Larry Arnold

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Larry Arnold

Timeline

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May 19, 1997: Military Review Suggests Cutting Fighter Protection over US; Several Bases Are Discontinued

William Cohen. [Source: US Department of Defense] Secretary of Defense William Cohen issues a comprehensive assessment of America’s defense requirements, called the Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This is a six-month analysis of the “threats, risks and opportunities for US national security,” and reviews all aspects of the US defense strategy. [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 5/19/1997] Among other things, the 1997 QDR outlines the conversion of six continental air defense squadrons to general purpose, training or other missions. It calls for there being just four “alert” air defense sites around the US: at Otis, Massachusetts; Homestead, Florida; Riverside, California; and Portland, Oregon. [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 5/1997; FILSON, 2003, PP. 348] Major General Larry Arnold, who is commanding general of NORAD’s Continental Region on 9/11, later says: “The QDR didn’t make any sense at all. [T]here was a fight just to maintain the number of alert sites that we had. We felt we could operate fairly reasonably with about ten sites and thought eight was the absolute highest risk we could take.” NORAD Commander in Chief General Howell M. Estes III has written to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a minimum of seven alert sites are needed to maintain America’s air sovereignty. In the end, three extra alert sites are added to the four suggested in the QDR. These are at Hampton, Virginia; Panama City, Florida; and Ellington, Texas. Larry Arnold later says, “I didn’t feel particularly comfortable with seven [alert sites] because there are great large distances between the alert sites.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 36] Other bases will lose their NORAD air defense functions over the next year, including those in Fresno, California; Fargo, North Dakota; Duluth, Minnesota; Burlington, Vermont; Atlantic City, New Jersey; and Great Falls, Montana. [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 5/1997] Of these closed bases, the most critical loss on 9/11 will be the Atlantic City, New Jersey base, located about halfway between New York City and Washington. Boston air traffic control, apparently unaware the base has lost its air defense function will try and fail to contact the base shortly after learning about the first hijacking of the morning, Flight 11 (see (8:34 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Howell M. Estes III, Larry Arnold, William S. Cohen Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(December 1997-2001): Number of Alert Air Bases Inadequate to Protect against Airborne Terrorism, NORAD Commander Says Major General Larry Arnold, who became commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR) in December 1997, fights to preserve the resources assigned to US air sovereignty (see May 19, 1997 and Late August 2001). To emphasize the need for air bases with fighter jets on alert, Arnold frequently gives a presentation describing “asymmetric” threats and including a slide featuring Osama bin Laden. As Arnold will later recall: “[W]e thought that the biggest threat to the US in the briefing that I always gave… was going to come from an asymmetric threat, from a terrorist or a rogue nation, or maybe associated with the drug cartels to some degree. The picture that we used to have on one of our slides there, dating all the way back to 1997 and 1998, was Osama bin Laden.” [FILSON, 2002] Colonel Alan Scott, who serves under Arnold at CONR, will later describe the “El Paso example” that Arnold uses to illustrate the need for more alert sites. Scott says: “We had fairly large gaps between our seven alert sites pre-9/11. The largest was between Riverside, CA, and Houston, TX. El Paso, TX, was in the middle of those two alert sites. There was no perceived ‘military’ threat from Mexico. As the threat of terrorism arose, General Arnold began to use the example in his talks to various groups. The example was that if a terrorist called and said in one hour he would overfly El Paso, TX, and spray deadly gas, we would watch it live on CNN because we could not get aircraft to that location in time to stop the attack.” [FILSON, 7/14/2002] Entity Tags: Larry Arnold, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Alan Scott Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Between 1998 and 2001: Pentagon Official Concerned about Plane Being Used as a Weapon

Joseph Eash. [Source: Department of Defense] A Defense Department official expresses concern about the possibility of an aircraft being used as a weapon to cause massive damage. At some point during his tenure as commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR), Major General Larry Arnold briefs Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Technology Joseph Eash about proposed cruise missile defense initiatives. Arnold suggests to Eash the scenario of a cruise missile with a weapon of mass destruction being launched into the US. But Eash is concerned about an attack carried out using a plane that takes off within the US. As Arnold will later recount, Eash tells him, “I’m worried about someone taking an airplane off from within the US and using it as a weapon of mass destruction.” Arnold will comment, “I don’t think he envisioned someone hijacking an airliner and crashing it into the World Trade Center, but I think he envisioned a light airplane or business jet that had been stolen, either to drop some chemicals or biological agents, or maybe even to crash it.” [FILSON, 2002] Entity Tags: Joseph Eash, Larry Arnold Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

1999: Air Force Study Warns against Neglecting Air Sovereignty; Threat of Terrorism Highlighted As the military community is discussing the future of continental air defense in a post-Cold War world (see May 19, 1997), Major General Larry Arnold, the commander of the 1st Air Force, orders a study to review the Air Force’s air sovereignty mission. At his request, Major General Paul Pochmara forms a 12-member roles and mission (RAM) team to gather information and ideas on the subject. The team has a one-hour presentation that outlines the military’s responsibility for protecting the nation’s air sovereignty. Major General Mike Haugen, a member of the team, will later say that the group discusses everything from technology to the future of the air sovereignty mission to the terrorist threat. Haugen will say: “We made some pretty bold predictions in our briefing.… In fact, it included a photo of Osama bin Laden as the world’s most dangerous terrorist.… We didn’t predict how the terrorists would strike but predicted they would strike.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 37-38] A 9/11 Commission memorandum will add, “Osama bin Laden is featured on the cover of the brief developed by the RAM team, and he figures prominently in the study.” Colonel Alan Scott of the Continental US NORAD Region will tell the Commission: “As we started talking about Osama bin Laden, the examples we gave in our mission brief were the first WTC bombing, the Tokyo subway, Oklahoma City bombing, and Atlanta Olympics. What we did was connect those dots. The conclusion we drew was that we had a viable threat.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/9/2004] Entity Tags: Mike Haugen, Paul Pochmara, Alan Scott, Larry Arnold, North American Aerospace Defense Command, 1st Air Force Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

February 2000: Fear of Airborne Terror Attack Keeps Air Defense Chief ‘Awake at Night’

Major General Larry Arnold, the commander of the 1st Air Force whose mission includes the protection of the continental US against air attacks, tells the Associated Press that he is deeply worried by the possibility of an airborne terrorist attack. He says: “I lie awake worrying. It is one thing to put a truck inside the twin trade towers and blow it up. It is quite another to be able to fly a weapon across our borders. That is an attack, a direct attack, an unambiguous attack from outside our country.” In 1999, a study commissioned by Arnold emphasized the continued importance of the Air Force’s air sovereignty mission and the threat of terrorism (see 1999). [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2/1/2000; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/2/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 92] As one of the top commanders of NORAD, Arnold will play a pivotal role on the morning of 9/11 (see (After 8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001, (10:08 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001, and 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20, 42] Entity Tags: Larry Arnold Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

===Late August 2001: NORAD Commander Fights to Keep Air Defense Plan Alive; Senior Officer Is Oblivious to Terror Threat

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Major General Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR), struggles to maintain funding for a plan to defend against a cruise missile attack by terrorists. Arnold has long been worried by the US’s vulnerability to an airborne attack by terrorists (see 1999 and February 2000). But, as he will later recount, not everyone shares his concern. He will say: “Just two weeks before September 11, 2001, I had met with Vice Admiral Martin Mayer, the deputy commander in chief of Joint Forces Command located in Norfolk, Virginia. He had informed me that he intended to kill all funding for a plan my command had been working on for two years, that would defend against a cruise missile attack by terrorists. While I convinced Admiral Mayer to continue his funding support, he told me in front of my chief of staff, Colonel Alan Scott; Navy Captain David Stewart, the lead on the project; and my executive officer, Lt. Col. Kelley Duckett, that our concern about Osama bin Laden as a possible threat to America was unfounded and that, to repeat, ‘If everyone would just turn off CNN, there wouldn’t be a threat from Osama bin Laden.’” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 289] Entity Tags: David Stewart, Alan Scott, Kelley Duckett, Larry Arnold, Osama bin Laden, Martin Mayer Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks

September 2001: Fighters from Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, Deployed to Saudi Arabia for Operation Southern Watch

F-15s from the 1st Fighter Wing at Langley Air Force Base patrol the southern no-fly zone in support of Operation Southern Watch. [Source: Jack Braden / United States Air Force] At the time of the 9/11 attacks, the 94th Fighter Squadron, which is stationed at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, is away on a 90-day combat deployment to Saudi Arabia for Operation Southern Watch, to enforce the no-fly zone over southern Iraq. Two days before 9/11, on September 9, the 27th Fighter Squadron, which is also stationed at Langley AFB, returns from Saudi Arabia, where it has been performing the same mission. [BBC, 12/29/1998; AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION, 10/2/2002; 1ST FIGHTER ASSOCIATION, 2003] The 94th and 27th Fighter Squadrons are two of the three F-15 fighter squadrons that are part of the 1st Fighter Wing, which is the “host unit” at Langley AFB. The third of these is the 71st Fighter Squadron. Between them, the three squadrons have 54 “primary assigned” F-15C fighter jets. [LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, 11/2003; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 2/12/2006] On September 11, most of the F-15s of the 71st FS are also away from base, for the Red Flag exercise in Nevada (see (Late August-September 17, 2001)). [VIRGINIAN-PILOT, 9/24/2001; LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, 9/15/2006] Langley Jets Not Part of NORAD Alert Unit - Langley Air Force Base, which is 130 miles south of the Pentagon, is one of two “alert sites” that NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) can call upon to get jets quickly launched. However, the F-15s of the 1st Fighter Wing are not involved in this mission. Instead, that task belongs to the North Dakota Air National Guard’s 119th Fighter Wing, which has a small detachment at Langley AFB and keeps two fighter jets there ready to take off when required. [USA TODAY, 9/16/2001; AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, 2/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 17; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 114] Despite not being part of the NORAD alert unit, aircraft from the 1st Fighter Wing are involved in the military response to the 9/11 attacks. Jets belonging to the 27th FS are airborne within two hours of the attacks, “providing protection for the National Command Authority and the rest of the nation’s civilian and military leadership.” [AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION, 10/2/2002] And F-15s belonging to the 71st FS are launched from Langley AFB following the attacks, to patrol the skies of the East Coast. [LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, 1/2005; 1ST FIGHTER ASSOCIATION, 3/14/2006] Possible Effect on 9/11 Response - Whether the deployment of the 94th Fighter Squadron to Saudi Arabia diminishes Langley AFB’s ability to respond on 9/11 is unknown. However, Air Force units are cycled through deployments like Operation Southern Watch by the Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) Center, which is at Langley Air Force Base. And according to NORAD Commander Larry Arnold, “Prior to Sept. 11, we’d been unsuccessful in getting the AEF Center to be responsible for relieving our air defense units when they went overseas.” [AIR FORCE PRINT NEWS, 6/2000; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 12/21/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 99] Entity Tags: 71st Fighter Squadron, 94th Fighter Squadron, Operation Southern Watch, Larry Arnold, 27th Fighter Squadron, Langley Air Force Base Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

