAA’s Boston Center. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] NEADS ID technicians are currently trying to locate Flight 11, when they are called by Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the Boston Center. ID tech Stacia Rountree answers the call. In response to Scoggins’s information, Rountree says to her colleagues, “A plane just hit the World Trade Center.” She asks Scoggins, “Was it American 11?” He tells her this is not confirmed. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 50] Another of the ID techs, Shelley Watson, starts murmuring in response to the news: “Oh my God. Oh God. Oh my God.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] A computer maintenance technician then runs onto the operations floor and announces that CNN is broadcasting that a 737 has hit the WTC. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 51] NEADS Calls New York Center - Master Sergeant Maureen Dooley, the leader of the ID techs, tells Watson: “Update New York! See if they lost altitude on that plane altogether.” Watson immediately calls the FAA’s New York Center and asks, “Did you just hear the information regarding the World Trade Center?” When the person who answers her call says no, Watson explains, “Being hit by an aircraft.” The person at New York Center says, “You’re kidding,” but Watson adds, “It’s on the world news.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] One of the NEADS technicians is finally able to display the live CNN coverage on one of the 15-foot screens at the front of the room. People stare in silence at the footage of the burning North Tower. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 51] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Shelley Watson, Maureen Dooley, Colin Scoggins, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Stacia Rountree Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(9:02 a.m.-9:07 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center Military Liaison Calls NEADS about Second Hijacking

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Moments before Flight 175 crashes into the World Trade Center, Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at Boston Center, calls NEADS to notify it that there is a second hijacked aircraft over the US. Scoggins learned of the second hijacking on the FAA headquarters’ hijack teleconference and senses that he should call NEADS with this latest information. According to Lynn Spencer, Scoggins

“imagines that he must be one of dozens of FAA facilities flooding [NEADS] with phone calls. What he doesn’t know is that his is in fact the only one giving them information about the flights this morning, other than the coverage on CNN.”

—Spencer, 

However, the 9/11 Commission will say that NEADS also learns of the second hijacking around this time from New York Center, stating,

“The first indication that the NORAD air defenders had of the second hijacked aircraft, United 175, came in a phone call from New York Center to NEADS at 9:03”

—Commission, .

Just after Scoggins reports the second hijacking to NEADS, those on the NEADS operations floor see the live television coverage of Flight 175 hitting the South Tower on a screen at the front of the room. Apparently, Scoggins’s phone call continues for several minutes: According to the 9/11 Commission,

“Between 9:04 a.m. and 9:07 a.m., the NEADS identification technicians were on the phone with FAA Boston Center seeking further information on Flight 175 when Boston Center confirmed a second crash at the World Trade Center.”

9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Tells FAA Regional Office that Hijackers Said ‘We Have Planes’; Office Suggests Notifying Military

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Over an FAA teleconference, Terry Biggio, the operations manager at Boston Center, reports to the FAA’s New England regional office the “We have some planes” comment apparently made by a Flight 11 hijacker at 8:24 a.m. .

Because the Boston Center controller monitoring Flight 11,Pete Zalewski, had not understood the communication, the center’s quality assurance specialist, Bob Jones, had been instructed to “pull the tape” of the transmission, listen to it carefully, and then report back. Biggio now reports to the New England region representative:

“I’m gonna reconfirm with, with downstairs, but the, as far as the tape, Bobby seemed to think the guy said that ‘we have planes.’ Now, I don’t know if it was because it was the accent, or if there’s more than one [hijacked plane], but I’m gonna, I’m gonna reconfirm that for you, and I’ll get back to you real quick. Okay?”

Another participant in the teleconference asks, “They have what?” and Biggio clarifies: “Planes, as in plural.… It sounds like, we’re talking to New York, that there’s another one aimed at the World Trade Center.… A second one just hit the Trade Center.” Tony, The Herndon representative replies: “Okay. Yeah, we gotta get—we gotta alert the military real quick on this.”

John White, a manager at the FAA’s Command Center is monitoring the teleconference, and so also learns of the “We have some planes” communication at this time .At 9:05 a.m., Biggio will confirm for the New England region representative—with the Command Center listening in—that a hijacker said, “we have planes” (forgetting the “some”).