September 7-8, 2001: High Level Air Force Discussions Call for Dismantling NORAD’s Alert Sites

The future of “continental air sovereignty” over America is in doubt. Discussions at the Air Force’s highest levels call for the dismantling of NORAD’s seven “alert” sites around the US and its command and control structure. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 149] Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental Region, will later add that “the secretary of the Air Force, James G. Roche, stated that he and the then chief of staff of the Air Force, General John Jumper, had decided to withdraw funding for air defense, and they had made that decision on September 7, 2001.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 289] Earlier in the summer of 2001, “a reduction in air defenses had been gaining currency in recent months among task forces assigned by [Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld to put together recommendations for a reassessment of the military” (see Summer 2001). [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/15/2001] Entity Tags: US Department of the Air Force, Larry Arnold, John P. Jumper, James G. Roche, North American Aerospace Defense Command Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(8:38 a.m.-8:43 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NORAD Personnel Mistake Hijacking for Part of an Exercise

Major Kevin Nasypany. [Source: CBC] When the FAA’s Boston Center first contacts NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) to notify it of the hijacking of Flight 11 (see (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001), personnel there initially mistake the hijacking for a simulation as part of an exercise.

Lieutenant Colonel Dawne Deskins, mission crew chief for the Vigilant Guardian exercise currently taking place (see (6:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), will later say that initially she and everybody else at NEADS think the call from Boston Center is part of Vigilant Guardian. [NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, 1/25/2002] Although most of the personnel on the NEADS operations floor have no idea what the day’s exercise is supposed to entail, most previous major NORAD exercises included a hijack scenario. [USA TODAY, 4/18/2004; UTICA OBSERVER-DISPATCH, 8/5/2004] The day’s exercise is in fact scheduled to include a simulated hijacking later on. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] 
Major Kevin Nasypany, the NEADS mission crew commander, had helped design the day’s exercise. Thinking the reported hijacking is part of it, he actually says out loud, “The hijack’s not supposed to be for another hour.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] 
In the ID section, at the back right corner of the NEADS operations floor, technicians Stacia Rountree, Shelley Watson, and Maureen Dooley react to the news. Dooley, the leader of the ID section, tells the other members of her team: “We have a hijack going on. Get your checklists. The exercise is on” (see (8:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Rountree asks, “Is that real-world?” Dooley confirms, “Real-world hijack.” Watson says, “Cool!” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 25] 
When NEADS Commander Robert Marr sees his personnel reacting to the news of the hijacking (see (8:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001), he reportedly thinks the day’s exercise “is kicking off with a lively, unexpected twist.” Even when a colleague informs him, “It’s a hijacking, and this is real life, not part of the exercise,” Marr thinks: “This is an interesting start to the exercise. This ‘real-world’ mixed in with today’s simex [simulated exercise] will keep [my staff members] on their toes.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 26] 
Major General Larry Arnold, who is at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, also later says that when he first hears of the hijacking, in the minutes after NEADS is alerted to it, “The first thing that went through my mind was, is this part of the exercise? Is this some kind of a screw-up?” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] According to author Lynn Spencer: “Even as NORAD’s commander for the continental United States, Arnold is not privy to everything concerning the exercise. The simex is meant to test commanders also, to make sure that their war machine is operating as it should.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 38] 
At 8:43 a.m., Major James Fox, the leader of the NEADS weapons team, comments, “I’ve never seen so much real-world stuff happen during an exercise.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006]

Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Shelley Watson, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Stacia Rountree, Robert Marr, Maureen Dooley, Vigilant Guardian, Kevin Nasypany, Dawne Deskins, Larry Arnold, James Fox Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(After 8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NORAD Scramble Order Moves Through Official and Unofficial Channels

NORAD commander Larry Arnold. [Source: US Air Force] NORAD gives the command to scramble fighters after Flight 11 after receiving Boston’s call (see (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Lieutenant Colonel Dawne Deskins at NEADS tells Colonel Robert Marr, head of NEADS, “I have FAA on the phone, the shout line, Boston [flight control]. They said they have a hijacked aircraft.” Marr then calls Major General Larry Arnold at the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. Arnold is just coming out of a teleconference with the NORAD staff, and is handed a note informing him of the possible hijacking, and relaying Marr’s request that he call him immediately. He goes downstairs and picks up the phone, and Marr tells him, “Boss, I need to scramble [fighters at] Otis [Air National Guard Base].” Arnold recalls, “I said go ahead and scramble them, and we’ll get the authorities later.” Arnold then calls the operations deputy at NORAD’s Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado headquarters to report. The operations deputy tells him, “Yeah, we’ll work this with the National Military Command Center. Go ahead and scramble the aircraft.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 56; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Upon receiving this authorization from Larry Arnold, NEADS orders the scramble and then calls Canadian Captain Mike Jellinek at NORAD’s operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, in order to get NORAD commander in chief approval for it (see (8.46 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002] Yet, according to the 1st Air Force’s own book about 9/11, the “sector commander [at NEADS] would have authority to scramble the airplanes.” Military controllers at NEADS are only a hot line call away from the pilots on immediate alert. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 50-52] Why NEADS calls the CONR headquarters at Tyndall, then NORAD’s Colorado operations center, to get authorization to launch fighters after Flight 11, is unclear. Entity Tags: Mike Jellinek, Robert Marr, Dawne Deskins, Larry Arnold, Federal Aviation Administration, National Military Command Center Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

8:45 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Commanders Give Order to Launch Otis Jets

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On the operations floor at NEADS, Major Kevin Nasypany, the facility’s mission crew commander, instructs Major James Fox, the leader of the weapons team, to launch fighter jets from Otis Air National Guard Base .

Nasypany has just received this order—to launch the jets—from Colonel Robert Marr, the NEADS battle commander. Marr issued it after seeking permission to do so from Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental Region (CONR).

Marr will later claim, “My intent was to scramble Otis to military airspace while we found out what was going on.” Nasypany gives Fox a coordinate for just north of New York City, and tells him, “Head ‘em in that direction.”

The jets will be scrambled from Otis a minute later , but there will be conflicting accounts of what their initial destination is .

The 9/11 Commission will later state that, “Because of a technical issue, there are no NEADS recordings available of the NEADS senior weapons director and weapons director technician position responsible for controlling the Otis scramble.”

(8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Fighters Head toward New York Area; Accounts Conflict over Exact Destination

Route of the Otis Air National Guard fighters to New York City. [Source: Yvonne Vermillion/ MagicGraphix.com] The two F-15 fighter jets launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod respond to the hijacking of Flight 11, but there will be conflicting accounts regarding their initial destination. The fighters were scrambled at 8:46 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), and are airborne by 8:53 (see 8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] Flying toward New York City - News reports shortly after 9/11 will say that, after taking off, the Otis fighters begin “racing towards New York City.” [CBS NEWS, 9/14/2001; CNN, 9/14/2001; CAPE COD TIMES, 9/15/2001] Other news reports similarly say they initially head toward New York City. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; FOX NEWS, 9/8/2002] Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental Region, will say the fighters are “coming to New York.” [MSNBC, 9/23/2001; SLATE, 1/16/2002] Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy, the lead Otis pilot, tells the BBC, “When we took off we started climbing a 280-heading, basically towards New York City.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] In one account, Duffy recalls that, after launching, he calls for the location of his target and is told, “Your contact’s over Kennedy,” meaning New York’s JFK International Airport. Duffy will add, “[W]e started heading right down to Long Island, basically.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002; BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 15] In another account, he says that he and the other Otis pilot, Major Daniel Nash, “climbed up, [and] we were supersonic going down to Long Island.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 57] Without a Target, Heading for Military Airspace - According to some accounts, however, the two Otis fighters do not initially head toward Manhattan. Major James Fox, the leader of the weapons team at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), will later recall: “We had no idea where [Flight 11] was. We just knew it was over land, so we scrambled [the Otis fighters] towards land.” [NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, 1/25/2002] The 9/11 Commission will conclude that, after taking off, because they are “Lacking a target,” the fighters are “vectored toward military-controlled airspace off the Long Island coast.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] Colonel Robert Marr, the battle commander at NEADS, says that when the Otis fighters took off, his “intent was to scramble [them] to military airspace while we found out what was going on.” He says that, before 9:03 when the second World Trade Center tower is hit, the fighters are “heading down south toward Whiskey 105 and we don’t really have a mission for them at this point.” Whiskey 105 is military training airspace southeast of Long Island, a few minutes flying time from New York City. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 56 AND 58-59] To New York, then Redirected to Military Airspace - Other accounts will say the Otis fighters initially head toward New York City, but are subsequently redirected to the military airspace off Long Island. According to author Lynn Spencer, after taking off, Duffy and Nash fly “supersonic toward New York for approximately 15 minutes.” But just after the second WTC tower is hit, Duffy suggests to the weapons controller at NEADS that the two fighters head to the Whiskey 105 training airspace off Long Island, and that is where they then go. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 83-85] Tape recordings of the NEADS operations floor will reveal that, at 8:45 a.m., Major Kevin Nasypany, the facility’s mission crew commander, gave Major Fox a coordinate north of New York City, and told him to “Head [the Otis jets] in that direction” (see 8:45 a.m. September 11, 2001). Then, at 8:52, he told one of his staff members, “Send ‘em to New York City still” (see 8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). But, according to Vanity Fair, shortly after the second tower is hit, the NEADS weapons technicians get “pushback” from civilian FAA controllers, who are “afraid of fast-moving fighters colliding with a passenger plane,” so the two fighters are directed to a “holding area” just off the coast, near Long Island (see 9:09 a.m.-9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001). [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Accounts are also unclear regarding what speed the Otis jets fly at after taking off (see (8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: James Fox, Larry Arnold, Daniel Nash, Robert Marr, Timothy Duffy Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Fighters Fly toward New York Area; Accounts Unclear over Speed

The two F-15 fighter jets that took off from Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod head toward the New York area. But accounts will be unclear regarding what speed they fly at as they respond to the hijacking of Flight 11. The two jets were scrambled from Otis at 8:46 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), and are airborne by 8:53 (see 8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] Flying Supersonic - In a number of accounts, it is claimed the fighters fly faster than the speed of sound. [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002] Lead pilot Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy will tell the BBC: “I was supersonic.… I don’t know what we could have done to get there any quicker.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] He tells ABC News, “[W]e go supersonic on the way, which is kind of nonstandard for us.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] According to author Lynn Spencer, “against regulations, [Duffy] takes his plane supersonic, breaking the sound barrier as he passes through 18,000 feet. This is a violation that can get a pilot into a good deal of trouble since the sonic boom tends to break windows in the homes down below.” When the other Otis pilot, Major Daniel Nash, radios and says, “You’re supersonic,” Duffy responds, “Yeah, I know, don’t worry about it.” Then, “Without hesitation, [Nash] follows his lead” and also goes supersonic. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 43] Flying 'Full Blower' - Duffy will recall, “I was in full blower all the way,” as he flies toward New York. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002] In another account, he similarly says, “When we took off I left it in full afterburner the whole time.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 57] F-15s can fly at up to 1,875 miles per hour. [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/12/2001; US AIR FORCE, 3/2008] According to an Otis Air Base spokeswoman, “An F-15 departing from Otis can reach New York City in 10 to 12 minutes.” [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/16/2001] But, according to the Boston Globe, while “In their prime, the planes can go Mach 2.5 [and] could have been to New York in less than 10 minutes,” Duffy and Nash are “flying F-15 Eagles that were built in 1977.… Because of their age and the three large fuel tanks they were carrying… the planes couldn’t attain that speed, both pilots said.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/11/2005] Different Speeds Given - Various speeds will later be given for how fast the Otis jets are traveling. Consistent with Duffy’s claims of flying “supersonic,” ABC News says the two fighters fly “at Mach 1.2, nearly 900 miles per hour.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] According to the Boston Globe, the fighters are flying at “about Mach 1.4—more than 1,000 miles per hour.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/11/2005] Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental Region, says they fly at “about 1.5 Mach, which is, you know, somewhere—11 or 1,200 miles an hour.” [MSNBC, 9/23/2001; SLATE, 1/16/2002] Major General Paul Weaver, the director of the Air National Guard, says the jets fly “like a scalded ape,” but as to their exact speed, he only says they are “topping 500 mph.” [DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 9/16/2001] And by 9:03 a.m., when the second World Trade Center tower is hit, the Otis fighters are still 71 miles from New York, according to NORAD. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001] The 9/11 Commission will state that they only arrive over Manhattan at 9:25 a.m. (see 9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001), though accounts of most witnesses on the ground indicate they do not arrive until after 10:00 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.-10:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] Accounts are contradictory regarding what exact destination the Otis jets are initially heading toward after taking off (see (8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Timothy Duffy, Paul Weaver, Larry Arnold, Daniel Nash Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NORAD Training Exercise Canceled

A NORAD training exercise that is taking place this morning, presumably Vigilant Guardian (see (6:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), is reportedly canceled shortly after 9:03, when the second World Trade Center tower is hit. [AIRMAN, 3/2002] NORAD Commander Larry Arnold later says that after Flight 175 hits the South Tower, “I thought it might be prudent to pull out of the exercise, which we did.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 59] According to author Lynn Spencer: “The phone calls start flying between the various NORAD command centers. General Arnold calls Maj. Gen. Rick Findley” at NORAD’s operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, “to give him the latest information and have him withdraw all forces from the simulated exercise.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 86] Arnold will recall, “As we pulled out of the exercise we were getting calls about United Flight 93 and we were worried about that.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 59] Some early accounts say the military receives notification of the possible hijacking of Flight 93 at around 9:16 a.m. (see 9:16 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/17/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] However, the 9/11 Commission will later claim that NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) first receives a call about Flight 93 at 10:07 a.m. (see 10:05 a.m.-10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Arnold will add, “Then we had another call from Boston Center about a possible hijacking, but that turned out to be the airplane that had already hit the South Tower but we didn’t know that at the time.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 59] Entity Tags: Larry Arnold, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Vigilant Guardian, Rick Findley Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Fighter Jets Running out of Fuel

Because the two fighter jets launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to Flight 11 expended a large amount of fuel as they flew toward the New York area (see (8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001), there are now concerns about getting them refueled. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] The jets are currently flying a “holding pattern” in “Whiskey 105,” which is military training airspace just south of Long Island, over the Atlantic Ocean (see 9:09 a.m.-9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001). Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy, the lead Otis pilot, reports to NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) that the two fighters have only 30 minutes of fuel remaining. At NEADS, Major Kevin Nasypany, the facility’s mission crew commander, orders, “Find me a tanker!” Weapons controller Major Steve Hedrick quickly calls McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey to see if it has any of its KC-10 tankers airborne, but none are. Nasypany gets on the phone to Colonel Robert Marr, who is in the NEADS battle cab, and requests launching the two F-16s kept on alert at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, so as to provide backup for the Otis fighters. Marr then discusses this over the phone with Major General Larry Arnold who is at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, but neither thinks it is a good idea. According to author Lynn Spencer: “If the battle expands, they don’t want to have all their assets in one place. Nor can they have them running out of fuel at the same time.” Marr and Arnold agree that they will try to find fuel for the Otis fighters. The Langley jets are ordered to “battle stations only” (see 9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001) so they will be ready to launch if a refueling tanker cannot be found. Marr tells Nasypany that he will need to find fuel for the Otis jets. NEADS technicians then begin searching for a tanker. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 460; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 112-113] According to Spencer, the two Otis jets will finally be refueled by a KC-135 tanker plane some time shortly after 9:35 a.m. (see (Shortly After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 153] Entity Tags: Larry Arnold, Langley Air Force Base, Timothy Duffy, Steve Hedrick, Robert Marr, Northeast Air Defense Sector, McGuire Air Force Base, Kevin Nasypany Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Orders Langley Fighters to Battle Stations

In response to learning of the second plane hitting the World Trade Center, NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) orders the two F-16 fighter jets kept on alert at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia to battle stations. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25 AND 88 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 112] Being at “battle stations” means the plane’s pilots are in the cockpits but with the engines turned off. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 55] Nasypany Wants to Scramble Jets - At NEADS, mission crew commander Major Kevin Nasypany is concerned that the two F-15s launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to Flight 11 are running out of fuel (see (9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and has asked Colonel Robert Marr, the NEADS battle commander, to scramble the two F-16s kept on alert at Langley, so as to establish a greater presence over New York. But after conferring with Major General Larry Arnold, who is at the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters in Florida, Marr orders “battle stations only at Langley.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 460; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 112] Jets Put on Battle Stations - Marr and Arnold will tell the 9/11 Commission that the Langley jets are held on battle stations, rather than being scrambled, “because they might be called upon to relieve the Otis fighters over New York City if a refueling tanker was not located, and also because of the general uncertainty of the situation in the sky.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25 ] Marr will also say that, after Flight 175 hit the WTC at 9:03 a.m., those at NEADS are “thinking New York City is under attack,” so the Langley pilots are ordered to battle stations, as “[t]he plan was to protect New York City.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 60] Colonel Alan Scott, who is with Arnold at the CONR headquarters, will explain, “At 9:09, Langley F-16s are directed to battle stations, just based on the general situation and the breaking news, and the general developing feeling about what’s going on.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Although the 9/11 Commission and other accounts will state that the Langley jets are put on battle stations at 9:09 (see (9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001), a BBC documentary will place this at 9:21, and journalist and author Jere Longman will indicate this does not happen until 9:24. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 64; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; BBC, 9/1/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] Entity Tags: Robert Marr, Kevin Nasypany, Langley Air Force Base, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Larry Arnold, Alan Scott Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(9:09 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001: Numerous False Reports of Hijacked Aircraft Cause Confusion