9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Command Center Learns of Hijackers’ ‘We Have Some Planes’ Communication

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At the FAA’s Command Center, manager John White learns of the communication apparently made by a hijacker on Flight 11, stating “We have some planes” , and quickly notifies the national operations manager of this. Terry Biggio, the operations manager at the FAA’s Boston Center, is relaying all the information he has about Flight 11 to the Command Center’s teleconference. In the conference room at the Command Center, White is listening in. Because the air traffic controller monitoring Flight 11 had not understood the “We have some planes” hijacker communication, the Boston Center’s quality assurance specialist(bobby?) had been instructed to “pull the tape” of the transmission, listen to it carefully, and then report back. Having learned that the specialist has deciphered the transmission, Biggio now relays the details of it over the teleconference. Seconds later, those at the Command Center see Flight 175 crashing into the South Tower of the World Trade live on CNN. White promptly dispatches a manager to pass on the details of the transmission to Ben Sliney, the national operations manager at the Command Center . [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 79-80] The FAA’s New England regional office also learns of the “We have some planes” communication at this time (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001).

(9:04 a.m.-9:11 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Air Traffic Control Managers Ban Aircraft around New York and Washington

In a series of stages, air traffic control managers ban aircraft from flying near the cities targeted by the hijackers. All takeoffs and landings in New York City are halted within two minutes of the Flight 175 crash (see 9:05 a.m. September 11, 2001). Mike McCormick, the air traffic control manager at the FAA’s New York Center, makes the decision. The FAA’s Boston Center follows suit in the next few minutes. Around 9:08 a.m.-9:11 a.m., departures nationwide heading to or through the New York and Boston regions’ airspace are canceled. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/12/2002; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; NEWSDAY, 9/10/2002] In addition, “a few minutes” after 9:03 a.m., all takeoffs from Washington Reagan National Airport are stopped. [USA TODAY, 8/11/2002] Entity Tags: Mike McCormick, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(9:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Tells Boston Center Flight 175 Is Down, Manager Later Claims

Within minutes of the second World Trade Center tower being hit, United Airlines tells the FAA’s Boston Center that Flight 175 is down. This is according to Colin Scoggins, a civilian manager who is the military liaison at the Boston Center. Scoggins will later recall, “When we phoned United [after the second tower was hit], they confirmed that United 175 was down, and I think they confirmed that within two or three minutes.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] However, according to the 9/11 Commission, even though by 9:20 United Airlines suspects that the second plane to hit the WTC was Flight 175 (see Between 9:10 a.m. and 9:20 a.m. September 11, 2001), at that time the identity of the crashed aircraft is “still unconfirmed.” It is not until 9:22 that United issues an advisory to its facilities, stating that Flight 175 has been in an accident in New York (see 9:22 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 ] Entity Tags: Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Colin Scoggins, United Airlines Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

9:07 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Manager Wants Cockpit Security Warnings Sent to Aircraft

in a template This article has been assessed as havingUnknown importance.

Good scope?N Timeline? +Y wikified? +Y red links < 10?N all red links fixed?N referenced?N Illustrated?N Googled and added info? N Checked 9/11 records archives? N Checked Wikinews? N Checked Wikisource? N After conferring with the FAA’s New England regional office and contacting representatives of the Air Transport Association, Boston Center decides to issue a Notice to Airmen , warning pilots to heighten cockpit security. Following the second attack on the World Trade Center, Terry Biggio, the operations manager at the Boston Center, is concerned that there may be additional attacks. He therefore asks an unknown manager at the FAA’s New England regional office if warnings could be sent to airborne aircraft via “ACARS or something,” advising them to increase their cockpit security.

Biggio is particularly concerned about the need to warn airborne international flights that are scheduled to arrive at JFK International Airport . On the advice of an unknown New England Region representative, Boston Center decides to contact Air Transport Association representatives through the FAA’s Herndon Command Center and ask them to formally request that airlines warn their aircraft to heighten cockpit security. According to the 9/11 Commission, though, Biggio is “[n]ot content to rely on the airlines to warn their aircraft,” and so decides that the Boston Center will issue a Notice to Airmen (“NOTAM”) to heighten cockpit security in light of the attacks in New York. Two or three minutes later, controllers at the Boston Center will contact all the aircraft in their airspace by radio and advise them to increase cockpit security .

9:09 a.m.-9:10 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Controllers Give Cockpit Security Alert to All Their Aircraft

Terry Biggio, the operations manager at the FAA’s Boston Center, instructs the air traffic controllers at his center to contact all aircraft in the center’s airspace by radio and inform them of the events taking place in New York. He tells the controllers to also advise the aircraft to heighten their cockpit security in light of these events. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 23; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25 ] According to author Lynn Spencer, previously “No transmission of that kind has ever been made on air traffic control frequencies.” Controller Jim Ekins is the first to act. He announces over all the radio frequencies in the sector: “All aircraft! Due to recent events that have unfolded in the Boston sector, you are advised to increase cockpit security. Allow no entry to your cockpit!” According to Spencer, other controllers nearby overhear and realize: “Yes! That’s exactly what we need to tell them!” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 98] The Boston Center air traffic controllers then immediately execute Biggio’s order, and give the warning to their aircraft. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25 ] However, Spencer will write: “Communications with controllers are [usually] as dry as they come, and to many pilots this announcement is so out of their realm of understanding, training, and experience that it simply doesn’t make sense. It actually agitates some, who cannot help but view it as some new kind of ‘FAA bureaucratic bullsh_t.’” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 99] Boston Center will subsequently ask the FAA’s Herndon Command Center to issue a similar cockpit security alert nationwide, but the Command Center apparently will not act on this request (see (9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 23] United Airlines will issue a company-wide order at 9:21 for its dispatchers to warn their flights to secure their cockpits (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 455] Entity Tags: Terry Biggio, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Jim Ekins Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Air Traffic Control Center Mistakenly Tells NEADS Flight 11 Is Still Airborne

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According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS is contacted by Boston Center. Colin Scoggins, Boston Center’s military liaison, tells it:

“I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air, and it’s on its way towards—heading towards Washington.… That was another—it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower. That’s the latest report we have.… I’m going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he’s somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further south.”

The NEADS official asks: “He—American 11 is a hijack?… And he’s heading into Washington?” Scoggins answers yes both times and adds, “This could be a third aircraft.” Somehow Boston Center has been told by FAA headquarters that Flight 11 is still airborne, but the 9/11 Commission will say it hasn’t been able to find where this mistaken information came from.

Vanity Fair will later add, “In Boston, it is Colin Scoggins who has made the mistaken call.” Scoggins will explain why he believes he made this error: “With American Airlines, we could never confirm if [Flight 11] was down or not, so that left doubt in our minds.”

He says he was monitoring a conference call between FAA centers, “when the word came across—from whom or where isn’t clear—that American 11 was thought to be headed for Washington.” However, Boston Center was never tracking Flight 11 on radar after losing sight of it near Manhattan:

“The plane’s course, had it continued south past New York in the direction it was flying before it dipped below radar coverage, would have had it headed on a straight course toward DC. This was all controllers were going on.”

Scoggins says, “After talking to a supervisor, I made the call and said [American 11] is still in the air.”

In the hours following the attacks, acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers will apparently refer to this erroneous report that Flight 11 is still airborne and heading toward Washington, telling the Associated Press that “prior to the crash into the Pentagon, military officials had been notified that another hijacked plane had been heading from the New York area to Washington.” Myers will say “he assumed that hijacked plane was the one that hit the Pentagon, though he couldn’t be sure.”

9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Tells NEADS that Delta 1989 Is Missing

The FAA’s Boston Center contacts NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and reports that another aircraft, Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, is missing. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2004] Why the Boston Center does this is unclear, since Delta 1989 is currently being handled by the FAA’s Cleveland Center, not the Boston Center. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 10] And, according to the 9/11 Commission, Delta 1989 “never turned off its transponder,” so it should still be clearly visible on radar. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 16, 28] Twelve minutes later, at 9:39, Boston Center will call NEADS and incorrectly tell it that Delta 1989 is a possible hijack (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Entity Tags: Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center and NEADS Decide to Send Home Fighter Jets on Training