NEADS commander Robert Marr. [Source: Dick Blume] During the course of the morning, there are “multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft in the system,” according to the 9/11 Commission. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Around 9:09 a.m., the FAA Command Center reports that 11 aircraft are either not communicating with FAA facilities or flying unexpected routes. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002] NORAD’s Major General Larry Arnold will later claim that during the “four-hour ordeal” of the attacks, a total of 21 planes are identified as possible hijackings. [FILSON, 2002; CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 71] Colonel Robert Marr, the NEADS battle commander, will recall, “At one time I was told that across the nation there were some 29 different reports of hijackings.” [NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, 3/31/2005] Officials will later claim that these false reports cause considerable chaos. Arnold says that particularly during the time between the Pentagon being hit at 9:37 a.m. and Flight 93 going down at around 10:06 a.m., “a number of aircraft are being called possibly hijacked.… There was a lot of confusion, as you can imagine.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 71-73] He says: “We were receiving many reports of hijacked aircraft. When we received those calls, we might not know from where the aircraft had departed. We also didn’t know the location of the airplane.” [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002] According to Marr: “There were a number of false reports out there. What was valid? What was a guess? We just didn’t know.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 73] Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Victoria Clarke, who is in the Pentagon during the attacks and for most of the rest of the day, will recall: “There were lots of false signals out there. There were false hijack squawks, and a great part of the challenge was sorting through what was a legitimate threat and what wasn’t.” [CNN, 6/17/2004; CLARKE, 2006, PP. 215-231] Entity Tags: Robert Marr, Larry Arnold, Federal Aviation Administration, Victoria Clarke Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Continental NORAD Region Headquarters Wants Otis Fighters Details Sent over Chat System At NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), Master Sergeant Joe McCain, the mission crew commander technician, receives a call from the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida. Major General Larry Arnold and his staff at Tyndall AFB are trying to gather as much information as they can about the ongoing crisis, and want to know the transponder codes for the two fighter jets scrambled from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to the first hijacking (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), so they can monitor their positions. The CONR officer that makes the call tells McCain to “send [the transponder codes] out on chat,” meaning on NORAD’s own chat system. NORAD's Computer Chat System - According to author Lynn Spencer, NORAD’s chat system “is similar to the chat rooms on most Internet servers, but classified.” It has three chat rooms that can be used by anyone with proper access. One room is specifically for NEADS, and connects its ID, surveillance, and weapons technicians to its alert fighter squadrons, and is where NEADS gets status reports on fighter units and their aircraft. Another chat room is for CONR, and is where the three CONR sectors—NEADS, the Western Air Defense Sector (WADS), and the Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS)—communicate with each other and can “upchannel” information to CONR headquarters. The third room is the Air Warfare Center (AWC), where senior NORAD commanders from the three NORAD regions—CONR, Canada, and Alaska—communicate with each other. NEADS is allowed to monitor this room, but not type into it. When there is a training exercise taking place, as was the case earlier this morning (see (6:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), one or two additional chat windows will be open specifically for communicating exercise information, to help prevent it being confused with real-world information. McCain Falling Behind - McCain’s responsibilities at NEADS include monitoring these chat rooms, keeping paper logs of everything that is going on, and taking care of “upchanneling” operational reports to higher headquarters. According to Spencer, “These chat logs help to keep everyone on the same page, but in a situation like the one unfolding they have to be updated almost instantaneously to achieve that end.” But, “The fact that CONR has had to call McCain to get information that by now he would normally have posted alerts him that he is falling behind despite his best efforts.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 139-140] Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Joe McCain, Larry Arnold Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Orders Jets Scrambled from Langley; Conflicting Explanations Later Given for Order

Alan Scott. [Source: United States Air Force] NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) processes and transmits an order to Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, to scramble three of its F-16 fighter jets. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 4/16/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16 ] NEADS mission crew commander Major Kevin Nasypany instructed his personnel to issue this order one minute earlier (see 9:23 a.m. September 11, 2001). Although he’d originally wanted the Langley jets sent to the Washington area, he will soon adjust this heading to send them to the Baltimore area. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27] NEADS Orders Jets North - A NEADS officer calls Langley Air Force Base and instructs: “Langley command post, this is Huntress with an active air defense scramble for Quit 2-5 and Quit 2-6.… Scramble immediately.… Scramble on a heading of 010, flight level 290.” This means the jets are to head in a direction just east of north, at an altitude of 29,000 feet. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/9/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 96 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 142] At Langley Air Force Base, a Klaxon horn will sound, notifying the pilots of the scramble order (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001), and they will be airborne by 9:30 (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 63; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 141] Fighters Launched in Response to Flight 77? - In later testimony, military officials will give contradictory explanations for why the Langley F-16s are scrambled. An early NORAD timeline will indicate the fighters are launched in response to NORAD being notified at 9:24 that Flight 77 has been hijacked (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001] Colonel Alan Scott, the former vice commander of the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR), will suggest the same, telling the 9/11 Commission: “At 9:24 the FAA reports a possible hijack of [Flight] 77.… And at that moment as well is when the Langley F-16s were scrambled out of Langley.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; 1ST AIR FORCE, 8/8/2006] And a timeline provided by senior Defense Department officials to CNN will state, “NORAD orders jets scrambled from Langley” in order to “head to intercept” Flight 77. [CNN, 9/17/2001] In Response to Flight 93? - However, Major General Larry Arnold, the CONR commander, will give a different explanation. He will tell the 9/11 Commission, “we launched the aircraft out of Langley to put them over top of Washington, DC, not in response to American Airline 77, but really to put them in position in case United 93 were to head that way.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] In Response to Incorrect Report about Flight 11? - In 2004, the 9/11 Commission will dispute both these previous explanations, and conclude that the Langley jets are scrambled in response to an incorrect report that Flight 11 is still airborne and heading toward Washington, DC (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 26-27; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 15 ] Tape recordings of the NEADS operations floor will corroborate this account. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] According to the 9/11 Commission, its conclusion is also confirmed by “taped conversations at FAA centers; contemporaneous logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD; and other records.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 34] Major Nasypany will tell the Commission that the reason the Langley jets are directed toward the Baltimore area is to position them between the reportedly southbound Flight 11 and Washington, as a “barrier cap.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27 AND 461] John Farmer, senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission, will later suggest that NORAD deliberately misled Congress and the Commission by hiding the fact that the Langley scramble takes place in response to the erroneous report that Flight 11 is still airborne. He will write that the mistaken report “appears in more logs, and on more tapes, than any other single event that morning.… It was the reason for the Langley scramble; it had triggered the Air Threat Conference Call. Yet it had never been disclosed; it was, instead, talked around.” [FARMER, 2009, PP. 266-267] Conflicting Times - Early news reports will put the time of the scramble order slightly later than the 9/11 Commission places it, between 9:25 and “about 9:27.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001; CNN, 9/19/2001] But a NORAD timeline released a week after the attacks will give the same time as the Commission does, of 9:24. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27] Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Kevin Nasypany, Alan Scott, Larry Arnold, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Langley Air Force Base, US Department of Defense, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Langley Jets Take off, but Are Delayed during Launch

Captain Craig Borgstrom. [Source: US Air Force / Austin Knox] The three F-16 fighter jets ordered to scramble from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001) take off and, radar data will show, are airborne by 9:30 a.m. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 4/16/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27] Delayed during Launch - Major Dean Eckmann will recall that, after receiving the scramble order, he and the two other pilots have “a pretty quick response time. I believe it was four to five minutes we were airborne from that point.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] According to the 1st Air Force’s book about 9/11, the three fighters are “given highest priority over all other air traffic at Langley Air Force Base” as they are launching. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 63] But, according to author Lynn Spencer, in spite of this, the jets are delayed. As Eckmann is approaching the runway, he calls the control tower for clearance to take off, but the tower controller tells him, “Hold for an air traffic delay.” Air traffic controllers at the FAA’s Washington Center “have not had time to clear airliners out of the way for the northerly heading. Dozens of aircraft at various altitudes fill the jets’ route.” After having to wait two minutes, Eckmann complains: “We’re an active air scramble. We need to go now!” Finally, the tower controller tells him, “Roger, Quit flight is cleared for takeoff, 090 for 60,” meaning the fighters are to fly due east for 60 miles (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Taking Off - The three jets launch 15 seconds apart, with Eckmann in front and the two other jets following. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 143-144] Pilot Craig Borgstrom will later recall, “[W]e took off, the three of us, and basically the formation we always brief on alert, we’ll stay in a two- to three-mile trail from the guy in front.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 63] According to the BBC, the pilots get a signal over their planes’ transponders, indicating an emergency wartime situation. [BBC, 9/1/2002] Could Reach Washington before Pentagon Attack - F-16s have a maximum speed of 1,500 mph at high altitude, or 915 mph at sea level, so the three fighters could plausibly travel the 130 miles from Langley Air Force Base to Washington in just minutes. [CHANT, 1987, PP. 404; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6/16/2000; USA TODAY, 9/16/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/16/2001 ; US AIR FORCE, 10/2007] Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region, will tell the 9/11 Commission, “I think if those aircraft had gotten airborne immediately, if we were operating under something other than peacetime rules, where they could have turned immediately toward Washington, DC, and gone into burner, it is physically possible that they could have gotten over Washington” before 9:37, when the Pentagon is hit. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Yet according to the 9/11 Commission, the jets are redirected east over the Atlantic Ocean and will be 150 miles from the Pentagon when it is hit (see 9:30 a.m.-9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27] Conflicting Times - Some early news reports after 9/11 will say the Langley jets take off at the later time of 9:35 a.m. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/14/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/15/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001] But according to Colonel Alan Scott, the former vice commander of the Continental US NORAD Region, though the jets are airborne at 9:30, the report of this does not come down until 9:35, so this fact may account for the conflicting times. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Entity Tags: Brad Derrig, Alan Scott, Craig Borgstrom, Dean Eckmann, Langley Air Force Base, Larry Arnold Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

9:30 a.m.-9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Langley Fighters Fly East over Ocean instead of North toward Washington

Route of the Langley Air Base fighters to Washington. [Source: Yvonne Vermillion/ MagicGraphix.com] The three F-16s that took off from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) head east, out over the Atlantic Ocean, instead of north toward the Baltimore area, as NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) instructed when it issued the scramble order (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27] Three Reasons Jets Head East - The 9/11 Commission will give three reasons why the Langley jets go east instead of north: “First, unlike a normal scramble order, this order did not include a distance to the target or the target’s location. Second, a ‘generic’ flight plan—prepared to get the aircraft airborne and out of local airspace quickly—incorrectly led the Langley fighters to believe they were ordered to fly due east (090) for 60 miles. Third, the lead pilot and local FAA controller incorrectly assumed the flight plan instruction to go ‘090 for 60’ superseded the original scramble order.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27] NORAD Commander Blames 'Peacetime Rules' - In his testimony before the 9/11 Commission in May 2003, Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region, will address the question of why the Langley jets head out over the sea. He says, “When we scramble an aircraft… the aircraft take off and they have a predetermined departure route.” According to Arnold, NORAD is “looking outward,” and so “our mission, unlike law enforcement’s mission, is to protect things coming towards the United States.” He concludes, “So our peacetime procedures, to de-conflict with civil aviation’s, so as to not have endanger[ed] civil aviation in any particular way.” Arnold will also suggest that “peacetime rules” might be partly to blame for the Langley jets heading in the wrong direction. He says, “[I]f we were operating under something other than peacetime rules… they could have turned immediately toward Washington, DC.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] According to the Wall Street Journal, the “peacetime rules” Arnold refers to are “noise restrictions requiring that [the Langley jets] fly more slowly than supersonic speed and take off over water, pointed away from Washington.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 3/22/2004 ] One of the Langley pilots, Captain Craig Borgstrom, will later recall that, shortly after the jets take off, NEADS “gave us max-subsonic,” which is “as fast as you can go without breaking the sound barrier.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 65] Risk of Midair Collision - NORAD official Major General Craig McKinley will tell the 9/11 Commission that “another reason why” the Langley jets are “vectored east originally” is that “the air traffic over the Northeast corridor is so complex that to just launch fighters… into that air traffic system can cause potential damage or midair collision. So we rely on the FAA to de-conflict those corridors.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Jets Far Away from Pentagon - When the Pentagon is hit at 9:37 a.m., the Langley jets have flown nearly 60 miles out over the ocean and are 150 miles from Washington (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 151] Entity Tags: Craig McKinley, Larry Arnold, Craig Borgstrom Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Before 9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001: Officials Claim NORAD Is Monitoring Flight 93 According to one account given by NEADS Commander Robert Marr, some time before around 9:36 when it changes direction, while it is still flying west, Flight 93 is being monitored by NEADS. Marr describes how, “We don’t have fighters that way and we think [Flight 93 is] headed toward Detroit or Chicago.” He says he contacts a base in the area “so they [can] head off 93 at the pass.” Not only does NORAD know about the flight, but also, according to NORAD Commander Larry Arnold, “We watched the 93 track as it meandered around the Ohio-Pennsylvania area and started to turn south toward DC.” (This change of direction occurs around 9:36 a.m.) [FILSON, 2003] This account completely contradicts the 9/11 Commission’s later claim that NEADS is first notified about Flight 93 at 10:07 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: Robert Marr, Larry Arnold, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(9:36 a.m.-10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Military Claims It Is Tracking Flight 93 and Ready to Shoot It Down; 9/11 Commission Says Otherwise According to the later claims of several senior officials, the US military is tracking Flight 93 as it heads east and is ready to shoot it down if necessary.

According to Brigadier General Montague Winfield, the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) has “received the report from the FAA that Flight 93 had turned off its transponder, had turned, and was now heading towards Washington, DC.” Winfield will add, “The decision was made to try to go intercept Flight 93.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] 
General Richard Myers, the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will write that in the NMCC, “We learned that there was apparently a fourth hijacked aircraft, United Airlines Flight 93 out of Newark, bound nonstop for San Francisco. Like the other planes, it had switched off its transponder, making it much harder if not impossible to track on ground radar.” [MYERS, 2009, PP. 152] 
Major General Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region, will say, “I was personally anxious to see what 93 was going to do, and our intent was to intercept it.” Three fighters have taken off from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to Arnold, “we launched the aircraft out of Langley to put them over top of Washington, DC, not in response to American Airline 77, but really to put them in position in case United 93 were to head that way.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] He says, “as we discussed it in the conference call, we decided not to move fighters toward 93 until it was closer because there could have been other aircraft coming in,” but adds, “I had every intention of shooting down United 93 if it continued to progress toward Washington, DC… whether we had authority or not.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 73] 
Colonel Robert Marr, the battle commander at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), is reportedly “focused on United Flight 93, headed straight toward Washington.” He will concur with Arnold, saying: “United Airlines Flight 93 would not have hit Washington, DC. He would have been engaged and shot down before he got there.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 73] Marr and Arnold will both say they were tracking Flight 93 even earlier on, while it was still heading west (see Before 9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001). 

Yet, contradicting these claims, the 9/11 Commission will conclude that the military only learns about Flight 93 around the time it crashes. It says the NMCC learns of the hijacking at 10:03 a.m. (see 10:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). Based upon official records, including recordings of the NEADS operations floor, it says NEADS never follows Flight 93 on radar and is first alerted to it at 10:07 a.m. (see 10:05 a.m.-10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 30-31, 34 AND 42; WASHINGTON POST, 4/30/2006; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Entity Tags: National Military Command Center, Montague Winfield, Richard B. Myers, Robert Marr, Larry Arnold Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Before 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001: AWACS Planes on Training Missions in Florida and Near Washington, DC While President Bush is still in Sarasota, an AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System plane) is flying a training mission off the coast of Florida. Referring to the AWACS plane, NORAD Commander Larry Arnold later says: “I had set up an arrangement with their wing commander at Tinker [Air Force Base, Oklahoma] some months earlier for us to divert their AWACS off a normal training mission to go into an exercise scenario simulating an attack on the United States. The AWACS crew initially thought we were going into one of those simulations.” Another AWACS is also flying a training mission, near Washington, DC, the morning of 9/11. [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002] When its pilot, Anthony Kuczynski, hears of the first WTC crash, he mistakenly believes he is involved in a planned military simulation. He says, “We sometimes do scenarios where we’re protecting the United States from bombers coming in from unknown areas.” [ST. THOMAS AQUIN, 4/12/2002] Entity Tags: Larry Arnold, Anthony Kuczynski Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Before 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001: AWACS Plane on Training Mission Instructed to Follow Air Force One

Ben Robinson. [Source: US Air Force] An Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) plane is directed toward Sarasota, Florida, where President Bush is currently located, and will accompany Air Force One as it carries Bush back to Washington, DC. The AWACS has been flying a training mission off the east coast of Florida (see Before 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001). NORAD now instructs it to head toward Sarasota, on Florida’s west coast. Pilot Thinks This Is an Exercise - Several months previously, Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region, made arrangements with Brigadier General Ben Robinson, the commander of the 552nd Air Control Wing at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, for AWACS support to be provided during training exercises simulating attacks on the United States. As Arnold will later recall, the pilot of the AWACS that NORAD now contacts “thought it was an exercise.” However the pilot is then told “what happened at the World Trade Center” and realizes “his responsibility was to follow the president.” Arnold will say: “We told him to follow Air Force One, and he asked the question we all asked: ‘Where is it going?’ We said: ‘We can’t tell you. Just follow it.’” [FILSON, 2002; CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 86-87] AWACS Escorts President to Washington - The time the AWACS plane gets close enough to Air Force One to be of assistance to it is unclear. According to journalist and author Bill Sammon, by around 10:30 a.m., it has not yet arrived to protect the president’s plane. [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 107] Arnold will recall that NORAD maintains “the AWACS overhead the whole route,” as Air Force One flies to Barksdale Air Force Base, then Offutt Air Force Base, and then back to Washington. [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002] AWACS Is a 'Wonderful Asset' - According to Mark Rosenker, the director of the White House Military Office, AWACS planes “give you the big picture in the sky. They’re able to identify what’s a friend, what’s a foe.” Rosenker, who will fly with Bush on Air Force One after it takes off from Sarasota (see (9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001), says the AWACS is “a wonderful asset to have up there for us, it tremendously helped us to be able to guide for where we needed to go, to what potential problems we might encounter.… [I]t was an important part of what we needed to do to guarantee the safety of the president of the United States.” [WHITE HOUSE, 8/29/2002] Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Larry Arnold, Mark Rosenker, 552nd Air Control Wing Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS Contacts Selfridge Air Base to Get Unarmed Jets Sent after Either Delta 1989 or Flight 93, according to Conflicting Accounts