The traffic management unit (TMU) at the FAA’s Boston Center calls NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) to ask whether military planes out on training should be sent home. Boston Center asks, “The military aircraft that are in the air right now, we’re wondering if we should tell them to return to base if they’re just on training missions, or what you guys suggest?” NEADS replies, “No, they’re actually on the active air for the DO [director of operations] out there,” but adds, “We did send the ones home in 105 that were on the training mission.” This is presumably a reference to some fighters from Otis Air National Guard Base that were training in “Whiskey 105,” which is military training airspace southeast of Long Island (see (9:15 a.m.-9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Boston Center mentions that there are other military aircraft still airborne for training, and asks, “In general, anybody that’s training?” After consulting with colleagues, the member of staff at NEADS tells Boston, “Yes, go ahead and send them home.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001] NEADS was involved in a major training exercise this morning, though this was reportedly canceled shortly after the second WTC tower was hit (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, 1/25/2002; AIRMAN, 3/2002] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Informs NEADS of Possible Hijacking of Delta 1989

Stacia Rountree. [Source: Vanity Fair] Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, contacts NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and incorrectly notifies it that another aircraft, Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, is a possible hijacking. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Boston Center previously called NEADS at 9:27 and said that Delta 1989 was missing (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] NEADS Technicians Respond - At NEADS, Stacia Rountree, the ID technician who takes Scoggins’s call, announces to her colleagues: “Delta ‘89, that’s the hijack. They think it’s possible hijack.… South of Cleveland.” The plane’s transponder is still on, and she adds, “We have a code on him now.” Rountree’s team leader, Master Sergeant Maureen Dooley, instructs: “Pick it up! Find it!” The NEADS technicians quickly locate Delta 1989 on their radar screens, just south of Toledo, Ohio, and start alerting other FAA centers to it. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 177] NEADS mission crew commander Major Kevin Nasypany will be notified by his staff of the suspected hijacking at about 9:41 or 9:42 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/22/2004 ] NEADS never loses track of Delta 1989. It will follow it on radar as it reverses course over Toledo, heads east, and then lands in Cleveland (see (10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28] It will order Air National Guard fighter jets from Selfridge and Toledo to intercept the flight (see (9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 10:01 a.m. September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178-179] But it will soon learn that Delta 1989 is not in fact hijacked. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28] Cleveland Center, Not Boston, Handling Delta 1989 - Although Boston Center notifies NEADS of the suspected hijacking, Delta 1989 is in fact being handled by the FAA’s Cleveland Center. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 10-12] Cleveland Center air traffic controllers suspected that Delta 1989 had been hijacked at around 9:30 a.m. (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but apparently only informed the FAA’s Command Center, and not NEADS, of this. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002] To explain why Boston Center alerts NEADS to the flight, the 9/11 Commission will later comment that, “Remembering the ‘we have some planes’ remark” (see 8:24 a.m. September 11, 2001), the Boston Center simply “guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked.” Similar to First Two Hijacked Planes - Like Flights 11 and 175, the two aircraft that have crashed into the World Trade Center (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), Delta 1989 took off from Boston’s Logan Airport. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27-28] According to the New York Times, it left there at about the same time as Flights 11 and 175 did, meaning around 8:00 to 8:15 a.m. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/18/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 32] Like those two aircraft, it is a Boeing 767. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27-28] But, unlike those flights, its transponder has not been turned off, and so it is still transmitting a beacon code. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] It is unclear what Delta 1989’s intended destination is. According to some accounts, like Flights 11 and 175 were, it is bound for Los Angeles. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/18/2001; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; ARIZONA DAILY STAR, 9/24/2007; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 167] Other accounts will say that its destination is Las Vegas. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Personnel at NEADS are apparently informed that Las Vegas is the intended destination. Around this time, one member of staff there tells her colleagues that the flight is “supposed to go to Vegas.” [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001] One of Numerous Incorrect Reports - The 9/11 Commission will comment: “During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft (see (9:09 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001). The report of American 11 heading south was the first (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001); Delta 1989 was the second.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28] Entity Tags: Maureen Dooley, Stacia Rountree, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Colin Scoggins, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Kevin Nasypany Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Air Traffic Control Center Evacuated following Report of Airborne Threat