F-16 Fighting Falcons from the 127th Wing at Selfridge Air National Guard Base. [Source: John S. Swanson / US Air Force] NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) contacts Selfridge Air National Guard Base in Michigan to arrange for two of its F-16 fighter jets that are out on a training mission to intercept a suspicious aircraft. Accounts will conflict over whether this aircraft is Flight 93 or Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, which is wrongly thought to have been hijacked. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/30/2002; ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178] Delta 1989 was flying about 25 miles behind Flight 93 when air traffic controllers mistakenly suspected it might be hijacked (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and since then it has been instructed to land at Cleveland Hopkins Airport in Ohio (see (9:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] Flight 93 is currently flying east across Pennsylvania. [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 ] NEADS has already tried getting fighter jets from a unit in Duluth, Minnesota, sent after Delta 1989, but the unit was unable to respond (see (Shortly After 9:41 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/22/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/23/2004 ] NEADS Calls Selfridge Base - A NEADS weapons technician now calls the 127th Wing at Selfridge Air National Guard Base. He knows the unit has two F-16s in the air on a training mission. Although these jets are unarmed and only have a limited amount of fuel remaining, the commander at the Selfridge base agrees to turn them over to NEADS. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178] The commander says: “[H]ere’s what we can do. At a minimum, we can keep our guys airborne. I mean, they don’t have—they don’t have any guns or missiles or anything on board.” The NEADS technician replies, “It’s a presence, though.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Fighters May Have to Crash into Hijacked Plane - Military commanders realize that, without weapons, the Selfridge fighter pilots might have to slam their jets into a hijacked plane to stop it in its tracks. Colonel Robert Marr, the NEADS battle commander, will later reflect, “As a military man, there are times that you have to make sacrifices that you have to make.” [ABC NEWS, 8/30/2002; ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] However, the Selfridge jets never have to intercept either of the two suspect aircraft, and instead are able to head back to base. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 70; WOLVERINE GUARD, 9/2006 ] Selfridge Called due to Concerns about Delta 1989? - According to author Lynn Spencer, the NEADS weapons technician’s call to the Selfridge unit is made in response to a report NEADS received about the possible hijacking of Delta 1989 (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178] Vanity Fair magazine and the 9/11 Commission will also say NEADS calls the Selfridge unit in response to this report about Delta 1989. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] NORAD Commander Gives Different Account - However, Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region, will suggest the Selfridge unit is called due to concerns about both Delta 1989 and Flight 93. He will say: “We were concerned about Flight 93 and this Delta aircraft [Flight 1989] and were trying to find aircraft in the vicinity to help out. We didn’t know where it was going to go. We were concerned about Detroit… and the fighters up there were out of gas with no armament.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 71] NEADS Commander Claims Fighters Sent toward Flight 93 - Robert Marr will give another different account. He will claim that NEADS contacts the Selfridge base solely because of its concerns over Flight 93. He tells author Leslie Filson that before Flight 93 reversed course and headed back east (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001), NEADS thought it was “headed toward Detroit or Chicago. I’m thinking Chicago is the target and know that Selfridge Air National Guard Base has F-16s in the air.” NEADS contacts “them so they could head off 93 at the pass.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 68] Marr will tell the 9/11 Commission that the Selfridge F-16s are going to be “too far from Cleveland to do any good,” and so he believes NEADS directs them to intercept Flight 93. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/23/2004 ] (Presumably, he means the jets cannot be responding to Delta 1989, which has been told to land in Cleveland [USA TODAY, 9/11/2008] ) 9/11 Commission Disputes Arnold's and Marr's Accounts - The 9/11 Commission will reject Arnold’s and Marr’s accounts. It will state, “The record demonstrates, however, that… the military never saw Flight 93 at all” before it crashes, and conclude, “The Selfridge base was contacted by NEADS not regarding Flight 93, but in response to another commercial aircraft in the area that was reported hijacked (Delta Flight 1989, which ultimately was resolved as not hijacked).” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 101 ] Lt. Col. Doug Champagne, the pilot of one of the Selfridge F-16s, will recall that “he and his colleague never received orders to intercept [Flight 93] in any way.” [MOUNT CLEMENS-CLINTON-HARRISON JOURNAL, 9/6/2006] Reports based on interviews with the two Selfridge pilots will make no mention of the jets being directed to intercept Delta 1989 either (see (9:56 a.m.-10:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 68-70; WOLVERINE GUARD, 9/2006 ; MOUNT CLEMENS-CLINTON-HARRISON JOURNAL, 9/6/2006] Entity Tags: Larry Arnold, 127th Wing, Doug Champagne, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Robert Marr, Selfridge Air National Guard Base Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Texas Air National Guard Jets Directed toward Air Force One

Two F-16s belonging to the 147th Fighter Wing. [Source: Gonda Moncada / Texas Military Forces] Four armed F-16 fighter jets belonging to the Texas Air National Guard are directed toward Air Force One in order to escort the president’s plane. [BBC, 9/1/2002; CBS NEWS, 9/10/2003; BOMBARDIER, 9/8/2006 ; ROSENFELD AND GROSS, 2007, PP. 40] SEADS Sends Fighters toward Air Force One - Air Force One has taken off from Sarasota, Florida (see (9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and the White House has requested a fighter escort for it (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001). [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/4/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 38] NORAD’s Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS) orders jets that belong to the 147th Fighter Wing of the Texas Air National Guard toward the president’s plane. [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 4/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 87; ROSENFELD AND GROSS, 2007, PP. 40] Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region, will later recall: “We were not told where Air Force One was going. We were told just to follow the president.” [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002] Ellington Field an 'Alert' Site - The 147th Fighter Wing is based at Ellington Field, a joint civil and military use airport about 15 miles south of Houston. [HOUSTON CHRONICLE, 12/9/2003; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 8/21/2005; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 1/21/2006] Ellington Field is one of NORAD’s seven “alert” sites around the US, which all have a pair of armed fighters ready to take off immediately if called upon. [AIRMAN, 12/1999; AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, 2/2002] Pilots Not Told What Their Target Is - Two of the F-16s sent toward Air Force One are on the ground at Ellington Field and have been placed on “battle stations,” with the pilots sitting in the cockpits, when the scramble order is received. [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 4/2002] The other two have been flying a training mission (see After 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001), and are pulled off it to escort Air Force One. [AMERICAN DEFENDER, 12/2001 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 255] Among the four pilots are Shane Brotherton and Randy Roberts. Their new mission is so secret that their commander does not tell them where they are going. When they ask what their target is, the commander says, “You’ll know when you see it.” Brotherton will later recall, “I didn’t have any idea what we were going up [for] until that point.” [CBS NEWS, 9/10/2003; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 255] Jets First to Reach Air Force One - At least two of the 147th Fighter Wing F-16s will be seen from Air Force One at around 11:30 a.m., although an official will tell reporters on board that fighters are escorting the plane about 15 minutes before that time (see (11:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). They are the first fighters to reach Air Force One after it left Sarasota, according to most accounts. [USA TODAY, 9/11/2001; FILSON, 2003, PP. 87; CBS NEWS, 9/10/2003; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/4/2004; ROSENFELD AND GROSS, 2007, PP. 40; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 255] However, a few accounts will indicate the first jets to reach it belong to a unit of the Florida Air National Guard located at Jacksonville International Airport (see (10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 9/2001; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001] The 147th Fighter Wing F-16s will accompany Air Force One all the way to Washington, DC. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 87-88; GALVESTON COUNTY DAILY NEWS, 7/9/2005] Entity Tags: Larry Arnold, 147th Fighter Wing, Randy Roberts, Southeast Air Defense Sector, Shane Brotherton Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Alert Fighters at Tyndall Air Base Do Not Launch to Escort Air Force One

Logo of the 148th Fighter Wing. [Source: Air National Guard] Although the White House has requested a fighter escort for Air Force One (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001), fighter jets that are kept on alert at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida reportedly fail to launch in order to accompany the president’s plane after it takes off from Sarasota, Florida (see (9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 87; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/4/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 38] Fighters on 'Battle Stations' but Not Launched - The 148th Fighter Wing of the Minnesota Air National Guard has a full time active duty detachment at Tyndall Air Force Base, near Panama City. [FILSON, 1999; US AIR FORCE, 2004; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 8/21/2005] This unit serves as one of NORAD’s seven “alert” sites around the US, which all have a pair of fighter jets on the runway, armed, fueled, and ready to take off within minutes if called upon. [AIRMAN, 12/1999; AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, 2/2002; BERGEN RECORD, 12/5/2003] But, according to the 1st Air Force’s book about 9/11, although NORAD’s Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS) puts the alert jets at Tyndall on “battle stations,” it does not launch them. The jets’ pilots sit “in their cockpits awaiting word to go, but Air Force One moved so quickly they were never scrambled.” Instead, F-16s from Ellington Field in Texas are scrambled, and escort Air Force One to Barksdale Air Force Base (see (After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (11:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 87] However, in a 2002 interview, Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region, will claim that after NORAD is told “just to follow the president” on Air Force One, it “scrambled available airplanes from Tyndall and then from Ellington in Houston, Texas. The Ellington F-16s chased Air Force One and landed with the president at Barksdale AFB in Louisiana.” [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002] Other Alert Fighters in Florida Not Launched - NORAD also keeps two fighters on alert at Homestead Air Reserve Base, near Miami, Florida, but it is unclear whether these are scrambled after Air Force One, and apparently they never accompany the president’s plane (see (10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Philip Melanson, an expert on the Secret Service, will later comment: “I can’t imagine by what glitch the protection was not provided to Air Force One as soon as it took off. I would have thought there’d be something in place whereby one phone call from the head of the security detail would get the fighters in the air immediately.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 87; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/4/2004] Entity Tags: Southeast Air Defense Sector, Larry Arnold, 148th Fighter Wing Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Fighters Possibly Scrambled from Florida Air Base toward Air Force One, but Apparently Do Not Reach It

An F-15 Eagle from the 125th Fighter Wing. [Source: Shaun Withers / US Air Force] Fighter jets belonging to a military unit in Jacksonville, Florida, launch to escort Air Force One after it takes off from Sarasota, Florida (see (9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001), some accounts will later indicate. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/16/2001; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001] However, other accounts will indicate that these jets, if launched, never reach the president’s plane. [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002; CBS NEWS, 9/10/2003; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 255] Fighters Reportedly Launched - The New York Times will report that at 10:41 a.m., Air Force One is “headed toward Jacksonville to meet jets scrambled to give the presidential jet its own air cover.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/16/2001] And, according to a report in the Daily Telegraph, after Air Force One climbs to 40,000 feet, it is “joined by an escort of F-16 fighters from a base near Jacksonville.” [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001] These reports are presumably referring to jets belonging to the 125th Fighter Wing, a unit of the Florida Air National Guard located at Jacksonville International Airport. The wing keeps two F-15s on alert at Homestead Air Reserve Base, near Miami, ready for immediate takeoff, as part of NORAD’s air sovereignty mission. [AIRMAN, 12/1999; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 8/21/2005; FLORIDA AIR NATIONAL GUARD, 2009] Fighters Likely Launched from Homestead - If 125th Fighter Wing jets are scrambled to accompany Air Force One, it appears they would be the unit’s F-15s on alert at Homestead, rather than its fighters at Jacksonville Airport. Major Charles Chambers, who is at the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, will state within a week of the attacks, “Fighters had been scrambled from Homestead [Air Reserve Base] and were escorting Air Force One westward.” [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 9/2001] In contrast, at Jacksonville International Airport, according to a 2007 report in the Florida Times-Union, “Within hours of the 2001 terrorist attacks, the wing’s aircraft were sitting on a JIA runway ready for the order to scramble.” [FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, 9/15/2007] And an account published by the Florida Air National Guard will only say, “On Sept. 11, 2001, several loaded F-15 aircraft lined Runway 13/31 [at Jacksonville Airport] for the first time in history.” [EAGLE'S EYE, 2007 ] Fighters Apparently Do Not Reach Air Force One - Most accounts will contradict Chambers’ claim that, if indeed 125th Fighter Wing jets are scrambled toward the president’s plane, they are subsequently “escorting Air Force One westward.” According to the 1st Air Force’s book about 9/11, it is in fact “[f]our F-16s from the 147th Fighter Wing, Texas Air National Guard,” that accompany Air Force One “from the panhandle of Florida to Barksdale Air Force Base.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 87] CBS News will report that the first fighters to reach Air Force One are two F-16s from the 147th Fighter Wing (see (11:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CBS NEWS, 9/10/2003; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 255] And Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region, will only say that 147th Fighter Wing F-16s “chased Air Force One and landed with the president at Barksdale AFB in Louisiana,” making no mention of any 125th Fighter Wing jets being scrambled. [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002] At NORAD’s other alert site in Florida besides Homestead—a unit at Tyndall Air Force Base—the two alert fighters are put on “battle stations,” but apparently do not take off to escort Air Force One (see (10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 87] Entity Tags: Larry Arnold, 125th Fighter Wing, Charles Chambers Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

10:01 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Calls Toledo Unit, Requests Fighter Jets NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) contacts an Air National Guard unit in Toledo, Ohio, and requests that it launch two fighter jets in response to the attacks. [WTOL, 9/11/2006; LYNN SPENCER, 2008; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178] First Time that Unit Has Answered a NORAD Request - The 180th Fighter Wing of the Ohio Air National Guard is based at Toledo Express Airport. It has 20 F-16 fighter jets and about three dozen pilots. [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001] Its “primary mission” is “to provide combat ready F-16C and support units capable of deploying worldwide in minimum response time.” [180TH FIGHTER WING, 9/19/2001; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG.), 10/21/2001] The unit is not one of NORAD’s seven alert facilities around the US, and this is believed to be the first time it has ever answered a request for help from NORAD. [AIRMAN, 12/1999; TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001] Call due to Concern over Delta 1989 - According to author Lynn Spencer, a weapons technician at NEADS makes the call to the 180th FW due to concerns about Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, which is incorrectly thought to have been hijacked (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 177-178] NEADS has already contacted units in Minnesota and Michigan about this aircraft (see (Shortly After 9:41 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/23/2004 ; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] The weapons technician calls the Toledo unit after Master Sergeant Joe McCain gives an update across the NEADS operations floor: “Delta [19]89! Hard right turn!” According to Spencer, the weapons technician knows the 180th FW is much better positioned than the Selfridge unit’s fighters are to reach Delta 1989. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178] NORAD Commander Gives Different Explanation - But according to Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region, the weapons technician’s call might also be in response to concerns over Flight 93. Arnold will say that NEADS calls the 180th FW “because we thought [Flight] 93 or Delta Flight 1989 might be headed toward Chicago.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 71] Two Toledo pilots who initially answer the call from NEADS appear to believe the call is a joke, but their wing commander then picks up the line and responds appropriately (see 10:01 a.m. September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178-179] Unit Prepared for Crisis Like This - Although it is not one of NORAD’s alert facilities, Lt. Col. Gary Chudzinski, a former commander of the 180th FW, will later comment that the Toledo unit has always been aware that it could be alerted to crises such as the current one, “but you just don’t expect it.” According to General Paul Sullivan, who heads all Ohio Air National Guard units, the 180th FW’s pilots practice “air interception,” but a typical mission focuses on either a plane ferrying drugs or enemy fighters approaching America’s coasts. [AIRMAN, 12/1999; TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001] Two 180th FW jets will take off from the Toledo unit at 10:17 a.m. (see 10:17 a.m. September 11, 2001). [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001; WTOL, 9/11/2006] Entity Tags: Gary Chudzinski, Joe McCain, Larry Arnold, 180th Fighter Wing, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Paul Sullivan Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(10:08 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NORAD Commanders Arnold and Marr Consider Possibility of Shootdown Authorization Two senior NORAD officials, Colonel Robert Marr and Major General Larry Arnold, have to address the possibility of issuing shootdown authorization to fighter jets under their command, after a report is received about an aircraft over the White House. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 224-225] Aircraft over White House - Marr, the battle commander at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) in Rome, New York, is in the NEADS battle cab. On the NEADS operations floor, mission crew commander Major Kevin Nasypany has just learned of a report of an aircraft flying over the White House (see 10:07 a.m. September 11, 2001), and now talks to Marr over the phone. Nasypany asks: “Okay, did you hear that? Aircraft over the White House. What’s the word? Intercept and what else?” Marr has a phone to each ear and does not hear what Nasypany says. Nasypany therefore repeats, “Aircraft… over… the White House!” pausing on each word for emphasis. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 224] Commanders Discuss Shootdown Order - The news of an aircraft over the White House forces Marr and Arnold, with whom he has been communicating, to address the issue of authorizing the shooting down of aircraft. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 225] Arnold, the commander of NORAD’s Continental US Region (CONR), is at the CONR air operations center at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida. [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002] According to author Lynn Spencer, he has not yet received any instructions from his higher-ups regarding shootdown authorization. “He talked to Major General Rick Findley,” who is at NORAD’s operations center in Colorado, “and asked him to get shootdown authority from the vice president, but he’s still heard nothing back.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 225] Arnold Possibly Authorizes Shootdown - Arnold will later tell author Leslie Filson that he has “the authority in case of an emergency to declare a target hostile and shoot it down under an emergency condition.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 75] But according to Vanity Fair, he only passes the current request for rules of engagement further up his chain of command. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] However, Spencer will claim otherwise, stating, “In light of the imminent attack on the White House,” Arnold “decides he will exercise the authority he has to protect the nation in an emergency.” He tells Marr: “We will intercept and attempt to divert. If we can’t, then we’ll shoot it down.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 225] Alleged Shootdown Authorization Not Passed On - Minutes later, though, Nasypany will tell his staff that the pilots that took off from Langley Air Force Base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) have “negative clearance to shoot” aircraft over Washington (see 10:10 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 31] And according to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS only learns that NORAD has been given clearance to shoot down threatening aircraft at 10:31 a.m., and even then it does not pass this order along to the fighter pilots under its command (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42-43] Entity Tags: Larry Arnold, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Kevin Nasypany, Robert Marr Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