The FAA’s Boston Center is evacuated after it receives a report that an unidentified aircraft is heading its way. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/20/2001; USA TODAY, 8/11/2002; NEW HAMPSHIRE UNION LEADER, 9/11/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 243] The Boston Center, located in Nashua, New Hampshire, manages air traffic above New England, and monitored Flight 11 and Flight 175 earlier on. [USA TODAY, 8/11/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/12/2002] Employees there are already concerned because a large tractor-trailer has parked directly in front of their facility, on New Hampshire’s Route 3. State police have been called to get it away from there. Possible Airborne Threat Leads to Evacuation - The FAA’s New England regional office in Burlington, Massachusetts, now calls the Boston Center and reports that an unidentified aircraft is heading for the facility. In response to this potential threat, managers at the center immediately order the closure and evacuation of their building. They also declare “ATC zero,” which shuts down the Boston Center’s airspace (see (Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Employees run from the building while managers try to decide which, if any, personnel should remain in the facility. According to Colin Scoggins, the center’s military liaison, “at this time we honestly felt that we were targeted and an impact was imminent.” Bomb Threat to Childcare Facility - Making matters worse, a bomb scare phone call is received at the center’s childcare facility, which is the employees’ usual evacuation point. Center managers therefore decide that everyone must leave the building. Employees are advised to go to either 11 Murphy Drive—an FAA administrative facility—or a nearby Holiday Inn. According to Scoggins, three or four Flight Service Data Processing System personnel remain in the basement of the Boston Center when it is evacuated, apparently because there is no paging system in their office on which they can receive the evacuation order. Evacuation Time Unclear - The time the evacuation takes place at is unclear. According to the account of author Lynn Spencer, it occurs some time shortly after 10:20 a.m. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/20/2001; USA TODAY, 8/11/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 242-243] At 10:34 a.m., John White, a manager at the FAA’s Command Center, reports that the Boston Center “has received a threat,” and is “going down to skeleton staffing.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 11/4/2003] A 10:52 a.m. entry in the log of the FAA headquarters’ teleconference will state that the Boston Center is “evacuating the building.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002 ] USA Today will report that the center is evacuated at “about 11 a.m.” Few Employees Return to Building - About 30 minutes to an hour after the building is evacuated, some of the center’s personnel will return to work. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/20/2001; USA TODAY, 8/11/2002] By 12:16 p.m., the center is back in operation, but with only a skeleton staff. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002 ] Suspicious Aircraft Only a Coast Guard Plane - As it turns out, the approaching aircraft that prompts the evacuation is just a Coast Guard plane. According to Scoggins, “We had already identified it.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/20/2001] The aircraft was noted in a 10:18 a.m. entry in the log of the FAA headquarters’ teleconference, which stated: “Aircraft 160 miles east of Nantucket is headed westbound toward Boston at a high rate of speed.” But a log entry five minutes later, at 10:23 a.m., noted that the aircraft “is identified as a Coast Guard flight from Nantucket.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002 ] Shortly before the Boston Center is alerted to this aircraft, Scoggins had been tracking what is apparently another unidentified target on his radar screen: a slow-moving large aircraft that is also flying toward the Boston Center from the east (see (10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 242-243] The identity of that aircraft is unclear. Entity Tags: Colin Scoggins, Federal Aviation Administration, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA’s Boston Center Declares ‘ATC Zero’

Managers at the FAA’s Boston Center declare “air traffic control zero” (“ATC zero”), which completely shuts down the center’s airspace, after a report is received of a possible airborne threat to their facility. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/20/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 243] The Boston Center in Nashua, New Hampshire, has received a call from the FAA’s New England regional office, informing it that an unidentified aircraft is heading its way. In response, the center’s managers immediately order the evacuation of the facility (see (Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). At the same time, they make the declaration of ATC zero. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 243] The declaration of ATC zero means aircraft are not permitted to depart from, arrive at, or travel through the center’s airspace until further notice. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 24 ] According to author Lynn Spencer, ATC zero means all the aircraft a center is handling are pushed “onto neighboring sectors, and any new airplanes from adjacent sectors are turned back, at the sector boundaries if necessary.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 68] Although the exact time the managers declare ATC zero at is unclear, the Boston Center notifies the FAA’s Herndon Command Center of the declaration at 10:35 a.m. At 11:41 a.m., the ATC zero alert at the Boston Center is canceled. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 3/21/2002 ] The FAA’s New York Center declared ATC zero at 9:05 a.m. (see 9:05 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 24 ] Entity Tags: Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

see also

[6] transcript