10:17 a.m. September 11, 2001: Non-Alert Jets Take off from Toledo Unit

F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft at the 180th Fighter Wing. [Source: Jodi Joice / US Air Force] Two F-16 fighter jets take off from a military unit in Toledo, Ohio, in response to the morning’s attacks, but accounts will conflict over what their mission is and who the pilots are. [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001; FILSON, 2003, PP. 71; WTOL, 9/11/2006] The 180th Fighter Wing of the Ohio Air National Guard is based at Toledo Express Airport. Although the unit is not one of NORAD’s seven alert facilities around the US, it has recently received a call from NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), requesting that it launch two of its fighters (see 10:01 a.m. September 11, 2001). [AIRMAN, 12/1999; TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001; WTOL, 9/11/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 178-179] The 180th Maintenance Squadron, which is responsible for maintaining the unit’s aircraft and equipment, was also contacted, and has loaded the F-16s’ guns with 500 rounds of 20-caliber ammunition. [180TH FIGHTER WING, 9/19/2001; WTOL, 9/11/2006] Jets Head East - The two F-16s, which were being set up for training missions, now take off and head east. [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001] According to author Lynn Spencer, they are piloted by Scott Reed and Ed Rinke. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 179] However, a local television station will report that the pilots are Scott Reed and Keith Newell. [WTOL, 9/11/2006] Mission Unclear - It is unclear what role the two jets play in defending the nation. Toledo Air National Guard officials will later refuse to talk about this morning’s events, even in the general terms permitted by the military. [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001] According to Spencer, NEADS wanted the 180th FW jets to respond to Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, which is incorrectly thought to have been hijacked and will land in Cleveland at around 10:18 (see (10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will similarly say the Toledo jets are ordered to intercept Delta 1989. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/16/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27-28; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 177-178] But Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region, will say the 180th FW was contacted “because we thought [Flight] 93 or Delta Flight 1989 might be headed toward Chicago.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 71] NEADS battle commander Colonel Robert Marr will say the two F-16s “never had a track close enough that they were directed to engage. [But] if a valid direction had come from the appropriate level to engage a target, or shoot down a target at some time, they could have done that.” Response Is 'Very Quick' - Marr will describe the 180th FW’s response to NEADS’s request for assistance as “very, very, very quick.” [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001] However, the fourth hijacked aircraft, Flight 93, has already crashed by the time the two jets take off (see (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 30] Entity Tags: Ed Rinke, Keith Newell, 180th Fighter Wing, Robert Marr, Scott Reed, Larry Arnold Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001: NORAD Passes on Shootdown Order to Its Air Defense Sectors The Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR) issues a message to its three air defense sectors—including the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS)—stating that Vice President Dick Cheney has authorized it to shoot down suspicious aircraft. Order Sent over Computer Chat System - About 15 minutes earlier, a military officer at the White House relayed to the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) that Cheney had confirmed that fighter jets were cleared to engage an inbound aircraft if they could verify that the aircraft was hijacked (see 10:14 a.m.-10:19 a.m. September 11, 2001). According to the 9/11 Commission, “It is not clear how [this] shootdown order was communicated within NORAD.” However, Major General Larry Arnold, the CONR commander, now instructs his staff to broadcast a message over a NORAD computer chat system, passing on Cheney’s authorization. The message states, “10:31 Vice president has cleared to us to intercept tracks of interest and shoot them down if they do not respond, per CONR CC [General Arnold].” The message is received at CONR’s three air defense sectors: the Western, Southeast, and Northeast. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 240] Arnold Could Issue Shootdown Order Himself - Arnold, who is at the CONR air operations center at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida, will later comment, “I have the authority in case of an emergency to declare a target hostile and shoot it down under an emergency condition… but it was comforting to know we legally had the authority from the president of the United States.” [FILSON, 2002; CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 75-76] The 10:31 chat message is the first notification personnel on the NEADS operations floor receive of the shootdown order. These personnel are reportedly confused over the order and do not pass it on to fighter pilots under their command (see 10:32 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42-43; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 47 ] Entity Tags: Continental US NORAD Region, Southeast Air Defense Sector, Western Air Defense Sector, Larry Arnold, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(11:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS Instructs AWACS Plane to Return to Washington Area to Help It Communicate with Fighters

An E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft from Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma. [Source: John K. McDowell / US Air Force] An Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) plane that is on its way back to its base in Oklahoma is called by NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and instructed to head to Washington, DC, in order to provide radar and radio coverage, and help NEADS to communicate with fighter jets that are in the airspace over the capital. Poor Communications over Washington - NEADS is having trouble communicating with fighters that have arrived over Washington (see (Between 9:49 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (11:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and the radio reception is nonexistent when those aircraft go below 20,000 feet. As Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region, will later recall, NORAD’s “picture over DC was pretty poor. And the communication was poor.” As a result, “the aircrews themselves” of the fighters over Washington “coordinated the refueling and the combat air patrols.” NEADS Contacts AWACS Heading toward Oklahoma - NEADS weapons controller Trey Murphy therefore gets on the radio to an AWACS belonging to the 552nd Air Control Wing, based at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma. [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 265-266] An AWACS is a modified Boeing 707 equipped with long-range radar and sophisticated communications equipment, which can track aircraft within a radius of several hundred miles. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/23/1995; ASIA TIMES, 1/27/2000] The AWACS Murphy contacts had been flying a training mission earlier in the morning, somewhere near Washington (see Before 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001), but was directed to return to Tinker, supposedly as a result of the “immediate confusion after the attacks” (see (Between 9:05 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). AWACS Told to Head to Washington - Murphy instructs the pilot of the AWACS to turn around and head back toward Washington. He says: “Here’s the deal. We need you to cover the NCA [national capital area].” The pilot responds, “Roger that,” and asks, “Where do you want us?” Murphy replies: “No, no. You’re the one with the big jet with the rotor-dome on it. You tell me where you need to go to get me a surface to infinity look at that area.” As author Lynn Spencer will later describe, with Murphy’s request, “The problem of radar and radio coverage over DC has been solved.” After it arrives over the Washington area, according to Arnold, “The AWACS could talk to the Northeast [Air Defense] Sector and provide a better picture to them.” [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 265-266] Entity Tags: Larry Arnold, Northeast Air Defense Sector, 552nd Air Control Wing, Trey Murphy Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(After 2:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001: 119th Fighter Wing Pilots Write Letter Confirming No Shootdown of Aircraft The three fighter pilots that launched from Langley Air Force Base to defend Washington, DC (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) sign a letter in which they confirm that they did not shoot down any aircraft on 9/11. At some point after the pilots, who belong to the 119th Fighter Wing of the North Dakota Air National Guard, land their fighter jets back at base (see (2:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001), one of them, Captain Craig Borgstrom, speaks over the phone with Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region (CONR). According to Borgstrom, who will later recall that Arnold phones him either on September 11 “or in [the] next day or two,” the CONR commander requests “a detailed, in writing, accounting of what happened that day.” Consequently, as another of the three pilots—Major Brad Derrig—will recall, “all three pilots signed a letter to 1st Air Force certifying that they had not shot down an aircraft.” Borgstrom will say he believes that “ammunition records were checked” as a part of the response to the 1st Air Force. [9/11 COMMISSION, 12/1/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 12/1/2003] Some early news reports suggested the possibility of a plane having been shot down by the US military (see 11:28 a.m.-11:50 a.m. September 11, 2001), and what appears to be debris from a plane is discovered far away from the main Flight 93 crash site (see (Before 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and September 13, 2001). [TCM BREAKING NEWS, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/13/2001; PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, 11/15/2001; MIRROR, 9/12/2002] But in later interviews with the media and the 9/11 Commission, the three 119th Fighter Wing pilots will state that they received no orders to shoot down a commercial airliner, and did not shoot down any planes on 9/11. [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/15/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 222; 9/11 COMMISSION, 12/1/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 12/1/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 12/1/2003] Entity Tags: Craig Borgstrom, Dean Eckmann, Larry Arnold, Brad Derrig Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(Between 2:50 p.m. and 4:30 p.m.) September 11, 2001: International Flight Is Suspected as Hijacked; Delays Bush’s Travel Some time after President Bush’s arrival at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska (see 2:50 p.m. September 11, 2001), those on the Pentagon’s air threat conference call discuss another possibly hijacked airplane. This is an international flight out of Madrid en route to New York’s JFK Airport. When it is clear the plane has not been hijacked, the president decides to leave Offutt for Washington. As the 1st Air Force’s official history of the 9/11 attacks will describe: “President Bush and his team were joining the air threat conference call. By this time, [Major Geneneral Larry] Arnold and [Colonel Robert] Marr were also on the line. ‘We were watching potentially hijacked aircraft,’ Arnold says. ‘I’m on the phone listening to the president talk to the secretary of defense and they were concerned about an aircraft that had taken off from Madrid and was going to land at John F. Kennedy International.… We didn’t know where that plane was. About that time, Bob Marr calls me, who was also on the conference call, but called me directly and said, ‘We just talked to the airline and that aircraft is back on the ground in Madrid.’” Arnold will recall: “I picked up the hotline and said, ‘Mr. President, this is the CONR commander.… No problem with Madrid.’ It was valid information and the president said, ‘OK, then I’m getting airborne.’” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 87-88] There are many other similar reports of suspicious aircraft during this day (see (9:09 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001 and (4:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Larry Arnold, Offutt Air Force Base, Robert Marr Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

May 23, 2003: General Claims Military Notified of Flights 77 and 93 Earlier than Apparently Happened The 9/11 Commission holds a public hearing at which it takes testimony from military officials about the timeline of events on the day of 9/11. The key witness is retired Air Force General Larry Arnold, who commanded NORAD’s Continental US Region on the day of 9/11. Under questioning from commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste, Arnold says, “I believe that to be a fact: that 9:24 was the first time that we had been advised of American 77 as a possible hijacked airplane.” However, the Commission will later conclude that the military was not notified of the hijacking at this time, although it had been mistakenly advised Flight 11 was inbound to Washington three minutes previously (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Arnold adds that if the military was slow in responding to Flight 77, it was because “our focus—you have got to remember that there’s a lot of other things going on simultaneously here—was on United 93.” However, Flight 93 was not hijacked until a few minutes after 9:24 (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Arnold adds: “It was our intent to intercept United Flight 93. And in fact, my own staff, we were orbiting now over Washington, DC, by this time, and I was personally anxious to see what 93 was going to do, and our intent was to intercept it.” However, the Commission will later conclude that the military did not learn that Flight 93 had been hijacked until around 10:00 a.m. (see 10:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). Prior to the hearing, the Commission’s staff had been concerned about the inaccuracy of timelines offered by the military. Author Philip Shenon will write: “It seemed all the more remarkable to [Commission staffer John Farmer] that the Pentagon could not establish a clear chronology of how it responded to an attack on the Pentagon building itself. Wouldn’t the generals and admirals want to know why their own offices—their own lives—had been put at risk that morning?” Therefore, Farmer thought that the hearing should clear things up, but, according to Shenon, he and his colleagues are “astonished” when they analyze what Arnold says, although he is not under oath on this day. Shenon will add, “It would later be determined that almost every one of those assertions by General Arnold in May 2003 was flat wrong.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 119-121] Entity Tags: John Farmer, 9/11 Commission, Philip Shenon, Richard Ben-Veniste, Larry Arnold Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline